,first_party,second_party,Facts
182,Irving Jerome Dunaway,State of New York,"On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself. At trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Illinois. The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal."
1245,Kansas,Colorado,"This case represents another chapter in the longstanding dispute between the two states concerning water rights to the Arkansas River. The states had created the Arkansas River Compact in 1943 in order to allocate portions of the river between them. In 1985, Kansas brought suit before the Court alleging that Colorado had breached the agreement. The Court appointed a ""Special Master"" to investigate the allegations and to make recommendations to the Court. The Special Master submitted his report in 1994, finding that Colorado had indeed violated the Compact. Since 1994, the Special Master has issued three more reports. These reports have been accompanied by several objections by both states. The Court has dismissed the majority of these objections. The question presently before the Court is whether or not to overrule two of Kansas' objections to the most recent report of the Special Master."
880,National Cable and Telecommunications Association,Gulf Power Company,"The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes ""any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way."" After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications."
170,Union Pacific Railroad Company,"Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region","The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively."
1171,"Fort Bend County, Texas",Lois M. Davis,"Lois Davis was an information technology ( IT ) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the staff, the director resigned. Davis alleges that on the director ’ s resignation, her supervisor — who was a personal friend of the director — retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “ previous religious commitment, ” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “ intake questionnaire ” in which she wrote in the word “ religion ” next to a checklist labeled “ Employment Harms or Actions ” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right - to - sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging sex retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the lower court dismissed Davis ’ s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There of no to within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement ( which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived ) or merely a prerequisite to suit ( and thus subject to waiver ). Relying on the Supreme Court ’ s, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 you. S. 500 ( 2006 ), in which the Court held that the Title VII ’ s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits."
940,Wiggins,Smith,"Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland."
16,David Gelbard,United States,"Perry Paul, an alleged bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, a former executive of a Las Vegas casino, had their telephones tapped by federal agents. The agents recorded conversations between Paul and David Gelbard and between Zarowitz and Sidney Parnas. Gelbard and Parnas were called before a federal grand jury convened to investigate possible violations of federal gambling laws. When the government pressed Gelbard and Parnas to testify about these conversations, however, they refused to do so. Instead, they claimed that the wiretaps were illegal and argued that they should not be required to testify until given an opportunity to challenge the legality of the taps. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found Gelbard and Parnas in contempt of court and committed them to custody until they agreed to testify. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, stating that ""a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding."" Gelbard and Parnas then sought certiorari from the Court, pointing to a decision by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacating contempt charges against a witness under similar circumstances."
605,Dunn,Commodity Futures Trading Commission,"The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought an action against William C. Dunn and Delta Consultants, Inc. claiming that they had solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme involving transactions in foreign currency options in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations. Dunn and Delta Consultants allegedly engaged in the transactions by contracting directly with international banks, rather than using a regulated exchange or board of trade. This is known as ""off exchange"" trading. Dunn, Delta Consultants, and their customers suffered heavy losses. The District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of Dunn and Delta Consultants' property. The court rejecting their defense that the transactions were exempt from the CEA under the ""Treasury Amendment,"" which excepts ""transactions in foreign currency"" unless they involve a sale ""for future delivery"" ""conducted on a board of trade."" The Court of Appeals affirmed."
2256,James L. Kisor,Robert L. Wilkie,"Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file. Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed. The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.” Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well."
2367,"Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al.","Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al.","Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption."
1744,Edwards,South Carolina,"187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law."
1560,United States,James Alvin Castleman,"In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault under the relevant Tennessee statute, which dealt with knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to the mother of the defendant's child. Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Because Castleman's domestic assault conviction prohibited him from purchasing firearms, Castleman's wife bought the weapons in her own name. Castleman was indicted in federal district court and charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The district court dismissed the charges and held that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction under Tennessee law did not constitute the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required by the federal statute. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
985,David Patchak,"Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior","The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is an Indian tribe in western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the you.S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe’s use under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 you.S.C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property. David Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the you.S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating to the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”"
1945,"Stephen M. Shapiro, et al.","David J. McManus, Jr., et al.","In 2011, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a redistricting plan based on the results of the 2010 census. Several of the districts consisted of de-facto non-contiguous segments—discrete segments that would be wholly unconnected but for one or two narrow strips connecting the two—often with largely inconsistent demographics between the two large segments. The plaintiffs were a group of citizens who sued the Chair of the Maryland State Board of Elections (Board) and the State Administrator of the Board and argued that the new districting plan violated their rights to political association and equal representation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires that a complaint be plausible on its face and enable the court to draw a reasonable inference of misconduct. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and held that the complaint did no more than imply the mere possibility of misconduct. Therefore, the case did not go before a three-judge panel, as the Three-Judge Court Act requires for cases dealing with congressional districts unless the claim is determined to be insubstantial. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal."
926,Travis Beckles,United States,"On April 11, 2009, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed - off shotgun was discovered in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district court determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) who had been in possession of a shotgun and was therefore subject of sentencing enhancement under its Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months into life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $ 5, 000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as “ violent felonies ” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed - off shotgun was not a “ crime of violence ” subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ’ conviction and sentence. The you. S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court ’ s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the District court again upheld Beckles ’ conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed - off shotgun was a “ crime of violence. ” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence."
595,United States,Watts,"After police discovered cocaine base in his kitchen and two loaded guns in his bedroom, a jury convicted Vernon Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. The jury acquitted Watts of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense and sentenced him accordingly. In a similar case, authorities videotaped Cheryl Putra selling cocaine to a government informant. A jury convicted Putra of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine, but acquitted her of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on a separate occasion. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Putra had indeed been involved in the second transaction and sentenced her accordingly. Reversing both cases, separate Courts of Appeals held that sentencing courts could not consider the conduct of the defendants' underlying charges of which they had been acquitted."
346,Arizona State Legislature,"Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw Congressional districts, subject to the use of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in its newly formed Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission ( IRC ). In 2003, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC of adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution."
855,Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services,Blumer,"The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the ""community spouse resource allowance"" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the ""income-first"" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method."
102,Stone,Powell,Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. This case was decided together with Wolf v. Rice.
1472,Cory R. Maples,"Kim T. Thomas, Interim Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections","Cory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in 1997. Alabama does not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had not notified the court or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in. When Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case."
488,Campbell,"Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.","Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song ""Pretty Woman"" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's ""Oh, Pretty Woman."" The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair."
786,Castillo,United States,"In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: ""Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years."" During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as ""machinegun"" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
2105,Shannon Nelson and Louis Alonzo Madden,Colorado,"The state of Colorado, like most states, imposes certain monetary penalties upon persons convicted of a crime. Shannon Nelson and Louis Madden were both separately arrested and charged with sexual assault crimes. Nelson was acquitted of all charges, and Madden was acquitted of one of two charges against him. Both requested refunds from the state for the penalties they had been charged, since their convictions were overturned. The trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction in Nelson’s case and only returned the funds taken from Madden in connection with the one charge on which he was acquitted. The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the state must refund the money Nelson and Madden had paid respective to their sexual assault charges that had been thrown out. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decisions in both cases and held that, under the state’s Exoneration Act, an individual may only recover monetary losses from an arrest if they can “prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [they were] ‘actually innocent.’”"
1514,PPL Corporation,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"PPL Corporation held a 25 percent stake in South Western Electricity Board, a utility in England subject to a onetime windfall tax. After PPL paid the tax, it claimed a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. §901 on its you.S. tax return. §901 allows a credit for foreign taxes on ""income, war, profits, [or] excess profits."" The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the tax credit and issued a notice of deficiency. PPL then filed a petition in Tax Court to challenge the IRS's determination. The Tax Court agreed with PPL and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that §901 does not cover the windfall tax because it is a tax on the company's value, not its profits. PPL argued that, looking beyond the face of the statute, the windfall tax was intended to act as a tax on excess profits. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the CIR, holding that the windfall tax is not eligible for credit."
380,Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury,Brian Wynne et ux.,"Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is ""passed through"" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes. The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes' argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland."
2130,James E. McWilliams,"Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, et al.","On December 30, 1984, James McWilliams raped and robbed Patricia Reynolds, who died in surgery later that night. McWilliams was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder during robbery in the first degree and murder during rape in the first degree. At the sentencing phase, defense counsel requested that the court order neuropsychological testing for McWilliams. The court did so and ordered that the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC) conduct the testing. The DOC doctor who conducted the testing recommended further testing from a doctor who was not affiliated with the DOC. The second doctor’s report was made available to both parties but did not arrive at the court until the day before the sentencing hearing, and the court did not allow a continuance for defense counsel to review the report with the assistance of an expert. At the sentencing hearing, the court concluded that there were aggravating factors but no mitigating factors and sentenced McWilliams to death by electrocution. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Alabama state courts. In 2004, McWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition without addressing all of the specific claims, one of which included a claim that he was denied his due process rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma because the court did not provide him with an independent psychiatric expert. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for the district court to address the specific claims in the petition. The district court again denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that McWilliams’ due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a competent psychiatric expert, which met the requirement of Ake, and any harm that he might have suffered was not prejudicial to the outcome of the sentencing hearing."
432,Florida,Bostick,"In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to ""leave the bus"" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
1273,"Eric Shinseki, Secretary of Veteran Affairs",Woodrow Sanders,"While serving in the United States army in 1944, Woodrow Sanders had a bazooka explode near him, burning the right side of his face. Sanders also claimed that the explosion had damaged his right eye. However subsequent examinations by Veterans' Affairs (""VA"") optometrists suggested that the because of the condition was difficult to determine and was likely due to an infection. When Sanders appeared before the Board of Veterans' Appeals, arguing that the injury was service related and seeking cost-free treatment, the Board denied his claim, finding that the injury was not service related. On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Sanders argued that the VA failed to provide notice as to who was responsible for obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, as required by the notice provision of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (""VCAA""). The Veterans Court affirmed the Board, basing its decision on the fact that Sanders did not suffer any ""specific prejudice"" due to the VA's failure to notify. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court, finding that the VCAA does not require any showing of prejudice. Any failure to notify as required by the Act creates a presumption of prejudice that need not be alleged or proved by the veteran seeking medical assistance."
852,Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty.,Earls,"The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate."
386,Nicholas B. Heien,State of North Carolina,"On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I - 77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse looked over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned why Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54. 2 grams of cocaine in the car. A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The East Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court but held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise under the "" reasonable suspicion "" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "" fundamental unfairness "" because it subjected citizens to the traditional rule that "" ignorance of the law is no excuse "", allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien successfully appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal."
272,"Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers","Pat Quinn, in his official capacity as governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31","Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in - patient care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services ( Disabilities Program ). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services ( Rehabilitation Program ). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a "" fair share "" provision, which required all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining agreement and contract administration. The Disabilities Program union rejected union membership in 2009. In 2010, Harris and her personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under its First and Fourteenth Amendments. The appeals court dismissed the plaintiffs'claims. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may order its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees, further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review."
181,"Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship","Leo P. Martinez, et al.","The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law ( CLS ) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow "" any student to participate, become a lawyer, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs. "" In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that "" I believe in : The Bible as the inspired word of God ; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son ; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins ; His bodily resurrection and His personal return ; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration ; [ and ] Jesus Christ, God's Son, is Lord of my life. "" The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Additionally, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights."
392,"M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.","John Kerry, Secretary of State","In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States residents. Manachem's parents requested that the you. S. State Department identify his place of birth on his passport as "" Israel, "" in accordance with Section 214 ( d ) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 ( Act ). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed "" Jerusalem "" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214 ( b ). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non - justiciable political question. The you. S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding but remanded this case. On remand, the district court ruled that Section 215 ( d ) "" provides intereferes "" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power can affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch."
851,"Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al.","Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al.","Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare debt and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act ( Recovery Act ), which expressly provided stronger protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs in this case are a consortium of investors who collectively hold nearly one billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico ’ s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ( PREPA ), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court who argued that Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits state corporation debt restructuring laws from binding creditors without written consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiff and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The I. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
2238,Mary Anne Sause,"Timothy J. Bauer, et al.","Mary Ann Sause, representing herself, filed a lawsuit under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 against members of the Louisburg, Kansas, police department, as well as the current and former mayor of the town. In her complaint she alleges that two police officers visited her apartment in response to a noise complaint, entered her apartment without consent, and “then proceeded to engage in a course of strange and abusive conduct.” She further alleges that at one point she “knelt and began to pray but one of the officers ordered her to stop.” Sause claims that the officers’ conduct violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The defendants moved to dismiss Sause’s claim for failure to state a claim, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Sause—now with counsel—argued only that her free exercise rights were violated by the officers’ conduct (dropping her Fourth Amendment claims). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity."
427,Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools,Robert L. Dowell,"In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the ""Finger Plan,"" which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached ""unitary"" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original ""Finger Plan"" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed."
1119,Dennis Obduskey,"McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.","Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $ 329, 940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated numerous times, but never completed. Obduskey ’ s loan remained in debt, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm Thomas McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non - judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other issues, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). The district court granted the defendants ’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non - judicial deposit proceedings. Upon Obduskey ’ s appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute ’ s plain language as well as policy statements, the FDCPA did not apply to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court ’ s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned the you. S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the of question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC."
572,"American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al.","Aereo, Inc.","Aereo, Inc. ( Aereo ) offers a service that allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet - enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves four functions : that of a regular television antenna, a recording application, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than tablets and computers. Aereo is now only available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the rights holders of the programs to record or transmit these programs. Two groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers whilst the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their right to "" publicly perform "" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different from another that had been determined non - violative of the rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs'businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling to deny the motion."
806,Duncan,Walker,"28 USC section 2244(d)(2) provides that the ""time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection."" In 1996, Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas petition under section 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition because it concluded that Walker had not exhausted available state remedies. In 1997, without returning to state court, Walker filed another federal habeas petition. Th District Court dismissed the petition because it had not been filed within a reasonable time from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's effective date. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Walker's first federal habeas petition was an application for ""other collateral review"" that tolled the limitation period under section 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely."
530,Arizona,Ronald William Roberson,"On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review."
405,Austin,Michigan Chamber of Commerce,"The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that ""the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption."" The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement."
1416,"Charles Andrew Fowler, aka Man",United States,"Charles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of Fowler's accomplices later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling."
241,"Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.","The Green family owns and manages Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with about 500 stores and over 13, 000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( ACA ), employment - based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA - approved contraceptive methods. While there is exemptions available for religious employers and non - profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for - profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2013, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment - based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ( RFRA ). The plaintiffs sought another preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two - judge panel of The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "" persons "" for the purposes behind employment and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
1031,"O. John Benisek, et al.","Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.","In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged with a process of collaboration, which in that state entails two parallel steps : a public - facing procedure led by the Governor ’ s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland ’ s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that assessed the likelihood of Democratic Party success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC - developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law matched one of the ones developed by NCEC ; rather, former Governor Martin O ’ Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the original document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the “ Cook Partisan Voting Index ” rated the Sixth District as a “ likely ” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a “ safe ” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20. 9 % majority. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the Virginia Supreme Court."
2363,Arthur Gregory Lange,California,"A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction. Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable because to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable because, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction. In the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies. Based on the inconsistent findings of the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction."
689,Hughes Aircraft Company,Jacobson,"Stanley I. Jacobson and other retired employees of Hughes Aircraft Company were beneficiaries of Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan. Jacobson and the others claimed in their class-action lawsuit that Hughes violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal pension protection law, when it amended the plan twice in response to a $1.2 billion dollar surplus. ERISA requires that some of the surplus be distributed to cover employees when a pension plan is terminated. Hughes' first amendment to the plan established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. The second amendment disallowed new participants from contributing to the plan. Jacobson and others argued that Hughes had terminated one plan and started another by stopping its pension plan contributions. Thus, the company had used the plan's surplus to benefit new employees at the expense of the retirees. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court by finding that the early retirement program and noncontributory benefit structure were prohibited by the ERISA."
304,Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang,"FMR LLC, et al.","The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Johnson, brought a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments ( Fidelity ), alleging that the company unlawfully employed them in retaliation for filing complaints. Officers Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ( OSHA ) that they believed that Lawson had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated following unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged. Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated "" whistleblower "" protection sections of the Sarbanes - Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to transfers of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in criminal activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals in the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act."
1005,"Jenny Rubin, et. al.",Islamic Republic of Iran,"In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight you.S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (""FSIA"") provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state-sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D.C. entered a $71.5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment. The case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections (a) and (g) of 28 you.S.C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (""TRIA""). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610(a) permits execution on a foreign state's property ""used for a commercial activity in the United States,"" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party (such as a museum). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610(g) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either. The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610."
25,United States,Charles J. Ash Jr.,"Charles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ash’s counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications."
2332,"Daniel D. Glasser, Norton I. Kretske, and Alfred E. Roth",United States,"Petitioners Daniel D. Glasser, Norton I. Kretske, and Alfred E. Roth were Assistant United States Attorneys in the Northern District of Illinois, specializing in liquor and revenue offenses. They, along with Anthony Horton, a professional bondsman, and Louis Kaplan, an automobile allegedly engaged in illicit alcohol trafficking around Chicago, were found guilty and sentenced for conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to bribery. In a joint trial, Glasser was represented by William Scott Stewart and George Callaghan. Kretske was originally represented by the firm “Harrington & McDonnell, but Kretske was dissatisfied with the firm, and the trial judge proposed appointing Stewart to represent Kretske (in addition to Glasser, whom Stewart was already representing). Glasser objected to the appointment, arguing (through Stewart) that that there would be a conflict of interest in representing both defendants. The judge appointed Stewart to represent Kretske over Glasser’s objection. A jury of 11 men and one woman convicted all five defendants of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and the judge denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions."
896,State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,Campbell,"Although investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award."
179,"Mohawk Industries, Inc.",Norman Carpenter,"In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. Mohawk argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, nor for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met for him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk since he was then involved in a Class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants. Before discovery and as part the discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney - client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney - client privilege did not qualify for exception."
1242,"Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy","Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.","Natural Resources Defense Council along with other environmental groups object to the ""SOCAL"" exercises, scheduled to take place between February 2007 and January 2009. The groups felt the exercises would because serious harm to various species of marine mammal present in the southern California waters. The groups sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from carrying out the exercises. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the NRDC had demonstrated probable success on its claim that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the exercises. The district court also denied the efforts of the Council on Environmental Quality to provide ""alternative arrangements"" for the Navy to proceed without an EIS. The district court stated that such arrangements require ""emergency circumstances"" not applicable to the case The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld the decision granting the injunction. The court reviewed the findings under an ""abuse of discretion"" standard and determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding that the environmental groups raised substantial questions as to whether the exercises would have a significant impact on the environment and that these claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Furthermore, the district court had acted properly when it found that allowing long-planned, routine training exercises to meet the ""emergency circumstances"" exception would create an unacceptably broad definition of that phrase."
2372,Americans for Prosperity Foundation,"Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California","The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law. In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy “strict scrutiny.” A panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc."
1711,United States,Virginia Electric & Power Company,"In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation. The district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1128,Jeanne S. Woodford et al.,Viet Mike Ngo,"Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were ""exhausted"" because they were no longer available to him."
344,"Hana Financial, Inc.","Hana Bank, et al.","In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name "" Hana Overseas Korean Club "" in English as well as "" Hana Bank "" in Korean. The advertisements also included Samsung Bank's logo, known as the "" golden man. "" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. ( HFI ) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words "" Hana Financial "" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other. In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the "" Hana Bank "" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the "" Hana Financial "" logo in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be "" tacked "" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but different use of the phrase "" Hana Bank. "" HFI appealed, arguing that the determination of whether a trademark may be "" tacked "" to a prior mark was a question of law that must be determined by this court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The you. S. Court Of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision."
715,"Walter M. Pierce, Governor",Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,"The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy."
1521,Adoptive Couple,"Baby Girl, a minor child under the age of fourteen years, Birth Father, and the Cherokee Nation","When the biological mother of Baby Girl became pregnant she did not live with the father and the father did not support the mother financially. The mother sent the father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. He sent a text back, saying that he would relinquish his rights, though he later testified that he thought he was relinquishing his rights only to the mother. The biological father was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. The biological mother attempted to verify this status, but spelled the father's name wrong and misrepresented his birthday in the request, so the Nation could not locate the father's registration. The mother listed Baby Girl's ethnicity as ""Hispanic"" instead of ""Native American"" on the birth certificate. The mother decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption because she had two other children that she struggled to support. Adoptive Couple, who resided in South Carolina, began adoption proceedings in that state. The Cherokee Nation finally identified the father as a registered member and filed a notice of intervention, stating that Baby Girl was an ""Indian Child"" under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father stated that he did not consent to the adoption and would seek custody of Baby Girl. After trial, the family court denied Adoptive Couple's petition for adoption and granted custody to the biological father. The court held that the biological father was a ""parent"" under the ICWA because of his paternity and pursuit of custody as soon as he learned that Baby Girl was being put up for adoption. Adoptive Couple did not follow the procedural directives in the ICWA to obtain the father's consent prior to initiating adoption proceedings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed."
2356,"Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General",Ming Dai,"Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility. This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156."
2257,Bradley Weston Taggart,"Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al.","In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.” Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman. Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees. In November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings. After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts. Brown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” While the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action. The state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim. Back in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees."
1298,"District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District, et al.",William G. Osborne,"In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory evidence. The district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show the disclosure of evidence would ""affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent"" in order to gain access. Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from pursuing post-conviction relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr. Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing. The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that favorable DNA results would afford a ""reasonable probability"" that he could prevail in an action for post-conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his confession."
1290,"Carlsbad Technology, Inc.","HIF Bio, Inc.","The purported inventors of an anti-cancer agent, Jong-Wan park and Yang-Sook Chun through HIF Bio Inc., sued Carlsbad Technology, Inc. in a California court for various claims regarding ownership of the invention. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. After dismissing the federal claim, it declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims and remanded the case back to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the remand order. It reasoned that when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the case, it necessarily found that the claims lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction."
175,North Carolina,Willie Thomas Butler,"An FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler his rights under Miranda v Arizona after arresting him on a federal warrant. At Butler’s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an “Advice of Rights” form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood his rights. Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicated that he would like to talk to the officer. Butler did not ask for an attorney. Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced as evidence at trial. Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The court held that Butler had effectively waived his right to an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that he understood his rights. The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements made under interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights."
456,James Draper,United States,"John Marsh, another federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1881, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver who was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had traveled to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 nor 9. Hereford later provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and his Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two bottles containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag. Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable because to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed."
495,Bernard Shapiro,Vivian Marie Thompson,"Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen-year-old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy the state's one-year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code."
613,M. L. B.,S. L. J.,"In 1994, a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated M.L.B.'s parental rights to her two minor children. M.L.B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36. Because she lacked the funds, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, under its precedent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. In front of the you.S. Supreme Court, M.L.B. argued that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees."
1326,"Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.",Joseph Kindler,"Joseph Kindler was convicted of first degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to death. He subsequently filed motions for post-conviction relief, but while the motions were pending, he escaped from prison. Pennsylvania immediately moved to dismiss the motions arguing that Mr. Kindler had waived any right to have his post-conviction motions considered because he was a fugitive. The trial court agreed and dismissed them. After recapture, Mr. Kindler moved to reinstate his post-conviction motions, which was denied. Both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. In 2000, Mr. Kindler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in a Pennsylvania federal district court. The State of Pennsylvania argued that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Mr. Kindler because Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was an ""independent and adequate"" state ground that precluded federal habeas review. The district court disagreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in Doctor v. Walters, it held that Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was not an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review."
183,Southeastern Community College,Frances Davis,"Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision."
627,"Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.","Greg Manning, et al.","The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. ( Escala ), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity investing. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs ’ shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs ’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) pursuant to the authority granted to it by its Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but several parties dispute the fact that the claims constituted violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the issue of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs attempted to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs ’ motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went into the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in federal court."
2199,Rose Mary Knick,"Township of Scott, Pennsylvania","In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours” and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision. Rose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge. Knick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government. The district court dismissed all but two of Knick’s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City."
606,Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn.,"Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company","Employees of Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), were entitled to pension, health and welfare benefits under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. These benefit plans were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1990, ATSF awarded the work performed by SFTS to In Terminal Services (ITS), and terminated those SFTS employees unwilling to continue work with ITS. The benefit plan offered by ITS was less favorable than the SFTS plan, and SFTS employees brought suit under, alleging that they had been discharged ""for the purpose of interfering with the attainment"" of rights to which they would have ""become entitled under [their SFTS] plan."" ERISA Section 510. After the District Court dismissed the Section 510 claims, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the employees' pension claims because Section 510 prevented interference with vested rights, but dismissed the employees' welfare benefit claims because such benefits did not vest."
1445,"ohn E. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.",James Lambert,"Bruce Reese and Bernard Jackson were brothers-in-law who had committed several robberies together in the past; James Lambert was a newcomer to the group. On September 23, 1982, they agreed to rob a bar in Philadelphia, eventually settling on Prince's Lounge. During the robbery, one man walked to the rear bar and pointed a gun in the face of a barmaid, Janet Ryan. A different man instructed another barmaid, Sarah Clark, to ""get the money."" While Clark was placing money in a bag, she heard two gunshots from the back of the bar; a single actor had shot and killed two patrons. Two weeks later, Jackson identified Lambert and Reese while in custody for an unrelated robbery. Lambert and Reese were tried jointly, with Jackson testifying against them. Janet Ryan also testified, and was at first unable to identify Lambert; shortly after stepping down from the stand, however, she approached the prosecutor and indicated that Lambert was the man who pointed the gun in her face. No other witness was able to identify Lambert or Reese, but the jury found Lambert guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to death. A few months later, the Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit of the Federal Defender Association of Philadelphia seized the police investigatory file in what was later ruled to be an abuse of subpoena power. Lambert's lawyers declared that several seized documents should have been available to the defense at trial, filing a claim under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act. One document indicated that Jackson named a ""Lawrence Woodlock"" as a co-defendant. The district court denied this claim, concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood the disclosure would have changed the verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the additional evidence was not significant because the defense had already thoroughly impeached Jackson's testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that Jackson's statement about an additional co-defendant opened up an entirely new line of impeachment."
77,Medical Board of California,Hason,"The California Medical Board gave Hason a license to practice medicine because of the mental illness. Hason sued a federal district court, alleging that his rights be violated under The Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims remained barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non - consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the ADA "" and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II. """
1544,Paula Petrella,"Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., et al.","After Jake LaMotta retired from boxing, he and Frank Peter Petrella (F. Petrella) created two screenplays and a book based on LaMotta's life. These works were registered with the United States Copyright Office in 1963, 1973, and 1970, respectively. In 1976, LaMotta and F. Petrella signed a written agreement that granted the exclusive rights to the book and the screenplays to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc, which in turn assigned those rights to a subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (MGM), United Artists Corporation. In 1980, United Artists Corporation registered a copyright for the film ""Raging Bull"" based on LaMotta and F. Petrella's work. When F. Petrella died in 1981, which was still within the original 28-year period of the copyright, his renewal rights passed to his heirs. In 1991, Paula Petrella (Petrella), the daughter of F. Petrella, filed an application for the renewal of copyright rights on the 1963 screenplay. In 1998, Petrella's attorney contacted MGM and asserted that Petrella had obtained the rights to the screenplay and its derivative works, which included the movie ""Raging Bull,"" and that MGM was infringing on those rights. MGM argued that the 1963 screenplay was a collaboration between LaMotta and F. Petrella, so MGM retained the rights to the screenplay under the agreement with LaMotta. MGM also argued that there was no ""substantial similarity of protectable elements"" between the 1963 screenplay and the film. In 2009, Petrella sued MGM for copyright infringement, and the federal district court granted summary judgment for MGM under the doctrine of laches, which prevents a legal claim from being enforced if a long delay in filing the claim adversely affected the defendant's ability to fight the claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1110,Michael J. Biestek,"Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration","Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert."
1862,Williams,Illinois,"Willie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to “work off” the fine at a rate of $5 per day. While in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the “work off” provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams’ ability to pay might change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation."
1716,"Mark Coppedge, Jr.",United States,"In early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him from the obligation to pay court costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition."
378,Webster,Reproductive Health Services,"In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that ""[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,"" and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions."
1082,"Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.",John Warren et al.,"The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals ( both plaintiffs in this case ). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “ until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute. ” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant the mining permits. The district court granted the county ’ s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, holding that the AEA does indeed regulate non - federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court ’ s findings de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1158,Weyerhaeuser Company,"Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc.","Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-Simmons) sued Weyerhaeuser, a competing sawmill, for ""predatory buying"" in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser was accused of buying more raw materials than it needed at unnecessarily high prices. Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser's business practices were aimed at monopolizing the market for purchasing unprocessed sawlogs and forcing its competitors out of business. At the jury trial, jurors were instructed to rule against Weyerhaeuser if Ross-Simmons could prove that Weyerhaeuser bought more sawlogs ""than it needed"" and paid more ""than necessary"" for them. Weyerhaeuser objected, arguing that the more stringent guidelines in the case of Brooke Group v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. required a ruling in its favor. In Brooke Group, the Court held that in order for a company to be liable for ""predatory pricing,"" a company must be shown to have been operating at a loss, and to have a ""dangerous probability"" of recouping its losses. The District Court rejected Weyerhaeuser's motion, ruling that Brooke Group applies only to predatory pricing, where a company prices its products too low in order force competitors out of the market, and not to predatory buying. Under the less stringent guidelines, the jury found Weyerhaeuser to be in violation of the Sherman Act, and awarded Ross-Simmons $78.8 million in damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court, ruling that the higher standard of liability for predatory pricing compared to predatory buying is appropriate, because business practices that resemble predatory pricing may result in benefits such as efficiency incentives and lower prices for consumers."
1094,Francis V. Lorenzo,Securities and Exchange Commission,"Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker - dealer. Lorenzo ’ s only investment - banking client at the relevant time was a start - up company named Waste2Energy Holdings ( W2E ). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial collapse by offering up to $ 15 billion in outstanding debentures ” — which is debt secured only by the debtor ’ s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E ’ s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company ’ s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $ 10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8 - K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $ 370, 552. Lorenzo ’ s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about it. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “ several key points ” about W2E ’ s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E ’ s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “ 3 layers of protection, ” which were : $ 10 million in “ confirmed assets ” ; purchase loans and LOIs for “ over $ 43 [ million ] in orders ” ; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “ at the request of [ Lorenzo ’ s boss ] - and the other stated it was sent “ at the request of [ another broker with the - ]. ” Lorenzo ’ s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities - fraud provisions : Section 17 ( a ) ( 1 ) of the Securities Act of 1933 ; Section 10 ( b ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b - 5. Lorenzo ’ s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo of to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated, three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ ’ s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission ’ s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b - 5 ( b ). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo ’ s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ ultimate authority ” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court ’ s definition of “ maker ” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 you. S. 135 ( 2011 )."
1868,Sara Baird,State Bar of Arizona,"Sara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which asked whether she “had ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.’” Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird’s petition for the Bar Committee to show because why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona."
937,"Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General",James Garcia Dimaya,"James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first - degree sexual burglary ; both convictions resulted in two years ’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ), a non - citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “ crime of violence, ” which is any offense that involves the use or excessive risk of physical force against another person or property. The Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) affirmed. When Dimaya ’ her appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for The Ninth Circuit was pending, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “ violent felony ” in the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) was unconstitutionally vague. As this result, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA ’ s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found because both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial."
2306,Bridget Anne Kelly,United States of America,"This case arises from the scandal that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays. In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 you.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 you.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback."
890,"Juan Bravo-Fernandez, et al.",United States,"In May 2005, Juan Bravo-Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo-Fernandez’s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez-Maldonado’s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose -- in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case. Based on this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court’s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed."
426,Chisom,Roemer,"The Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes' registered voters were white. Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans's black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana's governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state's justice election procedure weakened the minority's voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to ""have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."" The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed."
1276,Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company,United States et al.,"The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California's Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) cleaned a parcel of contaminated land at considerable expense. They sued the responsible parties for recovery. A federal district court held the responsible parties (Burlington Northern Rail Road, Santa Fe Railway Company, and she will Oil Company) liable for only a minor portion of the cleanup costs. The EPA and DTSC jointly appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its liability calculations. It reasoned that the recovery statute employed by the EPA and DTSC imposed strict liability on parties merely partly responsible for contamination. It explained that the statute's intention was to prevent taxpayers from bearing the burden of such cleanup costs."
1072,New Prime Inc.,Dominic Oliveira,"Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. ( Prime ), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractors. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “ substantially identical ” to those he had as an independent contractor. Oliveira then brought a class - action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), a state minimum - wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ( FAA ), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the company is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide. The district court concluded that a question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “ contracts of employment of transportation workers ” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The trial court thus denied Prime ’ s motion to compel arbitration. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s order denying the motion to require arbitration, noting that the applicability to the FAA constituted a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent - contractor relationship."
2296,"Thryv, Inc.","Click-to-Call Technologies, LP and Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office","This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it. The America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 you.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations. Further, 35 you.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable."
1074,New Prime Inc.,Dominic Oliveira,"Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. ( Prime ), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new company. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an associate of Prime, where his job responsibilities are “ substantially identical ” to those he had as an independent contractor. Oliveira then brought a class - action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of Federal Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), a state minimum - wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ( FAA ), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide. The district court concluded that the problem of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “ right of employment of transportation workers ” does not extend to independent contractors. Once reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime ’ s motions for compel arbitration. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that district court ’ s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent - contractor relationship."
1701,United States,"Republic Steel Corp., International Harvester Company, Interlake Iron Corp.","Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction….to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted."
211,"Esther Kiobel, et al.","Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.","The she will Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil exploration facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully deported, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the she will Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a second class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross - appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach onto corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with District Court holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners'request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc on a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term and address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to establish a because of action for violations of international law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."
93,Mathews,Eldridge,"George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing."
604,California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement,"Dillingham Construction, N.A.","California requires public works project contractors to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in state approved apprenticeship programs. Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media (SSM). SSM entered a collective bargaining agreement with Dillingham that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. SSM used that committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. The California Division of Apprenticeship Standards (the Division) issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and SSM, charging that paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state's prevailing wage law. Dillingham sued to prevent the Division from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Dillingham alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted enforcement of the state law. The District Court ruled in favor of the Division. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship program was an ""employee welfare benefit plan"" under the ERISA, and that the state law ""relate[d] to"" the plan and was therefore superseded by it."
111,DaimlerChrysler Corp.,"Charlotte Cuno, et al.","As part to Ohio's economic development plan, Ohio agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $ 280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others criticized the deal, though, arguing because Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the you. S. Constitution by providing the tax credits. A federal district court disagreed, ruling on DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The judge found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce."
1342,Tarahrick Terry,United States,"Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “ detectable ” amount of cocaine base ( 3. 9 grams ), thus triggering the creation of 21 you. S. C. § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months ’ imprisonment with 6 years ’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Treatment Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841 ( b ) from 5 tons of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit his “ covered offense ” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which has retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 31, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ), Terry ’ s offense was not a'covered offense. ” The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed."
48,Lawyer,Department of Justice,"Based on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan involving State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan when it appeared as to the Governor, Senate President, or House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the proposed plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate or House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's status, before the settlement might be approved. The court approved the settlement."
690,Homer Adolph Plessy,John Ferguson,"Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven-eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a ""whites only"" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and was arrested. At trial, Plessy’s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted."
1177,"Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools",Aileen Rizo,"The facts giving rise to this case are considered immediately relevant to the issue on which the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, brought a lawsuit against the superintendent of schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Third Circuit precedent interpreting this statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a motion en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation of the statute. Judge Reinhardt died after she had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it was officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have become approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those who concurred on the judgment but not the reasoning."
254,"Fifth Third Bancorp, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership program ( ESOP ), which is a defined contribution investment fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from employee salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to fraud, something it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock without having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, the presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not appropriate for a motion to dismiss."
1798,Jesse James Gilbert,California,"Jesse James Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and the murder of a police officer in Alhambra, California. Gilbert refused to answer questions about the robbery charge without the advice of counsel, but later answered questions about a robbery in which the robber, allegedly Gilbert, used a handwritten note demanding the money. He gave the police handwriting exemplars, which were later admitted into evidence. The police also had eyewitnesses identify Gilbert in a line-up that was conducted without notice to his counsel. During the trial, several witnesses identified Gilbert in the courtroom as being a part of multiple robberies, including the Alhambra robbery. No distinction was made as to whether the in-court identifications were independent of the illegal line-ups that occurred before the trial. The jury rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed."
2230,"Henry Schein, Inc., et al.","Archer and White Sales, Inc.","In 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest. After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement. The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit. In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’” Reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court."
619,California,Roy,"A California court convicted Kenneth Roy of robbery and first-degree murder. The State argued that Roy, in coming to the aid of a confederate who was committing the robbery, helped with the murder. The jury had been instructed that it could convict if Roy, with knowledge of the confederate's unlawful purpose, had helped the confederate. The State Supreme Court later held an identical instruction erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that a defendant had the knowledge and intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the confederate's crime. The State Court of Appeal affirmed Roy's conviction, finding that the error was harmless. On federal habeas review, the Federal District Court also found the error harmless, reasoning that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate's purpose and helped him but also did not intend to help him. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals applied a special harmless-error standard and held that the omission of the instruction's intent part is harmless only if a review of the assistance and knowledge facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted intent element."
545,Norfolk & Western Railway Company,Hiles,"Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk & Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with ""couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles."" The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed."
1479,United States,James X. Bormes,"In October 2000, the United States Treasury Department launched Pay.gov, a billing and payment processing system that allows consumers to make online payments to government agencies by credit or debit card. Numerous government agencies use Pay.gov to process credit and debit payments. On August 9, 2008, attorney James X Bormes filed a lawsuit on behalf of one of his clients in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, paying the filing fee with a credit card via Pay.gov. The confirmation page displayed the expiration date of Bormes' credit card. Bormes alleged that the inclusion of his card's expiration date violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (""FCRA""); he brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of individual cardholders. The statute provides that no person accepting credit or debit cards for a business transaction shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card or the expiration date on any receipt provided to the cardholder after a transaction. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the FCRA, but granted the government's motion to dismiss because the FCRA did not waive the government's sovereign immunity. It held that Bormes' invocation of the Little Tucker Act was moot because the court had jurisdiction under the FCRA. On appeal, a motions panel denied the government's motion to transfer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It held that Bormes' complaint invoked the district court's jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act; the Little Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to district courts over claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. Afterwards, a panel of the Seventh Circuit determined that the Little Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for the FCRA in Talley v. you.S. Department of Agriculture. The Seventh Circuit later vacated this opinion; the Talley case remains pending. Bormes appealed his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which determined that the FCRA mandates money damages from the federal government, giving jurisdiction to the district courts through the Little Tucker Act."
1185,Lisa Watson et al.,"Philip Morris Companies, Inc., et al.","Lisa Watson filed a class action lawsuit against the tobacco company Philip Morris, claiming that the company had violated Arkansas law by misrepresenting the amount of tar and nicotine in cigarettes branded as ""light."" Seeking to have the case removed to federal court, Philip Morris invoked 28 you.S.C. 1442(a)(1), which allows removal when a party is sued for actions taken while ""acting under"" a federal officer. Philip Morris claimed that it was acting under the direct control of regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), so 28 you.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applied. After the federal District Court denied Watson's motion to have the case sent back to state court, Watson appealed. The dispute centered on the degree of control exercised by the FTC over Philip Morris. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Philip Morris, allowing the case to continue in the federal court system. The Eighth Circuit held that the question of whether 28 you.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applies ""depends on the detail and specificity of the federal direction of the defendant's activities and whether the government exercises control over the defendant."" In the case of the tobacco industry, the Eighth Circuit found ""unprecedented"" government involvement, including detailed FTC regulations concerning the testing and disclosure of tar and nicotine levels. Therefore, Philip Morris was ""acting under a federal officer"" and consequently entitled to remove the case to federal court."
771,Arch R. Everson,Board of Education of the Township of Ewing,"A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the cost of transportation into and from schools, including private schools. 96 % of all private schools who benefitted from this law attended Roman Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this financial aid in religion violated neither the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. Ultimately losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds."
1175,Deborah Morse et al.,Joseph Frederick,"At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message ""Bong Hits 4 Jesus,"" a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 you.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would because a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful."
1651,Timothy Lee Hurst,Florida,"Timothy Lee Hurst was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing his co-worker, Cynthia Harrison, during a robbery of the Popeye’s restaurant where they both worked. He was sentenced to death and appealed. On appeal, Hurst was granted a new sentencing trial because the Supreme Court of Florida found that his counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of Hurst’s borderline intelligence and possible organic brain damage. At his new sentencing trial, Hurst was prevented from presenting mental retardation evidence as an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty, though he was allowed to present it as mitigating evidence. The jury again sentenced Hurst to the death penalty by a vote of seven to five, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Ring v. Arizona, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the presence of aggravating factors, which Arizona’s death penalty sentencing scheme viewed as essentially elements of a larger offense, be determined by the jury. The Supreme Court of Florida had previously held that the decision in Ring v. Arizona did not apply to Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme generally and specifically did not require that a jury’s recommendation of the death penalty be unanimous or that a jury determine the factual issue of a defendant’s potential mental retardation."
214,Rostker,Goldberg,"After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended to include the registration of females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained by a district court."
1907,"Basic, Incorporated, et al.","Max L. Levinson, et al.","Basic, Inc. (Basic) was a publicly-traded company engaged in manufacturing related to the steel industry. Combustion, Inc. (Combustion), a similar company, had expressed interest in merging with Basic but had not done so because of antitrust concerns. Beginning in 1976, Combustion representatives had conversations with Basic representatives regarding the possibility of a merger. Throughout 1977 and 1978, Basic made several public statements denying rumors that these conversations were taking place. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stocks because it had been approached about a merger, and on December 19 Basic’s board approved the offer from Combustion. The respondents in this case are former Basic stockholders who sold their stock after Basic’s first denial of merger conversations. They sued Basic and its director for making false or misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which has to do with material facts relating to the purchase or sale of stocks. The plaintiffs argued that these statements artificially depressed the market for Basic’s stock, which injured the sellers. The district court certified the plaintiffs as a class and granted summary judgment for the company. The court held that the statements were immaterial because the conversations were not necessarily destined to become a merger agreement. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a company cannot disclose misleading information and that the conversations, although they might not have been material on their own, became so because they made the company’s statements untrue."
2044,"Mark J. Sheriff, et al.","Pamela Gillie, et al.","In 1977, Congress enacted the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in an effort to combat abusive debt collection practices, which were particularly problematic with third party or independent debt collectors, who are unlikely to have contact with the consumer and therefore have little incentive to act fairly. One of the issues that the FDCPA addressed was independent debt collectors representing themselves as government officials. Therefore, the FDCPA targeted these “debt collectors” while exempting government officials from that definition. The statutory language of the exemption was specific to “any officer or employee of ... any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” The Ohio Revised Code contains a provision that unpaid debts owed to a state entity get “certified” to the Ohio Attorney General, who is then responsible for collecting the debt or disposing of it by other means. The Attorney General may enlist “special counsel” to collect debts on the Attorney General’s behalf. To do so, the special counsel and the Attorney General enter into a retention agreement that, among other terms, allows the special counsel to use the Attorney General’s letterhead in connection with claims arising out of the tax debts the special counsel is authorized to collect. The plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received debt collection letters that used the seal of the Ohio Attorney General from the defendants, who became special counsel to the Attorney General in 2013. The plaintiffs sued and argued that the defendants violated the FDCPA by using the Ohio Attorney General letterhead. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and held that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA because they are officers of the state for the purposes of debt collection, and therefore the use of the Ohio Attorney General letterhead was not false or misleading. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and held that special counsel are “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA and do not fall under the exemption, and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the use of Ohio Attorney General’s seal on debt collection letters was misleading."
1465,"Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al.","Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.","Prometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper dosages of drug treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent could not cover the body's reaction to drugs. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which specializes in patent issues, overturned the lower court order."
812,Bank Markazi,"Deborah Peterson, et al.","Deborah Peterson and a handful of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank ( Bank Markazi ) owned nearly $ 2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on The Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets to Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, “ [ T ] he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution … in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death sustained by an act of [ terrorism ]. ” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment judgment on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States ’ separation of powers because the law was solely directed at a specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The you. S. Court of Appeals for its Second Circuit affirmed."
1077,"Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.","Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.","Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working in Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “ thin metal ” ship components, or parts that were removed and shipped before any asbestos - containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors ’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs ’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright - line as opposed to the fact - specific rule that can be added to the thin metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it wanted them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court ’ s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict responsibility. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos - related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer ’ s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact - specific standard rather than the bright - line rule."
791,Ferguson,City of Charleston,"After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends."
200,Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,David Patchak,"The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band (""the Band"") is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township –known as the ""Bradley Tract""-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act (""IRA""). David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act (""QTA"") precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests do not fall within the IRA's zone-of-interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering ""affected members of the public"" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act."
847,"Chevron U.S.A., Inc.",Echazabal,"Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron you.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the because identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA."
1339,"City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities","Hotels.com, L.P., et al.","In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class - action lawsuit against various online travel companies ( OTCs ), such as Hotels. com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the high fees those companies charged constitute the “ cost of occupancy ” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that a hotel occupancy tax applied equally to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "" an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties. "" The OTCs ’ proposed order stated that "" costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 53, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39. "" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC ’ s proposed order. Then, OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $ 2. 3 million, which included over $ 2 million for “ post - judgment interest ” and “ premiums paid for the appeal bonds. ” San Antonio objected and asked the district Court to refuse to tax, but to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite."
1101,Keanu D.W. Ortiz,United States,"Since shortly thereafter the Civil War, federal legislation has required express authorization from Congress before active - duty military officers may hold a "" civil office, ” including positions that require "" an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. "" 10 you. S. C. § 973 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( ii ). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review ( CMCR ), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ( CCA ). A judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years'imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and affirmed. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ( AC ), requesting the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded her from serving on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's claims. Note : This case was original consolidated under Dalmazzi v. United States ( 16 - 961 ), and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there."
192,"Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.","Michael B. Whiting, et al.","Various business and civil - rights activists challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ( "" LAWA "" ) to an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted discrimination, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E - Verify employment license system and revokes business licenses of companies who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA is not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ( "" IRCA "" ). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring, recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – and LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E - Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states of requiring E - Verify participation."
1872,Choctaw Nation,Oklahoma et al. ,"Through several treaties, the United States granted the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations several million acres of land in what is now Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation sued the State of Oklahoma and several corporations for leasing gas, oil, and mineral rights to the river beds of the Arkansas River within that land. The Choctaw Nation was allowed to intervene to claim that the riverbeds of Arkansas River within their land grant belonged to them. The district court ruled against the Indian Nations, holding that the land grant did not convey rights to the river beds. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
429,California,Acevedo,"California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable because to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( you.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( you.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable because to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition."
271,New York,Quarles,"After receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights."
2135,Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco,"Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) is a global pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug intended to prevent blood clotting, and markets and sells the drug nationwide, including in California. In addition, BMS maintains five offices in California, four research facilities, and one government affairs office, as well as 250 sales representatives. In eight amended complaints filed with the San Francisco Superior Court, 86 California residents and 575 non-California residents joined in suing BMS and McKesson Corporation, a California-based Plavix distributor, on individual product defect claims. Each alleged serious side effects from their use of Plavix, that BMS had misrepresented the drug’s safety and efficacy, and asserted numerous California product liability causes of action against BMS. BMS moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction in California. BMS argued that these claims had no link to its California activities, as the nonresident plaintiffs were not injured by Plavix in California, had not been prescribed Plavix in California, and had not received Plavix distributed by McKesson from California. Additionally, BMS did not research or manufacture Plavix at its facilities in California. The trial court denied BMS’s motion and held that the company was subject to the California court’s general jurisdiction because it had “wide-ranging, continuous, and systematic activities in California.” The California Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s assessment that BMS was subject to general jurisdiction in California, but held that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently related to BMS’s California activities to support specific jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court affirmed and held that BMS’s nationwide marketing and distribution created a “substantial nexus” between the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims and BMS’s activities in California because the claims were based on the same allegedly defective product and misleading marketing that allegedly caused injury both in and outside of California."
1187,"Jalil Abdul-Kabir, fka Ted Calvin Cole","Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two ""special issues"" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by the Supreme Court in Penry v. Johnson. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not ""constitutionally relevant,"" and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the ""deliberateness"" and ""dangerousness"" determinations. After the Supreme Court rejected the ""constitutional relevance"" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with Brewer v. Quarterman No. 05-11287."
1247,"Coeur Alaska, Inc.","Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, et al.","The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted permits to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge processed wastewater from its gold mine into a lake in Alaska. The South East Alaska Conservation council sued to prevent the discharge. It argued that granting the permits exceeded the authority of the USACE. The federal district court in Alaska held that the permits were valid. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to void the permits. The court held that the USACE improperly interpreted the Clean Water Act when granting the permits. It explained that the characteristics of the wastewater discharge did not come under the USACE's scope of authority, but were of a nature that was explicitly prohibited by the Clean Water Act."
299,United States,Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez,"Customs officials stopped Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez at the Los Angeles Airport, where she arrived after a flight from Bogota, Columbia. Montoya de Hernandez’s passport revealed eight recent trips from Bogota to Miami or Los Angeles. After further questioning, officials detained Montoya de Hernandez under suspicion that she was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. After 16 hours of detention where Montoya de Hernandez did not speak or use the bathroom, officials obtained a court order for an x-ray and other tests. At the hospital, a doctor removed a balloon filled with cocaine from her rectum. Over the next four days, Montoya de Hernandez passed 88 balloons filled with cocaine, totaling 528 grams. At trial, the district court admitted the cocaine into evidence and convicted Montoya de Hernandez on federal drug charges. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Montoya de Hernandez’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment because customs officials did not have a “clear indication” that she was smuggling drugs."
976,"Joseph Jesner, et al.","Arab Bank, PLC","Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC ( Arab Bank ), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute ( 1983 ), which provides the federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ’ its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held because the ATS does also authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the you. S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel in other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals ’ holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the lower court noted that the Supreme Court ’ s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court affirmed the lower court ’ s dismissal."
831,Federal Election Commission,Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,"The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of ""contribution"" includes ""expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents."" The you.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to ""an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate."" In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
652,Robert Fletcher,John Peck,"In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the law which declared all rights and claims under contract to be invalid. In 1796, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold his land to Robert Fletcher three years later, arguing that the land sales had been illegal. Fletcher argued, since the previous sale of the land had been made invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract."
865,"Joseph P. Murr, et al.","Wisconsin, et al.","The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County’s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs’ application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property."
190,"Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.","Michael B. Whiting, et al.","Various business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act (""LAWA"") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute. On appeal the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (""IRCA""). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – like LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation."
515,"Sue Evenwel, et al.","Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al.","The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three-judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law. Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts do not adhere to the 'one person, one vote' principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in relation to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal."
371,Gregory P. Warger,Randy D. Shauers,"In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger launched suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter - suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of traffic accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted his jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection. The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606 ( b ), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was sufficient to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606 ( b ) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes or alleged dishonesty of a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606 ( b ) because it was based on statements the foreperson gave during a jury's deliberations. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
2005,J. D. Shelley and Ethel Lee Shelley et al. ,Louis Kraemer and Fern Kraemer,"In 1911, a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans from living in the area. In 1945, an African-American family (the Shelleys) moved into the neighborhood. Louis Kraemer brought suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house. A similar lawsuit arose in Detroit, Michigan. Both state supreme courts enforced the covenants because they were private rather than state action. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal."
632,Michael Musacchio,United States,"Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services ( ETS ), a transportation brokerage group that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services ( TTS ), a competing company, and several ETS executives moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential business agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that him and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $ 10 million. In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS members on counts of conspiracy and violations to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trials, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute itself requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court ’ s instructional error did not become the law of the court when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trials."
1317,Texas,New Mexico,"Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party can seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master'S judgment within 30 days of its final determination. In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a state owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico. When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could only use. The 30 - day review date lapsed, and New Mexico had no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to allow New Mexico for the evaporative loss."
425,"Richard E. Glossip, et al.","Kevin J. Gross, et al.","On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three-drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a ""known and available"" alternative to the drug in question. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again."
76,Richard Brown,Illinois,"On May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of Richard Brown, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested Brown and searched his apartment without probable because and without a warrant. The detectives read Brown his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, Brown confessed to assisting in Corpus’ murder. Later, Brown was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder. Prior to his trial, Brown moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Brown guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State’s argument that the arrest was legal."
299,Ford Motor Company,United States,"When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled with interest from the government during the period between the date of filing and the ultimate refund, but the "" date of overpayment "" is never specifically defined. The Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) informed the Ford Motor Company ( Ford ) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS who covered the underpayment. Ford later requested that the deposits be considered to cover additional taxes that Ford owed. The court eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a refund. Ford argued that the date of overpayment was the date that it first made the payments to the IRS for the underpayment of taxes, and the Government argued that the date of overpayment was the date when Ford requested that the payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district court, and the court found in violation of the Government. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
1036,"Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.","Charles E. Austin, et al.","When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the ""New Policy,"" which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority."
1084,eBay Inc. et al.,"MercExchange, L.L.C.","MercExchange patented a design for an online marketplace in which a single company provides the trustworthy framework within which buyers and sellers can negotiate for goods. After negotiations with eBay and Half.com to license the patent failed, MercExchange brought suit in federal district court alleging patent violation under the Patent Act. The jury sided with MercExchange, ruling that its patent had been violated, but the district court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. The injunction would have forced eBay and Half.com to stop using the contested framework, but the judge applied the traditional four-part test to determine whether an injunction was necessary and found that it was not. That decision was reversed, however, by the you.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied a ""general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringements absent exceptional circumstances."""
281,Palmore,Sidoti,"Anthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child."
783,"Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al.",United States,"In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were accused of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government or for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire or teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had begun petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party activists were found guilty and federal courts upheld the conviction."
1207,"CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al.","Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.","In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for the shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1, 900 - mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers. As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264, 000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $ 143 million. Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $ 88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil. At the beginning of what turned out to be complex litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was only liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third - party breach of CITGO - s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati ( thus implicating liability under both contract and tort laws ). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable and both contract and of. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( NOAA ), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO ’ s liability by 50 %. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims. "
1220,Dwayne Giles,California,"When Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court eventually convicted Giles of murder. On appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex-girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the because of his ex-girlfriend's absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of ""forfeiture by wrongdoing"", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court was not motivated by a desire to prevent the witness' testimony."
237,United States,Edwin D. Lee,"Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He did not pay quarterly social security taxes, and in 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $27,000 in unpaid taxes. Lee paid the portion due for the first quarter of 1973 and sued for a refund. Lee argued that the tax violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. In the Amish religion, it is a sin not to provide for the community’s elderly and needy citizens. Lee argued that paying the federal government for Social Security violates that provision of his religion by giving the responsibility of caring for the elderly and needy to the government. The district court held that the Social Security tax was unconstitutional as applied. The court also noted that §1402(g) provides an exception to the social security tax for certain self employed individuals. The you.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal."
762,Flippo,West Virginia,"In 1996, James Michael Flippo called 911 to report that he and his wife had been attacked while camping in a West Virginia state park. Inside Flippo's cabin, officer's found his wife, with fatal head wounds. During their search, officers found and opened a closed briefcase, in which they discovered various photographs and negatives that allegedly incriminated Flippo. After he was indicted for murder, Flippo moved to suppress the photographs and negatives on the grounds that the police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment had justified the search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers, having secured the homicide crime scene for investigative purposes, had been within the law to conduct a thorough investigation and examination of anything and everything found within the crime scene area. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review."
1922,Limelight Networks,Akamai Technologies,"In the late 1990s, two professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Tom Leighton and Daniel Lewin, began to research techniques to provide stable internet services during periods of high traffic. These men eventually founded Akamai Technologies, Inc. (Akamai) to capitalize on this research. Akamai is an internet content delivery company that owns and maintains thousands of servers around the United States and contracts with internet service providers. By contracting with these companies, Akamai can deliver stable, fast internet to far-reaching customers with less danger of internet slowdown or failure. On July 14, 1998, the two men filed a patent through MIT for a method designed to alleviate Internet congestion by delivering content from multiple available servers. MIT then licensed this patent to Akamai. Shortly thereafter, several other internet companies filed patent applications for internet content delivery systems. This led to a series of litigations that spanned from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. In 2004, in the midst of these court battles, Akamai entered into negotiations to purchase Limelight Networks, Inc. (Limelight). In 2006, however, Limelight informed Akamai that it no longer wished to be purchased. Akamai subsequently sued Limelight in district court for violating 35 you.S.C. § 271(a) and § 271(b), federal laws prohibiting patent infringement. Specifically, § 271(a) prohibits general patent infringement and § 271(b) prohibits inducing patent infringement. The case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded Akamai a $41.5 million verdict based on lost profit, lost royalties, interest, and price erosion damages. After a series of post-trial motions, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of Limelight and held that, although Akamai's patent was violated, much of the violation occurred when Limelight's customers took the key steps to violate the patent. Although Limelight allowed these steps to occur, it did not control its customers' actions and therefore was not liable. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that an entity accused of patent infringement must either perform all of the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through its direct control."
670,Dred Scott,John F. A. Sanford,"Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no “negro” or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution."
1853,"Edward Boykin, Jr.",Alabama,"In the spring of 1966, a series of armed robberies were committed in Mobile, Alabama. In two instances a gun was fired, and one person was injured when the bullet ricocheted off the floor. The petitioner, 27-year-old Edward Boykin, Jr., was arrested on five counts of robbery. He was provided with court-appointed counsel and pled guilty on all five counts. The judge did not ask Boykin whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, nor does the record show that Boykin was aware of his rights to trial by jury and to confront his accusers. Pursuant to Alabama law, a jury trial determined Boykin’s punishment. Boykin did not testify and offered no evidence regarding his character. There was no evidence of a prior criminal record. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death on all five counts. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the death sentence, but three justices dissented on the grounds that the record did not show the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily."
126,Adrian Martell Davis,Washington,"Davis was arrested. Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the officers that she had beaten her with his fists and then fired. At trial, McCottry does not testify, but his 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis declined, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross - examine McCottry violated their Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the you. S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not "" testimonial "" and was therefore different from the statements at issue of Crawford."
2221,John Sturgeon,"Bert Frost, in His Official Capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al.","John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 you.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service."
229,"Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General","AU Optronics Corporation, et al.","On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display ( LCD ) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Class actions and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court under the act. The State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims of the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under its jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower courts's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the lawsuit in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable."
1080,"Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.",John Warren et al.,"The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
2265,"Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd.",Brian Newton,"Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims."
813,Bank Markazi,"Deborah Peterson, et al.","Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank ( Bank Markazi ) owned nearly $ 2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. While this case is pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of that stated, “ [ T ] he financial assets which are identified in and are subject of proceedings of the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution … in order to satisfy any judgment concerning the effect of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for any injury or death caused by an act of [ terrorism ]. ” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States ’ separation of powers because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment of plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The N. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1211,"Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al.","Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.","The Indiana legislature passed two laws at issue in this case. The one related to the disposition for fetal remains by abortion providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and pathological waste, thereby preventing abortion providers from incinerating fetal remains with surgical byproducts. The law additionally authorized mass cremation for fetal remains, which Indiana law does not allow for human remains. The second provision of Indiana law barred the knowing provision of sex -, race -, or non - selective abortions by abortion providers. Planned cities of Indiana and Kentucky supported the laws on constitutional grounds but notably did not make an argument that either law burdened a fundamental right."
1113,"Volvo Trucks North America, Inc.","Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.","Reeder, a Volvo truck dealership, sued Volvo for violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits forms of discriminatory pricing that reduce competition. When retail customers take bids from dealers such as Reeder, the dealers ask manufacturers for price concessions, which dealers factor into their bids. Reeder accused Volvo of offering better price concessions to other Volvo dealers bidding for different customers. Reeder cited four instances in which it had received a comparatively low concession from Volvo, but it claimed that its losses due to discriminatory pricing went beyond those four instances. District Court allowed the case to go to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Reeder. On appeal, Volvo argued that no competition was present, as would be required by the RPA, because Reeder was not actually bidding against the other Volvo dealers that allegedly got favorable concessions. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the Volvo dealers - though they did not bid against each other - ""competed at the same functional level."" Volvo's price discrimination would therefore fall under the RPA."
1105,"Mike Evans, Acting Warden",Reginald Chavis,"After Reginald Chavis was convicted of murder, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California court. After the California Court of Appeal denied Chavis' petition, he waited more than three years before appealing the decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without explanation. Having exhausted his state-court remedies, Chavis then sought to file a habeas petition in federal court. The district court, however, dismissed Chavis' petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act there is a one-year period in which a habeas petition must be filed. Chavis' three-year delay, the court ruled, had exceeded that period, and Chavis' petition was therefore untimely. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Chavis' state-court petition had been ""pending"" for the entire three years. Because the one-year statute of limitations did not apply to time during which state court petitions were pending, Chavis' petition in federal district court was timely under the AEDPA."
303,Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang,"FMR LLC, et al.","The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a case against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments ( Fidelity ), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson or Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ( OSHA ) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation actions against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged. Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated "" special "" protection sections of the Sarbanes - Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs were engaged in illegal activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees of the act."
834,"Stephen Voisine, et al.",United States,"In 2003 - 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman ( with whom he was in a domestic relationship ) violating a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “ knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person. ” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the person is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was convicted on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course to their investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend ’ s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes don't constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “ recklessness ” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of limitations from the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court ’ s decision. United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the, physical force ” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine ’ s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute."
1328,United States,Glenn Marcus,"A New York federal district court convicted Glenn Marcus of violating sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (""TVPA""). The TVPA was enacted after Mr. Marcus engaged in some of the behavior for which he was charged. Yet, the jury was not instructed as to the date when the TVPA was enacted in relation to Mr. Marcus' allegedly illegal behavior. On appeal, he argued that the TVPA was applied retroactively, and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. Applying a ""plain-error"" standard of review, the court held that Mr. Marcus was entitled to a new trial on Ex Post Facto grounds. The court reasoned that if it was possible for the jury, who had not been given instructions regarding the date of the TVPA's enactment, to convict exclusively on the defendant's pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause."
748,Boy Scouts of America,Dale,"The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message."
151,"Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama",Yvonne Kennedy et al.,"In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing only a special election to fill vacancies in the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an Act explicitly allowing local laws to allow such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama. The you. S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local laws was the least recent precleared practice put to effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unconstitutional, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented."
1315,Texas,New Mexico,"Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination. In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico. When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30-day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss."
47,Joseph Anthony Davis,United States,"Joseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed ""acceptable for service"" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' case was not impacted by Gutknecht. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v. Fox. Fox involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 you.S.C. Section 2255. Davis asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Fox changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court."
290,Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley,United States,"In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $500,000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys. Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the you.S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys' offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision."
229,"Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County, The Commissioner of Education of the State of New York","Amy Rowley, by her parents Clifford and Nancy Rowley, and Clifford and Nacy Rowley in their own right","Furnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter. Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing. School administrators, along with a sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter. Amy’s parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all handicapped students. The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students. The district court ruled in the Rowleys' favor, holding that while Amy was doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
672,General Electric Company,Joiner,"In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical ""PCBs"" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely because of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion."
714,Charles Schenck,United States,"During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary labor. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the law, but offered only peaceful resistance. Schenck was charged in conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by failing to because insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Smith and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed under the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment."
1375,"Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al.","Edgar D. Brown et ux., co-administrators of the Estate of Julian David Brown, et al.","The families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction."
1297,Brett Jones,Mississippi,"When Brett Jones was three weeks old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his decision and sentence. In a post - conviction relief proceeding, The Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to prison eligibility. Subsequently, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 you. S. 460 ( 2012 ), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 you. S. _ _ ( 2016 ). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment ’ s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “ for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. ” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility."
623,Jorge Luna Torres,"Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General","In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( INS ) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “ alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. ” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the relocation order because he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony ; the Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute is an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres ’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, this you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA ’ preliminary ruling and concluded the violation in the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute ’ s interstate commerce element. That decision disagreed with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres ’ petition for cancellation of the removal order."
352,City of Los Angeles,"Naranjibhai Patel, et al.","Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code ( LAMC ) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also permits police officers to access hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the law violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are "" closely regulated "" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections. The district court determined that motels were not subjected to the similar kind of pervasive, regular regulations as other recognized "" closely regulated "" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels don't have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right for their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private "" papers "" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre - compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records."
460,Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus,United States,"Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist’s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “Mark”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel. FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) a report on Abel as a suspected spy; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel’s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial. Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel’s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel’s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel’s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant."
1144,Jason J. Mont,United States of America,"Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug - related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months ’ imprisonment followed with five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017. While on supervised release, Mont became engaged in and was incarcerated for state - law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state - court charges in exchange for a predetermined six - year sentence. Due to administrative delays following a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time to the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont ’ a probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont ’ s state - court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months ’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state - court convictions. Mont challenged the district court ’ s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a sentence of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercises jurisdiction."
1143,John Cunningham,California,"John Cunningham, a former police officer, was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of his young son. Under California's Determinate Sentencing Law, the trial judge can choose between three possible sentences for a given crime: a minimum, medium, and maximum sentence. Judges normally hand down the medium sentence unless there are special circumstances. In Cunningham's case, the judge found six aggravating factors, and sentenced him to the maximum 16-year sentence. However, in determining some of the aggravating factors the judge relied on evidence not considered by the jury. Cunningham appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge's discretion was a violation of Cunningham's right to a trial by jury. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court had ruled that for the right to a jury trial to be effective, any fact which increases a sentence ""beyond the prescribed statutory maximum"" must be proved before the jury. Cunningham argued that the judge can consider only factors determined by the jury when deciding which sentence to impose. A California Court of Appeal disagreed and upheld the sentence, ruling that the judge had merely handed down the maximum sentence prescribed by the statute. The California Supreme Court denied Cunningham's appeal, but the you.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case."
566,Richards,Jefferson County,"Jason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims were also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action."
539,United States,Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT,"The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 million. CF&I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 you.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent ""tax"" on any ""accumulated funding deficiency"" of plans such as CF&I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an ""excise tax"" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later approved a reorganization plan for CF&I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
1295,Brett Jones,Mississippi,"When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 you.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 you.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility."
1655,Kansas,Jonathan and Reginald Carr,"In December 2000, brothers Jonathan and Reginald Carr committed a series of crimes in Wichita, Kansas, known as “The Wichita Massacre,” which included assault, robbery, rape, and the murder of five people. The Carrs were prosecuted jointly. They moved to sever their cases and argued that being tried jointly would be prejudicial because they intended to mount antagonistic defenses and introduce evidence that would be admissible or non-prejudicial only in separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Carrs were later jointly convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to death. The jury instructions at the sentencing trial did not state that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Carrs argued that their Eighth Amendment rights to individualized sentencing were violated both by the trial judge’s refusal to sever their cases and the failure to affirmatively instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the death sentences by holding that the trial judge failed to do the necessary analysis and carefully consider the severance issue. The court also held that the jurors may have been prevented from giving meaningful effect to mitigating evidence because they were not instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the consolidated case, Kansas v. Gleason, Gleason was convicted of capital murder for the killings of several people in connection with a robbery. He was also convicted of pre-meditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The jury sentenced Gleason to death for the capital murder charge and a consecutive sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years for the other charges. Gleason appealed his convictions, and the Kansas Supreme Court vacated his conviction of life imprisonment because it was multiplicitous with his death sentence and vacated his death sentence because the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider mitigating circumstances."
939,"Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General",James Garcia Dimaya,"James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a former permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first - degree residential burglary ; both convictions resulted in two years ’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ), a non - citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “ crime of violence, ” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property. The Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) affirmed. While Dimaya ’ his appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a'violent felony ” in the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA ’ "" crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely identical to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice for defendants or failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial."
1482,Abigail N. Fisher,"University of Texas at Austin, et al.","In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in admission. Abigail N. Fisher, a Caucasian female, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent of her class, so she competed for admission with other non-top ten percent in-state applicants. The University of Texas denied Fisher's application. Fisher filed suit against the university and other related defendants, claiming that the University of Texas' use of race as a consideration in admission decisions was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The university argued that its use of race was a narrowly tailored means of pursuing greater diversity. The district court decided in favor of the University of Texas, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Fisher appealed the appellate court's decision."
9,Sierra Club,"Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States","The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest and was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80 - acre ski resort. The size of that proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting approval on the development of the Ice King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds, the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions before the court and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the trial court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case."
374,Gerald E. Mansell,Gaye M. Mansell,"Major Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed."
1076,"Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.","Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.","Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors which they allege developed cancer after both were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “ bare metal ” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos - containing insulation materials were made. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The two manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment decision on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors ’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs ’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright - line as opposed to the fact - specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district Court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court ’ s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos - related injuries because they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer ’ s actions. In so holding, the circuit court applied the bare metal defense's fact - specific standard rather than the bright - line rule."
1208,Samson Taiwo Dada,"Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General","Samson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a you.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Dada's wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada's request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country closed, Dada filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request. Dada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada's voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on future re-entry."
1357,"Paul Renico, Warden",Reginald Lett,"On the second day of jury deliberations in Reginald Lett's murder trial in a Michigan state court, the trial judge declared a mistrial because a juror asked what would happen if the jury did not agree. Mr. Lett was subsequently retried and convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After exhausting his state court remedies, including an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr. Lett petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan federal district court arguing that his retrial violated the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal district court granted the petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that a ""court may not force a defendant to undergo retrial on a matter that concluded without a conviction or acquittal unless there was a 'manifest necessity' for declaring a mistrial."" While the court further recognized that a jury deadlock is a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, a trial judge's decision may only be upheld if it was based on an exercise of ""sound discretion."" Here, the court concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial judge had exercised sound discretion."
1389,Michelle Ortiz,Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright,"Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told ""that the man was leaving,"" ""this was his nature,"" and he ""is just an old dirty man."" The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not ""deliberately indifferent"" to Ms. Ortiz's plight."
88,Nebraska Press Association et al.,"Hugh Stuart, Judge, District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska et al.","A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused."
870,"United States, et al.","Texas, et al.","In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, along with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program. Texas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice-and-comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice-and-comment claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims."
2247,"Manhattan Community Access Corporation, et al.","Deedee Halleck, et al.","A New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide “at least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.” This channel must be open to the “public on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.” New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that Time Warner provide four public-access channels, which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN). Petitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights. Generally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation requires “state action.” However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC’s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the City of New York but reversed as to MCAC and its employees, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC to find that New York City had “delegated to MNN the traditionally public function of administering and regulating speech in the public forum” of public-access cable television. Thus, MNN creates a public forum and functions as a state actor."
698,Curt Muller,Oregon,"Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The owner of a laundry business, Curt Muller, was paid $ 10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed her sentence. The state supreme judge upheld this law ’ s passage."
903,Lawrence Eugene Shaw,United States,"Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank to America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one time his employees to receive his mail and forward it for him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu ’ s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu ’'name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu ’ s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $ 307, 500 of Hsu ’ personal money to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $ 131, 000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $ 106, 000. Hsu lost about $ 170, 000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require. The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “ to defraud a financial institution. ” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial asset. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, but that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
915,Miller-El,Cockrell,"When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary."
1874,United States,"W.M. Webb, Inc., et al.","W.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions. The commercial fishing companies paid employers’ taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not “employees” for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1292,Ford Motor Company,"Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.","In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires collapsed. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett ’ s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design - defect, failure - to - warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over any defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general corporate jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant ’ s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff ’ s claims “ arise out of or relate to ” the defendant ’ s activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its offices in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court dismissed Ford ’ s motion to dismiss, finding a clear connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. ” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that through advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19 - 369, which arises from Minnesota but presents the same legal question."
59,Bigelow,Virginia,"A Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for ""any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage."" Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions."
526,Lockheed Corporation,Spink,"Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink."
1263,Daniel Girmai Negusie,"Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General","Daniel Negusie, an Eritrean citizen, worked as a prison guard in Eritrea before seeking asylum in the United States. When Negusie tried to come into the country, however, the you.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The INS based its decision on evidence that Negusie assisted in the persecution of prison inmates on the basis of a protected ground, specifically, the prisoners' Protestant religious beliefs. Negusie appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that he did not voluntarily assist in the persecution but rather attempted to help the individuals who were being mistreated. The BIA gave little weight to Negusie's argument that he was trying to help the prisoners, instead focusing on his more prominent involvement in the persecution as an armed guard who oversaw and was complicit in the acts. After the BIA upheld the INS' denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal, Negusie filed a petition to have his case reviewed before the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finding that the evidence from the BIA decision did not compel a conclusion that Negusie was uninvolved in the persecution of inmates, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition."
638,"Tyson Foods, Inc.","Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.","Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. ( Tyson ) at the company ’ s meat - processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a “ one - time ” system, which means they were paid only for time they had at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying employees compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified that class, and its jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars. Tyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in naming the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the company ’ s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s certification of a plaintiff class."
669,Proprietors of Charles River Bridge,Proprietors of Warren Bridge,"In 1786, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a dam and collect tolls. In 1786, a governor established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and toll. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on their mortgage loan."
1026,"Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea",United States of America,"Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant ’ s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant ’ s sentence under 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( e ) without providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government ’ s motion to reduced the defendant ’ s sentence to a term above their statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “ a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been raised by the Sentencing Commission... if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ” The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ) reductions. Rather, an Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence was based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court ’ s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different of those used by any district court."
890,United States,Vonn,"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures ""which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded"" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions."
2110,Juan Esquivel-Quintana,"Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General","Juan Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the relevant statute in California. In California, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor is defined as an act of sexual intercourse with a person who is a minor and not the spouse of the perpetrator. The statute further provides that anyone who is convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony. After 2009, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan, which is where the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA states that a non-citizen may be removed from the United States if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as sexual abuse of a minor. An Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California law constituted sexual abuse of a minor and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” in the INA encompassed convictions under the relevant California statute without looking at the individual facts of the case. The you.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision. The appellate court determined that the BIA’s decision was entitled to deference as a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and that the rule of lenity--requiring that statutory ambiguity be resolved in the defendant’s favor--did not apply in a civil case."
668,Federal Election Commission,Akins,"The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in ""contributions"" or which make more than $1,000 in ""expenditures"" in a year ""for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office."" Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a ""communication"" by a ""membership organization or corporation"" ""to its members"" as long as the organization is not ""organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election."" A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee."
1941,Red Lion Broadcasting Co.,Federal Communications Commission,"The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged."
1105,Helsinn Healthcare S.A.,"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.","Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 you.S.C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”"
738,West Coast Hotel Company,"Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife","Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $ 14. 50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an income less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the salary paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state statute. In ruling for the Court, the lower courts relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital ( 1946 ), in which the Court struck down a state wage law protecting working women."
2092,"Crystal Monique Lightfoot, et al. ","Cendant Mortgage Corporation, et al.","Crystal Monique Lightfoot and Beverly Ann Hollis-Arlington sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in federal district court and alleged numerous state and federal law claims arising out of the foreclosure proceedings Fannie Mae initiated against Hollis-Arlington’s home. The district court dismissed and held that the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their claims. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The plaintiffs then sued in California state court and alleged the state law equivalents of the claims in the earlier federal suit. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court and argued that its federal corporate charter contained language that granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which it was involved as a plaintiff or defendant. The plaintiffs in this case moved for a remand back to state court, but the district court denied the remand and then dismissed all the claims as having already been litigated in the earlier case in federal court. The appellate court determined that the language in Fannie Mae’s federal charter conferred subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts and affirmed the dismissal."
931,City of Los Angeles,Edwin David,"On August 13, 1998, Edwin David’s car was towed because he was improperly parked in a spot where parking was prohibited. He claimed he could not see the “no parking” sign because there were trees blocking it from view. David paid the fees to recover his car, but he also submitted a request for a hearing to challenge the ticket and recover his money. The hearing was held 27 days after the car was towed, and David’s claim was dismissed. David then sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 you.S.C. 1983 and claimed that the 27-day wait for the hearing denied him due process under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the Due Process Clause required that the city hold a hearing at least within five days."
1401,Ricky D. Fox,"Judy Ann Vice, as executrix of the Estate of Billy Ray Vice, et al.","In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an ""anonymous"" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal because of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order."
1345,Michigan,Jeremy Fisher,"Jeremy Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At trial, he argued that evidence be suppressed because its acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment. Leading up to Mr. Fisher's arrest, police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance where upon their arrival Mr. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and bleeding. After the officers inquired whether Mr. Fisher was okay, he ignored them and told them to get a search warrant. One of the officers then pushed the door open and entered the house and found Mr. Fisher pointing a gun at him. The trial court granted Mr. Fisher's motion to suppress the evidence, which was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied permission to appeal."
929,"Michael Fitzgerald, Treasurer of Iowa",Racing Association of Central Iowa,"A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision."
933,Susan Jinks,"Richland County, South Carolnia","If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions."
2165,"Encino Motorcars, LLC","Hector Navarro, et al.","Encino Motorcars, LLC, which sells and services Mercedes-Benz cars, employed Hector Navarro and others as “service advisors.” Their role was to greet car owners upon arrival in the service area of the dealership, listen to customers’ concerns about their cars, evaluate the repair and maintenance needs of the cars, suggest services, write up estimates, and follow up with the customer while repair work was being done. Navarro and the other plaintiffs alleged in federal district court that Encino Motorcars violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime wages. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the FLSA exempts service advisors from its overtime compensation provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, using the principle of Chevron deference to rely on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2011 interpreting the statutory exemption as not encompassing service providers. The US Supreme Court vacated the panel’s decision, holding that the regulation lacked sufficient explanation and thus was not entitled to deference. On remand, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own interpretation of the applicable FLSA provision and concluded that the exemption does not encompass service advisors."
781,"Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al.",United States,"In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders became convicted of advocating the immediate overthrow of the Communist government and for the violation of several sections of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire or teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction in another United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld their conviction."
136,Bordenkircher,Hayes,"Paul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had two prior felony convictions on his record.) If found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise."
11,Rudolph Santobello,State of New York,"In 1969, the State of New York indicted Rudolph Santobello on two felony counts. After Santobello pled not guilty to both counts, the prosecutor offered him a plea deal. In order to receive a lighter sentence, Santobello could plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor further agreed not to recommend a sentence to the judge. Santobello accepted the deal and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense. After several months, Santobello still had not been sentenced. By the time the court considered his sentencing, both Santobello’s defense counsel and the original prosecutor had been replaced. The new prosecutor, unaware of the previous prosecutor’s plea offer, recommended the maximum one-year sentence for Santobello’s crime. Despite Santobello’s objections, the court issued the maximum sentence. Santobello appealed, but the appellate court affirmed his conviction."""
2362,"Cedar Point Nursery, et al.","Victoria Hassid, et al.","In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances. Cedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union (""the UFW"") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not. Sometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice. Cedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court."
1500,"Doug Decker, in his official capacity as Oregon State Forester, et al.","Northwest Environmental Defense Center, et al.","Two logging roads in Oregon, Trask River Road and Sam Downs Road, are owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Board of Forestry. The roads are used primarily by various logging companies. These roads run parallel to rivers and use a series of ditches, culverts, and channels to direct storm water runoff into the nearby rivers. This runoff deposits large amounts of sediment in the rivers, which adversely affects the fish and other wildlife that relies on the water. The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry and several timber companies. The NEDC alleged that, since the runoff ditches and channels can be defined as ""point sources,"" the petitioners violated the Clean Water Act by failing to obtain permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. In district court, the petitioners moved for dismissal by arguing that the runoff was exempt from the permits. The district court granted the motion. The NEDC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the decision based on precedent that supported the NEDC interpretation of both the ""point source"" and the permit requirement."
802,"Robert J. Wittman, et al.","Gloria Personhuballah, et al.","In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting proposal that altered the composition of The Third Congressional District, which was already majority African - American, and increased the percentage of African - American people in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia ’ s Third Congressional District was becoming gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal ; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed before the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in 2016 on its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority ’ s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts should examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan."
1402,Eric L. Thompson,"North American Stainless, LP","Eric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to ""discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title."" The you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII ""does not permit third party retaliation claims."" A divided panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint."
407,Larry Whitfield,United States,"On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby, gave a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery. A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the evidence was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only had to find that his actions were the consequences because of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of allowing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
445,"Rufo, Sheriff Of Suffolk County, et al.",Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail et al.,"After the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail’s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
1189,"United States Department of Commerce, et al.","State of New York, et al.","Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition representing states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could because a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary ’ s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates existing regulatory, statutory, and statutory provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought — and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized — depositions of high - ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross "" s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government ’ s previous stay application without prejudice, “ provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before their depositions in question are taken. ” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high - ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed him to proceed. The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact - finding of the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the district Court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction."
1675,Albert L. Trop,"John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State","In 1944, United States Army private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca, Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to Casablanca. Despite testifying that he ""decided to return to the stockade"" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a US citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari."
848,BE & K Construction Company,National Labor Relations Board,"In filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K's claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K of committing an unfair labor practice."
1203,Myrna Gomez-Perez,"John E. Potter, Postmaster General","Myrna Gómez-Pérez worked as a clerk for the United States Postal Service (USPS) in Puerto Rico. Gómez alleged that she was subject to retaliatory treatment after filing an age discrimination complaint against her supervisors under section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A federal district court granted summary judgment to the USPS on the ground that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity as to retaliation claims under the ADEA. Gómez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals in the First Circuit. It held that the USPS and Potter have waived sovereign immunity with respect to ADEA suits, but that Section 15 of the ADEA does not provide a because of action for retaliation by federal employers."
785,Dickerson,United States,"During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that ""a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."" The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that ""Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."""
1066,"Gerald Devenpeck, et al.",Jerome Anthony Alford,"Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work. Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable because for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable because Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's ""closely related offense doctrine."""
749,Smith,Robbins,"A California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins."
1318,Mark A. Briscoe and Sheldon A. Cypress,Virginia,"This appeal is the consolidation of three separate cases that involved defendants' conviction for possession of cocaine in a Virginia state court. On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission into evidence of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at trial from the person who performed the analysis and prepared the certificate, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 19.2-187, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the provisions of Section 19.2-187 did not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Moreover, the court held that the defendants in these cases knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the forensic analysts when they failed to call them as witnesses at trial."
980,U.S. Bank National Association,"Village at Lakeridge, LLC","The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, (Lakeridge) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC (MBP), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge’s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP’s board. you.S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge’s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin’s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. you.S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non-statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court’s finding if it is clear from the evidence that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP’s board to be considered an insider."
1234,Michelle Monasky,Domenico Taglieri,"Michelle Monasky, a you. S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, said that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two - month - old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian state to terminate Monasky ’ s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri ’ s favor ex parte ( without an appearance by Monasky ). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby into Italy. The court granted Taglieri ’ s petition, finding that Italy was the baby ’ s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the you. S. Supreme Court denied Monasky ’ s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s ruling, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 you. S. C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking any child in violation of custodial rights “ under the law of the State in which the baby was habitually resident immediately before the removal. ” To determine the child ’ s habitual residence, a court must look “ to the place in which the child has become ‘ acclimatized, ’ or as a back - up inquiry, “ shared parental intent. ” Because the child, over two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents ’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court ’ and finding as to their residence, the Sixth Circuit ( en banc ) affirmed."
698,California Dental Association,Federal Trade Commission,"The California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies, provides its members with insurance and financing arrangements, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members' benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits false or misleading advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging that the CDA's guidelines restricted two types of truthful, non-deceptive advertising: price advertising and advertising relating to the quality of dental services and therefore had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the FTC had jurisdiction over the CDA and found a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC adopted most of the ALJ's factual findings and held that the price advertising, as well as the non-price, restrictions were violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Court of Appeals sustain the FTC's jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case."
2326,"David Thompson, et al.","Heather Hebdon, Executive Director of the Alaska Public Offices Commission, et al.","Alaska law imposes certain limits on political contributions. Specifically, it limits contributions made by individuals to political candidates, contributions made by individuals to election-related groups, political party-to-candidate contributions, and the total funds a candidate may receive from out-of-state residents. Three individuals and a division of the Alaska Republican Party challenged these four provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment. The district court upheld all four provisions. On appeal, a panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group limits, as well as the political-party-to-candidate limit. However, it reversed as to the out-of-state resident limit. The court reasoned that the first three limits are narrowly tailored to prevent actual or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption and thus do not impermissibly infringe constitutional rights. In contrast, the nonresident limit does not target an “important state interest” and therefore violates the First Amendment."
1502,Kim Millbrook,United States,"Kim Millbrook was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Millbrook alleges that a correctional officer took him to the basement of the Special Management Unit and sexually assaulted him while other officers stood by. Millbrook filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging sexual assault. Under 28 you.S.C. §2680(h), the United States is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees, except for certain torts committed by law enforcement officials. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d. 868 (1986) limited claims that arise under §2680(h) to intentional torts by a law enforcement officer while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making arrests for violations of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that Millbrook's claim was precluded by Pooler. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the definition of seizure is limited to seizure of evidence."
505,"Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, et al.",Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon et al.,"The Endangered Species Act requires that no person ""take"" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as ""harass, harm, pursue,"" ""wound,"" or ""kill."" The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes ""harm"" as including ""significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife."" Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, ""harm"" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal."
1840,Joyce C. Thorpe ,Housing Authority of the City of Durham,"Joyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was evicted after being elected president of the building’s Parents Club. The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction. When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered. The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe’s eviction. Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the eviction. While the case was pending before the you.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction. The you.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular. The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively. Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment."
2,Dunn,Blumstein,"A Tennessee law required a one - year residence in a town and a three - month residence in the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a college professor who had recently moved from Tennessee, challenged that law by filing lawsuits against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in Tennessee district courts."
844,"US Airways, Inc.",Barnett,"In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against ""an individual with a disability"" who with ""reasonable accommodation"" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer ""can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business."" In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an ""undue hardship"" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship."
167,"Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York","The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.","In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated individuals turn over certain non - public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association ( CHA ), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigations. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( OCC ), the federal agency credited with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks'compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act ( NBA ) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act ( FHA ) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue surrounding whether the FHA provided an obstacle to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication."
528,David Carpenter,United States,"R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ ) entitled Heard on the Street ( Heard ) in which he reported on up - and - coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, this generally affected both actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four - month period, the brokers used Winans ’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $ 690, 000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) began an investigation, Winans and his co - conspirator Carpenter confessed. The district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co - conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ — the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud and — had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners ’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services represented a sufficient nexus to Phillips'knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he sued the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ."
11,Regents of the University of California,Allan Bakke,"Allan Bakke, a thirty - five - year - old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of two hundred for "" qualified "" minorities, as part for the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress earlier, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's scores ( college GPA and test scores ) exceeded those of any of the minority students and in the two years Allan's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in The Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race."
762,West Virginia State Board of Education,Walter Barnette,"In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part in school discipline. The children in their family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform this salute and were sent away from school for non - compliance. They were also threatened with having schools used for criminally active offenders, and many parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile detention."
805,Bush,Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,"The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the you.S. Supreme Court."
1747,Banco Nacional de Cuba,Peter L.F. Sabbatino et al.,"Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar violated international law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
430,"Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator",Federal Election Commission,"In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted (""soft money"") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of ""issue ads"" or ""coordinated expenditures""). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals."
411,"Baker Botts, LLP","ASARCO, LLC","Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $ 120 million in fees for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 debt case, from which Asarco had resigned in 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors for full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy judge awarded Baker Botts more than $ 117 million to cover the fees in addition to $ 5 million for expenses incurred defending the fee claims. The district court reversed. The C. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code did specifically allow the firms to recover $ 5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's actions."
2169,Florencio Rosales-Mireles,United States of America,"Florencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 you.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). His total criminal-history score was calculated according to the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but when calculating the criminal-history score, the probation officer erroneously counted a 2009 Texas conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. His total criminal-history score, combined with other factors, led a sentence of 78 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Rosales-Mireles did not object to the sentence after it was imposed. The Fifth Circuit found that Rosales-Mireles met the three prongs necessary to meet the plain error standard. However, if all three prongs are met, the court has the discretion to remedy the plain error if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court declined to exercise its discretion in this case and therefore affirmed the judgment of sentence."
113,DaimlerChrysler Corp.,"Charlotte Cuno, et al.","As part of Ohio's capital development plan, DaimlerChrysler promised to expand its headquarters in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $ 300 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the you. S. Constitution while offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, which on appeal a judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other industries, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce."
219,"City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX",Federal Communications Commission,"Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the National Communications Act and required local governments to respond to these requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed progress. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission ( "" FCC "" ) to bring an answer to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following "" reasonable time "" limits for zoning requests : 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days on new structures. The local governments claimed : the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the agency to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long - standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation."
1404,Kevin Kasten,Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation,"On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (""FLSA"") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA."
647,American Telephone & Telegraph Company,"Central Office Telephone, Inc.","Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T must file ""tariffs"" containing all its charges for interstate services and all ""classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges"" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T, may not ""extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff].""In 1989, AT&T sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award."
657,Bousley,United States,"In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to ""using"" a firearm ""during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,"" in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense."
798,Zadvydas,Davis,"After a final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release. After being ordered deported based on is criminal record, efforts to deport Kestutis Zadvydas failed. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, Zadvydas filed a habeas action. In granting the writ, the District Court reasoned that his confinement would be permanent and thus violate the Constitution. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not impossible. Conversely, in ordering Kim Ho Ma's release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period."
1100,Keanu D.W. Ortiz,United States,"Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a ""civil office,” including positions that require ""an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."" 10 you.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). A judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), asking the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from serving on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's arguments. Note: This case was original consolidated under Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961), and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there."
620,Jorge Luna Torres,"Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General","In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s ruling and concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute’s interstate commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres’ petition for cancellation of the removal order."
1121,Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation,"Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.","Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that publishes online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall - Street. com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license clause, Wall - Street was required to remove all of the content generated by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall - Street cancelled its accounts, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly violated copyrights and the copyright owner had not yet registered its trademark. The district court dismissed that action, finding “ registration ” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of users “ register the infringement, ” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
2305,"Romag Fasteners, Inc.","Fossil, Inc., et al.","Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent. A jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the you.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 you.S. __ (2017), that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits."
1896,Zenith Radio Corporation,"Hazeltine Research, Inc.","After refusing to renew a patent licensing agreement, Zenith Radio Corp., a radio and television manufacturer, was sued by Hazeltine Research, Inc., for patent infringement in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Zenith counterclaimed, alleging anti-trust violations, misuse of patents, and a conspiracy to restrain trade in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith asked for treble damages and injunctive relief. Zenith contended that Hazeltine's license forced them to pay for use of unpatented products and that Hazeltine had illegally conspired with foreign patent pools to prevent Zenith from expanding into those markets. Before trial, Zenith had stipulated that Hazeltine and its parent corporation were one entity for the purposes of litigation. The District Court entered judgment against Hazeltine and its parent corporation, awarding Zenith treble damages and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award, but otherwise reversed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated all judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation because Zenith's pretrial stipulation did not properly designate the parent corporation as a party to the litigation."
1746,Bell,Maryland,"A group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant. Mr. Hooper called the police, who told him that they needed a warrant to be able to do anything. After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions."
1710,"James Monroe, et al.","Frank Pape, et al.","On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on ""open"" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney. Monroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no because of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal."
1569,Doyle Randall Paroline,United States and Amy Unknown,"Doyle R. Paroline pled guilty to possession of 150-300 images of child pornography. Included among those files on his computer were two photographs of Amy Unknown, a victim of child pornography. He was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration followed by release under supervision. Under a federal statute that mandates full restitution to victims of child pornography by those convicted of creating, distributing or possessing such material, the Government and Amy sought restitution in the amount of nearly $3.4 million. The district court denied restitution and held that the statute required the Government to prove that Paroline's possession of the images was the proximate because of the injuries for which restitution was sought. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Paroline was responsible for restitution for all the victim's losses even if his criminal acts occurred after the victim's losses."
740,Nynex Corporation,"Discon, Inc.","Discon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed."
1227,James Erin McKinney,State of Arizona,"By way of relevant background, James McKinney ’ s childhood was “ horrific ” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse — all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from family and was placed in juvenile court. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half - brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney ’ s jury found him guilty of two counts of first - degree murder ( without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder ), and Hedlund ’ s jury found him guilty of one count of first - degree murder and one count of second - degree murder. After McKinney ’ s capital sentencing hearing ( before a judge ), his psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with psychological “ resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered. ” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney ’ s childhood trauma and produce “ diminished capacity. ” The trial judge credited the psychologist ’ s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non - statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney ’ s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney ’ s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in an court. The district court denied relief, the a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 you. S. 104 ( 1982 ), a refusing to consider McKinney. s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney ’ s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court ; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 you. S. 584 ( 2002 ), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘ final ’ before the you. S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring."
1089,"Apple, Inc.","Robert Pepper, et al.",". lawsuit arose out of Apple ’ s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “ closed system, ” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “ App Store. ” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third - party developer, Apple receives 30 % of the sale price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action case against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The suit was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same or other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these allegations was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale. Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court ’ s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 you. S. 720 ( 1977 ). Under Illinois Brick, “ only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution ” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court ’ s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick, thus. standing."
525,David Carpenter,United States,"R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled Heard on the Street (Heard) in which he reported on up-and-coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four-month period, the brokers used Winans’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $690,000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, Winans and his co-conspirator Carpenter confessed. The district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co-conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ—the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges—had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans' knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ."
55,Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct ""loss reserves,"" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute ""reserve strengthening,"" or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves."
630,Edwards et al.,Balisok,"Jerry B. Balisok, a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable."
562,United States,Virginia,"The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer ""substantively comparable"" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court."
1299,Albert Holland,Florida,"A Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Holland petitioned for federal habeas relief in a Florida federal district court. The district court denied the petition as untimely. On appeal, Mr. Holland argued that his attorney failed to communicate with him about the status of his case, then failed to file a timely federal habeas corpus petition, despite repeated instructions by Mr. Holland to do so. Therefore, Mr. Holland contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that absent an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment on the attorney's part, no mere negligence of the attorney's rises to the level of egregious misconduct that would entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to equitable tolling."
1611,"Alabama Department of Revenue, et al.","CSX Transportation, Inc.","Alabama imposes a 4% sales tax on the gross receipts of retail businesses and a 4% use tax on storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property. Accordingly, rail carriers that purchase diesel fuel within the state are subject to a 4% sales tax. However, motor and water carriers that purchase fuel in Alabama pay an excise tax of $0.19 per gallon. In 2008, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) sued the Alabama Department of Revenue for violating the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 (4-R Act), which targeted local and state taxation schemes that discriminated against rail carriers. CSX argued that the sales tax was discriminatory because it required the rail carriers to pay more than their competitors for purchasing diesel fuel in the state. The district court dismissed the case and you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal by citing precedent that held that a railroad could not challenge its competitors' exemptions from a sales tax as discriminatory under the 4-R Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, overturned the ruling, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and issued an order holding that the state's sales tax does not discriminate against rail carriers for the purposes of the 4-R Act, because the amount that motor carriers paid was roughly equal to that paid by rail carriers. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that the tax is discriminatory because the state had not offered sufficient justification for exempting CSX's competitors from the sales tax."
747,"Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell",Connecticut,"Newton Cantwell and his family, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were driving door - to - door and approaching people on the street. Two witnesses objected angrily to an anti - Catholic message. Cantwell or his sons were arrested and charged with : ( 1 ) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, or ( 2 ) inciting a public - law breach of the peace."
36,San Antonio Independent School District,Rodriguez,"In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures."
2330,Manfredo Salinas,United States Railroad Retirement Board,"In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the you.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good because for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007. Nearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the you.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition."
653,Robert Fletcher,John Peck,"In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the law and declared all deeds and claims under it to be invalid. In 1795, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher several years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the previous sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the parcel and thus suffered a breach of contract."
2129,Epic Systems Corporation,Jacob Lewis,"Epic Systems Corporation (Epic) is a Wisconsin-based healthcare data management software company. Epic has an arbitration agreement that requires its employees to resolve any employment-based disputes with Epic through individual arbitration and to waive their right to participate in or receive benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. In February 2015, former Epic employee Jacob Lewis sued Epic in federal court individually and on behalf of similarly-situated employees and claimed that they had been denied overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Epic moved to dismiss the complaint and cited the waiver clause of its arbitration agreement. The district court denied Epic’s motion and held that the waiver was unenforceable because it violated the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities” under Section Seven of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and added that the waiver was also unenforceable under the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). That clause provides that arbitration agreements are to be enforced unless there legal or equitable grounds that would render a contract unenforceable. Finding the waiver of collective proceedings illegal under the NLRA, the appellate court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the FAA. This case was consolidated with Ernst & Young v. Morris and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., both cases that dealt with the relationship between the FAA and the NLRA."
765,Portuondo,Agard,"Ray Agard was tried in New York on sodomy, assault, and weapons counts. Ultimately, Agard's trial turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of Agard. The prosecutor challenged Agard's credibility. During summation, the prosecutor remarked, ""[h]e gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies,"" and ""[t]hat gives [him] a big advantage, does not it?"" The prosecutor alleged that Agard had tailored his testimony to fit evidence that he heard from witnesses through the course of the trial. The trial court rejected Agard's objection that these comments violated his right to be present at trial. After exhausting his state appeals, Agard petitioned for federal habeas corpus, claiming that the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at trial and confront his accusers, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied his petition. The Court of Appeals reversed."
56,Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct "" loss reserves, "" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1996 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute "" reserve weakening, "" including additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time added benefit because it would result in a financial deficiency. Treasury Secretary and the Commissioner for Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It said reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves."
991,Merit Management Group,"FTI Consulting, Inc.","Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares in a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in 1997 for $ 55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money to Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30 % shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $ 16. 5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code § 544, 548 ( a ) ( a ) ( b ), and 4, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers "" made by or to "" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “ made by or to ” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and don't benefit from it. The Seventh Circuit held that section 546 ( e ) does not establish a safe harbor against transfer of transfers to non - named entities where a designated entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary."
452,Junius Irving Scales,United States,"The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of United United States ( "" Party "" ) because it advocated the overthrow by the government "" as speedily as Congress would permit. "" Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act, 1950 ( "" Security Act "" ) provides that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, a Supreme Court granted review."
1221,"Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al.",Christopher M. Sulyma,"In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company ’ s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ), which sets forth the standards of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma claimed that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his management ( and thus investment ) period of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time - barred under 29 U. S. C. § 1113 ( 2 ), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “ three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation. ” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered consideration of the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that “ actual knowledge ” does not mean that the defendant knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, which means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court ’ this grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings."
362,David Randolph Gray,Mississippi,"On June 3, 1982, Attina Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik’s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik’s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping. During the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor’s for-because motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The voir dire oath of panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for because, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-because motions for the other panelists. The jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray’s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray’s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray’s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court’s failure to follow voir dire guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds."
1083,"Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.",John Warren et al.,"The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals ( both plaintiffs of this case ). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in its meantime banned the mining of uranium “ until a policy for permitting uranium mining is established by statute. ” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia forcing the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law, enjoining the states to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state ’ s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that "" AEA does not protect non - federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court ’ s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
460,Hudson,McMillian,"Keith Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed that he was beaten by Marvin Woods and Jack McMillian, two prison guards, while their supervisor, Arthur Mezo, watched. Hudson sued the guards in Federal District Court under 42 you.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit for the ""deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution."" Hudson argued that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court ruled that the guards had used force when there was no need to do so, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that Hudson was therefore entitled to damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that an inmate must demonstrate ""significant injury"" when he claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the use of excessive force."
1900,"Spokeo, Inc.",Thomas Robins,"Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo) operated a website that provided information about individuals such as contact data, marital status, age, occupation, and certain types of economic information. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo and claimed that the company willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about him on the website. However, Robins was unable to allege any “actual or imminent harm,” so the district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Robins’ lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Robins then filed an amended complaint in which he alleged that he suffered actual harm to his employment prospects due to the website falsely claiming that he was wealthy. The district court originally denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss but later reconsidered its order and dismissed the complaint for failure to state an injury in fact. Robins appealed and argued that the district court could not reconsider its previous decision and that he had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to qualify for Article III standing. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, although the district court could reconsider its ruling, the allegation of a violation of a statutory right is sufficient injury to qualify for standing."
2301,Noris Babb,"Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs","Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40. Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well. Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion. Babb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action."
1414,United States,Juvenile Male,"At the age of 13, S.E. engaged in non-consensual sexual acts with a 10-year-old child. This activity continued until S.E. was 15 and the victim was 12. S.E. and the victim were residents of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana. In 2005, the district court sentenced S.E. to two years of detention at a juvenile facility, followed by supervised release until his 21st birthday. In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (""SORNA""). Its reporting and registration requirements apply to adults and juveniles 14 or older who commit certain serious sex offenses. When S.E. completed his sentence, he moved to a prerelease center for six months. S.E. did not engage in a required job search and center officials deemed him a program failure, requesting his removal. In 2007, after SORNA's enactment, the district court revoked S.E.'s supervised release because he failed to meet the conditions of supervision. The court ordered, among other conditions, that S.E. register as a sex offender. S.E. appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, challenging the mandate to register as a sex offender. In May 2008, S.E. turned 21, and the order to register expired. Over a year later, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for a unanimous court, held that SORNA was invalid on its face because the constitution forbids laws that are enforced retroactively. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, asked the Montana Supreme Court to decide whether the question presented was moot because the district court's order had expired. Justice Jim Rice, writing for the court with two dissents, held that S.E. was obligated to register under the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (""MSVORA""). Hence, as Montana law required S.E. to register, and this registration was not contingent on the 9th Circuit's decision, the federal question was moot."
1017,"Los Rovell Dahda, et al.",United States of America,"Los and Roosevelt - – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much Of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the non - conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information gathered from these wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were declared guilty and sentenced. The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing information from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals ruled that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it argued that such defect did not "" directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “ core "" ” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 — privacy and uniformity — that were not implicated by the Dahdas ’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court ’ s jurisdiction."
2314,"United States Forest Service, et al.","Cowpasture River Association, et al.","The Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the you.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System. In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline “would have no long lasting impacts” on the Trail. Cowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service’s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest Service lacked authority to grant the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act because the Appalachian Trail is a “unit” of the National Park System. The court determined that the Mineral Leasing Act “specifically excludes” the Trail “from the authority of the Secretary of the Interior ‘or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights of way.” The Court consolidated this case for oral argument with you.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, No. 18-1584."
308,Bethel School District No. 403,"Matthew N. Fraser, a minor, and E.L. Fraser, Guardian Ad Litem","At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which ""substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."" Fraser was suspended from school for two days."
1870,"Joseph Waller, Jr. ",Florida,"Joseph Waller stole a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction."
316,Freddie Lee Hall,Florida,"Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1981 murder of John Hurst. Hall requested a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a relief of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed another motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non - record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the 2002 sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with "" unquantifiable weight, "" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court and a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for could a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test — whether he had an IQ below 70 — could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed."
518,Arizona,Isaac Evans,"In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans’ arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees."
349,Edward O'Lone,Estate of Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen,"Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu’ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays. The two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate’s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems."
1136,William Erickson,"Barry J. Pardus, et al.","William Erickson was diagnosed with Hepatitis C while imprisoned at Limon Correctional Facility in Limon, Colorado. He was prescribed medication to be administered via injection. One of the syringes he used for injection went missing from the medical center of the correctional facility and was later found in a communal trash can. Erickson was accused of stealing the syringe and utilizing it for illegal drug use, after which he was denied further treatment. Erickson sued prison medical officials under 42 you.S.C. 1983 and argued that the refusal of medical treatment violated his Eighth Amendment rights because he was suffering liver damage and threat of death by not being treated for Hepatitis C. The trial court dismissed Erickson’s suit on the grounds that he could not prove he was suffering substantial harm because he was being denied medical treatment. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
217,"City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX",Federal Communications Commission,"Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to structures. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required city governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission ( "" FCC "" ) to put an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long the zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following "" reasonable time "" limits for zoning requests : 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures. The local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the government to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long - standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the court and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine worked in this situation."
2244,"Rimini Street, Inc., et al.","Oracle USA, Inc., et al.","Oracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees so they can update their software through Oracle’s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle’s software in lawful competition with Oracle’s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle’s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle’s website by a means that violated the Oracle website’s terms of use. Oracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that 17 you.S.C. § 505 allows for recovery of “full costs” and the district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 you.S.C § 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party."
614,Avondale Lockhart,United States,"In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15, 000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on someone ’ s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court for first - degree sexual abuse due to another incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre - court judge for Lockhart ’ s child rape sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. It argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart ’ s argument and held that the standard minimum sentence applied. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision."
1844,Stanley,Georgia,"Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials."
1299,Brett Jones,Mississippi,"When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court for Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory term of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post - conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be released after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 you. S. 460 ( 2012 ), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 you. S. _ _ ( 2016 ). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment ’ s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified : Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “ for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. ” The circuit court held the jury weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones were not subject to parole eligibility."
343,"Hana Financial, Inc.","Hana Bank, et al.","In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Korea Bank included the name "" Hana Overseas Korean Club "" in English as well as "" Hana Bank "" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the "" dancing man. "" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. ( HFI ) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a diamond, with the words "" Hana Financial "" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other. In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the "" Hana Bank "" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the "" Hana Financial "" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be "" tacked "" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase "" Hana Bank. "" HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be "" tacked "" to its prior trademark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision."
959,Arizona,Rodney J. Gant,"Arizona police went to the home of Rodney Gant in search of drugs and to arrest him for failing to appear in court. When they arrived at the house, Gant was not there (though two other people were in his home, one of whom was in possession of a crack pipe) but while the police were still at the house Gant pulled into the driveway. While Gant was still in his car, an officer shined a flashlight into the vehicle, but the police made no other contact with him until he stepped out of the car. After he was out of the car, the police searched it and found drugs and a handgun. Gant was arrested and charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Before trial, Gant asked the judge to rule the evidence found in the car unconstitutional because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement under New York v. Belton (1981). Gant was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison. Gant appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling the search unconstitutional. The court found that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. The court ruled that these justifications did not apply in Gant's case because he had left the vehicle voluntarily without being stopped by police or asked to get out of the car. The search of the vehicle was therefore not directly connected to the arrest and, without that justification, clearly violated the Fourth Amendment."
1541,Sprint Communications Company,"Elizabeth S. Jacobs, et al.","In January 2010, Sprint Communications Co. filed a complaint with the Iowa Utilities Board (""IUB"") asking for a declaration that it was proper to withhold certain VoIP call access charges from Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom). Before IUB addressed the complaint, Sprint settled the dispute with Windstream and withdrew its complaint. However, IUB continued the proceeding so that it could decide a greater underlying issue of how VoIP communications should be classified under federal law. In February 2011, IUB issued an order with its own interpretation of VoIP's classification under federal law along with a determination that Sprint was liable to Windstream for the access charges. Sprint challenged IUB's order by filing a complaint in both state court and federal district court, alleging that federal law preempts the IUB's decision. In order to proceed with the federal complaint first, Sprint filed a motion to stay the state case until resolution of the federal case. In turn, the IUB filed a motion asking the federal court to abstain and dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Generally, this doctrine states that a federal court shall abstain from hearing a case if there is a threat of interference with a state court proceeding involving important state interests. The district court granted IUB's motion and dismissed Sprint's federal complaint. Sprint appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which upheld the district court's abstention, but determined that a stay on the federal proceedings was more appropriate than dismissal."
930,"Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General",Luis Ramon Morales-Santana,"Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales-Santana’s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales-Santana was “legitimated” by his father’s citizenship, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non-citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States or one of its possessions for a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child’s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales-Santana’s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 19th birthday, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales-Santana upon his birth. In 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales-Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued that the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers (which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child’s birth), and the gender-based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender-based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
1343,William G. Schwab,Nadejda Reilly,"In April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as ""exempt"" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Trustee William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Reilly's equipment. A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property."
120,Neil Randall et al.,William H. Sorrell et al.,"In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were ""narrowly tailored"" to the state's interests."
2280,"Altitude Express, Inc., et al.","Melissa Zarda, as Executor of the Estate of Donald Zarda, et al.","Donald Zarda worked in 2010 as a sky-diving instructor at Altitude Express. Part of his job was to participate in tandem skydives with clients, in which he was necessarily strapped in close proximity to the client. A gay man, Zarda sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to address any concern they might have about being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. On one occasion after Zarda informed a female client about his sexual orientation and performed the tandem jump with her, the client alleged that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. In response to this complaint, Zarda's boss fired him. Zarda denied touching the client inappropriately and claimed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation. Zarda filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was fired because of his sexual orientation and also because of he did not conform to male gender stereotypes. He brought a claim in federal court alleging, among other things, that Altitude Express violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating him because of his sexual orientation. The district court ruled for Altitude Express, finding that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. After the district court's ruling, the EEOC issued an opinion in a separate case (persuasive but not binding on federal district courts) that Title VII's “on the basis of sex” language necessarily includes discrimination “on the basis of sexual orientation.” In light of this decision, Zarda moved for the district court to reinstate his Title VII claim, but the district court denied the motion, citing binding Second Circuit precedent, Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), and Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005). Zarda appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled for Altitude Express as well. The panel declined Zarda’s request that it reconsider its interpretation of Title VII and overturn Simonton and Dawson, as only the court sitting en banc can do that. The Second Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and expressly overruled Simonton and Dawson, finding, consistent with the EEOC’s position, that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex necessarily includes discrimination because of sexual orientation. This case is consolidated for oral argument with Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-1618."
83,"Alfred Dunhill Of London, Inc.","Republic of Cuba, et. al","In 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named “interventors” to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the you.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an “act of state” so you.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the 1960 act was an “act of state”, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment."
296,Ford Motor Company,United States,"When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled to interest from the government for the period between the date of overpayment and its ultimate refund, but the "" date of overpayment "" is never specifically defined. The Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) informed the Ford Motor Company ( Ford ) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS which covered the underpayment. Ford later requested that the deposits be considered to cover additional taxes that Ford owed. The parties eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a debt. Ford argued that the date of overpayment was the date that it first submitted the deposits to the IRS for the underpayment of taxes, whereas the Government argued that this date of overpayment represented the date when Ford requested that the payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district proceedings, and the court found in favor against the Government. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
841,United States,Hatter,"In 1982, when Congress extended Medicare to federal employees, then-sitting federal judges began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. In 1983, Congress then required federal judges to participate in Social Security, except for those who contributed to a ""covered"" retirement program. A ""covered"" program was defined to include any retirement system to which an employee had to contribute, which did not encompass the noncontributory pension system for federal judges, whose financial obligations and payroll deductions therefore had to increase. A group of federal judges, who were appointed before 1983, filed suit arguing that the 1983 law violated the Constitution's Compensation Clause, which guarantees federal judges a ""Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."" Ultimately, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a 1984 judicial salary increase cured any violation. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the Compensation Clause prevented the government from collecting Medicare and Social Security taxes from the judges and that the violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase."
7,Sierra Club,"Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States","The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped area of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the later 1940s, companies began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80 - acre ski resort. The size of a proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that could run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to use it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these motions. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and it did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of successful success on the merits of the case."
365,"Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon et al.",Alfred Smith,"Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related ""misconduct."" The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed."
21,Merle R. Schneckloth,Robert Clyde Bustamonte,"A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent."
1205,"CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al.","Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.","In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers. As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million. Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil. At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO’s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO’s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims."
1096,Terry L. Whitman,Department of Transportation et al.,"Terry Whitman works as an air traffic assistant for the Federal Aviation Administration (which is part of the Department of Transportation). Federal law requires that FAA employees who perform ""safety-sensitive functions"" submit to random drug tests. Whitman brought suit in federal district court, claiming that the FAA was testing him for substance abuse three times more often than other people holding similar positions. The disproportionate testing, he argued, violated his ""First Amendment right to privacy"" as well as his statutory rights, because the testing was not truly random. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Civil Service Reform Act requires complaint's like Whitman's to be decided through the arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the FAA and the National Association of Government Employees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
115,Coker,Georgia,"In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was released shortly thereafter, without further injuries. The Georgia courts sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge."
936,"Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General",James Garcia Dimaya,"James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first - degree residential burglary ; both convictions resulted in two years ’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ), a non - citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject from deportation. The INA category of aggravated felony includes a “ crime of violence, ” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property. The Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) also initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) affirmed. While Dimaya ’ s appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was pending, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “ violent felony ” in the Early Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA ’ s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the hate crime provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial."
87,Paul,Davis,"A flyer identifying ""active shoplifters"" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights."
2026,Jeffrey Heffernan,City of Paterson,"Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could not vote in the city of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be “overt involvement in political activities.” Heffernan sued the city of Paterson and claimed that the city had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The city filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that, since Heffernan had not actually engaged in constitutionally protected speech, the City’s actions had not violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself that he was not associated with the candidate, and therefore there is no evidence of a violation of his right to freedom of association. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed."
442,Masson,"New Yorker Magazine, Inc.","After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself ""the greatest analyst who ever lived."" However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure."
160,"Altria Group, Inc., et al.",Stephanie Good et al.,"A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria's advertisement claiming that its product was ""light"" and had ""lowered tar and nicotine"" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act."
307,Manuel Jose Lozano,Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez,"Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, a native Columbians, met while living in London and raised a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, in 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally "" very happy together. "" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay in a women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post - traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing how her daughter had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved. After Lozano exhausted all remedies within the effort to attempt to rescue his child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in you. S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would because undue harm. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1156,Timothy Scott,Victor Harris,"After a police officer attempted to pull him over for speeding, Victor Harris fled in his vehicle, initiating a high-speed car chase. Attempting to end the chase, Deputy Timothy Scott rammed Harris's vehicle with his police cruiser. Harris crashed and was rendered a quadriplegic. Harris sued Scott in federal District Court, alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity as a government official acting in his official capacity, but the District Court rejected the claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In order to show that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff is required to prove that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Scott's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because there was no imminent threat - Harris remained in control of his vehicle and the roads were relatively empty - Scott's use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Although no Appellate Court had ruled on the specific question of the use of deadly force in a high-speed chase, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the limits on deadly force were ""clearly established."""
1773,Kent,United States,"Morris A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a ""full investigation"" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in prison. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver."
534,Arizona,Ronald William Roberson,"On April 13, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting judge read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering the questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, which was unaware whether Roberson had requested counsel, questioned him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. After this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. During trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review."
570,Young,Fordice,"In 1995, Mississippi attempted to simplify voter registration in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). A ""Provisional Plan"" for registration replaced the ""Old System,"" mandating that, among other things, driver's license applications could double as voter registration forms for state and federal elections. As required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the you.S. Attorney General pre-cleared the Provisional Plan, confirming that it did not discriminate against minority voters. Mississippi abandoned the pre-cleared Provisional Plan in favor of a composite ""New System,"" which used the Old System for state elections and both the Provisional Plan and Old System for federal elections. Mississippi assumed that the Attorney General's pre-clearance of the Provisional Plan extended to the New System. Thomas Young, a Mississippi citizen, filed suit against Governor Kirk Fordice, alleging a violation of the VRA. A three-judge District Court ruled in favor of Mississippi."
599,United States,LaBonte,"28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to ""assure"" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence ""at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of"" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive."
803,"Robert J. Wittman, et al.","Gloria Personhuballah, et al.","In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted an redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African - American, and increased the percentage of African - American voters in the county. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department for Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia ’ s Third Congressional District was intentionally gerrymandered in breach of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal ; instead, some members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does actually require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but because it requires that the legislature maintain a minority ’ s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District is unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan."
1494,United States,Anthony Davila,"In early 2010, Anthony Davila was tried for defrauding the federal government by filing false tax returns. During a hearing before the magistrate judge, Davila requested to discharge his court-appointed attorney. Davila was concerned that the attorney had not discussed any possible trial strategies with him; the attorney merely insisted that Davila plead guilty. The magistrate judge explained to Davila that there might not be another viable option and that pleading guilty may be the best advice his attorney could have given him. Following the judge's advice, Davila plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 115 months imprisonment. Davila appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Davila argued that the magistrate judge's advice to plead guilty warranted a new trial. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must not be involved in any plea discussions. Since the judge commented on the weight of the evidence against Davila and suggested that a guilty plea would result in a more lenient sentence, he participated in such a plea discussion. As a result of this violation, Davila claimed that the court should vacate the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Davila, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings."
578,United States,Jose,"In a proceeding to enforce two IRS summonses issued to Laddie Jose, as trustee for the Jose Business Trust and Jose Family Trust, the you.S. and an IRS agent represented that the documents sought were for a civil investigation. Ultimately, the District Court ordered enforcement of the summonses, requiring the IRS to give Jose five days' notice before transferring summoned information from its Examination Division to any other IRS office. The IRS appealed, challenging the District Court's authority to impose such a restriction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as not ripe because the record did not indicate that the Examination Division had attempted to disclose the documents to any other IRS division; therefore, the five-day notice requirement had not been triggered."
883,"Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc.",Village of Stratton,"The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any because without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation."
950,"Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed-wire fence on the you.S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a you.S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez’s friends at the you.S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the you.S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the head and killed him. Six months after Hernandez’s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the you.S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution’s deadly-force protections stop at the border for non-citizens like Hernandez. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also held that Mesa was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed."
2036,"David A. Zubik, et al.","Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires group health plans and health insurance issuers offering health plans to provide preventative care and screenings for women pursuant to the guidelines established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These guidelines include “approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” The regulations include an exemption from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a religious employer. The exemption does not mean that such services are not covered, but that they are not covered through a cost-sharing mechanism. The petitioners are religious organizations that argue that the contraceptive coverage mandate of the ACA violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted in 1993, because the mandate requires these organizations to “facilitate” the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services that they oppose on religious grounds. In several separate cases, the relevant district courts issued injunctions against the government, and the relevant Courts of Appeals reversed. The appellate courts held that the religious organizations were unable to show that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of their religious freedom."
203,Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,David Patchak,"The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band ( "" Game Band "" ) is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community of about 3, 000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior approved its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township – known as the "" Bradley Tract "" - - into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act ( "" IRA "" ). David Green, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti - gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that The Quiet Title Act ( "" QTA "" ) precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts ; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Brown's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Congress's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests do indeed fall within the IRA's zone - of - interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone - of - interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering "" affected members of the public "" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary'to argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the to waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. "
2100,"McLane Company, Inc.",Equal Opportunity Employment Commission,"Damiana Ochoa filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer, McLane Company (McLane), for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McLane required all new employees and employees returning work after a medical leave to take a physical capability strength test for positions that are classified as physically demanding. Ochoa failed the test three times, and therefore her employment was terminated. The EEOC opened up an investigation into McLane Co. During the investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena for information McLane withheld, including either “pedigree information” for each test-taker or reasons the test-taker’s employment was terminated. McLane continued to refuse to provide that information, so the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action. The district court required McLane to disclose some of the information the EEOC subpoenaed, but it refused to require McLane to divulge the “pedigree information” or reasons for termination. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part after reviewing the lower court’s decision “de novo,” or without giving deference to the lower court’s determination."
13,Regents of the University of California,Allan Bakke,"Allan Bakke, a thirty - five - year - old white physician, had unsuccessfully applied for admission at The University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen spots in each entering class of one hundred for "" qualified "" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications ( including GPA and test scores ) exceeded those of any of other minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, second in the Supreme Court, and she was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race."
1702,Sentilles,Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation,"In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates you.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury."
1230,Arnold M. Preston,Alex E. Ferrer,"In 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television's Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge Alex responded by filing a complaint with California's labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration."
1349,"Mary Berghuis, Warden",Van Chester Thompkins,"A Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his Miranda rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that Thompkins was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony."
274,Nix,Williams,"Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who is body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest."
673,Dred Scott,John F. A. Sanford,"Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois ( a free state ) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by a Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri again seeking his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free slave. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal law. Scott's master argued that every “ negro ” or descendant of slaves could be a free in the sense of Article III of the Constitution."
569,Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark,"William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al.","In 2001, Heidi Heffron - Clark inherited a $ 300, 000 individual retirement account ( IRA ) from her mother'S estate. The you. S. bankruptcy code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account that require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband ( The "" Clarks "" ), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from the claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund under Section 522 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money in the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was entitled to creditor claims under the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
248,Verlinden B. V.,Central Bank of Nigeria,"Verlindin B.V., a Dutch Corporation, sued Central Bank of Nigeria in you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for breaching a letter of credit. Verlindin alleged that the court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The FSIA grants jurisdiction for actions against foreign parties who are not entitled to immunity. Central Bank moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Central bank had sovereign immunity. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that the entire FSIA exceeded the scope of Article III of the you.S. Constitution."
2349,"AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al.",Federal Trade Commission,"Scott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that Tucker’s loan business violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme. The court granted the Commission’s requested relief, enjoined Tucker from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct “as much money as practicable” to “direct redress to consumers,” then to “other equitable relief” related to the practices described in the Commission’s complaint, and finally to the you.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter “injunctions,” and that the district court’s order to pay “equitable monetary relief” is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that § 13 of the FTC Act “empowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice.”"
69,Breuer,"Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.","Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal employer statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have their case moved to federal court "" unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress. "" Breuer't attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under this FLSA to be heard in state Courts and that the case should therefore be returned to state court ; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district judge refused to send the case forward to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
1432,Marmet Health Care Center,Brown,"These are two consolidated case involving negligence suits against nursing homes in West Virginia. In both cases, the children of nursing home patients signed an agreement with the nursing home requiring arbitration for any disputes. In both cases, the patients died under the nursing homes' care and the children sued in state court for negligence. The trial court dismissed both suits because of the arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed, holding that the forcing arbitration for personal injury and wrongful death cases violated public policy. The court also held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not preempt state public policy despite recent you.S. Supreme Court precedent to the contrary."
459,Derrick Morgan,Illinois,"In the Illinois judicial system, the jury chosen to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence also sentenced the defendant. And, the trial court, not the attorneys, performed voir dire, which involves questioning potential jurors during jury selection to determine their ability to be impartial. Before Derrick Morgan's capital murder trial, he requested that the court ask the potential jurors whether they would automatically sentence him to the death penalty upon conviction. The trial court denied Morgan's request, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. When he appealed, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, Morgan's conviction, and his sentence."
836,Franchise Tax Board of California,Gilbert P. Hyatt,"Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California ( FTB ) based on the FTB ’ s audits for his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed : Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada claiming negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. When the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune in the lawsuit based on California law which granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada laws were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity. At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and granted him over $ 300 million in damages. The parties cross - referenced to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the original damage award in this case should be reversed."
385,Massachusetts,Richard N. Morash,"The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) sued Richard N. Morash, the president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). Massachusetts alleged that, by failing to compensate two terminated employees for vacation time they accrued but did not use, Morash violated the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute (Statute). Massachusetts alleged the statute was pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires an employer to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on date of discharge. The trial judge certified the preemption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative and held that the policy constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the statute was pre-empted by ERISA."
1323,National Collegiate Athletic Association,"Shawne Alston, et al.","In NCAA Rep. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 you. S. 85 ( 1984 ), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA ’ s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different but less stringent analysis than other types of television cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against an NCAA, arguing against its restrictions on “ non - cash education - related benefits, ” violating antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “ computers, science equipment, musical instruments and all tangible items not included in the cost of attendance fees but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies. ” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash - equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA ’ s interest in “ preserving amateurism, ” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law."
1302,United States,"Graydon Earl Comstock, Jr., et al.","Convicted sex offenders moved to dismiss petitions requesting their indefinite civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. A North Carolina federal district court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Protection and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congress' authority when it enacted a law that could confine a person solely because of ""sexual dangerousness,"" and the government need not even allege that this ""dangerousness"" violated any federal law."
1951,"Kingdomware Technologies, Inc.",United States,"Various policies, regulations, and statutes of the federal government are intended to promote small businesses, especially those run by veterans. Although agencies generally have wide discretion to decide what method of contracting to use, a 2003 amendment to the Small Business Act established a goal of awarding three percent of government contracts to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and the Veterans Act of 2006 expanded the reach of the relevant provisions. Kingdomware Technologies is a small business owned and controlled by a service-disabled veteran and has been certified as such by the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). In 2012, Kingdomware filed a bid for a project, but the VA awarded the contract to a company that was not a veteran-owned business. Kingdomware filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and argued that the contract award was illegal. The GAO issued a recommendation that the VA cancel the contract and re-solicit bids. The VA refused to accept the recommendation, and Kingdomware sued in you.S. Court of Federal Claims, which held that there was sufficient ambiguity in the relevant statute and that the VA’s interpretation was reasonable, so therefore the contract award should stand. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
1341,Tarahrick Terry,United States,"Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “ detectable ” amount of heroin base ( 3. 9 grams ), thus triggering maximum penalties in 21 you. S. C. § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months maximum imprisonment with 6 years ’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that this Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841 ( b ) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 30 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a specifically covered offense ” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because this Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ), Terry ’ s offense was not a “ covered offense. ” The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
291,Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley,United States,"In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their families. This property included the deed of deposit for $ 500, plus, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys. Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prohibited them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their duty to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the you. S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted a pretrial appeal, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys'offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, another district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision."
1335,"City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities","Hotels.com, L.P., et al.","In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for ""an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties."" The OTCs’ proposed order stated that ""costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 you.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39."" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite."
161,"Altria Group, Inc., et al.",Stephanie Good et al.,"A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the tobacco manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers argued that Altria's advertisement claiming that its product was "" light "" and had "" lowered tobacco and nicotine "" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for The District of Maine granted final judgment in judgment of Altria on the claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, under a specific federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act."
2166,"Elsa Hall, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ethlyn Louise Hall and as Successor Trustee of the Ethlyn Louise Hall Family Trust","Samuel H. Hall, Jr., et al.","Ethlyn Hall, an elderly landowner in the Virgin Islands, filed suit against her son when she grew dissatisfied with his actions as her attorney. After Ethlyn passed away, one of her daughters, Elsa Hall, served as personal representative of the estate (the “Estate”) and continued to press Ethlyn’s claims against Samuel. Samuel brought claims of his own against Elsa in a separate proceeding. He argued that Elsa had poisoned his relationship with his mother, which caused him serious emotional distress. The Estate’s claims and Samuel’s claims were consolidated and tried together. A jury rejected the Estate’s claims and rendered a two million dollar verdict in Samuel’s favor. The District Court entered separate judgments on both aspects of the jury’s decision. The Estate appealed the judgment with respect to its claims, but did not appeal the judgment in favor of Samuel because the district court vacated the jury verdict and his claims were still awaiting retrial. Samuel argue that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal while his claims were still pending in the district court, and the Third Circuit agreed. The Third Circuit relied on its binding precedent in Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, which held that when two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. The Estate argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. affirming the appealability of final judgment in a case that was part of a multi-district litigation should dictate the outcome of the case and permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims that have a final judgment."
1114,Michael J. Biestek,"Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration","Michael Biestek struggled for most of his life being a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2008 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and other benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration ( SSA ) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the circuit judge ’ s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary physician - expert testimony and did not pose a very specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ ’ s determination, and the district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ ’ s finding that Biestek did not meet the back - pain - related impairment requirement and that the ALJ had evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert."
252,"Fifth Third Bancorp, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan ( ESOP ), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by their Fifth Third stock for their individual salaries. During the time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested into Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from primarily a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district Court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the tax decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed not prove prudent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss."
423,FMC Corporation,Holliday,"FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720."
1452,Southern Union Company,United States,"Southern Union Company is a diversified natural gas company with a storage facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In September of 2004, vandals broke into the facility and found liquid mercury. The vandals spilled the liquid mercury in and around the facility and around a nearby apartment complex. Southern Union did not discover the spill for several weeks, and the apartment residents were displaced for two months during the subsequent cleanup. On September 19, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Southern Union with illegally storing mercury without a permit. Southern Union was convicted by a jury, but the jury did not determine how many days Southern Union had illegally stored the mercury. At sentencing, the district court applied the penalty provision of 42 you.S.C. § 6928(d), which provided a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. The you.S. Office of Probation set the maximum fine for Southern Union's offense at $38.1 million dollars by multiplying $50,000 times 762, the full number of days referred to in the indictment. Southern Union objected. The company argued that the number of days that Southern Union illegally stored mercury was a fact that should have been determined by a jury, because it increased the maximum criminal penalty. As such, Southern Union believed that the imposition of the $38.1 million dollar fine was a violation of its rights to criminal due process under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment. The district court requested briefs, but it ultimately concluded that a fact which increases a criminal penalty need not be tried by a jury if the penalty is a criminal fine. Southern Union appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Southern Union's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision."
1186,Jose Antonio Lopez,"Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General","Jose Lopez, a Mexican national living in South Dakota, was convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine. The crime is a felony under South Dakota law, but only a misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Substances Act. The Immigration and Naturalization Service began proceedings to remove Lopez from the country. Lopez applied for a cancellation of his removal, citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA allows an alien to avoid removal if he meets certain qualifications and has no prior ""aggravated felony"" convictions. Lopez argued that he was eligible for cancellation of his removal because his drug offense was only a misdemeanor under federal law. An Immigration Judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, on the grounds that Lopez had committed an aggravated felony. Lopez then sued the Attorney General and brought his case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed the lower courts, ruling that a crime is an aggravated felony under the INA if it is a felony under either federal or state law."
583,"Dollar General Corporation, et al.","Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.","Dollar General Corporation ( $ General ) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians ( Tribe ). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13 - year - old member of the Tribe alleged when he was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, because he was working at the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend refused to participate. In 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both defendants sued to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement within the tribe, applied in this case. The tribe then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in state court. The district court granted the injunction of Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1889,"R. K. Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections",Veron Atchley,"In 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley’s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a gun, but said that the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley’s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction. Atchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the you.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
579,Kansas,Colorado,"Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1982 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, then set out to resolve the states'dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The N. S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado broke the Compact. The Court ruled with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for profit from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 until 1985. Kansas also requested a "" river master "" to settle a dispute over computer control of the river."
324,Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,Philadelphia Gear Corporation,"Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of ""deposit"" set forth at 12 you.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance."
139,Keith Lance et al.,"Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State","After the 2000 census, the you. S. Congress increased Colorado ’ s membership in the you. S. House of Representatives from six congressmen to seven. The Colorado state legislature had to redraw the districts before the 2002 elections, so the state courts redrew both districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district map, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado state constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and in the courts ’ 2002 redistricting took precedence over the redistricting by a state legislature. Keith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district court and argued that the Colorado Supreme Court ’ s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I of the you. S. Constitution, and those individuals ’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to qualify for redress of claims. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Lance appealed before the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue preclusion, since Lance was an individual citizen not directly affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court."
1691,"Beacon Theatres, Inc.","The Hon. Harry C. Westover, Judge of the United States District Court of the Southern District of California, Central Division, et al. ","Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for ""first-run"" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their ""first-run"" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed. The lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus."
1034,"O. John Benisek, et al.","Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.","In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state used two parallel procedures : a public - facing procedure led by the Governor ’ s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland ’ s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, the computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC - developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that were presented to voters was one of those ones developed by NCEC ; rather, former Governor Martin O ’ Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the “ Cook Partisan Voting Index ” rated the Sixth District as a “ likely ” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a “ safe ” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20. 6 % margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from executing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court."
342,"Hana Financial, Inc.","Hana Bank, et al.","In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name "" Hana Overseas Korean Club "" in English as well as "" Hana Bank "" into Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the "" dancing man. "" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. ( HFI ) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words "" Hana Financial "" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's usage of the name Central Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did never directly compete with each other. In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Central Bank alleging trademark infringement. The appeals court jury found that Hana Bank had used the "" Hana Bank "" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the "" Hana Financial "" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be "" tacked "" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase "" Hana Bank. "" HFI appealed, claiming that any determination of whether a trademark may be "" tacked "" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the courts, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision."
374,Gregory P. Warger,Randy D. Shauers,"In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter - suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter has been in a similar type of automobile collision and that the verdict would have had some negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection. The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606 ( b ), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade a juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606 ( b ) does not explicitly prohibit the testimony for the purposes, proving errors by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606 ( b ) because it was relied on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
790,"W. A. Gayle, Mayor of Montgomery",Aurelia Browder,"While the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a boycott of the racially segregated bus system in Montgomery Alabama, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP challenged racial segregation on the bus system in the federal courts. This case arose in federal court as a violation of Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes and as a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court held that state enforcement of the segregated but privately owned bus system in Montgomery violated the Equal Protection Clause. The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
147,Homero Gonzalez,United States,"Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co - defendant on several drug - related charges. He declared not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that they would conduct voir dire, but sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he physically object. He argued on appeal that Gonzalez had the right to a new trial because he did indeed give enough personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the same interviews."
748,"Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell",Connecticut,"Newton Cantwell and his family, Jehovah'd Witnesses, was visiting a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door - to - door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti - Catholic protest. Cantwell and his children were arrested and charged with : ( 1 ) violation of a Connecticut law requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the church, and ( 2 ) inciting a common - law breach of the peace."
600,Washington,Glucksberg,"Dr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients who have since died, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals contemplating physician assisted-suicide -- brought this suit challenging the state of Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide. The State of Washington has historically criminalized the promotion of suicide attempts by those who ""knowingly because or aid another person to attempt suicide."" Glucksberg alleged that Washington's ban was unconstitutional. Following a District Court ruling favoring Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted Washington certiorari."
1098,Washington State Department of Licensing,"Cougar Den, Inc.","Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "" the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways. "" Cougar Den is a Yakama - licensed fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into a state each year to sell to the public. In December 2006, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $ 3. 6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for carrying fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department ’ s ALJ ruled that the bill was void under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department ’ s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe ’ s right against travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempt members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "" any trade, traveling, and importation "" by members of the Yakama tribe “ that requires the use of public roads, ” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state ’ s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes."
1768,Pointer,Texas,"On the night of June 16, 1962, a man later identified by a witness as Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 Food Store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. The man then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers across the street from the 7-11 store to the front yard of a nearby residence, where Pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed eighty-one dollars in his billfold, and a later search revealed sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe. The police arrested Pointer and Lloyd Earl Dillard and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing; the state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, in violation of Texas law. An assistant attorney general conducted the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips, but Pointer did not. Pointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying his alleged role in the robbery and swearing he had never been in the 7-11 store. The state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence because Phillips had since moved out of Texas and did not intend to return. The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a denial of Pointer's right to confront a witness. The trial judge overruled because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing, and Pointer was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's claim that the use of the transcript violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."
317,United States,City of Fulton,"In 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would ""become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy)."" The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had not yet received ""confirmation and approval"" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented. The Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
81,International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,"Quality Manufacturing Company, National Labor Relations Board","Quality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady and assistant chairlady were also fired for trying to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would occur at the meeting. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent."
1340,"Sally L. Conkright, et al.","Paul J. Frommert, et al.","Current and former employees of Xerox Corp. sued the company in a New York federal district court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (""ERISA""). Plaintiffs had left the employer, been paid a lump sum, and after rehire had alleged Xerox improperly calculated their benefits. Xerox argued that release forms signed by some of the plaintiffs barred their ERISA claims. The district court disagreed and then crafted a remedy to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost benefits. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court crafted an appropriate remedy, but erred in finding that the release forms signed by some plaintiffs were unenforceable. Rather, the court reasoned that the release forms were signed knowingly and voluntarily, making them enforceable."
472,Poe,Ullman,"Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, claimed they use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their other two children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in attempt to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life - altering. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment."
934,"Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General",Luis Ramon Morales-Santana,"Luis Ramon Morales - Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At one time, Morales - Santana ’ s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales - Santana was “ legitimated ” by his father ’ s mother, and thus became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales - Santana ’ s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non - citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen mother was physically present in the United States or one of its possessions for a period totalling ten year at some point prior to the child ’ s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales - Santana ’ s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 19th birthday, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales - Santana upon his birth. In 2000, Morales - Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have this removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales - Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued, the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers ( which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child ’ s birth ), and the gender - based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen,. the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender - based difference in the physical presence of violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
822,TrafFix Devices Inc.,Marketing Displays Inc.,"Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) held utility patents for a ""dual-spring design"" mechanism that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in wind. After the patents expired, TrafFix Devices, Inc. began marketing sign stands with a dual-spring mechanism copied from MDI's design. MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of 1964 for, among other things, trade dress infringement. MDA claimed that its sign stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented design was visible. In granting summary judgement for TrafFix, the District Court concluded that MDI had not established a ""secondary meaning,"" or that consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring design with MDI. The court also found that there could be no trade dress protection for the design because it was functional. In reversing, the Court of Appeals suggested that the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDI's trade dress because a competitor had to find some way to hide the design or otherwise set it apart from MDI's and noted the issue whether an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of trade dress protection in the product's design."
1331,"Jose Santos Sanchez, et al.","Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.","Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2002, they applied for and received temporary protected status ( TPS ) and were subsequently forced to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 you. S. C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ( USCIS ) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “ statutorily ineligible ” for adjustment of Status since he had not been admitted into this United States. They challenged this denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant to TPS meets § 1255 ( a ) ’ s requirement that the alien must be “ inspected and admitted or paroled ” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally."
1035,"Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP",R. Scott Appling,"R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (“Lamar”) to represent him in legal proceedings against the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant legal fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to collect the debt, and the bankruptcy court ruled that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 you.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling’s fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed. The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how to construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling’s fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing and qualified as statements “respecting [his] . . . financial condition” under § 523(a)(2)(B), the debt could be discharged."
1319,"Stolt-Nielsen S.A., et al.",AnimalFeeds International Corp.,"AnimalFeeds International Corp. on behalf of a class of plaintiffs filed suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against Stolt-Nielsen among others alleging defendants were engaged in a ""global conspiracy to restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker transportation services."" After the case was transferred to the Connecticut federal district court, Stolt-Nielsen filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was denied. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. During arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a demand to proceed as a class. A panel was appointed to determine whether the language of the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class and answered in the affirmative. Stolt-Nielsen then petitioned the Connecticut federal district court to vacate the panel's determination, which was granted. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the panel's decision. The court held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when reaching its conclusion that the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class, even though the Award was silent on whether proceeding as a class was permitted. The court reasoned that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether an agreement permits class arbitration is generally left to the arbitrators, not the courts."
1243,Hugh Caperton,A. T. Massey Coal Co.,"In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a ""constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety."" The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried."
1260,Arthur James Lomax,"Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.","Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 you.S.C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “strikes” under 28 you.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief. Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show because before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show because order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes. The district court denied Lomax’s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
0,Dunn,Blumstein,"A Tennessee law required a one-year residence in the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had recently moved to Tennessee, challenged the law by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal district court."
1674,Oleta O'Connor Yates,United States,Fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully and knowingly conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This case was decided in conjunction with Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States.
257,Bruce J. Abramski,United States,"In November 2008, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ( "" ATF "" ) on which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person. In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $ 400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made a false statement about a "" material fact "" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski. Abramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the weapon to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski lacked a "" material fact "" required when purchasing the firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional for plea and and five years of probation and a $ 200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
2334,Our Lady of Guadalupe School,Agnes Morrissey-Berru,"Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru was an teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School and brought a claim against the school under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court first recognized a ministerial exception, which exempts religious institutions from anti-discrimination laws in hiring employees deemed “ministers.” The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Morrissey-Berru was not a “minister”; she had taken one course on the history of the Catholic church but otherwise did not have any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Given that she did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister, the court declined to classify her as a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception."
1338,"City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities","Hotels.com, L.P., et al.","In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class - action lawsuit against various online travel providers ( OTCs ), such as Hotels. com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “ cost of occupancy ” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "" an order entering Final Judgment in favor of all OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bond, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties. "" The OTCs ’ proposed order declared that "" costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to all you. S. C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39. "" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC ’ s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of court in the district court seeking over $ 2. 3 million, which included over $ 5 million for “ post - judgment interest rate and “ premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds. ” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums collected by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite."
1405,"American Electric Power Company Inc., et al.","Connecticut, et al.","Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue. The states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota."
1928,United States,"Michael Clarke, et al.","The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served five summonses to top officers of the Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo) during its investigation into the company's tax liabilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted enforcement of the summonses. Dynamo opposed the summonses by arguing that it was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the summonses were proper. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the decision that allowed the summonses to be enforced and remanded the case back to the district court for a hearing on whether the investigation was launched under an improper purpose, which would render enforcement of the summonses unlawful."
1620,"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.","Sandoz, Inc., et al.","Sandoz, Inc., (Sandoz) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mylan) submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce and market generic versions of Copaxone, a drug used to treat Multiple Sclerosis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the manufacturer of the original drug, sued Sandoz and Mylan and used two different types of claims that are based on different ways to use molecular weight to distinguish between polymer samples. The district court did not distinguish between the different methods of using molecular weight and held that the claims were not indefinite as Sandoz and Mylan argued. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Sandoz and Mylan products infringed on Teva's patent. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not error in holding that the patents were infringed, but that some of the claims had not been effectively shown to be definite."
715,Central State Univ.,"American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Central State Univ. Chapter","To increase the amount of time that public university professors spend teaching, Ohio enacted Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3345.45. Central State University adopted a workload policy pursuant to section 3345.45. The university then notified its professors that it would not bargain over the issue of faculty workload. The professors' collective-bargaining agent filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that section 3345.45 created a class of public employees not entitled to bargain regarding their workload and that this classification violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. In response, the state argued that achieving equal workloads was necessary to recapture the decline in teaching and that collective bargaining produced variation in workloads. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the professors and found that no evidence linked collective bargaining to the decline in faculty time devoted to undergraduate teaching."
2182,Upper Skagit Indian Tribe,"Sharline Lundgren, et vir","Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the “Tribe”) own adjacent pieces of property in Skagit County, Washington. The space between a fence running across the width of the Tribe’s property and its southern border became a subject of dispute between the parties after the Tribe attempted to assert ownership of it in 2013. The Lundgrens’ property had been in their extended family since approximately 1947, during which time they had always treated the fence as the property line. In 2013 the Tribe purchased land to the north of the Lundgrens’ property, and were apparently not aware of the fence at that time. When they discovered it, they informed the Lundgrens of their intention to assert ownership rights over the disputed portion of land. In 2015, the Lundgrens filed suit to quiet title to the property, seeking summary judgment on the basis that they had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession or mutual acquiescence and recognition long before the Tribe bought its parcel. The Tribe moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and because the Lundgrens could not join them as a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court denied the Tribe’s motion, and the Tribe sought direct discretionary review. In the resulting ruling, the court granted the Lundgrens’ motion for summary judgment, finding that they had established legal ownership of the disputed property through adverse possession and mutual recognition and acquiescence. The Washington Supreme Court accepted the Tribe’s amended motion for discretionary review of both prior orders, and affirmed. The court rejected the argument that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, which neither the Tribe nor Congress had waived with regard to quiet title actions. The court found that because it had in rem jurisdiction, the Tribe’s sovereign immunity did not create a barrier to jurisdiction."
1595,"City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.",Teresa Sheehan,"Teresa Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and lived in a San Francisco group home. After Sheehan threatened her social worker when he attempted to perform a welfare check, he became concerned that she was a danger to herself or others and summoned the police for help transporting her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When the police officers arrived, they entered Sheehan's room without a warrant to take her into custody. Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill the officers. They were forced to withdraw outside her room and call for backup, but instead of waiting for the backup to arrive, they drew their weapons and forced their way back into her room. When Sheehan again threatened the officers with a knife, they shot her several times. Sheehan sued the officers and the city for violations of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Sheehan appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' second entry into Sheehan's room was reasonable under the circumstances and whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Sheehan's disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act."
1216,"Frederick L. Allen, et al.","Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard ’ s Queen Anne ’ s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the you. S. Copyright Office. At some point before October 2011, a state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted material of Allen online without state permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying fees for the infringement on his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again deleted and published Allen ’ s works. The state then passed “ Blackbeard ’ s Law, ” which purportedly converted Allen ’ s works into “ public record ” materials that the state could use freely. Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the you. S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act ( CRCA ) — which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “ any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of another State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity ” — abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen ’ s arguments regarding the CRCA ’ s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity over the CRCA."
453,Junius Irving Scales,United States,"The Smith Act'extensive membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the rapid or forceful overthrow of the Central States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States ( "" Party "" ) because it advocated peaceful overthrow of the government "" as speedily as circumstances would permit. "" Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1917 ( "" Security Act "" ) stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal laws. After failing in both a state and district courts, the Supreme Court granted review."
1308,"William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission","American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al.","Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act — the automatic call ban — prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “ "" automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. ” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban : automated calls “ for political purposes ” and those made to a cell phone with “ the prior express consent of the called party. ” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “ to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States. ” Moreover, phone calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by its automated call rules. The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content - based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review ( testing whether the government had demonstrated the law was necessary to a "" compelling state interest, "" when the law is "" narrowly tailored "" to achieving this compelling purpose, and if the law uses the "" least restrictive means "" to achieve that purpose ) to the debt - collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt - collection exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that this provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision."
624,Kansas,Hendricks,"As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in ""predatory acts of sexual violence"" brought on by ""mental abnormality"" or ""personality disorder[s]."" On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari."
1051,"City of Sherrill, New York","Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.","In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas."
71,"Connell Construction Company, Inc.","Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada","Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
22,Barry Goldwater et al.,"James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al.",President Jimmy Carter asked for presidential approval in creating a military pact with Taiwan.
1527,BG Group PLC,Republic of Argentina,"In the early 1990s, BG Group PLC (BG), a British company, made a major investment in Argentina's natural gas industry. Later, in the midst of an economic crisis, Argentina enacted an emergency law that required investors to collect tariff revenues in Argentinian pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar. Given the weak international peso-to-dollar exchange rate, these changes that made it difficult for BG to see a return on its investment. Simultaneously, Argentina adopted legislation that stayed all lawsuits arising from the emergency measures. . BG sought recourse under a bilateral investment treaty (Treaty) between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Treaty required that BG first attempt to resolve its dispute before a ""competent tribunal"" in Argentina for at least eighteen months. Instead, BG bypassed the Argentinian courts and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral panel, seated in Washington, D.C., held that Argentina's changes to its judicial system excused the eighteen-month precondition to arbitration and awarded BG over US$185 million in damages. Argentina petitioned the district court to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act by arguing that the arbitral panel exceeded its powers. The court denied the petition. The you.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the determination of whether BG could submit its dispute directly to arbitration must be made by a court, not the arbitral tribunal."
1867,North Carolina,Henry C. Alford,"North Carolina charged Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford’s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford to the maximum 30-year sentence. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The you.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford’s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death."
282,Waller,Georgia,"Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing."
338,"Mach Mining, LLC",Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) received a complaint from a woman which claimed Mach Mining, LLC ( Copper Mining ) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable because to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants'behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in best faith is a viable defense to its suit for hiring discrimination. The lower court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a successful and reasonable effort to negotiate. Nonetheless, the court certified the question to the you. S. Court of Appeals on the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to support the failure - to - conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure - to - conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases."
320,"Clifton Sandifer, et al.",United States Steel Corporation,"Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent ""changing clothes."" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time. The company appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations."
10,Regents of the University of California,Allan Bakke,"Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for ""qualified"" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race."
41,Idaho,Laura Lee Wright,"Laura Lee Wright and her ex - husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half - sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright ’ s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and closed her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found evidence highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor. During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of speech. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding their conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the contrary testimony of Dr. Clark. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a statutory exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by the questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it of the conviction."
961,Kentel Myrone Weave,Commonwealth of Massachusetts,"On August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Lee Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver ’ s trial, the court officer closed in court to Weaver ’ s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was refused effective assistance of attorneys because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial court denied Weaver ’ s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver ’ s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel ’ s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “ structural error, ” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from an ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice."
1728,"Fong Foo, Robert Knupp, Standard Coil Products Co. ",United States,"Standard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil’s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant you.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. The court granted the writ, holding that the district court did not have the power to direct the judgment of acquittal."
561,Montana,Egelhoff,"James Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff."
744,Frank Palko,Connecticut,Frank Palko was been charged with first - degree homicide. He was arrested based on second - degree murder and sentenced for life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut tried and staged a new trial ; this time the court found him guilty of first - degree murder and sentenced him to death.
535,Doctor's Associates Inc.,Casarotto,"Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that ""[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration"" be ""typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract."" DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration ""valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."" The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether."
1047,Adaucto Chavez-Mesa,United States of America,"In 2013, Adaucto Chavez - Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At a time of his sentencing, the maximum Guidelines range was 135 – 168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135 - year sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended its Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez - Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ). He requested that the court reduce his sentences to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 115 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “ tak [ en ] into account the policy statement put forth at USSG § 1B1. 10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( a ). ” Chavez - Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553 ( a ) factors in deciding on the 114 - month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553 ( a ) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient."
575,Kansas,Colorado,"Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The you.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a ""river master"" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river."
1303,Taylor James Bloate,United States,"Taylor James Bloate was convicted in a Missouri federal district court on counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. In a pretrial motion, Mr. Bloate moved to dismiss arguing that there had been a Speedy Trial Act violation. It was denied. The Act requires that a defendant's trial begin within ""70 days after the indictment or the defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later."" However, it excludes ""any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant."" Following his conviction, Mr. Bloate appealed, arguing that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied as the court excluded too many days in its calculation. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Bloate's conviction. It recognized that six circuits hold that ""pretrial motion preparation may be excluded, if the court specifically grants time for that purpose"" and that two do not. Here, the Eighth Circuit sided with the majority in holding that the district court properly excluded days from the time of Mr. Bloate's indictment to his trial and therefore there was no violation to the Speedy Trial Act."
168,"Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York","The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.","In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn in certain non - public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association ( CHA ), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from pursuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( OCC ), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, were appropriately responsible for regulating the banks'compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act ( NBA ) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General found that the Federal Housing Act ( FHA ) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction but stopped the Attorney General's investigation. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, in do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court retained jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since The Attorney General had already yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication."
1420,Michigan,Richard Perry Bryant,"A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the lower court held that the statements were ""testimonial"" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the you.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death."
1665,John Watkins,United States,"In 1954, John Watkins, a labor organizer, was called upon to testify in hearings conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Watkins agreed to describe his alleged connections with the Communist Party and to identify current members of the Party. Watkins refused to give information concerning individuals who had left the Communist Party. Watkins argued that such questions were beyond the authority of the Committee."
1515,"Comcast Corp., et al.","Caroline Behrend, et al.","In 2003, Caroline Behrend, along with Stanford Glaberson, Joan Evanchuk-Kind, and Eric Brislawn, brought an antitrust class action suit against Comcast Corporation. The petitioners were all Comcast cable customers, alleging that the company obtained a monopoly on the cable market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By contracting with competitors to swap customers and subsume the regional cable markets, the company excluded and prevented competition amongst cable providers in the Philadelphia area. The proposed class of plaintiffs included all cable television customers in the Philadelphia area who subscribe or subscribed to Comcast's video programming services since December 1999. In May 2007, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class, allowing the case to move forward. In light of a new antitrust decision in 2008 on class certification from the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District Court reconsidered its certification decision. The court held evidentiary hearings in October 2009, which consisted of dozens of expert testimonies and depositions. Following the hearings, the District Court recertified the class, finding sufficient evidence of a common impact amongst class members and a common methodology available to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Comcast subsequently appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision."
1311,"Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John",State of Washington,"Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote as their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $ 1, 000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “ winner - take - all ” electoral system, which means that all of a state ’ s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, these electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton / Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a single individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $ 1, 000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law. The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld their fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed. This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, S. 19 - 518, but is no more consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020."
2359,"Federal Communications Commission, et al.","Prometheus Radio Project, et al.","The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership of broadcast media, intended to promote “competition, diversity, and localism.” In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC’s performance of its duties under that section has been the subject of extensive litigation. In 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC’s order. Among them, Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did “ostensibly” consider this issue, its analysis was “so insubstantial” that it cannot provide a “reliable foundation” for the FCC’s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency’s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act."
1351,"Mary Berghuis, Warden",Diapolis Smith,"A Michigan state court convicted Diapolis Smith of second degree murder and felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection ""worked no systematic exclusion."" The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- American jurors."
788,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel, et al.","Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.","This case was the consolidation of cases arising against Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D. C. related to the segregation of educational institutions on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance in certain segregated schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. ( This was known as "" “ separate but equal ” case. )"
1274,Seila Law LLC,Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( SEC ) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt - relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed the petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court ’ s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB ’ s structure violates the Constitution ’ s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who holds substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for because. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling : Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States, 435 you. S. 602 ( 1935 ), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 you. S. 654 ( 1988 ). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for - because removal restriction to the CFPB ’ s Director does not “ impede the President ’ his ability - do his constitutional duty ” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed."
684,George Reynolds,United States,"George Reynolds, Mormon member from the Church in Jesus Christ of Latter - day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti - Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married with his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the Act was unconstitutional. He reasoned that a religion and him must marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion."
1736,Clarence Earl Gideon,"Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections","Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief."
674,Calderon,Ashmus,"Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment."
1686,Federal Housing Administration,"The Darlington, Inc.","The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long as the building was used for “principally” residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The panel affirmed."
164,"John S. Toll, President of the University of Maryland","Juan Carlos Moreno, et al.","This case supplements Elkins v. Moreno, in which Juan Carlos Moreno and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Elkins v. Moreno, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown. On June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given the new resolution."
1132,Paul Allen Dye,"Gerald Hofbauer, Warden","On August 29, 1982, Glenda Collins and Donna Bartels were shot in the Forbidden Wheels Motorcycle Club. After several witnesses testified against him in exchange for immunity, Paul Allen Dye was convicted of first- and second-degree murder for the shootings. Dye contended that he was innocent and that one of the witnesses who had testified against him was the shooter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Dye petitioned for federal habeas relief and argued that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially held that there was flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and therefore reversed the district court’s ruling. The respondent moved for a panel rehearing, but before the rehearing occurred, one of the justices on the original panel retired. In its second opinion, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling and determined that Dye’s prosecutorial misconduct claim was too vague and was not presented as a violation of a federal right to the state court because the state court’s opinion did not mention it."
621,Caterpillar Inc.,Lewis,"Asserting state law claims, Lewis, a Kentucky native, brought suit in Kentucky state court, for injuries sustained in a construction accident, against Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply Company (Whayne), a Kentucky corporation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual), a Massachusetts corporation, later intervened in the case as a plaintiff. Less than a year after filing his complaint Lewis entered into a settlement with Whayne. Caterpillar immediately moved to remove the action to federal court, arguing that the settlement between Lewis and Whayne meant that there was complete diversity. Lewis protested that complete diversity was not present because Liberty Mutual had not yet settled with Whayne, so that both Whayne and Lewis were still party to the lawsuit. The District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand, erroneously concluding that complete diversity was present. Five months before the trial, Liberty Mutual and Whayne reached a settlement and the District Court dismissed Whayne from the case. Complete diversity was present for the remainder of the case, including trial and judgment in favor of Caterpillar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that the lower court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because there was not complete diversity, and should have remanded the case to state court."
109,Moore,City of East Cleveland,"East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of ""family"" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons."
6,Sierra Club,"Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States","The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that is mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1950s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hope of developing an 80 - acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and appeal motions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned those injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants, therefore did not find standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the district court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable damages or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case."
373,Gregory P. Warger,Randy D. Shauers,"In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter - suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on this basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her husband had been in a similar type 1 automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was alleged that the foreperson had lied during jury selection. The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606 ( b ), which bars the statement of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony concerning whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606 ( b ) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes for proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was limited by 606 ( b ) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1008,"Jenny Rubin, et. al.",Islamic Republic of Iran,"In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight you. S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are exempt from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( "" FSIA "" ) provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state - sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D. C. entered a $ 71. 5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran could not pay. The plaintiffs have litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment. The case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before this district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections ( a ) and ( g ) of 28 you. S. C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ( "" TRIA "" ). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610 ( a ) permits execution on a foreign state's property "" used for a commercial activity in the United States, "" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party ( such as a museum ). The district court also held, and its Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610 ( g ) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district courts held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either. The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610 ( g ) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets of otherwise subject to execution under section 1610."
1929,Esteban Martinez,Illinois,"Esteban Martinez was indicted in August 2006 for aggravated battery and mob action against Avery Binion and Demarco Scott. Following several continuances due to the State's inability to locate Binion and Scott beginning in July 2009, trial was ultimately set for May 2010. At trial, the State informed the judge that Binion and Scott were still not present and asked for another continuance. The judge initially gave the State some additional time while the jury was selected but eventually denied the motion for continuance. The judge then swore in the jury and started the proceedings. The State did not participate in the case or present any evidence. Martinez moved for directed findings of not guilty on both counts, which the judge granted. The State appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and argued that the trial court should have granted its motion for continuance. Martinez argued that the State's appeal was improper under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court had found him not guilty. The Appellate Court reversed and held that the action was appealable because no witnesses were sworn and no evidence was presented, and thus jeopardy had not attached. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted review and affirmed, though it noted that jeopardy generally attaches when a jury is sworn. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the relevant question is whether a defendant ""was subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction"" and that by this standard Martinez was never at risk of conviction."
1287,Vermont,Michael Brillon,"In June 2004 after 3 years awaiting trial, Michael Brillon was convicted in a Vermont court for felony domestic assault. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont agreed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to set aside Mr. Brillon's conviction and dismiss the charges against him. The court held that Mr. Brillon was not prosecuted within a time frame that satisfied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. It reasoned that the state was not relieved of its duty to provide Mr. Brillon with a speedy trial merely because the public defenders assigned him were mostly responsible for the delay. Rather, it considered the office of the public defender an arm of the state."
568,Commissioner,Lundy,"During 1987, Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than what the Lundys owed in taxes that year, but they did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the following 2 1/2 years. In 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Subsequently, the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes. Lundy also filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund. The Commissioner contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund, arguing that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Tax Court agreed, finding also that 2-year ""look-back"" period applies. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the applicable look-back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund."
652,Oncale,"Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.","Joseph Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (""Title VII""). On appeal from a decision supporting a district court's ruling against Oncale, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
4,Marvin Miller,California,"Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of ""adult"" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings."
172,Union Pacific Railroad Company,"Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region","The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad ( UPR ), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ( BLET ), contesting their discharge from conditions imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Advisory Board ( NRAB ) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the two parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt the resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to one federal district where a dismissal was affirmed. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively."
312,Edward Lane,Steven Franks,"In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth ( "" CITY "" ) division at Central Alabama Community College ( "" CACC "" ). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials in 2006 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president, CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against her and therefore violating his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision addressing the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that its First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duty as a public employee."
2376,"Minerva Surgical, Inc.","Hologic, Inc., et al.","Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (you.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States. Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system. In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement."
85,"Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.",Steve Conrad et al.,"Southeastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical ""Hair."" ""Hair"" was a controversial musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial content in the production. Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision."
300,Mitsubishi Motors Corporation,"Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.","These are two consolidated cases involving claims and counterclaims between the same parties. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese corporation that manufactures automobiles in Japan. The sales agreement provided for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association of all disputes arising out of certain articles of the agreement. A dispute did arise from slowing automobile sales. When the dispute could not be resolved, Mitsubishi sued in the you.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel arbitration. Soler filed counterclaims, including Sherman Act antitrust violations. The district court ordered arbitration of all claims, holding that the international nature of the dispute required enforcement of the arbitration clause. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed as to the antitrust claims."
1075,"Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.","Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.","Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer’s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule."
787,"Board of Regents , University of Wisconsin System",Southworth,"The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was ""not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights."""
14,Regents of the University of California,Allan Bakke,"Allan Bakke, a thirty - five - years - old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School, Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved two places in an entering class of one hundred for "" qualified "" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to remove existing, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications ( college GPA and test scores ) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted during the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, and he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race."
489,Curtis Publishing Company,Wallace Butts,"In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ( 1964 ) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "" with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. "" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an essay published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University and Alabama coach Paul "" Bear "" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel lawsuit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns several reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court - mandated enrollment of an African - American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the civil courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the jury in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court to Texas declined to hear the case."
407,Ohio,Akron Center for Reproductive Health,"In 1985 the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 319, which requires a physician to notify the parents of an unmarried minor who is requesting an abortion, unless the situation falls under one of the exceptions. Exceptions include: the minor providing a letter of parental consent; the physician providing the parents with actual notification 24 hours before the procedure or notification by mail 48 hours before the procedure; and a judicial bypass procedure that allows a minor to obtain the approval of a specified relative upon filing an affidavit with a juvenile court or receive a notification waiver from a juvenile court if parental notification would because the minor emotional, sexual, or physical abuse. Before the law was put into effect, an abortion clinic, one of its doctors, and a minor seeking an abortion sued in federal district court and claimed that the judicial bypass procedures the law required violated a minor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio form enforcing the statute. Ohio appealed and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
369,Lanell Williams-Yulee,The Florida Bar,"During her candidacy for County Court Judge, Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams - Yulee had collected campaign contributions. She stated how she served as the "" community Public Defender "" – although her title was "" assistant public defender "" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was one incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams - Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams - Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams - Yulee appealed the referee's order, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams - Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her presidential campaign. Williams - Yu appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rules prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech."
275,New Jersey,T.L.O.,"T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools."
2055,Supap Kirtsaeng,"John Wiley & Sons, Inc.","Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish, print, and sell its textbooks abroad. Supap Kirtsaeng is a Thai citizen who came to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics. While he was in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy the English-language versions of his textbooks there, where they were cheaper, and mail them to him. Kirtsaeng would then sell the textbooks in America, where they were worth more, reimburse his friends and family, and make a profit. In 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. The case went to the you.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether Kirtsaeng was barred from asserting an affirmative defense because the copyrighted works in question were manufactured abroad. The Court held that the affirmative defense was available to Kirtsaeng and remanded the case. Kirtsaeng won the case on remand and sought an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright Act. The district court held that Section 505 provides that the court may “in its discretion” award attorney’s fees but is not bound to do so. Because Wiley’s suit was not “frivolous” or “objectively unreasonable,” the district court held that awarding Kirtsaeng attorney’s fees would “not promote the purposes of the Copyright Act.” The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1103,John A. Rapanos et ux. et al.,United States,"John Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into ""navigable waters,"" which the Act defines as ""the waters of the United States."" Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also ignored cease-and-desist orders from the you.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered by the CWA as ""adjacent wetlands"" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as ""waters of the United States."" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ""hydrological connection"" of the wetlands to the navigable waters qualifies them as ""waters of the United States"" under the Act. The Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into ""navigable waters,"" which the Act defines as ""the waters of the United States."" Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot-wide berm (earthen barrier), but the Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the ""waters of the United States."" The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are ""adjacent"" to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a ""significant nexus"" with such waters, the wetlands qualify as ""waters of the United States"" for purposes of the CWA."
314,Edward Lane,Steven Franks,"In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth ( "" CITY "" ) program at Central Alabama Community College ( "" CACC "" ). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite having listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the suspension of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program happened in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties of a public employee."
487,Curtis Publishing Company,Wallace Butts,"In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ( 1964 ) the Court held that public officials in libel proceedings must show that a statement was made "" with confidence that it sounded false or with reckless ignorance of whether it was false or not. "" Those two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "" Bear "" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between two coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, stated that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally addressed a violent crowd attempting To prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court - ordered enrollment of an African - American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case."
135,Keith Lance et al.,"Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State","After the 2000 census, the you.S. Congress increased Colorado’s representation in the you.S. House of Representatives from six congressmen to seven. The Colorado state legislature failed to redraw the districts before the 2002 elections, so the state courts redrew the districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district map, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado state constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and therefore the courts’ 2002 redistricting took precedence over the redistricting by the state legislature. Keith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district court and argued that the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I of the you.S. Constitution, and those individuals’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file for redress of grievances. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Lance appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court, which held that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue preclusion, since Lance was an individual citizen not directly affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court."
134,BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"BCI Coca - Cola Bottling Company, Los Angeles fired African - American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part Because of a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non - African American employees so harshly. EEOC filed suit against BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703 ( a ) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado is racially biased, it dismissed the case because the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado'S discriminatory bias. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case to trial. The Tenth Circuit cited the subordinate bias theory of liability, which holds a company liable for a direct firing even if the employee who made the actual decision to fire was not the employee harboring racial bias."
1122,"Jill L. Brown, Warden",Ronald L. Sanders,"A California trial court sentenced Sanders to death for murder. The jury was told to consider four special aggravating circumstances during sentencing. On appeal, however, the state supreme court invalidated two of these circumstances, but still upheld Sanders's sentence. Sanders then filed a federal habeas petition, which was rejected by the district court but granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In overturning Sanders's sentence, it held that the sentence had been substantially affected by jury instructions to consider invalid aggravating circumstances. The Ninth Circuit faulted the state supreme court for its standard of review: The court should have determined whether the invalid circumstances were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in affecting the jury's sentence."
1286,"Ben Ysursa, Idaho Secretary of State, et al.","Pocatello Education Association, et al.","The plaintiffs in this case are comprised of labor organizations suing officials of the State of Idaho. The organizations claim that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA) violates their First Amendment free speech rights by restricting their ability to participate in any activities the VCA defines as ""political."" The State officials conceded the unconstitutionality of many of the VCA's provisions, however they argued for the validity of prohibiting payroll deductions for ""political activities."" The you.S. District Court for the District of Idaho held the payroll deduction provisions constitutional as applied to the state government but unconstitutional when applied to private and local government employees. The State officials appealed, contending that the provisions should be equally applicable to both groups. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the payroll deduction provisions could not be applied to private and local government employees because the State had provided no ""compelling justification"" to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that the officials had failed to show that the case should be reviewed under the more relaxed standard for a ""non-public"" forum."
2033,Lester Ray Nichols,United States,"In 2003, Lester Nichols was charged with intent to engage in sex with a minor. In 2006, the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was passed, and the Attorney General issued a rule in 2007 that SORNA applied retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Under this rule, Nichols was required to register with SORNA and update his residency. In 2012, Nichols flew from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his location pursuant to SORNA. Authorities in the Philippines took Nichols into custody and returned him to the United States where he was charged with noncompliance with SORNA regulations regarding updating his residency. Nichols filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the Philippines are outside you.S. jurisdiction, so he was not required to update his location. The trial court dismissed his motion, and Nichols plead guilty. He then appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction."
866,"Joseph P. Murr, et al.","Wisconsin, et al.","The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings ( the Murrs ) purchased two adjacent lots ( Lots E and F ) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots originally made up approximately. 98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs ’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County ’ s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot are at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if the lot were not at least one acre, two lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, both Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs ’ application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question engaged in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “ all, or above all, of their use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot. ” The circuit court granted summary judgement to each state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property."
478,"Robert Kennedy, Attorney General",Francisco Mendoza-Martinez,"Francisco Mendoza - Martinez ( Martinez ) became an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result from his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 ( the "" Act "" ) and served 366 days in prison. Five months after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401 ( j ) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their you. S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's judicial inquiry for stripping him of his O. S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401 ( j ) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted relief. This case was decided together in Rusk v. Cort."
722,Benjamin Gitlow,People of the State of New York,"Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1933 for distributing the “ Left Wing Manifesto "" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was tried under New York ’ s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of any government via force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's pages, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the superior court in that state."
792,Hunt,Cromartie,"In Shaw v. Hunt, the you.S Supreme Court found that North Carolina's legislature violated the Constitution by using race as the predominant factor in drawing its Twelfth Congressional District's 1992 boundaries. In 1997, after the State redrew those boundaries, the District Court found that the new boundaries had also been created with dominating racial considerations. In reversing, the Court found, in Hunt v. Cromartie, that the evidence was insufficient to show an unconstitutional race-based objective. On remand, the District Court again found that North Carolina's legislature had used race driven criteria in drawing the 1997 boundaries based on the district's shape, its splitting of towns and counties, and its heavily African-American voting population. The court newly found that the legislature had drawn the boundaries to collect precincts with a high racial, rather than political, identification. (Argued and decided with 99-1865, Smallwood v. Cromartie.)"
95,"Frances Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al.",William Baird et al.,"Massachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. Parental vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court."
454,New York,United States,"The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management."
313,Edward Lane,Steven Franks,"In 2008, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth ( "" CITY "" ) program at Central Alabama Community College ( "" CACC "" ). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's roster. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment of his favor. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a ruling on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did indeed protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public speaker."
597,Bennett,Spear,"When the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeopardize the species and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
343,Shaare Tefila Congregation,Cobb,"After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 you.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory."
541,Guy Rufus Huddleston,United States,"Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32, 000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market prices. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes over state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence saying Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then advised the jury that the evidence of prior good behaviour could only be used to establish Huddleston ’ s knowledge, not to prove his character. The court convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the materials in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence needed."
2346,The Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home,Commonweath of Pennsylvania and State of New Jersey,"The Women’s Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 you.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), closely-held for-profit corporations were also entitled to invoke the exemption if they had sincere religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage. Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 you.S. 958, (2014), the Court held that an entity seeking an exemption did not need to file the accommodation form; rather, its notification to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was sufficient to receive the exemption. HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury promulgated a final rule in compliance with these rulings. Then, in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 you.S. __ (2017), the Court considered another challenge to the rule, which asserted that merely submitting the accommodation notice “substantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion,” in violation of RFRA. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declined to reach the merits of that question. In 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services under the Trump administration promulgated regulations that greatly expanded the entities eligible to claim an exemption to the requirement that group health insurance plans cover contraceptive services. The new rules, which the agencies promulgated without issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public comment, expanded the scope of the religious exemption and added a “moral” exemption. Pennsylvania and New Jersey challenged the rules in federal district court, alleging that they violate the Constitution, federal anti-discrimination law, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After a hearing and reviewing evidence, the district court issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the rules’ enforcement, finding the states were likely to succeed on their APA claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. This case is consolidated with a similar case, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454, presenting the same legal question."
2212,Vernon Madison,State of Alabama,"Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed. In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Madison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier."
349,Arizona State Legislature,"Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to create congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission ( IRC ). In 2012, after an IRC published a proposed congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by taking redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district plan was unconstitutional and void. The legislature then requested that the District court permanently enjoin the IRC from adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution."
1323,Jose Padilla,Kentucky,"Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness."
104,Massachusetts Board of Retirement,Murgia,"Robert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at age fifty according to state law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court."
2070,"John Marshall, Warden",Otis Lee Rodgers,"On July 15, 2001, Otis Lee Rodgers was arrested after he threatened to shoot his wife in the head outside of the Garden Estates Apartments in Riverside, California. Before his trial, Rodgers waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and chose to represent himself. Rodgers then changed his mind several times, retaining and dismissing court-appointed attorneys, until his eventual trial. A Riverside County Superior Court jury subsequently found him guilty of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm as a felon, possession of ammunition as a felon, and making criminal threats. He also admitted that he was on bail for another pending felony trial and had two prior felony convictions. Rodgers was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. After sentencing, Rodgers asked the court to appoint an attorney to help him file a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied his request and subsequently denied his pro se motion for a new trial. Rodgers appealed to the you. S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking habeus corpus relief for the judge’s refusal to appoint counsel for the motion for a new trial. That court denied his petition. Rodgers then appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court granted Rodgers’ petition and remanded the case for trial."
808,Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County,United States Army Corps of Engineers,"The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into ""navigable waters."" Under the CWA, ""navigable waters"" are defined as ""the waters of the United States"" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court ruled in SWANCC's favor. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters."
815,"State of Nebraska, et al.","Mitch Parker, et al.","Omaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally-recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross-filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the you.S. Senate’s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision."
1990,A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation,United States,"Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine."
1583,Moones Mellouli,"Loretta Lynch, Attorney General","In 2010, Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia residing in the United States, was arrested for driving under the influence. While Mellouli was detained, police discovered four tablets of Adderall in his sock. Although initially charged with trafficking a controlled substance in a jail, Mellouli ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a Kansas statute. In 2012, the government attempted to deport Mellouli pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which states that aliens convicted under any law ""relating to a controlled substance"" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), are deportable. In immigration court, Mellouli argued that, since his 2010 conviction did not specify a particular controlled substance and the Kansas statute includes some substances not included in the CSA, his conviction did not necessarily ""relate to a controlled substance"" for the purposes of the INA. The judge rejected the argument and held that Mellouli was deportable because the particular controlled substance involved in his conviction was irrelevant. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that possession of drug paraphernalia involves drug trade in general, which is ""related to a controlled substance,"" and therefore Mellouli's conviction met the criteria required by the INA. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review and his petition for rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the BIA's conclusion was reasonable in light of the INA's use of the general term ""relating to"" instead of a more specific term like ""involving."""
201,Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,David Patchak,"The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band ( "" the Band "" ) is a Potawatomi Indian tribe from Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small unincorporated community comprising about 3, 000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior approved its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township – known as the "" Bradley Tract "" - - into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act ( "" IRA "" ). David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti - gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act ( "" QTA "" ) precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts ; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests don't fall within the IRA's zone - of - interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone - of - interests test for standing. The Court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering "" affected members of the public "" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA in Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in in contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. "
1050,Herman Avery Gundy,United States,"Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 you.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the you.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the you.S. Attorney General under 42 you.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted."
834,Glover,United States,"In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
218,United States Railroad Retirement Board,Gerhard H. Fritz,"In 1974 Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which restructured the retirement system previously established in 1937. Under the old system, employees who were eligible for both railroad benefits and social security benefits received both, along with an additional “windfall” benefit. Since this system threatened to bankrupt the railroad retirement program, the goal of the new Act was to eliminate some of these benefits. The new Act divided employees into different classes based on their employment history as of January 1, 1975. Employees who had worked for the railroad fewer than 10 years would not receive any windfall benefit. Employees who were already retired and receiving the full benefits would continue to do so. Employees who qualified for the full benefits but had not yet retired would receive the full benefits only if they had a current connection to the railroad industry or had served for 25 years or more. Employees who did not meet these requirements received a lesser windfall benefit. The appellee Gerhard H. Fritz was part of a plaintiff class of former railroad employees who were eligible for the windfall benefits under the old system, but who did not have a current connection to the railroad and had worked fewer than 25 years. Alleging that the Act created an irrational distinction between employees that violated the Due Process Clause, they filed a class action suit in district court. The district court held that such a distinction was not “rationally related” to the goal of ensuring the solvency of the retirement system."
602,"Wesley Harris, et al.","Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for 2012 state legislative elections based on the results of the 2010 election. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged how the newly redrawn districts were over - inhabited in Democratic - leaning districts and over - populated in Republican - leaning ones, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission held that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply With the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor of the Commission and held that the redrawn districts represented a poor faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act."
2194,"Wisconsin Central Ltd., et al.",United States of America,"Several subsidiaries of the Canadian National Railway Company (“the railway”) began in 1996 paying its employees in stock options as part of their compensation. Under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 you.S.C. § 3231(e)(1), any form of “money remuneration” paid to railway employees is subject to an excise tax “equal to a specified percentage of its employees’ wages….” (Railroad retirement tax rates are much higher than social security tax rates.) When employees exercise their stock options when the market price exceeds the price at which the employee has a right to buy the stock, the employee can benefit from a windfall. The Internal Revenue Service argues that this windfall is taxable, just as employees’ wages are taxable. The district court found for the government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court reasoned that while the government’s argument that “anything that has a market value is a form of money remuneration” was too broad, it was still correct in its assertion that stock is equivalent to cash. Moreover, as a policy concern, the government’s position avoids creating a tax incentive that could distort the ways in which employers structure compensation packages."
580,Printz,United States,"The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required ""local chief law enforcement officers"" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States."
100,"San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.","City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.","The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of ""issue preclusion""). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause."
1488,Marvin Peugh,United States,"In 1996, Marvin Peugh and Steven Hollewell formed two companies: the Grainary, Inc., which bought, stored and sold grain; and Agri-Tech, Inc., which provided custom farming services to landowners and tenants. From January 1999 to August 2000, the two obtained bank loans by falsely representing future contracts and inflating the bank accounts by writing bad checks between the two accounts. Peugh pleaded not guilty to all counts, while Hollewell pleaded guilty to one count and agreed to testify against Peugh in exchange for the other charges being dropped. After a jury trial, Peugh was convicted on five counts of bank fraud. At sentencing, Peugh argued that he should be sentenced under the 1999 you.S. Sentencing Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the offense, rather than the 2009 Guidelines that were in effect at the time of sentencing. He argued that use of the later Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison, and he and Hollewell were jointly ordered to pay nearly $2 million. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed."
1265,"FNU Tanzin, et al.","Muhammad Tanvir, et al.","The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the you.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in you.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” The you.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges."
850,"Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al.","Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al.","Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the you.S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the you.S. Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs in this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the you.S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits state municipal debt restructuring laws from binding creditors without their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
46,Lawyer,Department of Justice,"Based on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a settlement proposal for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and what appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and his residents filed lawsuits between state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a similar plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, so the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement."
231,Globe Newspaper Co.,"Superior Court, County of Norfolk","A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial."
2076,"SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag, et al.","First Quality Baby Products, LLC, et al.","SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag (SCA) produces adult incontinence products, as does First Quality Baby Products, LLC (First Quality). In 2003, SCA notified First Quality that it believed First Quality was infringing on one of its patents, and First Quality responded by arguing that, because the SCA patent in question was essentially the same as a prior-filed patent, it was invalid and therefore First Quality could not be infringing. The two companies ceased communication on the issue, but in 2004, SCA requested that the you.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamine its patent in light of the prior-filed one, and in 2007, the PTO determined that the patent in question was valid. In 2010, SCA sued First Quality for patent infringement. First Quality moved for summary judgment because SCA had unreasonably delayed litigation, and the district court granted the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion regarding the unreasonable delay because SCA should have been able to proceed with litigation after the reexamination and had not provided evidence to justify the delay. SCA requested a rehearing before the entire appellate court to reconsider the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer</i>, which held that the unreasonable delay defense cannot bar suits for copyright infringement that occurred during the three-year limitations period, and argued that the same analysis should apply to patent suits like this one. Upon rehearing, the appellate court rejected SCA’s argument and held that the Petrella decision did not affect its precedent, which stated that an unreasonable delay defense may be used in patent infringement claims brought within the six-year statute of limitations, and courts must examine the circumstances underlying those claims and the defense."
2151,Timothy Ivory Carpenter,United States of America,"In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain ""transactional records"" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 you.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when ""specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."" The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers—""cell site"" location information (CSLI). Based on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 you.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable because to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
125,Adrian Martell Davis,Washington,"Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the you.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not ""testimonial"" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford."
1071,Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation,"Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund ""contract support costs"" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government."
419,"David King, et al.","Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","In 2002, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act ( ACA ) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an "" exchange "" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low - income individuals. To limit the amount of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits to are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to these tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) created a regulation that limited the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as well as state exchanges. Virginia declined to establish a state - run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under a same exception and be exempt from having people purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that this IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied the defendants'motion to dismiss, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1334,Wanda Krupski,"Costa Crociere, S.p.A.","In 2007, Wanda Krupski booked a trip with Costa Cruise Lines. On February 21 while on the trip, Ms. Krupski allegedly tripped over a loose cable and broker her femur. She filed suit in a Florida federal district court against Costa Cruise Lines. One year and four days after her alleged injury, Costa Cruise Lines informed Ms. Krupski that it was merely the North American sales and booking agent for the carrier, Costa Crociere. The district court allowed Ms. Krupski to amend her complaint to include Costa Crociere and dismissed the action against Costa Cruise Lines. Costa Crociere then moved for summary judgment arguing the ticket sold to Ms. Krupski stipulated that suits must be filed against it within one year of the alleged injury. Therefore, Ms. Krupski was out of time. The district court agreed and granted Costa Crociere's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Ms. Krupski argued that her amended complaint against Costa Crociere related back to her original filing and thus should be considered timely filed against Costa Crociere. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. The court held that her amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint. The court reasoned that Ms. Krupski was aware that Costa Crociere was the carrier all along. Thus, to relate her amended complaint back to the original complaint was not the sort of mistaken identity correction contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure15(c)(1)(C)."
1344,Tarahrick Terry,United States,"Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one offense of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “ detectable ” amount of cocaine base ( 3. 9 grams ), thus triggering the penalties in 21 you. S. C. § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and a district court sentenced him to 188 months ’ jail with 6 years ’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling under Section 841 ( b ) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied that motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “ covered offense ” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for drug offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ), Terry ’ s offense was not a “ covered offense. ” The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
775,Julius A. Wolf,Colorado,"Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court."
1152,Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,Brentwood Academy,"Brentwood Academy, a private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties. On appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the ""police power"" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a ""government regulator."" The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating athletic competition was not substantial enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood."
709,Jacob Abrams et al.,United States,"In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian forces against Germany when the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated posters called for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets falling from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American soldiers to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production and weapons to use used against "" Workers Soviets of Russia "". Two were sentenced to 20 years in prison."
1204,"Randall Wright, Sheriff, Shawano County, Wisconsin",Joseph L. Van Patten,"When Joseph Van Patten pled no contest to a charge of first-degree reckless homicide in a Wisconsin state court, his lawyer was not at his side during the hearing. Rather, the lawyer was linked to the courtroom by speakerphone. After the court imposed the maximum penalty of 25 years on Van Patten, he retained new counsel and moved in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to have his plea withdrawn. Van Patten claimed that his lawyer's failure to appear in person and the decision to conduct the plea hearing via speakerphone violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Wisconsin appellate court, applying the Court's 1984 ruling in Strickland, concluded that Van Patten's counsel's representation was not ""deficient or prejudicial"" and denied the motion. Van Patten then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The district court denied the petition, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Van Patten's claim should have been analyzed under the Court's 1984 decision in Cronic, not Strickland, and came out in Van Patten's favor. The case came to the Court for a resolution of this conflicting case law."
1164,"Altadis USA, Inc.","Sea Star Line, LLC, et al.","Altadis USA, Inc. hired Sea Star Line, LLC (Sea Star) to ship a container of cigars from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Tampa, Florida. According to the contract, which was negotiated under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), the container would travel by ship until it reached port at Jacksonville, Florida. From there, American Trans-Freight, Inc. (ATF) would truck it to Tampa. Sea Star issued a ""'through' bill of lading"" which held Sea Star liable for the container's safety during both the land and sea portions of its transport. The container was stolen from an ATF truck and Altadis filed a claim against Sea Star in District Court. The one-year statute of limitations for filing a COGSA claim had expired and the District Court dismissed the suit. Altadis argued that the Carmack Amendment imposed a two-year minimum statute of limitations period on liability claims relating to the transport of goods into the United States. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Carmack Amendment's liability rules did not apply to the inland portion of transport because ATF did not issue a separate bill of lading. Other you.S. Courts of Appeals had ruled that the Carmack Amendment did not require a separate bill of lading to cover the inland portion of transport."
609,"Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board",Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,"Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ( Liberty Mutual ) operates a self - funded employee health plan through a third - party Administrator. Vermont state law requires that employee health plans, including self - insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how information is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third - party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( ERISA ) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court ruled in contempt of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt a Vermont statute. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted that state statute and the state statute ’ s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted."
419,Michigan Department of State Police,Rick Sitz,"In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower courts."
944,United States,Navajo Nation,"The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody's interest rather than the tribe's, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that ""the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes."""
2303,"Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer","Montana Department of Revenue, et al.","Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs. Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court."
1297,"Lawrence W. Nelson, aka Zikee",United States,"Lawrence Nelson was convicted in a federal district court of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine and sentenced to 360 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Nelson argued that the district court erred in presuming the United States Sentencing Guidelines were reasonable. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, vacated Mr. Nelson's sentence, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit in consideration of its decision in Rita v. United States. On remand, the Fourth Circuit once again affirmed Mr. Nelson's sentence, reasoning that the district court did not treat the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory."
1799,United States,"Arnold Schwinn & Co., Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association","The United States brought an antitrust action against Arnold, Schwinn & Co. and its distributor Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association. Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers. The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade. The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal"
526,David Carpenter,United States,"R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ ) entitled Heard on the Street ( Heard ) in which he reported on up - and - coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard with two friends who met at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it greatly affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four - month period, the brokers used Winans ’ reports on stocks intended to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $ 690, 000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) began an investigation, Winans and his co - conspirator Carpenter confessed. The district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co - conspirators guilty on mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The defense appealed and argued that, because the WSJ — the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges — had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners alleged misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans'knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ."
353,Griffith,Kentucky,"This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States."
2302,"GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS","Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al.","Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany. The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS. Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute. Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel."
889,Bassam Yacoub Salman,United States,"Maher Kara joined Citigroup ’ s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2003 to 2009 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became closer to Bassam Yacoub Salman ’ s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother - in - law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous incidents where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman "" s account reached $ 2. 1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for The Ninth Circuit and said there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information."
1980,Fremont Weeks,United States,Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.
1238,Richlin Security Service Company,"Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security","Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 you.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to ""fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings."" Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 you.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates."
225,"Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General","AU Optronics Corporation, et al.","On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Class action and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court under the CAFA. The State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable."
468,Crown Kosher Super Market,Gallagher,"The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which does shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one - third of its weekly business. In 2004, The Massachusetts ’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and prohibited any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision follows the Equal Protection Clause of this Fourteenth Amendment since Congress does not respect traditional religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free speech of religion."
1060,Russell Bucklew,"Anne Precythe, et al.","Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely because him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to because serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court."
287,Executive Benefits Insurance Agency,Peter H. Arkison,"Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. ( BIA ) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for its Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the insurance funds from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long - time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. ( EBIA ). Pearce then deposited over $ 100, 000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim for EBIA in the BIA restructuring proceeding. Arkison alleged fraud conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy Court's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may dismiss the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to that bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court."
1765,"Estelle T. Griswold, et al.",State of Connecticut,"In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court."
1629,Dennys Rodriguez,United States,"On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop."
559,Peacock,Thomas,"In 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru- Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in Thomas's favor, but found that Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit."
642,"Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc.",National Labor Relations Board,"In 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining-unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an ""objective reasonable doubt"" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724."
2001,"Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture et al.",Roscoe C. Filburn,"Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act. He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause."
740,Frank Palko,Connecticut,Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.
463,Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus,United States,"Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist ’ s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew, “ Mark ”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation ( “ FBI ) ) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not try to obtain a warrant of arrest or a arrest warrant relating to Abel. FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( “ INS ” ) a report on Abel as a suspected spy ; the FBI agents also asked him to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel ’ s personal effects in the room. It seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage ; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial. Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was leaving the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel ’ s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell ; he also reported that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel ’ s and, holding that INS agents could search Abel ’ s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant."
1198,Andre Martello Barton,"William P. Barr, Attorney General","A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B - 2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few days before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies : aggravated assault, first - degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating a Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a refusal to appear, charging him as removable ( deportable ) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government upheld the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation for removal under 8 you. S. C. § 1229b ( a ), that allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “ has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status. ” This residency requirement is subject to a “ stop - time rule ” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “ inadmissible ” or “ removable. ” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time - stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop - time rule because as an already - admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “ rendered inadmissible ” within the meaning of § 1229b ( a ). The immigration judge ruled in the government ’ s favor, and in a non - precedential single - member decision, - Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge ’ s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that of person need not seek admission ( or readmission ) to be to rendered inadmissible. ”"
1680,Rose Staub ,City of Baxley,"Rose Staub was convicted and fined for attempting to organize a branch of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union at Hazlehurst Manufacturing Company. She violated an ordinance in the neighboring town of Baxley, where many of the Manufacturing Co. workers lived. That ordinance required anyone soliciting members for a union to apply for a permit from the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permits for any reason. Staub argued that the ordinance violated her constitutional right to free speech. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, but did not consider the constitutional question because Staub did not attempt to comply with the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari."
210,Eddie C. Thomas,Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division et al.,"Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a ""good because [arising] in connection with [his] work"" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a ""personal philosophical choice"" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right."
1117,League of United Latin American Citizens et al.,"Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, et al.","In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000. The case was appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to. The three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair."
1992,National Labor Relations Board,Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,"With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country’s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members."
1189,Stephen Danforth,Minnesota,"At Stephen Danforth's trial for sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, the victim was found incompetent to testify in court, so his videotaped testimony was shown instead. Danforth was convicted and his appeals were unsuccessful. After Danforth's case became final, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that pre-recorded testimony without the possibility of cross-examination is unconstitutional. Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief, seeking to have the Crawford decision applied retroactively to his case. Supreme Court decisions announcing constitutional rules of criminal procedure are applied retroactively only in certain circumstances, which are specified in Teague v. Lane. The state court of appeals declined to retroactively apply Crawford. On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Danforth raised an alternative argument, claiming that the state court was free to apply a broader standard of retroactivity than the one in Teague. Under Minnesota state retroactivity principles, Danforth argued, the Crawford case met the criteria for retroactive application. In Danforth's interpretation, the Teague standard was mandatory for federal habeas corpus proceedings but not for state postconviction proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth's arguments, ruling that only you.S. Supreme Court decisions determine the proper standard for retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford does not apply retroactively under Teague, but it agreed to consider Danforth's alternative argument."
1269,"Doug Waddington, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center",Cesar Sarausad,"Cesar Sarausad was arrested in Washington state for his involvement in a drive-by shooting near a school. After he was convicted of second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges in a jury trial, Sarausad filed a petition for habeas corpus in the you.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted Sarausad's motion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that certain confusing jury instructions related to accomplice liability unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proof. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the insufficiency of evidence claim but affirmed on the jury instructions claim. The court stated that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction under Jackson v. Virginia. However, the jury instructions were ambiguous on the question of whether Sarausad could be convicted of murder and attempted murder on a theory of accomplice liability without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew an accomplice intended to commit a murder. According to the Ninth Circuit, there was a reasonable chance the jury misapplied these instructions."
728,Roy Olmstead et al.,United States,"Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed guards in the buildings near Olmstead's building ( where he maintained an office ) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was arrested with documents obtained from the wiretaps. This case gets decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green among several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire - tapped conversations, for conspiracy to break the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case is also decided with McInnis v. United States."
297,Ford Motor Company,United States,"When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled to interest from the government for the period following the date of overpayment and the ultimate refund, but the "" date of overpayment "" is not specifically defined. The Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) informed the Ford Motor Company ( Ford ) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS that covered the underpayment. Ford initially requested that the deposits be considered to cover additional taxes that Ford owed. The Government eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a refund. Ford argued that the date of overpayment was the date that Ford originally submitted the deposits from the IRS for the underpayment for taxes, and the Government argued, the date of overpayment was the date when Ford requested that their payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district court, and the court found in favor of the Government. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
239,Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette,California,"On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a tip from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers of the area, and two separate detectives soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, who while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the area, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for transportation. At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a credible suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers'observations of details that matched the tip constituted a suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the charge. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed."
2174,"Jefferson Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections",Vernon Madison,"Vernon Madison is a 66-year-old man on death row in Alabama for the murder of a police officer over thirty years ago. Madison has suffered strokes resulting in significant cognitive and physical impairments, and his lawyers argue that he is mentally incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman. At a competency hearing held by an Alabama trial court, Madison's lawyers presented testimony from a doctor that Madison's strokes caused him not to remember committing the murder and that he does not understand why the state is seeking to execute him. The State presented a different doctor's expert testimony that Madison was able to accurately discuss his legal appeals and legal theories with his attorneys and thus that he has a rational understanding of his sentence. The trial court decided that Madison was competent to be executed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that facts in the record were insufficient to support the trial court's decision and that the trial court erroneously applied the test for competency established in Panetti."
159,Citizens United,Federal Election Commission,"Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ( BCRA ) to its film Hillary : The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether supporting Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "" big money "" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a series of restrictions to "" electioneering communications. "" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate he intends to support. Citizens United argued that : 1 ) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2 ) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied within the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was ineligible for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that its McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "" might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom to associate in terms of a particular because, "" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's decision."
879,Rocky Dietz,Hillary Bouldin,"Hillary Bouldin ’ s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz ’ s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The party filed stipulations as to their damages, and the jury found in Dietz ’ s favor but awarded $ 0 in damages. The district court judge dismiss the jury but then reconsidered and re - empaneled the jury. He asked them to re - determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties ’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict then awarded $ 15, 000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors was not exposed by prejudicial influence during the immediate duration of their dismissal."
2127,Charles R. Kokesh,Securities and Exchange Commission,"The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Charles Kokesh for violating federal securities law by misappropriating funds from four business development companies. The district court found in favor of the SEC and ordered that Kokesh pay $34.9 million for “the ill-gotten gains causally connected” to Kokesh’s violations. On appeal, Kokesh argued that this “disgorgement” order is barred by the five-year statute of limitations on this type of claim because the SEC brought its action more than five years after the claims accrued. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the five-year statute of limitations did not apply to this case because the ordered payment was remedial rather than punitive in nature. The goal of disgorgement is not to punish a wrongdoer for illegal activity, but rather to return to the rightful owner whatever profits the wrongdoer gained in the course of the illegal activity. Therefore, a disgorgement payment may be ordered so long as the amount “reasonably approximates the ill-gotten gains causally connected to the Defendant’s violations.”"
1384,General Dynamics Corporation,United States,"More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the you.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies were not able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology. The government has argued that the companies could not press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed."
1800,Redrup,New York,"Robert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal. William Austin owned a retail bookstore and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name –High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial. Gent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling."""
72,United States,White Mt. Apache Tribe,"Under Public Law 86 - 392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to restore, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to appeal, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, letting alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the suit. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common - law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve a property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported their money damages claim."
975,"Joseph Jesner, et al.","Arab Bank, PLC","Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC (Arab Bank), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the you.S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals’ holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal."
272,Heckler,Matthews,"Congress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 amendments included a ""pension offset"" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision."
339,"Mach Mining, LLC",Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC ( Mach Mining ) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable because to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the male applicants'behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith constituted a viable defense to its suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts, determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate. Nonetheless, the court certified the question to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long that the EEOC itself pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review was satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers of informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure - to - conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure - to - conciliate as an affirmative defense can protract and resolve employment discrimination cases."
1372,Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization,"Kathleen M. Winn, et al.","Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim."
1307,"William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission","American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al.","Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act — the automatic call ban — prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “ any automatic telephone dialing system using an artificial or prerecorded voice. ” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban : automated calls “ for emergency purposes ” and those made to a cell phone with “ the prior express consent of the called party. ” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “ to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States. ” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban. The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content - based ban on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review ( testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a "" compelling state interest, "" that the law is "" specifically tailored "" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the "" least restrictive means "" to achieve that purpose ) to the debt - collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt - collection exemption does not satisfy any level of review. Finding that the government was exempt from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision."
1133,Jacob Zedner,United States,"Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of the defendant's arrest or first appearance in court. The Act includes a list of delays which do not count toward this 70-day period, and one of these acceptable delays occurs when a federal district court finds on the record that the ""ends of justice"" served by granting a delay outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. In this case, Zedner was a defendant in a criminal trial and twice asked the district court to issue such an order. The third time he requested one, the district court judge suggested that he sign a waiver of his right to a speedy trial under the Act for all time. Zedner signed the form, and accordingly the next time he asked for a delay the judge did not make on-the-record findings exempting the 91-day delay. Four years later, Zedner filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the Act's 70-day period that resulted from that 91-day delay. The district court rejected the motion because of the waiver, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Zedner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the waiver he signed was invalid under the Act."
691,Homer Adolph Plessy,John Ferguson,"Louisiana enacted the segregated Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven - eighths Caucasian – agreed with participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens ( Committee of Citizens ), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal that Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "" whites only "" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it thought that Act imposed unnecessary segregation via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the black - only car, he refused and were arrested. At trial, Plessy ’ s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted."
731,Immigration & Naturalization Service,Aguirre-Aguirre,"While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit ""serious nonpolitical crimes"" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
74,United States,White Mt. Apache Tribe,"Under Public Law 86 - 392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government held that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation of loss. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded whether the federal government's property use triggered a common - law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior may not utilize, which also supported a money limitation statute."
2266,Food Marketing Institute,"Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media","The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA. Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought. For the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to because substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’” Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court."
158,Herbert,Lando,"Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the ""actual malice"" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program."
790,"C. & L. Enterprises, Inc.",Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,"The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Tribe, entered into a contract with C & L Enterprises, Inc., for the installation of a roof on a Tribe-owned building in Oklahoma. The property rests outside the Tribe's reservation and is not held in trust by the Federal Government for the Tribe. The contract contains clauses requiring disputes arising out of the contract to be decided by arbitration and a choice-of-law clause that reads: ""The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located."" Thus, Oklahoma law governed the contract. After the contract was executed, but before performance commenced, the Tribe retained another company to install the roof. C & L then submitted an arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. The arbitrator awarded C & L a monetary award. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the Tribe was immune from suit. The court noted that the contract seemed to indicate the Tribe's willingness to expose itself to suit on the contract, but concluded that the Tribe had not waived its suit immunity with the requisite clarity."
938,"Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General",James Garcia Dimaya,"James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first - degree residential burglary ; both convictions resulted in two terms in imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ), a non - citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “ crime of violence, ” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against any citizen or property. The Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) affirmed. While Dimaya ’ s appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “ violent felony ” in the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA ’ s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the specific felony provision from the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied prior notice to defendants and failed to make clear when any risk of violence could be considered substantial."
1559,"Highmark, Inc.","Allcare Management Systems, Inc.","The Patent Act allows a court to award reasonable attorneys fees in exceptional cases in which the lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought in bad faith. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (Allcare) owns a patent that covers a computer-based method of generating treatment options based on symptom data entered by a physician. This process can help an insurance company determine whether to approve a particular treatment for a patient. In 2003, Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Allcare's patent. Allcare filed a counterclaim and alleged that Highmark infringed on two sections of its patent. The federal district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The court also found that Allcare had willfully pursued frivolous infringement claims and ordered it to pay Highmark's attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit independently reviewed the district court's determination that Allcare's claims were objectively baseless. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding with respect to one of Allcare's claims and reversed the court regarding Allcare's second claim."
491,United States,Eugene Frank Robel,"Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act if he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member from the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “ defense facility site. The district Court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an inactive participant of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the u. S. Supreme Court."
473,Poe,Ullman,"Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life - threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the publication or use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not always enforced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws required a Fourteenth Amendment."
1045,Adaucto Chavez-Mesa,United States of America,"In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 you.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 you.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient."
732,United States,"William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.","In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to ease the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go crazy. Authority to determine which commodities would be affected was granted through the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of his crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers to the Hoosal Mills Corp., a grain processor."
1091,Francis V. Lorenzo,Securities and Exchange Commission,"Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker - dealer. Lorenzo ’ the only investment - banking client at the relevant time was a start - up company named Waste2Energy Holdings ( W2E ). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $ 15 million in “ debentures ” — which is debt secured only by the debtor ’ s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E ’ s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company ’ s intangible assets and stated only that they remained worth over $ 10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8 - K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets, valuing its total assets at $ 370, 600. Lorenzo ’ s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “ several key points ” about W2E ’ s pending debenture offering, but rather without even mentioning the devaluation of W2E ’ s intangible assets, he said both that the offering came with “ 3 layers of protection, ” which were : $ 10 million in “ confirmed assets ” ; purchase orders and LOIs for “ over $ 43 [ million ] in orders ” ; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “ at the request of [ Lorenzo ’ s client ] ” and the other stated it was sent “ at the request of [ another broker with the firm ]. ” Lorenzo of s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities - and provisions : Section 17 ( a ) ( 1 ) of the Securities Act of 1933 ; Section 10 ( b ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b - 5. Lorenzo ’ s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ ’ s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission ’ s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b - 5 ( b ). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo ’ s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ ultimate authority ” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court ’ s definition of “ maker ” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 you. S. 135 ( 2011 )."
536,United States,Ursery,"Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court."
1301,"Anthony Hedgpeth, Warden",Michael Robert Pulido,"Michael Pulido was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court for his involvement in the shooting of a gas station attendant during the course of a robbery. He claimed that he was only involved in the robbery after the shooting had taken place. On appeal, Mr. Pulido argued that the jury instructions were in error and allowed a jury to convict him as an accomplice in the robbery and murder, even if he only took part in the robbery. The California Supreme Court refused to overturn the conviction holding that the error was harmless because the jury had specifically found that Mr. Pulido aided the robbery during the murder. Mr. Pulido sought and was granted habeas relief by a federal district court in California. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which was legally improper, was ""structural error"" entitling Mr. Pulido to automatic relief and exempted the instructions from ""harmless-error"" review."
2019,Saul Molina-Martinez,United States,"Saul Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being in the United States illegally following deportation proceedings that stemmed from his felony convictions. The district court accordingly sentenced Molina-Martinez to 77 months in prison, pursuant to the sentencing range established in the you.S. Sentencing Guidelines for his criminal history category. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, prior sentences are counted as a single sentence if they were imposed on the same day unless the offenses in question were separated by an intervening arrest. Molina-Martinez’s prior offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest, so when his probation officer calculated his criminal history points and concluded that they placed him in category VI, he erred; Molina-Martinez should properly have been placed in category V, which carries a lower sentencing range of 70-87 months. Molina-Martinez appealed his sentence on the grounds that the district court erred in sentencing him based on the incorrect criminal history category. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, despite the error in calculation, Molina-Martinez failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights and therefore affirmed his conviction and sentence."
1182,United States,Juan Resendiz-Ponce,"Juan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the you.S. using false identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had ""committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering"" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted Resendiz- Ponce. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued that the omission was ""harmless error,"" a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a ""fatal flaw."""
661,John Barron ex rel. Tiernan,Mayor of Baltimore,"Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the shipyard deliberately disrupted water flow into the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor robbed Barron of deep waters, or reduced his profits. He sued the city to regain a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded Barron $ 4, 500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down."
1071,New Prime Inc.,Dominic Oliveira,"Dominic Oliveira attended an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. ( Prime ), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, partially manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his parent LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “ substantially identical ” to those he had as an independent contractor. Oliveira then brought a class - action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), a state minimum - wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ( FAA ), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to settle. The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “ contract of employment of transportation workers ” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was a employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime ’ s motion to compel arbitration. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question of the court to determine. The appellate court then determined that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent - contractor relationship."
189,Richmond Newspapers Inc.,Virginia,"After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action."
501,"Honda Motor Company, Ltd.",Oberg,"Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards."
745,"Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell",Connecticut,"Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace."
1125,Terance Martez Gamble,United States,"Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 you.S. 187 (1959), that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court."
1704,William H. Burton et al.,Wilmington Parking Authority et al.,"In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court."
341,"Hana Financial, Inc.","Hana Bank, et al.","In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name "" Hana Overseas Korean Club "" in English as well as "" Hana Bank "" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the "" dancing man. "" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. ( HFI ) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI registered a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with its words "" Hana Financial "" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the term Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other. In 1997, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the "" Hana Bank "" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the "" Hana Financial "" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be "" tacked "" to their television advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase "" Hana Bank. "" HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be "" tacked "" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a point of fact that may be decided by a jury. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision."
815,United States,Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop,"Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted."
233,Michigan,Bay Mills Indian Community,"The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ( IGRA ) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state & the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a reservation on Indian lands. By the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in northern Michigan, established a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on property purchased with money from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal - State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over one of the plaintiffs'lawsuits, while Bay Mills'sovereign immunity bars the others."
840,Jermaine Simmons et al. ,Walter J. Himmelreich,"Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 you.S.C. §2676, that prohibits “any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim.” The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court’s judgment. It held that Himmelreich’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich’s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 you.S.C §2676."
809,United States,Cleveland Indians Baseball Company,"Under a grievance settlement agreement, the Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1120,Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation,"Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.","Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
589,Abigail Noel Fisher,"University of Texas at Austin, et al.","Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission in the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify in Texas'Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in - school graduating high school class. For the bright spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that the University ’ s admissions process was constitutional, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University ’ s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appeals court reaffirmed the lower court ’ s decision by holding that the University of Texas ’ use of Race as an consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of increasing educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny."
1192,James LaRue,"DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., et al.","James LaRue participated in a 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by his employer, the management consulting firm DeWolff, Boberg & Associates. Employee benefit plans are regulated under a federal law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). LaRue sought to exercise his option to make certain changes in his investment plan, but DeWolff neglected to make the changes. LaRue claimed that DeWolff's omission had cost him $150,000, and he sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking to recover the money. In response, DeWolff argued that ERISA does not provide for the type of individual monetary award sought by LaRue. Section 502(a)(2) allows plan participants to sue plan administrators for breach of fiduciary duty in order to ""make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach."" DeWolff argued that LaRue's suit was not of the type contemplated by the text of ERISA because LaRue sued to recover losses caused to his own personal retirement plan rather than suing to vindicate the interests of the plan as a whole. LaRue also invoked Section 502(a)(3), which allows plan participants to sue to obtain ""other appropriate equitable relief."" The you.S. District Court held that LaRue was not entitled to relief under ERISA, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Section 502(a)(2) was concerned with protecting entire plans from misuse of plan assets and not with providing recovery for losses suffered by individual accounts. The court also rejected LaRue's Section 502(a)(3) claim. It ruled that the phrase ""equitable relief"" rarely includes relief in the form of a monetary award and only when the money has been unjustly possessed by the defendant."
1673,Roviaro,United States,"On August 12, 1954, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (""FBN"") and the Chicago Police Department met twice with Albert Roviaro near the intersection of 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago. According to Agent Norris Durham of the FBN, after the second meeting, Detective Byson of the Chicago police climbed into the trunk of a Cadillac sedan owned and driven by ""John Doe,"" an informant for the government. The trunk was propped open slightly to preserve Byson's line of sight. John Doe drove the car to 74th Street and St. Lawrence Avenue, where Alberto Roviaro got out of a Pontiac sedan. Roviaro entered the Cadillac sedan and took a seat next to the driver, John Doe. Durham followed the Cadillac, which took a circuitous rote to Champlain Avenue and 74th Street. He observed Roviaro leave the Cadillac and walk to a nearby tree, where he picked up a small package. Byson confirmed this from his vantage point in the Cadillac's trunk. Roviaro then walked to the car's open right front door and motioned as if he was leaving the package inside. A chemist working for the United States later identified the package's contents as heroin. The government charged Roviaro with trafficking heroin, in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. He was convicted, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial. The you.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the ruling. Judge Walter Lindley, writing for a unanimous court, held that because John Doe was not a participant in Roviaro's actual possession of heroin, Roviaro is not entitled to full disclosure of his identity."
2197,State of Montana,State of Wyoming and State of North Dakota,"The Yellowstone River Compact is an interstate compact to which Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming are parties. The Compact was ratified in 1950, and went into effect in 1951, in order to provide for an equitable division and apportionment of the waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries and encourage mutually beneficial development and cooperation between the three states. Among other things, the Compact serves to protect the appropriative rights that existed before 1950 among the three states. In 2004, Wyoming reduced the volume of water available at the state line between Wyoming and Montana by 1300 acre feet, and by 56 acre feet in 2006. Montana invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over disputes among states."
369,Morrison,Olson,"The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an ""independent counsel"" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws."
767,Harris Trust & Savings Bank,"Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.","Section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) bars a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain prohibited transactions with a ""party in interest."" Such a party encompasses entities that a fiduciary might be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan's beneficiaries. After the Ameritech Pension Trust (APT), an ERISA pension plan, allegedly entered into a transaction prohibited by ERISA with Salomon Smith Barney Inc., APT's fiduciaries sued Salomon under section 502(a)(3), which authorizes a fiduciary to bring a civil action to obtain appropriate equitable relief."" Salomon arguing that section 502(a)(3) only authorizes a suit against the fiduciary who caused the plan to enter the prohibited transaction. Ultimately, the District Court held that ERISA provides a private because of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a prohibited transaction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the authority to sue under section 502(a)(3) does not extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary ""party in interest"" to a transaction barred by section 406(a)."
687,O'Sullivan,Boerckel,"After Darren Boerckel's state convictions of rape, burglary, and aggravated battery were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material was violated. In denying the petition, the District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first three claims by failing to include them in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals concluding that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims because he was not required to present them in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to satisfy 28 you. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), the exhaustion requirement. Under the exhaustion requirement federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court."
241,Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield,A. Ernest Fitzgerald,"On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the you. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion."
402,Illinois,Perkins,"While being held in jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing a murder to an undercover police officer who was posing as another inmate."
651,Robert Fletcher,John Peck,"In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to railroad companies. The following year, that legislature voided the law and declared the rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that became part of another Georgia legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the original sale of the land had been declared void, Peck had no legal right to sell the property and thus committed a breach of trust."
618,Bracy,Gramley,"During Thomas J. Maloney's tenure as an Illinois judge, William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before him for a triple murder. Maloney was later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from criminal defendants. In his federal habeas petition, Bracy argued that, because he had ""fixed"" other murder cases, Maloney had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion. Bract contended that Maloney's interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court denied the claim, concluding that Bracy's allegations contained insufficient specificity or good because. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that Bracy had not shown ""good because"" for discovery to prove his claim."
963,Kentel Myrone Weave,Commonwealth of Massachusetts,"On August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver ’ s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver ’ s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in her first place. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for the new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closing of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial court denied Weaver ’ s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver ’ criminal conviction. The court held that Weaver had consistently shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel ’ s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment error typically constitutes a “ structural error, ” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice."
551,Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,Federal Election Commission,"Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the ""Party Expenditure Provision"" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party ""expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate."" The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered judgment for the FEC."
671,Dred Scott,John F. A. Sanford,"Dred Scott was a judge in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois ( a free territory ) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning in Missouri, Scott filed again in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory rendered him a free man. After losing, Scott brought another new suit in federal law. Scott's suit maintained that no “ negro ” or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution."
915,National Labor Relations Board,"SW General, Inc.","In 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), which provided that, if a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms (PAS position) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an “acting officer” for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a PAS position, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians (EMTs), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “longevity pay,” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon’s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA."
597,"Rebecca Friedrichs, et al.","California Teachers Association, et al.","California law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public and employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “ agency shop ” arrangement, which means no one school district may require the local school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of dues to the union in the form called a “ fair share service fee. ” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling themselves to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for a nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year. Below are a group of public school students who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt - out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1314,"Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John",State of Washington,"Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees cannot agree to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $ 1, 000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “ winner - takes - all ” electoral system, which means that all of a state ’ s electoral victories go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In the 1996 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton / Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a single individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $ 1, 000 each for failing to vote for the candidate of their party in violation of the law. The electors challenged the law imposing the penalty as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed. This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19 - 518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020."
587,B. C. Foreman et al.,"Dallas County, Texas et al. ","In 1972, Texas became a covered jurisdiction for purposes of section 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965. By statute, Texas authorizes counties to appoint election judges, who supervise voting at the polls on election days. In 1983 and several times thereafter, Dallas County changed procedures for selecting election judges. Each of the new methods used party-affiliation formulas. In 1996, various parties brought suit in Federal District Court against the county, claiming that section 5 required the changes to be precleared by the you.S. Department of Justice. The District Court concluded that preclearance was not required, as the county had simply exercised its discretion under a state statute to adjust the procedure for appointing election judges. The court also noted that Department's preclearance of a 1985 submission from the state operated to preclear the county's use of partisan considerations in selecting election judges."
1203,R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.,"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.","Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for - profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her life at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and married to a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home ’ s owner and operator that he intended to switch from male to female, she was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) alleging that she had not terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen - s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal of conform to sex - based stereotypes. The district court granted the judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home ’ s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII."
152,"Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama",Yvonne Kennedy et al.,"In 1987, the United States Attorney General introduced a proposed Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive a local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit before federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an case against a Governor of Alabama. The you. S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that since the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been successful in being implemented."
994,Merit Management Group,"FTI Consulting, Inc.","Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange with $ 55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders that pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee for the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30 % shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to prevent Bedford's $ 16. 5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( b ), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers "" made by or to "" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “ made by or to ” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and don't benefit from it. The Seventh Circuit held that section 546 ( e ) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non - named entities where a named entity merely acts as a part of the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has applied the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary."
767,Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu,United States,"In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the you. S. government decided to require Japanese - Americans to move to relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months following Pearl Harbor. A Japanese - American man living in San Leandro, Fred Turner, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested then convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Turner'S sentence."
2243,Clayvin Herrera,Wyoming,"Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians. Herrera and several other tribal members went elk hunting on the Crow Reservation, and at some point, followed several elk across a fence, thereby leaving the Crow Reservation and entering the Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. They shot three bull elk and took the meat with them to Montana. None of the hunters had a license, and it was closed season. Herrera was cited with two hunting-related misdemeanors under Wyoming law. He moved to dismiss the charges under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the Laramie Treaty of 1868. He argued that the treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to hunt off the reservation and that the treaty was still valid and thus preempted state law. Bound by the Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the state court held that Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of Wyoming. Herrera was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts. He appealed the lower court’s pretrial determination on the off-reservation treaty hunting right. Reviewing the lower court’s conclusions de novo, the state appeals court affirmed the lower court."
295,Ford Motor Company,United States,"When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled to interest from the government for the period between the date of overpayment and the ultimate refund, but the ""date of overpayment"" is not specifically defined. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) informed the Ford Motor Company (Ford) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS that covered the underpayment. Ford later requested that the deposits be considered to cover additional taxes that Ford owed. The parties eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a refund. Ford argued that the date of overpayment was the date that it first submitted the deposits to the IRS for the underpayment of taxes, and the Government argued that the date of overpayment was the date when Ford requested that the payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district court, and the court found in favor of the Government. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
364,Andre Lee Coleman,"Todd Tollefson, et al.","The "" hunger strike "" provision of The Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA ) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the individual has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on either grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed a fourth claim and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous complaints prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $ 350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The you. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a "" strike. """
2297,Maine Community Health Options,United States,"Congress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government. In reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement. Several of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former."
1995,United States,Jack Miller and Frank Layton,"An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 (""NFA"") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case."
702,"W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney",Roland H. Dagenhart et al. ,The Keating - Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart'own father - - Roland - - had sued on behalf of the father to put the 12 year old son to work in a private company.
1832,Charles C. Green et al.,"County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia et al.","New Kent County had two schools that taught students elementary through high school. Prior to 1965, New Kent school taught all white students, while George W. Watkins school taught all African American students. After Brown v. Board of Education, the school district implemented a “freedom of choice” plan, where all students could choose which school they wanted to attend. While the school district did not prevent anyone from attending the school they wanted to, only a few African American students transferred to New Kent and no white students transferred to George W. Watkins. Several students and parents from the school district brought this action against the school district, arguing that the plan did not adequately integrate the school system. The district court upheld the plan. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case for a more specific order concerning desegregation of teachers."
317,Freddie Lee Hall,Florida,"Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for further hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held where all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the Florida statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non - record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was reversed and remanded for new sentencing. At the next sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with "" unquantifiable weight, "" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from, death penalty under that ruling. The trial, held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for would a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test — whether he had an IQ below 70 — could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed."
1120,Vickie Lynn Marshall,E. Pierce Marshall,"Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith) was involved in a dispute in Texas Probate Court over the estate of her late husband, J. Howard Marshall. While the state-court proceedings were ongoing, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy in federal court. E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard's son, filed a claim alleging that Ms. Marshall had defamed him, and she filed a counterclaim alleging that E. Pierce had interfered with a gift she expected from her late husband's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ms. Marshall and awarded her a large monetary award. Later, the probate court found J. Howard's will valid and ruled for his son. Under the judicially-created ""probate exception"" to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not interfere with state-court judgments concerning wills and estates. E. Pierce Marshall appealed the bankruptcy court decision (awarding Ms. Marshall a large monetary award) to federal district court, invoking the probate exception to argue that the court had no jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and ruled for Ms. Marshall, holding that since her claim did not require invalidating the will, the probate exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit reversed, broadly interpreting the probate exception as covering any question that would normally be handled in probate court."
1086,"Denver A. Youngblood, Jr.",West Virginia,"Denver A. Youngblood, Jr. was indicted on charges relating to the alleged abduction and sexual assault of three young women. The prosecution’s case rested largely on the testimony of the young women and evidence consistent with their claims. The jury convicted Youngblood of sexual assault, brandishing a firearm, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and indecent exposure. After being sentenced, Youngblood moved to set aside the verdict and argued that there was new and exculpatory evidence in the form of a note from two of the young women that supported Youngblood’s consensual-sex defense to the sexual assault charge. The note had allegedly been shown to a state trooper who was investigating the incident, but he had refused to accept possession of it and requested that it be destroyed. Youngblood claimed that the suppression of this evidence constituted a violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland, which held that a constitutional violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial by holding that the note was only impeachment, not exculpatory, evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed by holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a new trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals did not reach a decision on the merits of the alleged Brady violation."
673,Wisconsin Department of Corrections,Schacht,"In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their ""personal"" and in their ""official"" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the ""personal capacity"" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their ""official capacity."" On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case."
777,"Hunt-Wesson, Inc.",Franchise Tax Board of California,"California's ""unitary business"" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, however, permits use of that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review."
1423,Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School,"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.","Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her. Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the ""ministerial exception"" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply."
1473,Jeffrey L. Chafin,Lynne H. Chafin,"In March 2006, you.S. Army sergeant Jeffrey L. Chafin married United Kingdom citizen Lynne Hales Chafin in Scotland. They had one child, who holds dual citizenship in the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 2010, Lynne Chafin traveled to Alabama with the couple's child and intended to return to Scotland in May 2010 for the child's schooling. Before they could leave the country, Jeffrey Chafin filed a divorce petition in the Alabama courts and sought emergency relief to prevent his wife from leaving the country with the child. The trial court ordered both parties to stay in the country with the child throughout the divorce proceeding. Lynne Chafin filed a motion in federal district court requesting to return to Scotland with the child and citing The Hague Convention ruling on international child abduction. The district court held that the child was being unlawfully detained in the United States and allowed Lynne Chafin to return to Scotland with the child. Jeffrey Chafin appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the issue as moot because the child had already returned to Scotland."
1137,"Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",George W. Jackson,"In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt - collection action with a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank - issued credit card. In responding to Citibank ’ s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third - party class - action suits against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems ( CWS ). In these third - party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems ; Jackson ’ s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson. Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank for defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third - party complaint and remove any reference to Citibank. The district court denied Home Depot ’ s motion for realign parties, finding that there were not “ antagonistic parties on the same side, ” and granted Jackson ’ s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “ defendant ” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for a Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district courts properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment — to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction — was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of Alabama ’ s removal statute."
1376,"Los Angeles County, CA",Craig Arthur Humphries et al.,"Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index (""CACI"") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief."
754,Walter Chaplinsky,New Hampshire,"On his public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as A Jehovah's Witness and attacked more extreme forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "" a God - damned racketeer "" and "" a Nazi Fascist. "" He got arrested and convicted under a state statute that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On indictment, Chaplinsky argued that that law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague."
284,Chadbourne and Parke LLP,Samuel Troice et al.,"In 1995, Congress enacted The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ( PSLRA ), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class fight suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ( SLUSA ), which provided for the dismissal or review of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a "" covered security. "" The term "" covered security "" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for financially perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for breach of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated by two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints of SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of "" covered securities. "" The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least some of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as "" covered "" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal."
1312,"Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John",State of Washington,"Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate by the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number in senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $ 1, 000. Washington, as is the norm with all but two other states, has a “ winner - take - all ” electoral system, which means that all of a state ’ s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Smith and others were nominated as presidential electors of the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton / Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a nominated individual For Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $ 1, 000 annually for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law. The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial jury on appeal affirmed. This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19 - 518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020."
846,Chao,"Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.","In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an ""inspected vessel"" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a ""workplace"" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a ""workplace"" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels."
669,City of Chicago,International College of Surgeons,"In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action."
832,Central Green Company,United States,"The Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through Central Green Co.'s 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California. Central Green filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs. The Federal Government moved for judgment on the pleadings based on immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that ""no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place."" The complaint was then dismissed because the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, whose purpose was flood control. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity is attached solely because it is a branch of the larger project."
884,"Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC","Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office","Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. ( Cuozzo ) owns a 074 patent, “ Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the International Speed Limit, ” and Garmin International, Inc. ( Garmin ) is a Patent Trial and Appeal Board ( Board ) for inter partes review of claims under the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter part review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead of the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were unpatentable. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term and integrally attached ” regarding claim 14 on the components of the “ Speed Limit Indicator. ” Cuozzo appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board ’ s finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation."
1316,Texas,New Mexico,"Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination. In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in its Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also removed the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico. When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico'waters obligations during 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on water evaporation from water stored within the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30 - day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. Later, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative process."
34,Rosalind McClanahan,Arizona State Tax Commission,"Rosalind McClanahan was a member of the Navajo Indian nation who lived on the Navajo Reservation in Apache County, Arizona. Her employer withheld $16.20 in 1967 for Arizona state income taxes. McClanahan sought the return of her withheld income. She claimed that since she was a Navajo Indian residing on the reservation and since her income was derived completely on the reservation, she was exempt from state taxation. When her request was denied, she filed suit in Apache County Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed her claim. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected her petition for review."
1249,"Lisa Fitzgerald, et vir","Barnstable School Committee, et al.","In February 2001 Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, told her parents that an older student on the school bus, on several occasions, bullied her into lifting up her skirt. Jacqueline's mother reported these allegations to the school but its immediate investigation into the matter, including interviewing the supposed perpetrator, the school bus driver, and many students on the bus, did not provide any further proof of the sexual harassment. After Jacqueline told her parents about further instances of mistreatment, the local police department began its own investigation but was unable to find sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the alleged harasser. Jacqueline reported other incidents throughout the year, and each was addressed by the school's principal as it occurred. In April of 2002 the Fitzgeralds brought suit against the school district in federal court alleging violations of both Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and 42 you.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983). Title IX prohibits discrimination by any educational entity receiving federal funding, while Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and federal laws. The district court granted the school district's motion to dismiss both counts and the Fitzgeralds appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. First, discussing the Title IX claim, the court stated that five conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed: the student must prove that (1) the institution is a recipient of federal funding, (2) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment occurred, (3) the harassment denied the student of educational opportunities or benefits, (4) the institution had actual knowledge of the harassment, and (5) the institution's deliberate indifference caused the student to be subjected to the harassment. The First Circuit held that even if the first four factors were met in this case, the school's ""prompt"" and ""diligent"" investigation was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to deliberate indifference. Rather, the school looked into each allegation quickly and thoroughly. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' Section 1983 claim, applying the so-called ""remedial"" exception prohibiting such claims when the allegedly violated federal law is itself specific enough to demonstrate Congress' intention to allow only those remedies referred to in the statute itself. According to the First Circuit, Title IX is one of these remedial statutes and therefore any alleged violations of the statute cannot be litigated under Section 1983."
2210,BNSF Railway Company,Michael D. Loos,"Michael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos—$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos’s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling using alternate reasoning."
321,"Clifton Sandifer, et al.",United States Steel Corporation,"Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought their class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent shifting into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room into their working stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent "" changing clothes. "" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgement. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not any relation to compensation for transit time. The company appealed, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the money spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations."
1251,Eddie Lee Shular,United States of America,"The Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) provides in relevant part that a person that has three previous convictions for a “ violent felony ” or a “ serious drug offense ” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison. In recent cases, the you. S. Supreme Court has adopted a “ categorical ” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “ violent felony ” within the law. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “ serious drug offense ” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses — five for sale of cocaine and one for sale with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “ knowledge of the illicit nature in the substance, ” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular ’ s Florida convictions would qualify in a “ severe drug offense ” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA statute “ requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances. ”"
268,Strickland,Washington,"David Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering ""reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances."" It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence."
41,"Geduldig, Director, Department of Human Resources Development",Carolyn Aiello et al.,Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.
464,Lucas,South Carolina Coast Council,"In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed."
69,Tom E. Ellis and Robert D. Love ,"Frank M. Dyson, Alex Bickley, Scott McDonald, Hugh Jones, Wes Wise","Tom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance. The court fined each man $10. Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a harsher punishment, the men sued in the you.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records. The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith prosecution. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion."
992,"Michael Yarborough, Warden",Michael Alvarado,"Police interviewed Michael Alvarado, 17, without his parents at a police station about his involvement in a crime. Police neither arrested nor Mirandized Alvarado. During the interview, Alvarado confessed involvement. Based, in part, on these statements, Alvarado was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted robbery. After failed appeals in the California courts, Alvarado unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in California. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Recognizing the ""in custody"" standard to be whether a reasonable person would feel free to end interrogation, the appeals court held that a juvenile is more likely to feel he is in custody. Because Alvarado was ""in custody,"" the Fifth Amendment required that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) be read to him."
306,Manuel Jose Lozano,Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez,"Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening the rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, while they had normal couple problems, they are generally "" very happy together. "" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's shelter, moved to her sister's residence in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post - traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved. After Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a claim for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in you. S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would because undue harm. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
213,United States,Will,"Congress enacted legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust the compensation of federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur."
108,"Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, David Hall. M.D., and Michael Freiman, M.D.","John C. Danforth, Attorney General of New Jersey; and J. Brendan Ryan, Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis, Missouri","About a year after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define “viability” as the “stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems”; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman’s spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother’s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions. The district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal."
215,Stone,Graham,"Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky."
512,Campbell-Ewald Company,Jose Gomez,"On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited video message advertising the you. S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell - Ewald Company, a telecommunications consultant that the Navy employed to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to the company called Mindmatics. Gomez sued and argued that that Campbell - Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third - party vendor to distribute unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. When Campbell - Ewald ’ s motion to dismiss was rejected, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell - Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez ’ s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell - Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell - Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had not ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects."
874,"United States, et al.","Texas, et al.","In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) implemented the Deferred Action For Childhood Arrivals ( DACA ) program, along with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce their regulations under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of Americans and lawful permanent residents as far as improving DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ( DAPA ) program. Texas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice - and - comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file a suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA if the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice - and - comment claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims."
846,Brandon Thomas Betterman,State of Montana,"Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew and was supposed to appear in court, claimed he had no money nor transportation could get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and ordered to five years. On April 26, 2012, he pleaded guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence hearing did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail - jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman ’ s plea and trial was unacceptably long but had not violated constitutional rights to fair and speedy trial."
28,Edward Malley and Rhode Island,James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs,"In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone to Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs ’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony evidence for the Briggs. The charges were submitted to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for a Briggs ’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being convicted. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped. The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge ’ s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “ objectively reasonable "" basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable because for an arrest warrant."
1604,"Omnicare, Inc. et al.","Indiana State District Council of Laborers and Hod Carriers Pension and Welfare Fund, et al.","Plaintiffs were investors who bought Omnicare securities in a December 15, 2005 public offering. At the same time, Omnicare offered 12.8 million shares of common stock and made related filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings were incorporated into a Registration Statement. The plaintiffs sold all the securities by January 31, 2006. Plaintiffs brought suit under §11 of the Securities Act of 1993 claiming Omnicare materially misled or omitted material information on the registration statement because they were engaged in illegal activities that included kickback arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers and submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. Plaintiffs further allege that Omnicare failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which resulted in a substantial overstatement of the company's revenue affecting the 2005 public offering. The original suit filed in the district court had multiple claims from which this case arose, but all were dismissed in favor of Omnicare. The claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants had knowledge of wrongdoing when they materially falsified information on the registration statement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals except one filed under §11 for materially misleading or omitting material information because that claim was filed under a strict liability statute which did not require pleading to knowledge of wrongdoing. The Court held that plaintiffs had met their burden for making a prima facie case under §11 and remanded the case to district court."
1520,Association for Molecular Pathology  et al.,Myriad Genetics,"The Association for Molecular Pathology along with several other medical associations, doctors and patients sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Myriad Genetics to challenge several patents related to human genetics. The patents cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and certain mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast cancer. The suit also challenged several method patents covering diagnostic screening for the genes. Myriad argued that once a gene is isolated, and therefore distinguishable from other genes, it could be patented. By patenting the genes, Myriad had exclusive control over diagnostic testing and further scientific research for the BRCA genes. Petitioners argued that patenting those genes violated §101 the Patent Act because they were products of nature. They also argued that the patents limit scientific progress. §101 limits patents to ""any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."" The district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that isolating a gene does not alter its naturally occurring fundamental qualities. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that isolated genes are chemically distinct from their natural state in the human body. In March 2012, Petitioners sought certiorari; the you.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo Collective Services v. Prometheus Laboratories. On remand, the Federal Circuit again upheld the patentability of the BRCA genes."
499,Ibanez,"Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy","Silvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards—a private organization—to use the designation Certified Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of ""false, deceptive, and misleading"" advertising. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First Circuit, affirmed."
449,Cipollone,"Liggett Group, Inc.","Rose Cipollone died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in the you.S. Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court."
116,Bates,State Bar of Arizona,"In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees."
1040,State of Washington,"United States of America, et al.","In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “Stevens Treaties,” which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off-reservation fishing. This so-called “fishing clause” guaranteed the Tribes “the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.” Since those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and (originally) the white settlers there and (today) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes’ contention that the government was building and maintaining culverts (channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20+ Tribes represented in the suit allege that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties. Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties. The district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1092,Francis V. Lorenzo,Securities and Exchange Commission,"Francis Lorenzo was the director of personal finance for Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker - dealer. Lorenzo's only investment - banking client at the relevant time was a start - up company, Waste2Energy Holdings ( W2E ). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on usage of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $ 15 million in “ debentures ” — which is debt secured only by the debtor ’ s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible debt. At the time, W2E ’ s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company ’ s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $ 10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8 - K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $ 370, 552. Lorenzo ’ s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about it. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “ several key points ” about W2E ’ s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E ’ s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “ 3 layers of protection, ” which were : $ 10 million in “ confirmed assets ” ; purchase orders and LOIs for “ over $ 43 [ million ] in orders ” ; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “ at the request of [ Lorenzo ’ s boss ] ” and the other stated it was sent “ at the request of [ another broker with the firm ]. ” Lorenzo ’ s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, of Charles Vista with violating three securities - fraud provisions : Section 17 ( a ) ( 1 ) of the Securities Act of 1933 ; Section 10 ( b ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b - 5. Lorenzo ’ s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ ’ s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission ’ s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b - 5 ( b ). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo ’ s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ ultimate authority ” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court ’ s definition of “ maker ” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 you. S. 135 ( 2011 )."
1761,Hanna,Plumer,"After a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand. The parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld."
1484,"Charles L. Ryan, Director Arizona Department of Corrections",Ernest Valencia Gonzales,"Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted for the murder of Darrel Wagner. His conviction and death sentence became final on January 8, 1996. Gonzalez exhausted his state-court post-conviction relief opportunities before challenging his conviction in federal court. In November 1999, Gonzales initiated a federal habeas proceeding, which raised 60 claims for federal habeas relief, including claims relating to Gonzales' competence and ability to rationally communicate with his court-appointed attorneys. The federal court stayed Gonzales' execution pending resolution of those proceedings. Ultimately, the district court denied Gonzales' motion for a competency hearing and a stay of proceedings. Even though it determined that Gonzales was incompetent, the court considered this irrelevant because Gonzales' claims could not benefit from rational communication with counsel. Gonzales appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It disagreed with the lower court and held that Gonzales was entitled to a stay pending a competency determination. The Arizona Department of Corrections appealed. The related case, Tibbals v. Carter, was a similar capital murder appeal from the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Sean Carter, the defendant, was adjudged incompetent to assist his attorneys following his murder conviction. The district court granted Carter a stay on his habeas corpus proceedings based on a right to competence in such proceedings. After the appellate court affirmed, the State appealed further and the Court granted certiorari to answer the same question as in Ryan v. Gonzales."
760,Nixon,Shrink Missouri Government PAC,"In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review."
1140,Jason J. Mont,United States of America,"Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017. While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions. Mont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction."
395,"Stephen Kimble, et al.","Marvel Enterprises, Inc.","In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court. The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a ""hybrid"" agreement, in which patent and non-patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non-patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non-patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court."
1142,"Helen Purcell, Maricopa County Recorder, et al.",Maria M. Gonzalez et al.,"In 2002, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required a photo ID for voter registration. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) notified Arizona’s Secretary of State that Proposition 200 conflicted with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) regarding the need for photo ID as proof of citizenship for mailed voter registration forms. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs — Arizona residents, Indian tribes, and community organizations — filed a restraining order to prevent the state of Arizona from enforcing the new rules for voter registration. The petition for a restraining order was denied by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that it should grant an emergency injunction based on the fact that elections were about to begin. The appellate court granted the injunction to stop the enforcement of Proposition 200."
1586,"U.S. Department of Transportation, et al.",Association of American Railroads,"In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) through the Rail Passenger Service Act and gave them the priority to use track systems owned by freight railroads for passenger travel. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue metrics and standards addressing scheduling, including on-time performance and train delays. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) sued the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two officials alleging that the metrics and standards are unconstitutional. The AAR alleged that allowing a private entity, like Amtrak, to exercise joint authority in their issuance violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by vesting the coercive power of government in an interested private party, and also violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers by placing legislative authority in a private entity. The district court rejected the AAR’s argument, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed holding that Amtrak is a private corporation and Congress violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers."
1092,Salim Ahmed Hamdan,"Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.","Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the you.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant. A few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional."
300,Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang,"FMR LLC, et al.","The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged. Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated ""whistleblower"" protection sections of the Sarbanes-Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act."
2192,"Raymond J. Lucia, et al.",Securities and Exchange Commission,"The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) commenced an administrative enforcement action against Raymond J. Lucia and Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (collectively “Petitioners”) for alleged anti-fraud violations of the Investment Advisers Act arising from the way they presented their retirement wealth management strategy to prospective clients. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found liability and imposed sanctions including a lifetime industry bar against Petitioners. The Commission granted the parties’ petitions for review, and found that Petitioners had committed anti-fraud violations and imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ. The Commission also rejected the argument that the administrative proceedings had been unconstitutional because the ALJ who handed down the initial decision was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Petitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to vacate the Commission’s decision and order under review on the grounds that the ALJ who made the administrative ruling was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. The appeals court rejected this argument, explaining that Commission ALJs were not constitutional Officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, primarily because of their lack of authority to issue final decisions on behalf of the Commission pursuant to the agency’s regulatory scheme."
830,"Stephen Voisine, et al.",United States,"In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the you.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute."
1748,National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,"Alabama ex rel. Richmond M. Flowers, Attorney General","In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP’s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP’s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members’ freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court’s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists. The NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court’s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP’s case. The Supreme Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP’s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed."
269,"Lexmark International, Inc.","Static Control Components, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc. ( Lexmark ) is a large producer in printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. ( SCC ) and alleged that it violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale for Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit relied on the "" reasonable interest "" test that establish standing under the Sherman Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use its AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, the claimant must demonstrate 1 ) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2 ) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest."
1294,Ford Motor Company,"Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.","In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett ’ s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design - defect, failure - to - warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court may have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant ’ s headquarters are within the state and if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff ’ s claims “ arise out of or relate to ” the defendant ’ or activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled this vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford's motion to dismiss, finding a “ connection in the forum and the specific claims at issue. ” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege by doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19 - 369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question."
1231,"Avron J. Arave, Warden",Maxwell Hoffman,"Maxwell Hoffman was charged with first-degree murder after he and another man severely injured a drug informant, fatally pelted her with boulders, and left her for dead. Hoffman's assigned lawyer, who had never handled a capital case, advised him to reject a plea bargain deal in which he would be spared Idaho's death penalty in exchange for a guilty plea. The attorney told Hoffman that because a federal appeals court had recently stricken Arizona's identical death scheme, the Idaho law would soon be defunct and therefore could not be applied to him. Hoffman agreed to go to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to death. However, despite the attorney's prediction, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the death sentence. Hoffman eventually filed a habeas corpus petition alleging, among other things, that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to go to trial based on a faulty legal prediction. The Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered that Hoffman be freed unless the state renewed its plea bargain offer."
701,"W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney",Roland H. Dagenhart et al. ,"The Keating - Owen Child Labor Act restricted any interstate shipment of goods produced from Child laborers. Reuben Owen's father - - Roland - - did, on behalf of his freedom, allow his fourteen year old son for work in a textile mill."
326,Julie Heimeshoff,Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores,"Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal - Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that Hartford had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. ( Hartford ) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007. Heimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously takes legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff lost because the three - year statute of limitations should instead run from the facts when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The you. S. Court of Appeals from the Second Circuit affirmed."
1439,"American Tradition Partnership, Inc.","Steve Bullock, Attorney General of Montana, et al.","A Montana law states that a corporation may not ""make an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party."" The petitioners - American Tradition Partnership (formerly Western Tradition Partnership), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Association - sued the Attorney General of Montana and the Commissioner of Political Practices on the grounds that the statute violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The district court found the statute unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Montana found that the statute did not materially impact the freedom of speech of the corporations, and if it did, it served a compelling state interest to protect the electoral process. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the judgment of the lower court."
928,Travis Beckles,United States,"On April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed - off gun was located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district court determined : Beckles was an authorized career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ), had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months to life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $ 5, 000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable fine, that his prior convictions did not qualify as “ violent felonies ” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed - off shotgun was not a “ crime of violence ” subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The you. S. Court of Appeals for The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Beckles ’ conviction and sentence. The you. S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate Court ’ s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On appealed, the appellate court again upheld Beckles ’ conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed - off shotgun was a minor crime of violence. ” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence."
398,"Samuel A. Lewis, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.",Jimmie Wayne Jeffers,"In May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave. A jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona’s standard of an “especially heinous…or depraved” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers’ challenge. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence."
145,"Lutrelle F. Parker, Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks",Dale R. Flook,"A catalytic converter is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (“alarm limits”) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not “wholly pre-empt” the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection."
1670,Mallory,United States,"Andrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers on charges of rape. Upon arresting Mallory, the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, the police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory."
428,"Richard E. Glossip, et al.","Kevin J. Gross, et al.","On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three - drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly ; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs taken were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma halted all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the drug used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved to a temporary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided that evidence or evidence would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a "" known and available "" alternative to the drug in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again."
2253,"The American Legion, et al.","American Humanist Association, et al.","In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations. Several non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 you.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 you.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded."
1009,"Jenny Rubin, et. al.",Islamic Republic of Iran,"In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight you. S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit with an Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( "" FSIA "" ) provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state - sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D. C. entered a $ 71. 5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an agreement to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment. The case at hand involves extensive collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, any foreign country's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before a district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections ( a ) and ( g ) of 28 you. S. C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ( "" TRIA "" ). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while the 1610 ( a ) permits execution on a foreign state's property "" used for a commercial activity in the United States, "" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party ( such as a museum ). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610 ( g ) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either. The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the of Circuit's prior holding that § 1610 ( g ) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610."
986,George H. Baldwin,Michael Reese,"A state trial court sentenced Reese to 33 years in prison. An appellate court lowered the sentence to 24 years. In another appeal to a state appellate court, Reese argued his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated at trial and on appeal. The appellate court refused to reverse Reese's sentence. Reese appealed to the state supreme court and failed. Reese appealed to a you.S. District Court. Ruling against Reese, the Court held that Reese did clearly say to the state supreme court his claims were federal. Federal law requires state prisoners to ""fairly present"" federal constitutional claims in each state court before appealing to federal courts. A federal appellate court reversed, ruling that the state supreme court had had the opportunity to read the state appellate court decision - had the court done this, it would have understood Reese's claims were federal."
270,United States,S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),"The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to ""promote the safety of civil aircraft"" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct ""spot-check"" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the you.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that recovery against the you.S. was barred by 28 you.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the you.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California ""Good Samaritan"" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California ""Good Samaritan"" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1382,Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy,"James W. Stewart III, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, et al.","The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy (""VOPA""), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency."
924,Clyde Timothy Bunkley,Florida,"In 1989, Clyde Timothy Bunkley was convicted of burglary in the first degree because he was armed with a “dangerous weapon” at the time of the burglary. The “dangerous weapon” was a pocketknife with a 2.5-3 inch blade. In 1997, the state court interpreted the “common pocketknife” exception to the definition of “weapon” as a blade of 3.75 inches or shorter. Bunkley filed a motion for state post-conviction relief based on the state court’s 1997 decision and argued that his pocketknife could not have been considered a “weapon.” The trial court rejected the defendant’s motion for relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed and found the “common pocketknife” exception did not apply retroactively because the 1997 decision was merely an “evolutionary refinement,” not a “major constitutional change,” and therefore did not apply retroactively."
204,Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,David Patchak,"The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band ( "" the Band "" ) is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3, 000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau Of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township – known as the "" Bradley Tract "" - - into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act ( "" IRA "" ). David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti - gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace & quiet of his community, create violence, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act ( "" QTA "" ) precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts ; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust, Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests don't fall within the IRA's zone - of - interests. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone - of - interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant for benefit individuals in the situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering "" affected members of the public "" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred to's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak "" not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. "
540,Lonchar,Thomas,"Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed ""next friend"" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an ""eleventh hour"" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief."
1491,Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC,Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider,"Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider worked for Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC. As a condition of employment, they entered into confidentiality and noncompetition agreements that contained a clause requiring any dispute between Nitro-Lift and its employees to be settled in arbitration. When Howard and Schneider quit, they went to work for one of Nitro-Lift's competitors. Nitro-Lift demanded arbitration for breach of the noncompetition agreements. Howard and Schneider sued in the District Court of Johnson County, Oklahoma, asking the court to declare their noncompetition agreements null and void. The court dismissed the case, holding that the agreements contained a valid arbitration clause, so the arbitrator had to settle any dispute between the parties. On appeal, Nitro-Lift cited several you.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), noting that the law favoring arbitration applied in both federal and state cases. Despite this, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of an arbitration clause did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The court went on to find the noncompetition agreements ""void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma's public policy."""
1522,"Nevada, et al.",Calvin O'Neil Jackson,"On October 22, 1998, Calvin O'Neil Jackson was arrested outside of his girlfriend's apartment. His girlfriend, Annette Heathmon, told the police that Jackson forced his way into her apartment, assaulted her, threatened to kill her with a screwdriver, and raped her. At trial, Heathmon testified that Jackson had previously sexually and physically assaulted her but had never been convicted of a crime. The defense attempted to call police officers to testify that Jackson's girlfriend's previous accusations were unconvincing and unsubstantiated by the evidence. The court barred this testimony and also refused to allow the defense to cross-examine Heathmon regarding alleged prior acts of prostitution. The jury found Jackson guilty of burglary, battery with intent to commit a crime, first degree kidnapping with a deadly weapon, and two counts of sexual assault with a deadly weapon. Jackson appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Nevada and argued that the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence of Heathmon's previous accusations violated his right to present a defense. That court affirmed his conviction and stated that the excluded evidence was neither relevant nor material to his defense. Jackson then filed a habeas corpus claim based on the same argument. The district court denied his claim, holding that the state court's exclusion of police testimony did not violate Jackson's constitutional right to present a complete defense. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision."
1113,Michael J. Biestek,"Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration","Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration ( SSA ) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge ( EPA ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court reversed the magistrate judge ’ s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical - expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical for the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ determined that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ ’ s determination, and the trial court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ ’ s finding that Biestek did not meet the physical - pain - related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert."
199,United States,"Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.","Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his share in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short purchases of United States Treasury Bonds for $ 7, 472, 405. They then transferred the proceeds for that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $ 7, 359, 043. This transaction created "" outside basis, "" or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed. Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as its capital contribution. The taxpayers ( except Home Oil ) then transferred percentages of their partnership assets in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $ 10, 623, 348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step - up its inside basis, or the basis that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, will equal the taxpayers'outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $ 10, 527, 250. 53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $ 69, 125. 08 gain from the sale of its assets. The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "" solely for the purposes of risk avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners. "" On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment ( FPAA ), in which they decreased to zero the and'reported to bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers'taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) seeking to recover the increase. As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six - year period for assessing tax remains open for "" all taxable years … that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction … in which a decision had not become final. "" The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs."
298,"Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.",Nation Enterprises,"In 1977, former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. to publish his memoirs. Harper & Row negotiated a prepublication agreement with Time Magazine for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's account of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. Before Time released its article, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford manuscript. Subsequently, The Nation, using approximately 300 words from the manuscript, scooped Time. Harper & Row sued The Nation, alleging violations of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. The District Court held that The Nation's use of the copyrighted material constituted infringement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Nation's use of the copyrighted material was sanctioned as a fair use."
838,Illinois,McArthur,"In 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood just inside the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the ""fruit"" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to ""have destroyed the marijuana."" The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal."
2366,Edward A. Caniglia,"Robert F. Strom, et al.","Edward Canaglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Canaglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself. Kim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Canaglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Canaglia agreed to. While Canaglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Canaglia’s guns, despite knowing that Canaglia did not consent to their seizure. Caniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the you.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower court’s decision."
302,Commodity Futures Trading Commission,"Gary Weintraub, Frank H. McGhee, Andrew McGhee","The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint against the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. CDCB was going through bankruptcy at the time and a trustee was appointed At a deposition related to the Commission's lawsuit, Gary Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, refused to answer certain questions, citing attorney-client privilege. The Commission obtained a waiver of attorney-client privilege from the CDCB's bankruptcy trustee. The district court directed Weintraub to answer the questions, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive attorney-client privilege for communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition."
982,Verizon Communications Inc.,"Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP","Curtis Trinko was an AT&T customer but received service on lines owned by Verizon, which AT&T was permitted to use for a fee under the anti-monopoly 1996 Telecommunications Act. Trinko claimed that Verizon discriminated against AT&T customers by providing them worse service than it provided to its own customers. He claimed that this violated both the Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which prohibits monopolies from aggressively defending their monopoly position in the market. A federal district court ruled that Trinko had no grounds to sue because he was not a direct customer of Verizon. A 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reinstated the charges leveled under the Sherman Act."
1123,"Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections","Ronald Banks, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated","Pennsylvania houses ""incorrigible, recalcitrant"" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety."
1183,Kevin C. Rotkiske,"Paul Klemm, et al.","Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm initiated a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against it. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. Rotkiske filed the present action against it alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). Klemm sought to dismiss the claim as time - consuming, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “ within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. ” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “ discovery rule, ” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “ delays the beginning of a limitation period until the plaintiff knew or might have known of his injury. ” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of breach. Rotkiske appealed, but once the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court."
60,National League of Cities,Usery,"In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments."
1133,"Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Allina Health Services, et al.","The you. S. Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS ) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “ parts ” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Furthermore, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C. HHS contracts with “ fiscal intermediaries ” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services available to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports. The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments for hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low - income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “ patient days ” for patients “ entitled to benefits under part A ” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars. The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, not required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted a judgement in HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “ interpretive rule ” under the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA ) and thus - exempt from the APA ’ s notice - and - comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “ interpretive rule ” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment."
1061,"Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.","Michael Broudo, et al.","Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove ""loss causation"" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation."
664,John Barron ex rel. Tiernan,Mayor of Baltimore,"Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that pollution by the city had diverted water flow in his Baltimore area. She argued deep sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which increased his profits. Barron wanted the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court fined him $ 4, 500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down."
712,Charles Schenck,United States,"During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the military exceeded its Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary movement. The pamphlet urged general public to disobey the draft, but demanded only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to because insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were acquitted of violating this law and sentence on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment."
1813,Roland Camara ,Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco,"An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing."
820,Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama,Randolph,"Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. Randolph's financing agreement with Green Tree required that she buy insurance against default and provided that disputes under the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that it violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose the insurance requirement as a finance charge and that it violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The District Court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration and denied her request for reconsideration, which stated that she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, therefore, would have to forgo her claims. The Court of Appeals, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows appeals from ""a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title,"" held that it had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the agreement was silent with respect to payment of arbitration expenses, it was unenforceable."
1743,William L. Griffin et al.,Maryland,"On June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy ""not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park."" During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and later convicted for criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari."
977,"Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden",Richard Herman Ford,"Richard Ford filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court five days before the one-year statute of limitations for his appeal ended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). He represented himself, and his petition contained some claims that had been decided on by state courts and others that had not. The judge informed him that he could not hear the claims that had not been heard by state courts, and that Ford had several options: the judge could dismiss all the claims, allowing Ford to re-file them after he had presented the unheard claims to a state court, or he could dismiss the unheard claims, but delay proceedings on the other ones so that Ford could re-add the unheard ones after they had been heard. Ford chose the first option, but when he tried to re-file the claims after they were rejected by a state court, the judge refused to let him file them because the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations had ended. Ford appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, finding that the judge could have heard the claims if Ford had chosen the second option and that he should have warned Ford that the statute of limitations would likely end before he could re-file the claims under the first option."
909,Virginia,Kevin Lamont Hicks,"The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking ""a legitimate business or social purpose"" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment."
689,United States,E. C. Knight Company,"The Congress passed the Sherman Anti - Trust Act in 1890 with a response of the public concern in the form of giant corporations controlling commerce, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in private hands of the few. It outlawed "" every contract, combination... or combination, in restraint of trade "" or interstate commerce, and it declared every conspiracy to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E. C. Knight Company was such a giant controlling over 98 percent of the sugar - refining business in the United States."
759,Reno,Condon,"State departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism."
2375,Territory of Guam,United States,"The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.” In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean. In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill. In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011. In 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed."
761,Mitchell,Helms,"Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement ""secular, neutral, and nonideological"" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional."
2128,Divna Maslenjak,United States,"In April 1998, Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb from modern-day Bosnia, met with a you.S. immigration official to seek refugee status for her and her family at the close of the Bosnian civil war. Through a translator, Maslenjak told the immigration official that the family feared persecution in their home region of Bosnia based on their Serbian ethnicity. Maslenjak also told the immigration official that the family feared reprisal because her husband had evaded conscription into the Bosnian Serb militia during the war. Maslenjak and her family were granted refugee status in 1999 and immigrated to the United States in September 2000. Maslenjak was naturalized as a you.S. citizen on August 3, 2007. During the naturalization process, Maslenjak denied ever having given false or misleading information to a you.S. official in order to gain entry to the United states or to avoid removal. On October 7, 2007 Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, was convicted on two counts of making false statements on a government document for his failure to disclose that he had in fact served as an officer in a Serbian military unit. To avoid deportation, Ratko applied for asylum. Testifying on his behalf at the asylum hearing, Maslenjak admitted that Ratko had served in the Serbian militia and that she had lied to the immigration officer during the refugee application interview in 1998. Maslenjak was subsequently charged with two counts of naturalization fraud for denying having ever given false or misleading information to a you.S. official. At trial, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Maslenjak guilty of fraudulently obtaining her naturalization, it need not find that her false statements were material to the decision to approve her naturalization, merely that she made them knowing their falsehood. Maslenjak was convicted on both counts, sentenced to two years probation, and stripped of her citizenship. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction and held that proof of a material false statement was not a required element of naturalization fraud."
309,Manuel Jose Lozano,Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez,"Diana Alvarez & Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had one daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally "" very happy together. "" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's home, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post - traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved. After Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of The Hague Convention and the International Child Protection Remedies Act in you. S. district court. The district court found that the child was now settled in New York so that removing the child would because undue harm. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed."
120,Maher,Roe,"In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were ""medically necessary."" An indigent woman (""Susan Roe"") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut."
1314,Jamey Wilkins,Officer Gaddy,"In 2008, Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court. Without the aid of an attorney, he alleged that he was ""maliciously and sadistically"" assaulted ""[w]ithout any provocation"" by a corrections officer. Mr. Wilkins claimed that as a result of the assault he sustained heel and lower back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches and dizziness, depression, panic attacks, and nightmares of the assault. The district court, on its own motion, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In a motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prove fatal to his claim. The district court denied Mr. Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
988,Yarborough,Gentry,"A jury convicted Gentry in state court for stabbing his girlfriend. Gentry appealed, arguing his lawyer's closing argument deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. While Gentry's appeal lost in state courts, the you.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Gentry's conviction."
1669,United States,"Ludenia Howard, trading as Stokes Fish Company","Federal criminal information was filed in district court against Ludenia Howard, representing Stokes Fish Company, for violating the Federal Black Bass Act. The Act forbids any person to transport black bass or other fish across state lines if doing so is prohibited by the laws of the state. In Florida, such issues are governed by the regulations of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The district court held that the regulations were not “laws” of Florida under the meaning of the Black Bass Act and quashed the information. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
1162,North Carolina Department of Revenue,The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,"In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice ’ s descendants as the primary beneficiaries ( none of whom lived inside North Carolina at the time of creation ). In 2002, the entire trust was divided into three separate trusts, one to each of Rice ’ s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust ( now the Trust ” ), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trustees, and Rice appointed a second trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on taxes accumulated during those years, ensuring that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted The Department ’ s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust ’ s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “ minimum contacts ” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non - contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and the trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed."
1272,Seila Law LLC,Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) began investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt - relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil service demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to various interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court ’ s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB ’ s structure violates the Constitution ’ s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by no single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for because. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation and powers controlling : Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States, 295 you. S. 602 ( 1935 ), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 you. S. 654 ( 1988 ). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for - because removal restriction protecting the CFPB ’ s Director does not “ impede the President ’ his ability to perform his constitutional duty and to ensure that federal laws are faithfully executed."
1007,Iowa,Felipe Edgardo Tovar,"Felipe E. Tovar was charged with drunk-driving in Iowa three times in four years. Tovar pleaded guilty both times and waived his right to an attorney the first time. The third time, because Iowa law increases sentencing for successive drunk-driving, Tovar faced up to five years in prison. Tovar argued that his first conviction was an invalid waiver of his 6th Amendment right to counsel and should not increase his third sentence. The waiver was invalid, Tovar argued, because the judge did not warn him of the consequences of entering a guilty plea without an attorney. The Iowa district court rejected Tovar's argument and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The court of appeals affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed."
1959,OBB Personenverkehr AG,Carol P. Sachs,"OBB Personenverkehr AG (OBB) is owned by OBB Holding Group, a joint-stock company created by the Republic of Austria to operate rail service within Austria. OBB is a member of the Eurail Group, an association organized under Luxembourg law to provide rail pass to non-European residents. In March 2007, Carol Sachs purchased a four-day Eurail Pass from the Rail Pass Experts (RPE) website for travel in Austria and the Czech Republic. RPE is located in Massachusetts, and the pass Sachs purchased listed a series of disclaimers, including that the “issuing office is merely an intermediary of the carriers in Europe and assumes no liability resulting from the transport.” In April 2007, Sachs used her Eurail Pass in Innsbruck, Austria. While boarding the train, Sachs fell between the tracks, and her legs were crushed by the moving train; they had to be amputated above the knee. Sachs sued OBB in district court in California. OBB moved to dismiss and argued that it was entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), or alternatively, that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on foreign-sovereign-immunity grounds. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed but, upon rehearing en banc, later reversed and held that the commercial-activity exception of FSIA applied in this case because OBB was a common carrier owned by a foreign state that acted through a domestic agent to sell tickets to you.S. citizens and residents. Therefore, the district court did have subject-matter jurisdiction."
1057,Denard Stokeling,United States of America,"In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “ overcoming witness submission. ” Some state courts have interpreted the offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “ "" felonies ” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 you. S. C. Section 924 ( e ), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed for Stokeling according to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling ’ s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal."
1707,Dollree Mapp,Ohio,Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.
580,"Dollar General Corporation, et al.","Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.","Dollar General Corporation (Dollar General) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (Tribe). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13-year-old member of the Tribe alleged that he was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate. In 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1387,"Madison County, New York",Oneida Indian Nation of New York,"In 2005, you.S. District Judge David Hurd barred Oneida and Madison counties in New York from foreclosing on Oneida Indian Nation-owned properties on which taxes have not been paid. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the counties do not have the right to sue an Indian tribe unless Congress has authorized the lawsuit or the tribe has waived its legal immunity."
1066,Mount Lemmon Fire District,"John Guido, et al.","In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were appointed by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full - time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full - time employees at Phoenix Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ), which found discrimination because to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( ADEA ), as you. S. C. § § 621 - 34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “ employer ” within the meaning of the ADEA, where the district court agreed. A three - judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more firefighters, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA."
557,Republic of Argentina,"NML Capital, Ltd.","During an economic crisis in 2012, the Republic of Argentina ( Argentina ) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. ( NML ), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal bankruptcy court, which entered judgments totaling more than US $ 2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas to two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violation the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( FSIA ) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The district court ordered the government to comply with the subpoena requests. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appealed, reasoning that the FSIA did not apply to the subpoena as it was a discovery order directed at commercial entities that did not have a claim of sovereign immunity."
499,Bernard Shapiro,Vivian Marie Thompson,"Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen - year - old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC ) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy her state's one - year residency requirement. This case was filed together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for assistance were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they Had not resided within the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their applications, required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code."
1440,"National Federation of Independent Business, et al.","Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA."
854,"Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al.","Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al.","Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act ( Recovery Act ), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 or the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs in this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico ′ s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ( PREPA ), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code, which protects state municipal debt restructuring laws from protecting creditors without their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and denied the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
252,Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company,Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,"From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a ""use tax"" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax."
1135,"Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",George W. Jackson,"In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank’s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson’s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson. Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank. The district court denied Home Depot’s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “antagonistic parties on the same side,” and granted Jackson’s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “defendant” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment—to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction—was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA’s removal statute."
372,Richard Schweiker,James Chilicky,"In 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to pursuing remedies through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act’s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages."
2189,Sergio Fernando Lagos,United States,"Sergio Fernando Lagos pled guilty in federal district court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and multiple counts of wire fraud. He admitted that for a period of two years, he and his co-conspirators misled General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) regarding the value of their assets in order to increase their revolving loan amount and secure under-collateralized funds. Following his guilty plea, Lagos appealed the district court’s order of restitution to the 5th Circuit. He argued that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) did not allow restitution for the legal, expert, or consulting fees incurred by GECC in the course of investigating Lagos’ suspected fraud and the bankruptcy proceedings that followed. The 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in light of its own precedent interpreting 18 you.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) under the MVRA to permit restitution for investigative and legal costs, even under circumstances where these costs were incurred outside of the government’s investigation. The appeals court noted that the D.C. Circuit has adopted a narrower reading of the statute in question, though multiple other circuits have not."
1184,Kevin C. Rotkiske,"Paul Klemm, et al.","Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank transferred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its claim in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time - barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides for any action violating the Act must be brought “ within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. ” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “ discovery rule, ” it is recognized in both The Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “ at the beginning to a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury. ” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court."
794,William Fiore,"Gregory White, Warden, et al.","William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a ""valid permit"" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests. Fiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the you.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. .The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that it would require a retroactive application of a new rule of law. Following oral argument, a unanimous court in an opinion by Justice Stephen J. Breyer certified the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date when Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that ""the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that the decision ""did not announce a new rule of law,"" but ""merely clarified the plain language of the statute."" The you.S. Supreme Court then took up the pending constitutional question."
198,United States,"Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.","Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler, Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $ 7, 472, 405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the black market for $ 7, 359, 043. This transaction created "" outside basis, "" or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed. Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers ( except Home Oil ) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its shares to a third party purchaser for $ 10, 623, 348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for December to April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step - up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers'outside basis. Home Concrete then adjusted its inside basis to $ 10, 527, 250. 53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $ 69, 125. 08 gain from the sale of its assets. The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "" solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by not overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners. "" On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment ( FPAA ), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers'reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers'taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) seeking to recover the increase. As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that, taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six - year period for assessing tax remains open for "" all taxable years … that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction … in which a decision had not become final. "" The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs."
1296,Oregon,Thomas Eugene Ice,"Thomas Eugene Ice was convicted in state court in Oregon on two counts of first-degree burglary with intent to commit sexual abuse, as well as two counts of first-degree sexual abuse committed during those burglaries. Over Ice's objection, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences based on its own findings of fact. Ice appealed, raising the question whether the Oregon or you.S. Constitutions require a jury, rather than a judge, to make the factual findings upon which a court decides to prescribe consecutive sentences. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the consecutive sentences were not in violation of the State's Constitution because none of the factual issues reviewed by the judge were an ""element"" of the crime. However, the sentences did violate the Sixth Amendment of the you.S. Constitution because the factual findings were not made by a jury but were used to increase Ice's punishment to more than what the jury had imposed."
1821,"James A. Watts, et al.","Seward School Board, et al.","James A. Watts, a schoolteacher in Alaska, held private conversations with other teachers to obtain their support to remove the superintendent from his position. His further language included words to the effect of ‘we are unable to get rid of the superintendent, so let us get rid of the school board.’ The Seward School Board considered Watts' conduct to be “immoral,” defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect” under the relevant Alaska statute, so Watts was dismissed from his teaching job. Watts' dismissal was upheld in both the Alaska Superior Court and the Alaska Supreme Court. The Alaska Supreme Court held that Watts' conduct “had a tendency to bring the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Watts then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and argued that his dismissal violated his First Amendment right because the school board was attempting to limit his freedom of political speech. He also argued a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right because he should have the same equal protection for expression as any other private individual. After Watts filed his petition, Alaska amended the relevant state statute to reflect the rights of teachers to comment and criticize school administrators just as any private individual would have the right to do. Under the amended statute, Watts would not have been dismissed from his job."
330,"Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.","United States, ex rel. Benjamin Carter","In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a you.S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the you.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act (FCA). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the you.S. Government for services rendered in Iraq. In 2010, just before trial, the you.S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter’s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA’s “first-to-file” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA’s six-year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter’s complaint did not satisfy the first-to-file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter’s complaint, but the you.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), which suspends the applicable six-year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter’s claim from proceeding."
1218,"Frederick L. Allen, et al.","Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard ’ s Queen Anne ’ s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for over twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the you. S. Copyright Office. At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of their copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again removed and published Allen ’ s works. The state then passed “ Blackbeard ’ s Law, ” which purportedly converted Allen ’ s works into “ public record of items that the state could use online. Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the you. S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act ( CRCA ) "" which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “ any State, any citizen of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity ” — abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen ’ s arguments regarding the CRCA ’ s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA."
826,Nevada,Hicks,"Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land."
1336,"Hemi Group, LLC and Kai Gachupin",City of New York,"The City of New York sued several out-of-state cigarette vendors under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failing to report sales made to individuals over the Internet as required by the federal Jenkins Act. The State of New York and City of New York rely on this information to collect taxes imposed on cigarettes sold in the state and city. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City of New York's suit, holding that its claim did not meet the ""causation"" requirements set forth under RICO. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the City of New York met the RICO ""causation"" requirements and thus maintained a because of action. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct prevented the City from collecting taxes and thus directly injured it. Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss of taxes injured the City's ""business or property."""
123,Neil Randall et al.,William H. Sorrell et al.,"In 1997 Vermont introduced a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both to expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, political parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally high. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also claimed that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $ 400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's spending limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were "" narrowly tailored "" to the state's interests."
2010,Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company,"Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce","In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America."
1270,"Safford Unified School District #1, et al.",April Redding,"Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances."
1413,Henry W. Skinner,"Lynn Switzer, District Attorney for the 31st Judicial District of Texas","A Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mr. Skinner brought a 42 you.S.C. § 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 you.S.C. § 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus."
358,Vickie Lorene Rock,Arkansas,"Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation. Because an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence."
665,Proprietors of Charles River Bridge,Proprietors of Warren Bridge,"In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract."
396,Wards Cove Packing Co. et al.,Frank Atonio et al.,"Wards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had the burden of proof to show that its hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity."
367,Lanell Williams-Yulee,The Florida Bar,"During his candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams - Jones personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the "" community Public Defender "" – although her title was "" assistant public defender "" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams - Yulee and alleged that her actions during the election violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams - Yulee seek a public reprimand. Williams - Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams - Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial challenge. Williams - Yulee appealed and claimed : The Florida Bar rule protecting her candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection against freedom of speech."
752,Walter Chaplinsky,New Hampshire,"On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing posters that supported his beliefs as A Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "" a God - damned man "" and "" a damned Fascist. "" He was arrested and convicted under a state ordinance that prohibited intentionally mocking, insulting, or annoying speech to any person who stood lawfully in a street or public area. To appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated its First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague."
1214,"Michael Greenlaw, aka Mikey",United States,"When Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to revisit its holding."
416,"David King, et al.","Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act ( ACA ) to increase the number of Americans enrolled by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an "" exchange "" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would create one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay no tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low - income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the legislation provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of an ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as well as state exchanges. Virginia declined to establish a state - run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs were a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district attorney granted the defendants'motion to dismiss, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1789,United States,Herbert Guest et al.,"On July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. The you.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or more individuals conspiring to ""injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."" The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a specific denial of rights under you.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
2067,Michael Wearry,"Burl Cain, Warden","Eric Walber was murdered on April 4, 1998. Nearly two years after the murder, Sam Scott, who was incarcerated at the time, contacted authorities and implicated Michael Wearry in the murder. Scott had been friends with the victim and claimed that Wearry had confessed the crime to him. However, Scott gave an account of the murder that differed from the actual facts and changed his story several times before Wearry’s trial. The prosecution’s other main witness was also incarcerated at the time of trial and had made a prior inconsistent statement to the police that he also recanted. Wearry was convicted and sentenced to death. After Wearry’s conviction, information emerged that revealed that the prosecution had failed to disclose evidence that cast doubt on these witnesses’ testimony and would have materially aided Wearry’s defense at trial. Wearry sought state postconviction relief and argued that the state had violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the potentially exculpatory evidence and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court determined that, even if the state should have disclosed the evidence and Wearry’s counsel was ineffective, he was not prejudiced, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied further relief."
1193,James K. Kahler,Kansas,"Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and he allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti - anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as necessary. In November 2009, Kahler drove to his wife ’ s grandmother ’ s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was tried, indicted, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive - compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense counsel testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler ’ s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “ completely lost control. ” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “ that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. ” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “ whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between wrong and wrong with respect to those actions. ” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence."
322,Maine,Taylor,"In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities."
1016,"Los Rovell Dahda, et al.",United States of America,"Los and Roosevelt - – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired with acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co - conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds as the wiretap orders exceeded the trial court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial jury rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced. The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision for evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not "" directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “ core "" ” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 — privacy and uniformity — that were not implicated by the Dahdas ’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court ’ s jurisdiction."
2154,Marisa N. Pavan,Nathaniel Smith,"Leigh and Jana Jacobs, and Terrah and Marisa Pavan—both same-sex couples—were married in Iowa in 2010, and in New Hampshire in 2011, respectively. Leigh and Terrah each gave birth to a child in Arkansas in 2015, and each couple completed the requisite paperwork for birth certificates for the newborns listing both spouses as parents—Leigh and Jana in one case, and Terrah and Marisa in the other. Citing a provision of Arkansas law, Ark. Code 20-18-401, the Arkansas Department of Health issue certificates bearing only the birth mother's name. The Jacobses and Pavans filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the director of the Arkansas Department of Health seeking a declaration that the State's birth-certificate law violates the constitution. The trial court agreed with the couples, holding that the state statute is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court."
1767,Katzenbach,McClung,"Ollie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from outside the state. He argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue."
494,United States,Eugene Frank Robel,"Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged of violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when having remained an employee with the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a representative of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “ defense facility ”. The district court dismissed that indictment because it did not recognize that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district courts felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The you. S. Court Of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to a you. S. Supreme Court."
19,"Sears, Roebuck and Co.",County of Los Angeles and City of Compton,"The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored within warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from county tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items was intended for sale both into and out of the State of California. Sears sued seeking a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears ’ motion for summary judgment and denied the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving credit to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on international commerce."
332,"Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.","United States, ex rel. Benjamin Carter","In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root ( KBR ), a you. S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the you. S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing, under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the you. S. Government for services rendered in Iraq. In 2010, just before trial, the you. S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter ’ s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA ’ s “ first - to - file ” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR decided to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint had filed after the FCA ’ s six - year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter ’ this complaint did not satisfy the first - to - file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter ’ s complaint, but the you. S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ( WSLA ), which suspends the applicable six - year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related case to keep Carter ’ s claim from proceeding."
35,McDonnell Douglas Corporation,Percy Green,"Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was a mechanic working for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company’s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green’s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests. Green filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial discrimination charge."
1632,"John Walker, III, et al.","Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., et al.","In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it ""may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public."" The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application. Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that ""discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage."""
376,North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners,Federal Trade Commission,"The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners ( Board ) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six [UNK] are elected from other dentists in North [UNK] dental clinics, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry. In 2003, non - dentists stopped offering teeth - whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, The Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non - dentist teeth - whiteners. The non - dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over - the - counter teeth - scraping products exited the South Carolina market. The Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non - dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist orders ; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal labor laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private company and subject to federal antitrust laws."
66,Breuer,"Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.","Philip Breuer sued a state court to resolve an overtime dispute violating the Federal Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal courts "" unless otherwise expressly allowed by Act of Congress. "" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court ; attorneys for Jim'n Concrete disagreed. The district court decided to send the case back to federal court. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
144,Jose Ernesto Medellin,State of Texas,"Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted but sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post - conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court ( see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) holding that the you. S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals ( including Medellin ) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez - Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President in the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued : the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in federal court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez - Llamas'standing for the principle because rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state judges. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law - making power, allocated to him by the Constitution."
72,Eastland,United States Servicemen's Fund,"In an effort to investigate the ""administration, operation, and enforcement"" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War took place. The Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership."
959,"Charles S. Turner, et al.",United States,"In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, found guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Nearly 25 years later, Turner and nine of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had destroyed all evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that proved material to either prosecution or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome for their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the defense. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants."
649,Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson,Community Bank of Raymore,"Valerie Hawkins / Janice Patterson ′ s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC ( PHC ). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore ( Community ) made four loans totaling more than $ 2, 000, 000 to PHC for its development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to finance the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to being in default, accelerated the loans, but demanded payment. Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status or violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ( ECOA ). Community moved for summary judgement, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands ’ loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
658,United States,Beggerly,"In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an ""independent action."" The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor."
263,Elizabeth Anderson Hishon,King & Spalding,"In 1972 Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position with King & Spalding (Firm), a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia. During recruitment, Hishon had been told that after five or six years there was a possibility of promotion to partner; associates with “satisfactory evaluations” would be promoted to partner on a “fair and equal basis.” Hishon claimed to have relied on this information when making her decision to accept employment with the Firm. After six years of employment, Hishon was considered for admission to the partnership and was ultimately rejected. One year later Hishon was again considered for admission and again rejected. She was told to begin seeking new employment and was let go in December 1979. In November 1979, Hishon sued the Firm and filed her claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Hishon claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and that this discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and Hishon sued in federal district court. The district court dismissed her claim, and Hishon appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed that ruling."
2261,Hamid Mohamed Rehaif,United States of America,"Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased. A federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 you.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 you.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended)."
946,"Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO",Simon Shiao Tam,"Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, could not register the band ’ s logo with the you. S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards “ persons of Asian descent. ” The office cited the Disparagement Claus of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “ [ consist ] of or [ comprise ] immoral, deceptive, and scandalous matter ; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. ” Tam appealed to trademark officer ’ s decision, and the name was refused a second time by its board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found both the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment."
1330,Billy Joe Magwood,"Tony Patterson, Warden, et al.","An Alabama state court convicted Billy Joe Magwood of murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, an Alabama federal district court partially granted Mr. Magwood's petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The court upheld his conviction but instructed the state court to look at mitigating evidence when resentencing Mr. Magwood. Upon resentencing, the state court sentenced Mr. Magwood to death once again. Mr. Magwood filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief with the federal district court arguing that a judicial rule was retroactively applied in his case and that he lacked effective counsel at sentencing. The district court granted the petition and vacated Mr. Magwood's death sentence. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit reversed, holding that prisoners may not raise challenges to an original sentence that could have been raised in an earlier petition. The court also held that Mr. Magwood's counsel was not ineffective because he failed to raise an argument that had already been decided by the state's highest court adverse to his client's position."
1042,State of Washington,"United States of America, et al.","In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian authorities in what is currently the state of Washington entered into another series of treaties, collectively known as the “ Stevens Treaties, ” which provided that the Tribes would use significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off - reservation fishing. This so - called “ fishing clause ” guaranteed the Tribes “ their right of taking fish, with "" usual and accustomed grounds and stations... in common with all citizens of the Territory. ” Since those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and ( originally ) the white settlers there and ( today ) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes ’ contention that the government was building and maintaining culverts ( channels carrying salmon under roads or sidewalks ) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20 + Tribes represented in the suit argued that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties. Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties. The district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed."
1588,Ellen Gelboim,"Bank of America Corp., et al.","The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is a daily interest rate benchmark that is used to help set the interest rate of financial transactions across the globe. Between August 2007 and May 2010, it has been alleged that the LIBOR rate was artificially manipulated downward by a number of colluding financial institutions. Ellen Gelboim was one of many parties to file individual suits against these financial institutions. Given the large number of cases, Gelboim's case was consolidated with a number of other similar cases for pre-trial purposes. During this pre-trial phase, the district court dismissed a number of the cases, including Gelboim's, for failure to state a claim. Gelboim sought to appeal the dismissal, however the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Gelboim's appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court had not entered a final order concerning all the claims in the consolidated action."
1518,"James R. Clapper, et al.","Amnesty International USA, et al.","Several groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-you.S. persons outside the you.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury."
2248,United States of America,Andre Ralph Haymond,"Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration under 18 you.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing."
1230,Michelle Monasky,Domenico Taglieri,"Michelle Monasky, a you.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the you.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 you.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed."
1849,Clarence Brandenburg,State of Ohio,"Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating ""crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,"" as well as assembling ""with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."""
1817,Willie Israel Alderman,United States,"The petitioners were convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the government had relied on illegally obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing. The United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed in camera by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term."
1699,Henry L. Hess Jr.,United States,"Located on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called ‘baffles’, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson’s work, but did not have direct control over it. On August 20, 1954, Larson’s tug ‘Muleduzer’ set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson’s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River’s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters. Under Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon’s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham’s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess’ case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only the WDA applied to Hess’ claim."
2358,"Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.","Democratic National Committee, et al.","Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location. Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona’s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens. Arizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official’s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite “no evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,” Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot. The DNC challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. After a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court “clearly erred.”"
1185,"United States Department of Commerce, et al.","State of New York, et al.","Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could because a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed. The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction."
769,Arizona,California,"In 1952, Arizona invoked the you.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment."
1232,Michelle Monasky,Domenico Taglieri,"Michelle Monasky, a you. S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two - month - old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky ’ s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri ’ s favor ex parte ( without an appearance by Monasky ). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri ’ s petition, finding that Italy was the baby ’ s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the you. S. Supreme Court denied Monasky ’ s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their child to Italy. A panel from the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 you. S. C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the Court defines wrongful removal as taking a residence in violation of custodial rights “ under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal. ” To determine the child ’ s habitual residence, a court must look “ to the place in which the child has become ‘ acclimatized, ’ or as a back - up inquiry, “ shared parental intent. ” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to their country, the relevant factor is the parents ’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an assessment, and, finding no clear error in the district court ’ s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit ( en banc ) affirmed."
484,"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.",United States,"Title II of federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed racial discrimination by places of public use when their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel near Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the owners from discriminating under all grounds of segregation under Title II."
40,Idaho,Laura Lee Wright,"Laura Lee Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half-sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright’s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor. During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction."
1277,"Priscilla Summers, et al.","Earth Island Institute, et al.","Earth Island Institute, along with several other environmental groups, filed suit against the United States Forest Service in the you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that certain Forest Service regulations violated the Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA). The ARA requires the Forest Service to establish an administrative appeals process providing an opportunity for notice and comment. Earth Island brought this claim when, in 2003, the Forest Service issued new regulations greatly limiting notice, appeals and public comment on certain categorically excluded activities. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that if Congress intended to allow the Forest Service to limit notice, appeals and comment for categorically excluded activities (as the regulations did) it would not have enacted the ARA in the first place. In seeking certiorari, the Forest Service argued that the Ninth Circuit had overstepped its bounds in invalidating the regulations and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because the case was not yet ripe for judicial review."
829,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,"Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al.","In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with repeated violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in district court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued how, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States & the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially those same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the different offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against single jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the you. S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy remained binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges of Sanchez Valle should be dismissed."
637,"Tyson Foods, Inc.","Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.","Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of its plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. ( Tyson ) at the company ’ s meat - processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a “ gang - time ” system, which means they were paid only for time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The company sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying appropriate compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the court returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars. Tyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences between the employees made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the plaintiff ’ s actions and therefore held no right to damages. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s certification of the plaintiff class."
1190,Bruce Edward Brendlin,California,"Police stopped Karen Simeroth's car for having expired registration tabs. Bruce Brendlin, who had a warrant out for his arrest, was riding in the passenger seat. Police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Simeroth's person. In a California trial court, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that Brendlin had never been detained or ""seized"" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It denied the motion, and Brendlin pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. A California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a traffic stop necessarily results in a Fourth Amendment seizure. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled for California. The court held that the driver of the car is the only one detained in a traffic stop. The movement of any passengers is also stopped as a practical matter, but the court considered this merely a necessary byproduct of the detention of the driver. The court held that Brendlin had been free to leave the scene of the traffic stop or to simply ignore the police. Since he was never ""seized,"" however, he could not claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
483,"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.",United States,"Title II : Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial interference by places of public business if their operations involved commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel of Atlanta, Georgia, failed to accept Black Americans. The owners sought to enjoin the motel not discriminating on the basis of race under Title II."
1667,National Labor Relations Board,"Lion Oil Company, Monsanto Chemical Company","Beginning on October 23, 1950, Lion Oil Company and Oil Workers International Union CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions for employees of the company. The agreement provided the means to amend its terms: Either party must notify the other in writing of its desire to amend the agreement, after which the company and the union should attempt to agree on the desired amendments. If no agreement was reached within sixty days, either party may terminate the agreement. On August 24, 1951, the union transmitted a letter to the company notifying the company of its desire to modify the agreement. Representatives of the company and the union first met on August 29, 1951 to discuss the proposed amendments. The two groups held 37 more meetings between that date and April 30, 1952, but no agreement was reached. On April 30, employees of the company went on strike, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Neither the company nor the union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, the union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally, but the company refused this offer. The company distributed a letter to the union explaining that there would be no reinstatement of workers unless the employees agreed to work for a period of at least one year without work stoppage. After June 21, the company interviewed individual employees and rehired only those who assured the company that they would continue to work daily throughout the strike. On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was executed between the company and the union; employees were reinstated the next day. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided that where there is a collective bargaining contract, employees may not go on strike until sixty days after either party provides written notice of its intent to terminate or modify the contract or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Employees who go on strike before this point lose the protection of the NLRA. During the negotiations for the new agreement, the union filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the company with the National Labor Relations Board, based on the company’s response to the employees’ offer to return to work. The five member Board held in a split decision that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under the NLRA, rejecting the company’s defense that the strikers lost the protection of the act because the contract was still in effect. The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Board’s ruling. The Eighth Circuit held that a strike would violate the terms of the contract until the contract expired or was cancelled in the manner provided for in the NLRA. As the contract had not expired when the employees went on strike, those employees violated the terms of the NLRA and lost its protection. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Lion Oil Company was merged into Monsanto Chemical Company. By order of the Court, Monsanto was made a party in the case."
9,Board of Regents of State Colleges,David Roth,David Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed that he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.
1759,Nathan Jackson,"Wilfred Denno, Warden","On June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others upstairs before leaving the hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room. Jackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Jackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction."
368,Thompson,Oklahoma,"At the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari."
2288,Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez,United States,"Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges. At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence."
2118,Terry Michael Honeycutt,United States,"Terry Honeycutt was a salaried employee who worked at Brainerd Army Store, which was owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. In 2008, when Terry noticed an increase in the number of “edgy looking” people purchasing Polar Pure, an iodine-based water purification product, he called the local police station to find out if there was anything he should know about it. The police confirmed Terry’s suspicion that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine and that he should not sell it if he felt uncomfortable. Brainerd Army Store was the only place that sold Polar Pure locally, and the product was kept behind the counter, so only the Honeycutt brothers sold it. Over the course of the next year, the Honeycutt brothers sold increasing amounts of Polar Pure. The Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating the brothers and the store, which culminated in a search warrant in 2010. The search warrant revealed that Polar Pure was the store’s highest grossing item and that it generated $260,000 of profit. After the DEA agents seized the store’s inventory of Polar Pure, the number of area meth labs using the iodine method dropped to “insignificant” levels. A grand jury indicted both brothers. Tony pled guilty, and Terry went to trial, where he was convicted on 11 of the 14 counts with which he was charged. The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 60 months for each count, but the jury did not order any forfeiture of the proceeds of the sales, because it found that, as a salaried employee, Terry did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy. On appeal the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the doctrine of joint and several liability applied to co-conspirators for the purpose of forfeiture of the proceeds of drug sales. For the purposes of the forfeiture statute, a defendant may be jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of drug sales obtained by others with whom the defendant participated in the crime. Therefore, in this case, the district court erred in not ordering forfeiture of the proceeds."
721,Benjamin Gitlow,People of the State of New York,"Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for publishing his “ Left Wing Manifesto "" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York ’ s Criminal Anarchy Law, which allowed advocating the overthrow of any government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action resulting from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without reference to incitement of such action. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the only court in that state."
138,Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,Harry Mimms,"This case arose when two Philadelphia police officers pulled over the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. He was convicted on both counts at trial after his motion to suppress the revolver was denied. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' request for Mimms to exit the vehicle was an unlawful ""seizure"" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officer could not point to any ""objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety"" sufficient to warrant ordering Mimms to step out of the car. Therefore, the officers should never have noticed the bulge and the search should never have taken place."
117,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Robert Douglas Smith,"In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death for murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault in an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal corpus corpus in Arizona court that was denied. Although the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that the mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for its Ninth Circuit and argued that he was mentally retarded and thus could not be executed. The appellate court held : the issue of if or not Smith was mentally retarded had best be decided by a jury."
103,"San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.","City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.","The owners and operators of a casino in San Francisco sue the city in state court, arguing that $ 567, 000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional seizure of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that has been resolved in a state - court suit. The federal full faith and prohibition statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit were based on issues that had been resolved in state court ( the rule of "" issue preclusion "" ). The hoteliers asked federal district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause."
1035,"Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.",Nigh,"Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property."
1852,Carroll,President and Commissioners of Princess Anne,"A white supremacist organization held a public rally near a courthouse in Princess Anne, Maryland. During the rally, members of the organization made racist and derogatory speeches amplified over a public address system. Officials of Princess Anne and Somerset County obtained a restraining order to prevent the organization from reconvening the next day. The order was ex parte, so no notice was given to the organization. The order restrained the organization from holding rallies in the county for 10 days. At trial, the Circuit Court issued an injunction for another 10 months. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 10 day order, but reversed the 10 month injunction because the period of time was unreasonable and arbitrary."
373,Bowen,Kendrick,"The Adolescent Family Life Act (""AFLA"") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari."
2381,United States,Joshua James Cooley,"Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.” Cooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native."
2204,Andrew Kisela,Amy Hughes,"Tucson police officer Andrew Kisela and two other officers responded to a police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic behavior with a knife. When they arrived, they saw Amy Hughes holding a large kitchen knife in what appeared to be a confrontation with another woman later identified as Sharon Chadwick. Despite at least two commands to drop the knife, Hughes did not do so and instead took several steps toward Chadwick. Kisela fired four shots through the chain link fence, seriously injuring Hughes. Hughes sued Kisela under 42 you.S.C. §1983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Kisela, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes (as is required in a motion for summary judgment), was sufficient to demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Ninth Circuit next held that Kisela was not entitled to qualified immunity because, in its view, his actions violated clearly established law in that jurisdiction."
1477,"Marvin D. Horne, et al.",Department of Agriculture,"The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) was enacted to protect farmers from radical fluctuations in the market. The AMAA allows the Secretary of Agriculture to impose production quotas or supply limitations on products as needed. Refusal to comply with these orders can result in civil and criminal penalties. The orders only applied to ""handlers,"" those who process and package the products for distribution. The Raisin Marketing Order of 1949 created reserve-tonnage, a percentage of raisins that must be turned over the government each year. Marvin and Laura Horne were raisin producers living in California who implemented a system to bring their raisins to market without handlers to avoid the AMAA. The Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service initiated an enforcement action against the Hornes for failure to comply with the orders. The Administrative Law Judge held that the Hornes should be subject to the Order under the auspices of the AMAA. The Judicial Officer affirmed the decision and held the Hornes liable. The Hornes filed for judicial review in district court, and the court granted summary judgment for the Department of Agriculture. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Hornes' claim that the Order violated their Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause. The Court held that the Hornes must bring that claim before the Court of Federal Claims, as required by the Tucker Act."
48,Miami Herald Publishing Company,Pat Tornillo,"Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision."
533,National Labor Relations Board,"Town & Country Electric, Inc., et al.","Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term ""employee"" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company."
1194,United States,Ahmed Ressam,"In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called ""Millennium Bomber,"" was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-you.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 you.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such ""in relation to"" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits."
1055,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,Sigitas J. Banaitis,"Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the you.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The you.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases."
124,Trimble,Gordon,"Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, while allowing legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from either their mothers or fathers, allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Consequently, Deta Trimble, the illegitimate daughter of Sherman Gordon, was unable to inherit her father's estate when he died intestate. After losing her challenge to Section 12 in the Illinois Supreme Court, Trimble appealed to the Supreme Court."
1288,Donald J. Trump,"Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al.","The district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his wives. Trump ordered a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to transfer jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding government intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court noted, in the alternative, that there was no legal basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like another grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not add to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court."
1829,Sibron,New York,"After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: ""You know what I am after,"" Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools."
400,Pennsylvania,Inocencio Muniz,"On November 30, 1986, a patrol officer saw Inocencio Muniz and another passenger in a car stopped on the shoulder of a highway. When the officer approached, he could smell alcohol on Muniz’s breath and saw that his eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer advised Muniz to remain parked, but as he was leaving he saw Muniz drive off. The officer pulled Muniz over and had him perform three field sobriety tests, all of which Muniz failed. Muniz told the officer he failed them because he had been drinking. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Muniz answered a series of questions about himself and stumbled over an answer regarding the year he turned six. Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. The officer then read Muniz his Miranda rights, and Muniz signed a statement waiving them. In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol. At trial, the video and audio recordings of Muniz’s behavior at the booking center were admitted into evidence, along with the officer’s reports of Muniz’s failure of the field sobriety tests and his incriminating statements. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence of his behavior and statements prior to the Miranda warning should have been excluded from trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz’s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application for review."
1197,Kentucky Retirement Systems et al.,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"Charles Lickteig is a deputy sheriff in Kentucky. Because he is a hazardous duty worker, he is eligible to retire at age 55. Kentucky Retirement Systems offers a two-tier calculation of so-called ""disability retirement benefits."" If hazardous duty workers like Lickteig opt to keep working and then become disabled, they receive only their scheduled retirement benefits. In contrast, workers who become disabled before reaching age 55 receive payments that reflect not only their actual years of service but the number of years remaining until they would have reached 55. In effect, if two workers were otherwise identical, the one who retired on disability before 55 would always get benefits equal to or greater than those of the post-55 retiree. Lickteig decided against retirement at 55. Six years later, he became disabled because of ""a deteriorating vertebra, arthritis, nerve damage, and Parkinson's disease,"" and stopped working. When he applied for disability retirement benefits, he received word that he was eligible only for standard retirement. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued unsuccessfully in federal district court that the two-tier system violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that the simple act of treating younger disabled retirees better than older ones was sufficient to make out a prima facie ADEA violation."
8,Moose Lodge No. 107,Irvis,"K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination ""state action."""
59,Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct "" loss reserves, "" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. In the Act, increases from loss reserves that constitute "" reserve strengthening, "" or additions to a loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue modified the law to say that any increases from loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then said Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with that government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It limited reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves."
1319,Texas,New Mexico,"Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies in its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 90 days of its final determination. In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, they began and release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico. When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based upon its evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30 - day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Other than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing authority to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss."
717,"Walter M. Pierce, Governor",Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,"The Compulsory Education Act of 1850 required parents or guardians to send children under the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children lived. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care to orphans, educated adults, and established and maintained academies in schools. This case was heard together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy."
994,Grupo Dataflux,"Atlas Global Group, L.P., et al.","Atlas Global Group was a limited partnership company created under Texas law. They filed a suit in federal court against Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation. The suit dealt with a state law, but Atlas filed the case in federal court because, it claimed, the court had ""diversity jurisdiction"" (when a case involves citizens of two different states, or an American citizen and a foreign citizen, it is heard in federal court). However, at the time the case was filed, two of Atlas's partners were Mexican citizens (they left the partnership before the trial began). After the case was decided, but before the judgment was announced, Grupo Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss the case because the court did not have diversity jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, finding that Atlas was a Mexican ""citizen"" at the time of filing because of the citizenship of its partners, and that the federal courts therefore did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, Atlas argued that even if the necessary diversity had not been present at the time of filing, it was present before the trial began and the court should therefore ignore the error under an exception for cases that have already been decided. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed, reversing the decision."
410,"Baker Botts, LLP","ASARCO, LLC","Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $120 million in fees for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $117 million to cover the fees in addition to $5 million for expenses incurred defending the fee claims. The district court affirmed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition."
255,"Walter Zant, Warden of Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center ",Alpha Otis O'Daniel Stephens,"A jury in the Bleckly County Superior Court convicted Alpha Stephens of murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on two of three possible statutory aggravating circumstances. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled one of the aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty invalid. After exhausting all post conviction remedies, Stephens filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. On certiorari, the you.S. Supreme Court certified the Supreme Court of Georgia to answer the question of what state law premises support affirming Stephens death sentence, even though one of the aggravating circumstances was now invalid. The Georgia court responded, holding that the jury used other aggravating circumstances along with the invalid one to sentence Stephens, so his sentence should stand."
1860,Nacirema Operating Co. Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ,"William H. Johnson, Julia T. Kloseck, and Albert Avery",These are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by the men and their families under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (the Act) because the injuries did not occur “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required under the Act. The district court upheld those decisions and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.
506,J.E.B.,Alabama ex rel T.B.,"Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool."
2152,"Virginia, et al.",Dennis LeBlanc,"In 2003, Dennis LeBlanc was sentenced in Virginia state court to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for raping a woman when he was 16 years old. In 2010, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, which held that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses. The Court noted that Graham did not require states to guarantee eventual freedom to juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes, but they did have to allow for “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” LeBlanc subsequently filed a motion in state trial court seeking to vacate his sentence under Graham. The trial court denied the motion based on a Virginia Supreme Court decision that held that the state’s geriatric release program--that allows for conditional release for older inmates under some circumstances--satisfied the Graham requirements. Therefore, the state trial court held that LeBlanc’s sentence did not violate the rule established in Graham. In 2012, LeBlanc filed a federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge recommended that the petition be dismissed, but the district court disagreed and granted the petition because it determined that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of the law established in Graham. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1769,Aaron Henry ,Mississippi,"During Aaron Henry’s trial for disturbing the peace, the State of Mississippi introduced testimony of a police officer who conducted an unlawful search of Henry’s car. Henry allegedly made indecent proposals and offensive contact when he gave a ride to a hitchhiker. Henry’s counsel failed to object to the testimony when it was entered into evidence as required by local rules. Henry’s counsel later objected to the testimony in a motion for directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found him guilty. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted, and excused Henry’s lack of objection because he was represented by out-of-state counsel, who were unfamiliar with the local rules of criminal procedure. After this judgment, Mississippi filed a Suggestion of Error pointing out that Henry was represented by competent in state counsel as well as out of state counsel. As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction, holding that even honest mistakes are binding."
598,Reno,Bossier Parish School Board,"The Bossier Parrish School Board is subject to the preclearance requirements of ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, the Board must obtain the approval of either the Attorney General or the District Court before implementing any changes to a voting ""qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure."" Based on the 1990 census, the Board redrew its 12 single member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had precleared for use in elections of the parish's governing body. The Board rejected a plan proposed by the NAACP, which would have created two majority black districts. The Attorney General then objected to the preclearance, finding that the NAACP plan demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts and that the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, thereby diluting their voting strength in violation of ?2 of the Act. Subsequently, the Attorney General withheld preclearance to prevent a violation of ?2 of the Act. The Board filed an action with the District Court. A three-judge panel granted the Board's preclearance request. The court rejected the contentions that a voting change's failure to satisfy ?2 of the Act constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under ?5 and that a court must consider evidence of a ?2 violation as evidence of a discriminatory purpose under ?5."
5,"Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General of the United States; William P. Rogers, Secretary of State","Ernest E. Mandel, et al.","Ernest E. Mandel was a Belgian professional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Guache, a Belgian Left Socialist weekly publication. He described himself as a revolutionary Marxist, advocating the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world Communism. Previously, the United States twice allowed Mandel to temporarily visit the United States -- once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. Both times and without Mandel’s knowledge, the State Department found him ineligible, but the attorney general used his discretionary power under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to admit Mendel temporarily. The Graduate Student Association at Stanford University invited Mandel to the United States for six days to participate in a conference. On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Counsel in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Other persons invited Mandel to additional events, and Mandel filed a second visa application in October detailing a more extensive itinerary. On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that the State Department -- headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers -- refused his first application. The State Department later recommended to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October application. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that Mandel’s 1968 activities far exceeded the scope of that visa and concluded that the Attorney General should not waive Mandel’s ineligibility. Mandel’s address to the conference was delivered by telephone. Mandel, along with various United States citizens who invited Mandel to speaking engagements, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court panel held in a 2-1 decision that citizens of the United States have a First Amendment right to have Mandel enter the country and to hear him speak. The court entered a declaratory judgment ruling that the portions of the statute delegating the waiver power to the attorney general were invalid as applied to Mandel; it also enjoined Rogers and Kleindienst from denying Mandel admission to the United States."
2245,"Gary Thacker, et ux.",Tennessee Valley Authority,"Gary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA was attempting to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly. The district court dismissed the Thackers’ lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA “may sue and be sued in its corporate name,” subject to certain exceptions. Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit."
755,Jones,United States,"In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in you.S. District Court of violating 18 you.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to ""maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce."" The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."
1331,George Porter,"Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, et al.","A Florida state court convicted George Porter of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Porter filed for habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his attorney's failure to bring forward evidence about his war record and how it left him a changed man violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. The district court agreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Mr. Porter was not prejudiced by any deficient performance by his counsel was a reasonable application of Strickland v. Washington."
188,"Russell Bruesewitz, et al.","Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.","Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six - month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their mother was three - years - old, Russell and Nancy Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list as compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market. The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed his drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and could be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury cases. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed."
1447,"Virgil D. ""Gus"" Reichle, Jr., et al.",Steven Howards,"On June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President's polices regarding the Iraq War. On that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone ""I am going to ask him how many kids he is killed today."" Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President's right shoulder with his open hand. Agent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed. Howards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 you.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents' immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable because to arrest Howards and also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards' Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents objectively had probable because to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable because was not a bar to Howards' First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable because for his arrest."
2201,Weyerhaeuser Company,"United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.","In 2010, the you.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits. A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 you.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat. The 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 you.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court."
1069,Mount Lemmon Fire District,"John Guido, et al.","In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full - time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, became the two oldest full - time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ), which found reasonable because to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination of Employment Act ( ADEA ), 29 you. S. C. § § 621 - 34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment upon the basis that it was not an “ or ” within the meaning of the ADEA, and its district court agreed. A three - judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have said, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order they be covered by the ADEA."
289,Executive Benefits Insurance Agency,Peter H. Arkison,"Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. ( BIA ) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the executive commission from one of his largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long - time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. ( EBIA ). Pearce then deposited over $ 100, 000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a crown corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the you. S. Court Of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the fourth time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make its recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, asserted its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court."
1339,Wong,Belmontes,"A California state court convicted Fernando Belmontes of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Belmontes filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court arguing that at sentencing his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the you.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Belmontes did suffer ineffective counsel at sentencing. The court reasoned that Mr. Belmontes' attorney failed to prepare and present sufficient evidence to humanize Mr. Belmontes that may have mitigated his sentence."
206,Barion Perry,New Hampshire,"Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2013. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N. H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the time but later could possibly pick him out of a witness lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo search. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it appeared "" unnecessarily suggestive "" that Perry was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed his conviction."
1890,"Oregon, et al.","John Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States","In 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states."
1078,"Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.","Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.","Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom both allege developed cancer after they were exposed by asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. Each sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “ bare metal ” ship components, or parts that were assembled and shipped before any asbestos - containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors ’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, but a Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs ’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright - line as opposed to the fact - specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, specifically regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them irrelevant. It therefore affirmed that district court ’ s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos - related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer ’ s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact - specific standard rather than the bright - line rule."
504,"George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis","Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz","George Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charge, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to block continuation of their lawsuit. They claimed that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The federal court found the injunction constitutional and refused to extend the injunction. The you. S. Supreme Court decided this case on direct appeal"
337,"Mach Mining, LLC",Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC ( Mach Mining ) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that this was reasonable because to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the two defendants'behalf. Trump Mining argued whether the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment about whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to its suit against unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts should review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate. Nonetheless, the court certified the question to U you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially significant, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure - to - conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure - to - conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases."
1348,Granite Rock Co.,International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al.,"Granite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act (""LMRA"") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement (""CBA""). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the arbitration clause."
1049,Adaucto Chavez-Mesa,United States of America,"In 2013, Adaucto Chavez - Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range between 135 – 168 months. The government recommended the new 135 - month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted its recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez - Meza subsequently applied and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ). He requested that the court increase that sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating that had “ tak [ en ] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1. 10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( a ). ” Chavez - Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553 ( a ) factors in deciding on the 114 - month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a trial court must explain how it applies the § 3553 ( a ) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some basis for its decisions when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient."
603,"Wesley Harris, et al.","Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris, some individual voters challenged the Commission and alleged because the newly redrawn districts were under - populated in Democratic - leaning districts and less - populated in Republican - leaning ones, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission argued that the population deviations constituted the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor of the Commission and ruled that the redrawn districts represented a good faith effort and comply with the Voting Rights Act."
1912,Richard D. Shapero ,Kentucky Bar Association,"Richard Shapero submitted a client solicitation letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval. Shapero directed the letter at individuals who were about to lose their houses to foreclosure. The Commission found nothing false or misleading with the letter, but denied approval under a Kentucky Supreme Court rule, which prohibited direct mail advertisements “precipitated by a specific event” such as foreclosure. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion from the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Ethics. The committee upheld the Advertising Commission’s ruling. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed."
979,"Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.",George E. Banks,"In 1982, George Banks was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania for the murder of 13 people. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Banks unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found Banks's death sentence unconstitutional. The court held that jury instructions during sentencing led jurors to believe they could not vote against the death penalty unless they all agreed on mitigating evidence (that is, evidence that would have inclined them to vote against the death penalty). This, the court reasoned, violated the you.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mills v. Maryland (1988). The you.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision (in part) and remanded it. Pointing to its opinion in Teague v. Lane (1989) and the fact that Mills was decided after Banks's conviction, the Court reasoned that the appeals court did not consider whether Mills could be ""retroactively"" applied. The Third Circuit Court - reviewing its ruling - did not change its original opinion. It found that ""Mills did not announce a new rule of constitutional law for retroactivity purposes"" and that Banks's death sentence was unconstitutional."
477,"Robert Kennedy, Attorney General",Francisco Mendoza-Martinez,"Francisco Mendoza - Martinez ( Martinez ) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, by 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 ( 1940 "" Act "" ) and served 366 days in prison. Five years before his release, Martinez also issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401 ( j ) of the Act which divested draft veterans of their you. S. citizenship. Following a dismissal following his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping Mendoza of his you. S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401 ( j ) in District Court but was defeated. On ruling from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court issued certiorari. This appeal was decided together with Rusk v. Cort."
222,Piper Aircraft Company,Reyno,"(This summary was prepared by Tom Feledy.) A British company, flying an airplane manufactured by Piper, a Pennsylvania company, equipped with propellers made by Hartzell, an Ohio company, conducted a charter flight in Scotland for five Scottish citizens. When the plane crashed, killing all on board, the next of kin, also Scottish, had a Los Angeles-based lawyer sue Piper and Hartzell for wrongful death. The suit was filed in a California state court, then removed to Federal District Court in California, and finally transferred to Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. There it was dismissed for forum non conveniens under the determination that the case should be tried in Scotland: the crash had occurred, the crash investigation had been conducted there by British authorities, and the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter company were all located there. However, respondents successfully appealed, claiming that substantive law in Scotland would be unfavorable to their case. Scotland, unlike Pennsylvania, had no strict liability law, which, along with negligence, respondents were relying upon in order to prevail."
972,California Public Employees' Retirement System,"ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.","Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment company, with stock trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $ 31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees ’ Retirement System ( CPERS ), the largest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1907 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Warner Brothers again. The litigation was then merged with the other retirement fund ’ s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing in a later individual claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
981,U.S. Bank National Association,"Village at Lakeridge, LLC","The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, ( Lakeridge ) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC ( MBP ), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell his claim on Lakeridge ’ s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship from a member of MBP ’ s board. you. S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge ’ its assets, offered to purchase Rabkin ’ s claim, but Rabkin decided not to sell it. you. S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non - statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of reasonable error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court ’ s finding if it is clear from the evidence that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held because a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider role of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non - statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP ’ s board to be considered an insider."
795,David Anthony Taylor,United States,"David Anthony Taylor was a member of the “Southwest Goonz,” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor’s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government’s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor’s motion, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction."
171,"William H. Stafford, Jr., et al.","John Briggs, et al.","These are two consolidated cases. For 77-1546, in 1972, you. S. Attorney William Stafford, Assistant you.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida Stuart Carrouth, and Department of Justice Attorney Guy Goodwin conducted a grand jury investigation into a conspiracy to because a riot in Florida. Respondents were among the group subpoenaed to appear and testify. During the course of the proceedings, Goodwin stated under oath that there were no government agents in the witness lineup called by respondents’ counsel. Respondents later sued Stafford, Carrouth, Goodwin, and FBI Agent Claude Meadow in their individual and official capacities for falsely testifying and conspiring to deprive the respondents of statutory rights. Respondents sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where Goodwin resided. The petitioners requested a transfer to the Northern District of Florida or a dismissal based on improper venue. The district court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the venue was proper because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia. For 78-393, from 1953 until 1973, CIA agents regularly opened and photocopied mail going through the International Airport in New York to and from the Soviet Union. In 1975, respondents sued on their behalf and on the behalf of others whose mail had been opened by the CIA. Respondents sued in the district court of Rhode Island and alleged that the interference with their mail constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Petitioners moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. The district court denied these motions but certified the case for an immediate appeal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions as they relate to petitioners employed by the CIA at the time of filing, but reversed as to the officials who had left their government positions at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals held that the venue was proper because one of the petitioners resided in Rhode Island."
16,"Sears, Roebuck and Co.",County of Los Angeles and City of Compton,"The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and exported from the United States. These items were intended to sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund on the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears ’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended in interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the federal tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce."
594,Antoine Bruce,"Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al.","Several prisoners housed at the Special Management Unit ( STS ) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gangs - affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons ( BOP ) officials and claimed that SMUs violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang - affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival parties. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The parties then engaged in extensive back - and - forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and the ability of other parties to join to the lawsuit. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees."
121,Neil Randall et al.,William H. Sorrell et al.,"In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle than on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a former legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, because Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure would prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the expenditure limits. The District Court struck down some expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which federal, state, and local parties together could give over $ 400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that many of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were "" narrowly tailored "" to the state's interests."
202,Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,David Patchak,"The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band ( "" the Band "" ) is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned US Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3, 000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau for Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township – known as the "" Bradley Tract "" - - into trust for The Band under the Indian Reorganization Act ( "" IRA "" ). David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate complaint against the Secretary by a Michigan anti - gambling attorney. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act ( "" QTA "" ) precluded any person from seeking to divest the Member States of title to Indian land trusts ; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust and Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests don't fall within the IRA's zone - of - interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone - of - interests test for standing. The court held : Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA in the Secretary with considering "" affected members of the public "" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected of Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. "
2336,"United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.","Sierra Club, Inc.","Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially because significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action. The Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records."
1070,New Prime Inc.,Dominic Oliveira,"Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “substantially identical” to those he had as an independent contractor. Oliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide. The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “contracts of employment of transportation workers” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime’s motion to compel arbitration. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship."
1265,Arizona,Lemon Montrea Johnson,"Lemon Johnson was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a ""mandatory insurance suspension."" Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers began to question the car's occupants, including Johnson, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as Johnson's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked Johnson to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although Johnson was free to stay in the car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, Johnson was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable because to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with Johnson and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that Johnson was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that Johnson step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of a consensual encounter between the officers and Johnson. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of Johnson was illegal and unconstitutional."
604,"Wesley Harris, et al.","Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the new legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts was under - populated in Democratic - leaning districts and less - populated in Republican - leaning district, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission argued that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The district court ruled in favor of the Commission and held that newly redrawn districts represented a good faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act."
646,Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson,Community Bank of Raymore,"Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson ’ s parents are the two members of PHC Development, LLC ( PHC ). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore ( Community ) made four payments totaling more than $ 2, 000, 000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payments. Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void, unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ( ECOA ). Community moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion by holding that the couple, in joining their husbands ’ loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The T. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
2347,"Patrick J. Collins, et al.","Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.","Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President “for because.” Upon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs’ dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the “Third Amendment,” which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs’ net worth minus a specified capital reserve. Collins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of their ownership interests. The shareholders argued that FHFA had exceeded its authority under two federal statutes and that the structure of FHFA violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The district court dismissed the statutory claims and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claim. A panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the statutory claims but reversed the judgment as to the constitutional claim, finding that the structure of FHFA was unconstitutional but the remedy was to invalidate the provision addressing removal of FHFA’s director. In a deeply divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed as to one statutory claim, reversed as to the other statutory claim, held that FHFA’s structure violated the Constitution, and held that the appropriate remedy was to declare unconstitutional the removal provision, not to invalidate the Third Amendment."
2094,"Casimir Czyzewski, et al.","Jevic Holding Corp., et al.","Jevic Transportation, Inc. was a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey that in 2006 was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners. In 2008, Jevic filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; at that point, it owed about $53 million to its first-priority senior secured creditors and about $20 million to its tax and general unsecured creditors. Two lawsuits ensued in bankruptcy court: one was the truck drivers suing Jevic for violating federal and state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts, which required 60 days’ notice to workers before they were laid off, and the other was a fraudulent conveyance action on behalf of the unsecured creditors. In March 2012, the parties to the fraudulent conveyance action negotiated a structured dismissal settlement that disposed of many of the claims, but left out the drivers. The drivers objected to the settlement because it distributed property to creditors of lower priority than the drivers, according to the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court rejected the objections and approved the proposed settlement. The federal district court and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and held that the bankruptcy court had the discretion to approve a settlement scheme outside of the Chapter 11 proceedings that did not comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme."
560,Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.,"CLS Bank International, et al.","Alice Corporation (Alice) is an Australian company that owns the '479, '510, '720, and '375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor. On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '479, '510, and '720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the '375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
496,Associated Industries of Missouri,Lohman,"Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide ""use tax,"" the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate."
239,Earl Enmund ,Florida,"Earl Enmund and two codefendants were found guilty of the felony murder and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple. Enmund was the getaway driver, who waited in the car during the robbery, did not participate in the killing and had no idea anyone would be killed. Enmund argued that the evidence did not show any intent to kill, so the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. Despite this, the jury sentenced him to death along with his codefendants. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction."
1456,Steve A. Filarsky,Nicholas B. Delia,"On August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky to assist with the internal investigation. On September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies. On May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 you.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed."
242,"Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury",Taxation With Representation of Washington,"Two non-profit groups merged to form the group Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR). One of the original groups obtained 501(c)3 status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which allowed donors to make tax-deductible donations to it. Because the other group participated in political lobbying, it did not qualify for 501(C)(3) status and could not offer tax-deductible donations. Since the newly formed TWR also participated in ""substantial lobbying,"" the IRS denied it tax-deduction privileges. TWR alleged in District Court that the IRS's ""substantial lobbying"" restriction for 501(C)(3) status violated its First Amendment rights by imposing an ""unconstitutional burden"" on its ability to receive tax-deductible donations. TWR also argued that the restriction violated its Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since veterans' organizations that lobbied extensively could receive tax-deductible donations. The District Court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the ""substantial lobbying"" restriction did impair TWR's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights."
897,"Entergy Louisiana, Inc.",Louisiana Public Service Commission,"Several Louisiana cotton gins sued Entergy, an electric utility company, because it had over-billed them for electricity between 1988 and 1994. The gins claimed that Entergy had failed to notify them of a lower rate that would have saved them more than $2 million over the six-year period. Louisiana law requires that utility companies notify customers when they are eligible for a lower rate. Furthermore, the gins claimed that Entergy had discriminated against them by notifying several other gins in the state of the lower rate. Deferring to the decision of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, the state's utility regulatory agency, a state district court ruled against Entergy. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decision on appeal."
448,"Lechmere, Inc.",National Labor Relations Board,Lechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.
2061,Richard Mathis,United States,"On March 8, 2013, police officers executed a warrant to search Richard Mathis’ house following allegations of sexual abuse from young men. The officers found a loaded rifle and ammunition. After he was arrested and while in custody, Mathis admitted to owning the rifle and ammunition, and he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because of his five previous burglary convictions in Iowa state courts. At trial, the district court used a modified categorical approach to determine that Mathis’ prior convictions constituted violent felonies because the elements of the offense were substantially similar to generic burglary and posed the same risk of harm to others. Therefore, Mathis was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment pursuant to the ACCA. Mathis appealed his conviction and argued that his Iowa convictions should not have constituted predicate offenses under the ACCA, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision."
679,Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma,"Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.","The you.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct."
532,"BMW of North America, Inc.",Gore,"After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court."
1727,Theodore R. Gibson,Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,"In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called ""subversive organizations."" Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt."
1286,Donald J. Trump,"Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al.","The county attorney of New York County issued a grand jury indictment to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of the businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement under that subpoena, but the district court declined to grant jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with reference to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential removal from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the federal court relied did not apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court."
653,United States,Ramirez,"While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a ""no-knock"" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were ""insufficient exigent circumstances"" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1850,Harold Kaufman ,United States,"During his trial for armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association, Harold Kaufman admitted to the crime but unsuccessfully claimed insanity. He was convicted and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Kaufman then filed a post-conviction motion in district court challenging the evidence that proved his sanity. He alleged that the evidence was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied relief, holding that unlawful search and seizure was not an available attack in post-conviction proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1193,Michael H. Boulware,United States,"Michael H. Boulware founded a coffee and bottled water company known as Hawaiian Isles Enterprises. As his company became profitable in 1987, he began transferring money – a total of $4.5 million – from his company to his mistress. Seven years later, in the midst of a divorce, his mistress refused to return the money when asked, contending that it was a gift. A Hawaii court eventually held that the woman had been holding the money in constructive trust for the company's benefit. Seven years after that, the federal government indicted Boulware for failing to pay taxes on the disputed funds as well as $6 million more that he had received from the company. Boulware argued that under the ""return of capital"" rule, holding that when unprofitable companies distribute money to shareholders, the money is considered a nontaxable return of capital up to the shareholder's basis in the stock, he owed no taxes. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument."
854,Christopher,Harbury,"Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid because of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts."
771,Edwards,Carpenter,"Robert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as because to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal."
606,"Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board",Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,"Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ( Liberty Mutual ) operates a self - insured employee health plan through a third - party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including self - insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The report defines what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third - party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( ERISA ) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor with the state and found that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The you. S. Court Of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA exceeded the state statute because the state statute ’ s requirements were connected to the federal requirements, therefore were preempted."
1396,United States,Jicarilla Apache Nation,"In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents."
641,Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole,Scott,"In granting Keith M. Scott parole, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the ""Board""), stipulated that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. When officers learned that Scott may be in possession of weapons, they searched his home and found a bow and arrow and some firearms. Despite objecting at his parole violation hearing that the search was unconstitutional, the seized weapons were admitted as evidence and Scott was ultimately recommitted. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Scott's challenge to the search and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the decision. The Supreme Court granted the Board certiorari."
493,United States,Eugene Frank Robel,"Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an operator at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a representative of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “ defense facility ”. The district court dismissed the appeal because it did not allege Eugene Robel remained an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied against Communist Party members. The C. S. Court on Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the C. S. Supreme Court."
960,City of Cuyahoga Falls,Buckeye Community Hope,"After the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process."
2034,Chadrin Lee Mullenix,"Beatrice Luna, individually and as representative of the estate of Israel Leija, Jr., et al.","On March 23, 2010, a police officer approached Israel Leija, Jr. at a drive-in restaurant with a warrant for his arrest. Leija proceeded to lead the police on a high-speed chase on the interstate while periodically calling the police dispatcher, saying that he had a gun and threatening to shoot the officers chasing him. The officers continued their pursuit, and other officers deployed spike strips. Trooper Chadrin Lee Mullenix, upon learning that other spike strips were set up, decided to pursue the alternate tactic of shooting at Leija’s car in order to stop it. Although he had not received training on this maneuver, he informed one of the officers in pursuit of his plan and radioed his supervisor for permission. Before receiving a response, Mullenix got in position on an overpass. Witnesses testified that Mullenix could hear his supervisor respond to say that he should “stand by” and “see if the spikes work first.” When Leija’s car approached, Mullenix fired six shots. The car struck the spike strips, hit the median, and rolled several times. It was later determined that Leija died as a result of Mullenix’ shots, four of which struck his body and none of which struck the car’s radiator, hood, or engine block. The respondents sued Mullenix under 42 you.S.C. §1983 and argued that Mullenix had violated Leija’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. Mullenix moved for summary judgment and argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion and held that there were genuine questions of fact regarding whether Mullenix acted as a reasonable officer would have under similar circumstances. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and subsequently denied Mullenix’s petition for a rehearing."
651,Alaska,Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,"In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not ""Indian country,"" the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed."
451,"Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al.",Seattle Audubon Society et al.,"Respondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. The suits challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted §318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. §318 included the names of the lawsuits and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that §318 violated Article III of the Constitution because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation."
2383,PennEast Pipeline Co. LLC,"New Jersey, et al.","The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 you.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA. The district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the you.S. Constitution."
1263,Arthur James Lomax,"Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.","Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ( without paying the usual court fees ) pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax directed his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Smith's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The District court further noted that these dismissals were “ strikes ” under 28 you. S. C. § 1915 ( g ), which bars inmates from filing or pursuing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed if the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not adequately state a legal claim for relief. Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show because before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show because order, Lomax argued ( among other things ) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they don't count as strikes. The district court denied Lomax ’ s motion as barred by the three - strikes provision, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
1165,"Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.","United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt","The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup. Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 you.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt’s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 you.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) “6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed” or (2) “3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances….” The district court granted the contractors’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt’s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim."
1153,"Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office",Erik Brunetti,"Erik Brunetti is the clothing brand “ fuct, ” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals presented an intent - to - use application for identification mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2 ( a ) of the Sherman Act, finding it comprised offensive or scandalous matter ( the pronunciation of “ fuct ” sounds like another vulgar word ) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney ’ s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board may not err in concluding a mark should be excluded under Section 2 ( a ) of the Lanham Act, that section ’ s limitation on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech."
84,United States,"Reliable Transfer Company, Inc.","It was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The Supreme Court endorsed this ""rule of divided damages"" in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson, 58 you.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). On a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a you-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the you.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam. Abstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones"
996,"Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, et al.","George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.","Two Australians and 12 Kuwaitis were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The captives were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains ""ultimate sovereignty""). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision."
1236,"Ritzen Group, Inc.","Jackson Masonry, LLC","Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was eventually completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline. Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed against bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 you. S. C. section 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court ’'order denying relief under the automatic stay ( which Ritzen did not appeal at the time ). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy Court ’ s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals ; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits. Ritzen appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court ’ s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines : the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal."
945,"Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO",Simon Shiao Tam,"Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band’s name with the you.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards “persons of Asian descent.” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed the trademark officer’s decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment."
976,Middleton,McNeil,"Sally Marie McNeil was convicted of the murder of her husband. She appealed her conviction, claiming that the trial judge had given the jury improper instructions when it was deciding whether to convict her of murder or voluntary manslaughter (the last four words of the instruction, not included in the model jury instruction provided with the criminal statute, might have led the jury to misunderstand the meaning of voluntary manslaughter). The California Court of Appeal acknowledged that the jury instruction had been wrong, but found that, taken as a whole, the instruction did not make it reasonably likely that the jury would misunderstood the meaning of voluntary manslaughter, especially given the closing statements of the prosecutor, which provided the correct definition of the law. McNeil then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court rejected her claim, but a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed."
1094,"Joan Wagnon, Secretary, Kansas Department of Revenue",Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,"The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off-reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed Kansas's interest in raising revenue."
877,United States,Knights,"A California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would ""submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable because by any probation officer or law enforcement officer."" In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for ""investigatory"" rather than ""probationary"" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
2025,John Sturgeon,Bert Frost,"John Sturgeon regularly hunted on the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), which is part of the National Park Service (NPS), in Alaska. Sturgeon used a hovercraft to hunt. During one of his hunting trips, he was approached by three NPS enforcement employees and told that NPS regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts within all national parks, and therefore he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley boundaries. Sturgeon insisted that the NPS did not have jurisdiction in the area because it was a state-owned river and subsequently sued Bert Frost, the director of the NPS for Alaska. Sturgeon claimed the NPS violated Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) as applied to his use of hovercrafts on state-owned lands and waters because ANILCA limited the applicability of NPS regulations on land that is not federally owned."
1039,"Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP",R. Scott Appling,"R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP ( “ Lamar ” ) to represent him in legal proceedings against several former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant attorneys fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued as represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar conducted an adversary proceeding to collect the debt, and the bankruptcy courts ruled that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 you. S. C. § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling ’ s fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed. The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how could construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling ’ that fraudulent claims and his tax refund were not in writing and qualified as statements “ respecting [ his ]... financial condition ” under § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ), the debt could be discharged."
857,United States,Cotton,"A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the you.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 you.S. 466, that ""other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."" In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment."
1267,"FNU Tanzin, et al.","Muhammad Tanvir, et al.","The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the you. S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) placed their names on the national “ Daily Fly List, ” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in you. S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ( “ RFRA ” ), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “ [ a ] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain a relief against a government. "" The you. S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Abdullah, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges."
1280,Clemente Avelino Pereida,"Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General","Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review."
1088,Jenifer Arbaugh,"Y & H Corporation, dba The Moonlight Cafe","Jennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H claimed it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII, because it did not employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1116,Arlington Central School District Board of Education,"Pearl Murphy, et vir.","Using the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Joseph Murphy's parents brought legal action to require the Arlington Central School District to pay for their son's private school tuition. After they prevailed, they sought reimbursement from the school district for fees they had paid to an educational consultant during the proceedings. They relied on an IDEA provision that allows courts to ""award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs"" to prevailing parents. The school district argued that under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 you.S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 you.S. 83, expert fees can only be reimbursed when there is explicit authorization in the statute. Because the statute made no specific mention of expert fees, the school district argued, the fees could not be reimbursed. The federal district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, finding that a Congressional Conference Committee Report and a footnote in Casey referencing it showed that IDEA was intended to authorize reimbursement of expert fees."
157,Citizens United,Federal Election Commission,"Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ( BCRA ) to its film Hillary : The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "" big money "" campaign contributions, the FBI imposed a variety of restrictions to "" electioneering communications. "" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their election treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it wishes to support. Citizens United argued that : 1 ) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related media, and that 2 ) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to certain circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also noted that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 311 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "" might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular because, "" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim."
555,Republic of Argentina,"NML Capital, Ltd.","During an economic crisis in 2001, the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling more than US$2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The district court ordered the banks to comply with the subpoena requests. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the FSIA did not apply to the subpoena because it was a discovery order directed at commercial entities that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity."
962,"Delma Banks, Jr.","Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","Delma Banks, Jr. was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court in 1980. Sixteen years later Banks learned that one of the witnesses against him, Robert Farr, was a paid informant (a fact not stated during the trial). Charles Cook, another witness against Banks, claimed that he had made up much of his testimony in order to get other criminal charges against him dropped as part of a plea agreement. In Brady v. Maryland the you.S. Supreme Court held that due process is violated if prosecutors suppress evidence favorable to a defendant that relates to guilt or punishment. Pointing to Brady and evidence the prosecution suppressed information on its ties to the two witnesses, Banks sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to overturn his conviction and get a new trial. The district court granted habeas relief with respect to Banks' death sentence based on the state's failure to disclose Farr's informant status. However the district court refused to reverse the guilt verdict, rejecting Banks' Brady claim relating to Cook's testimony and Banks' argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) allowed the claim to be treated as if it were raised earlier. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to grant Banks relief as to his death sentence based on his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony. The Court held that Banks first had to press his claims in state court. The Court upheld the district court's rejection of Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings."
285,United States,Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen,"On May 1, 1981, pursuant to company procedure, employees at the FedEx office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport opened a package that had been damaged by a forklift. The package was an ordinary-looking cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside, they found a tube that contained four plastic bags inside one another, and the innermost bag contained a white substance. They notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the contents of the box. When the DEA agents arrived, they removed a small amount of the white powder to conduct a field test that determined the powder was cocaine. The DEA agents obtained a warrant for the address on the package and searched the location, where they arrested Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen for possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute. After they were indicted, the respondents filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal search. The motion was denied, and the defendants were tried and convicted in district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision and held that the warrant was the product of the test of the powder, for which a warrant was required."
1197,Andre Martello Barton,"William P. Barr, Attorney General","A resident and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 without a B - 2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies : aggravated assault, first - degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable ( deportable ) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent of seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two remaining charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then denied an application for cancellation of removal under 8 you. S. C. § 1229b ( a ), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “ has resided in the United States continuously, 7 years after having been admitted in any status. ” This residency requirement is subject to a “ stop - time rule ” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “ inadmissible ” or “ removable. ” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered his time - stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop - time rule of as an already - admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to to to States, he could not as a matter of law be “ rendered inadmissible ” within the meaning of § 1229b ( a ). The immigration judge ruled in the government ’ s favor, and in a non - precedential single - member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge ’ s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission ( or readmission ) to be “ rendered inadmissible. ”"
246,United States,Leroy Carlton Knotts,"Tristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in she will Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug-manufacturing lab. Knotts was convicted in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts’ Fourth Amendment rights."
263,Kevin Loughrin,United States,"Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them, make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. When the scheme came to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of personal mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act ; the district court denied the motion of dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury explicitly specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Murphy was convicted on all counts and sent to 36 months in prison. The you. S. Court of Appeals for a Tenth Circuit affirmed."
983,U.S. Bank National Association,"Village at Lakeridge, LLC","The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, ( Lakeridge ) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC ( MBP ), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge ’ s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP ’ s board. you. S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge ’ s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin ’ s claim, though Rabkin chose not to accept it. you. S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non - statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy courts held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the Court considered an insider since it was an affiliate with Lakeridge. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the new standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court ’ s finding unless it is clear from the facts that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that it was not a non - statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP ’ s board to be considered an insider."
619,Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin,"United States, et al.","Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin ( Menominee Tribe ) provided healthcare services among members of the tribe pursuant from a self - determination contract to the Secretary for Health and Human Services ( HHS ). The self - determination contract states that the federal government will provide the participating tribe the amount which the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government recover these costs in annual funding agreements. In 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS ’ s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six - year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe ’ s argument. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from running."
968,"Ricky Henson, et al.","Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.","The petitioners are a family of individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable for make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the car purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA ( Santander ), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed their putative class actions lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated its Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “ debt collector ” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and settled the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc."
1309,"Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al.","Irvin Muchnick, et al.","A federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation."
484,Federal Communications Commission,"Beach Communications, Inc.","Section 602(7)(B) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving ""only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such...facilities use any public right-of-way."" When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way, Beach Communications, Inc. and other SMATV operators petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Among other things, the appellate court found that section 602(7) violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and SMATV systems linking separately owned and managed buildings."
869,"Holmes Group, Inc.","Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.","Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the you.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case."
643,Faragher,City of Boca Raton,"After resigning as a lifeguard, Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against the City of Boca Raton and her immediate supervisors, alleging that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere by touching, remarking, and commenting. Faragher asserted that this conduct constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court concluded that Faragher's supervisors' conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of her employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The court then held that the city could be held liable. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that Faragher's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to the City, and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it."
1322,National Collegiate Athletic Association,"Shawne Alston, et al.","In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 you. S. 85 ( 1984 ), the Supreme Court struck up the NCAA ’ s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes were subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust legislation. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that the law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “ non - cash education - related benefits, ” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for student athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain forms of academic activities, such as “ computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies. ” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash - equivalent awards for academic purposes. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA ’ s interest in “ preserving amateurism, ” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law."
979,"Joseph Jesner, et al.","Arab Bank, PLC","Several alien victims were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC ( Arab Bank ), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and assisting various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute ( ATS ), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ’ s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the S. S. Supreme Court cited Kiobel on other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals ’ holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court ’ s decision did cast some doubt on the corporations liability holding in Kiobel. However, as the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of company liability, its appellate court affirmed the lower court ’ the dismissal."
756,Smith Betts,"Patrick J. Brady, Warden","he was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel so requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, though Betts subsequently found not guilty. He became convicted for robbery, though he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued that was wrongfully denied his right to counsel."
1252,"Thomas C. Horne, Superintendent, Arizona Public Instruction",Miriam Flores et al.,"The Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction and members of the Arizona state legislature moved for relief from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In January 2000, the court had cited the state for civil contempt for failing to adequately fund English Language Learner programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and subsequently rejected proposed legislation as inadequate to resolve the programs' deficiencies. The superintendent and representatives argued that increases in state funding, changes in the management of the school district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act sufficiently altered the foundations of the district court's original ruling and therefore relief was warranted. The federal district court of Arizona denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that since Arizona never appealed or complied with the district court's original order that it was fair to require compliance."
734,"El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.",Tsui Yuan Tseng,"In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws."
870,Kansas,Crane,"In 1997, the you.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 you.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- ""mental abnormality or personality disorder"" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding."
133,Rufus Junior Mincey,Arizona,"On October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine other plainclothes officers. Mincey’s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman’s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later. The other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey’s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant. The state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution’s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey’s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that Mincey made the statements voluntarily. Mincey’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his apartment was also denied, and he was convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds."
1010,Michael D. Crawford,Washington,"Michael Crawford stabbed a man he claimed tried to rape his wife. During Crawford's trial, prosecutors played for the jury his wife's tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing. The statement contradicted Crawford's argument that he stabbed the man in defense of his wife. Because it was pre-recorded, Crawford could not cross-examine the statement. The jury convicted Crawford for assault. Crawford claimed the playing of his wife's statement, with no chance for cross-examination, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee that ""[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him."" The state supreme court upheld the conviction, relying on the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts (1980). That decision allowed the admission of out-of-court testimony against a defendant if that testimony was reliable."
223,Missouri,Tyler G. McNeely,"On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his cheeks were red and glassy, and thought his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while unconscious and transported them to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered a sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit. The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's request. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over years represented an unfortunate circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law ; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision."
1671,William Earl Fikes,Alabama,"On April 24, 1953 in Selma, Alabama, an intruder broke into the apartment of the daughter of the city mayor. The daughter and the intruder struggled through several rooms until she was able to seize his knife, and he fled. The assailant had a towel over his head, so the victim could not identify the defendant during the trial. The police apprehended William Earl Fikes on the basis of a call from a private citizen and held him “on an open charge of investigation.” The police questioned Fikes for hours, placed him in jail, and limited his access to anyone familiar. After nearly a week of this treatment, Fikes confessed in the form of answers to the interrogator’s leading questions. Five days later, Fikes confessed under questioning a second time. When these confessions were admitted into the trial as evidence, Fikes did not testify regarding the events surrounding his interrogation because the judge had ruled he would be subjected to unlimited cross-examination. The jury convicted Fikes and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed."
93,"Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.",Henson,"Hurley also filed claims in Louisiana state law against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of the chlordimeform - based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba - Geigy Corp., in Louisiana district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state legal claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state - court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson not proceed. Syngenta then appealed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state - court lawsuit as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of his state - court action."
1942,Sila Luis,United States,"A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
969,"Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, et al.","United States District Court for the District of Columbia, et al.","In January 2001, President Bush created an advisory committee on energy policy headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. After the group issued its recommendations five months later, Judicial Watch, a non-profit government watchdog group, filed suit in federal district court. The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, later filed a nearly identical suit that was joined with the Judicial Watch suit. The two organizations alleged that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that it had generated. While FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal officials, Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in the energy committee's meetings. Cheney and the advisory group asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that it violated the Constitutional separation of powers by requiring judicial oversight of internal executive branch deliberations. The district court refused. The government then sought summary judgment of the case (without the discovery process) based on a few administrative documents that it claimed showed that only federal officials had worked on the group. The district court denied this request as well, and the government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court refused to grant summary judgment, arguing that it could not yet rule on the separation of powers argument. The government then appealed the case to the you.S. Supreme Court."
687,United States,E. C. Knight Company,"The Congress passed the Sherman Anti - Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in financial growth by giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in those hands of the few. It outlawed "" every conspiracy, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade "" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to exploit any part of trade for investment to be unlawful. The E. C. Knight Company owned such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar - refining business in the United States."
1099,Washington State Department of Licensing,"Cougar Den, Inc.","Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "" the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways. "" Cougar Den is a Yakama - owned fuel distributor that brings millions more gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $ 3. 6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, & licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department ’ s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department ’ s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe ’ s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this provision of the treaty bars members from taxing "" any trade, traveling, and importation "" by members of the Yakama tribe “ that requires the use of public roads, ” even those outside their reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state ’ s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes."
1548,Medtronic Inc,Boston Scientific Corp. et al.,"Between 1969 and 1980, Dr. Morton Mower worked with Dr. Mieczyslaw Mirowski to develop the implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) and the cardiac resynchronization therapy device (CRT), both devices that are meant to treat different kinds of heart failure. Mirowski Family Ventures (MFV) held both patents and licensed them to Guidant Corp. In 1991, Medtronic, a manufacturer of medical devices and equipment, entered into a sublicense agreement with Eli Lilly & Co., Guidant Corp's predecessor-in-interest regarding these patents. The agreement obligated MFV to inform Medtronic which items were covered by which patents, and if Medtronic disagreed, Medtronic could retain patent rights and file for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement on the patents. In October and November of 2007, MFV identified several Medtronic products that it believed infringed on its patents, and Medtronic subsequently sued for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement. In the bench trial in district court, the court, relying on precedent, stated that the patent holder bears the burden of proving that infringement occurred and found in favor of Medtronic. MFV appealed and argued that the burden falls on the alleged patent infringer to prove that infringement did not occur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because Medtronic is the party seeking relief from the court, it bears the burden to prove that it did not infringe on MFV's patents."
860,United States,John Bass,"In 1998, John Bass, a black man, was charged with two counts of homicide with a firearm in federal court, and the government filed notice of the intent to pursue the death penalty. Bass moved to dismiss the death penalty notice, and he filed a discovery request for information regarding the government’s death penalty charging practices and statistics by arguing that the government’s capital charging practices were racially motivated. The district court granted Bass’ motion for discovery and, after the government informed the court that it would not comply with the order, dismissed the death penalty notice. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant Bass’ motion."
511,Campbell-Ewald Company,Jose Gomez,"On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an intercepted text message advertising the you. S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell - Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics. Gomez sued and argued that that Campbell - Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third - party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell - Ewald ’ s motion to dismiss was denied, the Navy offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell - Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez ’ s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district judge denied the motion, and Campbell - Ewald moved for summary verdict based on the argument that the company sought derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The you. S. Court of Appeals from the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell - Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been used in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects."
554,Benjamin Robers,United States,"Benjamin King was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan [UNK] misrepresenting his income and his desire to live in the house and repay the [UNK] allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and he sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise. After government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically ( wired ) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ( MVRA ) in the amount of $ 218, 952. 18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan and the resale amount from each house that was foreclosed ( the offset value ). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation ; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should had been used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, vacated attorney fees and "" other expenses "" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum."
447,"William G. Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al.","John Aaron, et al.","The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Beginning February 20, 1968, five months after the integration crisis involving the Little Rock Nine, members of the school board ( along with the Superintendent of Schools ) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, urging suspension of its plan on desegregation. The relief that plaintiffs requested was for the African American children should be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The district court granted that school board's request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed."
620,Suitum,Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,"Bernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to ""Transferable Development Rights"" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite ""final decision"" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication."
640,Samuel Ocasio,United States,"Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Majestic). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio’s conviction."
587,Abigail Noel Fisher,"University of Texas at Austin, et al.","Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas'Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in - state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the school considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University ’ s admissions process was constitutional, and the u. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went against the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny doctrine to the University ’ s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court ’ s decision by stating that the University of Texas s uses of race as a consideration in the admissions process was not narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of preserving educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny."
642,Samuel Ocasio,United States,"Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was charged In connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop ( Majestic ). The prosecution charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing they unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from employees. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to arrange extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the scheme, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio ′ s convictions."
1169,"Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.","United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt","The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $ 60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees that would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a request, it did ultimately win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts — including forgery, deception, and threats — to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $ 1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract without bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup. Several years later, in 2010, federal agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about her role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt told the agents about the contractors ’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with several crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a, tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act ( FCA ), 31 you. S. C. § § 3729 – 33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt ’ s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt ’ s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 you. S. C. § 3731 ( b ) ( 1 ), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of ( 1 ) “ 6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed ” or ( 2 ) “ 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances …. ” The district court granted the contractors ’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt ’ s claim would be time - barred. Reviewing the district court ’ s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt ( the relator ) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim."
258,Hawaii Housing Authority,Midkiff,"After extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in real property could be taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the Act."
1471,National Meat Association,"Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, et al.","The National Meat Association contends that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents California from imposing its requirements on federally inspected slaughterhouses. In 2008, the state enacted the law after the Humane Society of the United States released a video of so-called downer cows being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with a forklift at a slaughterhouse. The California law bans slaughterhouses from buying or selling downer cows and from butchering them for human consumption. The measure also requires humane handling of the animals. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the law. Although the court said the humane-handling provision probably was pre-empted by federal law, the three-judge panel declined to block it, saying the trade group had not shown its members would suffer ""irreparable injury."""
882,"Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC","Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office","Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. ( Cuozzo ) owns the US patent, “ Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit, ” and Garmin International, Inc. ( Garmin ) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ( Board ) for inter partes review of claims regarding the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead of making plain and clear meaning of those claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, & 17 were identical. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term “ integrally attached ” regarding claim 14 on the components of the “ Speed Range Indicator. ” Cuozzo appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board ’ s finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation."
930,Price,Vincent,"During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
2185,Keith Tharpe,"Eric Sellers, Warden","Keith Tharpe was convicted in Georgia state court of the September 25, 1990 murder of his sister-in-law, Jacqueline Freeman. A jury sentenced him to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, an affidavit came to light in which a white juror from Tharpe’s trial, Barney Gattie, made several highly discriminatory statements regarding African Americans. Tharpe, who is black, sought habeas relief from the Butts County Superior Court, claiming that improper racial animus had influenced the jury’s deliberations. His petition was denied on the basis that he had procedurally defaulted by failing to raise the racial bias issue in earlier proceedings, and because he did not adequately support his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel was to blame for the omission. Juror testimony was also deemed inadmissible to prove Tharpe’s racial animus claim. He then applied for a certificate of probable because to appeal from the Georgia Supreme Court, and his application was denied. Tharpe next petitioned the US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 you.S.C. § 2254, alleging that racial bias among the jury had rendered his conviction and sentence unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The district court found this claim to be procedurally defaulted, but granted him a certificate of appeal (COA) on an ineffective assistance claim. The 11th Circuit then affirmed the district court’s judgment. Following the US Supreme Court’s 2017 decisions in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado and Buck v. Davis, Tharpe petitioned the district court under FRCP 60(b)(6) to reopen his § 2254 case. He argued that Pena-Rodriguez should apply retroactively, allowing him to present the juror testimony that had previously been deemed inadmissible, and ultimately overcome procedural default to prevail on his claim that improper racial animus had led to his conviction and sentence. The district court denied Tharpe’s motion, concluding, inter alia, that his claim was procedurally defaulted, and that he had failed to produce any clear evidence that Gattie’s statements had influenced the jury’s conclusions. The 11th Circuit affirmed, declining to issue a COA and stating that Tharpe had failed to show that the district court’s correctness was debatable with regard to its procedural ruling."
843,Jermaine Simmons et al. ,Walter J. Himmelreich,"Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging different causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was held in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act ( FTCA ) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his claims for failure to state a claim. Upon appeal, 29 you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 it. S. C. § 2676, that prohibits “ any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim. ” The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court ’ s judgment. It held that Himmelreich ’ s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the failure of Himmelreich ’ s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by another district court did not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 you. S. C § 2676."
413,"Baker Botts, LLP","ASARCO, LLC","Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $ 120 million in fees for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 with a settlement plan that would pay its creditors for full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker once more about $ 117 million to cover the fees in addition to $ 5 million for expenses incurred defending those fee claims. The district court affirmed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Florida Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $ 5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition."
632,Old Chief,United States,"Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was charged with violating federal law, 18 you. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer."
640,Gray,Maryland,"In 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word ""deleted"" or ""deletion"" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 you.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction."
1906,Michigan,Michael Mose Chesternut,"On December 19, 1984, Michael Mose Chesternut saw a police car approach him while one a routine patrol, so he ran. After the police caught up with him and drove alongside him for a short distance, they observed him discarding a number of packets. Assuming the packets contained cocaine, the police arrested Chesternut and, after a search of his person, discovered heroin and a hypodermic needle. Chesternut was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. The trial court dismissed the charge and concluded that Chesternut was unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Chesternut’s freedom was restricted as soon as the officers began their pursuit. Michigan appealed directly to the you.S. Supreme Court."
8,Sierra Club,"Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States","The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80 - acre ski resort. The creation of a proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that will run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits in the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it should be directly affected by the actions by the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the district court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case."
1327,Gregory Greer,United States,"In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C. § 922 ( g ), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “ punishable as an Armed Career Criminal ” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months ’ imprisonment. In 2015, the you. S. Supreme Court invalidated the “ residual clause ” of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral injury. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA ’ s enumerated - offenses clause, not the residual clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 you. S. C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they had a gun and that they knew he held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer ’ s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that his Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed no firearm. The Eleventh Circuit of in although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked, the entire trial record and Greer ’ s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review."
1199,Andre Martello Barton,"William P. Barr, Attorney General","A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B - 2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and acquitted of three felonies : aggravated assault, first - degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable ( deportable ) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of each. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 you. S. C. § 1229b ( a ), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other matters, the individual “ has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status. ” This residency requirement is subject to a “ stop - time rule ” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “ inadmissible ” or “ removable. ” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes trigger the time - stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop - time rule because as an already - admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “ rendered inadmissible ” within the meaning of § 1229b ( a ). The immigration judge ruled in the government ’ s favor, and in a non - precedential single -, decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals to the immigration judge ’ s decision. On the the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission ( or readmission ) to be “ rendered inadmissible. ”"
50,Reno,ACLU,"Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of ""obscene or indecent"" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes ""sexual or excretory activities or organs"" in a manner deemed ""offensive"" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions."
234,"American Tobacco Company, et al.","John Patterson, et al.","American Tobacco Company operated two plants in Richmond, VA. Until 1963, both plants were segregated, and the better job opportunities were reserved for white employees. Between 1963 and 1968, the plants were officially desegregated, but the promotion policies were left mostly to the discretion of the supervisors. The best jobs continued to go to the white employees. In November 1968, the company proposed nine new lines of employment progression that linked bottom jobs with the top job a worker could eventually receive. Four of the lines linked majority-white bottom jobs with majority-white top jobs; two of the lines linked majority-black bottom jobs with majority-black top jobs. The top jobs for the majority-white progression lines were the best jobs in the factories. On January 3, 1969, John Patterson and two other employees filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1973, alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act, the employees sued the company in district court . The district court held that the lines of progression violated the Act and prohibited the company from using them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the remedy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaints by arguing that the seniority system was exempt from the Civil Rights Act. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision because that the lines of progression are not a seniority system. The Court of Appeals also held that the immunity for seniority systems only extends to those in place before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act."
584,"Dollar General Corporation, et al.","Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.","Dollar General Corporation ( Dollar General ) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Nation ( Tribe ). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13 - year - old member of the Tribe claimed that he was sexually molested by the business manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at the store as part for an internship program that the Tribe runs and for which the Townsend agreed to participate. In 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the motion for Townsend, not for Dollar General because the company had failed to overcome its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1213,Sprint/United Management Company,Ellen Mendelsohn,"During a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not parties to the case is sometimes called ""me, too"" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the ""same supervisor"" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her. The jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the ""same supervisor"" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the ""me, too"" testimony was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had denied Mendelsohn an opportunity to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of ""me, too"" testimony."
328,Ford,Wainwright,"In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
1076,Ivan Eberhart,United States,"Ivan Eberhart was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. He filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial on the last day available for post-trial motions. Eberhart claimed that a flaw in the transcript published to the jury provided the basis for his motion. Six months later, he filed a “supplemental memorandum” alleging two additional grounds for his motion: the admission of potential hearsay testimony into evidence, and the district court’s failure to give a “buyer-seller instruction” to the jury. The district court granted Eberhart’s motion for a new trial. However, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which states that a motion for a new trial that is not based on new evidence must be filed within seven days of the verdict. Because Eberhart filed after the seven-day deadline, a new trial could not be granted."
1991,United States,Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,"The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a weapons manufacturer, sold fighter planes and bombers to Bolivia during the Chaco War, during which Paraguay and Bolivia contested control of a semi-arid region. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which banned you.S. weapons manufacturers from aiding either side of the war. Challenging its indictment, Curtiss-Wright argued that Congress had violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the executive branch to make decisions that were properly left to the legislature."
794,"W. A. Gayle, Mayor of Montgomery",Aurelia Browder,"While the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a boycott of the racially diverse bus system in Montgomery Alabama, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP challenged racial segregation on the bus system in the federal courts. This case arose in federal court as a violation of Reconstruction - era Civil rights statutes and was a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A two - judge district court held that law enforcement of the segregated but privately owned bus network in Montgomery violated its Equal Protection Clause. The district appealed again to the Supreme Court."
568,Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark,"William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al.","In 2001, Heidi Heffron - Clark inherited her $ 300, 000 individual retirement account ( IRA ) from his mother's estate. The you. S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs which are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions from the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband ( the "" Clarks "" ), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was derived from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an individual retirement fund under Section 522 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. Because all Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject to creditor claims during the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
565,Wood,Bartholomew,"Dwayne Bartholomew was convicted in a Washington state court of murder during a robbery. Bartholomew admitted the robbery, but claimed the victim was killed accidentally. At trial, Bartholomew's brother Rodney testified that Bartholomew had told them of his robbery plans and his intent to leave no witnesses. The prosecution never disclosed that Rodney's responses to questions about the robbery and murder weapon, during a pretrial polygraph examination, indicated deception. Bartholomew filed for federal habeas, claiming that because the polygraph results were material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 you.S. 83, which provides that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state prosecutor is required to disclose material evidence favorable to an accused, the prosecution's failure to disclose them justified setting aside the conviction. The District Court denied the writ. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the polygraph results, although inadmissible under Washington law, were material under Brady because they may have given Bartholomew's counsel known of the results a stronger reason to investigate Rodney's story."
1555,United States,Gary Woods et al.,"In 1999, Gary Woods and Billy McCombs became investors in two partnerships. Those partnerships then transferred their assets to a corporation that was jointly owned by Woods and McCombs, which caused the partnerships to be considered liquidated for tax purposes. Because the value of a liquidated asset is equal to the partner's basis in the investment, the partnerships reported their losses on their tax reports as equal to the purchased options Woods' and McCombs' separate companies originally contributed to the partnerships. After conducting an audit, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the partnership transactions served no business purpose and were solely for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore they had no legal basis and the IRS did not consider the partnerships valid. The IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties for understatements of income and gross valuation misstatements. In 2005, Woods (as the tax matters representative for the partnership) brought the matter before a district court and argued that penalties were inappropriate because the tax consequences of the transactions were accurately reported. The district court held that the transactions ""lacked economic substance"" and that their reported losses should be disregarded. The court also held that, because the transactions had no economic substance, the valuation misstatement penalties did not apply. The United States appealed the decision with regard to the valuation misstatement penalties, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling."
92,"Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.",Henson,"Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform - based insecticide. When he successfully intervened in a court action, Price v. Ciba - Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed a state court claim. Although the ensuing decision in Price stipulated that his state - judicial action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court over its All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state - court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating this dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly permit removal of the state - court action."
920,"Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","David Harris, et al.","After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for you.S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a “Black Voting Age Population” (BVAP) of 50% plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50%, which meant that there were two more majority-black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. David Harris and Christine Bowser are you.S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act’s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters’ influence in other districts. The district court determined that race was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause."
1805,Afroyim,Rusk,"After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall ""lose"" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari."
923,"Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","David Harris, et al.","After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the East Carolina federal legislature appointed House or Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for you. S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees hired a redistricting consultant to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally ; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a “ Black Voting Age Population ” ( BVAP ) of 50 % plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50 %, which meant that there were two more majority - black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new system and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. David Harris and Christine Bowser are you. S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and claimed that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act's requirements for a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters ’ influence in other districts. The district court determined that race remained the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause."
324,"Clifton Sandifer, et al.",United States Steel Corporation,"Workers at the United Steel Corporation launched a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the employer to compensate them for times spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent "" changing clothes. "" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district attorney granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in regard to compensation for transit time. The company appealed, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate their employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations."
346,"Asahi Metal Company, Ltd.","Superior Court of California, Solano County","On September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding. Asahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a ""stream of commerce"" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California."
856,Kelly,South Carolina,"After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a ""butcher,"" ""bloody,"" and ""dangerous."" Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 you.S. 154, that when ""a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'"" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue."
12,Morrissey,Brewer,"On January 4, 1967, John J. Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions in Iowa state courts between June 1969 and August 1969, but soon exhausted his state remedies. On September 12, 1969, Morrissey filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable because. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted Morrissey’s application and appointed counsel to represent Morrissey on appeal. On April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district court dismissed all of Booher’s petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable because in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher. Neither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man’s parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 en banc ruling."
1079,"Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.","Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.","Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed diseases because they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturer of “ bare metal ” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos - containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both proven and strict limits. The defendant then removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors ’ injuries because they put their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs ’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright - line as opposed to the fact - specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgement on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict limit claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court ’ s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos - related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer ’ s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact - specific standard rather than the bright - line rule."
274,"Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers","Pat Quinn, in his official capacity as governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31","Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in - home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of The Illinois Department of Human Services ( Disabilities Program ). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services ( Rehabilitation Program ). In 2003, The majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included its "" fair share "" provision, which required all personal assistants who are considered union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership after 2009. In 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share provisions violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'lawsuit. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court noted that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and also held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe of judicial review."
2208,United States of America,"Victor J. Stitt, II","In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony. In a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are “the same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.” If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as ACCA predicate offenses."
814,Bank Markazi,"Deborah Peterson, et al.","Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to seek judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank ( Bank Markazi ) owned nearly $ 2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of and stated, “ [ T ] he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution … in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages received against Iran for damages in personal injury or death caused by an act of [ terrorism ]. ” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 prohibited the United States ’ separation of arms because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1792,"Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General et al.","Morgan, et ux",New York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
1054,Herman Avery Gundy,United States,"Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving the sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 you. S. C. § 2013, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act ( SORNA ), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as any sex offender. She was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the you. S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to one question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the you. S. Attorney General under 16 you. S. C. § 16913 to impose the law ’ s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted."
2155,Beverly R. Gill,William Whitford,"In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican majority in the state assembly and the senate, and a Republican governor. As a result, the Republican leadership developed a voting district map that its drafters calculated would allow Republicans to maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario. The redistricting plan was introduced in July 2011, and both the senate and the assembly passed the bill shortly thereafter. The governor signed the bill into law in August 2011. Even before it was enacted, the plan faced two legal challenges, on constitutional and statutory grounds. A federal court upheld the plan as not violating the “one person one vote” principle nor violating the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs in this case challenge the plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. At issue is whether the plan systematically dilutes the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide."
2339,"Douglas Brownback, et al.",James King,"Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges. King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim. The district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity."
881,"Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC","Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office","Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. ( Cuozzo ) owns the 074 patent, “ Speed Limit Indicator, Method of Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit, ” and Garmin International, Inc. ( Garmin ) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ( Board ) for inter partes review of claims regarding the term. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretations when reviewing patent claims instead of the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 13, 14, and 17 were unconstitutional. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 13, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request "" applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term “ integrally attached ” regarding claim 14 on the components of the “ Speed Limit Indicator. ” Cuozzo appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it has authority to review the Board ’ the finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation."
1033,"KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.","Lasting Impression I, Inc., et al.","Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term ""micro colors."" Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the ""classic fair use defense"" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling."
363,Hazelwood School District,Kuhlmeier,"The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court."
393,Ward,Rock Against Racism,"New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression."
151,Allied Structural Steel Company,Spannaus,"In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions."
1621,"Alabama Democratic Conference, et al.","Alabama, et al.","The Voting Rights Act of 1965 focuses on preserving the equal representation of voters in different legislative voting districts. In 2012, the Alabama legislature redrew Alabama’s electoral districts with the goal of creating districts with a population deviation of only 1%, as opposed to the 5% courts traditionally allow when evaluating redistricting efforts. Alabama also tried to maintain the existing percentage of minority voters in each electoral district. Petitioners sued in district court and argued that Alabama’s redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act and amounted to racial gerrymandering that had negative impacts on the equal representation of racial minorities in multiple electoral districts. The district court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that Alabama used race as a “dominant and controlling” factor in redrawing its electoral districts and also that Alabama’s goal of maintaining the minority population percentages in existing districts was “narrowly tailored” to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to address the district court’s application of existing legal principles."
82,"J.B. O'Connor, M.D.",Kenneth Donaldson,"On January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for “a few weeks”. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years. When Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O’Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O’Connor was also Donaldson’s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson’s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O’Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation. In February 1971, Donaldson charged O’Connor and other members of the hospital’s staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and Gumanis. O’Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court rejected O’Connor’s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O’Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants’ reasonable belief that Donaldson’s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions."
440,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.",Board of Education of Topeka,"After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems."
871,"United States, et al.","Texas, et al.","In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ( DACA ) program, complete with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose whether to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ( DAPA ) program. Texas and other states tried to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act as it had not gone through the notice - and - comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held both the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notices - and - comment claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states'standing as well as a substantial likelihood of successes on their substantive and procedural claims."
1244,"John D. Ashcroft, Former Attorney General, et al.",Javaid Iqbal et al.,"In the aftermath of September 11th, the FBI arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into the attacks. One of these men, Javaid Iqbal, was classified as being a ""high interest"" detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal claims that during his detention he was segregated from the rest of the prison population and mistreated in several ways, including confinement to a cell for 23 hours a day where he had blinding light shone on him constantly and air conditioning pumped into the cell even during the winter months. After being released, Iqbal brought a suit against representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and FBI alleging 21 violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on his treatment while confined. These defendants argued that they should be protected from the suit in their official governmental roles through qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and rejected the qualified immunity defense. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on all counts but one for violation of the right to due process. The Second Circuit noted that the actions taken by the government occurred in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and therefore created a unique context in which Iqbal's claims had to be reviewed. Even with these circumstances, however, the court felt that the qualified immunity defense could protect the government only from the due process claim. The ""serious allegations of gross mistreatment"" were enough to sustain the remaining counts."
787,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel, et al.","Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.","This case follows the series of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D. C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied appeal in the lower courts, on Plessy J. Ferguson, which held only racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. ( This was known as the “ separate but equally ” doctrine. )"
452,David Riggins,Nevada,"On November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. Dr. Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed."
2126,"Town of Chester, New York","Laroe Estates, Inc.","Land developer Steve Sherman sued the Town of Chester (Chester) and alleged a regulatory taking of his property because Chester prevented him from developing his land by requiring unfair and repetitive procedures. While that case was pending, a real estate company, Laroe Estates, Inc. (Laroe), sought to intervene in the case and claimed that it currently owned the property in question based on an initial 2003 agreement and a subsequent one in 2013. In 2013, TD Bank, which held a superior mortgage on the property, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Laroe and Sherman then entered into a new sales agreement that took the foreclosure proceedings into account, but TD Bank took possession of the property. The district court denied Laroe’s motion to intervene because Laroe was not the owner of an interest in the property at the time of the alleged taking and therefore lacked independent standing in the takings claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under Article III of the you.S. Constitution, Laroe was not required to show it independently had standing to intervene. The appellate court reasoned that the Second Circuit case United States Postal Service v. Brennan, which held that there is no need to impose a standing requirement on an intervenor if there is an established valid case or controversy, applied in this case."
1700,"Arthur Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare",Ephram Nestor,"Ephram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and became eligible for old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court."
743,Carmell,Texas,"Scott Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review."
100,South Dakota,Opperman,"The respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment."
1315,Florida,Kevin Dewayne Powell,"Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to ""talk with an attorney"" is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present."
381,Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury,Brian Wynne et ux.,"Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. ( Maxim ), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is "" passed through "" to its owners, and the profits are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed property tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax credit had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that their tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes. The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that this limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes'argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by any county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held on the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who, income exclusively in Maryland while the to covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland."
954,"Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed - wire fence on the you. S. side of it and went running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a you. S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez ’ and friends at the you. S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing near the you. S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the head and killed him. Six months after Hernandez ’ s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the you. S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to speak of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution ’ s deadly - force protections stop at the border for non - citizens like Hernandez. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The district court also held that Mesa was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was, Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed."
395,"City of Dallas, et al.",Charles M. Stanglin,"The city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association."
1790,Hanna Mining Company,"District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO","Hanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were ""supervisors"" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be ""employees."" The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing. Hanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB."
19,United States,Allen H. Generes and Edna Generes,"In 1954, Allen Generes and his son-in-law William Kelly formed Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc. Generes and Kelly each owned 44% of the stock, with the remaining 12% owned by Generes’ son and another son-in-law. Generes was the president of the corporation and did not deal with the day-to-day running of the business. In addition to his position as president, he held another full-time position as the president of a savings and loan association. In 1958, Generes and Kelly signed an indemnity agreement for the corporation. In 1962, the corporation seriously underbid two contracts and went deeply into debt. Generes loaned the corporation money, but it went bankrupt, and he was unable to receive reimbursement. On his 1962 tax return, Generes claimed the money the corporation lost as business bad debt and his direct loans to the corporation as nonbusiness bad debt. He filed a claim for a refund on the business bad debt. This claim was the subject of a jury trial in which the jury was asked to determine whether Generes’ signing of the indemnity agreement was “proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee “of the corporation. The government requested a jury instruction to clarify that “significant” motivation satisfies the requirement, but the court refused and instructed the jury that “dominant” motivation was sufficient. The jury found in favor of Generes. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the significant motivation standard was acceptable."
1139,"Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",George W. Jackson,"In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt - collection action in a West Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank - issued credit card. In responding to Citibank ’ s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third - party class - action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems ( CWS ). In these third - party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems ; Jackson ’ s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims by Jackson. Home Depot filed the notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third - party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank. The district court denied Home Depot ’ s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “ two parties on the same side, ” and granted Jackson ’ s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “ defendant ” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because his purpose of realignment — to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction — was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA ’ s removal statute."
861,United States Army Corps of Engineers,"Hawkes Co., Inc., et al.","Hawkes Co., Inc. ( Hawkes ) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high - quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers ( Corps ) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and should take a longer time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination which derail Hawkes'plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “ lakes of the United States, ” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional decision was not a “ final agency action ” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The C. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final agency action and remanded that action for judicial review."
294,Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley,United States,"In 2005, a grand jury started investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury acquitted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was one criminal theft count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $ 500, 000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys. Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys sought to ignore the order because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the you. S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and appealed. On remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys'offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the lower court decided to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision."
1780,Leh,General Petroleum Corporation,"The Clayton Antitrust Act (""Clayton Act"") was enacted by Congress in 1914 to prevent anticompetitive practices in business. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act halted the running of the statute of limitations on pending claims arising from the act. It also specified a four-year statute of limitations for these causes of action. On September 28, 1956, Marc D Leh brought an action against General Petroleum Corportation and five other petroleum manufacturers alleging injury to his business caused by a conspiracy or combination to exclude Leh from engaging in wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California. He alleged that this conspiracy began in 1948; all parties agreed that Leh's right to initiate a because of action began in February of 1954. Leh anticipated a statute of limitations problem under California law, as California's Code of Civil Procedure specified a one-year statute of limitations for penal causes of action, in contrast to the Clayton Act's four-year limit. Hence, Leh cited to United States v. Standard Oil, in which the United States alleged a conspiracy to control prices among a nearly identical set of defendants and successfully applied the Clayton Act's longer limit. District court Judge William Mathes ruled in favor of General Petroleum, holding that the tripling of damages was a penalty, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations under California law. The court also held that the Clayton Act did not apply to the claim --distinguishing on the facts from Standard Oil -- primarily because Leh did not allege that the defendants combined to control prices, did not name the same set of defendants, and did not allege a similar period of conspiracy. Judge Stanley Barnes of the you.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. Judge Barnes affirmed the lower court's interpretation of California law, and that the application of the Clayton Act used in Standard Oil did not apply here because the facts were not similar enough to justify collateral estoppel."
119,Zacchini,Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company,"Hugo Zacchini performed a ""human cannonball"" act, in which he was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. A free-lance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recorded the performance in its entirety without consent and it aired on the nightly news. Subsequently, Zacchini sued Scripps-Howard, alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional property. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard. While recognizing that Zacchini had a because of action for the infringement of his state-law right to publicity, the court found that Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose."
1154,"Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office",Erik Brunetti,"Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “ fuct, ” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an end - to - use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2 ( a ) of a Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter ( The pronunciation of “ fuct ” sounds like a vulgar word ) in terms of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney ’ s refusal to register the mark. The US Court Of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in deciding that mark should be registered under Section 2 ( a ) of the Lanham Act, that state ’ s bar on both immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech."
137,Keith Lance et al.,"Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State","After the 2000 census, the you. S. Congress increased Colorado ’ s representation in the you. S. House of Representatives from six congressmen to seven. The Colorado state legislature failed to redraw the districts after the 2002 elections, so the state legislators redrew the districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district maps, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado State constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and therefore the courts ’ 2002 redistricting took precedence over the redistricting by the state legislature. Keith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district Courts and argued that the Colorado Supreme Court ’ s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I and the you. S. Constitution, and those individuals possessed First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file for redress of grievances. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction then dismissed the case. Lance appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue preclusion, since Lance was an individual citizen not directly affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court."
2254,Curtis Giovanni Flowers,State of Mississippi,"In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase. In the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders. Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 you.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986)."
1172,"Fort Bend County, Texas",Lois M. Davis,"Lois Davis was an information technology ( IT ) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department stating that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation of the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director ’ s resignation, her supervisor — who was a personal friend of the director — retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “ previous religious commitment, ” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “ intake questionnaire ” in which she wrote in the word “ religion ” next to a checklist labeled “ Employment Harms or Actions ” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her lawsuit but issued a right - to - sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of that county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination charge, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis ’ s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires v to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement ( which may be raised at any, and cannot be waived ) or merely a prerequisite to suit ( and thus subject to waiver ). Relying on the Supreme Court ’ s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 you. S. 500 ( 2006 ), in which the Court held that the Title VII ’ s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits."
207,Barion Perry,New Hampshire,"Jennifer Perry was in prison for breaking up her car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N. H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things from of a parked car. She identified Perry on the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was "" unnecessarily suggestive "" that he were a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction."
563,Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.,"CLS Bank International, et al.","Alice Corporation ( Alice ) is a Australian company that owns the'470,'510,'720, and'375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor. On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International ( CLS ) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non - infringement and invalidity of the'470,'510, or'720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims are drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the'375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include a patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that their asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court determined that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use in the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
43,United States,Richardson,"Richardson, a taxpayer interested in activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, sued the government to provide records detailing the CIA's expenditures."
1140,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections","Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan, aka Billy Patrick Wayne Hill","Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of first degree murder. During sentencing, Landrigan's counsel attempted to call witnesses to testify to Landrigan's disadvantaged upbringing and good character. However, Landrigan opposed his lawyer's decision to present this mitigating evidence, and the witnesses were never called. Landrigan was sentenced to death. He appealed, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. Landrigan claimed that he had wanted the lawyer to present mitigating evidence showing Landrigan's genetic predisposition to violence. After state courts rejected the claim as frivolous, Landrigan filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court ruled against Landrigan, but he finally prevailed in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the high degree of deference to state courts required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court had been unreasonable to uphold Landrigan's death sentence. Landrigan's lawyer should have presented the mitigating evidence, the Court ruled, and the omission had rendered counsel ineffective."
112,"E.C. Dothard, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Alabama ",Dianne Rawlinson et al.,"Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in “contact positions” that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The you.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The you.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal."
2279,State of Kansas,Charles Glover,"While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws. Glover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. The state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop."
1178,"Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools",Aileen Rizo,"The facts giving rise to this case were not immediately relevant to the issue in which the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, the employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, filed a lawsuit against the superintendent of schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of the Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with no new, purportedly binding interpretation of the statute. Judge Reinhardt died before he had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it was officially filed. Without Judge Baker, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on the judgment but not the reasoning."
881,City of Los Angeles,"Alameda Books, Inc.","Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime."
1597,"Ron Davis, Acting Warden",Hector Ayala,"Hector Ayala, a Hispanic man, was charged with three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder stemming from a failed robbery. During jury selection for his trial in California state court, the prosecution used seven preemptory challenges to exclude each black or Hispanic prospective juror. Ayala challenged the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges as a violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In accordance with Batson, if a party can make a prima facie showing that preemptory challenges are being used in a racially motivated way, the other party must give a non-racially motivated reason for their use of the preemptory challenges. The state court allowed the prosecution to give their non-racially motivated reasons in a closed hearing, from which Ayala and his attorneys were excluded, and subsequently found the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges was not racially motivated. Ayala was not given the prosecution's reasoning or a transcript of the meeting until after the conclusion of his trial. Additionally, after the trial it was discovered that the vast majority of the questionnaires all the potential jurors had to fill out had been lost. Ayala was found guilty of the majority of the charges against him and sentenced to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court found that the state court erred in excluding Ayala from the Batson hearing, but that error as well as the loss of the questionnaires were harmless, and therefore upheld Ayala's conviction. Ayala appealed to the you.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that the Batson hearing procedure and loss of the questionnaires violated his constitutional rights. In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the appellate court found that the California Supreme Court had not adjudicated Ayala's claims of federal constitutional violations on the merits largely on the basis that the California Court had determined the procedure used for the Batson hearing violated California state law; therefore the appellate court reviewed Ayala's claims de novo and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing, as well as the loss of the questionnaires, violated Ayala's constitutional rights. To determine whether the errors were harmless, the Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson , which asked whether the errors had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury's verdict, and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing deprived him of the ability to prevail on a compelling Batson challenge."
596,United States,Gonzales,"Miguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms."
283,Chadbourne and Parke LLP,Samuel Troice et al.,"In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ( PSLRA ), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state law to order to get around the restrictions of competition, Congress enacted the Securities and Uniform Standards Act ( SLUSA ), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with the "" covered security. "" The term "" covered security "" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) dismissed the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of "" covered securities. "" The district court held because the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because its was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement plan, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as "" covered "" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal."
680,National Endowment for the Arts,Finley,"The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: ""artistic and cultural significance,"" with emphasis on ""creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence,"" and the encouragement of ""public education and appreciation of the arts."" In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider ""artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."" After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari."
322,"Clifton Sandifer, et al.",United States Steel Corporation,"Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company alleging that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and their transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent "" Changing clothes. "" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to delays in changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time. The company appealed, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for a Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for both the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations."
537,Tuggle,Netherland,"Lem Tuggle was convicted of murder. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of his future dangerousness, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Tuggle to death. Subsequently, the you.S. Supreme Court remanded the case under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 you.S. 68, which held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but upheld the death sentence based on the vileness aggravator under Zant v. Stephens, 462 you.S. 862. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld based on one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid."
1097,Washington State Department of Licensing,"Cougar Den, Inc.","Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "" the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways. "" Cougar Den is a Yakama - owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to distribute to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $ 3. 6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department ’ s ALJ found that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department ’ s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order but ruled that it violated the tribe ’ s right for travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue protects members from taxes or state fees from commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, The Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling : this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "" any trade, traveling, and importation "" by members of the Yakama tribe “ that requires the use of public roads, ” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state ’ s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes."
564,Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.,"CLS Bank International, et al.","Alice Corporation ( Alice ) is an Australian company that owns the'479,'510,'720, and'375 patents, all of which have to do with a global trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party for the guarantor. On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International ( CLS ) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non - infringement and invalidity of the'479,'510, and'720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed appeals, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the'375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For other purposes of these motions, the district court assumed the all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and issued summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
558,Republic of Argentina,"NML Capital, Ltd.","During an financial crisis in 2001, The Republic of Argentina ( Argentina ) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One foreign bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. ( NML ), later prevailed with several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling greater than US $ 5 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the actions against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to enforce the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( FSIA ) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection under NML. The district court ordered the banks to comply with the subpoena requests. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the FSIA did not apply to the subpoena because it was a discovery order directed at commercial entities that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity."
146,Paul A. McDaniel,"Selma Cash Paty, et al.","Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute."
210,"Esther Kiobel, et al.","Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.","The she will Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the she will Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross-appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners' request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a because of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."
968,Robert James Tennard,"Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","Robert Tennard was convicted of murder. During the sentencing phase, he presented evidence that he had an IQ of 67. The instructions given to the jury by the judge when it was considering whether to apply the death penalty, however, did not account for this - they instructed they jury to determine whether the crime was committed deliberately and whether Tennard posed a future risk. Under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 you.S. 302, those instructions are not enough to allow the jury to weigh a defendant's mental retardation in his favor. After he was sentenced to death, Tennard filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming that the sentence, given the shortcomings of the jury instructions, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The district court rejected the petition. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Tennard had no shown that his mental retardation was constitutionally relevant. To be constitutionally relevant, Tennard's retardation would have had to be responsible for his crime, and Tennard had not shown that this was the case. After the Supreme Court decided, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 you.S. 304, that executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its holding. It affirmed the decision on the grounds that execution was only unconstitutional if the defendant could show that his mental retardation had actually caused the crime; being mentally retarded in and of itself did not exempt someone from the death penalty."
282,Chadbourne and Parke LLP,Samuel Troice et al.,"In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ( PSLRA ), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ( SLUSA ), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit suit against more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a "" covered security. "" The term "" covering securities "" was applied to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others of Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of "" covered securities. "" The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least two of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, possibly a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as "" covered "" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal."
281,Chadbourne and Parke LLP,Samuel Troice et al.,"In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ( PSLRA ), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ( SLUSA ), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a "" covered security. "" The term "" covered securities "" was given to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange and issued by a federally registered investment company. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved the dismiss the complaints from SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation on "" covered securities. "" The trial court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a clear connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as "" covered "" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal."
29,Edward Malley and Rhode Island,James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs,"In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made references to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs ’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two contacts, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented before a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs ’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 15, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped. The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley petitioned for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The trial court held as it was judge ’ s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “ objectively reasonable'basis to believe that the alleged facts was sufficient to establish probable because for an arrest warrant."
525,Florida Bar,Went For It Inc.,"Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster."
538,Supreme Court of Virginia,Friedman,"Susan Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired by a lobbying firm located at the state capital Virginia. Virginia law made permanent membership a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned away, her claim was upheld in federal district Court."
339,Richard Pope and Charles Morrison,Illinois,"In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California and established a three-prong test for determining whether material is obscene. The test asks whether the material in question appeals to a prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” On July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois’ obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review."
2145,Carlos Manuel Ayestas,"Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Institutional Division)","In July 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, a Honduran national, was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Santiaga Paneque at her home in Houston, Texas. Ayestas appealed his conviction and filed for state habeas relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; he argued that his trial counsel failed to secure the testimony of family members who could have presented mitigating evidence. The state habeas court found that Ayestas’ trial attorney was not ineffective and denied his application for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the findings of the state habeas court and denied relief as well. In 2009, Ayestas, with a new attorney, filed a federal habeas petition and claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would have uncovered “available and abundant” mitigating factors. However, the district court found that his claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised in the state habeas proceeding and denied relief. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court subsequently decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim may excuse a procedural default. The Supreme Court later extended the holding of Martinez to Texas’ habeas scheme in Trevino v. Thaler. In light of these decisions, Ayestas asked for a rehearing. On rehearing in the district court, Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance that was “reasonably necessary” to develop his broader ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 18 you.S.C. § 3599(f). The district court denied the motion based on Fifth Circuit precedent that holds that investigative assistance is not “reasonably necessary” unless the habeas petitioner can carry the ultimate burden of proof on the underlying claim at the time of the request for investigative assistance. The district court determined that Ayestas could not meet his burden of proof on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and therefore denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed."
758,Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,Samara Bros. Inc.,"Samara Brothers, Inc. designs and manufactures a line of children's clothing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., contracted with a supplier, Judy-Philippine, Inc. (JPI), to manufacture outfits based on photographs of Samara garments and to be offered under Wal-Mart's house label, ""Small Steps."" When JPI manufactured the clothes, it copied sixteen of Samara's garments with some small modifications to produce the line of clothes required under its contract with Wal-Mart. After discovering that Wal-Mart and other retailers were selling the so-called knockoffs, Samara brought an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946. The jury found for Samara and awarded the company more than $1 million in damages. Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Samara's clothing designs could be legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of section 43(a). The District Court denied the motion and awarded Samara relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and concluded that ""copyrights depicting familiar objects, such as the hearts, daisies, and strawberries in Samara's copyrights are entitled to very narrow protection. It is only the virtually identical copying...which will result in a successful claim of infringement of familiar objects."""
518,"Sue Evenwel, et al.","Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al.","The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2000 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three - judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this new plan exceeded the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2010 primary elections that was subsequently adopted or signed into law. Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts don't adhere to the'one person, one vote'principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in that Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in proportion to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted no jurisdiction on the appeal."
1062,"Margaret Bradshaw, Warden",John David Stumpf,"In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed."
591,Antoine Bruce,"Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al.","Several inmates housed in the Special Management Unit ( SMU ) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gang - affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons ( BOP ) officials and claimed that this violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang - affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival gangs. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The prisoners then engaged in extensive back - and - forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and an ability to other prisoners to testify in the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay some percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees."
177,"Mohawk Industries, Inc.",Norman Carpenter,"In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia Federal district court. He argued that he is fired, not for following company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter claimed that after filing his report, the Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to employ illegal immigrants. Before trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney - client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney - client privilege did not qualify for exception."
1723,United States,Borden Company,"The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under a plan that gave independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores. The government brought a Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States appealed the District Court's decision."
152,City of Philadelphia,New Jersey,"A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most ""solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."""
1001,"Cyan, Inc., et. al.","Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.","Since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims filed under that statute. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state court securities class action, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect that limitation on state court claims. Beaver County Employees'Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California superior court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercise subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts remain split as to whether state Courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege in 1933 Act claims."
2158,"Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.; and Jack C. Phillips",Colorado Civil Rights Commission; Charlie Craig; and David Mullins,"In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages. Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable because, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA. The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling."
345,Arizona State Legislature,"Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC). In 2012, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution."
659,Philip and Mendes Cohen,Virginia,"An act of Congress prohibited the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D. C. lottery tickets to neighboring state West Virginia, violating state rules. State authorities arrested and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be "" final arbiters of disputes between the states and our national government."
81,Nevada Department of Human Resources,Hibbs,"William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care of his wife through the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( FMLA ). The FMLA requires an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "" serious medical condition "" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks'FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA laws creating a private right of action "" against any authority "" that "" interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of "" FMLA rights, lawyers sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for the violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals disagreed."
325,"John Moran, Superintendent of the Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections ",Brian K. Burbine,"Brian Burbine was arrested for burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights and held for questioning. At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine’s sister called the local Public Defender’s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him. At trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The you.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer’s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights."
628,"Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.","Greg Manning, et al.","The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. ( Escala ), and the defendants are a group of financial investors that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in their short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs ’ shares to decline market value and violate their voting rights. The plaintiffs ’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 rule that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to bring the case back to state court, but the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs ’ immunity. The trial court disagreed, and the issue went to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be brought in state court."
402,Department of Homeland Security,Robert J. MacLean,"In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration ( TSA ) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the US public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and some members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This report was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from this position. MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Aircraft Systems Protection Board ( Board ) and argued that his acts were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act ( WPA ). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited in law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA."
1356,Thomas Carr,United States,"An Indiana federal district court convicted Thomas Carr of violating the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act. The Act imposes penalties on anyone who is a convicted sex offender, and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly fails to register as a sex offender, unless he proves that ""uncontrollable circumstances"" prevented him from doing so. On appeal, Carr argued that he did not violate the act because he traveled before the Act was passed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act does not require that the defendant's travel postdate its enactment, and, consequently, affirmed the district court."
98,Federal Power Commission,Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation,"Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (TGPL) proposed a plan for gas allocation among its customers to deal with a gas shortage. Under the plan, customers who used over the system-wide average would have to pay extra, and those who used less would receive a rebate. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) rejected the plan, stating it violated the Natural Gas Act, which prohibits discrimination among customers. The TGPL sought review of the FPC decision in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court directed the FPC to conduct a review of TGPL’s records to determine the extent of the gas shortage. The FPC refused, arguing that the court overstepped its bounds by interfering with an independent administrative agency. The FPC also argued that the extent of the gas shortage was not material to the issues in the litigation."
1056,Denard Stokeling,United States of America,"In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was in overcoming victim resistance. ” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome the resistance. Stokeling also contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “ violent felonies'in the context of the sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( e ), because those convictions did not require a violent use of violence. The district attorney ruled with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling ’ s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal."
1210,"Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al.","Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.","The Indiana legislature passed two laws at issue in this case. The first related to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and pathological waste, thereby preventing abortion providers from incinerating fetal remains with surgical byproducts. The law also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, which Indiana law does not allow for human remains. The second provision of Indiana law barred the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky challenged the laws on constitutional grounds but notably did not make the argument that either law burdened a fundamental right."
1148,"Jay F. Hein, Director, White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, et al.","Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., et al.","Shortly after taking office, President Bush created by executive order the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, a program aimed at allowing religious charitable organizations to compete alongside non-religious ones for federal funding. Another executive order instructed various executive departments to hold conferences promoting the Faith-Based Initiative. The Freedom from Religion Foundation sued, alleging that the conferences favored religious organizations over non-religious ones and thereby violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government argued that there was no ""Case or Controversy"" as required by Article III of the Constitution. According to the government, the Foundation had no standing to sue, because the Foundation had not been harmed in any way by the conferences. The fact that an individual pays taxes to the federal government is not normally enough to give the individual standing to challenge a federal program, but the Foundation noted that exceptions have been made for Establishment Clause challenges (see Flast v. Cohen and Bowen v. Kendrick ). The District Court ruled that the Foundation lacked standing to sue. The court held that the exceptions only covered challenges to specific congressional expenditures, not executive-branch actions funded by the general funds allotted to the executive departments. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that any taxpayer has standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against an executive-branch program, whether funded by a specific congressional grant or by a discretionary use of a general appropriation."
3,Dunn,Blumstein,"A Tennessee law required a one - year residence in the state and a three - month residency within the territory, a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a Princeton graduate who had recently moved into Tennessee, challenged the law by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal circuit court."
686,United States,E. C. Knight Company,"The Congress enacted the Sherman Anti - Trust Act in 1890 as a response to growing public concern for economic growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "" every enterprise, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade "" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part in trade or commerce must be illegal. The E. C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar - refining business in the United States."
1782,Harper,Virginia Board of Elections,"Virginia resident Annie Harper could not pay the state-imposed poll tax of $1.50. She filed suit, alleging the poll tax deprived indigent Virginia residents of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court dismissed her claim, based in part on a 1937 decision by the you.S. Supreme Court that had ruled poll taxes to be within the powers of the states."
56,"Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO","Henry M. Austin, et al.","In the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the Branch’s monthly newsletter published a list of those who had not yet joined the union under the heading “List of Scabs.” After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed."
522,City of Lakewood,Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,"Plain Dealer also cited the constitutionality of another Lakewood city ordinance that permitted its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by him, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor must provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him To subject all permit approvals to whatever "" terms and conditions "" which he "" deemed necessary and reasonable. "" On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's motion for certiorari."
1030,Bell,Cone,"In 1984 a Tennessee court sentenced Cone to death for murder. The jury had found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the murder was ""especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."" Cone's state appeals were unsuccessful. A federal district court then rejected Cone's habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The you.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bell v. Cone (2002). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed Cone's sentence on the ground that the ""especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment."
1791,Miranda,Arizona,"This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation. On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel."
971,California Public Employees' Retirement System,"ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.","Before it was bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $ 31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees ’ Retirement System ( CPERS ), the largest pension fund in the country, acquired millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial allegations were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify their lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund ’ s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims suit against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing of a later lawsuit claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed."
32,Leon Chambers,Mississippi,"Leon Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman. Another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the murder, in addition to confession to third parties, and was taken into custody. One month later, McDonald denied the confession and was released from custody. At trial, Chambers tried to prove McDonald admitted to the crime several times and confessed to third parties. The district court found the evidence of the confessions was inadmissible because of the voucher rule – a common-law rule that prohibits the defense from cross-examining a witness when the prosecution failed to do so – and the fact that the statements were hearsay. Chambers’ appealed and argued that the district court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to admit the evidence."
978,"Joseph Jesner, et al.","Arab Bank, PLC","Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC ( Arab Bank ), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute ( ATS ), which provides for a district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ′ s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS could not authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the you. S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court felt the ’ holding was without controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court ’ the decision did cast some doubt over the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question on corporate liability, the appellate court affirmed the lower court ’ s dismissal."
588,Abigail Noel Fisher,"University of Texas at Austin, et al.","Abigail Fisher, a white female, tried for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas'Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to its top ten percent of every in - state graduating high school class. For the bright spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the First Amendment. The district court held that the University ’ s admissions policies was constitutional, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which found that the appellate court erred by not applying the minimum scrutiny standard in the University ’ s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court ’ s decision by holding that the University of Texas ’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny."
678,Munn and Scott,Illinois,Illinois encourages grain elevators and farm operators by raising interest rates for their products.
2292,Comcast Corporation,"National Association of African American-Owned Media and Entertainment Studio Networks, Inc.","Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN. The district court dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for because of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with “white-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.” The Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc."
386,Consolidated Rail Corporation,Railway Labor Executives' Association,"On February 20, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation (""Conrail"") announced its decision to include drug screening in all periodic and return-to-duty examinations. Conrail had always enforced Rule G of its agreement with its unionized employees, which forbids the use or possession of ""intoxicants, narcotics, amphetamines or hallucinogens"" by its employees. Previously, it routinely used drug screening urinalysis as part of return-to-duty medical examinations of employees with drug-related problems and in other examinations where the examining physician suspected drug use. The Railway Labor Executives' Association (""RLEA"")-- comprised of individuals in leadership positions at more than eighteen craft unions-- filed suit against Conrail, alleging that Conrail violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act (""RLA""). The RLA, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934, created the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an arbitration board designed to settle minor disputes between railroad companies and labor organizations. Under Sections 5 and 6 of the RLA, major disputes require an extensive mediation and conciliation process. District court Judge Anthony J. Scirica found that the dispute was ""minor"" under the Railway Labor Act because Conrail's decision was arguably justified by the terms of its agreement with the unions, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the dispute. Judge Dolores Sloviter of the you.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's conclusion that Conrail's prior use of medical examinations arguably justified unilaterally changing its drug testing policy. The appeals court held that the dispute was ""major"" because it changed the terms and conditions governing employment relationships."
737,"Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc.",United States,"The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio-and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari."
1925,Susan B. Anthony List,Steven Driehaus,"Prior to the 2010 general election, Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List), a nonprofit, pro-life organization, announced that it intended to put up a billboard in the district of then-Congressman Steven Driehaus. The planned billboard would have asserted that Driehaus's vote in favor of the Affordable Care Act amounted to a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion. Citing threats of legal action by Driehaus's counsel, the company that owned the billboard space refused to put up the ad. Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA List violated Ohio's campaign laws by making false statements about his voting record. SBA List filed an action in federal district court arguing that the Ohio statutes infringed upon its rights to free speech and association under the First Amendment. Driehaus withdrew his complaint upon losing his bid for re-election and subsequently moved to Swaziland for an assignment with the Peace Corps. The district court dismissed the suit by SBA List for lack of standing and ripeness. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
609,Regents of University of California,Doe,"John Doe sued the University of California alleging that it had agreed to employ him at a laboratory it operated pursuant to a contract with the federal Department of Energy (DOE), and that it had wrongfully breached its agreement upon determining that he could not obtain a required security clearance. The university argued that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mr. Doe asserted that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to the case because any damages awarded would be paid by the DOE. The District Court held that the university was an arm of the state and therefore the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Mr. Doe from maintaining his breach-of-contract claim in federal court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision citing the university's agreement with the DOE, under which the department was liable for any judgments rendered against the university, not the state."
364,Lyng,Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,"The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng."
763,Bond,United States,"While checking the immigration status of passengers on a bus in Texas, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space. When Agent Cantu squeezed a canvas bag above Steven Dewayne Bond, Agent Cantu noticed that it contained a ""brick-like"" object. After Bond admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a ""brick"" of methamphetamine. Bond was indicted on federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search of his bag, when squeezing it, in alleged violation of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court denied the motion and subsequently found Bond guilty. On appeal, Bond conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag (by squeezing)in a way that other passengers would not, thus constituting an unreasonable search. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search under the Fourth Amendment."
645,Montana,Crow Tribe of Indians,"In 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the you.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The you.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed."
1847,Boyle et al.,Lawrence Landry et al.,"Plaintiffs, several African American residents of Chicago, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a number of Officials of Cook County and Chicago for the enforcement of a number of Illinois Statutes and Chicago ordinances prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and intimidation. Plaintiffs contended that the officials violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech by threatening enforcement of the statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the case in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A three-judge court upheld all of the statutes except for one subsection that prohibited ""the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act"" and one subsection a statute that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to commit any criminal offense. The court enjoined the officials from enforcing these two subsections. Defendants appealed the decision as to the intimidation statute."
1104,Keanu D.W. Ortiz,United States,"Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express permission from Congress before active - duty military officers may hold a "" civil office, ” including positions that require "" permanent appointment by The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. "" 10 you. S. C. § 973 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( ii ). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review ( CMCR ), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ( CCA ). A judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years'imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a motion for review with the Court of Appeals from the Armed Forces ( CAAF ), asking the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from serving on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's arguments. Note : This case was original consolidated as Dalmazzi v. United States ( 16 - 961 ), and the oral argument documents and transcripts can be found there."
1461,"Javier Cavazos, acting warden",Shirley Ree Smith,"On November 29, 1996, 7-week-old Etzel Glass died. Doctors initially attributed Etzel's death to sudden infant death syndrome. However, an autopsy conducted by a coroner concluded that the because of death was shaken baby syndrome (SBS). Shirley Ree Smith, Etzel's grandmother, stated that when Etzel had not responded to her touch she picked him up and gave him a little jostle. Smith was arrested and charged with assault on a child resulting in death. At Smith's trial, the jury heard seven days of expert medical testimony on the because of Etzel's death. The prosecutors offered three experts who each testified that Etzel's death was the result of shaken baby syndrome. The defense called two expert witnesses to dispute the conclusions. The jury found Smith guilty. Smith filed a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that the jury carefully weighed the tremendous amount of evidence. On direct review, Smith contended that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Etzel died from SBS. After reviewing the medical testimony, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, determining that where there was competing medical testimony it was for the jury to resolve the conflicts. Smith appealed to the California Supreme Court, which denied review. Smith subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the evidence against her was insufficient. The District Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court's opinion, concluding that the absence of physical evidence indicated that the Court of Appeal had unreasonably upheld Smith's conviction. The petitioners appealed."
137,Landmark Communications Inc.,Virginia,"A Landmark Communications newspaper, The Virginian Pilot, published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. Landmark was indicted by a grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction."
240,United States,MacDonald,"In May 1970, Jeffrey MacDonald, an army captain living at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was charged with the murders of his wife and two children. However, after an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), the murder charges were dropped, and MacDonald was given an honorable discharge. Following MacDonald’s discharge, the you.S. Justice Department asked the Army CID to continue its investigation into the murders, and in 1972 the CID created a report on the murders that recommended further investigation into MacDonald. After evaluating the report, the Justice Department presented the case to a grand jury in the fall of 1974, which returned an indictment for MacDonald in January of 1975 that charged him again with all three murders. MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the delay between the original murder charge in 1970 and the grand jury indictment in 1974 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied MacDonald’s motion. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed the district court by finding that the time-gap between the 1972 CID report to the Justice Department and the 1974 convening of a grand jury infringed on MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded. The Court held that MacDonald could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 6th amendment right to speedy trial until after the trial has been completed. MacDonald was tried and convicted of all three murders. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit again held the indictment violated MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights."
674,Dred Scott,John F. A. Sanford,"Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1819 to 1837, he resided at Illinois ( a free state ) and in the Louisiana Territory, until slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise in 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott faced suit in Missouri court for his property, claiming that his residence in free territory declared him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no “ negro ” or descendant of slaves should be a citizen in the sense of Article III of this Constitution."
601,Lambert,Wicklund,"In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or legal guardian 48 hours in advance. The Act provides for a waiver, or judicial bypass, of the notification requirement under certain circumstances, including if the notification of a parent or guardian was not in the best interests of the minor. Several physicians challenged the statute's validity. The Federal District Court, asserting that a parental notice requirement must be waived whenever an abortion would be in the minor's best interests, ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial bypass based on the consideration of a minor's best interests only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification was constitutionally impermissible, in that the bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion."
2088,"David Jennings, et al.","Alejandro Rodriguez, et al.","Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act require that noncitizens who are determined to be inadmissible to the United States must be detained during removal proceedings, though some may be released on bond if they can demonstrate that they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Alejandro Rodriguez and other detained noncitizens sued and argued that their prolonged detention without hearings and determinations to justify the detentions violated their due process rights. After litigation regarding class certification, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that required the government to provide each detainee with a bond hearing and to release that detainee unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention was justified. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged detention without a hearing raised serious constitutional concerns, and therefore that the relevant mandatory statutory language should be interpreted as having a time limitation; at the six-month mark, detainees are entitled to bond hearings. Because the plaintiff class proved that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff class then moved for a permanent injunction, which the district court granted and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court also determined that the duration of future detention and likelihood of eventual removal should not be considered in the bond hearings, and the noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings at six-month intervals throughout their detentions."
155,Citizens United,Federal Election Commission,"Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate ""big money"" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to ""electioneering communications."" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors ""might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular because,"" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim."
938,Lockyer,Andrade,"Leandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment."
907,United States,Bean,"After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
74,"John P. Wood, et al.","Peggy Strickland, et al.","Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request. Strickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial."
911,State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,"United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al.","Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies : One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government funds would account for flood damage claims ; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. ( State Farm ) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders ’ flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation with the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA ’ s seal requirement, which means that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the seal served on the defendant, and that breach of the corporate seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that, since Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate punishment."
974,United States,Samuel Francis Patane,"Samuel Patane was arrested at his home for calling his ex-girlfriend in violation of a restraining order. During the arrest, police officers began reading Patane his Miranda rights. Patane told the officers that he knew his rights. The officers then stopped reading them, at which point Patane told police that he had a gun in his house. They searched the house with his permission and found the gun. As an ex-felon, Patane was not permitted to possess a gun and was prosecuted for possession. During the trial on gun possession charges, Patane argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself because there was not probable because to arrest him and because the gun had been found as a result of an un-Mirandized confession. The district court initially ruled that there was not probable because for his arrest and that it was therefore unconstitutional. A 10th Circuit Court of Appeals panel disagreed, holding that Patane's ex-girlfriend had given police probable because for the arrest. However, the panel held that gun could not be used as evidence because it had been found as the result of an un-Mirandized (and therefore unconstitutional) confession. The government appealed, arguing that physical evidence found as the result of un-Mirandized testimony could be used in court, despite the fact that the testimony itself was inadmissible."
742,Frank Palko,Connecticut,Frank Palko had been charged with first - rate murder. He was convicted instead of second - degree murder but sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won one new trial ; each time that court found Palko incapable of first - degree murder and sentenced Frank to death.
983,"Edith Jones, et al., on Behalf of Herself and a Class of Others Similarly Situated",R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company,"In November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (you.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that the section was bound by a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed. Jones, however, argued that a separate section of you.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply. A federal district court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed."
940,"Expressions Hair Design, et al.","Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.","The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and discounts, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the statute qualified as permissible regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague."
347,Arizona State Legislature,"Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution that remove the congressional redistricting power from a legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission ( IRC ). In 2012, after that IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and holding that the legislative district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature then ordered that the district court permanently ban the IRC from adopting, altering, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution."
492,United States,Eugene Frank Robel,"Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member within the Party who remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “ defense facility ”. The district court dismissed the case because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The appeals court found that this provision of its Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied for inactive Party members. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the you. S. Supreme Court."
80,"Kevin J. Burns, Commissioner, Dept of Social Services of Iowa, et al.","Linda Alcala, Jane Doe, Joan Roe, et al.","The State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do not fit the Social Security Act’s definition of “dependent children” as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that unborn children were “dependent children”, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1231,Michelle Monasky,Domenico Taglieri,"Michelle Monasky, a you. S. citizen married into Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two - month - old daughter, so Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky ’ s parental rights. The Italian Court ruled in Taglieri ’ s favor ex parte ( without an appearance by Monasky ). Taglieri then asked a federal court to order that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri ’ second petition, finding that Italy was the baby, s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the you. S. Supreme Court denied Monasky ’ s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 2 you. S. C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law recognizes wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “ under the law of the State in which the child was not resident immediately before the removal. ” To determine the child ’ s habitual residence, a court must look “ to the place in which the child has become ‘ acclimatized, ’ or as a back - up inquiry, “ shared parental intent. ” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young and acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents ’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court ’ s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit ( en banc ) affirmed."
1724,"Steven I. Engel, et al.","William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.","The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments."
782,"Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al.",United States,"In 1948, five Communist Party leaders were charged of supporting the violent overthrow of the US, and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow & destruction of the United States government. The party members who had begun petitioning for socialist reform claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction."
1495,"Shelby County, Alabama","Eric Holder, Jr. Attorney General","The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to ""race, color, or previous condition of servitude."" The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change ""neither has the purpose nor will have the effect"" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time. Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination."
2200,"Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.","Hawaii, et al.","On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order No. 13,769 (EO-1), which, among other things, suspended entry for 90 days of foreign nationals from seven countries identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting heightened terrorism-related risks. EO-1 was immediately challenged in federal district court, and the judge entered a nationwide temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of several of its provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the government's emergency motion to stay the order pending appeal. Rather than continuing to litigate the matter, the government announced that it would revoke that order and issue a new one. On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,780 (EO-2). Section 2(c) of EO-2 directed that entry of nationals from six of the seven countries designated in EO-1 be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of the order, citing a need for time to establish adequate standards to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists. Section 6(a) directed that applications for refugee status and travel of refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) be suspended for 120 days from the effective date ""to review the adequacy of USRAP application and adjudication procedures."" Section 6(b) suspended the entry of any individual under USRAP once 50,000 refugees have entered the United States in fiscal year 2017. The effective date of the order was March 16, 2017. EO-2 was subject to swift litigation as well. On June 14, just before Section 2(c) of EO-2 was by its terms set to expire, President Trump issued a memorandum to Executive Branch officials declaring the effective date of each enjoined provision of EO–2 to be the date on which the injunctions in these cases “are lifted or stayed with respect to that provision."" The government sought review in both cases, making arguments both on the merits of the cases and on procedural issues. In a per curiam opinion issued simultaneously with an order granting certiorari, the Court granted the government's applications for a stay of the preliminary injunction with respect to Sections 6(a) and (b) of Executive Order 13,780 (EO-2), thereby allowing enforcement of those provisions. Under the Court's ruling, the government may enforce Section 6(a) except as to any ""individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,"" nor may such an individual be excluded under Section 6(b). On September 24, 2017—the same day EO-2 was expiring—President Donald Trump issued a Proclamation restricting travel to the United States by citizens from eight countries. That Proclamation too was challenged in federal court as attempting to exercise power that neither Congress nor the Constitution vested in the president. The Ninth Circuit struck down the Proclamation, and the Supreme Court granted review."
51,"Village of Belle Terre, et al.","Bruce Boraas, et al.","The Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute’s meaning of “family” was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in violation of the Village’s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare."
751,Walter Chaplinsky,New Hampshire,"On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky started distributing posters that denounced his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "" a God - damned racketeer "" and "" a damned Fascist. "" He got arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully outside a neighborhood or public area. On trial, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment upon the grounds that it was overly vague."
191,"Randal Rush, et al.",Jeffrey Savchuk,"On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk."
1422,Federal Aviation Administration,Stanmore Cooper,"In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue."
496,Bernard Shapiro,Vivian Marie Thompson,"Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen - year - old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC ) program from Connecticut after having recently applied there to Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since it did not satisfy the state's one - year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not lived in The District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior on their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code."
974,California Public Employees' Retirement System,"ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.","Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2010, the company raised over $ 31 billion in debt offerings. California Public Employees ’ Retirement System ( CPERS ), the largest mutual fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for fraud and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial claims were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not it certify the lawsuits as a class action, CPERS and Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund ’ s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed."
805,Americold Realty Trust,"Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.","The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust (Americold) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust’s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust’s beneficiaries (who are its shareholders), not just the trustees."
1657,Harry Slochower ,Board of Higher Education of New York City,"New York City municipal charter provision §903 required discharge of any municipal employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in a legally authorized inquiry into that employee’s official conduct. Harry Slochower, a tenured professor at Brooklyn College, invoked this privilege in a congressional committee investigation into his past Communist Party membership. Despite his tenured status, which required notice and a hearing before termination, the city terminated him immediately. The state trial court dismissed a motion to review the discharge and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed."
433,Automobile Workers,"Johnson Controls, Inc.","Johnson Controls, Inc. (""Johnson"") manufactures batteries whose assembly process entails exposure to high levels of lead. After discovering that eight of its female employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of those thought safe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Johnson barred all its female employees - except those with medically documented infertility - from engaging in tasks that require exposure to lead in access of recommended OSHA levels. Following its passage, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) challenged Johnson's fetal-protection policy as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act). When the Appellate Court affirmed a district court decision in favor of Johnson, the UAW appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
438,"Virginia Bankshares, Inc.",Sandberg,"First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a ""freeze-out"" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a ""high"" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an ""essential link"" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, finding that she would have received that much more if the stock had been valued adequately."
285,Executive Benefits Insurance Agency,Peter H. Arkison,"Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the insurance commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long-time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. (EBIA). Pearce then deposited over $100,000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court."
1897,United States,Vuitch,"The District of Columbia had an abortion statute that prohibits abortion unless “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health.” Milan Vuitch, a licensed physician, was indicted in federal district court for performing abortions that violated this statute. The district court held the abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
1175,"Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools",Aileen Rizo,"The facts giving rise to this case are not immediately relevant to the issue on which the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, filed a lawsuit against the superintendent of schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation of the statute. Judge Reinhardt died after he had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it was officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on the judgment but not the reasoning."
1320,"Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.",Frank Buono,"In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered. While the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock a national memorial and barred its dismantling with the use of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that the district court made an error in judgment."
2331,"United States Agency for International Development, et al.","Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., et al.","The Alliance for Open Society International and other organizations receive funding from the you.S. government to help with their mission of fighting HIV/AIDS abroad. The government provides the funds on the condition that “no funds be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” In you.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., decided in 2013, the Court held that the condition compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Although the government consequently did not apply the condition to Alliance for Open Society International, it continued to apply the condition to the organization’s foreign affiliates. The organization sued, asking for permanent injunctive relief. The district court granted the requested relief, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1546,Tim Wood et al.,Michael Moss et al.,"During the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush's team scheduled a campaign stop in Jacksonville, Oregon. With the approval of local law enforcement agencies, opponents of President Bush organized a peaceful demonstration to protest his policies. The demonstration took place at a public park before moving to the street near the local inn where the President was staying. Eventually, both opponents and supporters of President Bush gathered on the street of near the entrance to the inn, and each group had equal access to deliver its message to the President at the time of his arrival. Before the President arrived, Secret Service agents ordered local police to push protestors away from the immediate area for security reasons. The agents then ordered that the protesters be driven farther away from the inn onto the east side of 5th street. However, agents failed to give the same directive for supporters who remained stationed on the streets close to the inn. The plaintiffs alleged that the orders to move were unintelligibly given and that police proceeded to use force before confirming that the orders were understood or were being followed."
780,"Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al.",United States,"In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction."
820,"W. Kevin Hughes, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al.","Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al.","The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV’s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants."
1266,State of Hawaii,Office of Hawaiian Affairs,"The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), filed suit against the state of Hawaii to prevent the transfer of ""ceded"" lands for the purpose of private development. The OHA was established to manage the proceeds from lands ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii following its overthrow by the United States. The lands were marked to provide for the benefit of native Hawaiians. The OHA argued that ""any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third parties would amount to a breach of trust"" and would be without consideration of the claims of native Hawaiians to those lands. However, the trial court held that the State did have the power to transfer the lands. The OHA appealed. The Supreme Court of Hawaii overruled the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue an injunction to prevent the transfer of ceded lands from the public trust. In its reasoning, it cited Ahuna to illustrate that the State as trustee of these lands was under an obligation to administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary' (native Hawaiians). Further, it gave great weight to the Apology Resolution passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to mark the 100th Anniversary of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. This resolution stated that ""native Hawaiians (1) 'never directly relinquished their claims to… their national lands to the United States,' and (2) 'are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory.'"" Therefore, the court held, it was the responsibility of the State of Hawaii to preserve the ceded lands in the public trust, at least until such land claims were resolved."
977,"Joseph Jesner, et al.","Arab Bank, PLC","Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those that perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC ( Arab Bank ), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The aliens sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute ( ATS ), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the you. S. Court of Appeals for The Second Circuit ’ s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize action against private corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the you. S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and has not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals ’ holding was not controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court ’ s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. Finally, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court affirmed the lower court ’ s decision."
1496,Armarcion D. Henderson,United States,"Armarcion D. Henderson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. The sentencing guideline range was 33-41 months, but the judge sentenced Henderson to 60 months to ensure that he had the opportunity to enroll in the Bureau of Prisons drug program. Henderson did not object to the sentence. Eight days after sentencing, Henderson filed a motion to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Henderson did not preserve the error for correction under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so the court reviewed the decision for plain error. Henderson did not show plain error because the error was not clear under current law at the time of trial. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc."
1763,Cox,Louisiana,"On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality (""CORE"") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members. Baton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration ""to the west side of the street"" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox. Cox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his ""disturbing the peace"" and ""obstructing public passages"" convictions on certiorari, and the ""courthouse picketing"" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the ""disturbing the peace"" and ""obstructing public passages"" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the ""courthouse picketing"" statute."
1842,Tinker,Des Moines Independent Community School District,"In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion."
1144,National Association of Home Builders et al.,Defenders of Wildlife et al.,"The Clean Water Act (CWA) instructs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to turn over pollution permitting authority to a state if the state's proposal meets nine listed criteria. When Arizona issued such a proposal, the EPA regional office raised the concern that the transfer might violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which prohibits agencies from taking actions that might jeopardize endangered species. In accordance with the ESA, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The FWS's opinion was that the ESA was inapplicable because the agency had no authority to consider any additional factors beyond the nine CWA criteria (none of which concerned endangered species). On the advice of the FWS, the EPA approved the transfer. The Defenders of Wildlife challenged the transfer, arguing that the ESA imposed an authoritative, independent requirement on the EPA's decision to approve the transfer. The agency countered the ESA was not an independent source of authority. Rather, the ESA imposes requirements only on the discretionary decisions of federal agencies. Since its decision was non-discretionary under the CWA, the agency argued, the ESA did not apply. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Defenders of Wildlife and invalidated the transfer. The Ninth Circuit found the FWS opinion legally flawed and the EPA's reliance on it ""arbitrary and capricious."" It noted that the EPA's decision was inconsistent with previous transfers of permitting authority, in which the impact on endangered species was considered."
1547,"Sherry L. Burt, Warden",Vonlee Nicole Titlow,"In August 2000, Vonlee Nicole Titlow helped his aunt Billie Rogers murder his wealthy uncle Donald Rogers. After Titlow was charged with first-degree murder, the prosecution offered him a plea bargain. In exchange for testifying against Billie Rogers, Titlow could plead guilty to manslaughter and receive a reduced sentence. After consulting with his attorney, Titlow accepted the deal. However, before sentencing, Titlow spoke to a sheriff's deputy who suggested that he withdraw his guilty plea and consult another attorney. Titlow followed the deputy's advice, hired a new attorney and withdrew his guilty plea. Following his trial, a jury convicted Titlow of second-degree murder and sentenced him to 20-to-40 years in prison. This led Titlow to accuse his second attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to withdraw the original guilty plea. Both the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow's claim. Titlow petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court to hear his case, but they refused to do so. Titlow then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court denied his claim as well. The district court held that Titlow failed to meet the standard for overturning a state-court conviction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (""AEDPA""). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and ordered the state to reoffer Titlow's original plea agreement. The appellate court held that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his claims further, failing to obtain documents from the first attorney, and failing to convince Titlow to take the plea bargain."
228,Valley Forge Christian College,"Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.","The Secretary of Defense closed the Valley Forge General Hospital in an effort to reduce the number of military installations in the country. In accordance with a congressional statute regulating the dispersal of surplus government property, part of the hospital's land was given, free-of-charge, to the Valley Forge Christian College."
1708,Gomillion,Lightfoot,"An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived."
577,"Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al.",Hamar,"Richard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing."
401,Department of Homeland Security,Robert J. MacLean,"In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration ( TSA ) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed their Federal Air Marshals office. Not far after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flight from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was quickly rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared live on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed no role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position. MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board ( Board ) who argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act ( WPA ). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA."
418,"David King, et al.","Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act ( ACA ) to limit the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an "" exchange "" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an tax exemption for low - income individuals. To limit the amount of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as much as state exchanges. Virginia declined to establish a state - run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation with the Administrative Procedure Act. The trial court granted the courts'motion to dismiss, and the D. S. Court of Appeals for its Fourth Circuit affirmed."
511,"American Airlines, Inc.",Wolens,"In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from ""enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services."" The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 you.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari."
590,Antoine Bruce,"Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al.","Several prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gang-affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials and claimed that SMUs violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang-affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival gangs. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The parties then engaged in extensive back-and-forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and the ability of other prisoners to join in the case. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees."
1013,Charles Murphy,"Robert Smith, et al.","Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 you. S. C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him compensation for some of his claims under state law, and the district court fined him attorney fees under 42 you. S. C. § 1988. Two of these defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state - law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorneys fee award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity in public - law claims where the officials and employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 you. S. C. § 1997e ( d ) requires that the attorney fee award must not be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage."
567,Cooper,Oklahoma,"Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment."
470,Poe,Ullman,"Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment."
227,"Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General","AU Optronics Corporation, et al.",""" March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display ( LCD ) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to manipulate prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was unconstitutional under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Class action and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court by the CAFA. The State of Mississippi decided to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the motion. The respondents appealed to the Middle States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case in the interest of individual citizens, so that general public exception was not applicable."
436,"Curtis Reid, Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail",Claris Covert,"Mrs. Kennedy killed her husband in an airbase in England. Pursuant on a “ status - of - forces ” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court - martial without a formal trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ( UCMJ ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment obligations to be tried by the jury after indictment by a grand jury."
1047,"Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.","United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson","The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for ""making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States."" A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA."
822,"W. Kevin Hughes, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al.","Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al.","The Federal Power Act ( FPA ) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ( FERC ) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate highways. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, ( PJM ) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland plus the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC funds were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid should interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, ( CPV ) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, ( PPL ) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM - owned market. The district court argued that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV ’ s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants."
117,Beal,Doe,"In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary."
29,John R Gagnon,Gerald Scarpello,"After pleading guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin, Gerald Scarpelli, was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, which was later reduced to probation. Scarpelli signed an agreement allowing him to reside in Illinois and was supervised by the Adult Probation Department of Illinois. Shortly after, Scarpelli was caught committing burglary with an accomplice. After being informed of his Constitutional rights, Scarpelli admitted to committing the felony, an admission he later claimed was made under extreme duress. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections revoked Scarpelli’s probation because of the violation and imprisoned him. He was not given a hearing. Two years later, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court held that revoking Scarpelli’s probation without a hearing and an attorney was a denial of his Constitutional right of due process. Gagnon, the warden of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, appealed and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. Gagnon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit."
997,Maryland,Joseph Jermaine Pringle,"A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable because for arrest for possession."
1093,Oregon,Randy Lee Guzek,"A jury found Randy Lee Guzek guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the death sentence. Guzek was sentenced to death again, and the Oregon Supreme Court again threw out the death sentence. When Guzek was sentenced to death a third time, the Oregon Supreme Court again overturned his sentence and also considered his complaint that he had not been allowed to present testimony about his alibi at the sentencing phase of the trial. Oregon law requires that evidence of innocence, such as an alibi, be presented during the trial, not during the sentencing hearing. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted Guzek's argument that he had a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce the alibi testimony at his sentencing proceeding. Oregon appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was reasonable to restrict the introduction of evidence of innocence to the guilt phase of the trial."
1090,Francis V. Lorenzo,Securities and Exchange Commission,"Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 you.S. 135 (2011)."
624,Jorge Luna Torres,"Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General","In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state federal statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( INS ) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “ alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. ” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he became a permanent resident because of an unrelated felony ; the Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) had previously held that a violation under another New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres applied to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA rejected Luna Torres ’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA ’ s ruling and concluded that breach of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated crime because the state statute lacked the federal statute ’ s interstate commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres ’ petition for cancellation of the removal order."
164,"Altria Group, Inc., et al.",Stephanie Good et al.,"A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The defendants asserted that Altria's advertisement claiming for its product was "" light "" and had "" lowered tar and nicotine "" constituted misrepresentations under The Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District Of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, within a similar federal Act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions may in fact constitute misrepresentations within the Maine Act."
2378,"Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury","Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al.","For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs). In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any ""Indian Tribe"" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds. Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes."
1084,"Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.",John Warren et al.,"The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1990s, another uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals ( both plaintiffs in this case ). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal & Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “ until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by law. ” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law while enjoining the state to grant new mining permits. The district court granted the state ’ s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non - federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the circuit court ’ s conclusion en novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
75,Medical Board of California,Hason,"The California Medical Board denied Hason a license to practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non-consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the ADA ""and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II."""
793,"W. A. Gayle, Mayor of Montgomery",Aurelia Browder,"While the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a boycott of the racially segregated bus network in Montgomery Alabama, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP challenged state segregation on the bus system in various federal courts. This case arose in federal court as a violation of Reconstruction - style civil rights law and as a violation of the Equal Protection clause of The Fourteenth Amendment. A three - circuit district court held that state enforcement on the private but privately owned bus system in Montgomery violated the Equal Protection Clause. The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
910,Meyer,Holley,"The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed ""officer/broker,"" claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a ""designated officer/broker."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships."
676,Campbell,Louisiana,"erry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal."
908,Beneficial National Bank,Marie Anderson et al.,"Several H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court."
2029,Jesse Thurman Fowler,North Carolina,A jury found Fowler guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death in the state's gas chamber. Fowler appealed his conviction and sentence. Both were affirmed. Fowler then attacked the mandatory imposition of his sentence. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certioriari.
92,"Time, Inc.",Mary Alice Firestone,"Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging “extreme cruelty and adultery”. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone’s extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed."
38,United States,William Earl Matlock,"Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived. Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash. At trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed."
505,James Higginbotham,Stella Connell,"Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida” and “do not believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence.” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
409,Larry Whitfield,United States,"On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell house and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Grady was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a warrant admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted attempted robbery. A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the defense that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional crime, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate because of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was declared guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, instead of killing her. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, The district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court in Appeals affirmed."
1388,J.D.B.,North Carolina,"A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings."
2122,John Howell,Sandra Howell,"John Howell, a veteran, and his ex-wife Sandra Howell divorced in 1991. The Arizona Superior Court granted Sandra half of John’s Military Retirement Plan (MRP) funds when the payments were to begin. John retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began receiving his retirement funds soon after. In 2005, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs determined that John suffered from degenerative joint disease in his shoulder, that the because of the disease was directly related to his service, and that it caused him a net loss of 20% in his earnings. Because of this, he was entitled to tax-exempt military disability payments. To receive the disability payments, John had to waive an equal portion of his MRP benefits, which he did in July of 2004. In 2013, Sandra sued John and claimed that she was still entitled to a full 50% of the MRP benefits John received, regardless of his waiver of a portion of his benefits due to disability. Both the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in Sandra’s favor. John appealed and cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) preempted state courts from allowing the former spouses of veterans to claim interest in the waived portion of the veteran’s MRP. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and stated that, while the Mansell standard was applicable before divorce proceedings were finalized and during the proceedings, courts were split regarding the rules after a divorce had been granted. The Court found that, because the lower court did not grant Sandra an interest in the disability sum itself, but rather an interest in John’s overall assets in an equal sum, then Sandra was free to require payment from John to make up for the losses she would suffer due to his waiver of a portion of the benefits shared between them."
1997,Minersville School District,Walter Gobitis et al.,"In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights."
441,Riverside County,McLaughlin,McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable because determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.
134,"Jane Monell, et al.","Department of Social Services of the City of New York, et al.","The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred. The district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
107,General Electric Company,"Martha V. Gilbert, et al.","General Electric Co. offered its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class of female employees of General Electric Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1026,Antonio Dwayne Halbert,Michigan,"Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court."
236,Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette,California,"On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unnamed vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the particular truck in question. The dispatch center provided that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the truck, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. At trial, the defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence would not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined and the officers'observations of details that matched the information constituted reasonable proof of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed."
261,Florida,Meyers,"Meyers was charged with sexual battery. Police officers searched his automobile at the time of his arrest, and then impounded the vehicle at a private facility. Eight hours later, the police re-entered the facility, without a warrant, and searched the car a second time. A Florida court suppressed evidence obtained in the second search, arguing the warrantless search was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court subsequently accepted the State's petition for certiorari."
1602,"Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.","Jesse Busk, et al.","Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro were former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Integrity), a company that provides warehouse space and staffing to clients such as Amazon.com. Busk and Laurie both worked in warehouses in Nevada filling orders placed by Amazon.com customers. At the end of each day, all the workers were required to pass through a security clearance checkpoint where they had to remove their keys, wallets, and belts, pass through a metal detector, and submit to being searched. The whole process could take up to 25 minutes. Similarly, up to ten minutes of the workers' 30-minute lunch period was consumed by security clearance and transition time. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued Integrity and argued that these practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as Nevada state labor laws. The district court granted Integrity's motion to dismiss and held that time spent clearing security was non-compensable under the FLSA and that the shortened meal periods were not relevant to the FLSA because the plaintiffs did not argue that they performed work-related duties during their lunch periods. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the shortened lunch periods were not relevant to the FLSA, the Court of Appeals held that the district court should have assessed the plaintiffs claims that the security clearances were ""integral and indispensable"" to their work in order to determine if that time was compensable."
2195,South Dakota,"Wayfair, Inc., et al.","The so-called Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution prohibits states from imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval. Consistent with this doctrine, the US Supreme Court held, in 1967, that a state cannot require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence within that state to collect and remit taxes for goods sold or shipped into the state. The Court affirmed this holding in 1992. In 2015, the Court heard another case with similar facts and while it declined to change its jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence questioning whether the Court should continue following the earlier cases in light of additional dormant Commerce Clause cases as well as the significant technological and social changes that affect interstate commerce. In an apparent appeal to the doubt expressed by Justice Kennedy in that concurring opinion, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law requiring sellers of “tangible personal property” in that state who do not have a physical presence in the state to remit sales tax according to the same procedures as sellers who do have a physical presence. The act limited the obligation to sellers with gross revenue from sales in South Dakota of over $100,000, or 200 or more separate transactions, within one year. The legislature passed the law in defiance of Supreme Court jurisprudence, citing its inability to maintain state revenue in the face of increasing internet sales and their effect on sales tax collections. The State commenced a declaratory judgment action in state court seeking a declaration that certain internet sellers subject to the law must comply with it. The sellers moved for summary judgment based on the binding Supreme Court cases. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed to the state supreme court, and likewise bound by Supreme Court precedent, that court affirmed."
1937,Waters,Churchill,"A public hospital fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because she opposed its policy of nurse cross-training and said it was leaving certain units understaffed."
2121,Jae Lee,United States,"Jae Lee came to the United States from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived in the United States legally ever since, though he did not become a citizen. He eventually moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he got involved in the drug trade. In 2009, after a successful sting operation, Lee was arrested and charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute. The government’s case against Lee was very strong, and on the advice of his attorney, Lee pled guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee’s attorney had assured him that the guilty plea would not have immigration consequences; however, Lee’s guilty plea constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony, which is a deportable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Lee subsequently appealed his conviction and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which provides for a two-pronged test: whether the attorney’s counsel was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Lee’s conviction and determined that Lee could not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test because there was not sufficient evidence that the outcome of Lee’s case would have been substantially different had he known about the risk of deportation."
627,Idaho,Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,"The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe) of Idaho filed an action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials alleging ownership of the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed all the components of the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the title action against the officials. However, it allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims were based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims."
697,AT&T Corporation,Iowa Utilities Board,"The 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) fundamentally altered local telephone markets by ending the monopolies traditionally given to local exchange carriers (LECs) by states and subjecting LECs to a host of duties meant to facilitate market entry. Among these was the imposition of an obligation on incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitors. Following the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) issuance of regulations implementing the Act's guidelines, AT&T challenged their constitutionality on behalf of itself and other existing phone service providers."
1340,Tarahrick Terry,United States,"Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 you.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.” The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
516,"Sue Evenwel, et al.","Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al.","The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate seats during the first regular census after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the governor created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three - judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law. Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas Democrats who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts don't adhere on the'one person, one vote'principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they is apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they varied wildly in relation to total registered population. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be a basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal."
467,Crown Kosher Super Market,Gallagher,"The owners and a majority of the employees of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, and forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which Sears conducted about one - fifth of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts ’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work until Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does Not respect their religious practices. The federal appeals court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit a free exercise of religion."
1173,Norfolk Southern Railway Company,Timothy Sorrell,"Sorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway, crashed his company truck while swerving to avoid another company truck. Sorrell suffered injuries and sued Norfolk Southern for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Both Sorrell and the railroad had been negligent in the incident to some extent. Norfolk Southern argued that under the FELA, the ""causation standard"" - the standard for assigning the blame for an incident - was the same for both the employee and the railroad. According to Norfolk Southern, any damages awarded to Sorrell for the railroad's negligence had to be reduced by the amount of the damages that was attributable to Sorrell's own negligence. (If Sorrell was 60% responsible for the accident, for example, the damages would be reduced by 60%.) The trial ruled instead that the causation standards were different: the railroad was responsible for any negligence that contributed to the accident, but the employee was only responsible for negligence that directly caused damage. Under this more lenient standard for employee negligence, the trial court awarded Sorrell $1.5 million. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the you.S. Supreme Court granted review."
1448,David Bobby,Archie Dixon,"On September 22nd, 1993, Archie Dixon and Timothy Hoffner arrived at the Toledo home of Kirsten Wilkerson. Christopher Hammer was staying at Wilkerson's house. Upon arriving at Wilkerson's house, Dixon and Hoffner beat up Hammer, tied him to a bed, and robbed him. After restraining Hammer, Dixon and Hoffner proceeded to kill Hammer by burying him alive. After burying Hammer alive, Dixon used Hammer's birth certificate and social security card to obtain a state identification card in Hammer's name. He used the new ID to obtain a duplicate auto title to Hammer's car. He then sold Hammer's car to a dealer for $2,800. On November 4th, a police detective spoke with Dixon at a local police station in a chance encounter. The detective issued Miranda warnings to Dixon and asked to talk to him about Hammers disappearance; Dixon declined to discuss the disappearance. In the course of the investigation into Hammer's disappearance, the police discovered that Dixon had sold Hammer's car and forged Hammer's signature when cashing the check he received in the sale. On November 9th, the police detained Dixon and charged him with forgery. The police questioned Dixon without reading him his Miranda rights. The focus of the questioning was Hammer's disappearance and not Dixon's alleged act of forgery. Dixon asserted his right to have an attorney present, but the police continued to question Dixon without an attorney. Dixon admitted to the auto title forgery but said that he had no knowledge of Hammer's disappearance. Later that day, Hoffner led the police to Hammer's body. The police interviewed Dixon again. They did not inform Dixon of his Miranda rights until the second session because they feared Dixon would request counsel. Dixon confessed to the kidnapping, robbery, and murder. At trial, Dixon was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, robbery and kidnapping. The Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction. Dixon appealed to the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, and Judge Gilbert Merritt, writing for the majority, held that the police should have terminated the forgery interrogation when Dixon requested counsel. The court also held that the police's planned refusal to read Dixon his Miranda rights during the first session of his interrogation for murder was unconstitutional. It further held that Dixon's were not ""voluntary""."
2065,"Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.","Carol S. Comer, Director, Missouri Department of Natural Resources","Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint."
456,National Railroad Passenger Corporation,Boston & Maine Corporation,"Under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter into ""trackage rights"" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are ""required for intercity rail passenger service."" Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property. Amtrak had a ""trackage rights"" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B & M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue this agreement because B & M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B & M track and sell it to CV, which would take over maintenance of the track but grant ""trackage rights"" to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not ""required for intercity rail passenger service."""
1474,"Linda Metrish, Warden",Burt Landcaster,"On April 23, 1993, Burt Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer with a history of mental health problems, shot and killed his girlfriend. He was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his trial in state court, Lancaster admitted to the killing but argued he was not guilty by reason of insanity and diminished capacity. The jury convicted Lancaster on both counts. After exhausting his appeals in state courts, Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and argued that the state had improperly excluded a black juror based on his race. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, and Lancaster received a new trial in 2005. At the new trial, Lancaster waived his right to a jury and limited his defense to diminished capacity. Since Lancaster's first trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had held that diminished capacity defense was no longer valid. The trial court held that the Michigan Supreme Court ruling applied retroactively and that Lancaster could not use the diminished capacity defense. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Lancaster was again convicted on both counts. Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a substantive change in the law and that the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retroactively applying the change to his case. The district court denied his petition and held that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a reasonable change because the defense was not well established under Michigan law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the retroactive application of the new ruling denied Lancaster his right to due process."
2322,"Charles C. Lui, et al.",Securities and Exchange Commission,"Charles Liu operated an EB-5 fund, which is a fund that offers lawful permanent residence opportunities to foreigners who make significant investments in the United States. However, Liu misappropriated millions of dollars that had been invested in the fund, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the making of false statements in the context of a securities offering. The district court ordered Liu to “disgorge” (pay back) $26 million, the amount investors had paid into the EB-5 fund, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In petitioning the Supreme Court’s review, Liu argued that the SEC lacked the authority to obtain disgorgement, under the Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which held that disgorgement awarded under the court’s equitable power is a penalty, not a remedial measure."
1274,Vicky Crawford,"Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee","Vicky Crawford, a government employee, took part in an internal investigation regarding sexual harassment claims against another employee. When the investigation concluded, Crawford was fired based on charges of embezzlement and drug use. When these charges were later proven untrue, Crawford filed suit against her employer in federal district court in Tennessee claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on her participation in the investigation. The district court directed a verdict for her employer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Once again finding for the employer, the court stated that Crawford's participation in the investigation did not constitute ""opposition"" and her activity in that regard was not ""protected"" as those terms are defined in Title VII, making the Civil Rights Act inapplicable to her claim."
1784,Fred L. Shuttlesworth,City of Birmingham,"On April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry’s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry’s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation. Byars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry’s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, “You mean to say we cannot stand here on the sidewalk?” Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry’s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence. On April 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder’s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars’ initially testified that the group’s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution’s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth’s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth’s applications for certiorari and rehearing."
773,Arch R. Everson,Board of Education of the Township of Ewing,"A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement to local school boards of any costs of transportation into and from schools, including private schools. 96 % of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that giving indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, he appealed at the you. S. Supreme Court on purely Catholic constitutional grounds."
818,"State of Nebraska, et al.","Mitch Parker, et al.","Omaha Tribal Courts continue to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues who sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally - recognized Indian reservation land, therefore were actually under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross - filed for summary judgment, and the trial court decided in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction for tribal law because the you. S. Senate ’ s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ the decision."
153,"Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama",Yvonne Kennedy et al.,"In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court denied their contention and held that the previous state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group including Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against a Governor of Alabama. The D. S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if it was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that must have been precleared before being implemented."
53,"Richard E. Gerstein, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida ","Robert Pugh, Nathaniel Henderson, Thomas Turner, Gary Faulk on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated","Robert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances. Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable because. The district court certified the class and held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of the district court’s prescribed procedures."
1109,Helsinn Healthcare S.A.,"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.","Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy - induced nausea and vomiting ( “ CINV ” ). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2001. The critical date for the on - sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can affect the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on - purchase bar provision of 35 you. S. C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense involved an exclusive supply and service agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld all valid Helsinn ’ s patents and rejected Teva ’ s “ on sale ” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale due to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “ overwhelming. ”"
2350,"Facebook, Inc.",Noah Duguid,"Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account. Duguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.”"
1578,Peggy Young,"United Parcel Service, Inc.","Peggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter. Young sued UPS and claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed Young's claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1858,Epperson,Arkansas,"The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed."
321,Wygant,Jackson Board of Education,"Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing ""role models"" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari."
986,David Patchak,"Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior","The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians ( the Gun Lake Tribe ) is the Indian tribe in western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the you. S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, their Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put on trust for the Tribe ’ s use under the Indian Reorganization Act ( IRA ), 25 you. S. C. § 465, after the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property. David Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak launched a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary possessed "" authority to put the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the you. S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into force the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating to the Bradley Property “ should not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed. ”"
180,"Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State et al.",Holbrook Bradley et al.,"Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court."
1115,"Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire",Planned Parenthood of Northern New England et al.,"After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the ""undue burden"" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow. The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision."
1873,Beatrice Alexander,Holmes County Board of Education,"The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ordered school districts across the country to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” However, nearly fifteen years after this order, many school districts, including schools in Holmes County, Mississippi, were either still segregated or saddled with laws making it very difficult for full integration to take place. In the summer of 1969, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi entered an order allowing the schools in Mississippi to continue using “freedom of choice” laws, which allowed parents to choose which school their children attended. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 23, 1969. That court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the lower court, but required the school districts to create and submit alternate plans by August 27, 1969. The petitioners then appealed."
1869,Martin Robert Stolar,"State of Ohio, Columbus Bar Association","Martin Robert Stolar was admitted to the New York Bar in 1968. In his application, he answered several questions about his social, religious and political affiliations. When Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar in 1969 he supplied the Ohio Bar Association with all of the information from his New York Bar application. The Ohio Bar also subjected Stolar to an oral interrogation where they asked questions relating to whether he was associated with any organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Stolar refused to answer those questions and the interrogation committee recommended that he be denied admission to the Bar. Stolar had nothing in his record, other than refusal to answer the questions, that showed that he did not have the necessary good character for admission to the Ohio Bar. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee’s recommendation without opinion."
416,Atlantic Richfield Company,USA Petroleum Company,"Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is an integrated oil company that sells gasoline to consumers through its own retail stations as well as independent ARCO-brand stations. USA Petroleum (USA), a competitor of ARCO, is an independent retail marketer that purchases gasoline from major petroleum companies and resells it under its own brand name. USA sued ARCO under the Clayton Act in the you.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that ARCO had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the independent ARCO-brand stations to sell gasoline at below-market prices (the Clayton Act allows private parties to bring suit when they have been harmed by anticompetitive practices that violate the Sherman Act). The District Court ruled for ARCO, finding that even if USA could prove the conspiracy, it would not be an ""antitrust injury"" to USA under the Clayton Act unless it could also prove that the pricing was predatory (that is, that it was intended to drive USA and other competitors out of business). It would be impossible to prove this, the District Court concluded, because ARCO was not dominant enough in the market to exert that sort of power. A divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that it was not necessary to show predatory intent to prove an ""antitrust inquiry."" All that was necessary was a showing that the party bringing the suit had been harmed by price fixing carried out by the party being sued."
187,Harris,McRae,"In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the ""Hyde Amendment"" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services."
819,"State of Nebraska, et al.","Mitch Parker, et al.","Omaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs for alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally - recognized Indian reservation territory and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross - sued for summary judgment, and the trial jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The district court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the you. S. Senate ’ s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not within the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The I. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision."
220,Jeffrey Richard Robbins,California,"During the early morning hours of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers pulled over a the driver of a station wagon, Jeffrey Richard Robbins, for driving too slowly at speeds far below the minimum speed limit and drifting across the center lane. Upon smelling marijuana smoke as they approached the car, officers searched the passenger compartment, where they found marijuana. The officers then opened a recessed luggage compartment in the trunk and unwrapped two tightly sealed packages that each contained a pound of marijuana. Robbins was charged with several drug offenses. At trial, he argued that the evidence of the drugs was the product of an illegal search and filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The judge denied the motion, and a jury convicted Robbins. Robbins appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for the appellate court to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in <i>Arkansas v. Sanders</i>, which established that officers could not search closed luggage found during a lawful automobile search. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Robbins conviction a second time on that grounds that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the package’s contents could be inferred given the shape, size, and wrapping of the exterior."
156,Gordon M. Ambach,Susan M. W. Norwick and Tarja U. K. Dachinger,"Susan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the statute as ""overbroad."""
1827,Marvin L. Pickering ,"Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County","Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school taxes. The letter complained about the board’s handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics. The school board felt the letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools” and opted to terminate Pickering’s employment. Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment. The court ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed."
685,Bogan,Scott-Harris,"Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 you.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature."
1255,"Jesus C. Hernández, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on you.S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From you.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him. Hernández’s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 you.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied because of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the parents’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on you.S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 you.S. __ (2017), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under Bivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim."
952,"Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.",". June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed - wire fence on their you. S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a you. S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez ’ s friends at the you. S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the you. S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the face and killed him. Six months after Hernandez ’ s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fourth Amendments of the you. S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when conducting arrests. Mesa moved for dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution ’ s deadly - force protections stop at the border for non - citizens like Hernandez. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and concluded that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also held that Mesa was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment protection, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a but under the Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed."
2341,Augusto Niz-Chavez,"Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General","Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture. After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board."
595,"Rebecca Friedrichs, et al.","California Teachers Association, et al.","California law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “agency shop” arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of dues to the union in the form of a “fair share service fee.” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year. Petitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt-out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
509,Asgrow Seed Company,"Winterboer et al., Dba Deebees","Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for ""other than reproductive purposes."" The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing."
251,Sony Corporation of America,"Universal City Studios, Inc.","Sony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the ""Betamax"" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement."
2172,State of Florida,State of Georgia,"The Chattahoochee River starts in north Georgia, flows southwest past Atlanta, and then flows south along Georgia's border, first with Alabama, then with Florida. In the southwest corner of Georgia, the Chattahoochee joins the Flint River, to form the Apalachicola River, which flows south through northwest Florida and into the Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico. At issue is the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin), which the US Army Corps of Engineers reports drains a total of 19,800 square miles in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, which is distributed roughly into 74%, 15%, and 11%, respectively. Pursuant to congressional authorizations, the Corps operates a system of dams in the ACF Basin based on a Master Manual governing all the dams and a reservoir regulation manual for each individual dam. The Master Manual was completed in 1958 and has not been comprehensively revised since then. There have been several lawsuits among the states seeking update and clarify the apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin. The present action was filed by Florida, which alleges that the ecosystem and economy of the Apalachicola region ""are suffering serious harm"" because of Georgia's consumption and storage of water from the Basin. Florida invokes the US Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to ask that the Court equitably apportion the waters of the ACF Basin. For equitable relief to be granted, Florida must first show standing—that is, that it has suffered a wrong through the action of another state that can be corrected by the courts. Second, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence a ""threatened invasion of rights . . . of serious magnitude."" Third, the state must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result. If a state meets this burden, the Court must craft an equitable-apportionment decree. After lengthy evidentiary hearings, the Special Master filed a report recommending that the Court deny Florida's request for relief on the ground that ""Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin."""
1934,CTS Corp.,"Peter Waldberger, et al.","In 1980, in response to concerns about the repercussions of toxic waste dumping, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which was designed to establish a comprehensive response mechanism and to shift the cost of the clean-up to the parties responsible. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by adding a section stating that, if a state statute of limitations allows the period in which action may be brought to begin before the plaintiff has knowledge of the harm, CERCLA preempts the state statute and allows the period to begin only from the point at which the plaintiff has knowledge. CTS Corporation (CTS) manufactures and disposes of electronics and electronic parts. From 1959 to 1985, CTS operated the Mills Gap Road Facility (Facility) in Asheville, North Carolina, where notable quantities of carcinogenic solvents were stored. In 1987, CTS sold the Facility and promised the realtors that the property was environmentally safe and clean. Subsequently, the land was sold to David Bradley, Renee Richardson, and others (landowners), who learned that the land was contaminated and that their well water contained concentrated levels of carcinogenic solvents in 2009. The landowners sued CTS in federal district court and argued that CTS should be required to remove the toxic contaminants as well as pay monetary damages. CTS moved to dismiss the case by arguing that North Carolina's ten-year statute of limitations on real property actions resulting from physical damage to a claimant's property prevented the suit from going forward. Although the landowners argued that CERCLA preempted the limitation, the district court held that the ten-year limitation was actually a statute of repose, which limits legal action to a particular timeframe regardless of when the harm becomes apparent. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that CERCLA's preemption applied to both statutes of repose, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is not relevant to when the time period begins, as well as to statutes of limitation, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is relevant."
118,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Robert Douglas Smith,"In 1997, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death for murder, robbery, and sexual assault in an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus in district court that was denied. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that he was mental retarded and he could not be executed. The district court held that the issue concerning whether or not Smith was mentally retarded had to be decided by a jury."
521,Vernonia School District 47J,Acton,"An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing."
1237,"Ritzen Group, Inc.","Jackson Masonry, LLC","Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property for Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline. Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic settlement of the litigation under 11 you. S. C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The district court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, fulfilled the contract. After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court ’ s order denying payment from the automatic stay ( which Ritzen did not appeal at the time ). The second appeal arose from the district court ’ s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals ; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits. Ritzen appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court ’ s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion doctrine and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines : the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal."
807,Lackawanna County District Attorney,Coss,"In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction."
345,Hobbie,Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida,"Paula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed ""for misconduct connected with her work."" The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal."
457,James Draper,United States,"John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up supplies and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a brief description of Draper and the bag they would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person roughly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped by and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag. Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the discovery of the drugs and the bags as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable because to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed."
955,"Charles S. Turner, et al.",United States,"In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Nearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants."
633,Lachance,Erickson,"Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim."
330,New York,"P. J. Video, Inc. et al.","Investigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable because since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of ""probable-because"" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns."
423,Louis B. Bullard,"Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank","Louis Bullard borrowed $ 387, 000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, Louis filed for Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then put a rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts or would be paid at a higher rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions within the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but held the order was appealable and Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it would not exercise jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over "" final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees. """
21,Barry Goldwater et al.,"James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al.",President Jimmy Carter passed on government authorization in signing a trade treaty with Taiwan.
875,Rocky Dietz,Hillary Bouldin,"Hillary Bouldin’s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz’s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz’s favor but awarded $0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re-empaneled the jury. He asked them to re-determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $15,000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal."
280,Chadbourne and Parke LLP,Samuel Troice et al.,"In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a ""covered security."" The term ""covered security"" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of ""covered securities."" The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as ""covered"" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal."
1165,Charles Wilkie et al.,Harvey Frank Robbins,"Harvey Robbins owned a private dude ranch which was intermingled with federal lands. The previous owner had granted the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land, but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. Robbins alleged that BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless criminal charges, with the aim of forcing him to grant the government right-of-way. Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a federal agent for a constitutional violation). Robbins argued that the Fifth Amendment protects a ""right to exclude"" government officials from one's property, and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for his exercise of this right. The District Court dismissed both claims, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the BLM officials, while acting on behalf of the government, had qualified immunity and therefore could not be sued for extortion under RICO. The government also claimed that no Bivens action could be brought, because review of the BLM's actions was already available under the Administrative Procedure Act."
70,Billy J. Taylor,State of Louisiana,"Billy J. Taylor was indicted on kidnapping charges by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish. The day before his trial was supposed to start, he filed a motion to quash the petit jury that was selected for his trial because he argued that women were systematically excluded, which denied him a right to trial by a jury of his peers. Although 53% of eligible jurors in his district were female, only 10% of the jury wheel was female. This discrepancy was due to an article of the Louisiana Constitution that specifies that a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously submitted a written declaration of her desire to serve. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and he was tried and found guilty. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the article regulating women’s jury service did not violate federal law."
404,Everett A. Sisson,"Burton B. Ruby, et al.","On September 24, 1985, a yacht owned by Everett Sisson caught fire while it was moored at a Lake Michigan marina. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several others in the vicinity. The owners of the other yachts sued Sisson for $275,000 for the damage to their yachts and the marina. Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief to limit his liability to $800, the value of his yacht after the fire. He argued that the district court had maritime jurisdiction, but the court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Sisson moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed."
389,Nicholas B. Heien,State of North Carolina,"On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I - 77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not looked up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54. 2 grams of cocaine in the car. A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the "" excessive suspicion "" required for a full stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated : the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "" fundamental unfairness "" because it held citizens to a traditional rule that "" ignorance of the law is no excuse "" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed through the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal."
1012,Charles Murphy,"Robert Smith, et al.","Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Federal Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers treated Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 you. S. C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 42 you. S. C. § 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, finding that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state - law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials and employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state - law claims where the officials or workers violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 you. S. C. § 1997e ( d ) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 % of the damage award or that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage."
929,Travis Beckles,United States,""" April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a saw - off shotgun was located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his case, the district court determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) who had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhance under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months to life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $ 5, 000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as criminal violent felonies ” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed - off shotgun was not a “ crime of violence or subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Beckles ’ conviction and sentence. The you. S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court ’ s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the appellate court again upheld Beckles ’ conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed - off shotgun was a “ crime of violence. ” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements in crimes of violence."
1378,John Ashcroft,Abdullah al-Kidd,"In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists. The lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it did not apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution."
1025,"Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea",United States of America,"Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant’s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant’s sentence under 18 you.S.C. § 3553(e) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government’s motion and reduced the defendant’s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 you.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court."
1453,"Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General",Carlos M. Gutierrez,"Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied to an immigration judge for cancellation of his removal from the United States. The government appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) sustained the government's appeal. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Gutierrez's petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanded to the BIA to allow it to reconsider his case based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mercado Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). That case held that ""[f]or purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under 8 you.S.C. 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with the parent."""
730,Knowles,Iowa,"After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable because or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a ""pot pipe"" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari."
1342,"E. K. McDaniel, Warden, et al.",Troy Brown,"On January 29, 1994, around 1:00 a.m., nine-year-old Jane Doe was raped in the bedroom of her trailer in Carlin, Nevada. Troy Brown and his brother Travis lived in the same trailer park as Jane Doe. Their brother Trent and his wife lived in a trailer across the street from Jane Doe's trailer. Both Troy and Trent were acquainted with Jane Doe's family, but Jane did not know Travis. That night, Troy drank at least ten shots of vodka followed by beer chasers; he was so drunk that he vomited on himself after leaving a bar at 12:15 a.m. Two witnesses saw a man stumbling between the Browns' trailer and that of Jane Doe's family around 1:00 a.m. Jane Doe called her mother to report the rape at approximately 1:00 a.m.; according to Troy, he returned to his trailer from the bar at approximately 1:30 a.m, theoretically giving him enough time to assault Jane Doe. Troy Brown was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual assault on a child, attempted murder, and abuse and neglect of a child resulting in substantial mental harm. There was a large amount of conflicting evidence drawn from Jane Doe's testimony and from the crime scene itself. Most relevantly, the state's expert tested semen taken from Jane Doe's underwear. She determined that the DNA matched Troy's and testified that the probability it belonged to another person from the general population was 1 in 3,000,000. Troy Brown's family tested the semen independently and found a random match probability of 1 in 10,000, but this was not introduced into evidence at trial. The jury found Troy Brown guilty of sexual assault and abuse and neglect of a child and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 10 years. On appeal, Brown argued that double jeopardy barred the duplication of sexual assault charges, that the DNA evidence was improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The Nevada Supreme Court vacated the charge for abuse and neglect and remanded to the trial court for sentencing. The trial court again sentenced Brown to life in prison. His petition for post-conviction relief was denied. On appeal to the district court, Brown claimed that the state's evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, using the habeas corpus review developed by the Court in Jackson v. Virginia. Brown submitted a report prepared by Laurence Mueller, a professor in ecology and evolutionary biology (""Mueller report""). The Mueller Report suggested that the prosecution's random match probability gave an improper impression that the likelihood of Troy Brown's innocence was also 1 in 3,000,000. It also questioned the state expert's testimony on the probability that one of Troy Brown's brothers would match the DNA sample, arguing that the likelihood of a match to one of Troy's brothers was as high as 1 in 66. The district court supplemented the record with the Mueller Report, as it was not presented to any state court. The district court then set aside the state's DNA testimony as unreliable and held that no rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The you.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the district court's ruling in a divided decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by supplementing the record with the Mueller report and that the admission of the state's DNA evidence was a due process violation and a violation of federal law."
486,Curtis Publishing Company,Wallace Butts,"In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ( 1964 ) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "" with knowledge if it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. "" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "" Bear "" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the newspaper. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Burnett was not a public official. On appealed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals by enforcing the court - ordered enrollment of the African - American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found for Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case."
1540,"Octane Fitness, LLC","ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.","ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (ICON) manufactures and sells exercise equipment throughout the United States. In 2000, ICON obtained you.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (the '710 patent) for a system designed to link parts in elliptical exercise machines. In 2010, ICON filed a complaint against another manufacturer and seller of exercise equipment, Octane Fitness (Octane), and claimed that Octane's elliptical design infringed upon the '710 patent. The federal district court held that Octane's design did not violate ICON's '710 patent. ICON appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. Octane argued that ICON's lawsuit was not based on any real patent infringement, but instead aimed at hampering upstart competitors with expensive, frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, Octane asked the court to apply a patent law attorney fees statute, a statute that awards attorney fees when the plaintiff's suit is found to be ""exceptional."" The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, but found that ICON had not acted ""exceptionally"" under the statute."
528,United States,Armstrong,"Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of ""conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same."" The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated."
1146,"Robert L. Ayers, Jr., Acting Warden",Fernando Belmontes,"In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider ""[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."" After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a ""reasonable likelihood"" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation. After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or ""unadorned"" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding."
1291,Ford Motor Company,"Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.","In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was guiding a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as the result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett ’ s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design - defect, failure - to - warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal responsibility. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if that defendant ’ s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific Personal jurisdiction on a corporate defendant when the plaintiff ’ s claims “ arise out of or relate to ” the defendant ’ s activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford ’ s motion to dismiss, finding a “ connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. ” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state or Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to federal jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19 - 369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question."
148,Homero Gonzalez,United States,"Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co - defendant on several drug - related cases. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury interviews began, another magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the defendants and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he directly object. He argued on appeal that he had the authority to conduct new trial because he did not give any personal consent as a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews."
778,Reeves,"Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.","Roger Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were supervisors in different Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. departments. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. Reeves' department was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves' work. Caldwell informed the company's director of manufacturing, Powe Chesnut, that production in Revees' department was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Chesnut ordered an audit, which revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut recommended that Reeves and Caldwell be fired and, subsequently, their employment was terminated. Reeves filed suit, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was a pretext for age discrimination and introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of employees under his supervision and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-related animosity when dealing with him. Ultimately, the case went to a jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of age-based discrimination."
1151,"Michael W. Sole, Secretary, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.",T.A. Wyner et al.,"Florida state park officials prohibited T.A. Wyner and George Simon from forming a peace symbol from nude individuals at a public beach. Wyner and Simon petitioned a district court, which issued a preliminary injunction barring the officials' interference and awarded Wyner and Simon their attorney fees in accordance with 42 you.S.C. Section 1988. Later, the district court reversed the injunction because state laws prohibited nudity at the beach. The officials argued that Wyner and Simon did not qualify as a ""prevailing party,"" and therefore should not have their attorney fees refunded. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Wyner and Simon were the ""prevailing party"" because the district court had decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on merits of the case. The park officials responded that the preliminary injunction was based on a ""mistake of the law,"" because the case was dismissed upon further review. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that a preliminary injunction is not a ruling based on the merits, and therefore does not determine the ""prevailing party."""
675,Trest,Cain,"Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a ""procedural default."" The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the ""procedural default"" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties."
823,George W. Bush,Albert Gore,"Following the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all ""under-votes"" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the you.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The you.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later."
2187,"Greg Abbott, et al.","Shannon Perez, et al.","Individual voters in Texas, along with organizations representing Latinos and African Americans, filed a number of lawsuits in 2011, challenging the Texas legislature’s congressional and state house redistricting plans. The actions were consolidated and proceed in the you.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (“Texas District Court”). The plaintiffs alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) as well as the 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution. At that time Texas was bound by the preclearance requirements under § 5 of the VRA, and therefore the State simultaneously filed an action in the you.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) seeking preclearance of the redistricting plans. While trial proceedings were pending in both district courts, the 2012 primary elections were approaching. As a result, the Texas District Court assumed the task of implementing interim redistricting plans, which it did on an expedited basis, without access to all relevant facts, and with the understanding that most parties to the litigation alleged that those plans contained many of the same statutory and constitutional infirmities as the challenged plans. The you.S. Supreme Court vacated the first iteration of the interim maps on the grounds that the court had not been sufficiently deferential to the legislature; the Texas District Court issued more deferential plans in February 2012. The D.C. District Court subsequently denied preclearance to the proposed redistricting plans on the basis that they were enacted with discriminatory intent and had the effect of abridging minority voting rights. Texas appealed this decision to the you.S. Supreme Court. After the Texas District Court’s interim maps were used for the 2012 elections, the Texas legislature failed to take any action on redistricting in the 2013 regular session. However, it convened a special session during which it adopted, among others, the Texas District Court’s congressional interim map (“Plan C235”) without any changes. The governor subsequently signed the legislation adopting this plan. In June 2013, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, which removed the § 5 preclearance requirements from the VRA. Texas was therefore no longer automatically subject to preclearance requirements, and the you.S. Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for further proceedings the D.C. District Court’s preclearance decision, which the lower court then dismissed as moot. The defendants subsequently sought to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims in the Texas District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the case had become moot. In response, the plaintiffs expressed their desire to amend their complaints regarding the 2011 plans and to challenge the 2013 plans. The court granted them leave to amend, and denied the State’s motions to dismiss. The court explained that the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the 2011 plans were not moot because, inter alia, the plaintiffs continued to be harmed by them. The court also ordered that the 2013 plans, which included Plan C235, be used for the 2014 elections. The plaintiffs then filed their amended complaints, including claims related to both the 2011 and 2013 plans. Most plaintiffs included claims that Plan C235 violated § 2 of the VRA and the 14th and 15th Amendments. The Texas District Court held trials on the 2011 plans in 2014, and found that they violated certain aspects of § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. In the ongoing litigation, the plaintiffs contended that the 2013 plans, including Plan C235, included some of the same elements that the court determined were the result of discriminatory intent or statutory or constitutional violations as in the 2011 plans. In August 2017, the Texas District Court issued an interlocutory order regarding the plaintiffs’ C235 claims. It found that the racially discriminatory intent and effects identified in the 2011 plans carried through to the 2013 plans where the redistricting lines remained the same. It explained that the legislature had adopted the court’s interim plans (which included C235) as part of a litigation strategy that was designed to insulate the plans from any further challenge. The legislature had not engaged in any deliberative process to remove the discriminatory elements from the plans before adopting them, but instead intentionally furthered and continued the discrimination in the existing plans. The court also concluded that the configurations of CD 27 and CD 35 under Plan C235 violated § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. As to CD 27, though the court had found in 2012 that this district did not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose because it was not possible to create an additional Latino opportunity district in the region, the Texas legislature had still engaged in vote dilution. Regarding CD 35, the court stated that while C235 was enacted in 2013, the challenged district boundaries that it reflected were drawn in 2011 and found to violate § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. The court explained that the Texas legislature did not engage in any meaningful effort to cleanse the discriminatory elements from the 2013 plan before it was adopted, and in fact intended to maintain that discrimination in enacting the plan in substantially the same form. The court additionally found that the plaintiffs had proven a § 2 “results” violation as to CD 27, HD 32, and HD 34, and a racial gerrymandering claim as to HD 90. The court’s order directed the Texas Attorney General to issue a written advisory within three days as to whether the legislature would convene a special session to address the issue of redistricting. If the legislature did not plan to hold a special session, the parties were ordered to appear before the court to prepare remedial redistricting plans. In January 2018, the you.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the defendants’ appeal on the merits, at which time the Court would also consider the question of jurisdiction."
498,Fogerty,"Fantasy, Inc.","After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 you.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: ""the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs."" On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
2134,Anthony W. Perry,Merit Systems Protection Board,"In the mid-2000s, Anthony Perry began to develop osteoporosis, so in order to alleviate his pain and to ensure that he could continue working, he made an informal agreement with his supervisor at the you.S. Census Bureau. The deal allowed Perry to take breaks throughout the day to control the symptoms of his osteoporosis, and to make up any time lost during the workday after hours with no penalty. On June 7, 2011, Perry received a proposed removal notice that alleged that he had been paid for hours that he had not worked. He contested the charges and pointed to the informal agreement he and his supervisor had made and his unblemished performance record. In August 2011, Perry and the agency entered into an agreement that required him to serve a thirty-day suspension, to retire on or before September 4, 2012, and to forfeit any discrimination claims against the agency. After serving his suspension and retiring, Perry brought a pro se claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the federal board that is authorized the hear certain challenges by federal employees to adverse employment actions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction because retirements are presumed to be voluntary, and the Board cannot review claims that resulted in settlement with the agency. Perry appealed to the Board, which remanded the case. Upon further review, the ALJ again denied that it had jurisdiction and held that Perry had not sufficiently shown that he was improperly coerced into settling his claims. Perry appealed to the Board again, which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Perry appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on a lack of proper jurisdiction.The appellate court docketed the case but granted Perry’s motion to suspend proceedings until the you.S. Supreme Court resolves the jurisdictional issue of which court system should hear the case."
1004,John J. Fellers,United States,"After a grand jury indicted Fellers, police arrested him at home. Fellers made incriminating statements during the arrest. Police officially interrogated Fellers at county jail and told him of his Miranda rights. Fellers signed a waiver of these rights and restated incriminating statements he had made at home. Fellers later argued that, when he was arrested in his home without a lawyer, police ""deliberately elicited"" incriminating statements. Pointing to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fellers argued it would be unconstitutional to admit at trial his incriminating statements made in jail, because these were the ""fruits"" of comments made at home without a lawyer. Fellers was convicted in federal district court. A federal appellate court affirmed the conviction and ruled that officers did not violate Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel either at home or in the jailhouse."
1248,"James J. Thole, et al.","U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.","Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against you. S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( ERISA ) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage on prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded during 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties engaging in litigation, the plan became overfunded ; that is, and contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the question that the plaintiffs had not incurred any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1273,Seila Law LLC,Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides tax - relief services, amongst others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the client to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court ’ s order on two grounds, one in which was that the CFPB is too structured. Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB ’ s structure violates the Constitution ’ s separation of power because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for because. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling : Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States, 295 you. S. 602 ( 1935 ), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 you. S. 654 ( 1988 ). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for - because removal restriction protecting the CFPB ’ s Director does not “ impede the President ’ s ability to perform his constitutional duty ” to ensure that his laws are faithfully executed."
912,"Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C.",Wells,"Deborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician-shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability."
984,U.S. Bank National Association,"Village at Lakeridge, LLC","The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, ( Lakeridge ) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC ( MBP ), a member of Lakeridge, decided to surrender its claim for Lakeridge ’ s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified how he had a good relationship with a member of it ’ s board. you. S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge ’ s assets, offered to dismiss Rabkin ’ s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. you. S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non - statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court ’ s finding if it is clear from the evidence that the mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non - statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had no close enough relationship with the member of MBP ’ s board to be considered an insider."
615,Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin,"United States, et al.","Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Menominee Tribe) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The self-determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those costs in annual funding agreements. In 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS’s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six-year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe’s argument. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from running."
1013,Mitchell,Esparza,"Gregory Esparza murdered a store clerk during a robbery in Ohio. He was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder. He appealed the death sentence, arguing that the prosecutors had failed to charge him as the ""principle offender"" in the murder and that he was therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Ohio law. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that, because Esparza had been the only person charged in the crime, it would have been redundant (and therefore unnecessary) to charge him as the ""principle offender."" Esparza then filed a second appeal before the Court of Appeals, this time arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his first appeal. He specifically cited his attorney's failure to argue that the state had violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by not following the ""letter of the law"" in its sentencing. The court again rejected Esparza's argument, referring back to its first decision and holding that the prosecutor's error had been harmless and was therefore not grounds for overturning the sentence. The defense attorney's failure to raise Eighth Amendment objections to the prosecutor's error, therefore, was also harmless. Esparza then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In response, Ohio argued that the Ohio Appeals Court's decision had not violated ""clearly established Federal law"" and that the district court therefore could not overturn the sentence. The court sided with Esparza, however, holding that the state's failure to follow its sentencing laws violated the Eighth Amendment. The attorney's failure to raise the Eighth Amendment claim in the first appeal, therefore, was not harmless and could serve as grounds for overturning the sentence. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the federal district court's opinion."
1760,"Charles F. Barr, et al.",City of Columbia,"The Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed both black and white customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina."
469,Crown Kosher Super Market,Gallagher,"The owners and a majority of the shareholders of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish Temple, which is trading on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously stayed open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one - third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts ’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open while doing any shopping, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Mega Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that the provision is unconstitutional, but the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion."
2325,"City of Chicago, Illinois","Robbin L. Fulton, et al.","The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton’s plan. The City then amended its proof of claim and asserted its status as a secured creditor. It refused to return Fulton’s vehicle, and Fulton filed a motion for sanctions against the City. The bankruptcy court held that the City was obligated to return the vehicle under Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), a binding case in which the Seventh Circuit had held that a creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor’s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition. The City moved to stay the order in federal district court, and the court denied its request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment denying the City's request."
1311,New Process Steel,National Labor Relations Board,"The union representing employees at a New Process Steel plant in Butler, Indiana failed to reach an agreement over a new contract with New Process Steel. The union subsequently filed unfair labor practices claims with the National Labor Relations Board (""NLRB"") arguing that New Process Steel failed to honor its collective bargaining agreement to deal with the union as the exclusive representative of employees of the plant. A two-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the union. On appeal, New Process Steel argued that the NLRB's decision was invalid because 29 you.S.C. § 153(b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that three members of the five member National Labor Relations Board shall ""at all times"" constitute a quorum. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the board. The court held that the NLRB had power to delegate its authority to a group of three of its members. In which case, two sitting members constituted a quorum. Therefore, the NLRB appropriately rendered its decision."
958,Smith,Doe,"Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in Alaska must register with the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. While some of the data is kept confidential, some, such as the offender's name, photograph, and physical description, is published on the Internet. The Act's requirements are retroactive. John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before the Act's passage are thus covered by it. Both brought suit, seeking to declare the Act void as applied to them under the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The District Court ruled against them and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause."
194,William Walter,United States,"On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films. On April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
811,Bank Markazi,"Deborah Peterson, et al.","Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank ( Bank Markazi ) owned nearly $ 2 billion worth of bonds that were held in one account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be recovered by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, "" [ T ] he financial assets that are identified in and are subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et all. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution … in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an action of [ terrorism ]. ” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States ’ separation between arms because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
736,Cleveland,Policy Management Systems Corporation,"While working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work due to her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari."
1734,John Thomas Avent et al.,North Carolina,"S. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only. On May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store’s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged them with trespassing. At trial, Boger testified that it was Kress’ policy to refuse service to black customers at the luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors’ common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race."
842,Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil,"American Tobacco Company, Inc., et al.","Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil (Sao Paulo) sued American Tobacco Company (American Tobacco) in Louisiana state court and argued that American Tobacco knowingly did not disclose information regarding the dangers of using tobacco products. Sao Paulo sought compensation for federal funds spent on medical care for tobacco-related illnesses. The case was moved to federal court, where Judge Carl J. Barbier presided over it. American Tobacco filed a motion requesting that Judge Barbier be removed from the case because he had been involved in a former case against American Tobacco and would not be able to impartially decide the case. Nine years earlier, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association had filed a brief in a case against American Tobacco that listed Judge Barbier as the president of the organization; however, Judge Barbier had retired six months prior and had not participated in the filing. Judge Barbier declined to remove himself from the case because he had not been involved in the previous case or any other tobacco-related cases and had no knowledge of the case at issue. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that, because Judge Barbier’s name was listed on the earlier brief, a reasonable person would have doubts about his impartiality."
426,"Richard E. Glossip, et al.","Kevin J. Gross, et al.","On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three - drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly ; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to keep him unconscious and did not die for about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also provided for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and two other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also sued for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to demonstrate any "" known and available "" alternative to the drug in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, The Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again."
1163,"Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General",Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez,"Luis Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen living in California, was convicted of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for the deportation of aliens who are convicted of an aggravated felony, which includes ""theft offenses."" The Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Duenas-Alvarez. An immigration judge ruled in favor of the government and ordered Duenas-Alvarez deported to Peru, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. On appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Duenas-Alvarez argued that he was not guilty of a theft offense for purposes of the INA because he had only aided and abetted the theft of the car. The California anti-theft law did not distinguish between auto-theft and merely aiding an auto-theft, but the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the INA ""theft offense"" includes only the person who actually stole and took possession of the car, and not necessarily anyone who aided in the theft. Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Duenas-Alvarez and reversed the lower courts."
845,"Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.",Williams,"In 1997, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. terminated Ella Williams, citing her poor attendance record. Subsequently, claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, Williams sued Toyota for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Granting Toyota summary judgment, the District Court held that Williams's impairment did not qualify as a disability under the ADA because it had not substantially limited any major life activity and that there was no evidence that Williams had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the impairments substantially limited Williams in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Because her ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time, the appellate court concluded that Williams demonstrated that her manual disability involved a class of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work."
1660,Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw,Illinois,"Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw were indicted for armed robbery in Cook County, Illinois. Following their conviction, in preparation for filling for an appeal, Griffin and Crenshaw requested a transcript of their trial proceedings without cost, on the basis that they could not afford the standard fee for the transcript. The lower court dismissed the petition without hearing evidence."
1866,"Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare",Linda Williams et al.,"The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a ""standard of need"" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A you.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision."
629,"Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.","Greg Manning, et al.","The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. ( Escala ), and their defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically trading counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs traded shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs ’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no doubt dispute its fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The defense sought to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs ’ motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in state Court."
1238,"Ritzen Group, Inc.","Jackson Masonry, LLC","Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale had never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached his contract by providing false documentation about the property just before a deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline. Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 you. S. C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy courts ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court ’ s order denying relief from the automatic stay ( which Ritzen did no appeal at the time ). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court ’ s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contracts. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals ; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed upon the merits. Ritzen appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court ’ s findings of fact under its abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines : the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal."
849,Brandon Thomas Betterman,State of Montana,"Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear to court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get to a courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 17, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence hearing did not occur until January 17, 2015, when he filed the motion to dismiss on the grounds where he was denied a full and fair trial due to the period of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 19, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail - jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman ’ s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial."
467,R.A.V.,City of St. Paul,"Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which ""arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."" The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court."
741,Norfolk Southern Railway Company,Shanklin,"In 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad intersection. At the time of the accident, the intersection was equipped with advanced warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, which were installed with federal funds under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program and were fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices. Afterwards, Dedra Shanklin, Mr. Shanklin's widow, brought a diversity wrongful death action against Norfolk Southern. Shanklin alleged, based on Tennessee statutory and common law, that Norfolk Southern had been negligent by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) pre-empted Shanklin's suit. The FRSA contains an express pre-emption provision, which allows States to enforce their railroad safety measures until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. The District Court held that Shanklin's allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not pre-empted and, ultimately, entered judgement for her. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that federal funding alone was insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA. The court concluded that because the Tennessee Department of Transportation had installed the signs for the purpose of providing ""minimum protection,"" no individualized determination of adequacy had be made by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under the Crossings Program."
1324,National Collegiate Athletic Association,"Shawne Alston, et al.","In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 you. S. 85 ( 1984 ), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA ’ s television program, violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different, less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust laws. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and help distinguish amateur athletics from professional athletics. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “ non - cash education - related benefits, ” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “ computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies. ” However, the district court held that the NCAA can still limit cash or cash - equivalent awards for academic purposes. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA "" s interest in “ preserving amateurism, ” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law."
749,"Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell",Connecticut,"Newton Smith and four sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were going door - to - door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti - Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and convicted with : ( 1 ) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting help from general public, and ( 2 ) inciting the common - law breach of the peace."
247,Walter Fernandez,California,"On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes following the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location and two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The police knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct their search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had gotten arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied this motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for its Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a non - tenant consented."
1668,Charles Rowoldt,J.D. Perfetto,"Charles Rowoldt, a German citizen living in the United States, received an order of deportation under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because of his membership in the Communist Party. Rowoldt admitted to joining the Party for about a year and working at a Communist bookstore. However, he contended that he should not be deported because he joined the Party to ""fight for his daily needs"" and get ""something to eat and something to crawl into."" The Internal Security Act contained an exception for those who joined the Party to obtain food, employment, or other necessities of living. Rowolt also indicated that he was not aware that anyone in the Party supported violent overthrow of the government. Rowoldt sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of Minnesota, but his writ was denied because there was enough evidence to support his membership in the Party. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment."
25,Edward Malley and Rhode Island,James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs,"In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped. The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge’s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable because for an arrest warrant."
185,Ilya Wolston,"Reader's Digest Association, Inc., et al.","In 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston’s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader’s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent. Wolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a “public figure” and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed."
1584,"Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, et al.","Mortgage Bankers Association, et al.","The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime wages to employees who work more than 40 hours per week. However, the FLSA also provides exemptions to this overtime rule for employees, including those ""employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity…or in the capacity of outside salesman."" Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is a national trade organization that represents real estate financial companies and their employees across the country. Among these employees are mortgage loan officers, who assist prospective buyers in finding and applying for mortgage offers. In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers' duties fell within the definition of ""administrative"" and that they qualify for the exception to the overtime rule in the FLSA. In 2010, however, the Deputy Administrator issued a second pronouncement that declared that a mortgage loan officer did not qualify for the administrative employee exception. MBA sued the Department of Labor in district court and argued that the agency could not change its interpretation without first going through a notice-and-comment period required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied MBA's motion for summary judgment. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the Department of Labor's 2010 interpretation."
1338,"Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.",Allstate Insurance Co.,"Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates (Shady Grove), on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in part for Allstate's alleged failure to pay interest penalties on overdue insurance payments as prescribed by New York statute. Allstate moved to dismiss relying on New York's rules of civil procedure which instruct that class action lawsuits are inappropriate unless specifically prescribed by statute. The you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed that Shady Grove's class action claim was not authorized and thus dismissed its claim. On appeal, Shady Grove argued that the New York rules of civil procedure conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus were not applicable. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Shady Grove and affirmed the district court. The Second Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, stated that the New York rules of civil procedure did not conflict with Rule 23 and thus Rule 23 did not control."
223,Washington,Chrisman,"In 1978, a Washington police officer stopped a student at the Washington State University after observing the student was carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. The officer asked for identification. The student, accompanied by the officer, then went into his dormitory to retrieve proof of age. After the student had entered his room, the officer noticed that the student's roommate, Chrisman, had marijuana seeds and a pipe on his desk. Chrisman was subsequently charged with the possession of marijuana and LSD."
657,Philip and Mendes Cohen,Virginia,"An act of Congress authorized the operation of this bank in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to buy D. C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities charged and convicted the Cohens, and then found themselves to be the final victims of disputes between other states and the national media."
440,Cottage Savings Association,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as ""substantially identical"" (because they had the same fair market value). When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the ""sale or disposition of [the] property."" An exchange of property only constitutes a ""disposition"" if there is a ""material difference"" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as ""substantially identical,"" the IRS ruled, a ""disposition"" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS."
558,Behrens,Pelletier,"After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable ""final"" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction."
1063,Reginald Shepard,United States,"Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more ""violent felony"" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed ""burglary"" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. you.S.(1990) the you.S. Supreme Court said the act meant ""generic burglary"" of a ""building or other structure."" However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA."
792,"W. A. Gayle, Mayor of Montgomery",Aurelia Browder,"While the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a boycott of a racially segregated bus system in Montgomery Alabama, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP challenged racial segregation on the bus system in the federal courts. This case arose in federal court in a violation of Reconstruction - period equal rights statutes and as a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three - judge district court held that state enforcement on this segregated but locally owned bus system in Montgomery violated the Equal Protection Clause. The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
1772,"Ralph D. Abernathy, et al.",Alabama,"In 1961, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, was under martial law as a result of the riots that started when groups of Freedom Riders arrived at the Greyhound Bus Station. On May 25, 1961, a military convoy escorted Ralph D. Abernathy, an African-American pastor from Montgomery, and 10 others (both African-American and white) to the bus terminal. The group purchased tickets, and all 11 went to sit at the lunch counter. There were at least 30 people in the station and several hundred people outside who could see through the plate-glass windows to the lunch counter. Given the tense atmosphere in the city and particularly at the bus station, Colonel Poarch of the National Guard directed the Sheriff of Montgomery County to arrest the eleven men. In his opinion, their actions seemed “calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.” Abernathy was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on charges of disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly. He appealed the case and argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for a writ of certiorari."
121,United States,Eugene Lovasco ,"On March 6, 1975, federal prosecutors indicted Eugene Lovasco for the possession of stolen firearms and for dealing in firearms without a license. The indictment alleged that Lovasco committed the offenses between July 25 and August 31, 1973—more than 18 months before the prosecutors filed the indictment. Lovasco moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the delay was unnecessary and prejudicial to his defense, as two of his witnesses had died in the interim. The district court found that the government had collected all of the necessary information to indict Lovasco within a month of the alleged commission of crimes and granted the motion to dismiss. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
727,Dickinson,Zurko,"Mary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior art and, therefore, denied the application. The PTO's review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a ""clearly erroneous"" standard of review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari."
527,David Carpenter,United States,"R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ ) entitled Heard on the Street ( Heard ) in Which he reported on up - and - coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four - month period, the brokers used Winans ’ information regarding stocks yet To be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $ 690, 000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) began an investigation, Winans and his co - conspirator Carpenter confessed. The district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found he and his co - conspirators guilty of mail and wire corruption as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and decided that, because the WSJ was the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges — had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners ’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans'knowing what of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ."
1164,North Carolina Department of Revenue,The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,"In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice ’ s descendants as the primary beneficiaries ( none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation ). In 2002, the original trust was subdivided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice ’ s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust ( “ the Trust ” ), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was both resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2007, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund all taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department ’ s motion to dismiss the claim of injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both states then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust ’ s motion against summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “ minimum contacts ” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non - contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed."
764,Miller,French,"In 1975, inmates at the Pendleton Correctional Facility filed a class action lawsuit, which ultimately led the District Court to issue an injunction to remedy Eighth Amendment violations regarding conditions of confinement. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. The PLRA provides that a motion to terminate such relief ""shall operate as a stay"" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, the State of Indiana filed a motion to terminate the remedial order against the correctional facility. Under the PLRA, the motion stayed the court's original remedial order. The prisoners of Pendleton moved to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA violated due process and the separation of powers doctrine. The District Court enjoined the stay. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that the provision precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but concluded that the statute was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds."
278,United States,"James Karo, et al.","Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants."
773,Sims,Apfel,"After a state agency denied Juatassa Sims' application for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ also denied Sims' claims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a ""disability."" Sims then sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied review. She next filed suit in the Federal District Court, contending that the ALJ erred in three ways by making selective use of the record, by posing defective questions to a vocational expert, and by failing to order a consultative examination. The District Court rejected her contentions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the contentions because they were not included in Sims' request for review by the Appeals Council."
1168,"Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.","United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt","The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $ 60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, the Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had made a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts — including forgery, deception, and threats — to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was fired, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $ 1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, he had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup. Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents on the contractors ’ fraudulent scheme involving the contractors and security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act ( FCA ), 31 you. S. C., § 3729 – 33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt ’ s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt ’ s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 you. S. C. § 3731 ( b ) ( 1 ), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of ( 1 ) “ 6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed ” or ( 2 ) “ 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances …. ” The district court granted the contractors ’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt ’ s claim would be time - barred. Reviewing the district court ’ s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt ( the relator ) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim."
1859,William Spinelli,United States,"Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to ""local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker."" The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they ""had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136."""
1046,Adaucto Chavez-Mesa,United States of America,"In 2013, Adaucto Chavez - Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135 – - months. The government recommended the minimum 135 - month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense categories. Chavez - Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “ tak [ en ] into account the policy statement set forth on USSG § 1B1. 10 and the sentencing factors set down in 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( a ). ” Chavez - Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553 ( a ) factors in deciding on the 114 - month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must decide how it applies the § 3553 ( a ) factor. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have decided that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient."
926,Federal Election Commission,Beaumont,"In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its because, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
1019,"Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.","Livestock Marketing Association; Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Association","The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The USDA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the USDA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech."
52,United States,Robinson,A police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.
1044,State of Washington,"United States of America, et al.","In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “ Stevens Treaties, ” which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off - reservation fishing. This so - called “ fishing clause ” guaranteed the Tribes “ the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations... in common with all citizens of the Territory. ” Since the treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and ( originally ) the white settlers there and ( today ) the state government elsewhere. The present case arises from these Tribes ’ contention that Washington State was building and maintaining culverts ( channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks ) that reduced the size of commercial runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20 + Tribes represented in the suit allege that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties. Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in no particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties. The district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1136,"Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",George W. Jackson,"In 2016, Citibank initiated the debt - collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank - issued credit card. In responding to Citibank ’ s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third - party class - action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems ( CWS ). In these third - party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade agreements with respect to the water treatment systems ; Jackson ’ s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson. Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand his case to state court and amended his third - party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank. The district court appealed Home Depot ’ s motion to either party, finding because there were not “ antagonistic parties on the same side, ” and granted Jackson ’ s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “ defendant ” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties on the purpose of realignment — to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction — was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA ’ s removal statute."
1910,Kadrmas,Dickinson Public Schools,"North Dakota was a sparsely populated state, and as late as the mid-20th century some children were educated in crowded one-room schools. Since 1947, the legislature encouraged thinly populated school districts to reorganize themselves into larger districts; once reorganized, districts could only charge for transportation provisions with voter approval. Dickinson Public Schools chose not to participate in the reorganization. In 1973, the district began charging a fee for door-to-door bus service; about thirteen percent of students rode the bus, and the district charged their parents ninety-seven dollars a year for one child or one hundred fifty dollars a year for two children. In 1979, North Dakota enacted legislation expressly indicating that non-reorganized school districts could charge fees for transporting students. Sarita Kadrmas, her mother Paula, and the rest of her family lived about sixteen miles from Sarita’s school. In September 1985, the family’s annual income was at or near the poverty level. Until 1985, the Kadrmas family agreed each year to pay the busing fee for Sarita, but they refused to sign a contract for the 1985 school year and the bus no longer stopped for Sarita. The Kadrmas family then used private transportation, but the costs exceeded $1,000 per school year. In September 1985, Paula Kadrmas and other parents in the district filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the Dickinson Public Schools and various school district officials from collecting any bus service fees. The district court rejected their action on the merits. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, rejected Kadrmas’ argument that the busing fee violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It characterized the statute as purely economic legislation, concluding that the charges authorized by the statute were rationally related to the legitimate government objective of allocating limited resources. In the spring of 1987, while her appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was pending, the Kadrmas family signed a busing contract for the remainder of the 1986 school year and paid part of the fee. They also signed a contract for the 1987 school year."
277,United States,Alberto Leon,"The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable because necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial."
305,United States,John Clyde Abel,"In 1981, John Abel was indicted for robbing a bank in California. During Abel’s trial, the prosecution called one of his accomplices, Kurt Ehle, to testify that Abel had participated in the robbery. To counter Ehle’s testimony, Abel called a mutual friend, Robert Mills, to the stand. Mills, Abel, and Ehle knew each other from the time they spent in prison together and their involvement in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Mills testified that, in prison, Ehle had talked about his plans to rob the bank and blame it on Abel. To discredit Mills, the prosecution re-called Ehle to the stand to expose the three men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and the gang’s strict code of protection, which required members to lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect a fellow member. Ehle testified that this code of conduct explained why Mills testified in defense of Abel. Abel’s counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant, but the district court allowed it into evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have on Abel. Abel lost and appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed because admitting evidence that Mills belonged to a perjurious organization, to suggest he was committing perjury this time, unfairly prejudiced him by association absent any evidence of his individual willingness to lie."
523,Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al.,Hyde,"A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 you.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied Bendix and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Bendix could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision."
922,"Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","David Harris, et al.","After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for you. S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the committee committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally ; there is no written records of the precise instructions he received. The chairs of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a “ Black Voting Age Population ” ( BVAP ) of 50 % plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50 %, which meant that there were two more majority - black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 on the Voting Rights Act. David Harris and Christine Bowser are you. S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and alleged that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act ’ s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters ’ influence in other districts. The district court argued that race was the main factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial law that violated the Equal Protection Clause."
2304,"Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc., et al.","Marcel Fashions Group, Inc.","Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties. In 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued. In litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel’s “Get Lucky” trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the “Get Lucky” mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal. In 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use “Lucky Brand” mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel’s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims “could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel’s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel’s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims. The Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action."
63,Michael Anthony Maness ,The Honorable James R. Meyers,"Michael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling obscene magazines in violation of a city ordinance. The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale. Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk’s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding. When Maness’ client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to 10 days in jail and a $200 fine. Another state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time. The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment. Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the you.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition. The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the Fifth Amendment applied. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction."
211,United States,Hazel Morrison,Hazel Morrison was indicted for distributing heroin and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to the agents about the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.
1549,Atlantic Marine Construction Company,U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas,"In 2009 the you.S. Corps of Engineers contracted with Atlantic Marine Construction Company (Atlantic) to build a child development center at Fort Hood, a military base located in the western district of Texas. Atlantic then subcontracted with J-Crew Management, Inc. (J-Crew) to provide labor and materials. The subcontract agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that any dispute would be litigated in Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Despite this clause, J-Crew brought suit against Atlantic in the you.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for failure to pay for work J-Crew performed. Atlantic moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 28 you.S.C. §1406, arguing that the forum selection clause required the suit to be brought in Virginia. Atlantic also moved, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 you.S.C. §1404(a). The district court denied Atlantic's motions, holding that Atlantic did not show why the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of Virginia. Atlantic petitioned the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Virginia. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and venue was proper in the Texas court because the parties entered into and performed the agreement in that district."
2020,Utah,Edward Joseph Strieff,"Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop."
1394,National Aeronautics and Space Administration,"Robert M. Nelson, et al.","A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review."
396,"Stephen Kimble, et al.","Marvel Enterprises, Inc.","In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider - Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his invention. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase its patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an end date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court. The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a "" hybrid "" agreement, in which patent and non - patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that court, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over - compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extended the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non - patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non - patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district in."
919,Moseley,"V Secret Catalogue, Inc.","V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the affiliated corporations that own the Victoria's Secret trademarks, filed suit, alleging that the name Victor's Little Secret contributed to ""the dilution of famous marks"" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The law defines ""dilution"" as ""the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."" The District Court granted V Secret summary judgment on the FTDA claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that V Secret's mark was distinctive and that the evidence established dilution even though no actual harm had been proved."
50,Gertz,Robert Welch Inc.,"Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a ""Leninist"" and a ""Communist-fronter"" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling."
1450,Philip Parker,David Eugene Matthews,"In 1981, David Eugene Matthews broke into the home he once shared with his estranged wife, Marlene. Matthews found Marlene's mother asleep in bed and shot her in the head at point blank range. Matthews went to the next room and found Marlene, who he raped and then shot twice. Marlene died instantly and her mother died later that day. Police found Matthews at his mother's house attempting to wash the clothes he wore during the shootings. Police found the murder weapon hidden under the floorboards of a she would in the backyard. At the police station, Matthews made a tape recorded statement denying responsibility for the murders. A grand jury indicted Matthews for both murders and burglary. At trial, Matthews did not contest the fact that he committed the murders. Instead, he tried to argue that he suffered an ""extreme emotional disturbance"", which reduces a murder to first-degree manslaughter under Kentucky law. Matthews claimed the Marlene abused him throughout their relationship, which lead to his extreme behavior. The jury convicted Matthews and sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed and rejected Matthews claim that the jury erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove an extreme emotional disturbance. Matthews filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kentucky Supreme Court violated clearly established federal law in denying his claims of error."
831,"Stephen Voisine, et al.",United States,"In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman ( with whom he was in a domestic relationship ) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “ knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person. ” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a parent or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the same misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered evidence which they later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend ’ s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence not possess a firearm. Voisine, Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes don't constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “ recklessness ” is sufficient in conviction of the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court ’ s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “ physical force ” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine ’ s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute."
240,"Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.","The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were ""persons"" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
1310,"Rent-A-Center West, Inc.",Antonio Jackson,"Antonio Jackson filed a complaint in the Nevada federal district court alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The employer, Rent-A-Center West, Inc., moved to dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in part that the district court was required to determine in the first instance whether the coverage and discovery provisions of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable."
958,"Charles S. Turner, et al.",United States,"In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered at an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how other people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth various defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Nearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received new trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which argued that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants."
58,Cox Broadcasting Corporation,Cohn,"Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims."
856,Danny Birchfield,State of North Dakota,"Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests or the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to get their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired ( DWI ) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged on two counts of first - degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over his legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there are no probable because that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
478,Shaw,Reno,"The you.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
636,Crawford-El,Britton,"Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that ""Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...."" Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence."
1137,"Margaret Bradshaw, Warden",Kenneth T. Richey,"Kenneth T. Richey attempted to kill his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend by setting fire to his ex-girlfriend’s apartment. The ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend escaped, but the neighbor’s two-year-old child was killed in the fire. Richey was convicted of aggravated felony murder and sentenced to death on the theory of transferred intent. On direct appeal with new counsel, his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Richey sought state post-conviction relief but was denied by both the state trial court and the state appellate court. He then petitioned for federal habeas relief, but the federal district court denied his petition. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that under Ohio law, the theory of transferred intent cannot be applied to aggravated felony murder, and Richey received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s mishandling of the arson expert and expert testimony."
357,"Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.","The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.","Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low - income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project ( ICP ), a non - governmental organization dedicated to racial and economic aspects of development in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs ( TDHCA ), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments in Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low - income housing within minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act. At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard with disparate impact claims that the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court ruled in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used a wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The district court affirmed and held that this district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act."
1081,"Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.",John Cardegna et al.,"John Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies over the loan through arbitration. Cardegna later sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the contract were illegal. Buckeye filed a motion in Florida district court to have the case resolved by arbitration, as required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not enforceable. The court agreed and ruled for Cardegna. On appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbirtration Act, as interpreted by the you.S. Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals court relied on the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's use of Prima Paint, however, because the contract in that case had been merely voidable, while the contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed, ruling in favor of Cardegna."
953,"Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed - wire fence on the you. S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a you. S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez ’ s friends at the you. S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the you. S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck himself in the head and killed him. Six months after Hernandez ’ s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the you. S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a federal test, the district court concluded that the Constitution ’ s deadly - force protections stop at the border for non - citizens like Hernandez. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also held that Mesa was not entitled to constitutional immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, The Court declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under and Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the, States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed."
1696,Robert Aquilino and Joseph Sero dba Home Maintenance Co.,"United States, Ada Bottone, Fleetwood Paving Corp., Colonial Sand and Stone Co. Inc.","A general contractor defaulted on federal tax payments and payments to subcontractors. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the you.S. government claimed priority over the lien on the “property rights to the property” of the general contractor. The subcontractors also claimed priority, because the amounts owed to them were large enough that they constituted “trust funds” under a New York tax law. The subcontractors were the beneficiaries of these “trust funds” so the general contractor had no property rights. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the subcontractor’s motion to for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled in favor of the United States"
1806,"Warden, Maryland Penitentiary",Bennie Joe Hayden,"Around 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden’s room. Hayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had “evidential value only” and was improperly admitted into evidence at trial."
279,National Labor Relations Board,Noel Canning,"The National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA ) established the National Labor Relations Board ( Board ) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) presides over the hearing on the complaint, issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair union practice occurred, to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five - year terms. In 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi - Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 ( Union ). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and salary plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ held that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning. Noel Canning appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case, of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. in, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress."
713,Charles Schenck,United States,"During World War I, socialists Charles Taylor and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against sexual servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting suicide because insubordination in the military force to increase recruitment. Johnson and Smith were convicted of violating this Act and appealed on the grounds because the statute violated the First Amendment."
2364,"Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.","New York, et al.","On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of ""aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status."" The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number. Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the you.S. Conference of Mayors (the ""Governmental Plaintiffs""); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words."
114,City of Philadelphia et al.,New Jersey et al.,"A New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause of Article I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976."
190,"Crown Simpson Pulp Company, et al.",Douglas M. Costle,"Crown Simpson Pulp Company and Louisiana-Pacific Corporation operated two bleached craft pulp mills in California. The mills were granted permits by the California State Water Resources Control Board with variances from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for effluent discharge. The EPA, however, denied the variances. The mill companies sought review directly in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Act allows direct appeal of EPA actions either “issuing or denying any permit”. The court of appeals dismissed the review, holding that because the State granted the permits and the EPA merely objected the variances, this case did not fall under the Act."
371,California,Greenwood,"Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges."
221,Heffron,"International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.","A Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an assigned location on the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair."
720,Benjamin Gitlow,People of the State of New York,"Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto"" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York’s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state."
1508,"Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Dept. of Corrections",Edward Harold Schad,"In 1985, an Arizona jury convicted Edward Schad of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death for strangling 74-year-old Lorimer Grove. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, and Schad sought state habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the state courts denied his petition. Schad then sought federal habeas relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court denied. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to consider whether Schad’s state habeas counsel was properly diligent, at which point the state of Arizona petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case based on a recent decision holding that federal habeas review is limited to the record of the state habeas proceedings. The appellate court then affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. Schad filed a motion for the appellate court to reconsider, which was denied, and the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Schad then filed a motion requesting a stay of the mandate for the execution, which the appellate court denied. Then, instead of issuing the mandate, the appellate court construed the previous motion as another motion to reconsider, which it granted and remanded the case to the district court."
310,Batson,Kentucky,"Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him."
903,"Yellow Transportation, Inc.",Michigan,"Before 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States to charge interstate motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. Under this system, some States discounted or waived registration fees for carriers from other States in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), the ICC implemented a new registration system. ISTEA also capped state registration fees by establishing a fee system that ""will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee?that such State collected or charged as of?1991."" In 1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a fee for Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s trucks pursuant to a reciprocal agreement. However, in 1992, the commission changed how it computed fees and, ultimately, levied a fee of $10 per vehicle on Yellow Transportation's entire fleet. Yellow Transportation sued, alleging that, because Michigan had not collected or charged a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA's fee-cap provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State charged or collected as of 1991. The court reasoned that the new fee system is not based on the fees collected from one company, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of 1991."
795,Kansas,Colorado,"In 1949, Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact. Article IV-D provided that future development of the river basin could not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability to other users of the river's waters. In 1986, Kansas filed suit alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master found that post-Compact increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado had materially depleted the waters in violation of Article IV-D. The Special Master, in his second report, recommended that damages be awarded to Kansas. In his third report, the Special Master recommended that such damages be measured by Kansas' losses attributable to Compact violations since 1950, be paid in money not water, and include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of judgment. Colorado filed four objections to the third report, Kansas filed one, and the United States submitted that all objections should be overruled."
1102,"Mohawk Industries, Inc.",Shirley Williams et al.,"A group of current and former employees of Mohawk Industries brought suit against Mohawk in federal district court under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They claimed that Mohawk had conspired with third-party employment recruiters to bring illegal immigrants into Georgia to work for the company, and that the resulting competition for jobs hurt the legal workers. Mohawk asked the court to dismiss the case because, it argued, the plaintiffs had not shown that there were two distinct entities involved in the illegal activity as required under RICO. The only parties involved were the Mohawk corporation and the third-party recruiters, which were acting as its ""agents."" Mohawk argued that, because the recruiters were working on behalf of the corporation rather than in cooperation with (but distinct from) it, they should not be considered separate entities. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that the recruiters and the corporation were distinct and that RICO could therefore apply."
2272,"Robert A. Rucho, et al.","Common Cause, et al.","A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court."
479,"Robert Kennedy, Attorney General",Francisco Mendoza-Martinez,"Francisco Mendoza - Martinez ( Martinez ) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did eventually return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 ( the "" Act "" ) and served 366 weeks in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued a arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401 ( j ), the Act which divested draft dodgers of their A. S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his you. S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401 ( j ) in District Court but was defeated. After appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion of the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort."
1186,"United States Department of Commerce, et al.","State of New York, et al.","Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued the decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court with a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the court alleging that the question could because a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary ’ s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought — if the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, another venue for their action, authorized — depositions of high - ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross ’ s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government ’ s previous stay application for prejudice, “ provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken. ” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high - ranking officials, so that government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed. The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact - finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision further. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction."
585,Abigail Noel Fisher,"University of Texas at Austin, et al.","Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University’s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny."
64,Dempsey,Martin,"Pro - petitioner John B. Dempsey sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the you. S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In October 2006, the Court had modified Rule 39. 8 to deny Dempsey in forma civil status with respect of a petition for certiorari. Before the 38. 8 denial Dempsey had filed eleven petitions for certiorari and one petition for an extraordinary writ. After the 39. 8 denial, he filed five petitions for certiorari. All eighteen of Dempsey's previous claims were deemed frivolous to the Court and denied without any dissent."
967,"Ricky Henson, et al.","Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.","The petitioners are a group of consumers who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed vehicles, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they needed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA ( Santander ), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, three petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ) in its communications with them. Santander attempted to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “ debt collector ” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from the institution and did not originate it. The district judge agreed with Santander and dismissed the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court ’ s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc."
1434,"Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security",Karen K. Capato,"In 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato were married in New Jersey, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, and was advised that chemotherapy might render him sterile. Before beginning treatment, Robert deposited semen at the Northwest Center for Infertility and Reproductive Endocrinology so the couple could conceive a child in the future. Karen Capato conceived a child naturally, however, giving birth to a son in August of 2001. The Capatos wanted their son to have a sibling, but Robert's health deteriorated quickly, and he died in Florida in March of 2002. He was insured by social security when he died. His will named only his son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries. Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began treatment for in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen semen. She gave birth to twins on September 23, 2003, eighteen months after her husband's death. In October 2003, Karen applied for benefits from the Social Security Administration on behalf of her twins. § 416(e) of the Social Security Act (""SSA"") defined ""child"" as ""the child or legally adopted child of an individual"". In addition, the child must be dependent on an insured individual at the time of the qualified individual's death. § 416(h) provided an alternate method of determining a child's qualification, directing the Commissioner of Social Security to look to the intestate property laws of the domiciliary of the deceased insured individual. The Social Security Administration denied her claim, and Karen requested a hearing in front of an administrative court. While noting that granting benefits would be consistent with the purpose of social security, the court held that the twins were not Robert's ""child(ren)"" for the purposes of the SSA. The district court affirmed, echoing the ALJ's interpretation of ""child(ren)"". The court also held that because Robert died while domiciled in Florida, Florida's law of intestacy applies. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the twins were clearly children under § 416(e) of the SSA because they were the biological children of a married couple. It rejected the district court's argument that Florida state intestacy law should apply before § 416(e), holding § 416(h) to be an alternate definition only used when a child's status is in doubt."
1579,"M&G Polymers USA, et al.","Hobert Freel Tackett, et al.","Retirees from the Point Pleasant Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia⎯owned by M&G since 2000⎯sued after M&G announced that the retirees would be required to contribute to the cost of their medical benefits. The retirees, who had been employees of Apple Grove before the plant was bought by M&G, entered into a series of collective bargaining negotiations through their unions regarding healthcare benefits. Just as earlier versions had included, the 2005-2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) included a provision that ""capped"", or limited, the company's annual contribution towards employee healthcare benefits. In 2006, M&G announced it was requiring employees to cover their individual costs once that cap was exceeded in response to the shifting healthcare landscape. The retirees claimed that language in the effective CBA promised full coverage of healthcare benefits for life without any contribution requirement and sued the company because that ""capping"" provision was not included in the pension and insurance booklet or adopted by the union on behalf of employees in the latest agreement. The retirees sued under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court dismissed the retirees' claim, and they appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court found in favor of the retirees but ordered that their healthcare benefits be reinstated to the post-2007 version that included employee contributions. Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgement."
1111,Michael J. Biestek,"Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration","Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration ( SSA ) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) denied his application, then the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely apologized, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge ’ s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical - expert testimony and would not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but never before. Biestek appealed the ALJ's determination, and the district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding no substantial evidence supports the ALJ ’ s contention that Biestek did not meet the back - pain - related impairment requirement and because the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert."
616,Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin,"United States, et al.","Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin ( Menominee Tribe ) provided healthcare services for members of the tribe pursuant to a self - determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services ( HHS ). The self - determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those payments in annual funding agreements. In 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS ’ s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 2005 as untimely because the six - year statute for limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe rejected that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe ’ s argument. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitation had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from run."
1777,"William Albertson, Roscoe Quincy Proctor",Subversive Activities Control Board,"On November 22, 1950, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order requiring the Communist Party to register under Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) as a Communist-action organization. The Court sustained this order in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board. On May 31, 1962, the Attorney General separately required William Albertson and Roscoe Quincy Proctor, as alleged members of the Communist Party, to fill out two registration forms each. Neither registration form was specifically mandated by the SACA. Albertson and Proctor did not provide personal information required by the forms, instead asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the board and denying that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization. The Attorney General presented the testimony of paid Federal Bureau of Investigation informers that Albertson and Proctor participated in meetings of the Party and had been elected to Party offices. The board took official note of the proceedings and issued a final order stipulating that petitioners had not properly registered as members of the Communist Party. On appeal, the court held that Albertson and Proctor’s claims of privilege were premature in part because they had not yet been prosecuted for a criminal activity."
993,Randall C. Scarborough,"Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs","Randall Scarborough won a case against the Department of Veterans Affairs. He then applied for attorney's fees to the you.S. Veterans' Court under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Under the EAJA, the government must pay attorney's fees to anyone who wins against the federal government in litigation unless the government can show that its position was ""substantially justified."" However, Scarborough's attorney submitted an incomplete application, neglecting to assert that the government's position was not substantially justified. Though he amended and resubmitted it, he did so after the 30-day filing deadline. The Veterans' Court dismissed the application for ""lack of subject matter jurisdiction"" - that is, because it was not filed in its complete form within the 30-day deadline. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
873,JPMorgan Chase Bank,Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.,"Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is ""between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,"" and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking."
774,Arch R. Everson,Board of Education of the Township of Ewing,"A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of travel to and from communities, including private schools. 96 % of the private schools who benefitted from this funding are parochial Catholic institutions. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed another lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to school violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the N. S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds."
1157,Microsoft Corporation,AT&T Corporation,"AT&T owned the patent for certain speech codecs (a type of software code) included in Microsoft's Windows operating system. When Microsoft sent master versions of the software overseas, copied them, and sold the copied software, AT&T sued for patent infringement. A company is guilty of infringement under the Patent Act if it ""supplies...from the United States...components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components."" Microsoft argued that it was not liable because 1) software code is intangible and cannot not be considered a ""component"" of an invention and 2) no software had been ""supplied"" from the you.S. because the copies were made overseas. The District Court rejected both of Microsoft's arguments, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit ruled that software code could be a component, because the Patent Act was not limited to physical structures. The Circuit Court also held that each overseas copy made of the you.S.-originated software code was ""supplied"" from the United States."
824,"W. Kevin Hughes, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al.","Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al.","The Federal Power Act ( FPA ) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity production. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ( FERC ) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, ( PJM ) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing not adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, Inc, ( CPV ) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, ( PPL ) and other existing power plants sued but argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM - regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case then consolidated with CPV ’ s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants."
1919,Stephen Law,Alfred Siegel,"On January 5, 2004, Stephen Law filed for bankruptcy. He claimed that there were two liens on his property consuming all of the property's value beyond a homestead exemption. A homestead exemption protects equity in a house when filing for bankruptcy. One of these liens turned out to be a fictional construction involving a woman in China. Alfred Siegel (the Trustee) claimed that, in exposing the false lien, he incurred $465,000 in attorney fees. Because these costs resulted from Law's misconduct and misrepresentation, the Bankruptcy Court added a surcharge equal to the full amount of Law's homestead exemption to offset the Trustee's costs. Law appealed the decision to the Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, federal appeals courts may create panels of judges to hear appeals from Bankruptcy Court. The BAP affirmed the order and held that the surcharge was necessary to protect the Bankruptcy Court's integrity. Law appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the BAP decision."
608,United States,Lanier,"David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 you.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for ""lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage."" The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the you.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation ""fundamentally similar."" The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the ""clearly established"" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases."
917,United States,"American Library Assn., Inc.","Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment."
1037,"George J. Tenet, Individually, Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and United States","John Doe, et ux.","Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. you.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim."
1324,"Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice",Anthony Cardell Haynes,"Anthony Cardell Haynes was tried in a Texas state court for the murder of a police officer. The state sought the death penalty. During voir dire, two separate judges presided at different stages. One judge presided when the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually, the other judge presided when preemptory challenges were exercised. When the prosecutor struck an African-American juror, Mr. Thaler's attorney made a Batson objection -- arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The judge, who was not present during jury interviews, found that the strike was race neutral and denied the Batson objection. The case proceeded to trial and Mr. Haynes was convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, Mr. Haynes argued that ""a trial judge who did not witness the actual voir dire cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate a Batson challenge."" The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. Mr. Haynes then filed for and was denied habeas corpus relief by a Texas federal district court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted review. It held that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made an unreasonable application of you.S. Supreme Court precedent in its decision and Mr. Haynes warranted federal habeas corpus relief."
379,Skinner,Railway Labor Executives' Association,"Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules."
1368,Alejandra Tapia,United States,"Alejandra Tapia was convicted of bringing illegal aliens into the United States and of jumping bail after being charged with immigration crimes. Following the jury trial, a judge on the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Tapia to 51 months in prison, noting that one factor in giving her a longer sentence was to make sure she remained confined long enough to take part in a drug rehab program. Tapia appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court committed plain error by basing her sentence on speculation about whether and when she could enter and complete the Bureau of Prison's 500-hour drug abuse treatment program. But in April 2010, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court order."
635,"Tyson Foods, Inc.","Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.","Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) at the company’s meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a “gang-time” system, which means they were paid only for time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying appropriate compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars. Tyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the company’s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the plaintiff class."
30,"Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover",United States,"Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the you.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing."
1718,John Burrell Garner,Louisiana,"In a number of consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions were based upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari."
231,Michigan,Bay Mills Indian Community,"The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ( IGRA ) requires that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state & the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, a Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally registered Indian tribe operating a reservation located in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town in Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal - State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs'claims, while Bay Mills'sovereign immunity bars the others."
1103,Keanu D.W. Ortiz,United States,"Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active - duty military officers may hold a "" civil office, ” including positions to require "" an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. "" 10 you. S. C. § 973 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( ii ). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review ( CMCR ), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on a US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ( CCA ). A judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and publishing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years'imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ( CAAF ), asking the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because Mitchell had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from serving on the court under both of the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's arguments. Note : the case was original consolidated under Dalmazzi v. United States ( 16 - 961 ), and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there."
4,Dunn,Blumstein,"A Tennessee law required a one - year relationship with the state plus a three - month association with the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had just moved to Tennessee, challenged the legislation by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other state leaders in federal district court."
417,"David King, et al.","Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act ( ACA ) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an "" exchange "" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA only required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low - income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which the individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the Tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal - well as state exchanges. Virginia declined to establish a state - run exchange and has one operated by another federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, could fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and operates contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted the defendants'motion to dismiss, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
2043,"Universal Health Services, Inc.","United States and Massachusetts, ex rel. Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa","Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS) owns and operates Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), a mental health services provider in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Arbour participates in the state Medicaid program, MassHealth, and the state has promulgated regulations for such “satellite” facilities. Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa are the parents of Yarushka Rivera, a teenager with behavioral issues who began seeing a counselor at Arbour. These counselors were not licensed, and Escobar and Correa became concerned that they were not being properly supervised as the regulations of satellite facilities required. Rivera was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed a medicine by a “doctor” who was later discovered to be a nurse under the supervision of a non-board-certified psychiatrist. Rivera soon had an adverse reaction to the medicine and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she had a seizure and was hospitalized. A few months later, she suffered a fatal seizure. Escobar and Correa filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS under both the federal and state False Claims Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint and held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead the elements of falsity that claims under the False Claims Act require. The you.S. Court of Appeals reversed and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of falsity by applying an “implied certification” test, which states that falsity has been sufficiently pled when there is evidence that the defendant did not comply with a condition of payment."
68,Breuer,"Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.","Philip Breuer appealed in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state courts cases dealing with federal laws can have a case moved to federal court "" unless otherwise expressly allowed by Act of Congress. "" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits violating the FLSA to be heard in state court and so the case could therefore be returned to state court ; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to district court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
1347,Florida,Georgia,"this is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the dispute involves a water - related dispute involving Georgia and Florida over territorial waters of the Apalachicola - Chattahoochee - Flint River system."
1836,Maxwell,Bishop,"On November 3, 1961 William L. Maxwell was arrested and charged with raping a woman in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The jury convicted him of rape but did not render a verdict of life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial court imposed the death penalty, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Maxwell sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and claimed that his conviction and punishment were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury had determined the guilt and the penalty in a single proceeding. Additionally, he argued that the jury was not given any standards or direction regarding the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. The district court denied the writ, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial."
481,"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.",United States,"Title II of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 abolished racial discrimination by members of public business if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta factory near Atlanta, Georgia, refused to hire Black Americans. The government sought also prohibit the workers from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II."
1596,"John Kerry, Secretary of State",Fauzia Din,"Fauzia Din, who is a United States citizen, filed a visa petition for her husband Kanishka Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Nine months later, the State Department denied the petition based on a broad provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that excludes aliens on terrorism-related grounds. Berashk asked for clarification of the visa denial and was told that it is not possible for the Embassy to provide him with a detailed explanation of the reasons for denial. After several other unsuccessful attempts to receive explanation of the visa denial, Din sued and argued that denying notice for aliens who were not granted a visa based on terrorism grounds is unconstitutional. The district court held that Din did not have standing to challenge the visa denial notice. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the government is required to give notice of reasons for visa denial based on terrorism grounds."
1468,"CompuCredit Corporation, et al.","Wanda Greenwood, et al.","CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit was required. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The majority explained that a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims ""unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."" Accordingly, the ""burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies."""
807,Americold Realty Trust,"Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.","The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust ( Trust ) in bankruptcy court for a breach of contract stemming with a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to take the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust ’ s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, with the district court found in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did adequately meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must apply to the Trust ’ s beneficiaries ( who are its shareholders ), or just the trustees."
315,Freddie Lee Hall,Florida,"Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non-record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with ""unquantifiable weight,"" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test—whether he had an IQ below 70—could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed."
1807,Samuel Spevack,Solomon A. Klein,"The New York Bar charged Samuel Spevack, an attorney from New York, with professional misconduct because he refused to produce financial records and testify at a judicial inquiry. In his defense, Spevack claimed his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and stated that the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The New York appellate court rejected Spevack's defense and ordered Spevack disbarred, holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not available to attorneys against states."
599,"Rebecca Friedrichs, et al.","California Teachers Association, et al.","California law allows unions who become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union became the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “ agency shop ” arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent union dues to the union in the form of a “ fair share service fee. ” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must first opt out each year. Petitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and argued that their agency shop arrangement and the opt - out requirement violated The First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1257,"Jesus C. Hernández, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15 - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández ’'friends on you. S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From you. S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him. Hernández ’ s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son ’ s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion of dismiss, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 you. S. 388 ( 1971 ) ( holding an implied course of action of federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff ’ s constitutional rights ), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s dismissal of the parents ’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer became entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “ clearly established ” that it was unconstitutional for a officer on you. S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil. The you. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández ’ s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents _ assert claims for _ under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court ’ s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 you. S. _ _ ( 2017 ), in which. Court held that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under B ##ivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim."
797,David Anthony Taylor,United States,"David Anthony Taylor was a member of the “ Southwest Goonz, ” a group of robbers based around Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on the drug dealer, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and were reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor ’ s second trial, after his first resulted in one hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana south of state lines does actually affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government ’ s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present enough evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor ’ s motion, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction."
412,Maryland,Craig,"Sandra Ann Craig, the operator of a kindergarten and pre-school facility, was accused of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Over Craig's objections, a trial court allowed the alleged child victim to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The child testified outside the courtroom while Mrs. Craig, through electronic communication with her lawyer, could make objections. The judge and jury also viewed the testimony in the courtroom. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of serious emotional distress for the child witness. The trial court convicted Craig, but the Maryland high court reversed."
246,Walter Fernandez,California,"On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was robbed and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed a call help, and a few minutes after the assault, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told investigators that the suspect resided in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested during connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession in firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co - tenant consented."
943,"Expressions Hair Design, et al.","Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.","The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated the Free Speech Clause of its First Amendment and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the regulation was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and discounts, which narrowed the number of commercial products available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the statute qualified as the regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined that prices were not inherently protected - and thus, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague."
1262,"The Travelers Indemnity Company, et al.","Pearlie Bailey, et al.","In 1986, a federal bankruptcy court granted Travelers Indemnity Co.'s (Travelers) motion to settle with three separate classes of plaintiffs in asbestos related litigation (on behalf of its insuree Johns-Manville Corp.) and enjoin non-settling parties from future litigation with Travelers for alleged misconduct unrelated to the settlement. The orders were subsequently affirmed by a New York federal district court and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Over ten years later, the Second Circuit vacated the orders, stating that state-law actions (""Direct Actions"") against Travelers that alleged wrongdoing while it acted as Johns-Manville Corp.'s insurer were not barred by the 1986 order. The court held that the federal bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to prevent such lawsuits."
124,Neil Randall et al.,William H. Sorrell et al.,"In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, interest groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits constituted unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contributions restrictions were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying for raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, which upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits to contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $ 400 to a single candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were "" narrowly tailored "" to the state's budget."
724,Benjamin Gitlow,People of the State of New York,"Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1937 for distributing a controversial Left Wing Manifesto "" that called for the establishment of socialism through violence and class action of this form. Gitlow became convicted under New York ’ s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was little resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to be of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did its New York Court of Appeals, the highest tribunal in that state."
1463,Credit Suisse Securities LLC et. al.,Vanessa Simmonds,"Vanessa Simmonds alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to sue the banks herself. The banks argued that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds."
260,Immigration and Naturalization Service,Padungsri Phinpathya,"The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of any otherwise deportable alien if the person has been consistently physically present in the United States for at least seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would represent great hardship to the person and/or family members. Padrungsi Phinpathya, a citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. She and her husband, a Thai citizen who entered the country in 1968, were granted permission to stay until July 1971. When their visas expired, they chose to stay without the permission of the proper authorities. In January 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) commenced deportation processes on the couple. They applied for a suspension, which an immigration judge granted to Phinpathya’s husband but denied for her because she did not meet the continuous residency requirement. Phinpathya’s own testimony showed that she left the country in 1974 and improperly obtained a visa from the US consular office in Thailand for her return three months later. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s ruling and held that Phinpathya’s illegal status when she left and returned to the US made the absence “meaningfully interruptive” of her residency and made her ineligible for the suspension of deportation. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, despite her absence, Phinpathya’s intent was always to return to the US."
562,Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.,"CLS Bank International, et al.","Alice Corporation ( Alice ) is an Australian company that owns the'479,'510,'720, or'375 patents, all of which have a do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor. On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International ( CLS ) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non - infringement and invalidity of the'479,'510, and'720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the'375 patent expired, and Alice amended its complaint to incorporate this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted infringement claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an experimental idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange or eliminate risk. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
799,"Circuit City Stores, Inc.",Adams,"In 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a ""contract of employment,"" and thus not subject to the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes ""contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"" from the Act's coverage."
768,Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu,United States,"In response to the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor during World War II, the you. S. government decided to require Japanese - Americans to move into Japanese camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese - American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, decided to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested but convicted of violating the order. He responded by insisting that Executive Order 9066 violate the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction."
487,"Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration And Naturalization Service, et al.","Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et al.","According to Executive Order No. 12807 signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, the Coast Guard was required to force the return of all passengers discovered illegally traveling by sea from Haiti to the United States before reaching its borders without determining whether they qualify as refugees. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a collection of organizations representing illegal Haitian aliens and Haitians detained at Guantanamo, requested that the District Court for the Eastern District of New York delay the implementation of the order. The council argued that the order violated section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential prosecution from forced repatriation. The District Court denied the council's request, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed."
637,South Dakota,Yankton Sioux Tribe,"An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing ""shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty."" In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
193,Rhode Island,Innis,"After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located."
1018,"Los Rovell Dahda, et al.",United States of America,"Los and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas were obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co - conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that motion, and both brothers pronounced guilty and sentenced. The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect would not "" directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “ core concerns ” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 — privacy and uniformity — that were not implicated by the Dahdas ’ argument that an order exceeded the Kansas district judge ’ s jurisdiction."
1865,Mae Wheeler,John Montgomery,"Mae Wheeler was a 75-year-old widow who lived solely on her welfare check and monthly Social Security payment. On August 30, 1967, the San Francisco Department of Social Services learned that Wheeler had received the proceeds from her late son's veteran insurance policy. After a county welfare supervisor called Wheeler, the Welfare Department began withholding Wheeler's welfare check pending an investigation. Wheeler requested a hearing and for the restoration of her payments until her because could be heard. Wheeler did not get the restoration of her payments, but she ultimately prevailed in her claim and had benefits restored several months later. Wheeler along with other similarly-situated people were granted class action status, and the class claimed that California welfare termination provisions deprived the class members of their constitutional due process rights by terminating welfare benefits before having a full and adequate hearing. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reviewed the California court's opinion"
273,Bacchus Imports Ltd.,Dias,"The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii."
579,United States,Brockamp,"Stanley B. McGill, whose estate is administrated by Marion Brockamp, paid the Internal Revenue Service money he did not owe. McGill, or his representative, submitted an administrative refund claim several years past the end of the applicable filing period set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. McGill asked the court to extend the statutory period for an ""equitable"" reason, namely that he had a mental disability that caused the delay. Although such a reason is not mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code, the Court of Appeals read the statute as if it contained an implied ""equitable tolling"" exception, which the court found justified, and therefore permitted the actions to proceed."
209,Texas Department of Community Affairs,Joyce Ann Burdine,"The Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). Burdine possessed several years’ experience, was promoted and was often assigned additional duties. Burdine applied for the supervisor’s position of Project Director, however, she never received a response and the position remained vacant for six months. When the PSC learned it would lose funding unless it appointed a permanent Project Director and completely reorganized the PSC staff, a male employee from another division was hired as Project Director. Three employees, including Burdine, were let go, leaving a male as the only professional employee in the division. The TDCA rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where she received the same salary as the Project Director at PSC. Burdine sued the TDCA and alleged that the failure to promote her and the decision to terminate her were gender discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part because the TDCA bore the burden of proof and did not prove it was more likely than not that the male employee hired or promoted was better qualified than Burdine."
704,Minnesota,Carter,"Wayne Thomas Carter, Melvin Johns, and Kimberly Thompson were arrested after a police officer observed them through a window bagging cocaine in Thompson's apartment. During the trial in Minnesota state court, the defendants moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence. They argued the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Subsequently, they were all convicted on state drug charges. The Minnesota trial court held that because they were not overnight social guests they were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that the officer's window-based observation was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the state intermediate appellate court held Carter did not have standing for an objection to the officer's action because his use of the apartment for drug purposes removed any legitimate expectation of privacy. The court also affirmed Johns' conviction . The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It held that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place and that the officer's observation constituted an unreasonable search. Minnesota sought a writ of certiorari in the you.S. Supreme Court."
1064,Gary Sherwood Small,United States,"Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person ""convicted in any court"" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a you.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term ""convicted in any court"" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small."
808,Americold Realty Trust,"Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.","The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust ( Americold ) before state court for a breach of contract derived from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust ’ s board. No plaintiff challenged the legitimacy of the removal, and the federal court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary conviction, and the district court found in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing this issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust ’ s beneficiaries ( who are its shareholders ), not just the trustees."
1083,Richard Will et al.,Susan Hallock et al.,"you.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the detention of goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear the appeal."
226,Nixon,Fitzgerald,"In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust."
398,"Stephen Kimble, et al.","Marvel Enterprises, Inc.","In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider - Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., so that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the license to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then appealed to the federal district court. The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a "" hybrid "" agreement, in which patent and non - patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated, continue these payments beyond the expiration date for their patents because doing so would over - compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non - patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and no - patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended in the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court."
524,City of Lakewood,Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,"Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the validity of the Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor either grant or deny requests, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all his approvals to whatever "" standards and conditions "" which he "" deemed necessary and reasonable. "" On appeal from a state court ruling that found an act constitutional, the Court of Appeals ruled. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari."
2337,"Charles Borden, Jr.",United States of America,"Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 you.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
891,Devlin,Scardelletti,"Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement."
1272,"Pleasant Grove City, Utah et al.",Summum,"Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not ""directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove."" Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The you.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a ""public"" forum, not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest."
894,"Ricky Bell, Warden",Gary Bradford Cone,"Gary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be ""contrary to"" or involve ""an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing."
517,"Sue Evenwel, et al.","Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al.","The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three - judge panel from the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed onto laws. Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted or signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts don't adhere to the'one person, one vote'principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered vote population, and while the new districts are relatively equal to proportion of total population, they vary significantly in relation to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion to dismiss and held that the defendants failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal."
1293,F. Scott Yeager,United States,"In July 2005, a jury in a federal district court acquitted F. Scott Yeager of conspiracy, wire fraud, and security fraud, but hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering in relation to his involvement with Enron Broadband Services. The district court declared a mistrial on the counts the jury hung on. Thereafter, the United States again indicted Mr. Yeager on a portion of the mistried counts. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Yeager argued that in acquitting him of securities fraud, the jury ""necessarily found that he did not have insider information"", and therefore collateral estopple prevents the government from retrying him for insider trading and money laundering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial in Mr. Yeager's case. It recognized that Mr. Yeager had the burden of proving the jury necessarily found that he was not guilty of insider trading. He did not, as a jury that found him not guilty of insider trading and ""acting rationally"" would have acquitted him of insider trading and money laundering. The court reasoned that because it was unclear the jury's rationale for its decisions, Mr. Yeager's mistried counts did not prevent his retrial on those counts."
705,Conn,Gabbert,"Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol Najera, prosecutors in the retrial of the Menendez brothers, learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to Traci Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the first trial. After being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury and to produce any correspondence that she had received from Menendez, Baker responded that she had given all of Menendez's letters to her attorney, Paul L. Gabbert. When Baker appeared as directed before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert, Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the letter. While Gabbert was being searched, Najera called Baker before the grand jury for questioning. Gabbert brought suit against the prosecutors contending that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession without unreasonable government interference was violated when the prosecutors executed a search warrant at the same time his client was testifying before the grand jury. The Federal District Court granted Conn and Najera summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that Conn and Najera were not entitled to qualified immunity on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claim because their actions were not objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Gabbert had a right to practice his profession without undue and unreasonable government interference."
630,Michael Musacchio,United States,"Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services (ETS), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services (TTS), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $10 million. In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial."
862,Horn,Banks,"George Banks was convicted of 12 counts of first-degree murder. After Banks' direct appeal was denied, the you.S. Supreme Court decided in Mills v. Maryland, 486 you.S. 367, that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing determination. Under this new case law, Mills argued that the jurors in his trial were instructed improperly. Custodial officials argued that the law was not applicable retroactively on habeas corpus review. Ultimately, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rule on retroactivity, the Federal Court of Appeals concluded that the State Supreme Court had unreasonably applied federal law in evaluating Banks' claim that his penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills without evaluating retroactivity."
1162,Environmental Defense et al.,Duke Energy Corporation,"A 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act created the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program (PSD), which requires power companies that want to make emissions-increasing modifications to their facilities to first apply for permits. Between 1988 and 2000, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) made twenty-nine extensive improvements to its power plants without obtaining PSD permits. When the government, along with Environmental Defense and several other environmental groups, sued Duke, the company pointed to a PSD regulation explicitly defining ""modification"" for purposes of PSD as any change that increases the hourly rate of emissions from a facility. Duke's improvements increased the number of hours the plants remained open, and therefore also increased the total annual emissions from the plants. But since the improvements left the hourly rate of emissions unchanged, Duke argued that it did not have to obtain PSD permits. The government countered by citing the Environmental Protection Agency's current interpretation of the PSD regulations, which holds that a power company making improvements that increase the hours of operation of its plants does need to obtain a permit in all cases where construction is involved. The District Court ruled in favor of Duke. The judge refused to rely on the EPA's current interpretation, ruling that it was inconsistent with the wording of the PSD regulations. Environmental Defense appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the 1977 PSD amendment had taken its definition of ""modification"" directly from a 1975 Clean Air Act amendment concerning the New Source Performance Standards program (NSPS). In the 1975 amendment, the term ""modification"" explicitly excluded improvements that merely increase the hours of operation of a facility. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held, the EPA did not have statutory authority to interpret ""modification"" differently for the PSD program. Environmental Defense appealed to the Supreme Court, with the added argument that the Fourth Circuit never should have heard the case, because challenges to Clean Air Act regulations can only be brought in the D.C. Cricuit."
33,"Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover",United States,"Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges for conspiracy to invade the United States and of mail order. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony remained inadmissible to seek a guilty verdict under Rule 606 ( b ). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of judicial misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The circuit court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit upheld the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in attempting to hold a second evidentiary hearing."
183,"Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship","Leo P. Martinez, et al.","The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law ( CLS ) filed suit against the university in a California federal court for violating its First Amendment Rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow "" any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs. "" In contrast, CLS asked its members to attest in writing that "" I believe in : The Bible as the inspired word of God ; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son ; The eternal punishment of Jesus Christ for our sins ; His bodily resurrection and His personal return ; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration ; [... ] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of eternal life. "" The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, a school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights."
2176,"National Institute of Family and Life Advocates, et al.","Xavier Becerra, et al.","The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively “NIFLA”) sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “Act”). The law’s stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act’s requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA’s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 you.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived. The Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny. Finally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include this issue."
277,National Labor Relations Board,Noel Canning,"The National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA ) established the National Labor Relations Board ( Board ) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or from the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five - year terms. In 2010, Noel Morris, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi - Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 ( Union ). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and salary plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Montgomery's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An attorney determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective labor agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning. Noel Canning appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling the invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January,. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress."
1705,"Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc.","Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc.","Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
1141,Sinochem International Co. Ltd.,Malaysia International Shipping Corporation,"Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the you.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of ""forum non conveniens,"" which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court should have first ruled on the jurisdictional issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court."
1616,Robert Mitchell Jennings,"William Stephens, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","On July 19, 1988, Houston Police Officer Elston Howard was in the midst of arresting the clerk of an adult bookstore when Robert Mitchell Jennings entered the store intending to rob it. Jennings shot Officer Howard four times and then proceeded to rob the store. The trial court jury subsequently convicted Jennings of capital murder. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Jennings' long criminal history as an aggravating factor. The defense called the jail chaplain to testify to his opinion that Jennings was not ""incorrigible,"" and the defense did not present any further evidence of mitigating factors. In 1996, Jennings filed a state habeas petition and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase because his attorneys had failed to contact his family to provide evidence of a disadvantaged background and had failed to find and present a 1978 psychological report that suggested that Jennings had a ""mild organic brain dysfunction."" The state court held that Jennings' attorneys had conducted a sufficient investigation into his background, and that their decision not to introduce this testimony and evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. The state court recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals deny the request for habeas relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acted accordingly. In 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition with the district court. The district court granted the petition and held that Jennings had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to present evidence of his disadvantaged background and possible mental incapacities. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Jennings' counsel's decision not to pursue these avenues of argument was a legitimate trial strategy. The Court of Appeals also held that a federal habeas petitioner must file a certificate of appealability in order to respond to arguments concerning the state's appeal."
914,State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,"United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al.","Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies : One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that included hurricane but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for handling wind damage claims, while government funds would pay for flood damage claims ; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. ( State Farm ) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders ’ flood protection claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). The appeals court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA ’ s seal rule, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the client, and that violation of the FCA sealing requirement warrants swift dismissal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal."
1221,Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar,United States,"Humberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar was apprehended in 2004 driving a Volkwagen Beetle crawling 30 miles below the speed limit on a main artery through Texas to Mexico. When police pulled Cuellar over, they discovered that he had logged about 1,000 miles in the past two days stopping in major cities along the way for just hours each time. When questioned, Cuellar acted nervously; he later turned over a large roll of cash that smelled like marijuana. When police examined the car, they found drill marks suggesting tampering with the gas tank, as well as mud splashings and animal hair typical of efforts to conceal the existence of contraband. Police found $83,000 in cash in a secret compartment beneath the floorboard. Cuellar was convicted of money laundering, but the appeals court overturned the conviction. The court ruled that the federal money laundering statute required the government to prove that Cuellar was attempting to portray the money he carried as legitimate wealth, rather than merely showing that he tried to hide it."
1936,Republican Party of Minnesota,White,"Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
435,"Curtis Reid, Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail",Claris Covert,"Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England. Pursuant to a “status-of-forces” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury."
865,TRW Inc.,Andrews,"In 1993, while at a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise."
276,National Labor Relations Board,Noel Canning,"The National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA ) established the National Labor Relations Board ( Board ) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at minimum three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred, to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five - year terms. In 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi - Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with his employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 ( Union ). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor situation in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ determined on the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling in Noel Canning. Noel Canning appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that The Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by of Senate in 2010 and two members of President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January,, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress."
1891,"Leander H. Perez, Jr.; Louis Reichart; George Bethea; Earl Wendling ","August M. Ledesma, Jr.; Harold J. Speiss; Lawrence P. Pittman ","August Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly appealed the district court decisions to the you.S. Supreme Court."
1268,"FNU Tanzin, et al.","Muhammad Tanvir, et al.","The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the you. S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) placed their names on the FBI “ No Fly List, and despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in you. S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in defiance of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ( “ RFRA ) ), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “ [ a ] person whose religious liberty has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate damages against a government. ” The you. S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals of the Second Circuit, that panel of which reversed the lower bench. One of the agents, Tanzin, sued for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges."
1226,James Erin McKinney,State of Arizona,"By way of relevant background, James McKinney ’ s childhood was “ horrific ” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse — all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried a run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half - brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney ’ s jury found her guilty of two counts of first - degree murder ( without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder ), and Hedlund ’ s jury found him guilty of one count of first - degree murder and one count of second - degree murder. At McKinney ’ s first sentencing hearing ( before a judge ), a psychologist testified that it had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “ resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered. ” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney ’ s childhood trauma and produce “ diminished capacity.. The trial judge credited the psychologist ’ s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge is prohibited from considering non - statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney ’ s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney ’ s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 you. S. 104 ( 1982 ), by refusing to consider McKinney ’ s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death of case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney ’ s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court ; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 you. S. 584 ( 2002 ), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘ final ’ before the you. S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring."
304,City of Oklahoma City,"Rose Marie Tuttle, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Tuttle","On October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert’s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who “acting under color of state law” deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused by a municipal “policy,” but a single, unusually excessive use of force could support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle’s estate $1.5 million in damages. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
40,Wolff,McDonnell,"An inmate of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit also objected to the prison's inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail."
377,North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners,Federal Trade Commission,"The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners ( Board ) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It currently composed of six [UNK] are elected by other dentists in North [UNK] dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry. In 2003, non - dentists began offering teeth - whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After customers complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non - dentist teeth - whiteners. The non - dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over - the - counter teeth - cleaning products dominated the North Carolina market. The Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non - dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board also engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters ; the FTC overturned that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as the state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws."
1091,"Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.","Swift-Eckrich, Inc., dba ConAgra Refrigerated Foods","When ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, in contrast to the precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the procedural dispute."
57,DeFunis,Odegaard,"DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The you.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school."
200,Ohio,Herschel Roberts,"On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute. After being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed."
1267,Carlos Jimenez,"Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","In 1995, Carlos Jimenez pled guilty in Texas state court to burglary and violating his probation. Because Jimenez had a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he was sentenced to 43 years in prison. Jimenez appealed and, in 1996, a state appeals court dismissed Jimenez's petition when a court-appointed lawyer stated that Jimenez had no grounds for appeal. Six years later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed leave for Jimenez to renew his appeal based on his lawyer's incompetence, however the court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In 2005, Jimenez filed a habeas corpus petition in a Texas federal court arguing that he had not received adequate legal assistance during his proceedings in the state courts. The district judge dismissed the claim, holding that the one-year statute of limitations, which began running on the date of conviction, had expired. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's appeal. Jimenez, in his petition for certiorari, argued that the one-year statute of limitations should actually have begun in 2005, after his final appeal was denied in state court, rather than in 1995 when he was convicted."
789,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel, et al.","Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.","This case represented the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D. C. relating to the segregation at public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be regulated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs then denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, and held only racially neutral public facilities were legal, long as the facilities for blacks and women were equal. ( This was known as the “ separate but distinct ” doctrine. )"
206,Democratic Party of the United States,Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,"The Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) required that delegates sent to its National Convention were chosen exclusively by voters affiliated with the party, but the state of Wisconsin allowed non-Democrats to participate in state primaries. In the primary, voters expressed their choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination. Although the Wisconsin Democratic Party (State Party) selected delegates at a caucus occurring after the primary, Wisconsin law required these delegates to allot their votes at the National Convention in accord with the amount of support each candidate received in the primary. The National Party prohibited the State Party delegates from participating in the 1980 National Convention because of non-Democrat influence in the state primary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the National Party must admit the delegates since Wisconsin had a ""compelling interest"" to maintain the ""open"" feature of its primary system."
34,"Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover",United States,"Anthony Tanner and William Williams were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol for lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach the jury verdict under Rule 606 ( b ). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearings. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing."
972,"City of Littleton, Colorado","Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., a Limited Liability Company, dba Christal's","Littleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. If the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 you.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for ""prompt judicial determination."" The federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed."
2353,"Federal Republic of Germany, et al.","Alan Philipp, et al.","In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then. In 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection. The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the you.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s and SPK’s argument based on principles of international comity."
232,Michigan,Bay Mills Indian Community,"The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ( IGRA ) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state and the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with money from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation reservation in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various parts of its Tribal - State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over three of the plaintiffs'actions, while Bay Mills'sovereign immunity bars the others."
1161,North Carolina Department of Revenue,The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,"In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos division with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice ’ s descendants as the primary beneficiaries ( none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time their creation ). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice ’ s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust ( “ the Trust ” ), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated in those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund all taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking in court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department ’ s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motions as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state judge granted the Trust ’ s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “ its contacts ” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non - contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish and contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed."
535,Supreme Court of Virginia,Friedman,"Myrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was upheld in federal district court."
1637,Jeremy Carroll,"Andrew Carman, et ux.","On July 3, 2009, the Pennsylvania State Police Department received a report that Michael Zita had stolen a car and two handguns and then likely fled to the Carman residence. Officers Jeremy Carroll and Brian Roberts went to the Carman residence to investigate and noticed that a small structure in the rear of the property had a light on a door open, so they approached and announced their presence. When no one responded, the officers continued to approach the house via a back door that the officers believed looked like a customary entrance. The residents confronted the officers, but eventually identified themselves as the Carmans and allowed the officers to search their house. The officers did not find Zita, and the Carmans were not charged with a crime. The Carmans later sued Officer Carroll in district court and argued that he had unlawfully entered their property in violation of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Carroll argued that his entry was legal under the ""knock and talk"" exception to the warrant requirement, which allows officers to knock on someone is door as long as the officers are standing on the parts of the person's property on which the general public is allowed. The Carmans argued that exception did not apply in this case because a normal visitor would have used the front door. The jury found in favor of Carroll, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because the ""knock and talk"" exception requires that the police begin their interaction at the front door. The appellate court also held that Carroll was not entitled to qualified immunity because his actions violated clearly established law."
1127,Lincoln Property Company et al.,Christophe Roche et ux.,"Christophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest."
2223,Tyson Timbs,Indiana,"Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January. The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the you.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law."
242,"Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.","The Green also owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 shops and over 13, 000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed its desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( ACA ), employment - based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA - approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non - profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for - profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, including representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment - based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ( RFRA ). The plaintiffs sought another preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied when a two - judge panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, while the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "" persons "" for the purposes of RFRA who had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
46,"Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior et al.",C. R. Mancari et al.,"Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 you.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court."
1253,Eddie Lee Shular,United States of America,"The Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “ violent felony ” or a “ serious drug "" ” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 days in prison. In recent years, the you. S. Supreme Court has adopted a “ categorical ” approach to determine if a prior conviction constitutes the “ violent felony ” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “ serious drug offense ” as well. Eddie Lee Shular emerged as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses — five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these convictions required that the government prove that Shular had “ knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, ” this is, that a substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular ’ s Florida convictions would qualify as a “ serious drug offense ” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “ requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances. ”"
22,Keyes,"School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado","Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well."
357,Maryland,Harold Garrison,"Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed."
439,Barnes,Glen Theatre Inc.,"Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear ""pasties"" and a ""G-string"" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute."
1030,"O. John Benisek, et al.","Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.","In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state entails two parallel procedures: a public-facing procedure led by the Governor’s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland’s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC-developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was one of the ones developed by NCEC; rather, former Governor Martin O’Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the “Cook Partisan Voting Index” rated the Sixth District as a “likely” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a “safe” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20.9% margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court."
876,Atkins,Virginia,"Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or ""mentally retarded"" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded."
1462,"Eric Greene, aka Jarmaine Q. Trice","Jon Fisher, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al.","A jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements. Greene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal ""as having been improvidently granted."" In 1998, the you.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as ""habeas corpus."" By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates ""clearly established Federal law."" The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not ""clearly established"" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling."
153,"Winston M. Holloway, et al.",State of Arkansas,"On June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall moved for the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed."
235,National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,Claiborne Hardware Company,"In 1966, at a local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched a boycott of white merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and “threats” to carryout the boycott."
1253,Deondery Chambers,United States,"Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had ""knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution"" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA."
2214,"Animal Science Products, Inc., et al.","Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al.","Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. (“Petitioners”) are US vitamin C purchasers who commenced a multidistrict class action lawsuit against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al. (“Respondents”), which are business entities incorporated under the laws of China, alleging violations of you.S. antitrust laws. Specifically, they claimed that Respondents engaged in price-fixing and supply manipulation in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Respondents did not deny that they had coordinated prices and sought to create a supply shortage, but moved to dismiss on the grounds that they acted in accordance with Chinese government regulations requiring them to do so. The district court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss and a subsequent motion for summary judgment. Following a jury trial, the court entered a judgment of approximately $147 million against Respondents, and enjoined them from engaging in any further anti-competitive activity. Respondents appealed to the 2nd Circuit, which vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint with prejudice. The appellate court based its reversal on international comity grounds, explaining that the district court had erred in not deferring appropriately to the Chinese government’s explanation of its domestic laws, which mandated the conduct by Respondents that was considered anti-competitive under US law. Particularly given that the Chinese government had appeared in the proceedings, the fact that Respondents could not simultaneously comply with US and Chinese laws necessitated the conclusion that the district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The appeals court further held that other factors significant under an international comity balancing test derived from 3rd and 9th Circuit case law affirmed that abstention was appropriate in the instant matter."
251,"Fifth Third Bancorp, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan ( ESOP ), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During a time period in question, a large portion of an ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) by declining to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious future. The federal district court rejected Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss."
1561,"Brandt Revocable Trust, et al",United States,"In 1908, the United States granted land, known as a right-of-way (ROW) to the Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company to build a 66-mile railway from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado. In 1976, the United States granted Fox Park, Wyoming⎯land that surrounds the ROW⎯to Melvin and Lula Brandt. In 1986, a new company, the Wyoming and Colorado Railway Company, acquired the ROW. The company operated the ROW until it officially abandoned the land in 2003. Following the abandonment, the United States sued the Brandt Revocable Trust and other potential property owners under 42 USC 912, a statute governing the disposition of abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. The government argued that this statute reverts abandoned ROWs back to the federal government's exclusive possession. The United States sought a judicial order of abandonment and exclusive possession of the ROW. The Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners filed a countersuit seeking full possession of the ROW, insofar as it cut through their land. They argued that the statute only granted an easement to the United States, not full possession. The district court granted the interest in the ROW to the United States and the US. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
714,United States,Rodriguez-Moreno,"Jacinto Rodriguez-Moreno and others were hired by a drug distributor to find a drug dealer who stole cocaine from the distributor while holding captive the botched deal's middleman, Ephrain Avendano. In pursuit of the dealer, Rodriguez-Moreno took Avendano from Texas to New Jersey to New York to Maryland. In Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a revolver and threatened to kill Avendano. However, Avendano escaped and called the police. Rodriguez-Moreno was then arrested. Rodriguez-Moreno was charged in a federal District Court with, among kidnapping and other violations, using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm ""during and in relation to any crime of violence."" Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the firearm count for lack of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno argued that the only place where the Government had proved he had actually used a gun was Maryland and, therefore, venue was proper only in Maryland. The court denied the motion and a jury found Rodriguez-Moreno guilty of the count. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied a ""verb test,"" under which a violation of section 924(c)(1) is committed only in the district where a defendant ""uses"" or ""carries"" a firearm. Thus, the New Jersey court venue for the firearm count was improper."
677,Munn and Scott,Illinois,Illinois regulated both elevator and elevator companies by imposing maximum rates for their products.
311,California,Ciraolo,"The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction."
1256,Frank Ricci et al.,John DiStefano et al.,"White and Hispanic candidates for promotion in the New Haven, CT fire department sued various city officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed for the plaintiffs' promotion to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. The plaintiffs argued that their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 you.S.C. Section 2000e, and the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause were violated. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that the CSB, by refusing to certify the results of the promotional exam, was trying to fulfill its obligations under the rules utilized by the plaintiffs in their argument and therefore was protected in its actions."
922,"Hillside Dairy, Inc.",Lyons,"California regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship."
1087,"Apple, Inc.","Robert Pepper, et al.","This lawsuit arose out of Apple ’ s handling of a sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “ closed system, ” in that Apple controls which apps can have loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “ App Store. ” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third - party developer, Apple receives 30 % of the sale price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone software market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits involving both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of judges included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale. Apple issued yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court ’ s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 you. S. 720 ( 1977 ). Under Illinois Brick, “ only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution ” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then it may sue Apple. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the of Circuit reviewed the district court ’ s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing."
353,City of Los Angeles,"Naranjibhai Patel, et al.","Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code ( LAMC ) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes the officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are "" closely regulated "" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections. The district court determined that motels were not subjected to that same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized "" closely regulated "" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels does not have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records contained private "" papers "" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not account for non - compliance judicial review of an officer's request to inspect a motel's records."
519,McIntyre,Ohio Elections Commission,"On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of ""Concerned Parents and Tax Payers."" Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature."
1489,Carlos Trevino,"Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","On the night of June 9, 1996, Carlos Trevino and four others drove to a nearby store to pick up beer for a party. One of the men noticed 15-year old Linda Salinas and offered to drive her to a nearby restaurant. Instead, the group drove Linda to Espada Park in San Antonio, Texas where they started to sexually assault her. Trevino's cousin, Juan Gonzalez, refused to participate and returned to the car; meanwhile, Trevino and the three other men continued the assault. Linda's body was discovered in the park the next day with fatal stab wounds to her neck. After their investigation, the San Antonio Police arrested Trevino and a grand jury indicted him on one count of intentional murder and attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault. At trial, Trevino's cousin Gonzalez testified against him. Gonzalez testified that the men returned to the car with blood on their shirts discussing the murder, with Trevino bragging about how he learned to kill in prison. With this evidence, the jury found Trevino guilty and was left to decide on an appropriate punishment. They determined that Trevino intended to kill Linda and was likely to commit such violent acts in the future. At the jury's suggestion, the trial court sentenced Trevino to death. Through both the punishment phase of the trial and the first state habeas corpus proceeding, Trevino's attorney did not investigate or present any mitigating evidence that could have reduced Trevino's sentence. During the federal habeas proceeding that followed, Trevino's attorney withdrew and the court appointed new counsel. Trevino's new counsel undertook his own investigation and discovered several pieces of evidence that the jury could have found relevant during the punishment phase of the trial. Trevino returned to state court and filed a second habeas corpus application on the basis that his first attorney had a duty to investigate and present the mitigating evidence. Since the attorney failed to do so, Trevino claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a competent attorney had been denied. The state court denied his application, stating that Trevino should have presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the first state habeas proceeding. Trevino returned to the federal district court to reassert this claim, but that court also denied his claim because it was never properly raised in state court. The district court went on to explain that the allegedly ineffective performance of his first attorney during state habeas proceedings did not excuse his failure to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during those proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and Trevino appealed further. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question below."
1015,"Los Rovell Dahda, et al.",United States of America,"Los and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co-conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced. The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not ""directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “core concerns” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—privacy and uniformity—that were not implicated by the Dahdas’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction."
1334,"Jose Santos Sanchez, et al.","Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.","Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status ( TPS ) and were subsequently permitted a remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and her wife applied to becoming lawful permanent residents under 8 you. S. C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ( USCIS ) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “ statutorily ineligible ” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and a district judge granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 2000 ( a ) ’ s requirement that an alien must be “ inspected and admitted or paroled ” to be eligible through adjustment of status. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve without an admission for those who entered the United States illegally."
1278,United States Patent and Trademark Office,Booking.com B.V.,"Booking. com operates a website from which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING. COM since at least 2003. In 2011 and 2012, Booking. com filed with the you. S. Patent and Trademark Office ( USPTO ) four separate applications for the use of BOOKING. COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark. Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “ distinctive ” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are also distinctive. The USPTO also rejected Booking. com ’ s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING. COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration ( online hotel reservation services, among others ). The Lanham Act also allows protection for “ descriptive ” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the eyes of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking. com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection. Booking. com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed their rejection of Booking. com ’ s applications. The Board found that BOOKING. Co was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “ booking ” generically refers to “ a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room ” and “. com ” indicates a commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term “ BOOKING. CO ” to refer to an online reservation service for travel — the very services proposed in Booking. com ’ s applications. The district court reversed, ruling Booking. com had acquired secondary meaning. A panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal."
1721,Vaughan,Atkinson,"The general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to ""maintenance and cure,"" that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty of cure.) At discharge, after two voyages on S.S. National Liberty, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly pay, including his attorney's fees. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
2098,Endrew F.,Douglas County School District RE-1,"Endrew F. is an autistic fifth grade student who was placed in private school because his parents believed his public school education was inadequate. Endrew was placed in Firefly Autism House and his parents sued for reimbursement of Endrew’s private school tuition and related expenses pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). IDEA provides that if a free public school cannot meet the educational needs of a disabled student, the student’s parents may enroll their child in a private school and seek reimbursement for tuition and related expenses. This case first went to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for review. The ALJ rejected Endrew’s parent’s request for reimbursement concluding that Endrew’s public school had provided him with “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as required by the IDEA. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s ruling and held that Endrew’s parents failed to meet their burden to prove that Endrew was not provided with FAPE. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
221,Missouri,Tyler G. McNeely,"On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving over its speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused he submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the normal limit. The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the publication of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court disagreed, but that the case represented a departure from current case law ; it transferred the case to another Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision."
931,"Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General",Luis Ramon Morales-Santana,"Luis Ramon Morales - Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a stepfather who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales - Santana ’ s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales - Santana was “ legitimated ” by his father ’ s citizenship, and he became his lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales - Santana ’ first birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non - citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States or one of its colonies for a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child ’ s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales - Santana ’ s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until four days before his 19th birthday, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales - Santana upon his birth. In 2000, Morales - Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales - Santana filed a motion to appeal and argued that the denial of derivative nationality violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer his citizenship, he did fulfill the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers ( which required physical presence in the United States or all of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child ’ s birth ), and the gender - based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, but the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender - based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
1557,"Shaun McCutcheon, et al.",Federal Election Commission,"In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation. Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a ""cognizable government interest"" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit."
2258,"Tim Shoop, Warden",Danny Hill,"In 1986, Danny Hill was convicted in an Ohio court for the torture, rape, and murder of a 12-year-old boy. An intermediate state court affirmed his conviction, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1993. After unsuccessfully seeking to obtain post-conviction relief in state and federal court, Hill filed a new petition in Ohio state court arguing that his death sentence was illegal under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 you.S. 304 (2002), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal execution of a defendant who is “mentally retarded.” The trial court denied the claim, an intermediate court affirmed the denial, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied review. In 2010, Hill filed a federal habeas petition under 28 you.S.C. § 2254 seeking federal review of his Atkins claim. The federal district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief under 28 you.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which applies when a state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Though it expressly disclaimed reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 you.S. __ (2017)—in which the Court struck down a state law that relied on outdated medical standards in determining intellectual disability for the purpose of eligibility for the death penalty—the Sixth Circuit repeatedly cited the language and the decision of Moore itself in reaching its decision granting the petition."
1893,Ida Phillips,Martin Marietta Corporation,"In 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment by holding that, because seventy-five to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
905,"Star Athletica, LLC","Varsity Brands, Inc., et al.","Varsity Brands, Inc. (Varsity) designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and do not consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC (Star) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “useful articles,” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non-functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “useful article.”"
504,"Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.",Federal Communications Commission,"In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels."
1181,"Jacob Winkelman, a minor, by and through his parents and legal guardians, Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, et al.",Parma City School District,"Jeff and Sandee Winkelman claimed that Parma City School District failed to give their disabled son Jacob a ""free appropriate public education"" as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Despite the Winkelmans' opposition, the school district planned to place Jacob in a public elementary school. After a preliminary school district hearing affirmed Jacob's placement, the Winkelmans placed Jacob in a private school at their own expense and petitioned a federal District Court for reimbursement. The District Court ruled for the School District. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the suit because the Winkelmans lacked a lawyer. The Winkelmans argued that according to the IDEA, ""any party aggrieved by the findings"" of a preliminary school district hearing may appeal in a federal court. Also, because the IDEA demands active parental involvement in order to enforce proper child placement, the parent should be able to appear in court ""pro se"" - without a lawyer. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that the IDEA does not establish any right of a non-lawyer parent to represent his disabled child in federal court. Non-lawyer parents cannot represent themselves either, the Circuit Court ruled, because the IDEA protects the rights of the child, not the parents."
770,Arch R. Everson,Board of Education of the Township of Ewing,"A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds."
80,Nevada Department of Human Resources,Hibbs,"William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a ""serious health condition"" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action ""against any employer"" that ""interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of"" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed."
2096,Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,"Leroy Haeger, et al.","In 2003, Leroy, Donna, Barry, and Suzanne Haeger were injured when one of the tires on their motorhome failed while they were driving on the highway, which caused the motorhome to swerve off the road and overturn. The tire was manufactured by The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear). In 2005, the Haegers sued Goodyear, which was represented by Basil J. Musnuff on all cases involving that particular model of tire and by Graeme Hancock as local counsel. The parties reached a settlement without going to trial in 2010. Over a year later, the Haegers’ attorney saw an article that indicated that Goodyear had done testing on the tire in question that had not been provided to the Haegers during discovery. The attorney filed a motion for sanctions with the district court and argued that Goodyear had committed discovery fraud by knowingly concealing crucial tests. Goodyear opposed the motion and argued that it had never represented that it provided all the test records that had been conducted on the tire at issue. The district court determined that Goodyear and Musnuff had deliberately tried to frustrate attempts to resolve the case on its merits. The district court also determined that, while it could not impose sanctions because the matter was settled, it could award the plaintiffs attorney’s fees for all costs incurred after Goodyear’s responses to the first discovery request, which came to approximately $2.7 million. Musnuff and Goodyear were held jointly responsible for 80% of this figure, and Hancock for the other 20%. Musnuff and Goodyear appealed and argued that the district court could not impose such sanctions without the additional procedural protections required for the imposition of punitive sanctions. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in both appeals that the district court had not abused its discretion and affirmed the award of sanction fees."
1725,National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,Button,"The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned ""the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business."""
1022,"State of Ohio, et al.","American Express Company, et al.","In the credit - card industry, there is what is called a “ two - sided relationship. ” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and their merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card. In the United States, credit - card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks : Visa ( 45 % ), American Express ( 26. 4 % ), MasterCard ( 23. 3 % ), and Discover ( 5. 3 % ). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they don't directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly represented in the vast majority of transactions on its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly charges the relevant fees. In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing any products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex ’ s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of payment, known as non - discriminatory provisions ( NDPs ). In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade and violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti - steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti - steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex ’ s NDPs violated US antitrust the. Reviewing the district court ’ s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs ’ net effect on both merchants and of under the generally accepted “ rule of reason. ”"
1127,Terance Martez Gamble,United States,"Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for carrying of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble in the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held In Abbate v. United States, 359 you. S. 187 ( 1959 ), that conviction in federal and state court for a same offense does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state or federal governments are separate persons ( the so - called “ separate sovereigns ” exception ). Under this binding precedent, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court."
1379,Federal Communications Commission,AT&T Inc.,"CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of ""personal privacy."" The FCC rejected AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase ""personal privacy"" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined ""person"" as a corporation."
508,James Higginbotham,Stella Connell,"Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent and the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing her sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath declares that the employees “ will support the Constitution of the United States, of the State of Florida ” and “ do indeed believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence. ” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is invalid, but the promise not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
1598,Tony Henderson,United States,"Tony Henderson was a former United States Border Patrol Agent who was charged with, among other crimes, distribution of marijuana. On June 9, 2006, two days after he was arrested, Henderson voluntarily turned 19 firearms over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which he argued was for ""safekeeping as a condition of the bond."" He later pled guilty to his narcotics charges. In 2008 and 2009, Henderson requested that the FBI return his firearms so that he could transfer them to a purported buyer, but the FBI refused to do so. Henderson then moved the district court to allow him to transfer the firearms to the 2009 buyer or his wife. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion because Henderson was a convicted felon, and the district court adopted the recommendation. Henderson appealed and argued that, because he had not been given notice that his guilty plea would disqualify him from firearm ownership, he is entitled to relief. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court."
2109,"Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership, et al.","Janis E. Clark, et al.","Olive Clark and Joe Wellner were both residents at the Fountain Circle Care and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home operated by Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership (Kindred Nursing) in Winchester, Kentucky. Prior to their admission to the facility, each had designated their relatives as attorneys-in-fact, which gave the relatives broad authority to enter into transactions and agreements on their behalf. Their relatives, Janis E. Clark and Beverly Wellner, used their status as attorneys-in-fact to sign an alternative dispute resolution agreements with the facility that stipulated that any disputes arising from the Olive’s and Joe’s stays at the facility would be resolved through arbitration. Olive and Joe both passed away in the spring of 2009, and Janis and Beverly each filed lawsuits against Kindred Nursing for personal injury and wrongful death on their behalf. Kindred Nursing moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements that Janis and Beverly had signed. The state trial court initially dismissed both judicial actions in favor of arbitration, but later reversed in accordance with the precedent the Supreme Court of Kentucky established in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. In that case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the power of attorney that authorized an attorney-in-fact to manage the principal’s “financial affairs” and “health-care decisions” did not include the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court’s decision."
1720,William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes,California,"William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes, two indigent men, were arrested and charged with thirteen felonies, including armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender represented both defendants. The public defender asked the trial court for a continuance because he was unprepared, there was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, and Douglas requested a new attorney. The judge denied the request for a continuance. The defendants then requested that the public defender be removed from the case. The judge granted that request but denied their request to appoint a new attorney. The defendants completed the trial without any representation. A jury found the defendants guilty of all thirteen felonies. The defendants appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals for California’s Third District did not appoint counsel to represent the defendants, because, based on their review of the record, appointing counsel would add no benefit to the defendants’ case. Following this decision, that court affirmed the trial court’s decision."
1730,"Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., et al.","United States, et al.","In accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in question required those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a “compensatory payment.” The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the “compensatory payment” provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act."
531,Lewis,Casey,"Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that ""the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."" The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms."
15,"Sears, Roebuck and Co.",County of Los Angeles and City of Compton,"The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce."
1418,"Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al.",First Derivative Traders,"First Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group (""JCG"") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management (""JCM"") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit ""market timing"" of the funds – the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements."
273,"Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers","Pat Quinn, in his official capacity as governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31","Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in - home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of an Illinois Department of Human Services ( Disabilities Program ). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with employees in either their Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services ( Rehabilitation Program ). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The woman and her state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a "" fair share "" provision, which required all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership until 2009. In 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under its First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'claims. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and it held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review."
1861,A.L. Dutton ,Alex S. Evans,"A jury convicted Alex Evans of murder. The prosecution presented 20 witnesses who described Evans’ participation in the murder. A prison inmate testified that one of Evans’ conspirators in the murder said “we would not be in this now” if it were not for Evans. Evans’ counsel questioned the inmate, but still argued that Evans’ right to confrontation was violated because they could not confront the conspirator. The judge overruled Evans’ objection citing a Georgia statute that allows admission of conspirator’s statements against co-conspirators. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction. Evans filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violates Evans right to confrontation because it is broader than the rule used in federal conspiracy trials. The court found no “cogent reasons” for the Georgia hearsay exception."
135,Hicklin,Orbeck,"In 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases Act which required ""all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a party"" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents over non-residents. To administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard."
1475,United States,Anthony James Kebodeaux,"Anthony Kebodeaux was a registered sex offender. He served three years in prison in for his offense. After his release Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). When Kebodeaux moved from San Antonio, Texas to El Paso, Texas, he failed to update his residence in the registry within three days, as required, and was charged and convicted under SORNA. He appealed, arguing that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to him because regulating a sex offender's intrastate travel after being released from custody exceeds Congress' powers. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that past commission of a federal crime is insufficient to permit the federal government to have unending criminal authority over Kebodeaux. While SORNA was unconstitutional under the circumstances of this case, the court did not question Congress' ability to place restrictions on federal prisoners after release, including requiring sex offenders convicted after SORNA to register intrastate changes of residence."
699,El Paso Natural Gas Company,Neztsosie,"In 1995, Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie, and others, filed separate lawsuits in the Navajo Tribal Courts, claiming damages for injuries suffered as a result of El Paso Natural Gas Corporation's and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company's uranium mining operations. El Paso and Cyprus Foote, defendants in those suits, each filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing their tribal court claims. The District Court denied preliminary injunctions except to the extent that the Neztsosies sought relief in the Tribal Courts under the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides certain federal licensees with limited liability for claims of ""public liability"" arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, converts such actions into federal claims, grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions, and provides the mechanics for consolidating the actions and for managing them once consolidated. The District Court left the determinations whether the Act applied to the Neztsosies' claims to the Tribal Courts. On El Paso's and Cyprus Foote's consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions not to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing non-Price-Anderson Act claims and to allow the Tribal Courts to decide whether the Neztsosies' claims fell under that Act. Further, although the Neztsosies had not appealed the partial injunctions, the Court of Appeals moved on its own to reverse them."
553,United Food & Commercial Workers,"Brown Group, Inc.","The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that ""[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof."" Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing."
852,"Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al.","Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al.","Unlike Mexico, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act ( Recovery Act ), that expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs of this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by three of Puerto Rico ’ s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ( PREPA ), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits bankruptcy and financial restructuring laws from binding them without their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
725,Roy Olmstead et al.,United States,"Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States."
500,"George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis","Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz","George Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws constitutional and refused to grant the injunction. The you.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal"
1828,Phil A. St. Amant,Herman A. Thompson,"On June 27, 1962, Phil St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a television speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During this speech, St. Amant accused his political opponent of being a Communist and of being involved in criminal activities with the head of the local Teamsters Union. Finally, St. Amant implicated Herman Thompson, an East Baton Rouge deputy sheriff, in a scheme to move money between the Teamsters Union and St. Amant’s political opponent. Thompson successfully sued St. Amant for defamation. Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Thompson did not show St. Amant acted with “malice.” Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. That court held that, although public figures forfeit some of their First Amendment protection from defamation, St. Amant accused Thompson of a crime with utter disregard of whether the remarks were true. Finally, that court held that the First Amendment protects uninhibited, robust debate, rather than an open season to shoot down the good name of anyone who happens to be a public servant."
692,Jefferson County,Acker,"Two you.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and you. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The you.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case."
1261,Arthur James Lomax,"Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.","Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion of leave to proceed in forma pauperis ( without paying the usual court fees ) pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to include violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed as prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on those grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “ strikes ” under 28 you. S. C. § 1915 ( g ), which bars inmates from pursuing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees after they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a federal claim for relief. Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show because before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show because order, Lomax argued ( among other issues ) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they don't count as strikes. The district court denied Lomax ’ s motion as barred by the three - strikes provision, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed."
524,Curtis Lee Kyles ,John P. Whitley,"Curtis Lee Kyles was charged with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann’s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The you.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing Brady v. Maryland, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1179,"Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, fka Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, et al.",Glen Billing et al.,"Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse and other Wall Street investment firms. The lawsuit alleged that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to drive up the cost of initial public offering (IPO) securities during the stock market boom of the 1990s. The firms allegedly entered into illegal contracts with IPO purchasers, requiring subsequent investors to pay artificially inflated prices for the secutities. Credit Suisse argued that the suit should be dismissed, because the firms had implied antitrust immunity. It claimed that the firms' conduct was normal business practice, and was closely regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. If plaintiffs were able to bring antitrust suits against investment firms for securities violations, Credit Suisse argued, the plaintiffs would be able to subvert the securities laws that Congress intended to govern such suits. The federal District Court agreed with Credit Suisse and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, however, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and reinstated the suit. The Second Circuit held that there was no evidence that Congress had intended securities laws like the Securities Act of 1933 to foreclose antitrust suits challenging practices like those engaged in by Credit Suisse."
1940,Smith,Branch,"After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by the state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration."
540,Guy Rufus Huddleston,United States,"Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32,000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston’s knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard."
1275,Arthur Andersen LLP et al.,Wayne Carlisle et al.,"After Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) sold their construction equipment business, they hired multiple consultants in order to set up a tax shelter for the proceeds. The IRS later determined the tax shelter was illegal, but offered amnesty under certain conditions. Carlisle was never informed of these developments and was ultimately required to pay taxes and penalties that exceeded $25 million. Carlisle filed suit in a federal district court against nine parties alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty. Before trial, one of the defendants motioned to stay the proceedings pending arbitration with Carlisle per a written agreement with Carlisle. Stay was granted. The remaining defendants motioned seeking their own stay arguing that allowing one party to arbitrate with Carlisle and not allowing the rest would be contradictory. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to review the matter. The parties then appealed the denial of jurisdiction. They argued that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies and makes available a stay of proceedings in order to arbitrate when there is a written agreement that directs litigated issues into arbitration. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA then grants appellate jurisdiction over Section 3 motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 16(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized that the appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement with Carlisle. Thus, it reasoned there was no written agreement that could direct litigated issues into arbitration. Since the appellants' motion to stay was not rooted in Section 3, Section 16(a)(1) did not grant appellate jurisdiction."
2227,Republic of Sudan,"Rick Harrison, et al.","Sailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the you.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the you.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 you.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs’ request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered. The judgment was registered in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the orders, holding that service of process had been proper under FSIA. In 2015, Sudan sought a rehearing en banc, and the United States filed an amicus brief in support of the petition. The Second Circuit denied Sudan’s request for a rehearing en banc."
90,"Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.",Henson,"Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action."
320,Anderson,"Liberty Lobby, Inc.","Liberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty), a nonprofit ""citizen's lobby"" corporation, filed a libel action against a magazine published by Jack Anderson et al. Liberty claimed that one of Anderson's articles contained false and derogatory statements about its operations. In its defense, Anderson claimed that as a public entity Liberty must show with ""convincing clarity"" that Anderson acted with actual malice - something they could not do since the article's author stated in an affidavit that he thoroughly researched and cross-checked all his information. Liberty claimed that Anderson did act with actual malice since its author depended on patently unreliable sources. Following a district court's summary judgment ruling favoring Anderson, an appellate court reversed as it held that the lower court erroneously applied actual malice standards of proof at the summary judgement phase. Anderson appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
706,Jacob Abrams et al.,United States,"In 1917, the United States participated in a military campaign on Russian soil against Germany after a Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a massive strike in ammunition plants to support the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City warehouse. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the government and advocated for the ban of the production of weapons to be used against "" Workers Soviets of Russia "". They were sentenced to 20 days in imprisonment."
362,Andre Lee Coleman,"Todd Tollefson, et al.","The "" three strikes "" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA ) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or illegal to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, the Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as dismissal, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also rejected for failure to state a claims, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was rejected when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved to proceed in the arbitration. The district court denied Coleman's motion and noted that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $ 350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fees and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The you. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a "" strike. """
173,Union Pacific Railroad Company,"Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region","The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad ( UPR ), filed claims against their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ( BLET ), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by a UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board ( NRAB ) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET refused to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held the conference with the UPR in attempt to resolve the disputes – a call to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed. On appeal, the you. S. Court for Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process rights requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The Court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively."
634,"Quality King Distributors, Inc.","L'Anzaresearch International, Inc.","L'anza Research International, Inc., a California based manufacturer and seller of hair care products, has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to its products. Compared to domestic markets, the price of L'anza products in foreign markets is substantially lower. L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged for the sale of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta. The Malta distributor then sold the products to Quality King Distributors, Inc., who imported the products back to the you.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. In its suit, L'anza alleged that Quality King violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the you.S. Rejecting Quality King's defense based on the ""first sale"" doctrine, the District Court ruled in favor of L'anza. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1932,"Nautilus, Inc.","Biosig Instruments, Inc.","Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Biosig) holds the '753 Patent, which refers to a heart rate monitor associated with exercise equipment and procedures. Biosig sued Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus) in federal district court and alleged that Nautilus infringed on several claims of the patent. Nautilus moved for summary judgment on two issues: whether there was infringement, and whether the patent was invalid due to its vagueness. The district court denied Nautilus' motion as far as the issue of infringement due to lack of discovery and granted the motion as it related to the patent's invalidity because of its vagueness. Biosig appealed and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefinite when it is ""insolubly ambiguous,"" or not possible for a person of ordinary skill in the area to understand and resolve."
965,"Ricky Henson, et al.","Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.","The petitioners are a group of individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA (Santander), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “debt collector” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case.The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc."
365,Lanell Williams-Yulee,The Florida Bar,"During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams-Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the ""community Public Defender"" – although her title was ""assistant public defender"" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams-Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams-Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams-Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams-Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams-Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech."
302,Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang,"FMR LLC, et al.","The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, filed a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments ( Fidelity ), alleging that that company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for their complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ( OSHA ) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) and federal laws relating the fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively fired. Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants abused "" whistleblower "" protection sections of the Sarbanes - Jones Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act."
458,Suter,Artist M.,"The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be ""in effect in all"" a state's political subdivisions and ""be mandatory upon them,"" and must state that ""reasonable efforts will be made"" to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 you.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals a right to sue for ""deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws."" They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
105,United States,Freddie J. Booker,"In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the you.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range. Following you.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge. In another case, you.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the you.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases."
98,"Republic of Austria, et al.",Maria V. Altmann,"Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her family had been forcibly seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued a American federal court to recover six paintings from The Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ( FSIA ), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving "" rights to property taken in violation of international law. "" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1930s, when the United States embraced this different - and more extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively ( that is, to actions taken before it was passed ) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity. The district court sided with Vienna, holding because the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel disagreed."
1571,Marcus Burrage,United States,"Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay."
127,"W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Ralph Gray, Medical Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, H. H. Husbands, Warden of the Walls Unit.",J. W. Gamble,"J. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the “Walls Unit.” On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell. That same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in “administrative segregation” -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of the next year, although he complained that his back pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times. On February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a pro se complaint alleging that the prison subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble’s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble’s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care."
2183,"China Agritech, Inc.","Michael H. Resh, et al.","China Agritech is a holding company incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business in Beijing. The company represented that it manufactured and sold organic compound fertilizers and other agricultural products to farmers in over two dozen provinces throughout China. It listed its shares on NASDAQ in 2005, and in 2009 reported to the SEC a net revenue of triple the amount it had reported four years earlier. In 2011, company shareholders alleged fraudulent business practices by China Agritech. The company denied the allegations and announced that it would conduct an internal investigation, and subsequently dismissed its independent auditor. Later that year, NASDAQ halted trading in and initiated delisting proceedings against China Agritech’s stock, and in 2012 the SEC revoked the stock’s registration. Shareholders sued China Agritech in two successive putative class actions in 2011 and 2012, alleging various securities law violations against the company and several individual defendants. Class certification was denied in both cases. Shareholder Michael Resh brought a third putative class action against the company and individual defendants in 2014, alleging securities law violations arising from the same facts and circumstances as the first two cases. China Agritech moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it had been filed after the two year limitations period applicable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Resh and the additional plaintiffs argued that under the American Pipe & Construction v. Utah line of cases, the limitations period had been tolled on their claims during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The district court rejected this contention, finding that under American Pipe and its progeny, the limitations period was tolled as to individual class members, but that the Supreme Court had not decided whether an entirely new class action based on a substantially identical class was subject to the same rule. It ruled that the limitations period was therefore tolled as to the individual claims of the named plaintiffs in the instant case, but not as to the putative class. The Ninth Circuit reversed, with a three-judge panel finding that the plaintiffs’ class action would not be time-barred where: (1) the named plaintiffs had been unnamed in the two prior suits, which were against many of the same defendants and involved the same underlying events; (2) the two prior cases were timely; (3) class certification was denied in the earlier actions; and (4) pursuant to the American Pipe line of cases, the named plaintiffs’ individual claims were tolled during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The panel explained that permitting such claims to go forward was consistent with the policy goals of tolling in general. The panel further stated that in light of FRCP 23’s requirements, as well as principles of comity and preclusion, the existing legal system contains sufficient safeguards to prevent litigants from filing repetitious actions in light of this ruling."
1694,Vincent Joseph Spano,State of New York,"On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did. The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed."
682,United States,Bestfoods,"The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the you.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 you.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the you.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, ""any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility."" The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had ""owned or operated"" the facility."
387,Nicholas B. Heien,State of North Carolina,"On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of a Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I - 77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, hiding under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked him permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54. 2 grams of cocaine in the car. A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held because the traffic stop was not objectively legitimate because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the "" reasonable suspicion "" required for another traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error of the trial court's reasoning. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "" fundamental unfairness "" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that "" ignorance of the law is no excuse "" while allowing police to be ignorant about the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed through the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal."
264,Kevin Loughrin,United States,"Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by buying checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make money at Target, and using the purchases for cash. When the scheme come to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted with six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Act ; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud another financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not sufficient and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
482,"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.",United States,"Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their activities affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, declined to accept Black Americans. The government sought and enjoin the motel after deciding on the issue of race with Title II."
551,Benjamin Robers,United States,"Benjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan [UNK] misrepresenting his name and his intention to live in the house and repay the [UNK] allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise. After government officials discovered the scheme, prior to discovery, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically ( digitally ) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him on three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Assistance Act ( MVRA ) in the amount of $ 218, 952. 18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan and the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed ( the offset value ). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation ; instead, the fair purchase price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and "" other expenses "" from the restitution sum, and remanded the judgment back to the district court for draw a new order with the corrected sum."
1108,"Domino's Pizza, Inc., et al.",John McDonald,"John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 you.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue."
745,"Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc.",Harbert Construction Company,"In 1995, Cortez Byrd Chips hired Bill Harbert Construction to install a chip mill in Mississippi. Byrd and Harbert agreed that any ensuing disputes would be decided by arbitration. After the installation, Harbert demanded an upward adjustment on the bill. Byrd refused, claiming that Harbert had not submitted a written statement requesting additional compensation as required under their contract. Harbert called in the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration was conducted in Alabama and Harbert received an award. In response, Byrd sought to vacate or modify the award in a Federal District Court of Mississippi, where the contract was performed. Harbert then sought to confirm the award in Alabama. The latter court refused to dismiss, transfer, or stay its action, concluding that venue was proper only there because ""[t]he place of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court,"" and it entered judgment for Harbert. Byrd appealed, claiming that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided that the case should be deferred to Mississippi because the suit had been filed there first. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, under the FAA, venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in the district where the arbitration award was made, and thus venue was limited to the Alabama court."
937,"Jeanne Woodford, Warden",John Louis Visciotti,"On November 8, 1982, John Louis Visciotti and his co-worker attempted to rob two fellow employees while driving together to a party. Visciotti asked the driver to stop the car in a remote area, pulled out a gun, and demanded the victims’ wallets. Because the victims had little money in their wallets, Visciotti located the money in the car and then shot the victims. Visciotti was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and robbery. The jury recommended the death penalty since the homicide took place during a robbery with a deadly weapon. Visciotti petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the California Supreme Court and claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court denied the petition and held that, although Visciotti received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, the jury was not prejudiced. The state court interpreted the Supreme Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel precedent as requiring the defendant to show that, more likely than not, the outcome of the trial would have been different had it not been for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Visciotti then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which granted the petition and determined that Visciotti had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
2116,"Advocate Health Care Network, et al.","Maria Stapleton, et al.","The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) protects employees from unexpected losses in their retirement plans by putting in place required safeguards on plans that qualify for ERISA protections. Church plans are exempted from the Act and its protections to prevent excessive entanglement of the government with religion through regulation. Maria Stapleton and the other plaintiffs in this case are a group of employees who work for Advocate Health Care Network (Advocate), which operates hospitals, inpatient, and outpatient treatment centers through northern Illinois, and are members of Advocate’s retirement plan. Advocate formed in 1995 as the result of a merger between two religiously affiliated hospital systems (though neither system was owned or financially operated by the church with which it was affiliated). Advocate is also affiliated with a church, and though it is not owned or financially operated by the church, it maintains contracts with the church and “affirms [the church’s] ministry.” The plaintiffs in this case sued Advocate and argued that the Advocate retirement plan is subject to ERISA, and therefore Advocate has breached its fiduciary duty by failing to adhere to ERISA’s requirements. The defendants moved for summary judgment because the Advocate plan fell under the ERISA exemption for church plans. The district court denied the motion because it determined that a plan established and maintained by a church-affiliated organization was not a church plan within the meaning of the statutory language. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and this case was consolidated with two other ones presenting the same issue before the Supreme Court."
313,Pennsylvania,Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,"In April of 1973, pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (Penn DER) submitted a plan for meeting federal air quality standards. This plan included a provision requiring the implementation of a program for the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems (I/M program) by May 1, 1975. By mid-1976, Pennsylvania had not implemented any I/M program. In response, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA) brought suit against Pennsylvania and the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA filed a separate action against Pennsylvania and DVCCCA dropped its charges against the EPA. On August 29, 1978, Pennsylvania, Penn DER and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) agreed to a final consent decree, terminating the DVCCCA and EPA actions. On January 2, 1982 and after more than five years of intermittent litigation -- during which Pennsylvania consistently resisted or ignored the consent decree -- the district court declared Pennsylvania, the Secretaries of the Penn DOT and Penn DER to be in civil contempt. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the Secretary of Penn DOT to implement an I/M program following several years of consistently denying Pennsylvania the requisite funding. The CAA provided that in issuing a final order in any action brought under the CAA, the court may award the costs of litigation to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The DVCCCA and the EPA consequently sought attorneys’ fees and costs for all activity performed after the court issued the consent decree on August 29, 1978. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees that included time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys monitoring Pennsylvania’s performance under the consent decree, an award for “superior quality” while opposing the state’s motion to stay the consent decree, and work performed for hearings held before the EPA. It also awarded a multiplier for the arguably small likelihood of plaintiffs’ success in three phases of the litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the attorneys’ fees awarded by the district court."
168,"Hilmar G. Moore, Raul Jimenez, Jaime Clements","John Pleasant Sims, Mary Carter Sims, Sabrina Marie Sims, Paul Edward Sims, Shawna Evette Sims","The Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse. The Sims moved to modify the Harris County court order granting custody to the state. When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed a writ of habeas corpus. The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas’ child custody laws. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws. The court held that abstention under Younger v Harris was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation. The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision. Under Younger v Harris, a federal court must abstain from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal."
719,Florida,White,"Two months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the ""fruit of the poisonous tree."" After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The court reasoned that although the police developed probable because to believe a violation of the Act had occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure."
1753,Maryland Committee for Fair Representation,Tawes,"Under its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed."
804,"Robert J. Wittman, et al.","Gloria Personhuballah, et al.","In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African - American, and increased the percentage of African - American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice as preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia ’ s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as the factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal ; instead, ten members of Congress, that had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to The C. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that ruling, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority ’ s ability to elect a candidate with choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan."
1947,Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,"Electric Power Supply Association, et al.","The Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate the wholesale interstate transmission and sale of electric power. In 2011, FERC promulgated a rule that established uniform compensation levels for suppliers of demand-side resources that meet certain conditions, including cost-effectiveness as measured by a net benefits test. The rule’s stated purpose was to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when it was economically efficient to do so. Various state regulatory agencies, trade associations, publicly owned utilities, transmission owners, and other industry groups requested a rehearing on the rule and argued that it conflicted with FERC’s efforts to promote a competitive market as well as FERC’s statutory mandate to avoid unjust and discriminatory rates. FERC confirmed the rule, and the industry groups petitioned for review in federal court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not have the statutory authority to directly regulate the retail market and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because FERC did not adequately consider and respond to the arguments made in opposition to the rule."
1000,"Household Credit Services, Inc. and MBNA America Bank, N.A.",Sharon R. Pfennig,"Sharon Pfennig went over her $2000 credit limit. The company that issued Pfennig her credit card, Household Credit Services, Inc., charged her a fee of $29 for each month that her balance remained over $2000. This fee was listed in the ""Purchases"" category on her monthly statement rather than as a ""finance charge."" Under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), any charges ""incident to the extension of credit"" must be listed separately as ""finance charges."" Household Credit Services chose not to list the over-limit fee as a ""finance charge,"" however, based on the Federal Reserve Board's definition of the term, which explicitly excludes ""charges ... for exceeding a credit limit."" Pfenning countered that the Board's definition was an unreasonable interpretation of TILA's plain language and should therefore be disregarded. The district court sided with Household Credit Services, finding that the the Federal Reserve Board had properly exercised its authority under TILA to define the term, that the definition was a reasonable interpretation of TILA, and that the credit company was therefore justified in relying on its definition. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."
1131,"Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Allina Health Services, et al.","The you. S. Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS ) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “ parts ” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When people enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C. HHS contracts with “ fiscal intermediaries ” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports. The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low - income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “ patient days available for patients “ entitled to benefits under part A ” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient hours for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars. The plaintiff had challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as authorized by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “ interpretive rule ” under the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA ) and thus was exempt from - APA ’ s notice - and - the requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit reversed, finding the the adjustment was not merely an “ interpretive rule ” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment."
935,Ford Motor Company,Ramon Romo,"When Romo's Ford Bronco swerved to avoid another vehicle, it rolled over, killing three of the Romo family and injuring three more. A California jury found that the rollover was caused by a dangerous flaw in the design of the Bronco, which Ford had willfully ignored. The jury awarded Romo $5 million in compensatory damages (which are intended to compensate the plaintiff for a loss) and $290 million in punitive damages (which are intended to punish the defendant for wrongdoing.) Ford argued that the very large award of punitive damages was excessive. Nevertheless, the California Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal upheld the verdict, comparing the level of Ford's negligence to involuntary manslaughter. After the California Supreme Court declined to hear the case, Ford appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the punitive damages awarded by the jury were so excessive as to be prohibited by the Constitution's Due Process Clause."
1863,Colonnade Catering Corporation,United States,"A group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering’s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some time, the agents asked Colonnade’s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels. At trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept “so far as it may be necessary” in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope."
1337,"Esther Hui, et al.","Yanira Castaneda, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Francisco Castaneda, et al.","These cases involve malpractice suits against Public Health Service (""PHS"") employees. The plaintiffs filed actions recognized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in a California federal district court alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The PHS sought a dismissal arguing that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) preempted Bivens claims. The district court rejected the argument and denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that FTCA did not preempt Bivens claims. The court reasoned that the FTCA was enacted six months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens and, thus, could not have been intended as a substitute."
530,Wisconsin,City of New York,"Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an ""actual enumeration"" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups."
20,Barry Goldwater et al.,"James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al.",President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan.
1313,"Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John",State of Washington,"Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to vote for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $ 1, 000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “ winner - take - all ” electoral system, and means that all of a state "" s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In the 2016 Presidential Election, Tom Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton / Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $ 1, 000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law. The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An state law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed. This case had originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, Ch. 19 - 3, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020."
660,Arkansas Educational Television Commission,Forbes,"During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
6,Argersinger,Hamlin,"Jon Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the State of Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney."
114,DaimlerChrysler Corp.,"Charlotte Cuno, et al.","As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for certain exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $ 280 million. Charlotte Cuno among others challenged the offer, however, alleging that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause and the you. S. Constitution by offering the taxes incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on Tuesday a judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the request of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce."
443,Powers,Ohio,"Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black individual from the jury without explanation. The court denied the request for explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution’s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court."
2354,"Nestlé USA, Inc.","John Doe I, et al.","The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case). Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor. The children filed a proposed class action in the you.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the you.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 you.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS. In the interim, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 you.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute."
1085,Joseph Scheidler et al.,"National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.","In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not ""obtain"" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that ""Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated."" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of ""violence-only"" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)"
1717,United States,Don Gilmore et ux.,"Don Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for ""ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income."" Gilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws."
692,Homer Adolph Plessy,John Ferguson,"Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks or whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven - eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens ( Committee of Citizens ), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who were technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "" whites only "" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad protested because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via her purchase of segregated railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the white - only car, she refused and was arrested. At trial, Plessy ’ s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and seventeenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted."
1303,Thedrick Edwards,"Darrel Vannoy, Warden","Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the charges of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards ’ s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, after each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10 - 2 vote, so Edwards ’ s conviction became final in 2010. On April 20, 2020, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, finding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not has been convicted if he has been prosecuted in one of 48 other states controlled by the federal government, much as in Louisiana."
906,Jennifer Gratz,Lee Bollinger et al.,"The University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be “underrepresented minorities.” Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration. In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’ College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to “holding seats” for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the University’s admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue."
1261,United States,Eurodif S. A.,"This case examines the correct application of federal antidumping statutes to so-called ""separate work unit"" (SWU) contracts for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU). The case, brought by the federal government and the United States Enrichment Corporation, has been consolidated from two cases both alleging that Eurodif, a French corporation, imported LEU in violation of federal antidumping laws. Based on a decision from the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that SWU contracts for the production of LEU are contracts for services rather than goods and are therefore immune from the antidumping laws, the you.S. Department of Commerce excluded all LEU entering the country from antidumping regulations if accompanied by a certificate that the uranium was imported under an SWU contract. The Court of International Trade sustained the Commerce Department decision. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the case, saying that it was ""unripe"" for judicial review. The court held that the issues raised by the government only concerned the application of the Department's decision regarding future importation of LEU; and, therefore, the court did not have a specific factual context in which to review the claim."
552,Benjamin Robers,United States,"Benjamin Williams was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. Its role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan [UNK] misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the house and repay the [UNK] allow his loan to default by not selling it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure the houses in this guise. After government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically ( wired ) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Housing Restitution Act ( MVRA ) in the amount of $ 218, 952. 18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between the loan plus the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed ( the offset value ). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation ; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and "" other expenses "" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum."
394,Murray,Giarratano,"The respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state’s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The district court found that Virginia’s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia’s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found the availability of attorneys to assist inmates was inadequate. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1171,LaRoyce Lathair Smith,Texas,"LaRoyce Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court overturned his death sentence and sent the case back to state court because of a judge's improper jury instruction. (See Smith v. Texas , No. 04-5323.) Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-imposed the sentence, holding that the erroneous instruction had not done any ""egregious harm"" to the fairness of Smith's sentencing. The Texas court found that the jury had still been able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, despite the unconstitutional instruction. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case a second time."
2072,Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez,Colorado,"Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. After the entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that one of the other jurors made racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and the alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits explaining what the “biased” juror said about Pena-Rodriguez or his alibi witness. Based on these affidavits, which related racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez’s likely guilt and the alibi witness’ lack of credibility because both were Hispanic, Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Colorado held the jurors’ affidavits were inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence, which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court of Colorado also held Rule 606(b) did not violate Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because Pena-Rodriguez had waived that right by failing to adequately question jurors about their racial bias during voir dire."
613,Avondale Lockhart,United States,"In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a distribution of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15, 000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart ’ s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had earlier been convicted at state prison of first - degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult daughter. Based on this previous conviction, the pre - hearing report for Lockhart ’ s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart ’ s argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that lower court ’ s decision."
832,"Stephen Voisine, et al.",United States,"In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman ( with whom he was within a domestic relationship ) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “ knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person. ” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family, household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute which makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend ’ s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them but argued that Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes don't define misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal laws because “ recklessness that is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of limitations from the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court ’ s, in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “ physical force ” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine ’ s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute."
1962,William Marbury,"James Madison, Secretary of State","Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State. William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions."
1531,Daimler AG,Barbara Bauman et al.,"The workers and relatives of workers in the Gonzalez-Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of German-based DaimlerChrysler AG (""the company""), sued the company for violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. They argued that, during Argentina's ""Dirty War"" of 1976-1983, the company sought to punish plant workers suspected of being union agitators and worked with the Argentinean military and police to do so by passing along information and allowing the plant to be raided. The plaintiffs also argued that the company stood to gain from these actions as they ended strikes and allowed the plant to continue operating at maximum production levels. The plaintiffs sued the company in district court in California, where some of the company's major subsidiaries are located under the Alien Torts Act, and the company moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for dismissal and held that the company did not have enough contacts in California to warrant a California court exercising jurisdiction. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and held that it is reasonable for a California court to have jurisdiction over a multinational company that is capable of litigating the case regardless of the location and has pervasive business contacts in the state."
1179,"Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools",Aileen Rizo,"The facts giving rise to this case are not immediately relevant to the issue on which the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, filed a lawsuit against the superintendent of schools, claiming, among several things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district attorney denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Eighth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation of the statute. Judge Reinhardt died after he had finished reading the opinion but 11 days before he got officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on the facts but not the reasoning."
1888,Webster Bivens ,Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,"In 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens’ home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a because of action. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
663,"Newsweek, Inc.",Florida Department of Revenue,"In 1988, a Florida statutory provision exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from sales tax. In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found the classification invalid under the First Amendment. Subsequently, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of the sales tax that it had paid between 1988 and 1990. The Florida Department of Revenue denied the refund. Newsweek then filed suit alleging that Florida's failure to accord the magazine retroactive relief was a violation of due process. Ultimately, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because Florida law permits prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement, without suffering onerous penalties."
1871,Gladys Boddie et al.,Connecticut,"Gladys Boddie was a married resident of Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed for a divorce in New Haven County Superior Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing because she had not paid the filing fee under Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court."
267,"Capital Cities Cable, Inc.",Crisp,"In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
329,Davis,Bandemer,"A group of Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally diluted their votes in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge."
1430,"Rick Perry, Governor of Texas et al.","Shannon Perez, et al.","The United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on changes in the state's population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new map into law in July of 2011. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle. The district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed the district court's redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court's new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court's new map until the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter."
2164,Ray Austin Collins,Commonwealth of Virginia,"On two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property. At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable because and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not “immediately mobile” and applies to vehicles parked on private property."
1733,Ferguson,Skrupa,"A Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for ""debt adjusting"" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a ""Credit Advisor"" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an ""unreasonable regulation of a lawful business"" and struck it down."
1069,Ronald Rompilla,"Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections","A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the you.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed."
465,Crown Kosher Super Market,Gallagher,"The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion."
1095,Washington State Department of Licensing,"Cougar Den, Inc.","Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have ""the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways."" Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing ""any trade, traveling, and importation"" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes."
2269,The Dutra Group,Christopher Batterton,"Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law. The district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 you.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action. The Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Evich."
658,Philip and Mendes Cohen,Virginia,"An act of Congress authorized the operation for a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D. C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating Virginia law. State authorities tried and convicted The Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final victims of disputes between the states and their national government."
1110,Northern Insurance Company of New York,"Chatham County, Georgia","James Ludwig's yacht was damaged when it collided with a drawbridge. Ludwig's insurance company, Northern, sued Chatham County to recover its costs. The county claimed that it was immune from civil suits due to its sovereign immunity under common law. The District Court agreed and ruled for the county. The court held that the county had sovereign immunity as a local government exercising power delegated by the state. Under Supreme Court precedent, sovereign immunity does not apply to local governments, but only to states and ""arms of the state."" Although the county did not qualify as an arm of the state under those precedents, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The Circuit Court held that common law nevertheless guaranteed the county a ""residual immunity."""
1642,Mark A. Christeson,"Don Roper, Warden","In 1999, a jury convicted Mark Christeson of capital murder for invading the home of a mother and her two children, raping the mother, and then cutting their throats and pushing them into the pond. The jury sentenced Christeson to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, which meant that Christeson's federal habeas petition was due on April 10, 2005. Nine months before the deadline, the Court appointed attorneys Phil Horwitz and Eric Butts to represent Christeson. Horwitz and Butts failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after the petition was due, and they filed the petition 117 days late. The federal district court dismissed the petition as untimely. Seven years later, Horwitz and Butts contacted attorneys Jennifer Merrigan and Joseph Perkovich to discuss Christeson's case. Merrigan and Perkovich discovered Christeson's only chance would be to reopen the final judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitation should not have been enforced in this case. Horwitz and Butts, knowing this would ruin their reputations, refused to let outside counsel access their files. Merrigan and Perkovich moved for substitution of counsel, which the district court denied because they were from out of state and because Horwitz and Butts had not abandoned their client. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
813,Lujan,"G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.","The California Labor Code requires that contractors and subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. To recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all."
106,United States,Freddie J. Booker,"In Blakely v. Washington ( 2004 ) the you. S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to execution by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range. Following you. S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Eighth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge. In another case, you. S. Sentencing Manual allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188 - 235 life without prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from reducing the sentence and increased Fanfan to 78 days. The federal government appealed directly to the you. S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases."
111,Oregon,Carl Mathiason,"An Oregon state police officer suspected Carl Mathiason of burglary and asked him to come to the police station for questioning. Mathiason came freely, spoke with the officer, and was not arrested at the time. He was arrested later and a trial court used evidence obtained during the questioning to convict him. Mathiason moved to suppress the evidence since he was not read his Miranda rights before the questioning. The court admitted the evidence since Mathiason was not in custody during the questioning. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed since it found that Matianson was in a ""coercive environment"" when questioned and therefore deserved to hear his Miranda rights."
471,Hartford Fire Insurance Company,California,"Nineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants -- domestic primary insurers, trade associations, and a reinsurance broker, along with London-based as well as domestic reinsurers -- violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 you.S.C. Section 1, by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the conduct alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 you.S.C. Section 1012(b), and that none of the conduct amounted to a ""boycott"" within the meaning of the Section 3(b), 15 you.S.C. Section 1013(b), exemption to that grant of immunity. The court of appeals reversed."
292,Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley,United States,"In 2005, a federal jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the pair on four criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $ 500, 000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys. Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the property because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the you. S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion, granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded. On remand, the circuit court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys'offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower courts's decision."
358,"Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.","The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.","Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low - income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing agencies. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project ( ICP ), a non - profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs ( TDHCA ), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low - income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated growth in violation of the Fair Housing Act. At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination with equal impact, so the District court found that the statistical allocation of Tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA went to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department for Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act."
189,"Russell Bruesewitz, et al.","Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.","Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six - month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. While their daughter was three - years - old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the filing, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the kind of vaccine used in Hannah's case from the market. The Bruesewitzes filed their lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed should develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed."
655,Philip and Mendes Cohen,Virginia,"An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government."
2310,"Department of Homeland Security, et al.","Regents of the University of California, et al.","In 2012, the you.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program—known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of “mainstream” society in the United States. In 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA “without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date” and thus that it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.” The plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by discriminatory animus. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the DACA recission was not “committed to agency discretion by law” and that there was “law to apply.” Further, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction restoring DACA, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits of their arguments, they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs’ favor, and the injunction is in the public interest."
1300,"Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security",Catherine G. Ratliff,"Catherine Ratliff was the attorney for Ruby Kills Ree in her successful suit against the Social Security Administration for Social Security benefits. The district court also granted Kills Ree’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Before paying the fee award, the government discovered that Kills Ree owed the government a debt that predated the fee award and accordingly sought to offset the fee award against the debt. Ratliff then intervened in the case to challenge the offset and argued that the fee award belonged to her and therefore could not be used to offset Kills Ree’s debt. The district court held that the offset was proper because the fee award goes to the “prevailing party,” not directly to the attorney. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that precedent established that EAJA fee awards go to the attorney."
414,"Baker Botts, LLP","ASARCO, LLC","Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $ 120 million in fees for representing Asarco, CA in its Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 under a reorganization agreement that could pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $ 117 million to cover the fees in addition to $ 5 million for expenses incurred defending their fee claims. The district court affirmed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $ 5 million by defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition."
1098,"Joseph Anza, et al.",Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,"Ideal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, ""[a]ny person injured in his business or property"" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue. The federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue under RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage."
403,Department of Homeland Security,Robert J. MacLean,"In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration ( TSA ) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA informed the Marshals that all missions and flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his role. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in a 2003 MSNBC contact. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security data, and MacLean was removed from his position. MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board ( Board ) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act ( WPA ). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that NASA's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA."
1572,"Northwest, Inc., et al.",S. Binyomin Ginsberg,"S. Binyomin Ginsberg became a member of the Northwest Airlines frequent flyer program in 1999 and obtained Premium Elite Status in 2005. In 2008, his membership was terminated, as per the terms of the program that allow Northwest Airlines discretion over the removal of participants. In January 2009, Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines and argued that, by terminating his membership in the frequent flyer program, the company breached both the contractual agreement and the implied doctrine of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law. At trial in district court, the defense argued that Ginsberg's claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits states from enacting or enforcing regulation over the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The district court found in favor of Northwest Airlines. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the ADA did not preempt the claims because the claims were unrelated to the price, route, or services of the air carrier."
1317,"Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia, et al.","Kenny A., By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al.","In 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that ""the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the fee"" and thus justified the enhancement. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that the enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature of results."
35,John Doe,United States,"John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury’s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents. The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe’s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe’s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe’s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information. The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “fishing expedition” for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed."
876,Rocky Dietz,Hillary Bouldin,"Hillary Bouldin ’ s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz ’ s in Montana in 2009. He filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz ′ s favor but awarded $ 0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed his jury but then reconsidered and re - empaneled the jury. He asked them to re - determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties ’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $ 1, 700 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had not dismissed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and held that dismissing the judge, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to such situations during the brief duration of their dismissal."
1880,"Time, Inc.",Frank Pape,"In November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape. The case was based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report’s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings. Pape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide."
1970,Samuel A. Worcester,Georgia,"In September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester and others, all non-Native Americans, were indicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state of Georgia for ""residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license"" and ""without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia."" They were indicted under an 1830 act of the Georgia legislature entitled ""an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians."" Among other things, Worcester argued that the state could not maintain the prosecution because the statute violated the Constitution, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation, and an act of Congress entitled ""an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes."" Worcester was convicted and sentenced to ""hard labour in the penitentiary for four years."" The you.S. Supreme Court received the case on a writ of error."
896,Marcelo Manrique,United States,"Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession in child pornography. He was sentenced to a life terms of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though this final judgment did not include an amount for the damages and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the original judgment was entered. When another amended judgment was entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge for that award in their briefs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the previous award."
2015,Richard L. Thornburgh,"Jack Abbott, et al.","Jack Abbott and other prisoners were denied access to publications that Richard Thornburgh, the you.S. Attorney General at the time, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) deemed to be detrimental to penological interests. FBP regulations allow publications that may pose a threat to the security and discipline of prisons or that promote criminal activity to be rejected. Material cannot be rejected based on its political, philosophical, or distasteful nature, and prison officials have the burden of showing why the restriction was necessary and how the denied material was detrimental to penological interests. Abbott and others sued and argued that the restriction on certain publications violated their First Amendment rights. The district court held that prisons had a right to deny access to certain publications and that prison wardens must be given broad discretion in their duties to maintain the security of the prison, but their discretion must not limit the prisoners’ First Amendment right more than what is necessary to protect the government’s penological interests. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the prison officials had the burden of showing how the denied material is detrimental to penological interests."
160,Burch,Louisiana,"Burch was found guilty by a nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000."
1243,"State of Georgia, et al.","Public.Resource.Org, Inc.","The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, critical analyses of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor ’ s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries and advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references. ” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “ shall be merged with annotations, ” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves don't have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representative, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. Public. Resource. Org ( PRO ) is a non - profit organization with a mission on improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites. The Commission sent PRO several cease - and - desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia ’ s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, citing injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in, Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are the and integrated into the, official ” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created — finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations."
1714,Bruce Boynton,Commonwealth of Virginia,"Bruce Boynton, an African American law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so. Boynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed."
2294,Gregory Dean Banister,"Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order. On June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017. On July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 you.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.”"
694,Clinton,Goldsmith,"James T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to ""issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,"" to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls."
1228,James Erin McKinney,State of Arizona,"By way of this background, James McKinney ’ s childhood was of horrific ” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse — all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh Grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half - brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in the deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney ’ s jury found him guilty of two counts of first - degree murder ( without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder ), and Hedlund ’ s jury found him guilty of one count of first - degree murder and one count of second - degree murder. At McKinney ’ s capital sentencing hearing ( before a judge ), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “ resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered. ” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could reduce McKinney ’ s childhood trauma and produce “ mental capacity. ” The trial judge credited the psychologist ’ s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non - statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney ’ s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could still consider it mitigating evidence, thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney ’ s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 you. S. 104 ( 1982 ), by refusing to consider McKinney ’ s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney ’ s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court ; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 you. S. 584 ( 2002 ), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘ final ’ before the you. S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring."
97,Washington,Davis,"After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants."
165,Willam Orr,Lillian Orr,"William and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed."
722,American Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Company,Sullivan,"Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's ""reasonable"" and ""necessary"" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process."
521,City of Lakewood,Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,"Plain Dealer Publishing challenged a constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance and authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made to publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit applications to any "" terms and conditions "" which he "" deemed necessary and appropriate. "" On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari."
1222,"Quanta Computer, Inc., et al.","LG Electronics, Inc.","LG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips used in personal computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses."
469,Christine Franklin ,"Gwinnett County Public Schools, William Prescott","Andrew Hill, a teacher at North Gwinnett High School, sexually harassed Christine Franklin throughout her 10th grade year. Franklin reported the harassment to teachers and school district administrators, but the administration did nothing. They also encouraged Franklin to refrain from pressing charges. Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all matters pending against him were dropped. After Hill’s resignation the school closed its investigation. Franklin brought this action against the school district under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failing to take action against Hill. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Title IX did not authorize an award for damages. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed."
811,Becker,Montgomery,"Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled ""Counsel for Appellant"" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed."
971,"Linda Frew, on Behalf of Her Daughter, Carla Frew, et al.","Albert Hawkins, Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Services Commission, et al.","In 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached through a consent decree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas."
115,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Robert Douglas Smith,"In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death for murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault in an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus in district court that was denied. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that he was mentally retarded and therefore could not be executed. The appellate court held that the issue of whether or not Smith was mentally retarded had to be decided by a jury."
248,Walter Fernandez,California,"On October 20, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives entered a nearby alley where was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, but requested to search the apartment. Rojas objected to the search verbally and in writing. Following the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied this motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co - tenant consented."
363,Andre Lee Coleman,"Todd Tollefson, et al.","The "" three strikes "" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA ) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed from failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed as failure to state a claims, but he appealed that judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's four previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma except on his fourth attempt. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $ 350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The you. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held "" the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a "" strike. """
79,Interstate Commerce Commission ,"Oregon Pacific Industries, Inc., et al.","The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a hearing. If a railroad shipper held a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a tariff from the point of origin to the holding point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the you.S. Supreme Court."
1259,Steven Spears,United States,"In 2004, Steven Spears was charged and convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and 500 grams of powder cocaine. The district court determined that the 100:1 weight ratio for sentencing crack cocaine and powder cocaine that the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (Guidelines) used was excessive given the circumstances, so the district court instead based its ruling on a 20:1 ratio. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the district court could not decide what ratio it wanted to apply for conviction and remanded Spears case for retrial and sentencing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United States, in which the Court held that the Guidelines were advisory and that a district court does not abuse its discretion by varying from the Guidelines’ prescribed ratio due to disagreement with the disparity the Guidelines create between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. On remand, the appellate court again held that the district court erred in categorically rejecting the Guidelines’ ratio and substituting its own."
1505,Matthew R. Descamps,United States,"On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (""ACCA""), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release. Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence."
835,Franchise Tax Board of California,Gilbert P. Hyatt,"Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) based on the FTB’s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based on California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the you.S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity. At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $300 million in damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed."
512,"Adarand Constructors, Inc.",Peña,"Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by ""socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."" [The clause declared that ""the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...."" Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales."
243,United States,Rodgers,"Phillip Bosco died with a great deal of tax debt, so the government sued his widow, Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers, to force her to sell the house in which she currently resided to pay off his debt. Rodgers, however, was not in debt and under Texas law, had a separate right to the homestead. The district court held Rodgers had a state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a force sale. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
564,Degen,United States,"Brian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the you.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the you.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are not obliged to extradite their nationals to the you.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the ""fugitive disentitlement doctrine."""
196,United States,"Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.","Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the primary shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated buying his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $ 7, 472, 405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning the identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $ 7, 359, 043. This transaction created "" outside basis, "" or how much one partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed. Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as the capital contribution. The taxpayers ( except Home Oil ) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $ 10, 623, 348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step - up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers'outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted their inside basis to $ 10, 527, 250. 53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $ 9, 125. 51 gain from the sale of its assets. The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of the investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "" solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners. "" On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment ( FPAA ), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers'reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers'taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) seeking to recover the increase. As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six - year period for assessing tax remains open for "" all taxable years … that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction … in which a decision had not become final. "" The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs."
830,Kyllo,United States,"A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager ""did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life,"" only ""amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall."""
1235,Republic of the Philippines et al.,"Jerry S. Pimentel, temporary administrator of the Estate of Mariano J. Pimentel, et al.","The case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors. The Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the ""equity and good conscience"" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party."
1894,Clay,United States,"Board No. 47, Louisville, Kentucky, denied the application of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for classification as a conscientious objector. Clay then took an administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board, which tentatively classified him I-A, or eligible for unrestricted military service, and referred his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation. The Justice Department concluded, contrary to a hearing officer's recommendation, that Clay's claim should be denied. The Department wrote that Clay did not meet any of the three basic tests for conscientious objector status; that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, and that this objection is sincere. Subsequently, the Appeal Board denied Clay's claim, but without stating its reasons. When Clay refused to report for induction, he was tried and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
508,Metropolitan Stevedore Company,Rambo,"John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition."
15,Lloyd Corp. Ltd.,Donald Tanner et al.,"Donald Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."
89,Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America,Walsh,"In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost - saving measures, the "" Maine Rx "" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. Once a company does not enter into the rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales become subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for use. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre - empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding "" the obstacle to the federal program'S administration is sufficient to establish pre - emption. The Court of Appeals reversed."
5,Sierra Club,"Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States","The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case."
1344,"Jamal Kiyemba, et al.","Barack Obama, President","Seventeen ethnic Uighurs, Chinese citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval- Base, Cuba sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District of Columbia federal district court. The petitioners argued that since they were no longer considered ""enemy combatants"" they were entitled to transfer and release from Guantanamo Bay. The petitioners feared that a transfer to China would lead to their arrest, torture, or execution. Therefore, they sought a transfer to the United States where they could be released safely. The district court granted the petition and ordered their transfer and release into the United States. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the district court lacked authority to order the petitioners' transfer and release into the United States. The court reasoned that only the political branches of government may determine the admissibility of aliens into the United States. Without specific authorization by statute, treaty, or the Constitution, the district court could not grant the relief sought by the petitioners."
1169,Safeco Insurance Company of America et al.,Charles Burr et al.,"In No. 06-100, Edo, a consumer, sued GEICO General Insurance Company, alleging that GEICO had violated the requirement in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that insurance companies give consumers notice before raising rates. Edo sought statutory and punitive damages, which the FCRA awards only when a company ""willfully"" violates the law. Similarly, in 06-84, several consumers sued Safeco for failing to notify them that better credit ratings would have entitled them to better premiums. It was GEICO's policy to notify new applicants only if their credit ratings were worse than a certain ""neutral"" (average) value, while Safeco as a matter of policy did not give ""adverse action"" notices to any new applicants. GEICO argued that it was unaware that the FCRA applied to the setting of premiums for new applicants such as Edo, and thus could not be considered to have acted willfully. The District Court ruled for GEICO and Safeco, holding that their actions did not qualify as willful. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that that the concept of willfulness includes ""reckless disregard"" for the law as well as actual knowledge that the conduct was illegal. The ruling put the Ninth Circuit in conflict with most other circuit courts, but the court argued that its interpretation was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the FCRA."
1226,Commonwealth of Virginia,David Lee Moore,"Virginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional."
948,"Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO",Simon Shiao Tam,"Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, applied to register the band ’ s name with the you. S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards “ persons of Asian descent. ” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, "" prohibits trademarks that “ [ consist ] of... [ comprise ] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter ; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. ” Tam appealed the trademark officer, s decision, and the name were refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a board of judges on the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office felt incorrect in refusing the trademark application or that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment."
1438,"Margaret Minneci, et al.","Richard Lee Pollard, et al.","Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a ""black box"" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would because him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied because of action for injury caused by ""a federal agent acting under his authority."""
383,"Granfinanciera, S.A., et al.",Paul C. Nordberg,"In 1983, the Chase & Sanborn Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida made Paul Nordberg the trustee in bankruptcy. In 1985, Nordberg sued Granfinanciera, S.A. and Medex, Ltda. in district court. Nordberg alleged that they received $1.7 million in fraudulent transfers from Chase & Sanborn’s corporate predecessor a year before the bankruptcy filing. The district court referred the proceedings to bankruptcy court. Five months later, after the Colombian government nationalized Granfinanciera, Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court denied the request because fraudulent transfers were a non-jury issue under English common law. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud claim but found in favor of Nordberg on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The district court affirmed the decision. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Granfinanciera and Medex did not have a statutory right to a jury trial, nor did they have a right under the Seventh Amendment."
2379,United States,Refugio Palomar-Santiago,"Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 you.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 you.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013). Palomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 you.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 you.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all. The district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government’s claims."
1345,Florida,Georgia,"This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin."
1271,United States,Randy Edward Hayes,"Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The you.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a ""domestic"" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction."
1538,"Eleanor McCullen, Jean Zarrella, Gregory A. Smith, Eric Cadin, Cyril Shea, Mark Bashour, and Nancy Clark","Martha Coakley, Attorney General for the state of Massachusetts","In 2007, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in ""pro-life counseling"" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics."
2267,Edward G. McDonough,Youel Smith,"During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged. After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012. On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim. The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions."
729,Roy Olmstead et al.,United States,"Roy Olmstead became a suspected communist. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building ( where he maintained an office ) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained with the police. This case was decided separately with Green v. United States, in which Green and several fellow defendants were similarly convicted, based on newly obtained wire - tapped evidence, for conspiracy to break the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States."
185,"Russell Bruesewitz, et al.","Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.","Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market. The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed."
1729,John Joseph Killian,United States,"John Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act. As early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group’s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings. Killian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses’ testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka’s testimony. The government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian’s motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses."
763,West Virginia State Board of Education,Walter Barnette,"In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes of the flag for teachers and administrators as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses declined to perform the salute and were sent absent from school for non - compliance. They were also threatened by reform being used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency."
701,South Central Bell Telephone Company,Alabama,"Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed."
633,Michael Musacchio,United States,"Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services ( ETS ), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio bought Total Transportation Services ( TTS ), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the holding company with them. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $ 10 million. In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than this Act actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to its higher burden and failed fully meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the agents was barred under a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court ’ s instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial."
1381,"Erica P. John Fund, Inc., fka Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc.","Halliburton Co., et al.","A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The you.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they could not sue as a group because they had not established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order."
932,"Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General",Luis Ramon Morales-Santana,"Luis Ramon Morales - Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales - Santana ’ s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales - Santana was “ legitimated ” by his father ’ s citizenship, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales - Santana ’ s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non - citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States or one of their possessions for a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child ’ s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales - Santana "" s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 19th birth, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales - Santana upon his birth. In 2000, Morales - Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had gotten convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied this application. Morales - Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued that the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the criteria for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers ( which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child ’ s birth ), and the gender - based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, but the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender - based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
1576,Carol Anne Bond,United States,"Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act). In the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The you.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce."
1166,"Alicia G. Limtiaco, Attorney General of Guam","Felix P. Camacho, Governor of Guam","Governor Camacho of Guam sought to borrow over $400 million through the issuance of bonds. Guam Attorney General Moylan argued that the bond issuance violated the Guam Organic Act, a federal law governing the Territory of Guam. The Organic Act sets the limit for government borrowing to 10% of the ""aggregate tax valuation of the property on Guam."" The Governor asked the Supreme Court of Guam for a decision on the disputed text. The Guam legislature had interpreted the phrase ""aggregate tax valuation"" to mean the assessed value of property on Guam for purposes of taxation. However, the Guam Supreme Court declined to follow the legislature's interpretation and ruled that the ""aggregate tax valuation"" was equivalent to the full appraised value of property on Guam. Under that interpretation, the debt-limit would be about $1.1 billion. The Attorney General appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the case was pending, Congress passed a law allowing parties to appeal directly from the Guam Supreme Court to the you.S. Supreme Court. When the Ninth Circuit declined to hear the case, Moylan appealed to the Supreme Court. Normally parties must seek Supreme Court review within 90 days of a lower court's decision, but the case had been pending before the Ninth Circuit for two years. The Supreme Court directed the parties to argue the question of whether the time the case was pending before the Ninth Circuit counted toward the time limit."
162,"Altria Group, Inc., et al.",Stephanie Good et al.,"A group of cigarette smokers brought their claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria'trademark advertisement claiming that its product was "" light "" and included "" both tar and nicotine "" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted a judgment in favor of Altria on the claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, overturned the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that a Maine Act was not preempted, both explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's advertising did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act."
234,Michigan,Bay Mills Indian Community,"The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ( IGRA ) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state and the tribal, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the River Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this tribe. The state of Michigan called for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal - State compact. The district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop their casino at the Vanderbilt property. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated this injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs'claims, while Bay Mills'sovereign immunity bars the others."
949,Woodford,Garceau,"In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 you.S. 320, the you.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed."
610,Blessing,Freestone,"Cathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve ""substantial compliance"" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements."
2097,"Bank of America Corporation, et al.","City of Miami, Florida","The city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Federal Housing Act (FHA) and argued that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, that their actions denied the city of expected property and tax revenues, and cost the city money that it would not have had to pay had the banks not engaged in these predatory lending practices. The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that Miami did not fall within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect, and therefore did not have standing to sue under the FHA. The district court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that the banks’ conduct was the proximate because of the harm the city claimed to have suffered. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that, as long as the plaintiffs in an FHA case would have standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution, they can sue under the FHA; the statutory standing requirement is not more narrow than Article III. The appellate court also determined that Miami had sufficiently shown that the banks’ actions were the proximate because of the harm because the harm was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the actions."
1499,Steven Lefemine dba Columbia Christians for Life,Dan Wideman et al.,"Steven Lefemine and Members of the Columbia Christians for Life engaged in pro life demonstrations where they carry posters featuring graphic pictures of aborted fetuses. During a protest in Greenwood, South Carolina, police officers told Lefemine that he would be ticketed for a breach of the peace if he did not discard the posters. Lefemine objected, arguing that the police officers were infringing on his First Amendment right to free speech, but he eventually disbanded the group. A year later, Lefemines attorney sent a letter to Dan Wideman, sheriff of Greenwood County, informing him that the group would be protesting again on the same site with the posters. The police reiterated that they would ticket the group if they showed up with the offending posters. The group decided not to protest, but two years later Lefamine filed a complaint alleging First Amendment violations and seeking nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and attorneys fees. Under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act the prevailing party in a suit may recover attorney fees from the opposing party. The district court issued a permanent injunction against the police officers, but declined to award money damages. The court also denied attorney fees, holding that attorney fees were not warranted. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Lefemine was not a prevailing party under the Act. The court reasoned that the injunction did not alter the relative positions of the parties, so no party actually prevailed."
1464,"Edward Dorsey, Sr.",United States,"These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing."
1028,Garrison S. Johnson,"California, et al.","California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the you.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the you.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a ""strict scrutiny"" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were ""reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld,"" the appellate court wrote."
389,Arizona,Larry Youngblood,"On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data. At trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review."
904,Lawrence Eugene Shaw,United States,"Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account after working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu ’ s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu ’ s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu ’ s accounts to the PayPal account directly from there through an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $ 307, 500 of Hsu ’ s money to himself before the fraud was committed. Bank of America returned approximately $ 131, 000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $ 106, 000. Hsu lost about $ 170, 000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require. The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “ to defraud a financial victim. ” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the intended financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1467,"Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., et al.","Novo Nordisk A/S, et al.","Novo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application (""ANDA"") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code — a description of the scope of the patent —undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) the drug for which the brand's new drug application was approved or 2) an approved method of using the drug. The you.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo's patent did not claim any approved method of use."
1406,"Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.","Betty Dukes, et al.","Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart ""greeter"" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in you.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification."
1073,"John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.","John C. Tesmer, et al.","A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the you.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court."
1511,"Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al.",Laura Symczyk,"Genesis Healthcare Corporation (""Genesis"") employed Laura Symczyk as a registered nurse between April 2007 and December 2007. During her employment, Genesis implemented a policy that automatically deducted pay for employees' meal breaks whether or not they worked during those breaks. This prompted Symczyk to file a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (""FLSA""). In February 2010, Genesis offered to pay all of Symczyk's unpaid wages and attorney's fees. Symczyk did not respond to the offer. Genesis filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Symczyk no longer had a real interest in the outcome of the action since they offered her full relief. Since Genesis made an offer of judgment and no one had yet joined Symczyk's collective action, the District Court dismissed the case. Symczyk appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Third Circuit held that a full offer of relief does not because an FLSA collective action suit to be dismissed."
1436,"Natalie E. Tennant, Earl Ray Tomblin, Jeffrey Kessler, and Richard Thompson, in their official capacities.","Jefferson County Commission, Patricia Noland (as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated), and Dale Manuel (as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated)","In January 2012, the Jefferson County Commission brought suit against West Virginia Secretary of State Natalie E. Tennant, Governor Earl Ray Tomblin, State Senate President Jeffrey Kessler, and Speaker Richard Thompson of the West Virginia House of Delegates, each in his or her official capacity. The county commission and two of its commissioners claimed that the State's congressional apportionment statute enacted after the 2010 census violates Article I Section 2 of the US Constitution. The new statute created voting districts with significant disparities in population, violating the constitutional principle of ""one person, one vote."" Since the plaintiffs showed that the population disparities could have been reduced, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that the apportionment is not constitutional and declared it null and void. The state officials appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court."
999,Oil States Energy Services LLC,"Greene’s Energy Group, LLC","During hydraulic fracturing ( known as “ fracking ” ) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to hydraulic fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first proposed using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2, 195, 118 ( the ’ 118 Application ) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “ mandrel ” into the wellhead through where the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently solve the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism ( described in Patent No. 6, 179, 053, or the ’ 053 Patent ), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene ’ s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the ’ 053 Patent to be distinct from the ’ 118 Application using the “ ordinary meaning ” standard. Greene ’ s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the you. S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO ’ for issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter part review as violating the constitutional right from patent owners to a jury and an Article III court before having their patent invalidated."
503,"George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis","Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz","George Samuels and five other defendants, indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charges, in violation to New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their trial. They argued that these New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws invalid and refused not grant the injunction. The C. S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal"
574,"American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al.","Aereo, Inc.","Aereo, Inc. ( Aereo ) provides a service that allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet - enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions : that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo Is currently only available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the copyright holders of the programs to record or transmit their programs. Two groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violate their right to "" freely perform "" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was still substantially different from another that had been determined non - infringement of the rights of copyright holder and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs'businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower Court's ruling to deny a motion."
706,Wyoming,Houghton,"After pulling Sandra Houghton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for drugs, the officer searched the car and Houghton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Houghton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari."
182,"Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship","Leo P. Martinez, et al.","The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law ( CLS ) filed suit against the university in a California federal judge for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize its CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all other student organizations to allow "" any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs. "" In fact, CLS requires its students to attest in writing that "" I believe in : The Bible as the inspired word of God ; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son ; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins ; His bodily resurrection and His personal return ; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the act of regeneration ; [ and ] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life. "" The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on the student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. However, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights."
1138,"Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",George W. Jackson,"In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt - collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank - issued credit card. In responding to Citibank - s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third - party class - action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems ( CWS ). In these third - party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment system ; Jackson ’ s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson. Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction over the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Home Depot then submitted a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case into state court and amended his third - party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank. The district court denied Home Depot - s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “ antagonistic parties on the same side, ” and granted Jackson ’ the motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “ defendant ” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment — to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity software — was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA ’ s removal statute."
708,Jacob Abrams et al.,United States,"In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil by Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants or undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted after two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American soldiers to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of mass production of weapons to Russia distributed against "" Workers Soviets of Russia "". Each was sentenced to 20 years in prison."
503,Jonathan Dale Simmons,South Carolina,"In July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution’s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of “life imprisonment” in this case, and the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons’ request."
946,United States,Jimenez Recio,"In 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when ""'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'"" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before the drug seizure."
2309,United States of America,Evelyn Sineneng-Smith,"Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to help her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications. Federal law prohibits encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the you.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a “substantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep.”"
372,Gregory P. Warger,Randy D. Shauers,"In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed claims against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter - suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis of, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's judgment, and because it was evidence where the foreperson had lied during jury selection. The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606 ( b ), which bars the testimony of a juror on any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the likelihood of a verdict, with an exception for those regarding whether an improper outside influence was necessary to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606 ( b ) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving innocence by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the defense was barred by 606 ( b ) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
224,Missouri,Tyler G. McNeely,"On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. As Winder ordered McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the test taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol levels was far above the legal limit. The state accused McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial Court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court Of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law ; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision."
872,"United States, et al.","Texas, et al.","In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ( DACA ) program, along with criteria for determining when people can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ( DAPA ) program. Texas and other states sued to prevent an implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice - & - comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued because DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily delay the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice - and - comment claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the state had reasonable as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims."
566,Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark,"William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al.","In 2006, Heidi Heffron - Clark inherited a $ 300, 000 individual retirement account ( IRA ) from her mother's estate. The you. S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the personal account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband ( the "" Clarks "" ), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed her inherited IRA was exempt from creditor charges. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund per Section 522 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was exempt to creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
1021,"State of Ohio, et al.","American Express Company, et al.","In the credit - card industry, there is what is called a “ two - sided market. ” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card. In the United States, credit - card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks : Visa ( 45 % ), American Express ( 26. 4 % ), MasterCard ( 23. 3 % ), and Discover ( 5. 3 % ). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they don't directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees. In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex ’ s smaller network and higher merchant costs. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non - discriminatory provisions ( NDPs ). In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They claimed that the credit card companies used anti - steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti - steering provisions. This proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that America ’ s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court ’ s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower of should of weighed the and ’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “ rule of reason. ”"
814,Brentwood Academy,Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn.,"The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing ""undue influence"" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action."
571,"American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al.","Aereo, Inc.","Aereo, Inc. ( Aereo ) provides its website that allows its subscribers to see programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet - enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions : that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo is currently exclusively available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the copyright holders of the programs to record or transmit their programs. Two groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their right to "" publicly perform "" any copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different than another that had been determined non - violative of their rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent liability for the plaintiffs'businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower circuit's ruling to deny the motion."
785,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel, et al.","Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.","This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the “separate but equal” doctrine.)"
73,United States,White Mt. Apache Tribe,"Under Public Law 86 - 392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate its property, alleging that the United States had violated a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was granted here because no statute or regulation could be used to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain, restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for The Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common - law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of its Interior chose to utilize, but also supported a money loss claim."
719,"Walter M. Pierce, Governor",Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,"The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages ages eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the parents resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon institution that facilitated care of orphans, educated youths, and established locally maintained academies or institutes. This issue was decided together as Pierce v. Hill Military Academy."
1843,Morris H. Kramer et al.,Union Free School District No. 15,"Section 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim."
288,Executive Benefits Insurance Agency,Peter H. Arkison,"Mercer Insurance Agency, Inc. ( BIA ) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA applied for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company moved the insurance commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long - time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. ( EBIA ). Pearce then deposited US $ 100, 000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Pearce, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed. On appeal at the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while any bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before any Article III court."
1614,"Larry D. Jesinoski, et ux.","Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al.","On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011. Countrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1112,United States,Jeffrey Grubbs,"On federal trial for possessing child pornography, Grubbs asked the judge to suppress evidence officers seized from his home. Grubbs said the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers showed him an ""anticipatory warrant,"" something valid only after triggering events take place, with no mention of the triggering conditions. The condition set on this warrant was that officers could search Grubbs' house only after he received a pornographic video in the mail. The judge denied Grubbs' motion because the trigger was set forth in an affidavit that the officers carried during the search and that the warrant referenced. The Ninth Circuit reversed and said officers had to show the triggering events for an anticipatory warrant to the person being searched."
1017,"Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, and Raymond B. Yates, Trustee","William T. Hendon, Trustee","Raymond Yates owned a corporation with a profit sharing/pension plan. Yates borrowed money from the plan at a set interest. After he had repaid the loan to his profit sharing/pension plan, Yates' creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against him. They asked the bankruptcy court to set aside the repayment (interest included) and give it to the creditors. Yates argued that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the interest from the profit sharing/pension plan could not be seized (except for loans to participants). The bankruptcy court disagreed and granted Yates' creditors' requests. The court reasoned that as the sole owner of the business, Yates was an employer under ERISA, not a ""participant."" The plan's prohibition on interest seizure therefore did not apply. A federal district court and a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed."
1093,Francis V. Lorenzo,Securities and Exchange Commission,"Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker - dealer. Lorenzo ’ s only investment - banking client at the relevant time was a start - up company named Waste2Energy Holdings ( W2E ). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $ 15 million in “ debentures ” — which is debt secured only by a debtor ’ s earning power, rather, by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E ’ s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company ’ s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $ 10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8 - K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $ 370, 552. Lorenzo ’ s secretary alerted Lorenzo via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “ several key points ” about W2E ’ s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E ’ s intangible assets, he assured them that the offering came with “ 3 layers of protection, ” which were : $ 10 million in “ confirmed assets ” ; purchase orders and LOIs for “ over $ 43 [ million ] in orders ” ; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the bonds holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “ at the request of [ Lorenzo ’ s boss ] ” and the other stated it was sent “ at the request of [ another broker of the firm ]. ” Lorenzo ’ s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities - fraud provisions : Section 17 ( a ) ( 1 ) of the Securities Act of 1933 ; Section 10 ( b ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b - 5. Lorenzo ’ s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ ’ s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission ’ s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b - 5 ( b ). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo ’ s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ ultimate authority ” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court ’ s definition of “ maker ” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 you. S. 135 ( 2011 )."
2251,"Mission Product Holdings, Inc.","Tempnology, LLC","Tempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology’s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology’s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology’s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products. After accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to “reject any executory contract” that is not beneficial to the company. Although the parties do not dispute that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were brought) whether Mission can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed."
54,"Kinney Kinmon Lau, et al.","Alan H. Nichols, et al.","In 1971, the San Francisco, California school system was integrated. As a result, the San Francisco school system absorbed over 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who were not proficient in English. Of these students, the school system only provided about 1,000 with supplemental English language courses. Classes were taught exclusively in English. Lau and other students of Chinese descent who did not speak English and received no supplemental English courses brought a class action suit against the officials in the San Francisco Unified School District. The students claimed that the failure to provide supplemental English classes constituted an unequal educational opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court denied relief, holding that the policies of the school system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and a hearing en banc was denied. The students appealed the appellate court's decision."
631,"Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General",James H. Armstrong et al. ,"In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied the practitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the you.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition."
662,United States,Scheffer,"While defending himself before a military court martial on, among other things, substance abuse charges, airman Edward G. Scheffer sought to introduce his polygraph examination results. The results indicated there was ""no deception"" in Scheffer's denial that he used drugs while enlisted. Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707 (""Rule 707""), prohibiting the use of polygraph results in court-martial proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
385,Nicholas B. Heien,State of North Carolina,"On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car. A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the ""reasonable suspicion"" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created ""fundamental unfairness"" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that ""ignorance of the law is no excuse"" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal."
742,Los Angeles Police Department,United Reporting Publishing Corp.,"The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the ""JAILMAIL"" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest."
178,"Mohawk Industries, Inc.",Norman Carpenter,"In 2007, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district courts. He argued that he was fired, never for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated shortly after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which accused the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants. Before trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney - client power. The federal district court allowed Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that since the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney - client privilege did not qualify for exception."
796,David Anthony Taylor,United States,"David Anthony Taylor became a member of the “ Southwest Goonz, ” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery and extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor ’ s second trial, after his first resulted in a grand jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor in offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate Commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district courts granted the government ’ s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The circuit court denied Taylor ’ s motion, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction."
1681,Kent,Dulles,"Rockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed Kent to submit an affidavit as to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more asked to sign an affidavit concerning his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the Passport Department advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent certiorari."
449,"William G. Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al.","John Aaron, et al.","The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly opposed the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board Of Education. On February 20, 1958, five months after the integration crisis involving The Little Rock Nine, officers of the school board ( along with the Superintendent of Schools ) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, urging suspension of its plan of desegregation. The order the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation on the desegregation plan to be postponed to two and an half years. The district court granted the school board's request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed."
2233,"Luis A. Nieves, et al.",Russell P. Bartlett,"Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 you.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable because did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the you.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 you.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable because, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable because."
1795,"Canada Packers, Ltd.","Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al.","Several American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers’ plants in Canada. Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment. Later, Canada Packers’ sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for the unreasonably low original payment. The railroads refused to pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the you.S.A. The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed."
2114,"County of Los Angeles, et al.","Angel Mendez, et al.","In October 2010, Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded to a tip from an informant that wanted parolee Ronnie O’Dell had been seen in front of the nearby residence of Paula Hughes. The officers were informed that Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia lived together in the backyard of the Hughes residence. Although they did not have a search warrant, other officers directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to search the backyard. After determining that O’Dell was not in any of the three storage sheds in Hughes’ backyard, the deputies proceeded to a wooden she would surrounded by an A/C unit, clothes locker, clothes, and other belongings. The deputies did not knock and announce their presence. Deputy Conley, upon opening the door, saw the silhouette of a person holding a rifle through a curtain in the she would. Conley yelled “Gun!” and both deputies proceeded to shoot Mendez and Garcia. Whether Mendez was merely moving the gun or was pointing it at the deputies was subject to conflicting testimony at trial. As a result, Mendez required amputation of his right leg below the knee, and Garcia was shot in the back. Mendez and Garcia sued Conley and Pederson and alleged that the deputies, in their official capacity, deprived them of their Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unjustified warrantless search and that the deputies failed to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule, which requires that officers announce their presence before they enter a home. The district court found for the plaintiffs on both these allegations and also held that, although the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, they were liable for the shooting under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. That rule holds an officer liable for use of deadly force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation via a Fourth Amendment violation. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment but reversed the knock-and-announce rule holding that because there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on whether officers must announce themselves again at a separate residence on the same property. The appellate court also held that the officers were liable under the provocation rule because their unjustified search of the occupied she would led to the shooting."
801,Board of Trustees of University of Alabama,Garrett,"After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama in Birmingham, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from ""discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."" The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed."
887,United States,Ruiz,"After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a ""fast track"" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information."
142,Jose Ernesto Medellin,State of Texas,"Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised another post - conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for the crime the right to contact the consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court ( see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) holding that the u. S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals ( including Medellin ) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez - Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts not comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President exclusive power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez - Llamas as standing for its principle that rulings of the ICJ are never binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement to state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law - making power not allocated to him by the Constitution."
906,"Star Athletica, LLC","Varsity Brands, Inc., et al.","Varsity Brands, Inc. ( Varsity ) designs and manufactures uniforms and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and don't consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two - dimensional artwork of those designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC ( Star ) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to The Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions seeking summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “ useful articles, ” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs must be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non - functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary conviction for Star and held that these designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The N. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “ useful article. ”"
66,"Bowman Transportation, Inc., et al.","Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. et al.","These are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States. The ICC rejected all but three applications. Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than initially set out in their application. The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in you.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate. The district court found the ICC’s actions arbitrary and capricious. The court voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal."
406,Larry Whitfield,United States,"On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a tree, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several banks as well as the attempted bank robbery. A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that man while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield sought to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate because of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the prohibition and the court denied the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of threatening her. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for appeal on the issue of whether or not the circuit court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
1690,Williams,Lee,"A non-Native American merchant ran a general store on a Navajo reservation. The merchant filed a collection action against petitioners, Native American customers, for goods sold on credit at the store. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial court's judgment that the state courts had jurisdiction. The Native American customers sought review."
829,Lewis,"Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.","In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors ""all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled."" Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed."
73,Richard Erznoznik,City of Jacksonville,"The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari."
238,Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette,California,"On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The command center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting assistance from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck floor. The occupants of the truck, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were responsible for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence could not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that an anonymous tip combined with the officers'observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed."
1856,Presbyterian Church in United States,Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,"The general Presbyterian Church (general church), and two local churches, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church) and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, were in dispute over the control of properties used by the local churches in Savannah, Georgia. The local churches withdrew from the general church due to these conflicting views. In response, the general church took over the local churches’ property. Each of the local churches sued the general church for trespass on the disputed property. The general church argued that the civil courts do not have the power to determine whether the general church had departed from its faith and practice. The district court disagreed and concluded that, under Georgia law, the implied trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church was terminated because of the general church’s substantial departure from its doctrines. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by agreeing with the general church that the First Amendment prevents civil courts from ruling on church doctrine issues."
176,"R. W. Jones, Sr., et al.",Charles T. Wolf et al.,"Vineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”). Under the PCUS’s hierarchical structure, the actions of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order. On May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville’s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission’s inquiry. The minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville’s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia’s “neutral principles of law” approach to church property disputes, found for the majority faction. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction’s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
149,Houchins,KQED Inc.,"KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media."
1216,"CSX Transportation, Inc.",Georgia State Board of Equalization et al.,"The Tax Injunction Act establishes a general rule that federal courts will not interfere with matters of state taxation, but the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) provides an exception for railroads. In an effort to prevent state tax discrimination against railroads, Section 306 of the 4-R Act requires that the ratio of the assessed value to the true market value of railroad property not exceed by more than five percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction. This calculation requires that states determine the ""true market value"" of the railroads' property - a valuation that can be subjective. Using a new valuation methodology, the Georgia State Board of Equalization appraised the property of the railroad company CSX Transportation, Inc. at $8.2 billion. CSX filed a complaint under the 4-R Act, noting that the old appraisal methodology would have valued the property at only $6 billion. Despite CSX's argument that the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge state valuation methods, the district court ruled that the only the state's methodology could be considered. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that in the absence of a clear statement in the 4-R Act, principles of federalism weighed against interpreting the Act to give railroads additional power to challenge the taxing authority of the states in federal court. The Circuit Court stood by the general principle that federal courts should not interfere with state taxation policies. Since the 4-R Act did not allow challenges to the state's choice of valuation method, CSX could not bring its arguments that Georgia's methodology was faulty."
908,"Star Athletica, LLC","Varsity Brands, Inc., et al.","Varsity Brands, Inc. ( Varsity ) designs and manufactures clothing and uniforms for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and don't consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two - dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to designs that Star Athletica, LLC ( Star ) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other issues, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star asserted that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “ useful articles, ” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible under copyright. Varsity claimed that the designs were separable and non - functional, and therefore that those copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were essential to the functionality of the uniform. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows "" features of a product to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “ useful article. ”"
951,"Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert along Rio Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed - wire fence on the you. S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a you. S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez ’ s friends at the you. S. border, while Hernandez retreated up the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the you. S. side of the river, fired at him two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the head and killed him. Six years after Hernandez ’ s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the you. S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution ’ s deadly - force protections stop at the border for non - citizens like Hernandez. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also ruled that Mesa was not entitled to federal immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed."
927,Stogner,California,"In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. In 1998, Marion Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's because of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed."
1513,"US Airways, Inc. in its capacity as Fiduciary and Plan Administrator of the US Airways Employee Benefit Plan",James E. McCutchen,"After James E. McCutchen suffered a serious injury in a car accident, a benefit plan administered by US Airways paid $66,866 to cover his medical expenses. The plan requires the beneficiary to pay back the medical expenses out of any amount recovered from third parties. Once McCutchen recovered over $100,000 from third parties in a separate suit, the plan demanded that McCutchen reimburse them for the full amount they paid out. McCutchen argued that US Airways did not take into account his legal fees, which reduced his recovery amount from third parties to less than the amount demanded. US Airways then filed suit for ""appropriate equitable relief"" under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA). The district court ordered McCutchen to pay the full $66,866. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that ERISA is subject to equitable limitations. To determine appropriate equitable relief, the district court must take into account the distribution of the amount recovered from third parties between McCutchen and his attorneys."
1712,Charles W. Baker et al.,Joe C. Carr et al.,Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.
702,Hanlon,Berger,"In 1993, a magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of Paul and Erma Berger's Montana ranch for evidence of the taking of wildlife in violation of federal law. Later, a multiple-vehicle caravan consisting of government agents and a crew of photographers and reporters from CNN proceeded to the ranch. In executing the warrant, the federal officers allowed the media crew to accompany and observe them. Subsequently, the Berger's filed suit, asserting that the officials, special agents of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and an assistant United States attorney, had violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court concluded that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, as no clearly established law protecting individuals from the commercial recording of a search of their premises existed at the time. The Court of Appeals reversed."
1129,United States,Georgia et al.,"Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed. Before the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the you.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection."
1256,"Jesus C. Hernández, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15 - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández ’ s friends on you. S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From you. S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him. Hernández's parents filed their lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son ’ s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion to dismiss, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 you. S. 388 ( 1971 ) ( holding an implied because of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff ’ s constitutional rights ), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s dismissal of the parents ’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “ clearly established ” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on you. S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil. The you. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández ’ s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could. claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court of s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court. s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582,. S. _ _ ( 2017 ),,. the Court. that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under B ##ivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim."
919,National Labor Relations Board,"SW General, Inc.","In 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act ( FVRA ), which provided that, if a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms ( PAS position ) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an “ acting officer ” for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another company to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB ), a PAS position, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not approve him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians ( EMTs ), firefighters, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “ longevity pay, ” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a similar complaint. An administrative law judge determined the SW General has committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states in the acting officer may not become the, for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon ’ s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA."
1884,New York Times Company,United States,"In what became known as the ""Pentagon Papers Case,"" the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co."
311,Edward Lane,Steven Franks,"In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth ( "" CITY "" ) program at Central Alabama Community College ( "" CACC "" ). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work on the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the suspension of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and ruled "" his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Franks and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that his doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from criticism and granted summary judgment in his favor. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public servant."
36,John Doe,United States,"John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible illegal manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt for unreported income. As part of the grand jury ’ s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self - incrimination regarding any other documents. The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe ’ s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe ’ s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe ’ s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe must sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information. The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “ fishing expedition ” for incriminating evidence ; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought and prevent. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and ordered that him be held in contempt because he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed."
1794,"Henry Keyishian, et al.","Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, et al.","Harry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent the appointment and continued employment of “subversive persons.” Because the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program."
2093,"Stacy Fry, et vir, as Next Friends of Minor E. F.","Napoleon Community Schools, et al. ","The Frys’ daughter, E.F., was born with cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aide in accordance with her Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), did not allow her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued the school, the principal, and the school district and argued that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state disabilities laws. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the claims necessarily implicated the IDEA, which required plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Frys appealed and argued that the exhaustion requirement did not apply because they were seeking damages, which is not the sort of relief the IDEA provided. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that the Frys’ claims were essentially educational, which are precisely the sort of claims the IDEA was meant to address, and therefore the exhaustion requirement applied."
82,Nevada Department of Human Resources,Hibbs,"William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care For his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( EPA ). The FMLA entitles an existing employee to take up to four workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the treatment of a "" serious health condition "" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Owens'initial request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, notified him that he must report for work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "" against any employer "" that "" interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of "" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed."
1018,Hernan O'Ryan Castro,United States,"Hernan O'Ryan Castro was sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug related offenses. After the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Castro alleged that he had discovered evidence that a government witness had testified falsely. Based on this evidence, he requested a new trial without legal representation. The district court, because Castro had no legal representation, attempted to help him by re-characterizing his request for a new trial as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judge's re-characterization of Castro's appeal was intended to help him, but two years later, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress limited the number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus that a prisoner could file to one. When Castro attempted to petition for what he thought was his first write of habeas corpus in 1998, he was denied because of the earlier reclassification of his request for a new trial. When he appealed, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals initially sided with Castro, ruling that the reclassification should not count against him. Four months later, however, the 11th Circuit reconsidered, siding with the government."
2027,Terrance Williams,Pennsylvania,"Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted the relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and lifted the stay of execution. The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court’s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution."
1065,Mount Lemmon Fire District,"John Guido, et al.","In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable because to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 you.S.C. §§ 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA."
1639,Marvin D. Horne,U.S. Department of Agriculture,"In 1949 the you.S. Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order). The Marketing Order authorized the federal government to reserve a percentage of the yearly California raisin crop to stabilize the supply, and thus the price, of California raisins. Under the Marketing Order, farmers are entitled to a share of the proceeds acquired when, or if, the government sells the reserved raisins. Marvin Horne, a farmer and raisin producer, attempted to skirt the Marketing Order by processing his own raisins, which he claimed exempted his raisins from the Marketing Order's reserve requirement. The Department of Agriculture claimed Horne's raisins were still subject to the Market Order, and following administrative proceedings, Horne was fined nearly $700,000. Horne sued the Department of Agriculture and claimed that the Marketing Order violated his Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. The district court found in favor of the Department of Agriculture. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked standing to address Horne's claim, because Fifth Amendment takings claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The United States Supreme Court held that the appellate court did have jurisdiction and remanded the case. On remand, the appellate court found for the Department of Agriculture by holding that the reserve requirement did not act as a per se taking because Horne's raisins constituted personal property rather than real property. The appellate court also held that the Marketing Order did not constitute a taking because there was a sufficient nexus, and rough proportionality, between the reserve requirement and the specific interest the government seeks to protect, which in this case is the government's interest in stabilizing raisin prices."
809,Americold Realty Trust,"Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.","The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and General Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust ( USA ) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought not remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity in the trust ’ s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties for submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Congress did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate and the inquiry must extend to the trust ’ its directors ( who are its shareholders ), not just the trustees."
1318,Texas,New Mexico,"Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies to its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination. In 2014 and 2015, after severe rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of its waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas did not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico. When the River Master analyzed and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based around the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30 - day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive access to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report that credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss."
90,United States,Henry Ogle Watson,"On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
1074,Jeffrey Jerome Salinas,United States,"Jeffrey Jerome Salinas was charged with bank robbery in federal district court. The district court treated Salinas’ two prior robbery convictions as unrelated. But because he had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance, he was treated as a career offender for sentencing purposes, which meant that his sentence was increased in accordance with the you.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the district court properly treated Salinas’ prior robbery convictions as unrelated and that his conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance was a “controlled substance offense” within the meaning of ""career offender"" for sentencing purposes."
2342,"CIC Services, LLC","Internal Revenue Service, et al.","In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any ""reportable transactions."" IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors. On November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties. On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 you.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 you.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal."
1305,"William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission","American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al.","Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act—the automatic call ban—prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban: automated calls “for emergency purposes” and those made to a cell phone with “the prior express consent of the called party.” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban. The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review (testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a ""compelling state interest,"" that the law is ""narrowly tailored"" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the ""least restrictive means"" to achieve that purpose) to the debt-collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt-collection exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that the provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision."
947,"Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO",Simon Shiao Tam,"Simon Tam of his band, The Slants, sought to register the band ’ s name with the you. S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application when it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards “ persons of Asian descent. ” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “ [ consist ] of or [ comprise ] immoral, deceptive, and scandalous matter ; or matter which would disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. ” Tam appealed the trademark officer ’ s decision, and the name was refused a second time on a jury comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on a you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the patent office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application or that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment."
1168,"Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General",Leroy Carhart et al.,"In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when ""the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother."" Dr. Leroy Carhart and other physicians who perform late-term abortions sued to stop the Act from going into effect. The plaintiffs argued that the Act could apply to a more common abortion procedure known as ""D&E"" (""dilation and evacuation""), as well as to the less common ""intact D&E,"" sometimes called D&X (""dilation and extraction""). With this application the Act would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional ""undue burden"" on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, regardless of Congress's finding in the Act that partial-birth abortions are never medically necessary. A federal District Court agreed and ruled the Act unconstitutional on both grounds. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The government argued that the Act only bans a narrow category of abortion procedures, and that a health exception is not required when Congress determines that a banned abortion procedure is never necessary for the health of the mother. The Eighth Circuit disagreed and upheld the District Court, ruling that a health exception is required for all bans on abortion procedures when ""substantial medical authority"" supports the necessity of the procedure. The Circuit Court ruled that the ongoing disagreement among medical experts over the necessity of intact D&E abortions was sufficient to establish that the Act was unconstitutional without a health exception. The Circuit Court did not reach the question of whether the Act was so broad as to qualify as an unconstitutional ""undue burden."""
67,Breuer,"Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.","Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under its Federal Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ). Attorneys for Breuer's attorney, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved in federal court by citing the federal removal law. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court "" as so expressly provided by Act and Congress. "" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits violating the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state jurisdiction ; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
270,"Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers","Pat Quinn, in his official capacity as governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31","Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in-home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services (Disabilities Program). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services (Rehabilitation Program). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a ""fair share"" provision, which required all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership in 2009. In 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review."
388,Florida,Michael A. Riley,"Michael Riley lived in a mobile home situated on five acres of rural land in Florida. Riley owned a greenhouse that was located behind his home; from the ground, the contents of Riley’s greenhouse were shielded from view by its walls and the trees on his property. In 1984, the Pasco County Sheriff’s office received a tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property. The investigating officer tried to see into the greenhouse from the ground but could not, so he circled in a helicopter at 400 feet and saw what he believed to be marijuana growing inside. Acting on this information, the investigating officer obtained a search warrant, searched the greenhouse, and found the marijuana. Riley was charged with possession of marijuana. Riley filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court granted his motion and held that viewing his property from the air violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the trial court’s decision and denied Riley’s motion to dismiss the evidence. The appellate court also certified the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reinstated the trial court’s order to suppress the evidence."
1306,"William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission","American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al.","Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act — the automatic call ban — prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “ any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. ” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban : automated calls “ for emergency purposes ” and those made to a cell phone with “ the prior express consent of the called party. ” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones used to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States. ” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban. The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, arguing that it challenged the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content - based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review ( testing that the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a "" compelling state interest, "" that the law is "" narrowly tailored "" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the "" least restrictive means "" to achieve that purpose ) to the debt - collection issue and ruled that it does not meet the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the trial court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt - collection exemption does not satisfy that level of scrutiny. Finding that the Act was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision."
1040,"City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.",Mark J. Abrams,"Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations. The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a ""comprehensive remedial scheme,"" Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws."
352,Puerto Rico,Branstad,"Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused."
453,Quill Corporation,"North Dakota by and through its Tax Commissioner, Heitkamp","Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 you.S. 753. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of Bellas Hess in light of the ""tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations"" since it had been decided."
1545,Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation,William L. Hoeper,"Section 125 of the Aviation Transportation Safety Act (ATSA) states that an air carrier who voluntarily reports suspicious transactions or behavior shall not be ""civilly liable."" The immunity does not apply to disclosures made with ""actual knowledge"" that the disclosure is false, inaccurate, or misleading. Likewise, the immunity does not extend to an air carrier that makes a disclosure with ""reckless disregard"" as to its truth or falsity. William Hoeper, a pilot for Air Wisconsin, made four unsuccessful attempts to become certified to fly another type of aircraft after Air Wisconsin discontinued use of the type of plane that Hoeper had previously piloted. During his fourth and final opportunity to pass the test, Hoeper abruptly ended the test because he believed that the test administrators were deliberately sabotaging his efforts to pass. One test administrator knew that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had issued a firearm to Hoeper in his role as a federal flight deck officer (FFDO). FFDO pilots are not allowed to carry the firearm while traveling as passengers. This administrator booked Hoeper on a flight from the testing center in Virginia to Hoeper's home in Denver and then called the TSA to report that Hoeper was a disgruntled, and possibly armed, employee. In response, TSA officials arrested and searched Hoeper. Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in a Colorado state court and alleged defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin moved for a directed verdict based on the argument that it was immune from civil liability under ATSA. Air Wisconsin also argued that Hoeper could not prove ""actual malice"" because its statements were ""substantially true"" and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The jury found that Air Wisconsin's statements to the TSA were false and that it made at least one statement with reckless disregard for the truth, so the jury awarded Hoeper damages. A Colorado appellate court affirmed the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court's submission of the matter to the jury was improper; however, the error was harmless in this case because Air Wisconsin was not entitled to claim immunity under ATSA. The Colorado Supreme Court further held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the statements were false."
2207,"Lamps Plus, Inc., et al.",Frank Varela,"Frank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration. The district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward. The appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite “contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 you.S. 662 (2010)."
645,Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson,Community Bank of Raymore,"Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson’s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC (PHC). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore (Community) made four loans totaling more than $2,000,000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payment. Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands’ loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1046,"Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.",Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,"Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is ""a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests."" The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
857,Danny Birchfield,State of North Dakota,"Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired ( DWI ) and taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first - degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to perform a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was above the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving over the influence. All three men challenged state state statutes criminalizing refusing to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to driving free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no reason because that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing his refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
644,Samuel Ocasio,United States,"Samuel Ocasio was a senior officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop ( Majestic ). The indictment accused Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury indicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiracy and commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio "" s conviction."
1519,"Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden of the Central California Women's Facility at Chowchilla",Tara Sheneva Williams,"In 1999, Tara Williams was charged with the 1993 robbery-murder of Hung Mun Kim. During jury deliberations at Williams' trial, the judge received a jury note saying that one of the jurors, juror number six, expressed an intention to disregard the law due to a concern about the severity of the charge of first-degree murder. After an inquiry and evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed the juror for bias. Williams appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed juror number six, because the removal of the ""lone holdout"" juror violated Williams' Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury. The California Court of Appeals rejected her claim as meritless, and the California Supreme Court denied further direct appellate review. Williams filed a state habeas corpus petition in Los Angleles County Superior Court. The court denied the petition, ruling that the issues raised in the petition were issues for direct appeal, not collateral attack. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, in which she again challenged the removal of juror number six. The magistrate judge concluded that the trial court's factual finding of bias was entitled to deference and that the discharge of juror number six did not constitute a constitutional violation. The district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Williams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the deferential-review standard did not apply because the California Court of Appeal had only reviewed her state claim and had not adjudicated her federal constitutional claim. The appellate court then conducted a review of Williams' federal claim and concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of his views on the merits of the case. The State of California appealed to the appellate court's decision."
513,United States,Robert P. Aguilar,"In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to you.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the you.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation."
2173,Scott Kernan,Michael Daniel Cuero,"In 2005, the State of California charged Michael Cuero with two felonies and a misdemeanor. Cuero initially pleaded “not guilty” but subsequently changed to plead guilty to the two felony counts. Cuero admitted that he had previously served four separate prison terms, including a term for residential burglary, which counts toward California’s “three strikes” law. On his guilty-plea form, Cuero indicated that he understood that he “may receive this maximum punishment as as result of my plea: 14 years, 4 months in State Prison, $10,000 fine and 4 years parole.” After a hearing, the state trial court accepted the plea and granted the State’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charge. The court then scheduled a sentencing hearing. Before the sentencing hearing occurred, the prosecution determined that a second of Cuero’s prior convictions qualified as a “strike” and that the guilty-plea form erroneously listed only one strike. The fact that the present conviction would constitute his third “strike” under the law, Cuero faced instead a minimum sentence of 25 years. The State asked the trial court for permission to amend the criminal complaint accordingly, and over Cuero’s objection, the court granted the State’s motion. However, the court permitted Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the change. Cuero withdrew his initial guilty plea and entered a new guilty plea to the amended complaint, which charged Cuero with one felony. The trial court sentenced Cuero to 25 years to life, his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied a state habeas petition. Cuero then filed a petition for federal habeas relief in the US District Court for the Southern District of California, which denied his petition. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state trial court had “acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law” by refusing to enforce the original plea agreement.”"
268,"Lexmark International, Inc.","Static Control Components, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc. ( Lexmark ) is a large producer of cartridge and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. ( SCC ) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's trademark property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The you. S. Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit relied on the "" reasonable interest "" test to establish standing under the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, don't use the AGC Factors, which met the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must have 1 ) a reasonable interest to the alleged false advertising and 2 ) a reasonable basis for believing that the actual false advertising will violate that interest."
718,"Walter M. Pierce, Governor",Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,"The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians must send students between the ages ages eight and sixteen to public school in the district where those children resided. The Society of Sisters became an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for poor, sheltered youths, and built and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided along with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy."
109,United States,Freddie J. Booker,"In Blakely v. Washington ( 2004 ) the you. S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase their sentence beyond the standard range. Following you. S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge upheld Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the judge violated their Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found in a judge. In another case, you. S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188 - 235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge holding Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly through the I. S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases."
693,Maryland,Dyson,"Acting on a tip from a confidential informant and a subsequent investigation, sheriff's deputies stopped and searched Kevin Dyson's automobile. The deputies found 23 grams of crack cocaine in a duffel bag in the trunk. Dyson was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. In reversing, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment to apply, there must be not only probable because to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of an exigency which precluded the police from obtaining a warrant. Although there was abundant probable because, the court concluded that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant."
759,Smith Betts,"Patrick J. Brady, Warden","Betts was tried for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford lawyers and requested to be appointed for him. The judge hearing the case denied the request, and he subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed in the Supreme Court. They argued he was wrongfully denied his rights to counsel."
997,Oil States Energy Services LLC,"Greene’s Energy Group, LLC","During hydraulic fracturing ( known as “ fracking ” ) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas well are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2, 195, 118 ( the ’ 118 Application ) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “ mandrel ” into the hole through which the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism ( described in Patent Nr. 6, 179, 053, or 1 ’ 053 Patent ), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2007, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene ’ s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the ’ 053 Patent to be distinct from the ’ 118 Application using the “ ordinary meaning "" standard. Greene ’ s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the you. S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO ’ s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the assumption that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the constitutional right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum against having their patent invalidated."
1285,Donald J. Trump,"Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al.","The district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court."
1068,Mount Lemmon Fire District,"John Guido, et al.","In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full - time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full - time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed employment discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ), which found reasonable because to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( EPA ), 29 you. S. C. § § 621 - 34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “ employer ” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three - judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the circuit court stated that a political subdivision of the state does indeed need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be hired by the ADEA."
2217,"Budha Ismael Jam, et al.",International Finance Corporation,"Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital. The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not because damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project. The plant’s construction and operation did because harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance. The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 you.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute. The Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit."
1289,Salman Khade Abuelhawa,United States,"In 2007, a federal district court convicted Salman Khade Abuelhawa in part for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally using a communications facility (a telephone) in committing, causing, and facilitating a felony (distribution of cocaine) in violation of 21 you.S.C. Section 843(b). Mr. Abuelhawa appealed arguing that Section 843(b) does not apply because he purchased cocaine for personal use, which is not a felony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Abuelhawa's conviction. It reasoned that Mr. Abuelhawa's use of a cell phone facilitated cocaine distribution because his telephone call made the distribution of cocaine ""easier"" for his dealer, which is a felony, thus Section 843(b) properly applies."
1079,Clarence E. Hill,"James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.","Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 you.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision."
789,"Cooper Industries, Inc.","Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.","Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., manufactures a multifunction pocket tool, the Pocket Survival Tool (PST). In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. used photographs of a modified PST to introduce a competing tool, the ToolZall. The photographs were used in posters, packaging, and advertising materials. Subsequently, Leatherman filed an action asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Ultimately, a trial jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The District Court then entered judgment, rejecting Cooper's argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, using an ""abuse of discretion"" standard, concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the award."
45,Lawyer,Department of Justice,"Based on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and it appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement."
867,Barnhart,Walton,"The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an ""inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."" After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his ""inability"" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies ""impairment"" not ""inability,"" that no similar duration requirement relates to an ""inability,"" and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to work, his ""inability"" would have been ""expected"" to last 12 months."
1446,Marcus D. Mims,"Arrow Financial Services, LLC","Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions."
1581,Direct Marketing Association,"Barbara Brohl, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Revenue","Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the sale of tangible goods in the state, which retailers with a physical presence in the state are required to collect from purchasers and remit to the state. If a Colorado purchaser has not paid the sales tax on tangible goods, as occurs in some online and mail-order transactions in which the businesses have no physical presence in Colorado, the purchaser must pay a 2.9% use tax and is responsible for reporting and paying the tax to the state. To increase the rate of collection of the use tax, in 2010, Colorado implemented regulations for non-collecting retailers whose gross sales in Colorado exceed $100,000. These retailers must provide transactional notices to Colorado purchasers, send annual purchase summaries to Colorado customers, and annually report Colorado purchaser information to the Colorado Department of Revenue. Retailers that do not comply with these regulations are subject to penalties. In June 2010, Direct Marketing Association (DMA)—a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet—sued the Colorado Department of Revenue's executive director and argued that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The district court granted DMA's request for an injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of DMA. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not reach a decision on the merits of the appeal and instead held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's tax collection effort."
529,David Carpenter,United States,"R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ ) entitled Heard on the Street ( Heard ) in which he reported on up - and - coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him providing information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over one four - month period, the brokers gave Winans ’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $ 690, 000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) began an investigation, Winans and his co - conspirator Carpenter confessed. The district court found that Winans had breached the duty and confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co - conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities fraud. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ were the only other victim of the mail and wire fraud that — had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction must have overturned. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners ’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans'knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ."
2106,"Levon Dean, Jr.",United States,"Levon Dean, Jr. and Jamal Dean were brothers who agreed to participate in a robbery of a local drug dealer known as J.R. with Jessica Cabbell and Sarah Berg. On April 15, 2013, Levon and Jamal accompanied Berg to the Palmer House Motel in Sioux City, Iowa, to confront J.R. Jamal pulled a gun on J.R. and hit him on the head with the firearm. Berg, Jamal, and Levon fled the scene with J.R.’s car, cell phone, and methamphetamines. Later that month, Levon and Jamal robbed another methamphetamine dealer, C.B., at gunpoint in his home. In a similar manner, Jamal hit C.B. with his gun and fled the scene in C.B.’s car with $300, methamphetamines, and other electronics. During this robbery, the Deans ordered Hope Marsh who was living at the residence to come with and live with them. The Deans were eventually arrested in May of 2013. The Deans were convicted of multiple crimes including robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, which requires that a crime “obstruct, delay, or affect commerce.” Levon Dean, Jr. was sentenced to 400 months, including a 360-month mandatory minimum consecutive sentence pursuant to the sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 you.S.C. §924(c). Without the mandatory minimum, Levon’s sentence guideline would have been 84-105 months. On appeal, Levon Dean challenged the sufficiency the evidence to establish a nexus to interstate commerce as the Hobbs Act requires, the sufficiency of evidence for his firearm convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to follow the precedent it established in United States v. Hatcher, which held that the district court did not have discretion to reconsider mandatory minimums in sentences. The appellate court held that the district court’s sentence of 40-months to be served consecutively with the 360-month sentence was “substantively reasonable and not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.”"
1735,Raymond L. Haynes ,Washington,"On the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, and he signed a written confession after he was told that he could not call his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction."
2078,"Scott Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation",Antonio A. Hinojosa,"In 2009, while Antonio Hinojosa was serving a 16-year sentence for armed robbery and related crimes, prison officials determined that he was a prison-gang associate and placed him in a secured housing unit. At that time, California law allowed prisoners placed in a secured housing unit solely because of prison-gang affiliation could continue to accrue good-time credits. In 2010, the California Legislature amended the law so that, while prisoners in secured housing units could retain whatever good-time credits they had upon entry, they could no longer accrue good-time credits while in the unit. Hinojosa filed a state habeas petition and argued that the amended law’s application to him violated the ex post facto clause of the you.S. Constitution. The state court denied the claim because Hinojosa did not file it in the court for the county in which he was incarcerated. Hinojosa sought review by the appellate court and then the state supreme court, both of which denied his petition. Hinojosa then sought federal habeas relief. The district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which establishes a deferential standard of review of state denials of habeas, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that, because the initial state court denial was not based on the merits, the AEDPA did not apply."
879,United States,Drayton,"Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused."
501,"George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis","Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz","George Samuels among several other defendants were indicted in circuit court on political anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in district court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated electoral process, First Amendment freedoms, and consumer protection. The district court found the laws constitutional and refused to grant the injunction. The you. S. Supreme Court dismissed this case on an appeal"
1240,"Polar Tankers, Inc.","City of Valdez, Alaska","In 1999, the city of Valdez, Alaska imposed a property tax on large vessels that used its port. Vessels subject to taxation elsewhere were held to an apportionment formula based on the number of days spent there. In response, Polar Tankers Inc. filed suit in an Alaska trial court arguing that the apportionment provision was unconstitutional. The trial court in part agreed, ruling that the apportionment method violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but did not violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed in part. The court held that the tax apportionment formula used by the city of Alaska was fair and non-duplicative. Therefore, it did not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses in the Constitution."
947,Connecticut Department of Public Safety,Doe,"Connecticut's ""Megan's Law"" requires persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety and requires the Department to post a sex offender registry containing registrants' names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on the Internet. John Doe, a convicted sex offender who is subject to the law, filed suit, claiming that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court enjoined the law's public disclosure provisions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that such disclosure violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing."
1052,Roderick Jackson,Birmingham Board of Education,"Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a ""private right of action"" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson."
2278,"Linda H. Lamone, et al.","O. John Benisek, et al.","This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 you.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable. After the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 you.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court."
2368,TransUnion LLC,Sergio L. Ramirez,"In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom you.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party. The jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million. TransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first."
1787,Harris,United States,"Al Harris refused to answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the District Court for the Southern District of New York where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1202,Larry Begay,United States,"In 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shooting a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to possessing the rifle. Prior to the firearm arrest, Begay had been convicted twelve times of driving while intoxicated. Under New Mexico law, each DWI conviction after the first three were considered felonies. The court concluded that the DWI convictions were violent felonies, triggering the federal career criminal law's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A deeply divided court of appeals panel affirmed the decision to treat the DWIs as violent felonies."
746,Pegram,Herdrich,"In 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured. Herdrich sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal."
1039,"Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.","Angel McClary Raich, et al.","In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and you.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two you.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - you.S. v. Lopez (1995) and you.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not ""substantially affect"" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress."
781,Arizona,California,"In 1952, Arizona invoked the you.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment."
303,Glen Burton Ake,Oklahoma,"In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. At trial, his behavior was so abnormal that the court ordered a prolonged mental examination to determine his competency to stand trial. After six months of examination, a state psychiatrist declared Ake unfit for trial and in need of a “maximum security facility.” Six weeks after this declaration, the same psychiatrist found that, when Ake was on his anti-psychotic medication, he was stable and competent to stand trial; the state resumed proceedings. Ake intended to assert the insanity defense, so a psychiatrist had to determine Ake’s mental state at the time of the killings. Because Ake could not afford to hire a psychiatrist, his attorney requested that the state provide him one. The court refused and rejected Ake’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. Without a psychiatrist, Ake was unable to provide any evidence as to his mental state at the time of the offense. Absent this evidence, jurors were instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake’s insanity defense and convicted him on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, Ake—still unable to afford a psychiatrist—could not provide expert testimony to mitigate his offense and was sentenced to death. Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and held that the government was not responsible for providing psychiatric help to indigent defendants charged with capital crimes."
1214,"Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al.","Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.","The Indiana legislature passed two laws at issue in this case. The former related to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and pathological diseases, thereby banning abortion providers from incinerating fetal remains with surgical byproducts. The law also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal bones, which Indiana law does not allow for human remains. The second provision of Indiana Law barred any knowing provision in sex -, race -, or disability - selective abortions by private providers. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky challenged the laws on constitutional grounds but notably did not make the argument that state law burdened a fundamental right."
573,"American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al.","Aereo, Inc.","Aereo, Inc. ( Aereo ) provides a service which allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet - connected devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions : that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo is currently only available to subscribers in one New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not require a license from the copyright holders to the programs to record or transmit their programs. Two groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their freedom to "" publicly perform "" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different from another that had been determined non - violative of the rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs'rights, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling to deny the motion."
391,Florida Star,Betty Jean Freeman,"A reporter for the Florida Star wrote and printed an article about Betty Jean Freedman’s rape, including her full name. The reporter obtained all of his information, including the victim’s name, from the police report. The police department did not restrict access to the pressroom or police reports, but there were several signs in the area instructing not to print victim’s names. The newspaper also had a policy of not printing the full names of victims. After the article ran, Freedman and her family received several threatening phone calls, and Freedman sought mental counseling and police protection. Freedman sued, claiming emotional distress. The district court found Florida Star guilty of negligence under a Florida law that prohibits publishing the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instrument of mass communication. The court awarded Freedman compensatory and punitive damages. The district court of appeal affirmed and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review."
735,"Murphy Brothers, Inc.","Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.","On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a ""courtesy copy"" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 you. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand the case to the state court on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 you. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice ""shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint]."" Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words ""receipt...or otherwise."""
625,United States,O'Hagan,"The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found James O'Hagan, a partner at Dorsey and Whitney law firm (Dorsey), guilty of 57 counts of fraud for profiting from stock options in Pillsbury Company based on nonpublic information he misappropriated for his personal benefit. O'Hagan knew that Dorsey's client, Grand Metropolitan PLC, was considering placing a tender offer (a public offer to pay shareholders a premium for their stock at a specified time) to acquire a majority share in Pillsbury Company. O'Hagan bought a large number of stock options without telling his firm and later sold his options for a $4.3 million profit. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's convictions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Eighth Circuit applied the Act only to security-traders who wrongfully use confidential information pertaining to their own companies. The Circuit Court ruled that the SEC had exceeded the rule-making authority granted to it by the Act by making it a fraudulent action to trade securities on exclusive non-public foreknowledge of a tender offer."
1215,"Frederick L. Allen, et al.","Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the you.S. Copyright Office. At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely. Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the you.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA."
1042,"Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al.","Andrea L. Beaver, et al.",Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.
147,Zurcher,Stanford Daily,"In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant."
14,Frederick E. Adams,Robert Williams,"During the early morning hours of October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from Williams’ waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of possession of a handgun and heroin. After the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, Williams filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a prisoner. Williams argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with Williams and ordered that his conviction be set aside."
1294,"Michael A. Knowles, Warden",Alexandre Mirzayance,"Alexandre Mirzayance was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court. He was subsequently denied post-conviction relief by the trial court and the California Court of Appeals. Mr. Mirzayance then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. He maintained that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because at trial, his attorney advised him to abandon his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). The federal district court denied Mr. Mirzayance's petition, but was reversed by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ordered an evidentiary hearing limited to determining whether ""there were tactical reasons for abandoning the defense."" At the hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel had ""nothing to lose"" by going forward with the NGI plea and thus found his performance ineffective. The federal district court accepted this finding and granted Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's advice to withdraw his NGI plea was unreasonable because there was ""reasonable probability"" the jury would find Mr. Mirzayance insane. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin. On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision stating that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's failure to pursue the NGI defense constituted ineffective counsel because it ""secured no tactical advantage."""
1628,"Wellness International Network, Ltd., et al.",Richard Sharif,"Richard Sharif and others entered into distributorship contracts with Wellness International Network (WIN) for the sale of health and wellness products. Sharif and others later sued WIN and claimed that WIN was running a pyramid scheme. The district court granted summary judgment for WIN and awarded $655,596.13 in attorney's fees as a sanction against Sharif and his co-plaintiffs for ignoring some of WIN's discovery requests. WIN attempted to discover Sharif's assets, but Sharif ignored all attempts until he was held in civil contempt for discovery violations and arrested. In 2009, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. WIN filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and claimed that Sharif had continuously concealed property and information pertaining to his assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of WIN and ordered Sharif to pay WIN's attorney's fees along with other sanctions. Sharif appealed to federal district court, but before he filed his first brief, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, which held that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment on a state-law counterclaim against a creditor. Sharif subsequently attempted to advance an argument based on Stern, but the district court did not allow it. Instead, the district court held that such an objection can be waived and that Sharif's failure to bring up to argument earlier constituted an implied waiver. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The Court of Appeals held that an objection based on Stern cannot be waived and that the bankruptcy court only had the authority to enter a final judgment on some of WIN's claims."
256,Perry Education Association,Perry Local Educators' Association,"The Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
1080,"Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.",Shadi Dabit,"Shadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. Dabit's class action was filed in the you.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law. In response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law that allege misrepresentation ""in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."" Merrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter."
1312,"David Bobby, Warden",Robert J. Van Hook,"An Ohio state court convicted Robert J. Van Hook for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, and imposed a death sentence. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Van Hook filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court. After numerous appeals and remands, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Van Hook relief, holding that Mr. Van Hook's lawyers performed deficiently in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at his sentencing."
694,Homer Adolph Plessy,John Ferguson,"Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven - eighths Caucasian - agreed to stand in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens ( Committee of Citizens ), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "" whites only "" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs on the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites - only car, he refused and was arrested. At trial, Plessy ’ s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge held that Louisiana could enforce this law only as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted."
1213,"Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al.","Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.","The Indiana legislature had two laws at issue in this case. The first related to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and biological waste, thereby preventing abortion providers from incinerating fetal remains with biological byproducts. The law also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, which Indiana law does not allow for human remains. The second provision of Indiana law barred the explicit provision in sex -, disability -, or disability - selective abortions by abortion providers. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky challenged the law on constitutional grounds but notably did not make the argument whether either law burdened a fundamental right."
78,"Margaret Mae Cantrell, et al.","Forest City Publishing Company, et al.","In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell’s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home. Margaret Cantrell and her children sued under the “false light” theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff’s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict."
286,"Dan V. McKaskle, Acting Director of the Texas Department of Corrections",Carl Edwin Wiggins,"On January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April 16, 1973, about two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed."
827,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,"Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al.","In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in California for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican laws and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses as what the federal courts had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a defendant could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the you. S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed."
894,"Juan Bravo-Fernandez, et al.",United States,"In May 2005, Juan Bravo - Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez - Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled into Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo - Fernandez and Martinez - Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo - Fernandez ’ s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez - Maldonado ’ s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose - - in this case, the violation violated the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statutes, but found the defendants neither guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case. Based on this holding, the district court entered an order that convicted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court ’ s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did also require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The District court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed."
141,Butz,Economou,"Following a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings. On appeal from an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
1283,Gary Bradford Cone,"Ricky Bell, Warden","This is the third habeas corpus appeal of petitioner Gary Bradford Cone after his 1982 conviction in a Tennessee state court on several felony counts including first degree murder and robbery by use of deadly force. The jury found that Cone had bludgeoned two elderly people to death while hiding out after a robbery. Cone's initial appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court soon following his conviction fell on deaf ears: the court ruled that although errors had been committed during the trial, each of them had been ""harmless"" and did not warrant overturning Cone's conviction. He responded by twice filing habeas corpus petitions alleging violations of several constitutional rights, appealing both all the way up to the Court but both times having his case remanded with, in his view, several of his claims still unresolved. In his third appearance before the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cone raised two main points of contention. First, he claimed that he was entitled to relief because the jury in his trial had weighed invalid aggravating factors during his sentencing hearing, thereby entitling him to a new hearing. This argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which found that the Tennessee Supreme Court had conducted a satisfactory harmless error test on the issue. The court pointed out that habeas petitions should be granted only after finding that a state court ruling has ""resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law."" Because Tennessee had not abridged any federal laws, the Sixth Circuit denied Cone relief on this first issue. Cone also argued that the Sixth Circuit had erred when, in a previous appeal, it had held that his claims relating to the prosecutor's improper withholding of evidence had been procedurally defaulted. Cone argued that his case met the Court's ""exceptional circumstances"" test as set out in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski for overruling the procedural default rule and rehearing the issue. The Sixth Circuit once again disagreed, ruling that Cone had failed to show ""because and prejudice"" on the part of the prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit denied Cone's habeas appeal on all counts."
348,"United States, et al.",James B. Stanley,"In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred."
1115,Dennis Obduskey,"McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.","Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Upon Obduskey’s appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned the you.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC."
1052,Herman Avery Gundy,United States,"Herman Avery Gundy was convicted for committing sexual assault in Maryland and on supervised release for his prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to have transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York unless required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 you. S. C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act ( SORNA ), after traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the you. S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority from the you. S. Attorney General under 42 you. S. C. § 16913 to impose the law ’ s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted."
557,Koon,United States,"Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 you. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable you.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them."
1770,United States,California,"In United States v. California (1947), the Court ruled that the federal government owned rights to the undersea land off the California coast, an area with rich oil and mineral deposits. The Court held that California's rights were limited to low and inland waters and appointed a special master to better define the limits of California's land rights. In a report filed in 1952, the special master based his definition on the one used by the federal government in foreign relations. In 1953, before the Court considered the special master's report, Congress passed the Submerged Land Act, granting to the states' ownership of underwater land within their borders ""as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union."" The act limited states' seaward rights, however, to no more than three miles from the coastline. The act also acknowledged states' ownership of land beneath inland waters. The act gave no specific definition of either ""coastline"" or ""inland waters"" and did not address bodies of water adjoining the sea, such as bays."
1259,"Jesus C. Hernández, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15 - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert in El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on a scene and detained one of Hernández ’ s friends on you. S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From you. S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him. Hernández, s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son ’ s Fourth and Fifth Amendment liberties. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion to dismiss, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 you. S. 388 ( 1971 ) ( holding an implied because of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff ’ s constitutional rights ), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s dismissal of the parents ’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment or that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “ clearly established ” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on you. S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil. The you. S. Supreme Court granted this in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández ’ s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the. banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court ’ s dismissal of. complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 you. S. _ _ ( 2017 ), in which the Court held that for a _ type of claim to be cognizable under B ##ivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim."
447,Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,"Robert P. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania","The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement."
53,Reno,ACLU,"Several litigants challenged the passage of two sections in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "" obscene or indecent "" messages as well as the transmission of content which depicts or describes "" sexual - excretory activities or practices "" in a form deemed "" offensive "" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the provisions concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno reported directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's statutory review provisions."
862,United States Army Corps of Engineers,"Hawkes Co., Inc., et al.","Hawkes Co., Inc. ( Hawkes ) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high - quality peat. Hawkes applied to US Army Corps of Engineers ( Corps ) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then created an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes ’ plan to purchase to mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “ waters of the United States, ” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the statutory determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a “ final agency action ” of the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional finding was a final agency action and remanded the action for judicial review."
1037,"Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP",R. Scott Appling,"R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP ( “ Lamar ” ) to represent Lamar in legal proceedings against the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant legal fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax return, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for dismissal. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to collect the debt, and the bankruptcy court ruled that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant under 11 you. S. C. § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling's fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed. The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit opinion on how to construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling ] s fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing and qualified the statements “ respecting [ his ]... financial condition ” under § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ), the debt could be discharged."
775,United States,Martinez-Salazar,"Abel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for because. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-because ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for because and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for because was an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal."
1268,Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran,Dariush Elahi,"In 1977, the Iranian Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with an American defense contractor for the purchase of military equipment to be used by the Iranian Air Force. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American company breached its contract with Iran and sold the equipment elsewhere. Iran requested arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and received $2.8 million in damages for breach of contract. Iran then reduced the award to a judgment in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Dariush Elahi, brought a wrongful death claim against the Iranian government alleging that Iranian agents had assassinated his brother in Paris in 1990. Elahi was awarded over $300 million in damages by the you.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He attempted to satisfy this judgment in part by attaching the damages Iran had recovered from the previous contract dispute. Iran argued that the previous recovery was immune from attachment. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California held that Iran had waived its immunity from attachment by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC and the district court in its prior contract dispute. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling but on different grounds. The court held that Elahi could attach the Iranian judgment under Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which allows creditors such as Elahi to attach ""the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party."" Eschewing the jurisdiction argument relied on by the district court, the Ninth Circuit characterized Iran as a ""terrorist party"" and held that the contract judgment was a ""blocked asset"" subject to attachment."
704,"W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney",Roland H. Dagenhart et al. ,The Keating - Owen Child Labor Act abolished the interstate shipment for labor produced through child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's son - - Roland - - had sued on behalf of his family for get his fourteen month old son to work in their textile mill.
1347,Maryland,"Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr.","In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child. Prior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible."
860,United States Army Corps of Engineers,"Hawkes Co., Inc., et al.","Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high-quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes’ plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “waters of the United States,” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final agency action and remanded the action for judicial review."
2017,"RJR Nabisco, Inc., et al.","The European Community, et al.","The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) and alleged that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The European Community claimed that Colombian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European countries, where they produced revenue in euros that was then laundered back into the currency of the criminal organizations’ home countries while the euros were sold to cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR’s cigarettes. The lawsuit alleged that RJR controlled this operation and in the course of executing it committed various violations of the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion based on the presumption the you.S. statutes did not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially."
233,New York,Ferber,A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.
1781,Brown,Louisiana,"The Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested ""for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an officer."""
1329,Gregory Greer,United States,"In 2012, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C. § 922 ( g ), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “ punishable as an Armed Career Criminal ” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months ’ imprisonment. In 2015, the you. S. Supreme Court invalidated the “ residual clause ” of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his petition, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA ’ s enumerated - offenses clause, not the residual clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 you. S. C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer ’ s petition for writ of certiorari, affirmed the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, although the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearms. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error,, could not prove that he was had by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial in and Greer ’ s of convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review."
86,Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America,Walsh,"In order they achieve savings on state spending above federal cost - saving measures, the "" Maine Rx "" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a license agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Medical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre - empted by a Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any constitutional issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the law's implementation, concluding that an obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre - emption. The Court of Appeals reversed."
354,Pennzoil Co.,Texaco Inc.,"Pennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Younger held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion"
824,Whitman,"American Trucking Associations, Inc.","Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which ""air quality criteria"" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Carol Browner, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no ""intelligible principle"" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard."
1683,Byrd,"Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.","Byrd, a resident of North Carolina, was employed by a subcontractor of Blue Ridge Electric, a South Carolina company. When he was hurt during his work on power lines, Byrd sued Blue Ridge for negligence in a federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. Blue Ridge defended against his claim based on a South Carolina law providing that employees of sub-contractors should be considered employees of contractors for which the sub-contractor provided work. South Carolina law further provided that the immunity defense needed to be determined by a judge rather than a jury. Byrd contended that his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should trump that provision of the state law."
31,"Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover",United States,"Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. Before the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing which denied relief, holding that juror conduct was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606 ( b ). There was insufficient evidence earlier than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the hearing. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in attempting to hold a new evidentiary hearing."
1063,Russell Bucklew,"Anne Precythe, et al.","Russell Bucklew was convicted by one state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri ’ s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in part by the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely because him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood. ” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging "" they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the State ’ s execution method “ presents a risk that is sure or very likely to because serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently serious dangers, ” and failed to propose “ an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain, ” both of which steps are limited by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew ’ s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “ assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties. ” Reviewing the district court ’ s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court."
388,Nicholas B. Heien,State of North Carolina,"On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of a Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving alone on I - 77 with a broken brake pedal. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he observed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned why Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54. 2 grams of cocaine in the car. A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, but the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the Law is reasonable, it may give rise to the "" reasonable suspicion "" required for a traffic stop of a crime under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "" fundamental unfairness "" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that "" ignorance of the law is no excuse "" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal."
1886,United States,Roosevelt Hudson Harris,"A judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris’ residence based on a federal tax investigator's affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris’ property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police searched Harris’ residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax paid liquor. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable because for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial."
331,"Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.","United States, ex rel. Benjamin Carter","In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root ( KBR ), a you. S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the I. S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower lawsuit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). Carter argued that KBR had a standing purpose of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the you. S. Government for services rendered in Iraq. In 2010, just before trial, the you. S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was similar to Carter ’ s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA ’ s “ first - to - file ” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by stating that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA ’ s six - year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter ’ s complaint did not satisfy the first - to - file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter ’ s complaint, but the you. S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that The Wartime Suspension of Rights Act ( WSLA ), that suspends the applicable six - year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no such related matter to prevent Carter ’ s claim from proceeding."
359,Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,Amos,"Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities."
37,John Doe,United States,"John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent use of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury ’ s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records on bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self - incrimination regarding any other documents. The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe ’ s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe ’ s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe ’ s consent. The government then asked to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank document authorizing his banks to release the information. The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that ordering him to disclose this information would amount into a “ fishing expedition ” for incriminating purposes ; precisely the kind the action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be found in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed."
1134,"Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Allina Health Services, et al.","The you. S. Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS ) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and above. Patients may obtain coverage under different “ parts ” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C. HHS contracts with “ fiscal intermediaries ” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. The intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports. The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low - income people. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “ patient days ” for patients “ due to benefits under part A ” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to eliminate this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C provisions in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars. The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “ interpretive rule ” under the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA ) and thus was exempt from the APA ’ s notice - and - comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, the the you. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “ the rule ” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule the providing notice and the opportunity for comment."
279,Clark,Community for Creative Non-Violence,"In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request."
1745,Malloy,Hogan,"William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, ""on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]"" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
375,North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners,Federal Trade Commission,"The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six dentists⎯who are elected by other dentists in North Carolina⎯one dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry. In 2003, non-dentists began offering teeth-whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whiteners. The non-dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter teeth-whitening products exited the North Carolina market. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non-dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws."
962,Kentel Myrone Weave,Commonwealth of Massachusetts,"On August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver ’ s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver ’ s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2006, Weaver filed a motion for no new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial court denied Weaver, s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court from Massachusetts affirmed Weaver ’'conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel ’ s attempt to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “ structural error, ” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court determined that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective aid of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice."
422,Louis B. Bullard,"Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank","Louis Bullard used $ 387, 000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and submitted a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was paid by the actual property and then put the rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts that could be returned at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions from the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order was appealable because voters could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction on "" final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees. """
51,Reno,ACLU,"Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in their 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect illegal and unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "" obscene or indecent "" messages as well as the transmission of material which depicts or describes "" sexual - excretory activities and organs "" in a manner deemed "" offensive "" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, save for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child abuse, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for within the Act's special review provisions."
2328,Jimcy McGirt,Oklahoma,"Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction."
1269,"FNU Tanzin, et al.","Muhammad Tanvir, et al.","The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the you. S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) placed their names on the national “ No Fly List, ” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants or on fellow Muslims. They represented the agents in their official and individual capacities in you. S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing in their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ( “ RFRA Act ), because their refusal was influenced by Muslim tenets. Under this, “ [ a ] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this right may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief by a government. ” The you. S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which vacated the lower court. One of the agents, Abdullah, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges."
1421,"Blaine Lafler, Warden",Anthony Cooper,"Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake."
171,Union Pacific Railroad Company,"Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region","The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad ( UPR ), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ( BLET ), for their discharge or discipline imposed by their UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board ( NRAB ) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to present conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes was a prerequisite to arbitration even though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed. Upon appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding : the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively."
895,Lee,Kemna,"While on trial for first-degree murder, Remon Lee planned an alibi defense. His mother, stepfather, and sister were to voluntarily testify that he was in California at the time of the murder. The day the defense was to begin its case, the three could not be found. Lee's counsel moved for an overnight continuance to gain time to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion. Subsequently, no alibi witnesses testified, the jury found Lee guilty, and he was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. The Missouri Court of Appeals eventually disposed of the case on state procedural grounds. The appeals court held that the denial of the continuance motion was proper because Lee's counsel had failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.09, which requires that such motions be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and with Rule 24.10, which sets out the showings a movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on witnesses' absence. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that federal review of Lee's claim, that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of his federal due process right to a defense, was unavailable because the state court's rejection of that claim rested on state-law grounds, independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment."
126,United States Trust Company of New York,New Jersey,"New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies."
1804,Cascade Natural Gas Corporation,"El Paso National Gas Co., United States, Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp.","In an antitrust suit, the you.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock. Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the district court denied the motions. The district court approved El Paso’s divestiture plan, under which El Paso would create a new company to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets. The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor. The you.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal."
1709,Roy R. Torcaso,"Clayton K. Watkins, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland","Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed."
1689,William G. Barr,Linda A. Matteo and John J. Madigan,"Linda Matteo and John Madigan created a plan for utilizing $2.6 million in funds from the Office of Housing Expediter. The Office’s commission was coming to an end, and the plan involved firing and rehiring employees on a temporary basis until the life of the Office was extended or ended. William G. Barr, general manager of the Office, vehemently opposed the plan, and several Senators attacked the plan on the Senate floor. Barr decided to suspend Matteo and Madigan. He issued a press release explaining his reasons. Matteo and Madigan sued for libel based on the statements in the press release. In certain circumstances, government officials are protected from civil suits for actions done in the scope of their official duties though absolute or qualified privilege. The district court ruled in favor of Matteo and Madigan, rejecting Barr’s claim that his statements were protected by privilege. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, considering only absolute privilege. The you.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded so the court of appeals could consider qualified privilege. On remand, the court of appeals held that qualified privilege existed, but was defeated due to Barr’s malice. The court remanded the case to district court for a new trial."
309,Regents of the University of Michigan,Ewing,"Scott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board’s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful. In August of the following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing’s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
425,California,Hodari D.,"Two police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word “Police” on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car. As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths panicked and ran. One of the officers left the car and ran after Hodari D. Hodari tossed away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and handcuffed him. The officer retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine. At trial, Hodari moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer obtained it during an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Hodari was “seized” when he saw the officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state’s application for review."
1528,Mike Stanton,Drendolyn Sims,"In the early hours of the morning on May 27, 2008, Officer Mike Stanton and his partner responded to a reported disturbance involving a person with a baseball bat in La Mesa, California. When the officers arrived at the location, they observed three men walking along the street, two of whom promptly turned into a nearby apartment complex while the third crossed the street in front of the police vehicle. Although he did not see a baseball bat, Stanton considered the behavior of this third man to be suspicious and ordered him to stop. The man continued walking into the residence and closed a gate behind him. With the gate closed, Stanton's view was blocked, and believing that the man had committed a jailable offense by refusing to stop, he decided to forcibly open the gate. Unbeknownst to Stanton, the residence's owner, Drendolyn Sims was standing behind the gate and was injured when Stanton opened it. Sims sued Stanton in federal district court and argued that he had unreasonably searched her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Stanton and held that Stanton's entry was justified by the potential danger of the situation, Sims had a lesser expectation of privacy in the curtilage—surrounding area—of her home, and Stanton was entitled to qualified immunity. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Stanton's actions were unconstitutional because Sims was entitled to the same expectation of privacy in the curtilage of her home as she was in her home itself. The Court of Appeals also held that Stanton's warrantless entry was not justified because the man was only suspected of a misdemeanor and that Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity."
1341,"Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District, et al.","United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson","In 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (""EWPP""). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over the case. The court agreed and dismissed. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case."
237,Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette,California,"On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the message that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the tow truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported to the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the officer, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. At trial, the defendants moved not suppress the evidence obtained from the bus stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers'observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion about the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed."
399,Illinois,Edward Rodriguez,"A woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside. She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal."
1001,National Archives and Records Administration,"Allan J. Favish, et al.","Vincent Foster, a high-ranking White House lawyer involved in the investigation of possible fraud by the Clinton family in the Whitewater real estate venture, was found dead in a Virginia park. Two government investigations subsequently found that the death had been a suicide. Allan Favish questioned the findings of the government investigations, claiming that they were part of a government cover-up of murder. Under the Freedom of Information Act, Favish requested access to 150 photos of Foster's body in the park and during the autopsy. He later reduced his request to 129 photos. The government initially denied him access to all the photos, but eventually gave him access to 118 of them. It withheld the rest, arguing that the privacy interest of Foster's family members in relation to Foster's death trumped the public interest served by providing Favish access to the photos. The government stated that the photos were very graphic and that releasing them would upset the family. Favish countered by arguing that the family did not have a relevant privacy interest; the only person whose privacy interests would be violated by the release of the photos was Foster, Favish argued, and Foster's death had rendered him incapable of exercising that interest. After a series of appeals in which a Ninth Circuit panel held that the Foster family's right to privacy was relevant to the case but that the district court must look at the specific photos in order to weigh the privacy rights against Favish's right to access government information, the Ninth Circuit eventually decided that Favish should be given access to all but four of the photos. The government, joined by the Foster family, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court."
838,Franchise Tax Board of California,Gilbert P. Hyatt,"Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California ( FTB ) based on the FTB ’ s actions on his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until 1996 and therefore failing to file state claims for time that he was actually living with California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional actions and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be exempt from the lawsuit based on California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity. At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt which awarded him over $ 300 million in damages. The parties cross - appealed with the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow monetary damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed."
1779,Alfred D. Rosenblatt,Frank P. Baer,"Frank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer’s performance as Supervisor of the Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt’s appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact."
1650,Henry Montgomery,Louisiana,"In 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and his conviction was overturned because of community prejudice. At his new trial, Montgomery was again convicted, but he was sentenced to life without parole. In 2012, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, in which the Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring children convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. In light of that decision, Montgomery filed a motion in state district court to correct what he argued was now an illegal sentence. The trial court denied Montgomery’s motion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery’s application by holding that the decision in Miller does not apply retroactively."
755,Smith Betts,"Patrick J. Brady, Warden","Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel."
27,Edward Malley and Rhode Island,James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs,"In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police department was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls of an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs ’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge granted warrants for the Briggs ’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped. The Briggs sued Malley in district Court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a unanimous verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it the judge ’ s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer whom believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The C. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “ objectively reasonable ” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable because for an arrest warrant."
179,Billy Duren ,Missouri,"A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics. The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards."
1000,"Cyan, Inc., et. al.","Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.","Since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under that statute. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state law securities class actions, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect that limitation on state court claims. Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California superior court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims."
2246,Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association,"Russell F. Thomas, Executive Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission, et al.","To sell liquor in the state of Tennessee, one must have a license from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission,” and there is a ten-year residency requirement to renew a liquor license. The state imposes similar requirements on entities seeking a license. Two entities did not satisfy the residency requirement when they applied for a license with the TABC, so TABC deferred voting on their applications. The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, which represents Tennessee business owners and represented the two entities here, informed TABC that litigation was likely. In response, the state attorney general filed an action in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The Association removed the action to federal district court. The district court determined that the durational-residency requirements are facially discriminatory, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed."
939,"PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.",Book,"A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
514,Campbell-Ewald Company,Jose Gomez,"On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message through the you. S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell - Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone messages and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics. Gomez sued and argued that "" Campbell - Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third - party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell - Ewald ’ s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell - Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez "" s rejection of the settlement offer made her claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell - Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative federal immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court dismissed the motion for summary judgment. The you. S. Court for Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell - Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the law had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from government works projects."
1219,"Frederick L. Allen, et al.","Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard ’ s Queen Anne ’ s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos, registered his works with the you. S. Copyright Office. At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without its knowledge. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a plea agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted / published Allen ’ s works. The state then passed “ Blackbeard ’ s Law, ” which purportedly converted Allen ’ s works into “ public record ” materials that the state could use freely. Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the you. S. Constitution. Allen argued for the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act ( CRCA ) — which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “ any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of the State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity ” — abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen ’ s arguments regarding the CRCA ’ s abrogation of sovereign powers. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA."
868,"Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.",National Labor Relations Board,"Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order."
1219,Patrick Kennedy,State of Louisiana,"A Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the you.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the death penalty. In seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a ""national consensus"" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites."
444,Franklin,Massachusetts,"Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their ""homes of record."" Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their ""homes of record"" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people ""in each State."""
667,City of Monroe,United States,"Monroe, Georgia is covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires the preclearance of certain voting changes. Prior to 1966, the Monroe city charter did not specify whether a majority vote or a plurality vote was needed to win a mayoral election. In practice, the city changed in 1966 from using a plurality-voting requirement to using a majority-voting requirement. The United States brought suit against the city, claiming that it had not sought preclearance of the change, as required by section 5 and sought to enjoin such majority voting and to require the city to return to plurality voting. The District Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States, expressed the view that the change to majority voting had not been precleared in accordance with section 5."
2240,Nutraceutical Corporation,Troy Lambert,"Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product. Lambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations. The district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert’s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3). Ten days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court instructed him to file the motion within ten days, which was twenty days after the decertification order. In accordance with the court’s instructions, Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration ten days later, highlighting evidence from his class certification motion that could be used to support the full refund damages model. He also offered an alternative damages model for the first time, based on non-restitutionary engorgement. Three months later, the court denied his motion for reconsideration, rejecting his proposed damages models. Lambert timely filed a petition under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for class decertification to the 9th Circuit, which conditionally granted his petition. A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit held that Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition for class certification had been timely filed with the appellate court. The court explained that because Rule 23(f)’s 14-day deadline was procedural rather than jurisdictional, equitable exceptions such as tolling could apply. It also held that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Rule 23(f) deadline would toll the deadline. The panel further held that other circumstances could toll the deadline. In this case, Lambert had informed the district court of his intention to file a motion for reconsideration within Rule 23(f)’s 14-day window, and had submitted the filing within the ten-day time frame set by that court. The panel concluded that under these circumstances the deadline should be tolled and Lambert’s motion for reconsideration should be considered timely filed with the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that a number of other circuits would likely reach the opposite conclusion."
538,United States,Noland,"The IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision."
738,NCAA,Smith,"The Postbaccalaureate Bylaw of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private organization, only allows a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. Under this rule, Renee M. Smith, who played undergraduate volleyball at St. Bonaventure University, was denied permission from the NCAA to play at two other institutions she attended as a graduate student. Subsequently, Smith filed suit alleging that the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw denied her from playing intercollegiate volleyball on the basis of her sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which proscribes sexual discrimination in ""any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."" The NCAA responded by moving to dismiss the case on the ground that Smith failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Smith, in turn, argued that ""the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members' receipt of federal funds."" The District Court concluded that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal financial assistance to member institutions were too attenuated to sustain a Title IX claim and dismissed the suit. Smith then moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion as moot. Reversing that denial, the Court of Appeals, in addressing Smith's proposed amended complaint, held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice, if proven, to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds."
774,United States,Locke,"In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to provide the ""best achievable protection"" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1333,"Jose Santos Sanchez, et al.","Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.","Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or parole in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status ( TPS ) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and his family applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 you. S. C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ( USCIS ) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “ statutorily ineligible ” for adjustment of status as he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255 ( a ) "" s requirement whereby an alien must be “ inspected and admitted or paroled ” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, with no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally."
1192,James K. Kahler,Kansas,"Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many decades. However, in 2008, that marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from her children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti - anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife ’ s grandmother ’ s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, including the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive - disorder, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in her opinion, due to Kahler ’ s mental illness, he did not make the best choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “ completely lost control. ” Under Kansas law, a defendant cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “ that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. ” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “ whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions. ” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence."
1132,"Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Allina Health Services, et al.","The you. S. Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS ) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “ parts ” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct grants to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes then those enrolled in Part C. HHS contracts with “ fiscal intermediaries ” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports. The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high population of low - income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “ patient days ” for patients “ entitled to care under part A ” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars. The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “ interpretive rule "" under the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA ) and thus was exempt from the APA ’ s notice - and - comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and of you. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “ interpretive rule ” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment."
378,North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners,Federal Trade Commission,"The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners ( Board ) is a statutorily constituted agency that regulates professional practice of surgery. It is composed of six [UNK] are elected by other dentists in North [UNK] dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring legal action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry. In 2003, non - dentists began offering teeth - whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons throughout the state. When dentists left, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non - dentist teeth - whiteners. The non - dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over - the - counter teeth - whitening products exited the North Carolina market. The Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ) subsequently charged the Board of violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non - dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters ; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market organizers who are elected from other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws."
817,"State of Nebraska, et al.","Mitch Parker, et al.","Omaha Tribal members attempted the enforce liquor laws and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and found that they are not located on federally - recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross - filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Nebraska, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law and the you. S. Senate ’ after passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal lands did not diminish the tribal boundaries of Nebraska. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower circuit ′ s decision."
1108,Helsinn Healthcare S.A.,"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.","Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for decreasing the likelihood of chemotherapy - induced nausea and vomiting ( “ CINV ” ). All four claim led to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on - purchase bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale in the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on - sale bar provision of 35 you. S. C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase contract between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn ’ s patents and rejected Teva ’ s “ on sale "" defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the products were subject to an invalidating license for sale prior to the Critical date of January 30, 2004, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “ overwhelming. ”"
243,"Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.","The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13, 000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( ACA ), employment - based group health care facilities must provide certain types of preventative care, such as employer - approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non - profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for - profits institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment - based group health care plan cover contraception violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ( RFRA ). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary ruling to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two - judge panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "" persons "" serving the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
2,John Giglio ,United States,"John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While his appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, Giglio’s counsel discovered new evidence. The evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to disclose that it promised a key witness immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony against Giglio. The district court denied Giglio’s motion for a new trial, finding that the error did not affect the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
709,Ortiz,Fibreboard Corporation,"After decades of litigation, Fibreboard Corporation and a group of plaintiffs' lawyers reached a ""Global Settlement Agreement"" of its asbestos personal-injury liability. Subsequently, a group of named plaintiffs filed the present action in Federal District Court, seeking certification for settlement purposes of a mandatory class that comprised three certain groups. Intervening objectors argued that the absence of a ""limited fund"" precluded Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that ""an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of... (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."" The court ruled that both the disputed insurance asset liquidated by the global settlement, and, alternatively, the sum of the value of Fibreboard plus the value of its insurance coverage, as measured by the insurance funds' settlement value, were relevant ""limited funds."" The Court of Appeals affirmed both the class certification and the adequacy of the settlement. The appellate court approved the class certification, under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), on a limited fund rationale based on the threat to other class members' ability to receive full payment from the manufacturer's limited assets."
626,Bibles,Oregon Natural Desert Association,"The Oregon Natural Desert Association filed a request with the Oregon Bureau of Land Management in order to obtain the names and addresses of people who received a newsletter that provided information about the Bureau's activities and plans affecting the Oregon desert. Invoking Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Bureau refused to release any portion of the list. Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure files ""similar"" to personnel and medical files. Subsequently, the association filed an action in District Court under the FOIA to obtain the list. The court ordered the release. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that there was a substantial public interest in knowing to whom the government was directing information and providing those persons with additional information from other sources that did not share the Bureau's views."
1191,"Allison Engine Co., Inc., et al.",United States ex rel. Roger L. Sanders and Roger L. Thacker,"Two workers involved in the manufacture of electrical supplies for the Navy's billion-dollar guided missile destroyers brought a whistleblower case alleging that subcontractors performed faulty work. The two charged that the companies employed unqualified workers, installed leaky gearboxes and used defective temperature gauges. After a five-week trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the companies, concluding that the False Claims Act under which the suits were brought requires that defendants ""present"" the fraudulent claims to the government. Because the subcontractors actually invoiced the general contractor and not the government, the court ruled that the presentment requirement had not been met. The appeals court reversed, holding that the Act should be liberally construed to discourage private companies from defrauding the government."
654,Swidler & Berlin,United States,"During the 1993 investigation of the White House Travel Office (""Travelgate""), Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., met with an attorney from Swidler & Berlin's law firm named James Hamilton. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide. During a subsequent investigation into the legalities of Travelgate, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Hamilton's notes about his meeting with Foster. When Swidler & Berlin challenged Starr's subpoena as a violation of the attorney-client privilege, a district court agreed. On appeal from an appellate court reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
641,Samuel Ocasio,United States,"Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of North Baltimore Police Department that was indicted in connection with the kickback scheme offering payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to an Auto Repair Shop ( Majestic ). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty for conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims from this conspiracy, since the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio ’ s conviction."
988,David Patchak,"Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior","The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians ( the Gun Lake Tribe ) is an Indian tribe in western Michigan that was originally formally organized by the you. S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, this Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe ’ s use under the Indian Reorganization Act ( IRA ), or you. S. C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property. David Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put the Bradley Property into trust with the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the you. S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating with the Bradley Property “ shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dropped. ”"
783,City of Erie,Pap's A.M.,"""Kandyland,"" operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a ""state of nudity,"" To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, ""pasties"" and a ""G-string."" Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to ""impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance."" Additionally, because the ordinance was not content neutral, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the you.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion."
101,United States,Martinez-Fuerte,Martinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.
3,Sally Reed,Cecil Reed,"The Idaho Probate Code specified that ""males must be preferred to females"" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court."
991,"Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al. ","Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et al.","The federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated 2.5 million acres of land in Utah as ""Wilderness Study Areas"" under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Under the Act, the BLM is required to manage this land ""so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness."" The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and several other environmentalist groups brought suit in federal district court under section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows federal courts to compel government action when an agency has failed to meet its legal duties. SUWA claimed that the BLM had failed to take a ""hard look,"" as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, at the effects of off-road vehicles on the Wilderness Study Areas. It also claimed that the permitted off-road vehicle use was in fact damaging the study areas in violation of the agency's FLPMA obligations. The district court dismissed the case, holding that SUWA's charge that the bureau had failed to adequately protect the study areas was not specific enough for the court to hear under the Administrative Procedure Act. On appeal, a divided panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the bureau's discretion was limited to deciding how to implement the act, not if to implement it, and that SUWA could therefore bring suit to force it at least to take a ""hard look"" at the effects of the off-road vehicle policy."
415,United States,Verdugo-Urquidez,"Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico. In cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexican police officers apprehended and transported him to the you.S. border, where he was arrested for various narcotics-related offenses. Following his arrest, a DEA agent sought authorization to search Verdugo-Urquidez's residences for evidence. The Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no search warrant from a you.S. magistrate was ever received. At trial, the district court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."
128,Adrian Martell Davis,Washington,"Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but a 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection of Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis declined, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the authority to cross - examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted from the you. S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the record was not "" testimonial "" and was no different from the one at issue in Crawford."
2360,United States,"Arthrex, Inc., et al.","The Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 you.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the you.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.” Arthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the you.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the you.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem."
96,"Republic of Austria, et al.",Maria V. Altmann,"Maria Altmann learned that the stolen artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six works from the Austrian authorities. She won the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ( FSIA ), which allows suits against foreign nationals in cases involving "" rights to property taken in violation of international law. "" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more extensive - idea of immunity and would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not specifically state that it applied retroactively ( that is, to actions taken before it was passed ) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity. The district court sided with Altmann, holding because the FSIA applied specifically. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed."
476,Zobrest,Catalina Foothills School District,"James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1336,"City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities","Hotels.com, L.P., et al.","In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class - interest lawsuit against various online travel companies ( OTCs ), such as Hotels. com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “ costs of occupancy ” and therefore not subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "" an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties. "" The OTCs ’ proposed order stated that "" costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39. "" San Antonio could not object, so the district court entered in OTC ’ s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the circuit court seeking over $ 2. 3 million, which included over $ 2 million for “ non - judgment interest ” and “ premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds. ” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite."
2198,"CNH Industrial N.V., et al.","Jack Reese, et al.","In 1998, CNH agreed to a collective-bargaining agreement, which provided health care benefits under a group benefit plan to certain employees retiring under the pension plan. Other benefits, including life insurance, ceased upon retirement. The agreement also contained a clause stating that it would terminate in May 2004. When it did expire in 2004, a class of CNH retirees and surviving spouses filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that their health care benefits vested for life and asking the district court to enjoin CNH from changing them. While that lawsuit was pending, the US Supreme Court issued a decision in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, holding that collective-bargaining agreements must be interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract law. The Court’s holding in Tackett specifically targeted the Sixth Circuit, in which there was precedent for courts to presume that collective-bargaining agreements vested retiree benefits for life. Because of the intervening ruling by the US Supreme Court in Tackett, the district court initially awarded summary judgment in favor of CNH, but then it awarded summary judgment to the retirees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the court’s award of summary judgment to the retirees, using the same precedents the Court proscribed in Tackett to find the collective-bargaining agreement ambiguous as a matter of law and thus susceptible to interpretation based on extrinsic evidence about lifetime vesting."
1460,Missouri,Galin E. Frye,"Missouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered does not mean that Frye did not know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty."
207,"American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al.","Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor","In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enact mandatory nationwide standards to govern workplace safety. On December 26, 1978, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a proposal to change the federal standard regarding cotton dust exposure. There was a 90-day comment period followed by a series of hearings over the course of two weeks. After the hearings, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond J. Donovan, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health risk that warranted the adoption of the new standard. The new standard required a mix of engineering controls, such as the installation of pieces of equipment, along with work practice controls, and required these changes within four years. The petitioners, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the standard in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They argued that the Act required OSHA to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the standard. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA had done everything required by the Act."
1215,Lakhdar Boumediene et al.,"George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.","In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when you.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the you.S. embassy there. The you.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the you.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo. In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: ""The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."" The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to ""all cases, without exception"" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the you.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier."
1062,Russell Bucklew,"Anne Precythe, et al.","Russell Bucklew was convicted by a federal court jury of assault, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri ’ s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely because him to hemorrhage during the execution, possibly choking on his own flesh. ” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which members are hired. The district judge granted summary judgment to each state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state ’ s execution method “ presents a risk that is sure or very likely to because serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers, ” and failed to propose “ an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain, ” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew ’ s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “ assume that Missouri employed personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties. ” Reviewing the district court ’ s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court."
399,"Stephen Kimble, et al.","Marvel Enterprises, Inc.","In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider - Man toy that was set for expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar of Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dropped. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties had not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court. The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a "" hybrid "" agreement, in which patent and non - patent rights were transferred, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser are not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over - compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear when pre - patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non - patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did and, for the toy itself. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court."
519,"Sue Evenwel, et al.","Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al.","The Texas Constitution requires that the state Legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three - judge panel of the Dallas district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for November 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law. Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that were adopted and signed into law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts don't adhere to the'one person, one vote'principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in relation the total voter population. The district Court granted the defendants ’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim Based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on their appeal."
1776,United States,Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis,"Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on federal narcotics charges in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal."
966,"Ricky Henson, et al.","Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.","The petitioners are a set of individuals who all obtained car loans for CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they wanted a balance to cover a difference between the agreed purchase price and the quantity of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA ( Santander ), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ) in its communications with them. Santander declined to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “ debt collector ” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and declined to dismiss the case en banc."
253,"Fifth Third Bancorp, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan ( ESOP ), which is A defined contribution retirement fund of employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Third Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the time period in question, a substantial amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the financial decisions made by ESOP managers are presumed to be prudent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion for dismissal."
1251,"Donald L. Carcieri, Governor of Rhode Island","Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.","In 1991, the Narragansett Indian Tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, RI to build a housing complex for the elderly. The you.S. Department of the Interior, acting at the tribe's request, moved to take the land into federal trust, thereby placing it largely under federal and tribal control, in 1998. However, Rhode Island officials opposed the move, claiming that the Department of the Interior lacked the proper authority because the Narragansett tribe was not recognized until nearly 50 years after the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act took effect. The you.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the action, stating that Rhode Island was taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision and approved of its reasoning. In seeking Supreme Court review to determine whether the time of tribal recognition should be dispositive on this issue, Rhode Island noted that ""the future allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between states and tribes over a potentially unlimited amount of land hangs in the balance."""
1156,Jamar Alonzo Quarles,United States of America,"Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C § 922 ( g ). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles ’ s conviction for third - degree home invasion was a violent felony under the preservation clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( “ ACCA ” ) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon - in - possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court ’ s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 you. S. _ _ ( 2015 ), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan ’ s crime of third - degree home invasion is a “ violent felony ” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months ’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic burglary is “ an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or presence in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. ” Michigan law defines the crime of third - person home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the residence, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing another misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles ’ s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent - upon - entry - that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third - degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary."
1532,Anthony Walden,"Gina Fiore, Keith Gipson","In 2006 Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to San Juan, Puerto Rico before returning to Las Vegas by way of Atlanta, Georgia. The two are professional gamblers with residences in California and Las Vegas. At a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint in San Juan, Fiore and Gipson were subjected to heightened security because they were travelling on a one-way ticket. TSA officers search the gamblers luggage and found $97,000 in you.S. currency. San Juan Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers arrived and questioned the pair to determine whether the money was the proceeds of illegal drug trade. Fiore and Gipson stated that the cash was their seed money and winnings from gambling. The DEA let Fiore and Gipson board the plane to Atlanta with their luggage. When Fiore and Gipson landed at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Anthony Walden and other DEA agents approached and questioned them. Fiore and Gipson repeated their story and produced records of their travels. When a drug-detecting dog pawed Gipson's bag once, Walden stated that he had probable because to seize the cash and took both Fiore and Gipson's bags before allowing them to continue on to Las Vegas without the money. When Fiore and Gipson got to Las Vegas they sent records of their gambling earnings along with past tax returns to prove their status as professional gamblers to Walden. Walden refused to return the money and referred the matter to a you.S. Attorney in Georgia based on a false probable because affidavit. The you.S. Attorney found no probable because and ordered the money returned. The money was returned to Fiore and Gipson seven months after it was seized. Fiore and Gipson sued Walden in the you.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging that the seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Walden moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the court did have personal jurisdiction because Walden intentionally caused foreseeable harm in Nevada by falsifying the probable because affidavit and attempting to secure the seized funds permanently for the Atlanta DEA."
1139,"Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., et al.",Evelyn Coke,"Long Island Care at Home (Long Island) employed Evelyn Coke as a ""home healthcare attendant"" for the elderly. Coke sued her employer, claiming rights to overtime and minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled for Long Island, holding that Coke fell under the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in ""companionship services."" The court gave deference to the Department of Labor's regulation 29 CFR Section 552.109(a), which applies the exemption to employees in ""companionship services"" who are ""employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services."" The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It ruled that the regulation was a misinterpretation of the statute, and was therefore unenforceable. The Second Circuit declined to give the Department's regulation any of the judicial deference normally due to administrative regulations. No Chevron deference (""strong deference"") was due, because the regulation was under a section titled ""Interpretations."" Regulations that are interpretive rather than legislative are not entitled to Chevron deference. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the regulation was ""unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme,"" and thus not entitled to Skidmore deference (""weak deference"") either."
1756,Lucas,Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,"Acting on behalf of several voters in the Denver area, Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under Colorado's apportionment plan, the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography, compactness and contiguity, accessibility, natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions). Consequently, counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate; the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3.6-to-1; and the chief metropolitan areas, with over two-thirds of the State's population, could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan, stressing its recent approval by the electorate, the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari."
765,Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu,United States,"In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the you.S. government decided to require Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese-American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction."
458,James Draper,United States,"John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, is stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be back by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a cab from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found another syringe in his bag. Before a trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been seized through an unlawful search and seizure. The appeals court dismissed the motion after finding what the officers had probable because to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed."
2073,Jeffrey Woods,Timothy Etherton,"In 2006, Michigan law enforcement received an anonymous tip that two white males were traveling between Detroit and Grand Rapids on I-96 in an Audi and were possibly carrying cocaine. Timothy Etherton was driving a car that matched that description, and he was pulled over. Both he and his passenger, Ryan Pollie, were arrested when the officers found 125.2 grams of cocaine in the car. During Etherton’s trial in state court, Pollie testified that he accompanied Etherton to Detroit without knowing that they were traveling there to obtain cocaine and that Etherton did not inform Pollie about the drugs until the two started back to Grand Rapids. Several police officers also testified at trial and described the anonymous tip, which was “not evidence” but admitted “only to show why the police did what they did.” Etherton was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Etherton sought state postconviction relief and argued that the admission of the anonymous tip violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the tip on that ground, and his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the previous two claims. The state court denied postconviction relief because Etherton failed to prove that his counsel acted unreasonably. Etherton then sought federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which specifies that federal habeas relief is only available after a state court’s denial if the state court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. If “fairminded jurists” could disagree as to the validity of the state court’s determination, federal habeas relief is unavailable. The district court denied relief by finding the state court’s denial of relief was objectively reasonable because Etherton’s counsel was adequately prepared for trial. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Etherton’s right to confrontation had been violated because the anonymous tip was referenced four times during the trial, which indicated that the tip was admitted for its truth. The court concluded Etherton’s counsel had been constitutionally ineffective and “no fairminded jurist could conclude otherwise.”"
1935,Tara Sheneva Williams,"Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden","In October 1993, Tara Williams drove two of her friends to a liquor store in Long Beach, California, with the intent to commit a robbery. Williams waited in the car to serve as the getaway driver while her friends stole the cash from the liquor store and fatally shot the store's owner. Five years later, Williams was apprehended and charged with first-degree murder. At trial, the judge discharged a juror for bias and replaced that juror with an alternate, after which the jury convicted Williams for first-degree murder. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. While Williams' petition to the California Supreme Court was pending, that court decided a case that held that a court abused its discretion when it dismissed a juror who seemed to disagree with the other jurors. Based on that decision, the California Supreme Court remanded Williams' case, and the California Court of Appeal issued a revised opinion holding that the lower court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the juror. Williams filed a federal habeas corpus petition, but the district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which restricts federal habeas relief to cases that have already been adjudicated on their merits in state court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the California Court of Appeal had disregarded Williams' argument that dismissal of the juror in question violated the Sixth Amendment. In a unanimous decision, the you.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the California court had adjudicated the case on the merits, even if the Sixth Amendment claim was not explicitly addressed. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of habeas relief."
2235,Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.,"Doris Albrecht, et al.","Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme (“Merck”), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures. In 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the you.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under Wyeth v. Levine, 555 you.S. 555 (2009), which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under Wyeth’s demanding “clear evidence” standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would have approved an appropriately worded warning about the risk of femur fractures, or at least that the chances of FDA rejection were not highly probable. Pursuant to Wyeth and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this showing was sufficient to defeat summary judgment and move forward to trial."
208,Barion Perry,New Hampshire,"Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N. H., police that she observed Perry from his apartment building taking things out of a parked truck. She identified Perry at the scene but later could only pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second officer identified Perry in the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo contest because it was "" unnecessarily suggestive "" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction."
514,Rosenberger,Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,"Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it ""primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,"" as prohibited by University guidelines."
436,Cohen,Cowles Media Company,"Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state ""promissory estoppel"" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers."
607,Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company,Buckley,"Michael Buckley was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos while employed as a pipefitter by Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. Buckley feared he would develop cancer, of which periodic medical check ups have revealed no evidence of an asbestos related disease. Buckley filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits a railroad worker to recover for an ""injury . . . resulting from"" his employer's ""negligence."" He sought damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress and to cover the cost of future check ups. The District Court dismissed Buckley's case because since there had been no ""physical impact"" from his exposure, the FELA did not permit recovery for his emotional injury. Buckley's medical monitoring claim was not discussed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that that his contact with the insulation dust was considered a physical impact that, when present, permits a FELA plaintiff to recover for accompanying emotional distress. Furthermore, Buckley could recover the costs of check ups made necessary by the exposure."
199,Peter E. Aaron,Securities and Exchange Commission,"While working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5."
379,North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners,Federal Trade Commission,"The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners ( Board ) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six [UNK] are elected by other dentists in North [UNK] dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry. In 2003, non - dentists began offering tooth - whitening services to consumers in dental kiosks and salons across the state. After consumers complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non - professional teeth - whiteners. The non - dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over - the - counter teeth - whitening products exited the North Carolina market. The Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non - dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters ; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as an state agency, it remained exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, although a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws."
43,Idaho,Laura Lee Wright,"Laura Lee Wright and her ex - husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half - sister would live near her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were three years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright ’ s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles was jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor. During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination for the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to any conditions the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Giles. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview without question lacked reasonable safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction."
756,Shalala,"Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.","The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes participating in Medicare, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, challenging the validity of various Medicare regulations establishing sanctions and remedies for nursing homes found guilty of violating minimum health and safety standards. The Council alleged that certain terms in the new regulations were unconstitutionally vague, that the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the you.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause, and that the regulations' legislative rules that were not promulgated consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Council invoked the Federal District Court's federal-question jurisdiction, which states that ""district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"" to rule on its claims. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that set of special statutory provisions under the Medicare Act create a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings."
57,Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to legally deduct "" loss reserves, "" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in lost reserves that constitute "" reserve restructuring, "" or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a real time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury officials and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue changed the statute to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court on Appeals overturned the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss resources."
583,Lopez,Monterey County,"Because Monterey County, California is a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it must obtain federal preclearance of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. Between 1972 and 1983, the County merged its nine separate and independent inferior court districts into a single, countywide municipal court served by judges whom County residents elected at large. In 1991, five Hispanic voters, who resided in the County, sued, alleging that the County had violated section 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of its judicial district consolidation ordinances. The County did not submit its ordinances after a three-judge District Court ruled against it. Rather, the County began to work with the voters to develop a new judicial election plan. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan."
184,"Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship","Leo P. Martinez, et al.","The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law ( CLS ) filed suit against the university in a California federal lawsuit for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student members to allow "" any member to participate, become a citizen, nor seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs. "" In contrast, CLS asked its members to attest in writing that "" I believe in : The Bible as the inspired word of God ; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son ; The vicarious death ; Jesus Christ for our sins ; His bodily resurrection and His personal return ; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration ; [ and ] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life. "" The district court dismissed its case. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Furthermore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights."
885,Gonzaga University,Doe,"A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private because of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable."
88,Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America,Walsh,"In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above the cost - saving measures, the "" Maine Rx "" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. With the program, Maine attempts negotiate agreements with drug producers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales become subjected to another prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre - determined by the Hobbs Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre - emption. The Court of Appeals reversed."
1183,KSR International Co.,Teleflex Inc. et al.,"Teleflex sued KSR International (KSR), alleging that KSR had infringed on its patent for an adjustable gas-pedal system composed of an adjustable accelerator pedal and an electronic throttle control. KSR countered that Teleflex's patent was obvious, and therefore unenforceable. Under 25 you.S.C. Section 103(a), obvious inventions cannot be patented. A federal District Court granted summary judgment for KSR, accepting KSR's argument that the invention was obvious because each of the invention's components existed in previous patents. Anyone with knowledge or experience in the industry, the District Court ruled, would have considered it obvious that the two components could be combined. Teleflex appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the District Court. The Circuit Court found the lower court's analysis incomplete, because the District Court had not applied a full ""teaching-suggestion-motivation test."" Under this test, in order to label the patent obvious the District Court would have needed to identify the specific ""teaching, suggestion, or motivation"" that would have led a knowledgeable person to combine the two previously-existing components. KSR appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Circuit Court's test conflicted with Supreme Court precedent and that it would allow too many patents of obvious inventions."
656,Bragdon,Abbott,"During a visit to her dentist's office, in order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
1147,United States of America,Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover,"On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence ( a “ Hobbs Act robbery ” ) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including all two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants ’ challenges and affirming the district court ’ s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court ’ s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 you. S. _ _ ( 2018 ), the Court remanded their case forward into the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that judgment. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( c ) contains both an “ elements clause ” and a “ residual clause. ” The elements clause describes an offense as a crime of violence if it “ has as an element the use, attempted murder, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, ” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “ by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course before committing the offense. ” In Dimaya, the Court addressed ( and invalidated ) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924 ( c ) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924 ( c ) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause."
52,Reno,ACLU,"Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the Internet Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, that Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "" obscene or indecent "" messages as well, the transmission of information which depicts nor describes "" sexual or excretory activities or organs "" in a manner deemed "" offensive "" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from all the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and the inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions."
638,Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund,"Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc.","The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a ""withdrawal liability,"" which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late."
733,Richardson,United States,"A federal criminal statute, 21 you.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in ""continuing criminal enterprise (CCE),"" which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a ""continuing series of violations."" Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some ""continuing series of violations"" but also that the he committed each of the individual ""violations"" necessary to make up that ""continuing series."" In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction."
1523,United States,John D. Apel,"The Department of the Air Force owns a section of land that Highway 1 crosses, and the Department has granted roadway easements to the State of California and Santa Barbara County. Highway 1 runs next to the main gate of Vandenberg Air Force Base (Vandenberg). Near the gate is a designated area for public protesting that falls under the Highway 1 easement. John D. Apel was barred from Vandenberg's property in 2007 for trespassing. In 2010, while the order barring him was still in effect, he entered the designated protest area three times and was asked to leave. On all three occasions the respondent failed to leave. In two separate trials, Apel was convicted of three violations of a federal statute prohibiting a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter. Apel appealed, arguing that the federal statute requires that the base has exclusive possession over the area. The district court affirmed the convictions by holding that, under the terms of the easement, the land is subject to base rules and regulations. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because the area is subject to an easement, the federal government does not have an exclusive right of possession, so the conviction cannot stand."
438,"Curtis Reid, Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail",Claris Covert,"Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an asteroid near England. Pursuant to a “ status - of - forces ” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court - martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ( 1963 ). She petitioned for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her First & Fifth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand Jury."
1,"Peter Stanley, Sr. ",Illinois,"Joan Stanley had three children with Peter Stanley. The Stanleys never married, but lived together off and on for 18 years. When Joan died, the State of Illinois took the children. Under Illinois law, unwed fathers were presumed unfit parents regardless of their actual fitness and their children became wards of the state. Peter appealed the decision, arguing that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because unwed mothers were not deprived of their children without a showing that they were actually unfit parents. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley’s Equal Protection claim, holding that his actual fitness as a parent was irrelevant because he and the children’s mother were unmarried."
727,Roy Olmstead et al.,United States,"Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. After judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building ( where she maintained an office ) or in the streets near her home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. Associated States, in which Green and several other defendants were each convicted, based on illegally recorded wire - tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, transporting, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States."
1411,"Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania, et al.",harles J. Guarnieri,"In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts."
1876,Donald J. Vale ,Louisiana,"New Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale’s home, the officers saw Vale come out of the house and do what they thought was a drug deal. The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale’s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale’s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure."
750,Walter Chaplinsky,New Hampshire,"On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal ""a God-damned racketeer"" and ""a damned Fascist."" He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague."
2079,"Brian Coleman, Superintendant, State Correctional Institution at Fayette et al. ",Lorenzo Johnson,"In 1995, Corey Walker shot and killed Taraja Williams following an argument about a debt Williams owed. Lorenzo Johnson was present for this argument and heard Williams repeat several times that he was “going to kill that kid.” A witness saw Walker and Johnson walking into an alley with Williams in between them. Walker wore a long coat concealing a shotgun. Johnson waited at the front of the alley while Williams shot Walker. Johnson was tried as an accomplice to the murder. The jury convicted him after hearing the testimony of several witnesses, among other evidence. Johnson appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction, and Johnson filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the writ, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Third Circuit held that the evidence did not sufficiently prove Johnson’s intent to kill Williams."
826,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,"Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al.","In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims against Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could neither be indicted twice for the same crimes by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from their United States Constitution, they have their same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed but held that the you. S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed."
1652,William Thompson,Coastal Oil Co.,"William Thompson suffered a head injury aboard the SS. Rosina Marron after an attack by a fellow crewmember. After several months of recuperation, Thompson signed an agreement releasing Costal Oil Company from liability in exchange for $4000. Later, Thompson discovered the damage from his injury was much more extensive than originally thought. Thomson sued to recover damages from his injury. The district court upheld the release, noting that Thompson adamantly refused to consult an attorney, although he had many opportunities to do so, and freely entered into the agreement. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed."
1786,United States,Cecil Ray Price,"On June 21, 1964 Cecil Ray Price, a sheriff’s deputy, detained three civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, in the Neshoba County Jail, in Philadelphia, Mississippi. That night, Price released all three men from custody, and then drove his police cruiser to intercept them on Mississippi Highway 19. Price accosted the three men, placed them in his police car, and then drove them down an unpaved road. There Price and seventeen other men, including both local citizens and members of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department, executed the three men and dumped their bodies in a construction site. All eighteen defendants were subsequently arrested and were indicted by a Grand Jury on January 15, 1965 for violating federal statutes. The first statute, 18 you.S.C.S. 241, dealt with criminal conspiracies. The second statute, 18 you.S.C.S. 242, criminalized anyone acting under the color of law from depriving any of the rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the charges for violating 18 you.S.C.S. 242 against the non-police officer defendants, claiming that the indictment did not state an actual offense against the United States. This appeal followed."
970,California Public Employees' Retirement System,"ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.","Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CPERS), the largest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund’s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1301,Thedrick Edwards,"Darrel Vannoy, Warden","Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission on several robberies involving rape in 2006. At Edwards ’ s trial, that state filed legal challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana denied conviction by an 10 - 2 vote, so Edwards ’ s conviction became final in 2016. On April 20, 2020, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both local and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana."
520,Matthew Wayne Tome ,United States,"Matthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child’s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness’ testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence of motive.” Tome was convicted. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose."
654,Robert Fletcher,John Peck,"In 1795, the Georgia legislative assembly made a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the act and deemed all laws and rights under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold this land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since this original sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract."
864,Porter,Nussle,"In 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Nussle did not file a grievance under the applicable Connecticut Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that ""No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase ""prisons conditions"" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners."
368,Lanell Williams-Yulee,The Florida Bar,"During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams - Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served in her "" community Public Defender "" – although her title was "" assistant public defender "" – and inaccurately stated on the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams - Yulee and alleged that her actions during the case violated the law regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams - Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams - Yulee rejected the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams - Yulee violated bar rules by directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaigns. Williams - Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate through personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech."
1400,Kentucky,Hollis Deshaun King,"Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police."
1403,United States,Tohono O'odham Nation,"In 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the you.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and ""has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged ""gross mismanagement"" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 you.S.C. § 1500. But the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, ""the Nation's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action."""
2150,"North Carolina, et al.","Sandra Little Covington, et al.","In 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew state legislative districts in response to changes in population recorded in the 2010 Census. In May 2015, several North Carolina citizens sued North Carolina in federal district court and argued that 28 majority-black districts under the new districting plan were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs in August 2016 and held that race had been the predominant factor in redrawing the districts at issue. The court did not require changes to the districts in the short time before the November 2016 election but did order the General Assembly to redraw the map prior to holding any other elections. Three months later, the court put in place a remedial order that set a March 2017 deadline for the redrawing of the districts, required that any legislator elected in 2016 from a later-modified district serve only a one-year term, and ordered special elections take place in the fall of 2017. North Carolina appealed the remedial order to the you.S. Supreme Court."
1255,James Eric Moore,United States,"A federal district court convicted James Eric Moore of possessing cocaine base (crack cocaine) with intent to distribute and sentenced him to 188 months in prison and 6 years of supervised release. Mr. Moore appealed arguing the district court improperly sentenced him when it failed to consider the disparate treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the court of appeals to consider Mr. Moore's case in light of its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, where it held a judge ""may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses."" The court of appeals affirmed once again. It reasoned that the district court was aware it had such discretion, but chose not to exercise it in Mr. Moore's case."
1367,"Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, et al.",John Thompson,"John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 you.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court."
837,Good News Club,Milford Central School,"Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was ""quintessentially religious"", and the activities ""fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'"" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination."
485,Richard Lyle Austin ,United States,"Richard Lyle Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota’s drug laws. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years in jail. The United States then filed an in rem action, seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop under federal statutes that provide for forfeiture of property that is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, or related materials. Austin argued that forfeiture of his property would violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected Austin’s argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem actions for forfeiture of property to the government."
1043,State of Washington,"United States of America, et al.","In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state Of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “ Stevens Treaties, ” which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off - reservation fishing. This so - called “ fishing clause ” guaranteed the Tribes “ exclusive right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations... in common with all citizens of Indian Territory. ” Since those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and ( originally ) the white settlers there and ( today ) the state of itself. The present case arises from the Tribes ’ contention that the government was building and maintaining roads ( channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks ) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20 + Tribes represented in the suit argued that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause in the treaties. Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to state law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties. The district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1118,Dennis Obduskey,"McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.","Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $ 2, 940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey ’ s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non - judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). The district court granted the firm ’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. Upon Obduskey ’ s appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the circuit court held that based on the statute, s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court ’ s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began paying the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same of attempting to collect a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this question in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned the you. S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC."
1254,Eddie Lee Shular,United States of America,"The Criminal Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) provides in relevant part that each person who has three previous convictions for a “ violent felony ” or a “ serious drug offense ” shall serve the mandatory minimum penalty of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the you. S. Supreme Court has adopted a “ categorical approach approach to determine whether a prior conviction is a “ violent felony ” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether this prior conviction constitutes "" “ serious drug offense ” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses — five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “ knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, ” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular ’ s Florida convictions would qualify as a “ serious drug offense ” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “ "" only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances. ”"
490,"Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. et al.",Department of Environmental Quality of The State of Oregon et al.,"In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed."
575,Saratoga Fishing Company,J. M. Martinac & Company,"J. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga. Martinac installed a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle Inc. in the Saratoga. The initial user, Joseph Madruga, bought the ship new and added extra equipment. Madruga then sold the Saratoga to Saratoga Fishing Co., the subsequent user. Saratoga Fishing used the ship until it caught fire and sank. Saratoga Fishing then filed an admiralty tort suit against Martinac and Marco. Precedent stated that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover damages for the physical damage that a defective product caused to the ""product itself,"" but can recover damages for physical damage that the product caused to ""other property."" The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the added equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing and, therefore, was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm."
1808,Jackie Washington ,Texas,"Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, actually shot the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction."
695,No. 97-53 Roberts,"Galen of Virginia, Inc.","Wanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and was rushed to the Humana Hospital-University of Louisville, Kentucky, now Galen of Virginia, Inc. After about six weeks at Galen, during which time Johnson's health remained in a volatile state, Galen's agents arranged for her transfer to the Crestview Health Care Facility in Indiana. Johnson was transferred to Crestview in July, and upon arrival her condition deteriorated significantly. Johnson was taken to the Midwest Medical Center where she remained for many months and incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of her deterioration. Jane Roberts, Johnson's guardian, then filed a federal action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), alleging violations of Section 1395dd(b) of the Act. Section 1395dd of the Act places obligations of screening and stabilization upon hospitals and emergency rooms that receive patients suffering from an ""emergency medical condition."" The District Court granted summary judgment for Galen on the ground that Roberts had failed to show that ""either the medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was caused by an improper motive."" In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that in order to state a claim in an EMTALA suit alleging a violation of Section 1395dd(b)'s stabilization requirement, a plaintiff must show that the hospital's inappropriate stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient."
712,Albertsons Inc.,Kirkingburg,"Before starting his job as a truck driver for Albertsons Inc., Hallie Kirkingburg underwent an eye examination during which he was erroneously certified as meeting basic Department of Transportation (DOT) visual standards. Two years later, in 1992, the error of Kirkingburg's earlier diagnosis was discovered during a routine physical examination. Kinrkingburg was told that he had to obtain a DOT waiver if he wanted to continue driving. Before he could do so, however, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet minimum visual requirements and refused to rehire him even after he obtained the waiver. Kirkingburg challenged his dismissal under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit Court ruling reversing a favorable district court finding, the Supreme Court granted Albertsons certiorari."
2119,TC Heartland LLC ,Kraft Food Brands Group LLC,"TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is a company organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) is a company organized under Delaware law and with its principal place of business in Illinois. Heartland sold liquid water-enhancing products that it shipped to Delaware, pursuant to two of its contracts. Kraft sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware and argued that these products infringed on Kraft’s patents for similar products. Heartland moved to dismiss the claim and argued that the Delaware lacked personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit because Heartland is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence in Delaware, and does not solicit business in Delaware. The district court held that, under you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit precedent, the subsection of the general venue statute that allows a defendant to reside in many jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction applies to the patent venue statute. However, this precedent runs counter the the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., which held that the definition of corporate residence is limited to the jurisdiction of incorporation and that the subsection of the general venue statute does not expand jurisdiction under the patent venue statute. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that Congress’ amendments to the general venue statute post-dated and therefore superseded the Fourco precedent."
735,West Coast Hotel Company,"Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife","Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women."
2148,SAS Institute Inc.,"Joseph MatalAndrei Iancu, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al.","SAS Institute Inc. appealed a decision by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in which that court held that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) did not err in issuing a final written decision in an inter partes review that was petitioned by SAS Institute. While the PTAB contended that it need only have addressed certain challenged claims, rather than every challenged claim, SAS alleged that the PTAB in fact misconstrued a claim term, as well as erred by not addressing all the claims SAS challenged in its original petition."
264,Selective Service System,Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,Part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid to males between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or had not) registered for the draft.
1107,Helsinn Healthcare S.A.,"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.","Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations or medications for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy - induced nausea and vomiting ( “ CINV ” ). All four claim priority to a provisional trademark application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on - sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, it argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on - sale bar provision of 35 you. S. C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva on its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn ’ s patents and rejected Teva ’ s “ on sale ” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the inventions were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to that critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before its Critical date was “ overwhelming. ”"
901,Lawrence Eugene Shaw,United States,"Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. After he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter but regularly checked her mail. After the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu ’ s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu ’ s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu ’ s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $ 307, 000 of Hsu ’ s money to himself when the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $ 131, 000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $ 106, 000. Hsu lost about $ 170, 500 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require. The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes government “ to defraud a financial institution. ” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended so only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the sole financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government show only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
2124,National Association of Manufacturers,"Department of Defense, et al.","The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides for judicial review in instances where the Environmental Protection Agency’s action results in the issuance or denial of any permit or places restrictions on waste emissions or other activities related to the waters.On August 28, 2015, a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and you.S. Army Corps of Engineers that defined the scope of “the waters of the United States” under the CWA came into effect. Numerous states and other organizations challenged the validity of the agencies’ rule and contended both that it did not conform with the CWA and was improperly adopted in violation of the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Following consolidation of the claims before the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the National Association of Manufacturers intervened to join the plaintiffs and moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that the CWA does not provide the federal circuit courts with jurisdiction over the agencies’ rule and that review is properly held in the district courts instead. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction because, although the rule only defined the scope of you.S. waters, by defining its boundaries, the rule functionally placed restrictions on activity related to the waters. Therefore, the rule affected permitting requirements and thus had the practical effect of granting or denying permits."
893,"Juan Bravo-Fernandez, et al.",United States,"In May 2005, Juan Bravo - Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez - Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a poker match. Bravo - Fernandez and Martinez - Maldonado were later indicted for charges that Bravo - Fernandez ’ s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez - Maldonado ’ s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of federal federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose - - in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case. Based off this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that an appellate court ’ s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of Congress that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The circuit court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed."
646,Calderone,Thompson,"In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial."
611,Agostini,Felton,"This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
779,Julius A. Wolf,Colorado,"Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, or Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. During trial, Wolf objected to evidence presented and admissible as to his co - defendants would remain inadmissible if both were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all four convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal trial."
1170,Lorenzo L. Jones,"Barbara Bock, Warden, et al.","Congress passed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1995 in an effort to cut down on frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. Under the PLRA, before bringing a federal civil rights suit a prisoner must go through his prison's internal complaint process. Only after exhausting all of these ""administrative remedies"" can the prisoner bring the complaint to federal court. Lorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries in a car accident while in custody. He sued prison officials in federal court, claiming that they were violating his Eighth Amendment rights by making him do arduous work despite his injuries. The officials moved to dismiss the suit, because Jones had not provided any evidence or description of the administrative remedies he claimed to have pursued. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court ruled that in order for Jones to sue, he would have had to provide the court with copies of his grievance forms or at least describe the administrative processes he had exhausted. The Circuit Court further ruled that the PLRA requires ""total exhaustion,"" which means that if a prisoner's suit has multiple claims, administrative remedies must have been exhausted for each and every claim. The Supreme Court accepted review in order to resolve the conflict between Circuit Courts over which side bears the burden of proving exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Williams v. Overton, Timothy Williams suffered from a medical condition which caused tumor growth and disfigurement in his arm. He claimed that prison officials were violating his rights by ignoring his medical needs. Williams's complaint had two claims: he needed additional surgery on his arm and a single-occupancy, handicapped-accessible cell. Williams went through the administrative remedial process on both grievances and both claims were denied. Williams then sued in federal court. The District Court dismissed the suit, because Williams had neglected to name any prison officials as defendants in his medical complaint. Therefore, the court ruled, the administrative remedies for that claim could not be considered to have been exhausted. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that ""The prisoner must demonstrate that he has exhausted the administrative remedies with respect to each individual he intends to sue."" The Circuit Court also ruled that the PLRA requires ""total exhaustion,"" which meant that Williams's entire suit was dismissed because of his unexhausted medical claim, even though the administrative remedies for his request for a new cell had been exhausted."
816,"State of Nebraska, et al.","Mitch Parker, et al.","Omaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes from local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages near Pender, Nebraska, joined by the State of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are still located on federally - recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not outside the authority of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross - filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor against their defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the you. S. Senate ’ s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The you. S. Court of Appeals from the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court - s decision."
1067,Mount Lemmon Fire District,"John Guido, et al.","In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of Washington State in Arizona. They were full - time fire captains, and at ages 46 & 54, respectively, were the two oldest full - time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed employment discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ), which are reasonable because to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( ADEA ), 29 you. S. C. § § 621 - 34. Guido and Rankin subsequently entered suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “ employer "" within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three - judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, an appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state don't need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA."
31,Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty,"Ewald B. Nyquist, Commissioner of Education of New York","New York enacted Chapter 414 of its Education and Tax Laws, which created aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. These amendments included Section 1, which provided a grant for the maintenance and repair of schools that served many low-income students; Section 2, which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income parents; and Sections 3, 4, and 5, which provided tax relief for parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement. After the institution of these amendments, the Campaign for Public Education and Religious Liberty challenged the amendments in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that these amendments violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that Sections 1 and 2 violated the Establishment Clause, but not Sections 3, 4, and 5."
523,City of Lakewood,Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,"Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance and allowed the mayor to grant or reject permission, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide no explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever "" terms and conditions "" as he "" deemed necessary and reasonable. "" On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari."
648,Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson,Community Bank of Raymore,"Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson ’ s husbands are the two directors of PHC Development, LLC ( PHC ). Between 2005 and 2012, Community Bank of Raymore ( Community ) made four loans totaling more than $ 2, 000, 000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins / Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared its loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payment. Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ( ECOA ). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by saying that the wives, in joining their husbands ’ loans, would not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants or gain the protections from the ECOA. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
315,Press-Enterprise Co.,Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside,"A nurse in California was charged with killing 12 patients by administering massive doses of heart medication. During a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, the nurse moved to exclude the public. California law requires preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless a closed hearing is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial. The judge granted the motion because of the the national publicity surrounding the case. After the hearing, Press-Enterprise Co. requested a transcript of the proceedings. The court denied the request because the transcript might prejudice the nurse’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Press-Enterprise filed a preemptory writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, but the court denied the writ. The California Supreme Court also denied the writ, holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to preliminary hearings. The court also held that once the accused establishes a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice”, the burden shifts to Press-Enterprise to show there is no reasonable probability of prejudice."
639,"Tyson Foods, Inc.","Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.","Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. ( Tyson ) at the company ’ s meat - processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a “ gang - time ” system, which means they were paid only for time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying appropriate compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at every beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars. Tyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class must be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the defendant ’ s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district Court ’ s dismissal of a plaintiff class."
1600,"Oneok, Inc. et al.","Learjet, Inc. et al.","Learjet, Inc. and other retail buyers of natural gas (Learjet) sued Oneok, Inc. and other energy trading companies (Oneok) for artificially increasing energy prices during the 2000–2002 energy crisis in violation of several states' antitrust laws. Learjet claimed that Oneok reported false data and engaged in ""wash sales,"" which are prearranged sales in which traders execute a trade on an electronic trading platform, and then immediately offset that trade by executing an equal and opposite trade. Oneok moved to dismiss Learjet's claims and argued that the claims were pre-empted by the federal Natural Gas Act (NGA). The Natural Gas Act regulates interstate, wholesale natural gas trade, but it does not apply to retail sales of natural gas. The district court granted Oneok's motion to dismiss and held that Learjet's claims were pre-empted by the NGA because Oneok's actions affected wholesale prices as well as retail prices. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because Learjet suffered harm in retail transactions, which the NGA does not regulate, Learjet's claims were not pre-empted."
42,United States,John P. Calandra,"A federal grand jury questioned John P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities. The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra’s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company. Calandra refused to answer any questions, arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment. The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the suppression order and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding."
1217,"Frederick L. Allen, et al.","Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard ’ s Queen Anne ’ s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the you. S. Copyright Office. At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for any infringement of his works and agreeing not To infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen ’ s works. The state then passed the Blackbeard ’ s Law, ” which purportedly converted Allen ’ s works into “ public record ” materials that that state could use freely. Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the you. S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act ( CRCA ) — which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “ any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or his official capacity ” — abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. The district court denied the motion to dismissal, finding persuasive Allen ’ s arguments regarding the CRCA ’ s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA."
71,United States,White Mt. Apache Tribe,"In Public Law 86 - 392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in contempt for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate its property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal court argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read that impose a legal obligation on them to maintain or protect the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for damages. The Court in Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common - law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a federal damages claim."
1841,John Dalmer Benton,Maryland,"Benton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the grounds that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him were selected unconstitutionally. The case was remanded and Benton chose to confront a new grand jury. It indicted him for larceny and burglary; the petit jury found him guilty of both charges. Benton then appealed arguing that that re-indicting him on the larceny charge after he had been acquitted amounted to double jeopardy. The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed, following the you.S. Supreme Court's Palko decision, which held that the double-jeopardy clause did not apply to state court criminal proceedings."
278,National Labor Relations Board,Noel Canning,"The National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA ) established the National Labor Relations Board ( Board ) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five - year terms. In 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi - Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 ( Union ). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed the submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that such discussions did actually amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a binding collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the case against Noel Canning. Noel Canning appealed to the I. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board the present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed of the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed of Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress."
1155,Jamar Alonzo Quarles,United States of America,"Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 you.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary."
148,Federal Communications Commission,Pacifica Foundation,"During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, ""Filthy Words."" Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included ""sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some."" The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son."
1485,"American Trucking Associations, Inc.","The City of Los Angeles, the Harbor Department of the City of Los Angeles, and the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles","In 1997, the Port of Los Angeles (""the Port"") introduced a plan to expand its cargo terminals to better accommodate its high shipping volume. Following public concern that the plan could significantly increase air pollution, the Board of Harbor Commissioners adopted a Clean Air Action Plan (""CAAP""). The CAAP aimed to reduce emissions and specifically targeted the Port's drayage truck business. Roughly 16,000 drayage trucks regularly serve the Port, transporting goods between customers and the cargo terminals. Beginning in 2008, the CAAP banned drayage trucks from the Port, unless the carriers entered into a series of concession agreements. These agreements imposed a progressive ban on older trucks and provided incentives for drayage truck operators to convert their aging fleets to cleaner trucks. American Trucking Associations (""ATA""), a national association of motor carriers, challenged several provisions within the concession agreements and brought suit against the City of Los Angeles and its Harbor Department. ATA argued that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (""FAAA"") preempted the agreements. The FAAA Act prohibits a state from enacting any regulation related to the ""price, route, or service of any motor carrier."" ATA claimed that the concession agreements amounted to such a regulation. ATA further argued that the State could not limit a federally licensed motor carrier's access to a port. The district court disagreed with ATA and held that none of the provisions were preempted; ATA appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court determined that when the Port was acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, the FAAA Act did not apply. ATA appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari limited to the two questions below."
1248,Ignacio Carlos Flores-Figueroa,United States,"Ignacio Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to 75 months imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that his conviction was in error because the government did not prove he knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's decision. It held the government need not prove Mr. Flores-Figueroa knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person."
544,Guy Rufus Huddleston,United States,"Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32, 000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business associate in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston ’ s knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for theft of stolen goods. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that his government failed to prove through presenting and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a ruling and subsequently affirmed the decision, holding that the government only acted to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard."
1200,Allen Snyder,State of Louisiana,"In capital murder trial of Allen Snyder, an African-American, the prosecution used peremptory (automatic) challenges to dismiss five African-American prospective jurors. This resulted in Snyder being tried by an all-white jury, which found him guilty and approved the death penalty. The defense argued that the prosecution's striking of the black jurors was racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. As part of its case for the prosecution's alleged discriminatory intent, the defense cited two of the prosecutor's statements comparing the case to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. After having indirectly referred to the Simpson trial before jury selection, the prosecutor had invoked the case again during the sentencing phase, comparing aspects of Snyder's case to Simpson's and noting that the latter defendant ""got away with it."" The trial court applied the Batson framework and denied the defense's challenges. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court, ruling that the trial judge had not acted unreasonably when he accepted the prosecution's race-neutral justifications for the dismissals of the black jurors. The court ruled that the O.J. Simpson references were harmless comparisons made in the course of a rebuttal, and it noted that the prosecution had not mentioned Simpson's or Snyder's race. When the Supreme Court instructed the state court to reconsider the case in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating discriminatory intent, the court affirmed the trial court a second time."
176,"Mohawk Industries, Inc.",Norman Carpenter,"In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. She subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. He argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing the report, a Mohawk company attorney met with Carpenter and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class v lawsuit which charged the company with trying to hire illegal immigrants. Before trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its CEO. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney - client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have discretion over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney - clients privilege did not qualify for exception."
1056,"Darin L. Muehler, et al.",Iris Mena,"Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment."
682,George Reynolds,United States,"George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter - day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti - Bigamy Act after marrying another woman whilst still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. Reynolds reasoned, his religion allowed him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated her First Amendment right to free speech of religion."
1355,"City of Ontario, California et al.","Jeff Quon, et al.","Employees of the City of Ontario, California police department filed a 42 you.S.C. § 1983 claim in a California federal district court against the police department, city, chief of police, and an internal affairs officer. They alleged Fourth Amendment violations in relation to the police department's review of text messages made by an employee on a city issued text-message pager. While the city did not have an official text-messaging privacy policy, it did have a general ""Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy."" The policy in part stated that ""[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice,"" and that ""[you]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources."" Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted that the police department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used ""less intrusive methods"" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service."
629,Hughes Aircraft Company,United States ex rel. Schumer,"In 1989, William J. Schumer filed an action against Hughes Aircraft Co. under the False Claims Act (FCA), specifically under the qui tam provision which allows suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the government. Schumer alleged that Hughes had submitted false claims related to two Air Force radar projects between 1982 and 1984. Hughes moved to dismiss the case claiming that the 1986 amendment to the FCA that Schumer had filed under was not retroactive and that the alleged conduct precluded the suit because the government already had the information on which the suit was based. The motion was dismissed; however, the District Court ruled in favor of Hughes based on the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected Hughes, finding that the FCA should be applied retroactively to suits pre-1986. The appellate court also found that, because no public disclosure of information possessed by the Government had been made, the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act."
1053,Norfolk Southern Railway Company,"James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., dba Kirby Engineering, and Allianz Australia Insurance Limited","James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama. The train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms."
739,Stewart,LaGrand,"After they were sentenced to death in Arizona, Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Among other things, Walter's petition claimed that execution by lethal gas constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the claim unripe until and unless Walter chose gas as his method of execution and denied his petition. Under Arizona law, lethal injection is the default form of execution. Separately, as part of its ultimate order, the Court of Appeals stayed Karl's execution and enjoined Arizona from executing anyone by means of lethal gas. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately denied Walter a stay of execution but restrained and enjoined the Arizona from executing him by means of lethal gas."
162,Payton,New York,"New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed."
713,Martin,Hadix,"Everett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the you.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed."
1350,Timothy Mark Cameron Abbott,Jacquelyn Vaye Abbott,"Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, litigated their divorce in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Abbott was awarded custody of their son, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. At Mrs. Abbott's request, the Chilean court entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or mother without express mutual consent. One year later, Mrs. Abbott moved the child from Chile without Mr. Abbott's consent. Upon location of the child in Texas, Mr. Abbott requested an order in a Texas federal district court that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court denied the order holding that the child's removal did not constitute a breach of the father's ""rights of custody"" as defined by the Hague convention. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Chilean court's order and Chilean statute that required father's consent before the child could leave Chile did not give a non-custodial father ""rights of custody"" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court stated that Mr. Abbott merely possessed the rights of ""access to the child."""
672,Dred Scott,John F. A. Sanford,"Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois ( a free state ) and later the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. On returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that the residence in free territory made him a free man. Despite losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master claimed that no “ negro ” or descendant of his could be a citizen in the words of Article III of the Constitution."
230,Michigan,Bay Mills Indian Community,"The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state and the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal-State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs' claims, while Bay Mills' sovereign immunity bars the others."
2335,"Sharonell Fulton, et al.","City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.","In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children. The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion."
1239,"Ritzen Group, Inc.","Jackson Masonry, LLC","Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline. Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 you. S. C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not lift the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. With this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose in the bankruptcy court ’ s order denying relief from the automatic stay ( which Ritzen did not appeal at the time ). The second appeal arose from the circuit court ’ s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals ; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed upon the merits. Ritzen appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals of The Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court ’ s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines : the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal date, leading to its waiver of appeal."
2216,Richard Allen Culbertson,"Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration","Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 you.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 you.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 you.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context. In ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap. In his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both § 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to § 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior precedent to affirm the district court’s ruling."
1247,"James J. Thole, et al.","U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.","Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against you. S. Bank and other over - mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan during 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 1974 ( ERISA ) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court denied in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2008, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded ; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved toward dismiss a remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a legitimate belief in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
119,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Robert Douglas Smith,"In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death, murder, kidnapping, including sexual assault in an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a review of federal habeas Corpus in district court that was denied. After The Supreme Court ruled Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that he was mentally retarded and therefore could not be executed. The appellate court held that the issue of whether or not Smith was mentally retarded had to been decided by a judge."
1809,Helen Maxine Levi Travis ,United States,"This is a companion case to United States v. Laub, 385 you.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis’ passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, the you.S. government did not allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction."
1166,"Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.","United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt","The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $ 1 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts — including forgery, deception, and threats — that induce Parsons to transfer the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in Congress refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $ 1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to Hunt. Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors ’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam, under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act ( FCA ), 31 you. S. C. § § 3729 – 33, by submitting to the of States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt ’ s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt ’ s claim was. by and statute of limitations in 31 you. S. C. § 3731 ( b ) ( 1 ), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of ( 1 ) “ 6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed ” or ( 2 ) “ 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances …. ” The district court granted the contractors ’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt ’ s claim would be time - barred. Reviewing the district court ’ s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt ( the relator ) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim."
37,Milliken,Bradley,"A suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley."
1280,Pacific Bell Telephone Co.,LinkLine Communications,"LinkLine, along with several other internet-service providers (ISPs), sued Pacific Bell, claiming that the company was selling digital subscriber line (DSL) access at ""a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which [it was] providing retail services."" The ISPs condemned the scheme as price squeezing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a piece of you.S. antitrust legislation designed to prevent the formation of monopolies. A price squeeze occurs when a company holding a monopoly on the production of certain goods sets its wholesale prices higher than the retail prices it charges directly to consumers, preventing the wholesale customers from competing with it at the retail level. The district court denied Pacific Bell's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim but granted its motion for an interlocutory appeal, allowing the appellate court to determine whether such price squeezing claims are permissible before delivering a final judgment at the trial level. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the ISPs had stated a legitimate price squeezing claim under Section 2. The Ninth Circuit argued that prior Supreme Court precedent had not eliminated the application of traditional antitrust laws to partially regulated industries. While noting that the wholesale market is governed by a separate document, the 1934 FCC Act, the court stated that the retail market remains unregulated and is therefore subject to the antitrust laws. As far as the retail market was concerned then, the ISPs had stated a valid price squeezing claim under Section 2."
1361,Karen L. Jerman,"Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA et al.","Karen L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (""FDCPA""). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew its complaint. Before trial, the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors."
726,"National Federation of Federal Employees , Local 1309",Department of Interior,"The National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations Authority, requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining."
26,"William S. Neil, Warden of the Tennessee State Penitentiary ",Archie Nathaniel Biggers,"A Tennessee state court convicted Archie Biggers in the rape of Margaret Beamer. The only major evidence against him was Ms. Beamer’s identification several weeks after the incident at a police station “show up”. The “show up” was similar to a line up, but contained the suspect alone. The police officer also had the suspect say phrases Ms. Beamer heard her attacker say on the night of the rape. Ms. Beamer said she had “no doubt” that Biggers was her attacker. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The you.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court. Biggers then filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted, holding that the Supreme Court affirming by an equally divided court did not bar the writ. The court also held that the “show up” procedure was so suggestive that it violated due process. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
782,Nelson,"Adams USA, Inc.","The Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making Nelson a party and subjecting him to judgement."
361,Andre Lee Coleman,"Todd Tollefson, et al.","The "" three strikes "" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA ) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, initiated an action or appeal that was dismissed upon the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was discharged as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure and state a claim. Coleman's third claim was initially dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and failed to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $ 350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The you. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a "" strike. """
209,Barion Perry,New Hampshire,"Michael Perry is facing prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N. H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the moment but later could only pick Perry out of a photo lineup or describe Perry to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed another petition for suppress the photo identification because it was "" unnecessarily suggestive "" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction."
186,"Russell Bruesewitz, et al.","Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.","Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six - month diphtheria, headache and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer a residual seizure disorder that requires her to provide constant care, according to the parents. When their daughter was three - years - old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's coordination disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the brand of vaccine used in Hannah'd inoculation from the market. The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over childhood injury claims. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed."
107,United States,Freddie J. Booker,"In Blakely v. Washington ( 2004 ) the you. S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment prior to trial by jury required judges to use only evidence proved to a jury to increase his sentence beyond the standard range. Following you. S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge. In another case, you. S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188 - 235 months in prison based on facts the judge decided. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to this you. S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan sentences."
841,Jermaine Simmons et al. ,Walter J. Himmelreich,"Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a claim against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act ( FTCA ) or a claim that these Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his lawsuit claiming failure to state a claim. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case seeking reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 you. S. C. § 2676, that prohibits “ any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim. ” The appellate court again vacated but remanded the lower court ’ s judgment. It held that Himmelreich ’ s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich ’ s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 you. S. C § 2676."
429,"Richard E. Glossip, et al.","Kevin J. Gross, et al.","On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three - drug lethal combination procedure. The procedure went poorly ; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 20 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did another protocol used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and 20 other death Row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of alcohol as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of these claims and that they had failed to identify a "" known and available "" alternative to the drug in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates joined the Court again."
1195,Walter A. Rothgery,"Gillespie County, Texas","Walter Rothgery was arrested in Texas as a felon in possession of a firearm. Rothgery was taken before a judge for processing and, upon learning that seeking legal assistance would delay the proceedings, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. No prosecutor was present at this hearing. Rothgery posted bail and was released, but was rearrested after a grand jury indictment several months later hiked his bail to a sum he could not afford. Throughout this entire period Rothgery continued to pursue legal counsel and only obtained such counsel approximately one week after the grand jury indictment. Rothgery's attorney produced evidence that Rothgery was in fact not a felon and he was released from custody. Rothgery brought suit against Gillespie County, TX for violating his civil rights by not appointing counsel as required under the Sixth Amendment. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit rejected his claim, the Fifth Circuit stating that Rothgery's Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated because no prosecutor was present at the initial hearing. In his petition for certiorari, Rothgery argued that both federal and state case law indicate that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any hearing where a defendant is advised of his rights and the charges against him, regardless of whether or not a prosecutor is present."
1167,Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America,Pacific Gas & Electric Company,"Prior to declaring bankruptcy, Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG & E) purchased surety bonds from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (Travelers). These bonds obliged Travelers to settle debts PG & E could not repay. When PG & E went bankrupt, Travelers hired attorneys to protect its interests. State law mandated that PG & E cover all attorney fees incurred by Travelers during state bankruptcy proceedings. The litigation later moved to federal court. PG & E refused to pay for Travelers's expenditures in federal court, claiming responsibility only for fees incurred during state proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court denied Travelers's request for reimbursement because the precedents of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that only federal laws could ensure payment for federal litigation. PG & E was only under contractual and legal obligation to pay for state-court attorney fees. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit denied Travelers's claim on the same grounds. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court, citing inconsistent rulings among the Circuit Courts of Appeals."
301,Williamson County Regional Planning Commission,Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,"Hamilton Bank of Johnson City owned of a tract of land in Williamson County Tennessee and intended to develop it into a residential subdivision. When Hamilton Bank attempted to get a layout of the subdivision approved, the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission denied it because the layout violated certain zoning regulations. Hamilton Bank sued the Commission alleging that the zoning laws constituted a ""taking"" under the Fifth Amendment. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 as compensation for the taking. The court issued an injunction against the Commission and awarded judgment notwithstanding the verdict denying money damages because the ""taking"" was only temporary. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the zoning laws denied Hamilton Bank all ""economically viable"" use of the land and that damages were required to compensate for the temporary taking."
1911,Russell Frisby et al.,Sandra Schultz et al.,"Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was ""the protection and preservation of the home."" When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment."
340,"Hana Financial, Inc.","Hana Bank, et al.","In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name ""Hana Overseas Korean Club"" in English as well as ""Hana Bank"" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the ""dancing man."" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words ""Hana Financial"" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other. In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the ""Hana Bank"" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the ""Hana Financial"" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be ""tacked"" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase ""Hana Bank."" HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be ""tacked"" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision."
1304,"Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.","Humanitarian Law Project, et al.","Among the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (""KWP"") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (""LTTE""). The KWP and LTTE engage in a variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (""AEDPA""). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a ""foreign terrorist organization."" Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide ""material support or resources"" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (""IRTPA"") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals ""knowingly"" provide ""material support or resources"" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the Act that further clarified what constituted ""material support or resources."" The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms ""service,"" ""training,"" or ""other specialized knowledge"" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague."
819,Shafer,S. Carolina,"Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., was found guilty of murder, among other things. During the sentencing phase, Shafer's counsel argued that Simmons v. South Carolina required the trial judge to instruct the jury that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. The you.S. Supreme Court held in Simmons that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. The prosecution responded that because the state did not plan to argue to the jury that Shafer would be a danger in the future that no Simmons instruction was required. During deliberations, the jury asked under what conditions someone convicted of murder could become available for parole. The trial judge stated that parole eligibility or ineligibility was not a matter for the jury's consideration. Ultimately, the jury recommended the death penalty and the judge imposed the sentence. In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons generally did not apply to the State's sentencing scheme because an alternative to death other than life without the possibility of parole exists."
850,Securities and Exchange Commission,Zandford,"In 1987, Charles Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
1601,Kevan Brumfield,Burl Cain,"In 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation. Brumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
625,"Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.","Greg Manning, et al.","The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. (Escala), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs’ shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs’ motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in state court."
1101,Gil Garcetti et al.,Richard Ceballos,"Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment."
89,Roberts,Louisiana,"Following his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence existed to support such verdicts. This case is one of the five ""Death Penalty Cases"" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina ."
2081,"Deborah K. Johnson, Warden",Donna Kay Lee,"Donna Kay Lee and Peter Carasi were each convicted in California state court of two counts of first-degree murder for the murder of Carasi’s mother and for his ex-girlfriend. Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and the California appellate courts affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Lee filed a petition for federal habeas relief without seeking state postconviction relief, and the petition mostly raised claims that Lee had not raised on direct appeal. Because Lee had not exhausted state relief measures, the district court stayed the case until the state law claims could be fully litigated. The California Supreme Court ruled that Lee’s state law claims were barred based on the precedent of In re Dixon, which held that a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal but was not raised until postconviction relief proceedings is considered procedurally defaulted. The federal district court similarly dismissed Lee’s claims based on the Dixon bar. On appeal, Lee argued that the California courts were not consistently applying Dixon because the courts had not cited the case in every instance in which it should have applied and therefore that the bar was inadequate. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded for further evidence, and after the presentation of evidence about how often California courts applied the Dixon bar, the district court again dismissed Lee’s claims. The appellate court reversed and held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the Dixon bar was being consistently applied, and therefore that the bar was inadequate."
235,Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette,California,"On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers' observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed."
1201,Derrick Kimbrough,United States,"In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the you.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers. Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence ""ridiculous."" Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio."
75,"Albemarle Paper Company, et al.","Joseph P. Moody, et al.","The respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a race discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant’s labor union, Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant “policy, practice, custom, or usage” that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay. At trial, the court found that the plant’s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle’s use of pre-employment tests. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests."
710,Lopez,Monterey County,"The Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires designated states and political subdivisions to obtain federal pre-clearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. Hispanic voters, residing in Monterey County, California, filed suit in federal court claiming the county had failed to obtain the required pre-clearance for a series of ordinances changing the method for electing county judges. A three-judge District Court ultimately dismissed the case because the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires pre-clearance did not cover California. Moreover, California had passed legislation requiring the voting changes forged by Monterey County."
434,"Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator",Federal Election Commission,"In early 2002, a many years - old effort of Senator John McCain and Russell Feingold to change the way that money is raised for - - and spent during - - political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ( the so - called McCain - Feingold bill sometimes referred as as BCRA ). Its key provisions were a ) a ban on unrestricted ( "" soft money "" ) donations made directly for political parties ( often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals ) based on the solicitation of those donations by elected representatives ; b ) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non - profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election ; and c ) restrictions on political parties'use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates ( in the form of "" issue ads "" or "" coordinated expenditures "" ). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by - passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three - judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft - money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide any resulting appeals."
334,Russell Anderson,"Robert E. Creighton, Jr., et ux., et al.","On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable because. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home."
1737,"Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.",Paul,"California prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was not a factor in these standards. Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard for maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law."
1065,Florida,Joe Elton Nixon,"A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was ""per se ineffective."""
1284,Entergy Corp.,"Riverkeeper, Inc., et al.","Three consolidated cases center around whether or not the EPA surpassed its federal authority by weighing the pros and cons of systems to be used at water intake cooling structures rather than simply employing the most advanced technology available on the market. The claims, brought by environmental groups and corporations, allege that the EPA's cost/benefit analysis violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by leading to the use of structures that were insufficient to protect aquatic organisms from being harmed or killed as required by the CWA."
276,Massachusetts,Osborne Sheppard,"Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no ""good-faith exception"" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant."
1239,"14 Penn Plaza LLC, et al.","Steven Pyett, et al.","A group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that the arbitration clause included in the employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable."
138,Keith Lance et al.,"Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State","After the 1990 census, The you. S. Congress increased Colorado ’ s representation in the I. S. House of Representatives from six congressmen to seven. The Colorado state Legislature failed to redraw the districts before the 2002 elections, so the state courts redrew the districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district map, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado state constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and therefore the courts ’ 2002 redistricting took precedence over the redistricting by the state legislature. Keith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district court and argued that the Colorado Supreme Court ’ s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I of a you. S. Constitution, and those individuals ’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file for redress of grievances. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction then dismissed the case. Lance appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear their case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue jurisdiction, since Lance was an individual citizen not directly affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court."
1176,"Jeffrey H. Beck, liquidating trustee of the Estates of Crown Vantage, Inc. and Crown Paper Company",PACE International Union et al.,"During Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings, Crown Vantage, Inc. (Crown) terminated its employee pension plan and purchased an annuity for the employee participants as a replacement. The participants advocated merging the current plan into a multiemployer PACE International Union (PACE) pension plan but Crown did not investigate the possibility. The participants alleged that Crown breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not acting ""solely in the interests of the participants"" (Section 1104(a)(1)). A bankruptcy court ordered Crown to maintain the plan's funds until they were distributed to the participants. A District Court affirmed, finding that Crown failed to consider its employees' interest. Crown appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it did not consider the PACE plan because Section 4041 of ERISA prevents termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, ruling that ERISA does allow termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan."
392,County of Allegheny,"American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter","Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh."
250,Michigan,Long,"David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution."
836,"Semtek International, Inc.",Lockheed Martin Corporation,"Semtek International filed a complaint against Lockheed Martin Corporation in California state court, alleging breach of contract and various business torts. Based on diversity of citizenship, Lockheed Martin moved the case to the District Court. In the District Court, Lockheed Martin successfully moved to dismiss Semtek's claims, as they were barred by California's 2-year statute of limitations. The dismissal was upheld on appeal. Semtek then filed suit in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. The suit was not time barred under Maryland's 3-year statute of limitations. The court dismissed the case under res judicata. In affirming, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the California federal court's dismissal barred the Maryland complaint because the res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments is prescribed by federal law, under which the earlier dismissal was on the merits and claim-preclusive."
260,Kevin Loughrin,United States,"Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. When the scheme came to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
443,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.",Board of Education of Topeka,"In the decision in Brown v. Board for Education of Topeka ( Brown I ), which declared racial barriers in public schools unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would have Congress implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed off many different regions of this United States with distinctive conditions and problems."
827,Pollard,E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company,"Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ultimately, the Federal District Court found that Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory damages, the maximum permitted under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for such damages. The court then noted that the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard. On appeal, Pollard argued that ""front pay,"" the money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement, was not an element of compensatory damages, but a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. Rejecting Pollard, the Court of Appeals affirmed."
725,Hunt,Cromartie,"Following the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. However, even before an evidentiary hearing, a three-judge District Court granted Cromartie summary judgment. Hunt appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari."
409,Lujan,National Wildlife Federation,"The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were ""arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."" NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands ""in the vicinity"" of lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late). The BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing to challenge all 1,250. On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the additional four affidavits."
605,"Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board",Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,"Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including self-insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third-party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted the state statute because the state statute’s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted."
1854,"Sallie M. Hadnott, et al.","Mabel S. Amos, et al.","The National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) sought to place the names of minority candidates on the ballot for local and state-wide offices. Alabama election officials denied the NDPA request under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. The NDPA then brought suit in a special three-judge you.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama claiming constitutional violations. NDPA lost and appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Initially, the Court heard arguments on October 18 in support of a temporary restraining order which it had granted on October 14. The day after oral argument, the Court granted the order and subsequently addressed the merits of the controversy on March 25."
1364,Carol Anne Bond,United States,"Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment."
78,Medical Board of California,Hason,"The California Medical Board denied Hason a license for practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ). The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of constitutional immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing another non - consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by violating Title II of the ADA "" and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II. """
717,Jones,United States,"Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense."
329,Julie Heimeshoff,Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores,"Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal - Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Heart Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2003, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. ( Hartford ) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, stating that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007. Heimsehoff prevailed in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan law prohibited legal representation more than three years after proof of eligibility is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three - year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
105,Hortonville Independent School District No. 1 et al. ,Hortonville Education Association et al. ,"Teachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The attorney argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced. The fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board’s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker."
262,Kevin Loughrin,United States,"Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. When the scheme came to its end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of delivery of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act ; the district court rejected the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held even such an evidence was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted in all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
912,State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,"United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al.","Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies : One that covered flood or not wind damage, and another, covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, so the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government funds would pay for flood damage claims ; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. ( State Farm ) was one of two companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster that believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders ’ flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA ’ s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until a court orders a complaint served on the defendant, and that violation of the FCA seal requirement required immediate dismissal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for a Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal."
173,Davis,Passman,"Davis, a former employee of Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman, charged Passman with violating her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Prior to the time of her firing Passman wrote a note explaining that, even though he knew Davis as an ""able, energetic, and a hard, hard worker"", he preferred a man to work in her position. The Court of Appeals ruled that Davis had no civil remedies under the Fifth Amendment due process requirement."
1752,Wesberry,Sanders,"James P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want of equity. Wesberry appealed."
96,"Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc.","Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc.","In 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated by its employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick’s negligence. Transamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers."
1146,United States of America,Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover,"On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence ( a “ Hobbs Act robbery ” ) and the illegal use or carrying of a gun to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts mentioned above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants ’ challenges and affirming the district court, s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court ’ s decision on Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 you. S. _ _ ( 2018 ), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( c ) contains both an “ elements clause ” and a “ residual clause. ” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “ has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, ” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “ by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. ” In Dimaya, the Court addressed ( and invalidated ) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924 ( a ) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924 ( c ) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause to that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed to prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause."
427,"Richard E. Glossip, et al.","Kevin J. Gross, et al.","On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three - step lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly ; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could become solved but subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and 20 other death row survivors sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three additional plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a "" known and available "" alternative to the drug in question. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ under certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently convicted. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again."
350,City of Los Angeles,"Naranjibhai Patel, et al.","Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes police officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are ""closely regulated"" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections. The district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized ""closely regulated"" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels do not have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private ""papers"" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre-compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records."
2307,Simon E. Rodriguez,Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,"United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment."
1481,Chunon L. Bailey aka Polo,United States,"On July 28, 2005, an informant told Officer Richard Sneider of the Suffolk County Police Department that he had purchased six grams of crack cocaine at 103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York, from an individual named ""Polo."" Officer Sneider obtained a warrant to search the basement apartment at that address; the warrant provided that the apartment was occupied by a heavy set black male with short hair, known as ""Polo."" That evening during surveillance, officers observed two men -later identified as Chunon L. Bailey and Bryant Middleton-exiting the gate that led to the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive. The officers followed Bailey and Middleton as they left the premises in a black Lexus, and pulled the Lexus over about one mile from the apartment. The officers patted down Bailey and Middleton, finding keys in Bailey's front left pocket. They placed both men in handcuffs and informed them that they were being detained, not arrested. Bailey insisted that he did not live in the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, but his driver's license address in Bay Shore was consistent with the informant's description of Polo. The police searched the apartment while Bailey and Middleton were in detention, finding a gun and drugs in plain view. The police arrested Bailey, and seized his house keys and car key incident to his arrest; later, an officer discovered that one of the house keys opened the door to the basement apartment."
1058,Charles Russell Rhines,"Douglas Weber, Warden","A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims."
547,South Carolina,Baker,"In 1998, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Relief Act ( TEFRA ). The law removed the federal income tax exemption on interest earned on publicly offered long - term bonds issued by state / local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co ( 1895 ). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to exempt bonds associated with taxation ; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt."
731,United States,"William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.","In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, through which funds would be distributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go insane. Authority to decide which crops would be affected became granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He ruled that one of the crops should remain cotton, and Butler received a tax credit as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor."
1321,National Collegiate Athletic Association,"Shawne Alston, et al.","In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University at Oklahoma, 468 you. S. 85 ( 1984 ), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA ’ s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for collegiate athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of NCAA cases. Because of this new standard, an NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits courts to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “ non - cash education - related benefits, ” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “ computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation "" nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies. "" However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash - equivalent awards for academic purposes. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA ’ s interest in “ preserving amateurism, ″ but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law."
943,Sprietsma,Mercury Marine,"Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims."
1624,"Commil USA, LLC","Cisco Systems, Inc.","Commil USA, LLC (Commil) holds a patent on a method to implement short-range wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) and alleged that Cisco performed the patented method and induced its customers to infringe by performing the patented method. Cisco argued that Commil's patent was invalid for indefiniteness, non-enablement, and lack of written description. The district court found for Commil and awarded more than $70 million in damages. Cisco appealed and argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard for inducement was negligence and precluded the submission of evidence of Cisco's good-faith belief that Commil's patent was invalid. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the standard for induced infringement is actual knowledge or willful blindness, and therefore that a good-faith belief of patent invalidity was a defense to claims of induced infringement."
259,Roberts,United States Jaycees,"According to its bylaws, membership in the United States Jaycees was limited to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Females and older males were limited to associate membership in which they were prevented from voting or holding local or national office. Two chapters of the Jaycees in Minnesota, contrary to the bylaws, admitted women as full members. When the national organization revoked the chapters' licenses, they filed a discrimination claim under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. The national organization brought a lawsuit against Kathryn Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, who was responsible for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law."
1209,"Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections",Daniel Siebert,"Daniel Siebert was convicted of the murder of Linda Jarman and sentenced to death by electrocution in 1989. His conviction was confirmed on appeal, and Siebert’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in 1990. In 1992, Siebert filed a petition for state post-conviction relief that was denied because it was filed after the two-year statute of limitations period. In 2001, Siebert filed a federal writ of habeas corpus that was denied because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) has a one-year statute of limitation for filing a federal writ of habeas corpus. Siebert appealed to you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and argued that the statute of limitations should not run while his “properly filed” state post-conviction relief was pending. The appellate court determined that the state statute of limitations was not jurisdictional and the state courts could have granted Siebert’s petition, so his petition for state post-conviction relief was “properly filed” and should have prevented the AEDPA’s statute of limitations from running. The appellate court remanded the case for consideration of the petition on the merits. While that review was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pace v. DiGuglielmo, in which the Court held that a petition for state post-conviction relief that was determined to be untimely did not halt the running of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Therefore, the district court again rejected Siebert’s petition. The appellate again remanded by holding that the state statute of limitations in this case was non-jurisdictional, and therefore Pace did not apply."
1130,"Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Allina Health Services, et al.","The you.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “parts” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C. HHS contracts with “fiscal intermediaries” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports. The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “patient days” for patients “entitled to benefits under part A” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars. The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “interpretive rule” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and thus was exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “interpretive rule” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment."
1302,Thedrick Edwards,"Darrel Vannoy, Warden","Thedrick Edwards was convicted to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards ’ s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but the African American individual from the jury, but at least one person voted for acquit Edwards, a White man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10 - 2 vote, so Edwards ’ s conviction became final in 2010. On April 1, 2020, a you. S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, arguing that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal courts, rather than in Louisiana."
1117,Dennis Obduskey,"McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.","Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $ 329, 940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were launched several times, but never completed. Obduskey ’ s mortgage remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non - judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). The district court granted the defendants ’ motions to dismiss on all counts, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. Upon Obduskey ’ s appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, that appellate court held that based on the statute ′ s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non - judicial collection proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court ’ s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same of attempting to collect a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned, you. S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC."
1875,John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens ,Alabama,"John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them was the identification by the victim, Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review."
555,Morse,Republican Party of Virginia,"In 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the claims."
1478,Supap Kirtsaeng,"John Wiley & Sons, Inc.","Supap Kirtsaeng came to the United States from Thailand in 1997. He obtained an undergraduate degree at Cornell University before being accepted into a PhD program at the University of Southern California. To subsidize the cost of his education, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand and to ship those books to him in the United States. Kirstaeng then sold the textbooks on eBay at a profit. Among the books Kirtsaeng sold, were eight textbooks printed in Asia by John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Wiley sued Kirtsaeng in district court for copyright infringement under Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which makes it impermissible to import a work ""without the authority of the owner."" Kirtsaeng asserted a defense under Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy ""lawfully made under this title"" to sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner's permission. The district court rejected Kirtsaeng's argument, and held that the doctrine was inapplicable to goods manufactured in a foreign country. Kirtsaeng appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A divided panel acknowledged that it was a difficult question of statutory construction, but the majority held that Section 109(a) referred specifically to works that are made in the United States and did not apply to works manufactured abroad. Kirtsaeng's request for rehearing was denied, and he appealed the appellate court's decision."
422,James,Illinois,"James was a youth arrested for the murder of another adolescent. During his trial a witness testifying on his behalf described James's appearance on the night of the supposed crime. This description contradicted statements which James had made to police officers the day after the crime. To expose this perjured testimony, prosecutors moved to introduce James's statements into the trial even though they were obtained illegally."
1145,United States of America,Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover,"On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 you.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 you.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause."
1740,John L Brady,Maryland,"A Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. Brady maintained that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady’s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only."
556,Fulton Corporation,Faulkner,"After North Carolina levied an ""intangibles tax"" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce."
424,"Eastern Airlines, Inc.",Rose Marie Floyd,"On May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami, bound for the Bahamas. After takeoff, one of the plane’s jet engines lost pressure. The flight crew shut down the failing engine and turned the plan around to return to Miami. The flight crew informed the passengers that the plane would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, but the crew managed to restart the engine and land the plane safely at Miami International Airport. A group of passengers, including Rose Marie Floyd, sued Eastern Airlines for mental distress caused by the incident. Eastern Airlines argued the engine failure and preparations for ditching the plane amounted to an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and also that Article 17 requires physical injury a condition of liability. The district court concluded than mental distress alone is not enough to receive compensation under Article 17. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held the language in Article 17 encompasses purely emotional distress."
1433,Juan Smith,"Burl Cain, Warden","Juan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois."
2048,United States,"Michael Bryant, Jr.","In June 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr. was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender in violation of 18 you.S.C. 117(a), a federal law that criminalizes domestic assault by any person who has been convicted of at least two domestic violence offenses in federal, state, or Indian tribal court. For the predicate offenses, the prosecution relied on Bryant’s previous domestic abuse convictions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. Bryant moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the use of the tribal court convictions as predicate convictions for the charge violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was not afforded counsel in the tribal court proceedings, so his convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if they had occurred in state or federal court. The district court denied the motion, and Bryant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that an uncounseled conviction that violated the Sixth Amendment could not be used as a predicate offense for the purpose of a charge under Section 117(a)."
2051,Elijah Manuel,"City of Joliet, Illinois, et al.","Elijah Manuel was a passenger in a car that was pulled over for failing to signal on March 18, 2011. When the police officer detected an odor of marijuana in the car, he dragged Manuel out of the car, pushed and kicked him, and handcuffed him. The officer found a bottle of pills in Manuel’s pocket during his pat-down. The pills were tested and the officers falsified the results to show the pills were ecstasy. The initial positive pill results were later tested at the scene of the arrest. More detailed negative lab results were presented by Manuel later. Manuel was arrested based on these initial results. The officers continued to rely on the false positive initial test throughout the grand jury proceedings, and he was held until May 4, when the Assistant State’s Attorney sought dismissal of the charges. Manuel sued the City of Joliet and various city officials and alleged malicious prosecution as well as other civil rights claims. The district court dismissed most of Manuel’s claims as falling outside of the statute of limitations. His malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, however, but was dismissed under Newsome v. McCabe, which held that federal claims of malicious prosecution stem from the right to due process and are not a Fourth Amendment issue. Therefore, there was no malicious prosecution claim under federal law if the state provided a similar because of action, as Illinois did. On appeal, Manuel argued that Newsome did not foreclose a malicious prosecution claim on Fourth Amendment grounds when officers misrepresented evidence. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling against Manuel as consistent with the Newsome precedent."
421,Louis B. Bullard,"Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank","Louis Bullard borrowed $ 387, 000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then deposit the rest of the mortgage loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order is void because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an order but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner has already filed his notice of appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, and courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over "" final decisions, judgments, orders and orders. """
1282,Clemente Avelino Pereida,"Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General","Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and unsuccessfully sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude ; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be eligible for cancellation of removal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that it was Pereida ’ s burden to establish such eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis of Pereida's eligibility, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals ’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida ’ s petition for review."
1966,McCulloch,Maryland,"In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual commitment for the federal government to charter a bank."
1058,Denard Stokeling,United States of America,"In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty of charges that he was a felon in possession of a rifle and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, so an element of that offense was “ overcoming victim resistance. ” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force and overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should "" qualify as “ violent felonies ” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( e ), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, and vacated Stokeling "" s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal."
1233,Michelle Monasky,Domenico Taglieri,"Michelle Monasky, a you. S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two - month - old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky ’ s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri ’ s favor ex parte ( without an appearance by Monasky ). Taglieri then asked an federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri ’ s petition, finding that Italy was the baby ’ s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the you. S. Supreme Court denied Monasky ’ s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s decision, and then the Seventh Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 you. S. C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “ under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident, before the removal. ” To determine the child ’ s habitual residence, that court must look “ to the place in which the child has become ‘ acclimatized, ’ not as a back - up inquiry, “ shared parental intent. ” Because a child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents ’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court ’ s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit ( in banc ) affirmed."
474,"Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources","Doe, By His Mother And Next Friend, Doe, et al.","A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures."
54,Reno,ACLU,"Several organizations challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "" obscene or indecent "" materials as well as the transmission of information which depicts or converts "" sexual or excretory activities or organs "" into a way deemed "" inappropriate "" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court in enforcing the other provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided above by the Act's special review provisions."
169,Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts,Feeney,"A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores."
498,Bernard Shapiro,Vivian Marie Thompson,"Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen - year - old mother to one child who applied seeking assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC ) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy the state's one - year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two persons, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their residency are required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code."
1196,Jack Davis,Federal Election Commission,"Jack Davis, a wealthy Democratic candidate for Congress from New York's 26th Congressional District, brought this claim challenging the constitutionality of the so-called 'Millionaire's Amendment' to the 2002 campaign finance law. Davis argued in the district court that the law, which basically raises the contribution cap for individuals running against self-financed candidates, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected both of these claims, stating first that the law did not implicate the First Amendment because it did not impede Davis' ability to spend money in support of his message, noting that it actually led to a higher level of speech in the race overall. The district court similarly rejected Davis' Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that although Davis may have been held to higher reporting standards than his opponent, his disproportionate wealth meant that the two candidates were not similarly situated and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not apply. The campaign finance law allows direct appeal to the Court, which will consider whether Davis has standing to bring the First Amendment claim before deciding the case on the merits."
1617,"Dart Cherokee Operating Company, LLC, et al.",Brandon W. Owens,"On October 30, 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in state court that alleged that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline underpaid the members on the class on royalties they were owed from wells. The petition alleged that this underpayment constituted a breach of contract and sought damages without specifying an amount. On December 5, 2012, the defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court and cited that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA requires that three elements be established for a class action case to fall under federal jurisdiction: at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states, the class must consist of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The defendants in this case claimed that they met the requirements for removal to federal court under CAFA because the amount in controversy exceeded $8 million, but did not include specific evidence in the notice of removal. The federal district court held that defendants had not provided evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in the notice of removal and therefore remanded the case back to state court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court should not have remanded the case because requiring the party requesting the removal to produce evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million creates an evidentiary burden. The Court of Appeals held that that such evidence is wholly unnecessary unless the removal is contested. A party requesting that a case be removed to federal court need only allege that the grounds for removal exist and need only prove those allegations if they are contested."
143,Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,Charlotte Horowitz,"Several faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior."
1089,Barbara Dolan,United States Postal Service et al.,"Barbara Dolan tripped over mail left on her porch by a mailman, injuring herself. She sued the Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), arguing that her injuries were due to the mailman's negligence. The government, claiming that its sovereign immunity had not been waived in this particular case, moved to have the case dismissed. The FTCA, while waiving federal sovereign immunity for most incidents that could arise under it, has an exception for the ""negligent transmission of letters or postal matter."" Dolan argued that this exception referred only to mail that was lost or damaged by the Postal Service, not to people injured by the placement of the mail, but the district court disagreed. The case was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals."
847,Brandon Thomas Betterman,State of Montana,"Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 15, 2011, on charges of partner or family member theft, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself around and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor car to get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. The sentence still did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss with the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail - jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman ’ s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long, had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial."
1566,"Environmental Protection Agency, et al.","EME Homer City Generation, L.P., et al.","The Clean Air Act creates a federal-state partnership that aims to control air pollution in the United States. The Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to both establish air quality standards and gives the states significant freedom to implement plans in order to meet those standards. Among the problems the Act sought to prevent was the possible spread of air pollution from ""upwind"" states to ""downwind"" states. In 2011, the EPA created the Transport Rule, a rule which sets emission reduction standards for 28 ""upwind"" states based on the air quality standards in ""downwind"" states. Various states, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations brought suit in the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and argued that the Transport Rule created federal standards with no deference to the states, which violated federal law. The court held that the Transport Rule violated federal law because the Clean Air Act allows states to implement their own plans to curb air pollution."
681,George Reynolds,United States,"George Reynolds, a member of His Church of Jesus Christ of Latter - day Saints, became convicted with bigamy under the 1967 Morrill Anti - Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was constitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him not marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion."
737,West Coast Hotel Company,"Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife","Under Washington state Law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women and Industry set a minimum wage of $ 14. 50 for each work week of 24 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less of this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins J. Children's Hospital ( 1923 ), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women."
383,Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury,Brian Wynne et ux.,"Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents that own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. ( Maxim ), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim't income is "" passed through "" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which covers Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied to and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes. The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes'argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated with the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax profits from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without tax credit violated the Commerce Clause because, county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would is taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland."
1293,Ford Motor Company,"Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.","In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal owners of Gullett ’ s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design - defect, failure - to - warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant ’ s interests are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction on a corporate defendant if that plaintiff ’ s claims “ arise out of or relate to ” the defendant ’ s activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford built the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon dealer, which also sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford ’ s motion to dismiss, finding a “ connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. ” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated as Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19 - 369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question."
703,"W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney",Roland H. Dagenhart et al. ,The Smith - Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment to goods produced by Child labor. Reuben Miller's grandfather - - Roland - - had sued on behalf for his freedom to allow his fourteen year old grandson to live at a textile mill.
1878,Garrett H. Byrne,Serafim Karalexis et al.,"Serafim Karalexis owned and operated a movie theater in Boston that was showing a movie entitled “I am Curious (Yellow).” The film was produced in Sweden and is about a girl’s search for identity and her relationship to the contemporary social and political problems of the time. During the course of the film, she takes a lover, and the film shows their explicit sex scenes, including scenes of oral sex. Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne determined that the film was obscene because it appealed to a “prurient interest in sex,” was offensive to community moral standards, and had no redeeming social value. He charged Karalexis with violating a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of obscene films. Karalexis sought an injunction in district court in order to prevent this prosecution and future ones under a law that he argued violated the First Amendment protection afforded to such films..The district court held that the law was likely unconstitutional and granted the injunction."
350,United States,Ronald Dale Dunn,"Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs. At trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The you.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy."
1237,"Cordell Pearson, et al.",Afton Callahan,"This case stems from a search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search, however the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction. Subsequently, Callahan filed this action in federal court against the Task Force and individual officers alleging that the search violated his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment. The you.S. District Court for the District of Utah dismissed his claim, holding in part that the ""consent once removed"" doctrine applied to the search. Under the doctrine, an undercover officer may summon backup officers into a home after that officer has been invited with consent. However the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the doctrine does not apply when the officers are summoned by a police informant. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, Callahan had established a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures."
247,"Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, et al.","State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al.","In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which gave the Secretary of Transportation the power to issue motor vehicle safety standards. The Secretary also has the ability to delegate that power to another agency, in this case the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Act also authorizes judicial review to determine whether the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In 1967, the Department of Transportation first issued Standard 208, which at that point only required all automobiles to have seat belts. By 1975, Standard 208 had been revised multiple times to require passive restraints, such as airbags and seat belts that would operate automatically and not require action on the part of the occupants. Because of the unpopularity of the standard, in 1974 Congress amended the Act to allow alternative safety measures. In 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the passive restraint requirement entirely. The succeeding Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, issued Modified Standard 208, which required passive restraints in large cars of model year 1982 or later and in all cars of model year 1984 or later. In 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis began reconsidering Modified Standard 208. The NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 because it determined that the restraints would not have the expected safety benefits, so the requirement would not be reasonable or practicable. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed for review of the NHTSA’s decision, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NHTSA’s decision to rescind the standard was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that there was not enough evidence to support the NHTSA’s position and that the NHTSA failed to properly consider alternative possibilities under which the standard could be effective."
966,"Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security",Pauline Thomas,"After a heart attack left her unable to continue working as a housekeeper in the late 1980s, Pauline Thomas took a job as an elevator operator. By the mid- 1990s, however, Thomas's job and others like it were eliminated as elevators became automated. Thomas applied for Social Security disability benefits because she could not do other work. The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, rejected her claim because, it said, she was still able to perform the duties of her former position. The fact that it was nearly impossible to find such a position, the SSA held, did not entitle her to benefits under disability law. An administrative judge and a federal district court both upheld the SSA's position, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ""a claimant's previous work must be substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."""
129,Adrian Martell Davis,Washington,"Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911, told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists as he fled. At trial, McCottry did indeed testify, but the 911 call was presented as evidence supporting the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross - examine McCottry violated his First Amendment freedom to confront his accuser as interpreted by the you. S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not "" testimonial "" and was substantially different from the statements at issue in Crawford."
459,James Draper,United States,"John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was trafficking drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh : Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would probably be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag. Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the discovery of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers felt probable because to arrest him without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried but convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for The Second District affirmed."
699,Curt Muller,Oregon,"Oregon enacted a law to limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The proprietor of a laundry store, Curt Muller, was fined $ 10 when he violated state law. Muller appealed her sentence. The state supreme Court upheld the act ’ s constitutionality."
617,Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin,"United States, et al.","Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin ( Menominee Tribe ) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to a self - determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services ( HHS ). The self - determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those costs in annual funding agreements. In 2005, the Menominee Tribe lodged administrative claims with the HHS ’ s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the period 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because their six - year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations would not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe ’ s argument. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate judge affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary events that should have prevented the statute of limitation from running."
573,Ohio,Robinette,"After stopping Robinette for speeding, an Ohio deputy warned him, returned his license, and asked him if he had any illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered ""no"" but after agreeing to have his car searched, the officer found some marijuana and a pill that later proved to be a powerful drug. On appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals' reversal of his lower court conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Ohio Supreme Court Affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ohio certiorari."
188,Chiarella,United States,"Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use ""in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"" of ""any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe."" Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to ""employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."" Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction."
1469,"Curt Messerschmidt, et al.","Augusta Millender, et al.","Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community and the personnel serving the search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims. The district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable because existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant's scope to items supported by probable because."
952,"Inyo County, California",Paiute-Shoshone Indians,"During an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant to search for the records at the casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe."
99,Coleman Young,"American Mini Theatres, Inc.","American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with ""regulated uses"" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause."
869,"Joseph P. Murr, et al.","Wisconsin, et al.","The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings ( the Murrs ) purchased two adjacent lots ( Lots E and F ) in St. Croix County in 1960. The adjacent lots together made up approximately. 98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs ’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1999, the two plots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County ’ s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot was not at least one acre, the lots may be put together to equal one acre. Ten years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs ’ application and sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of practically all, or practically any, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot. ” The circuit court granted summary judgement against the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property."
1125,"Brigham City, Utah","Charles W. Stuart, et al.","Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the ""emergency aid doctrine"" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man."
356,"Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.","The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.","Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low - income housing developers through an application process, where the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project ( ICP ), a non - profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Co. of Housing and Community Affairs ( TDHCA ), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low - income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act. At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the distribution of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the same standard in evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the rules promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing a Fair Housing Act."
1426,"Darin Ryburn, et al.","George R. Huff, et al.","Darin Ryburn and Edmundo Zepeda were Burbank Police Officers. Vincent Huff was a student at Bellarmine-Jefferson High School, who was rumored to be intending to ""shoot-up"" the school. Ryburn, Zepeda, and other officers arrived at the school to investigate the rumors. After conducting some interviews, the officers went to Vincent Huff's home. The officers attempted to speak with Vincent Huff and his parents. Eventually, Mrs. Huff came out of the house, but she refused to let the officers to enter her home. After the police asked if there were any weapons in the house, Mrs. Huff ran back into the house. Officer Ryburn followed Mrs. Huff into the house, because he believed that Mrs. Huff's behavior was unusual and further believed that the officers were in danger. Officer Zepeda and the other officers followed Officer Ryburn into the house. The officers briefly questioned the Huffs and left after concluding that Vincent Huff did not actually pose any danger. The Huffs brought an action against the officers. The Huffs claimed that the officers entered their home without a warrant and thereby violated the Huffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that the officers had qualified immunity because Mrs. Huff's odd behavior made it reasonable for the police to believe that they were in imminent danger. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court's ruling. The court acknowledged that the police officers could enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believed that immediate entry was necessary to protect themselves or others from imminent serious harm, but the court concluded that the officers' belief that they were in serious immediate danger was objectively unreasonable. The officers appealed the Supreme Court."
1731,Norton Anthony Russell ,United States,"Six individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction because they were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the convictions."
810,Bank Markazi,"Deborah Peterson, et al.","Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank (Bank Markazi) owned nearly $2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, “[T]he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution…in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of [terrorism].” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States’ separation of powers because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1090,"Anthony Kane, Warden",Joe Garcia Espitia,"Joe Garcia Espitia chose to represent himself in his trial on charges of carjacking and was convicted. Garcia Espitia was repeatedly denied law library access to prepare for trial, but he received four hours of access during trial just before closing arguments. He sought federal habeas relief, but the district court denied his petition. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the lack of pretrial access to law books violated Garcia Espitia’s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself as established in Faretta v. California."
981,Till,SCS Credit Corp.,"Lee Till owed $4,000 in payments on his truck when he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 13 debtor must promise each creditor future payments ""not less than the [claim's] allowed amount."" When a repayment plan includes a series of payments (installments), as Till's did, the installments must equal the ""total present value"" of the amount owed. Till proposed that he make monthly payments on the truck to SCS Credit with a 9.5 percent yearly interest rate, which was slightly higher than the average loan rate to make up for the increased risk that Till would fail to make a payment (because he had already declared bankruptcy once). SCS, however, argued that it was entitled to 21 percent interest because that was how much it would have made if it had foreclosed on the loan, taken the truck, sold it, and reinvested the proceeds. SCS argued that this 21 percent plan was necessary to ensure that the payments were equal to the ""total present value"" or ""not less than the [claim's] allowed amount."" The bankruptcy court ruled for Till. The district court reversed, imposing SCS's 21 percent rate. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel modified that approach slightly, ruling that the 21 percent rate was probably correct but that the parties could introduce evidence that a higher or lower rate should apply."
921,"Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","David Harris, et al.","After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for you. S. House of Representatives districts. The head of the respective committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally ; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their respective redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be required to have a “ Black Voting Age Population ” ( BVAP ) of 50 % plus one. To go with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50 %, which meant that there were two more majority - black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the proposed plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of its Voting Rights Act. David Harris and Christine Bowser are you. S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act ’ s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters ’ influence in other districts. The district court determined that race was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause."
289,United States,Harrison P. Cronic,"During a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic’s counsel withdrew and the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government’s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the government. The jury found Cronic guilty on and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Court of Appeals concluded that Cronic’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction."
284,Hudson,Palmer,"Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a ""shakedown"" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State."
690,United States,Haggar Apparel Company,"The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the you.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the you.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the you.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1006,"Jenny Rubin, et. al.",Islamic Republic of Iran,"In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight you. S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing humanitarian support to terrorist attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( "" FSIA "" ) provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state - sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D. C. entered a $ 71. 5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the court. The case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. Under few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections ( a ) and ( g ) of 28 you. S. C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ( "" TRIA "" ). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610 ( a ) permits execution on a foreign government's property "" used for a commercial activity in the United States, "" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party ( such as a museum ). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610 ( g ) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either. The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with or Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610 ( g ) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and to upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets of otherwise subject to execution under section 1610."
955,The Citizens Bank,"Alafabco, Inc. et al.","Citizens Bank (Citizens) and Alafabco Inc. (Alafabco) had multiple business dealings with each other spanning over a decade. In 1998, Alafabco bid on a construction job based on a contract it had with Citizens to finance the project. When Citizens did not finance the project, Alafabco used existing funds meant to repay the debts it owed to Citizens to fund the project and subsequently defaulted on its loan payments to Citizens. Citizens and Alafabco composed two different debt-restructuring agreements, both of which included arbitration clauses that stated that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would apply. Alafabco sued Citizens in Alabama state court for breach of contract and claimed that it had incurred detrimental debt because of Citizens’ breach. Citizens invoked the arbitration clause, and the state court ordered the parties to submit to arbitration pursuant to their agreement. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and held that, because the debt-restructuring agreements did not substantially involve interstate commerce, the FAA did not apply to the parties’ disputes."
1114,"Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.","Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., et al.","The Solomon Amendment, 10 you.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny you.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds."
2084,"Golden Bethune-Hill, et al.","Virginia State Board of Elections, et al.","Based on the 2010 Census, the Virginia General Assembly sought to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia Legislature. At the time the districting legislation was prepared, Virginia was subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore any new districting plan must have ensured that there would be no “retrogression” in the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Accordingly, the new districting plan contained 12 majority-minority districts. On December 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, each of whom resided in one of the twelve challenged districts, sued and argued that those districts constituted racial gerrymanders that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the plaintiffs did not establish that race was the predominant factor in the creation of 11 of the 12 challenged district. The district court also held that, although race was the predominant factor in the creation of one district, in doing so the General Assembly was pursuing a compelling state interest and its use of race was narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
408,"Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon",Alfred Smith et al.,"Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related ""misconduct."" The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The you.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 you.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the you.S. Supreme Court in this new posture."
1258,"Jesus C. Hernández, et al.","Jesus Mesa, Jr.","Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15 - year - old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández "" s friends on us. S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From you. S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him. Hernández ’ s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son ’ s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants ’ motion to appeal, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and denied and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 you. S. 388 ( 1971 ) ( holding an implied because of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff ’ s constitutional rights ), and the officer are not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the parents ’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “ clearly and ” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on you. S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil. The you. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández ’ s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court ’ s dismissal of the., holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 you. S. _ _ ( 2017 ), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim to, cognizable under B ##ivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim."
1086,"Apple, Inc.","Robert Pepper, et al.","This lawsuit arose out of Apple ’ controlling handling of and sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2009, and from the outset, it has been a “ closed system, ” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “ App Store. ” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third - party developer, Apple receives 30 % of its purchase price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts of similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale. Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sued under the US Supreme Court ’ s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 you. S. 720 ( 1977 ). Under Illinois Brick, “ only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution ” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. Also, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court ’ s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning in Illinois Brick and thus have standing."
825,Saucier,Katz,"Donald Saucier, a military police officer, arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate."
492,"C & A Carbone, Inc., et al.",Town of Clarkstown,"A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 ""tipping fee"" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a ""flow control ordinance."" The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown."
615,Walters,"Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.","In 1990, Darlene Walters was fired by Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (Metropolitan). Soon thereafter, Walters filed an employment discrimination charge against Metropolitan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC sued Metropolitan alleging that the firing violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not an ""employer"" covered by Title VII because, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it was not ""a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."" The parties stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989; that, during most of 1990, it had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; and that, during 1990, there were only nine weeks in which it was actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day. The District Court dismissed the case. It reasoned that employees may be counted for Title VII purposes only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence as opposed to any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1831,Case-Swayne Co.,"Sunkist Growers, Inc.","Since 1958, Sunkist Growers, Inc. organized as an agricultural collective, and about 12,000 growers of citrus fruit belonged to this collective. Sunkist grouped these growers into local associations, each with a designated packing house for preparing fruit for market. Most of these associations were comprised entirely of fruit growers operating under a cooperative structure, but about five percent were corporate growers with their own packing houses. An additional fifteen percent of the associations were private for-profit corporations and partnerships; these associations operated by marketing contracts, not by the cooperative structure. Sunkist controlled approximately seventy percent of all oranges produced in Southern California and Arizona. This control manifested in several ways. Each grower in a cooperative local association agreed to market all fruit through his association, to appoint the association as the marketing agent for all his fruit, and to contract with one packing house. While each association reserved the right to decide its prices and markets, Sunkist had sole discretion to pool products for exports, and could set maximum supplies for a given area. The Capper-Volstead Act privileged collective activity in processing and marketing in the production of agricultural products. It was enacted to provide an exception to the Sherman Act’s prohibition against combinations in restraint of trade. Case-Swayne manufactured orange juice and other blended juices as an independent operator. It alleged that the Sunkist system was a conspiracy of trade in violation of the Sherman Act and sought treble-damages under the Clayton Act. The district court granted Sunkist’s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed in part. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sunkist engaged in monopolistic practices, but also held that the participation of non-producers in Sunkist’s system did not destroy its exempt status under the Capper-Volstead Act."
1882,Eugene Griffin et al.,Lavon Breckenridge et al.,"A group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 you.S.C Section 1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, Collins v. Hardyman. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the you.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed."
1172,"Tellabs, Inc., et al.","Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., et al.","Several plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud lawsuit against Tellabs, Inc., a manufacturer of equipment for fiber optic cable networks. The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs had misrepresented the strength of its products and earnings in order to conceal the declining value of the company's stock. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud complaints must allege specific facts that give rise to a ""strong inference"" that the defendant intended to deceive investors (scienter). The District Court dismissed the complaints. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were too vague to establish a ""strong inference"" of scienter on the part of Tellabs. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed one of the lower court's dismissals. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need only allege ""acts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent."" The Court of Appeals decided to consider only the plausibility of the inference of a guilty mental state, and not any competing inferences of an innocent mental state. This decision was due in part to the court's concern that weighing competing inferences was more properly the task of a jury. The Seventh Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, which required plaintiffs to show that the inference of scienter supported by the alleged facts was more plausible than any competing inference of innocent intent."
961,Illinois,Robert S. Lidster,"Police stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover ""ordinary criminal wrongdoing."" The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed."
581,"Dollar General Corporation, et al.","Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.","Dollar General Corporation ( Dollar General ) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians ( Tribe ). The store operates pursuant to a franchise and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13 - year - old member of the Tribe alleged that Townsend was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working in the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate. In 2005, Doe defended Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Two defendants tried to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a license and regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
554,44 Liquormart Inc.,Rhode Island,"Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari."
1839,"Evelle J. Younger, District Attorney of Los Angeles County","John Harris, Jr. et al.","California's Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism. John Harris, a socialist, was indicted under the statute. Harris claimed the law had a ""chilling effect"" on his freedom of speech. After a California state court upheld Harris' conviction, a federal district court struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth."
1174,"Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General","Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al.","In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when ""the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother."" Planned Parenthood sued the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional under the right to an abortion protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. The District Court agreed and stopped the Act from going into effect. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Though the government claimed that the Act banned only a narrow, rare category of abortions, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act applied to the common abortion procedure known as ""D&E"" (""dilation and evacuation""), as well as to the far less common ""intact D&E,"" sometimes called ""D&X"" (""dilation and extraction""). This made the ban expansive enough to qualify as an unconstitutional ""undue burden"" on the right to abortion, as defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional. Congress had included in the Act a finding that partial-birth abortions were never medically necessary, but the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart required the health exception in all cases where medical opinion on the necessity an abortion procedure is divided. Finally, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, because the inclusion of ambiguous statutory terms such as ""partial-birth abortion"" would prevent physicians from knowing which methods of abortion were covered. The Circuit Court determined that the proper course of action was to block enforcement of the entire Act."
772,Arch R. Everson,Board of Education of the Township of Ewing,"A New Jersey statute authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation into and from communities, including private schools. 96 % of the private school who benefitted from this act were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed another case alleging that this indirect aid to religion affected both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds."
1619,John L. Yates,United States,"On August 17, 2007, John L. Yates and his crew prepared his fishing vessel for a commercial fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, Officer John Jones, a field officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission who was empowered to enforce federal fisheries laws, boarded the vessel and noticed red grouper fish that appeared to be smaller than the requisite 20 inches. Officer Jones measured the grouper that appeared smaller and found a total of 72 fish that measured under 20 inches. Officer Jones placed these fish in wooden crates, issued Yates a citation, and informed Yates that the National Marine Fisheries Service would seize these fish upon the vessel's return to port. Contrary to Officer Jones' directions, Yates instructed his crew to throw the fish in question overboard and replace them with larger fish. When the vessel returned to port and the fish were measured on August 27, Officer Jones suspected that Yates had disposed of the fish he had measured. Yates was charged with destruction and falsification of evidence. At trial he argued that the fish thrown overboard were not actually undersized because Officer Jones had measured the fish with their mouths closed, which shortens the length of fish. The district court found Yates guilty of disposing of undersized fish and therefore in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to destroy or conceal ""a tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence"" a governmental investigation. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
2086,Duane Edward Buck,"Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","In July 1995, Duane Edward Buck was arrested for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Debra Gardner, and her friend Kenneth Butler. Buck was convicted of capital murder for both of the deaths. During the penalty phase of trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Buck’s future dangerousness based on his criminal history, his conduct, and his demeanor before and after arrest. The defense presented the testimony of a clinical psychologist to evaluate the risk of future dangerousness. That expert stated that he considered demographic factors, including race, in his analysis and that, statistically, minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. On cross-examination, the prosecution clarified that the expert’s opinion was that the race factor “black” increased the likelihood of future dangerousness. The jury found that there was sufficient evidence of Buck’s future dangerousness without any sufficient mitigating factors to justify a life sentence, so the jury sentenced Buck to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Buck filed various claims for state and federal habeas relief that were denied, until the you.S. Supreme Court decided Trevino v. Thaler, which held that Texas’ procedural scheme made it almost impossible to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, and therefore that a procedural default on such a claim could be excused. While some of these claims were pending, the state attorney general admitted in a different case that the state should not have called an expert witness to testify about future dangerousness of a defendant based on race and named Buck’s case as one affected by similar testimony. Buck again sought federal habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel knowingly called an expert witness who testified that race was a factor in determining future dangerousness. The district court dismissed the claim because Buck failed to show that the outcome of his trial was prejudiced. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly denied Buck’s request for a Certificate of Appealability by holding that Buck did not show sufficient extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from the lower court’s judgment."
754,Garner,Jones,"While serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and again in 1995. Then a you.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation."
2140,Michael Damon Rippo,"Renee Baker, Warden","Michael Damon Rippo was charged with first-degree murder in Nevada state court. During his trial, Rippo obtained information that the judge was the subject of a federal bribery investigation and that the Clark County District Attorney’s Office prosecuting his case was a participant in the judge’s investigation. Rippo moved to disqualify the judge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and argued that a judge could not impartially preside over a case in which one of the parties was investigating him. The judge declined to recuse himself, Rippo was convicted. After the initial judge was indicted on federal charges, another judge denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Rippo’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and held that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authorities were involved in the federal investigation. Rippo later applied for state post-conviction relief. He reasserted his bias claim, this time with evidence of state authorities’ involvement in the federal investigation of the trial judge. The state court denied post-conviction relief. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed and determined that Rippo was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allegations did not support an assertion that the trial judge was actually biased in his case."
1176,"Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools",Aileen Rizo,"The facts giving rise to this case are not immediately relevant to the issue on what the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, filed a lawsuit with the superintendent of schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county'd motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing de banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation to the statute. Judge Reinhardt died after he had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it had officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by just 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on that judgment but not the reasoning."
244,"Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.","The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts business with over 500 stores and over 13, 000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( ACA ), employment - based group health Care plans must provide certain types of health care, such as FDA - licensed contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non - profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for - profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. Since September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that her employment - based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ( RFRA ). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two - judge panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for this Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, but the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The En banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "" persons "" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
26,Edward Malley and Rhode Island,James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs,"In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 10, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs ’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs ’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped. The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a jury verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge - s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and thus an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The T. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “ objectively reasonable ” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable because for an arrest warrant."
729,West,Gibson,"In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust."
1138,Los Angeles County et al.,Max Rettele et al.,"The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department obtained a warrant to search a residence connected with a fraud and identity-theft crime ring. Unbeknownst to the police, the residence had been sold three months prior to the search, and there was no longer a suspect living there. The suspect the police thought lived in the residence for which the warrant was obtained was African American. When the police arrived at the house to conduct the search, the family living there was Caucasian. Max Rettele and his girlfriend were ordered out of bed and detained while the police secured the premises, but the police realized their mistake and quickly left. Rettele sued Los Angeles County for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. The trial court held that the police were not liable for violating Rettele’s Fourth Amendment rights. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision and held that, since the race of Rettele and his girlfriend did not match the race of the suspect identified in the search warrant, the police violated Rettele’s Fourth Amendment rights."
985,Securities and Exchange Commission,Charles E. Edwards,"Charles Edwards founded a company that sold pay telephones and then leased them back from the purchasers for a fixed monthly fee. After Edwards filed for bankruptcy, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued him for selling securities (considering the telephones to be investments on the part of the purchasers and therefore securities) in violation of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. A federal district court froze Edwards' assets in a preliminary injunction. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's injunction for lack of jurisdiction. The SEC, the court reasoned, failed to show that Edwards' selling pay telephones was an ""investment contract"" under federal securities laws. In defining ""investment contract,"" the court used the Supreme Court's ruling in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. (1946), that a financial interest is an ""investment contract"" if it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others. The 11th Circuit ruled that the SEC could not meet the test's third part because the purchasers received a fixed fee that was guaranteed by contract and therefore not dependant on Edwards' success."
382,Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury,Brian Wynne et ux.,"Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. ( Maxim ), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is "" passed through "" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not solely for Howard County taxes. The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes'argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that a Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax was a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate. would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the and tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily is Maryland."
1417,"Vincent Cullen, Acting Warden",Scott Lynn Pinholster,"A California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. During rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that Strickland v. Washington requires trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations."
1641,"Michigan, et al.","Environmental Protection Agency, et al.","The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) if it finds that such regulation was ""appropriate and necessary"" after conducting a utility study. In December 2000, the EPA issued a notice that such regulation was necessary based on the results of the utility study, which showed that the mercury emissions from EGUs were a threat to public health. In 2005, the EPA reversed its findings and determined that it was not ""appropriate and necessary"" to regulate coal-and oil-fired EGUs. States and other groups petitioned for review, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's attempt to reverse its findings was unlawful because it could not remove pollutant sources from the regulation list once they were on it. In 2012, the EPA confirmed that EGU regulation was necessary and promulgated emission standards. State, industry, and labor groups petitioned the appellate court for review of the EPA's interpretation of the ""appropriate and necessary"" requirement with respect to these regulations. The appellate court denied the petition."
1585,United States,Kwai Fun Wong,"Kwai Fun Wong, a citizen of Hong Kong and leader of the Wu Wei Tien Tao religious organization, was arrested and deported by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for unlawful entry into the you.S. Prior to her deportation, Wong was briefly detained by the INS, during which she claimed to have been treated negligently by the INS. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no civil suit may be filed against the United States unless the claimant has first filed a claim with the relevant federal agency and that claim has been denied. Following denial, a claimant has six months to file suit or the suit is permanently barred. Wong filed a claim with the INS and, following the denial of that claim, sought leave from the district court to add a civil claim against the you.S. to her already outstanding suit against a number of federal officials. For unexplained reasons, the district court did not allow Wong to amend her complaint until seven months later, after the six-month deadline had passed. The district court then dismissed Wong’s federal civil complaint and held that the six-month deadline was “jurisdictional” and thus not subject to equitable tolling, or delaying the time at which a statute of limitations begins to run. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that equitable tolling could be applied to the six-month deadline. This case was consolidated with United States v. June, a case in which the conservator (financial manager) of an estate argued that the two-year statute of limitations for filing suit under the FTCA should not have begun to run until she had access to the depositions of federal employees without which she could not have been aware of her claim against the federal government. As in Wong, the federal government claimed that this statute of limitations was “jurisdictional,” and thus not subject to equitable tolling. The district court agreed with the federal government and dismissed the suit. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that equitable tolling was appropriate based on its earlier opinion inWong v. Beebe."
960,Kentel Myrone Weave,Commonwealth of Massachusetts,"On August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver’s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver’s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.The trial court denied Weaver’s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver’s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “structural error,” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice."
411,United States,Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo,"Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo (Montalvo) was held in pretrial custody on federal criminal charges for attempting to enter New Mexico from Mexico with 72 pounds of cocaine. Montalvo cooperated with authorities and agreed to make a controlled delivery to the intended purchasers in Chicago. The authorities took Montalvo to Chicago where the purchase fell through, so they transferred Montalvo back to New Mexico where the criminal complaint charging him with possession of cocaine was originally filed. Montalvo’s detention hearing was not held until 13 days after his initial arrest in New Mexico because of the need to transfer him, the passage of two weekends, a federal holiday, and the fact that the government attorneys were unprepared. At Montalvo’s detention hearing, the district court determined that the delays violated the timeliness of proceedings required by the Bail Reform Act (Act). The district court also determined that Montalvo did not pose a flight risk and, to remedy the untimeliness of the pre-trial proceedings, released him. Montalvo fled upon his release. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the government’s failure to uphold the Act’s directions for a timely hearing justified Montalvo’s release."
437,"Feist Publications, Inc.","Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.","Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's directories. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1848,Street,New York,"Sidney Street was a black veteran of World War II and a recipient of the Bronze Star. He held a position with the New York City Transit Authority and had no prior criminal record. On June 6, 1966, Street was in his Brooklyn apartment listening to the radio when he heard a news announcement that civil rights activist James Meredith had been shot by a sniper during his march through Mississippi. Street went to a bureau drawer and removed an old 48-star American flag. He carried the flag to the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and St. James Place, one block from his residence. He laid a piece of paper on the sidewalk. Then, keeping the flag properly folded, he set it on fire with a match. He held the burning flag in hand as long as he could, then laid it on the paper so that it would not touch the sidewalk. When a police officer arrived, he found Street standing over the burning flag and talking to a small group of people. Street admitted that he burned the flag. The officer later testified that he heard Street shout, ""If they did that to Meredith, we do not need an American flag."" The New York City Criminal Court charged Street with malicious mischief for willfully and unlawfully defiling, casting contempt upon, and burning an American flag. The allegation included Street's words at the scene of the flag burning. At trial, Street moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that Street engaged in a constitutionally protected act because the flag burning was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed this motion; Street was convicted and given a suspended sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed Street's conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the flag burning was an act of incitement fraught with danger to the public peace."
351,City of Los Angeles,"Naranjibhai Patel, et al.","Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code ( LAMC ) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes police officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed complaints and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are "" closely regulation "" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections. The district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and misleading regulations as federally recognized "" close regulation "" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels don't have any ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The you. S. Court of Appeals from the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records contain private "" papers "" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre - compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect their motel's records."
217,Haig,Agee,"In 1974, Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign ""to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating."" Over the next several years, Agee successfully exposed a number of CIA agents and sources working in other countries. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig revoked Agee's passport, Agee filed suit claiming that Haig did not have congressional authorization to do so. Agee also claimed that the action violated his right to travel, his First Amendment right to criticize the government, and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights."
2108,"Brian Lewis, et al.",William Clark,"On October 22, 2011, Brian Lewis was driving southbound on Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when William Clarke crashed into him while driving a limousine owned by the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Lewis sued Clarke, claiming that he was injured as a result of Clarke’s negligent and careless driving. Clarke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that, because he was driving the limousine as an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion and held that it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because Lewis sought damages from Clarke personally, not from the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and held that tribal sovereign immunity extended to Clarke as a member of the tribe acting within the scope of his employment as a limousine driver with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority."
1134,United States,Joseph Olson et al.,"Injured workers sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped because a mine accident. The FTCA authorized private tort actions against the you.S. when the federal government, if a private person in similar circumstances, would be liable according to the law of the place where the incident occurred. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the allegations failed to show Arizona law would have imposed liability on a private person in like circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding federal mine inspections were a governmental function with no private analogue. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit held, the FTCA waived sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred."
710,Charles Schenck,United States,"During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to because insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment."
695,Curt Muller,Oregon,"Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The owner of a laundry business, Curt Muller, was fined $10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed the conviction. The state supreme court upheld the law’s constitutionality."
1283,Clemente Avelino Pereida,"Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General","Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and native of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, aside from his attempt at use a fraudulent social security card to find employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. Another issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude ; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Trump ’ s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his requirements. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals ’ determination that he did already show such eligibility and denied Pereida ’ s petition for review."
2149,Jon Husted,A. Philip Randolph Institute,"Ohio currently employs a process that clears the state’s voter rolls of individuals who have died or relocated. Under this process, voters who have not voted for two years are sent notices to confirm their registration. If the state receives no response and these individuals do not vote over the next four years, they are ultimately removed from the rolls. Plaintiffs are various civil rights groups that are challenging the process, claiming that it is not only inappropriate to remove individuals from the voter rolls as a consequence of failing to vote but also violates part of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Act prohibits a program for voter-list maintenance for federal elections that involves “the removal of the name of any personal from the official list of voters . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Plaintiffs believe that the Supreme Court should involve itself and determine whether this process violates the Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit previously struck down these rules, deeming them a violation of federal voting law because Ohio's process involves using an individual's failure to vote as a ""trigger"" for sending out a confirmation notice to that person. Plaintiffs consequently argue that there is no reason to disturb the appellate court decision. Defendants argue that Ohio is adhering to federal voter law, as set forth in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)."
441,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.",Board of Education of Topeka,"In its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka ( Brown I ), which declared racial discrimination in public instruction unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which could help to implement the newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different areas of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems."
1130,Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,Dariush Elahi,"Dariush Elahi sued in federal court claiming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had murdered his brother, and he won $300 million in damages. When Iran's Ministry of Defense won an arbitration award against a third party, Elahi sued to claim the award as part of the damages due to him. The Ministry objected, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) granted its property immunity from such claims. The District Court ruled for Elahi on the grounds that the Ministry had waived its immunity when it sued to enforce its award against the third party. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court's reasoning, but it also ruled for Elahi, pointing to a provision of the FSIA that excepts from immunity the property of any ""agency or instrumentality"" of a foreign government if the agency is ""engaged in commercial activity in the United States."" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the exception covers any foreign state as long as it is ""engaged in commercial activity in the United States."""
1457,Joel Judulang,"Eric H. Holder, Jr.","Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also you.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18. In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony ""crime of violence."" The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a ""crime of violence"" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari."
578,Kansas,Colorado,"Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states'issues. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The you. S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to solve the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's first set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court'S ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1984. Kansas also requested a "" river master "" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the River."
655,Hohn,United States,"Arnold Hohn was convicted, among other things, of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Two years after his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided that the term ""use"" in 18 you.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm. Hohn filed a pro se motion under 28 you.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his Section 942(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove use of a firearm. While his motion was pending before the district court, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a Section 2255 petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge before he can appeal the denial of a Section 2255 petition. 28 you.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1). The district court denied Hohn's petition and he appealed. The court of appeals treated the notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability, and a three-judge panel declined to issue a certificate. Hohn then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of the certificate, seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under 28 you.S.C. Section 1254(1)."
1281,"David Bobby, Warden",Michael Bies,"In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder and sentenced to death by an Ohio court. In his appeals to the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Bies argued that he was mentally retarded and this fact should mitigate his sentence. Both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, but agreed that he was mentally retarded. While Mr. Bies proceeded with his post-conviction appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atkins stating that ""death is not a suitable punishment for mentally retarded people."" He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court relying on Atkins. In response, the state claimed that Mr. Bies was not mentally retarded. Mr. Bies argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the state from relitigating the fact of his mental retardation. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Bies' petition for habeas corpus relief and ordered that he be resentenced. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the state was prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating the Supreme Court of Ohio's determination that Mr. Bies was mentally retarded."
561,Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.,"CLS Bank International, et al.","Alice Corporation ( Alice ) is an Australian company that owns various'479,'510,'720, and'375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk for each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor. On May 24, 2008, CLS Bank International ( CLS ) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non - infringement and invalidity of the'479,'510, and'720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district judge denied both motions. In the meantime, the'375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in writing for CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral object to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
506,James Higginbotham,Stella Connell,"Stella Connell applied toward a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Connell was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a kindergarten teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing her sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “ will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida ” and “ don't believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or overthrow the State of Florida by force or violence. ” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution are valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
1322,"Kevin Smith, Warden","Frank G. Spisak, Jr.","Frank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas corpus relief by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Musladin and Landrigan. On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that Musladin and Landrigan were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law."
527,O'Connor,Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation,"James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old."
1562,Ray Haluch Gravel Co. et al.,Central Pension Fund et al.,"A collective bargaining agreement directed Ray Holuch Gravel, a landscape supply company, to remit contributions to several benefit funds affiliated with the Central Pension Fund, a labor union which represents landscape supply company employees. After conducting an audit of the company's books in 2009, the union sued for additional remittances of past unreported work. They also sued for attorney's fees. The district court ruled in favor of the labor union on both issues with respect to one employee, but ruled against them with respect to employees who could not be identified because the landscape supply company failed to keep the required records. The two decisions were announced separately and one week apart. The labor union appealed both rulings within thirty days of the second ruling, but more than thirty days after the first ruling. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the appeal was timely because the attorney's fees are a merits issue, so the first decision was not final until the lower court had decided both cases."
927,Travis Beckles,United States,"On April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed - off shotgun were located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district courts determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) who had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months and life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $ 5, 000 fine. Johnson appealed and argued that the Sentencing Board imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as “ violent felonies ” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed - off shotgun was not a “ crime of violence ” subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Beckles ’ conviction and sentence. The you. S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court ’ s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which found that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the appellate court again upheld Beckles ’ conviction and sentence because possession from a sawed - off shotgun was a “ crime for violence. ” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was still sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence."
1143,Jason J. Mont,United States of America,"Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug - related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months ’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so during his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017. while on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state - law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state - court charges in exchange for a predetermined six - year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of delays, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as having served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending parole disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont ’ s probation officer informed another federal district court of Mont ’ s state - court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months ’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively until his imprisonment for state - court convictions. Mont challenged the district court ’ s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term for supervised release is followed by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction."
256,Bruce J. Abramski,United States,"In November 2008, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ( "" ATF "" ) on which they checked a box indicating that he was not buying the firearms on behalf of another person. In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During another search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $ 400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a misleading, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the same statement about a "" material fact "" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski. Abramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally donated the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski withheld any "" material fact "" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court judge held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $ 200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1676,United States,"Shotwell Manufacturing Company, et al.","Shotwell Manufacturing, along with several employees, was convicted of evading income taxes. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction because the district court had denied Shotwell’s motion to suppress evidence of certain disclosures. Shotwell allegedly made these disclosures in good faith, thinking they would shield them from liability. After the government petitioned for certiorari, they moved to remand the case to the district court in light of new evidence. If true, this new evidence could prove Shotwell lied while testifying about making the disclosures in good faith."
500,Robert Edward Stansbury,California,"Robert Edward Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was taken to the Pomona Police Department for questioning as a potential witness in the investigation of the death of a 10-year-old girl. Stansbury was not a suspect in the death, and did not receive Miranda warnings, but during questioning, made a statement that put him under suspicion. After further questioning, Stansbury admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation. At this point the interrogating officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights and Stansbury refused to make any further statements. Stansbury requested an attorney and was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. The trial court held that Stansbury was not truly in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings until suspicion focused on him. The court refused to suppress Stansbury’s statements made prior to the warning. Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed."
2181,United States of America,"Rene Sanchez-Gomez, et al.","Rene Sanchez-Gomez and defendants in three other criminal cases (collectively “Defendants”) objected to a policy (the “Policy”) of the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the “District”) which required them to appear for pretrial non-jury proceedings in full physical restraints. The Policy, which applied to most in-custody defendants appearing in such proceedings, was proposed by the you.S. Marshals Service and accepted by the District’s judges. The magistrate judges in all four cases overruled the Defendants’ objections to the Policy. The Defendants appealed these denials to the district court, and also filed emergency motions challenging the Policy’s constitutionality. The district court denied all relief, and the four cases were consolidated before the 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit, sitting en banc, construed the Defendants’ appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority, and found that it had jurisdiction to review the Policy’s constitutionality. It explained that while the individual Defendants’ claims may be moot by the time of review due to their criminal cases ending and the Policy having been changed, under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Defendants represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be injured should the Policy be reinstated. Thus, applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review mootness exception, the supervisory mandamus case was not moot. However, because the Policy was no longer in effect, the court withheld a formal writ of mandamus."
1739,Federal Power Commission,Tennessee Gas Transmission Company,"In 1959, Tennessee Gas Transmission Company filed a 7% proposed rate increase across all six of its zones with the Federal Power Commission. The rate increase was based on the expected cost of service and rate of return. The Commission imposed a five-month suspension period while hearings were conducted to determine whether the rate increase was reasonable. At the end of five months, the new rates would be applied, but they were subject to refund if the hearings found a reasonable rate lower than 7%. On August 9, 1960, the Commission found that only a 6 1/8% increase was reasonable and that Tennessee Gas must provide refunds. Tennessee Gas challenged the ruling by arguing that requiring a refund prior to a final determination of cost made the company unable to recoup its 6 1/8%. Because Tennessee Gas spreads its rates differently across the different zones, there are certain zones in which the refund would be greater than the value of the new rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Tennessee Gas."
970,"Elk Grove Unified School District and David W. Gordon, Superintendent","Michael A. Newdow, et al.","Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words ""under God"" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words ""under God"" violates the establishment clause of the you.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The you.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing ""to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter."" The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words ""under God"" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause."
360,First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale,"County of Los Angeles, California","In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed."
76,Medical Board of California,Hason,"The California Medical Board denied him a license to practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ). The federal court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non - sovereign state for its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling "" Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign protection by enacting Title II of the ADA "" and thus states and their agencies may be protected pursuant to Title II. """
898,Robert Kaupp,Texas,"In January 1999, a 14-year-old girl disappeared. The police discovered that she had been having a sexual relationship with her 19-year-old half-brother, who had been with Robert Kaupp on the day of the girl’s disappearance. The police questioned the girl’s half-brother and Kaupp at police headquarters and allowed Kaupp to leave. The half-brother later confessed to stabbing the missing girl and implicated Kaupp in the crime. The police failed to obtain a warrant to question Kaupp, but they went to his home in the middle of the night and were given permission to enter by Kaupp’s father. Police officers awakened Kaupp and said, “We need to go and talk,” and Kaupp responded, “Okay.” Wearing only his pajamas and no shoes, Kaupp was handcuffed and taken for questioning. There is no evidence that Kaupp was told he could decline to go with the officers for questioning. Kaupp was read his Miranda rights at the police station and, after being informed of the half-brother’s confession, admitted to some involvement in the crime. At trial, Kaupp moved to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The motion was denied, and Kaupp was convicted of murder and sentenced to 55 years in prison. The Texas Court of Appeals confirmed the district court’s conviction and held that no arrest had occurred until after Kaupp’s confession because Kaupp’s statement indicated that he consented to going with the officers. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review."
1325,Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo,"Eric Holder, Attorney General","Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo was admitted to the United States in 1993 and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2004, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana. One year later, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of Xanax, but was not tried as a recidivist. In 2006, Mr. Carachuri was notified that he was removable from the United States. He applied for removal cancellation, which was denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Mr. Carachuri was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that because Mr. Carachuri's second drug conviction could have been punished as a felony under the Controlled Substances Abuse Act, had he been prosecuted in federal court, the conviction qualified as an ""aggravated felony"" making him ineligible for cancellation of removal."
157,Zackary C. Brown,Texas,"On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no because to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation. Brown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted."
741,Frank Palko,Connecticut,"Frank Wilson had been charged with first - degree murder. He was convicted instead of first - degree murder and sentenced with life imprisonment. The state, Connecticut appealed and won a new trial ; this time a judge found Palko guilty of first - degree murder, condemned him to death."
616,Vacco,Quill,"Dr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban on physician-assisted suicide. New York's ban, while permitting patients to refuse lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling favoring the State of New York, the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari."
166,Hutchinson,Proxmire,"In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the ""Golden Fleece Award of the Month."" The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the ""nonsense"" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss."
925,Travis Beckles,United States,"On April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed-off shotgun was located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district court determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) who had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months to life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not a “crime of violence” subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Beckles’ conviction and sentence. The you.S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the appellate court again upheld Beckles’ conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed-off shotgun was a “crime of violence.” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence."
2060,Robert F. McDonnell,United States,"On November 3, 2009, Robert F. McDonnell was elected Governor of Virginia. At the time of his election, he and his family were experiencing economic difficulties; by September 2010, he and his wife had a combined credit card balance of $90,000, and by 2012 the business he and his sister operated had a loan balance of $2.5 million. Shortly after his election, McDonnell met with Jonnie Williams, the founder and CEO of Star Scientific, Inc. (Star), which was trying to market a product called Anatabloc that could be used to treat chronic inflammation. Star wanted the Food and Drug Administration to classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical, which would be more profitable than the alternative classification of nutraceutical. However, such a classification would require expensive testing, clinical trials and studies, and Star lacked the funds. Between 2009 and 2012, Williams and McDonnell met several times and agreed that “independent testing [of Anatabloc] in Virginia was a good idea.” Williams also provided expensive gifts to the McDonnells and “was willing to help” with their financial troubles. A launch event for Anatabloc was held at the Governor’s Mansion, and Mrs. McDonnell facilitated meetings between Star officials and officials at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University to get the studies started. Mrs. McDonnell also purchased, sold, and gifted Star stock in such as way as to avoid reporting requirements, and McDonnell spoke to various government officials about the benefits of Anatabloc. The McDonnells were eventually arrested and charged for corruption, under federal statutes that make it a felony to take “official action” in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. On September 4, 2014, McDonnell was found guilty on 11 counts of corruption. McDonnell appealed his conviction and argued that the jury instructions given at trial did not properly define the term “official action.” The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held that the jury instructions in question were adequate."
226,"Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General","AU Optronics Corporation, et al.","On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display ( LCD ) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly moved the suit from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Class action and mass action claims can be properly removed to federal court under the Act. The State of Mississippi moved to remove the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents went to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi heard the case in the interest of national interests, so the general public exception was not applicable."
1006,"Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., fka Southwestern Bell Telephone Company","Missouri Municipal League, et al.","The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed federal preemption of state and local regulations ""prohibiting the ability of any entity"" to provide telecommunications services. Based on this act, a group of local governments in Missouri (the Missouri Municipal League) asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to nullify a state law that prevented municipalities from providing telecommunications services. Missouri argued that municipal governments were not separate entities but merely subsections of the state government and that the state could therefore restrict their authority. The FCC agreed with the state, refusing to nullify the law. The Municipal League appealed, and an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision. The panel held the words ""any entity"" were intentionally broad and that a proper understanding of them would include municipal governments. The state could therefore not regulate attempts by municipalities to provide telecommunications services. The FCC, along with the state of Missouri and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court."
1150,"Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office",Erik Brunetti,"Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech."
1225,Department of Revenue of Kentucky et al.,George W. Davis et ux.,"When calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional. On appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the ""market participant doctrine,"" which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and struck down the tax policy. The Court of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy."
1023,"State of Ohio, et al.","American Express Company, et al.","In the credit - card industry, there is what is called a “ two - sided market.'Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, while merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card. In the United States, credit - card trading volume is comprised primarily of four networks : Visa ( 45 % ), American Express ( 26. 4 % ), MasterCard ( 23. 3 % ), and Discover ( 5. 3 % ). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they don't directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees. In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex ’ s smaller business and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non - discriminatory provisions ( NDPs ). In 2010, the federal government of 17 states sued Amex, Visa, & MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti - steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti - steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex ’ s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court ’ s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs of net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “ rule and reason. ”"
1419,AT&T Mobility LLC,"Vincent Concepcion, et ux.","Customers brought a class action lawsuit against AT&T Mobility LLC in a California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act (""FAA"") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability."
12,Regents of the University of California,Allan Bakke,"Allan Schwartz, a thirty - five - year - old Jewish man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each qualifying class of one hundred for "" qualified "" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress unfair, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications ( college credits and test subjects ) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that she was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race."
1410,"Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al.","Ken Bennett, in His Official Capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, et al.","Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech. The you.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found ""minimal"" impact on freedom of speech."
904,Virginia,Black,"Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony ""for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place,"" and specifies that ""any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group."" At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required ""intent to intimidate"" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech."
1498,Coy Koontz,St. John's River Water Management,"In 1994, Coy A. Koontz requested a permit from St. John's River Water Management to develop more of his land than the original permit allowed. St. John's had jurisdiction over Koontz's land. St. John's agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and do some mitigation work on the surrounding areas. Koontz agreed to the deed but not to the mitigation work. St. John's denied the permit application. Koontz sued St. John's River Water Management, and the trial court found in favor of Koontz. A Florida trial court held that St. John's actions effected a taking of Koontz land and that imposing requirements for the issuance of a permit is only constitutional if the required action serves the same governmental purpose as the ban on development. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed."
1741,Sherbert,Verner,"Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good because to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday."
408,Larry Whitfield,United States,"On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding in a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery. A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved toward dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his motives were the proximate because of Parnell's death, and it did not include any minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on an additional charge he is found guilty of forcing someone to accompany him, not of killing her. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case under review on the issue of whether or not the district court actually amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
1029,"Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea",United States of America,"Timothy D. Koons and four additional defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant ’ s trial, state government moved to reduce the defendant ’ to sentence under 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( e ) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the court ’ s motion and reduced the defendant ’ s sentence for a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( d ) ( 1 ), which allows the district court to reduce the sentence of “ a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission... if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ” The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court."
1846,Allen et al.,State Board Of Elections et al.,"Voters and candidates in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and candidates filed direct appeals, and the cases were consolidated."
1524,Schuette,"Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, et al.","In November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit ""all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting."" The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation."
224,"Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense","Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Radamees Tirado Guevara, Environmental Quality Board","The island of Vieques lay six miles off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. Vieques’ population of 8,000 mostly lived in two coastal towns and in a rural area outside of those two towns. Of a total area of approximately 33,000 acres, the United States Navy owned 25,231.72 acres, slightly more than 76% of the island. The Navy’s installations on the eastern part of Vieques were part of a large military complex known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. This consisted of four firing ranges; the outer range was a large area of ocean thirty-five miles to the north and twenty miles to the south of Vieques. Two separate inland areas were used for artillery training, strafing, air-to-ground bombing, and simulating close air support; no targets existed in the area between the eastern border of these areas and Punta Este, the easternmost point of Vieques. During air-to-ground training, however, pilots sometimes accidentally discharged ordnance into the navigable waters around Viques. Carlos Romero-Barceleo was the governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Along with Radamees Tirado Guevara, the mayor of Vieques, and Puerto Rico’s Environmental Quality Board, Romero-Barceleo sought to enjoin the United States Navy from using any part of its lands in Vieques, or in its surrounding waters, to carry out naval training operations. Plaintiffs alleged harm to all residents of Vieques and violations of numerous environmental laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Under the FWPCA, the addition of any pollutant from any point source into the navigable waters of the United States required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency. The district court acknowledged that the release of ordnance into navigable waters was a discharge of pollutants, but it refused to enjoin Navy operations, instead ordering the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It ordered the Navy to cease operations until it obtained an NPDES permit. It held that the Navy has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until it obtains a permit despite the importance of its operations to the public good."
225,Giles M. Lugar,"Edmondson Oil Company, Inc.","Giles Lugar leased a truckstop from Edmondson Oil Co. and fell behind on his rent payments. Edmondson issued a suit against him in a Virginia state court for failing to repay his debt. Before the court reached a decision, it issued a ""writ of attachment"" against Lugar. This disabled him from selling any property he owned while the case was open, since Edmondson wanted the property as collateral in case he could not repay his debt. A state trial judge cancelled the ""writ of attachment"" one month later after finding no statutory justification for its issuance. Lugar claimed that Edmondson worked with the government to deprive him of his property without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He said this caused him financial loss and sought to recover damages from Edmondson in a District Court under 42 you.S.C. Section 1983. This code provides rewards to those who have had their rights violated because of ""state action."" The District Court rejected Lugar's claim because it deemed that no ""state action"" had occurred. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected using solely ""state action"" to validate Section 1983 suits. It claimed that certain instances where private parties acted ""under the color of state law"" also validated Section 1983 suits. However the Fourth Circuit found that none of these actions occurred in Lugar's case and rejected his suit."
366,Lanell Williams-Yulee,The Florida Bar,"During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams - Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the "" community Public Defender "" – although her title was "" assistant public defender "" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams - Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams - Yu face a public reprimand. Williams - Yulee appealed that referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams - Yulee violated bar regulations in directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams - Yulee appealed and argued that The Florida Bar rules prohibiting the candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated her First Amendment protection of freedom of speech."
454,Junius Irving Scales,United States,"The Smith Act's membership also prohibited membership in organizations seeking the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in any Communist Party of the United States ( "" Party "" ) because it advocated the overthrow of the government "" as speedily as circumstances would permit. "" Challenging his felony conviction, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 ( "" Security Act "" ) stated that membership in a Communist organization would not constitute a non se violation of any criminal laws. After hearing before both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review."
333,"Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd.",Zenith Radio Corporation,"In 1974, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, and National Union Electronic Company (collectively referred to as Zenith) sued 21 Japanese-owned or -controlled manufacturers of consumer electronics and claimed that these companies conspired to drive the American companies out of the market. According to Zenith, the Japanese companies conspired to set artificially high prices for their products in Japan to offset the artificially low prices of their products in America, which was harmful to the American companies. Zenith claimed this conspiracy was a violation of several anti-trust laws intended to prevent price-fixing. The Japanese companies filed a motion for summary judgment. After finding the bulk of Zenith’s evidence inadmissible, the district court held that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that most of Zenith’s evidence was admissible. On the merits of the case, and in light of the greater amount of admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of a conspiracy and that the district court improperly granted the summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies."
1020,"Ulysses Tory, et al.","Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.","Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The you.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument."
1041,"City of San Diego, California",John Roe,"John Roe, a San Diego police officer, was fired for selling a video on eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform and masturbating. He then sued the city in federal district court and alleged his firing violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court ruled against the officer; the Ninth Circuit reversed."
723,Calderon,Coleman,"During the penalty phase of Russell Coleman's trial, the trial judge gave the jury a ""Briggs instruction,"" explaining the Governor's commutation power. The trial judge then instructed the jury that it was not to consider the Governor's power in reaching its verdict. Ultimately, Coleman sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District Court found that, because the Governor may not commute the sentence of a prisoner who, like Coleman, is a twice-convicted felon without the approval of four judges of the California Supreme Court, the Briggs instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by ""giving the jury inaccurate information and potentially diverting its attention from the mitigation evidence presented."" In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the giving of the instruction was constitutional error."
1654,"DIRECTV, Inc.","Amy Imburgia, et al.","On September 7, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV), and argued that DIRECTV had improperly charged early termination fees to its customers. In 2011, the you.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California precedent that had previously held that, in certain circumstances, arbitration clauses in customer agreements were unenforceable. Less than one month after that decision, DIRECTV moved to stay or dismiss the plaintiffs’ case and compel arbitration, which DIRECTV argued it had not done previously because it thought the arbitration clause in its customer agreement was void under California precedent. The trial court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed by holding that the language of the customer agreement subjected the arbitration clause to state law."
254,Harry Connick ,Sheila Meyers,"Sheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court. Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney Harry Connick. Before the official transfer took place, Meyers prepared a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors. When Connick learned of the questionnaire, he immediately terminated Meyers. He said he fired her because she refused to accept her transfer. He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination. Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
49,Lawyer,Department of Justice,"Based on the 1990 census, its Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and it appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would immediately convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting proposal itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging in his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House Of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement and revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer'the argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan satisfactory, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement."
139,"John D. Carey, et al.","Jarius Piphus, et al.","During school hours on January 23, 1974, the principal of the Chicago Vocational High School saw Jarius Piphus, then a freshman, standing on school property sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette with another student. The principal saw a pack of the cigarettes change hands and believed he smelled marijuana. When the principal approached, the students immediately discarded the cigarette. The students were suspended for the customary 20 days for violation of the school drug policy, despite their protests that they had not been smoking marijuana. A few days later, Piphus, his mother and sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic met to discuss the suspension, not to determine whether or not Piphus had violated the school drug policy. Piphus and his mother sued the school official in federal district court for violating Piphus’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $3000 in damages. On September 11, 1973, Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago, received a 20-day suspension for wearing an earring to school in violation of school policy. The previous year, the school principal had enacted a policy banning earrings, as he believed they were associated with gang affiliation. When asked to remove the earring, Brisco refused and stated it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco and his mother sued the school officials in federal district court for violating Brisco’s right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $5000 in damages. The two cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that their suspensions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the schools were not entitled to immunity, but the court did not award damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider questions of relief and damages."
63,Dempsey,Martin,"Pro se plaintiff John B. Dempsey sought counsel to proceed in forma pauperis in the you. S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In October 1992, the Court had invoked Rule 39. 8 to deny Dempsey in fact pauperis status with respect to a motion for certiorari. Before the 39. 8 denial Dempsey had filed eleven petitions for certiorari and one petition for an extraordinary writ. After her 39. 2 denial, Dempsey filed five motions for certiorari. All eighteen of Dempsey's eleven petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded evidence."
415,"David King, et al.","Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an ""exchange"" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low-income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as well as state exchanges. Virginia declined to establish a state-run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
128,"John R. Manson, Commissioner of Correction of the State of Connecticut ",Nowell A. Brathwaite,"An undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the officer’s identification was unreliable and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive."
384,Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury,Brian Wynne et ux.,"Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. ( Maxim ), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's stock is "" passed through "" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share included Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining money owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and denied the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes. The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected both Wynnes'argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals but argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county, is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the is covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that, business primarily in Maryland."
1360,"American Needle, Inc.","National Football League, et al.","American Needle Inc. filed suit in an Illinois federal district court against the National Football League (""NFL"") and Reebok International Ltd. alleging that the teams' exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. American Needle argued that because individual NFL teams separately own their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok, was in fact a conspiracy to restrict other vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that NFL teams were a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have conspired to restrict trade. Therefore, the court stated that the teams were free to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis."
1775,United States,Standard Oil Company,"Standard Oil of Kentucky was charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word “refuse” meant “rejected matter,” which the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
543,Guy Rufus Huddleston,United States,"Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32, 000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for sale under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government found evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to obtain Huddleston ’ s knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston with possession of stolen goods. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that his government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently overturned the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet the preponderance of the national standard."
204,Robert Franklin Godfrey,Georgia,"In September 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. After Godfrey consumed a number of beers, threatened his wife with a knife, and tore her clothes, she threatened to leave him and then left to stay with relatives. Within a few days, she had secured a warrant against Godfrey for aggravated assault and filed for divorce. On September 20, they argued again, and Godfrey’s wife told him that reconciliation was impossible. Godfrey went to his mother-in-law’s trailer with his shotgun. He shot his wife through the window, struck his daughter with the butt of the gun, and shot his mother-in-law. Godfrey then called the police, explained what had happened, and asked them to come and pick him up. Godfrey was indicted on two counts of murder, and one count of aggravated assault. He pled not guilty, and argued the defense of temporary insanity. Godfrey was found guilty, and at the sentencing phase of the trial, the same jury sentenced him to the death penalty on both counts of murder. Georgia law states that a person my be convicted of murder and sentenced to the death penalty if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an aggressive battery to the victim.” The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed."
351,Ricky and Ramond Tison,Arizona,"Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty."
1033,"O. John Benisek, et al.","Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.","In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of review, which in that state entails two parallel procedures : a public - facing procedure led by the Governor ’ s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland ’ s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the magnitude of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC - developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was one of the best developed by NCEC ; rather, former Governor Martin O ’ Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was enacted, the “ Cook Partisan Voting Index ” rated the Sixth District as a “ likely ” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a “ safe ” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20. 9 % margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding other Republican candidates. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a preliminary map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another cited case by the US Supreme Court."
1480,Lamar Evans,Michigan,"Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house in Detroit, Michigan. He was charged with ""burning other real property."" The trial court required the prosecution to prove that the building was not a dwelling, although that is not an element of the crime under Michigan law. As a result of this extra element, the court granted Evans' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the trial court decision and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a retrial because the trial court did not resolve any factual element of the case. The directed verdict was based only on the prosecution's failure to prove an element that is not part of the crime. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed."
2117,"Impression Products, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges. The customers who buy Lexmark’s cartridges may choose a cartridge subject to a “Return Program,” which is a combination single-use patent and contract license, and those who purchase the Return Program are given a discount on the cartridge in exchange for agreeing to use the cartridge once and then return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Otherwise, customers may choose a cartridge free of restrictions on its use. Some of Lexmark’s cartridges sold abroad and all of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue were subject to both a discount and the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired the cartridges at issue after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable re-use in violation of the single-use Return Program. Then, Impression Products acquired the cartridges abroad and resold them in the United States. Lexmark sued Impression and alleged that Impression infringed on Lexmark’s patents because Impression Products acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, Impression’s resale of the cartridges is non-infringing because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges and held that the patent-holder’s rights were exhausted when the initial sale was authorized and unrestricted. The motion was denied as it related to the foreign-sold cartridges, however. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that Lexmark’s sale did not “confer authority” to Impression to resell without infringing on the patent. The appellate court also held that Lexmark’s foreign sales did not confer authority to import, sell, or use the cartridges, and it did not waive Lexmark’s rights to its patent."
1917,New Energy Company of Indiana,Limbach,"An Indiana law gave a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers, provided that the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages as the Ohio scheme."
920,Dastar Corporation,Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation,"Doubleday published the WWII book, Crusade in Europe, registered the work's copyright, and granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book's copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television series, leaving the series in the public domain. In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights. In 1995, Dastar Corporation released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which it made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television series. Fox filed suit, alleged that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted ""reverse passing off"" in violation of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted Fox summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, because Dastar copied substantially the Crusade series, labeled it with a different name, and marketed it without attribution to Fox, Dastar had committed a ""bodily appropriation"" of Fox's series, which was sufficient to establish reverse passing off."
236,United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds,"Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager, et al.","A new collective bargaining agreement increased health benefits for widows of coal miners who were receiving pensions when they died. The agreement did not increase benefits for widows of coal miners who were still working at the time they died, although they were eligible for pensions. These health benefits were paid out of a trust fund financed by the operators. Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager brought this class action on behalf of all similarly situated widows. They alleged that requiring the worker to be receiving a pension at the time of death to qualify for increased health benefits bore no relation to the purpose of the trust. The district court denied relief, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement failed to meet the reasonable standard set out in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The LMRA requires pension trusts to be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees…and their families”."
464,Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus,United States,"Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist ’ s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York after living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting like a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “ Mark ”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation ( “ FBI ” ) agents began a long pursuit of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant given to Abel. FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration Services Naturalization Service ( “ INS ” ) a report on Abel as a suspected spy ; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel ’ s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage ; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial. Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel ’ s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell ; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a conviction warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel ’ s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel ’ s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant and a deportation. warrant."
998,Oil States Energy Services LLC,"Greene’s Energy Group, LLC","During hydraulic fracturing ( known as “ fracking ” ) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids or can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt that address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in the Patent Application No. 1, 195, 118 ( the ’ 118 Application ) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “ mandrel ” into the wellhead through which the fracking fluid could be pumped by contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism ( described in Patent No. 6, 179, 053, or the ’ 053 Patent ), rather than air pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent discrimination suit against Greene ’ s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the ’ 053 Patent to be distinct from the ’ 118 Application using the “ ordinary meaning ” standard. Greene ’ s filed for inter partes review, this is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the you. S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO ’ s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the constitutional right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum before having their patent invalidated."
1210,Washington State Grange,Washington State Republican Party et al.,"The State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new ""modified blanket primary"" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision, ruling that since ""party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters may rely upon in casting a vote,"" Initiative 872 ""constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights."" (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.)"
1504,Allen Ryan Alleyne,United States,"On October 1, 2009, Allen Ryan Alleyne and two accomplices robbed the store manager of a Mapco/East Coast convenience store in Petersburg, Virginia as he was dropping off the nightly deposit at the bank. In April 2010, after an extensive investigation, the authorities arrested Alleyne and a grand jury indicted him for robbery and possessing a firearm. On September 7, 2010, after a week-long trial, the jury convicted Alleyne on both counts and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 130 months imprisonment. Alleyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court made three specific errors: 1) the evidence against him was not strong enough to support his convictions; 2) he was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and not carrying it out, which changed his original indictment; and 3) he should not have received a mandatory 7 year sentence for possession of a firearm. The Fourth Circuit rejected all three of his claims. First, the appellate court refused to overrule the jury's decision on the strength of the evidence because a jury is best equipped to determine whether evidence is credible. Second, since aiding and abetting a crime is not itself a separate offense, it does not need to be included in the indictment and does not change the original charge. Finally, there was no indication that the district court should not have imposed the minimum sentence for possessing a firearm."
708,Mitchell,United States,"Amanda Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would be waiving her right ""at trial to remain silent."" At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
1291,United States,Navajo Nation,"In 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a contract with Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of coal on its land. The contract called for royalty payments to the Navajo Nation not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton of coal mined. However, the contract allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to adjust the royalty rate to a ""reasonable"" level after twenty years. At the end of twenty years, the Navajo Nation was being paid the equivalent of 2 percent of the proceeds from the mining operation. As stipulated by the contract, the Navajo Nation entered into discussions with Peabody Coal Company (formerly Sentry Royalty Company) to adjust the royalty rate. After discussions failed, the Navajo Nation asked the Secretary of the Interior to resolve the dispute. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reached an initial decision to set the royalty rate at 20 percent. This decision was delayed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior. Unbeknownst to the Navajo Nation, the Secretary had been meeting with executives of the Peabody Coal Company who requested the delay. Facing dire economic circumstances, the Navajo Nation agreed to a royalty rate of 12.5 percent which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. In 1993, the Navajo Nation brought suit against the United States for violations of its statutory and fiduciary duties to the Nation. It sought damages of $600 million. This latest decision by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the fifth chapter in the long running saga over the original dispute. Its decision comes in the wake of the you.S. Court of Federal Claims holding, on instructions from the Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation did not provide sufficient evidence to seek damages from the United States. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the Navajo Nation marshaled sufficient evidence to show that the United States ""controls the leasing of the [Navajo's] coal resources and that the government is responsible for the liabilities arising thereunder."" It reasoned that the body of regulations and statutes that governed the Nation's resources were ""reasonably amenable"" to an interpretation that imposed liability on the part of the government for breach of its duties."
804,Clark County School District,Breeden,"Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful ""for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees...because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]."" Shirley Breeden alleged that, during a review of job applicant files in 1994, a male co-worker's vocal reaction to an applicant's psychological evaluation report constituted sexual harassment. Moreover, Breeden alleged that she suffered from adverse employment actions for complaining about the about the alleged harassment. Breeden claimed she was transferred about a month later to a job with less supervisory authority. In 1997, Breeden filed a retaliation claim against Clark County School District. The District Court granted summary judgment for the school district. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed."
1466,Kouichi Taniguchi,"Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.","On November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income. Taniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the accident. After discovery, the district court awarded summary judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 you.S.C. § 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted ""compensation of interpreters"" in you.S.C. § 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents. Taniguchi appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi's petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed."
786,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel, et al.","Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.","This case was the case in cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D. C. relating to the segregation of education facilities on the basis upon race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that the segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the state courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were illegal so long as the facilities for blacks & whites were equal. ( This was known as the “ separate but equal ” doctrine. )"
461,Keith Jacobson,United States,"Before the Child Protection Act of 1984 rendered it illegal, Keith Jacobson, the petitioner, purchased a magazine including photographs of nude minors. In 1985, government agencies began investigating Jacobson's interest in child pornography. Over the course of about 2 ½ years, they sent him mailings from 5 fictitious organizations and one non-existent pen pal all promoting sexual liberation and challenging government censorship. After Jacobson was somewhat responsive, a government agency attempted to sting him by selling him child pornography which he purchased, resulting in his arrest and conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1635,"Richard Armstrong, et al.","Exceptional Child Center, Inc., et al.","The federal Medicaid Act requires that state Medicaid plans contain procedures to ensure that reimbursement rates for healthcare providers ""are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers"" to meet the need for care and services in the geographic area. Ninth Circuit precedent also requires that reimbursement rates bear a reasonable relationship to Medicaid provider costs, and where rates do not ""substantially reimburse providers their costs,"" a state cannot justify its rates with ""purely budgetary reasons."" Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare, and others (the Directors) conducted provider cost studies and recommended increasing reimbursement rates but ultimately did not increase rates for budgetary reasons. A group of Idaho Medicaid providers (the Providers) sued the Directors and claimed that, based on the new cost information, the Department's failure to raise rates was not consistent with the Ninth Circuit's requirements. The Directors argued that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution does not give providers a private right of action and that the existing rates were consistent with the Medicaid Act's requirements of efficiency, economy, and quality of care. The district court granted the Providers' motion for summary judgment and held that the failure to increase rates led to a failure to substantially reimburse providers. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
913,"Richard E. Early, Warden, et al.",William Packer,"William Packer was convicted in a California state court for second-degree murder and attempted murder. During jury deliberations, a juror requested dismissal on two separate occasions. In order to avoid having to restart deliberations with a replacement juror, the judge asked the juror to continue. After further conversations between the judge and the juror in question as well as the foreperson of the jury, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of California, Packer argued that the state trial judge had coerced the jury’s verdict in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and held that, as long as the judge only encouraged further deliberations and did not coerce a certain verdict, there was no violation of due process. Packer petitioned for habeas relief from the federal district court, which denied his petition. The US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that the state appellate court failed to properly apply federal law and that the judge was impermissibly coercive, which affected the jury’s guilty verdict."
1160,"Glen Whorton, Director, Nevada Department of Corrections",Marvin Howard Bockting,"Marvin Bockting was accused of sexually assaulting his six year old stepdaughter. The girl told a detective about Bockting's crimes against her, but at the trial she became very upset and refused to testify. The judge declared the witness unavailable and allowed the detective to give hearsay testimony on what Bockting's daughter had told him. Bockting was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without having had a chance to cross-examine the only witness against him. Bockting's appeals in state court were denied. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser had been violated. During Bockting's appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that hearsay testimony given outside the court by an unavailable witness is only admissible if the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before trial. Bockting appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Nith Circuit, arguing that Crawford should apply retroactively to his case. The Circuit Court ruled that Crawford had announced a ""new rule"" of criminal procedure; new rules are normally not applied to cases that were final before the rule was announced. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the rule on hearsay testimony was a ""watershed"" rule that was fundamental to a fair trial. Under an exception defined by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, watershed rules are applied retroactively."
750,"Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc.",United States,"In 1981, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. and Marathon Oil Co. both paid the Federal Government over $150 million in return for the rights to explore for and develop oil off the coast of North Carolina, provided that the companies received exploration and development permissions in accordance with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to OCSLA and CZMA. In 1990, the companies submitted an exploration plan, as required by OCSLA and CZMA, to the Department of the Interior for approval. Thereafter, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became effective. The OBPA prevented the Secretary of the Interior from approving the exploration plan for at least 13 months. The state of North Carolina then objected to certification of the companies' plans under the CZMA. Before the Secretary of Commerce rejected Mobil's request to override North Carolina's objection, the companies filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit. In granting summary judgement for the companies, the Court of Federal Claims found that the Federal Government had broken its contractual promise to follow OCSLA's requirement to approve an exploration plan that satisfied OCSLA's requirements within 30 days of the plan's submission, which constituted the repudiation of the contract and entitled the companies to restitution of the payments. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Federal Government's refusal to consider the companies' final exploration plan was not the operative because of any failure to carry out the contracts' terms, because North Carolina's objection would have prevented the companies from exploring."
611,Avondale Lockhart,United States,"In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered any number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a death warrant and discovered over 15, 000 images and of least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart ’ personal computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart have previously been convicted in state court of first - degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this earlier conviction, the pre - sentencing report for Lockhart ’ s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involved a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart ’ s argument and held that the minimum maximum sentence applied. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision."
861,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"Waffle House, Inc.","Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief."
1270,Seila Law LLC,Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt-relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court’s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for because. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling: Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 you.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 you.S. 654 (1988). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for-because removal restriction protecting the CFPB’s Director does not “impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed."
2050,"Victor L. Berger, et al.",United States,"Victor L. Berger, Adolph Germer, William F. Kruse, J. Louis Engdahl, and Irwin St. John Tucker were all indicted and charged with violating the Espionage Act of 1917. Their case was assigned to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, and the defendants moved to have another judge preside over the trial under Section 21 of the Judicial Code, which states that, whenever a party to an action files an affidavit that the judge before whom the action is proceeding has a personal bias or prejudice, another judge will be designated to hear the case. In this case, the defendants provided an affidavit alleging that Judge Landis was biased against people of German descent, and several of the defendants were German. The motion was denied, Judge Landis heard the case, and the defendants were convicted. The defendants appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which certified questions of law about Section 21 to the Supreme Court."
186,United States,Herman Raddatz,"Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome."
547,Pennsylvania,Edwin Labron,"This is the consolidation of two cases involving the search and seizure of illicit drugs in automobiles. In Pennsylvania v. Labron 95-1691, the police observed Edwin Labron participating in a number of drug transactions out of his car on a street in Philadelphia. Without a warrant, but with probable because, the police then found cocaine when they searched the trunk of Labron's car. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional, finding that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement required both the existence of probable because and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. In Pennsylvania v. Kilgore 95-1738, a search of Randy Kilgore's truck during a drug raid on his home turned up cocaine. Again, the police did not obtain a warrant, but probable because existed. Again the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present."
911,Sell,United States,"In 1997, the Federal Government charged Charles Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. Although Sell has a long history of mental illness and was initially found competent to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered his hospitalization to determine whether he would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed. Subsequently, the Magistrate authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In affirming, the District Court concluded that medication was the only viable hope of rendering Sell competent to stand trial and was necessary to serve the Federal Government's interest in obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the fraud charges, the appellate court found that the Federal Government had an essential interest in bringing Sell to trial, that the treatment was medically appropriate, and that the medical evidence indicated that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his trial."
859,Danny Birchfield,State of North Dakota,"Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch of Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Danny was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He declined to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been robbed and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired ( DWI ) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first - degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. All three men challenged the state law criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal searches and seizures when there was no probable because that would support a warrant for the test. Neither the Supreme Court of Minnesota or the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
297,United States,Hughes Anderson Bagley,"In October 1977, Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. The government’s two principal witnesses were James F. O’Connor and Donald E. Mitchell, private security guards. Between April and June 1977, they assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) in conducting an undercover investigation of Bagley. In response to a discovery request for information about any deals, promises or inducements made to O’Connor or Mitchell, the government produced only affidavits from each man stating that each spoke without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward. Bagley waived his right to a jury trial. At trial, O’Connor and Mitchell testified about the firearms and narcotics charges. On December 23, 1977, the court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not the firearms charges. In mid-1980, Bagley filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Privacy Act of 1974. He received copies of ATF form contracts, each entitled, “Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.” These contracts indicated that O’Connor and Mitchell provided information to the ATF and promised a future payment of $300 to each informer. Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under 28 you.S.C. § 2255, alleging that the government’s failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion came before the same district judge who presided at Bagley’s trial. At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate found that neither informant expected payment for his testimony. In contrast, the district judge found that O’Connor and Mitchell probably expected to receive compensation for their assistance, and that the government suppressed evidence favorable to Bagley. He also concluded, however, that the disclosure would not have had an effect on the court’s verdict. He emphasized that Bagley’s counsel did not seek to discredit O’Connor or Mitchell on cross-examination. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed, reasoning that the government’s failure to disclose required automatic reversal because it impaired Bagley’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through effective cross-examination."
45,Richard Guy Steffel,"John R. Thompson, et al.","On October 8, 1970, Richard Guy Steffel and other individuals were distributing flyers protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War on the exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Employees asked them to stop, but they did not, so the employees called the police. The police informed them that they would be arrested under a Georgia criminal statute if they did not stop, so they left. The next day Steffel and another individual returned to hand out flyers. The police were called again, and Steffel left to avoid arrest. The other individual, however, was arrested. Steffel sued and argued that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because his fear of being arrested kept him from distributing flyers. The district court dismissed the action and denied all relief after it found no evidence that the state acted in bad faith and therefore there was no active controversy. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
1266,"FNU Tanzin, et al.","Muhammad Tanvir, et al.","The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the you. S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) placed their names on the national “ No Fly List, ” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to meet FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in you. S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and a Charter. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ('RFRA ” ), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “ [ a ] Muslim whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and for civil relief against a government. ” The you. S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed that lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges."
1003,"BedRoc Limited, LLC, and Western Elite, Inc.","United States, et al.","BedRoc Ltd. and Western Elite, Inc., own property in Nevada patented under the federal Pittman Act (1919). (The act was repealed in 1964.) The act authorized the issuance of patents to desert lands in Nevada to individuals who successfully developed underground water resources. However, the act specified that patents reserve to the United States ""all the coal and other valuable minerals"" in the patented lands. When the previous owner of BedRoc and Western Elite's land extracted and sold commercially valuable sand and gravel from the lands without a federal mineral contract, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) gave notification that the mining was illegal under federal law. The owner lost an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Once BedRoc and Western Elite owned the land, they filed suit in you.S. district court, arguing that the Pittman Act's ""valuable minerals"" provision did not include valuable sand and gravel. The district court rejected the companies' argument and sided with the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
158,Citizens United,Federal Election Commission,"Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ( BCRA ) to its film Hillary : The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "" big money "" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "" electioneering communications. "" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer whether the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that : 1 ) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2 ) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied within the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that conclusion. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its ads. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "" might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support for a particular because, "" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim."
1246,"James J. Thole, et al.","U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.","Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against you. S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( ERISA ) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited trades with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result to these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court for their part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded ; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district Court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any future damages the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
269,INS,Lopez-Mendoza,"Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and ""[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing."" The BIA also found application of the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests."
874,Ashcroft,American Civil Liberties Union,"Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only ""material that is harmful to minors."" Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply ""contemporary community standards"" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad."
1264,Arthur James Lomax,"Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.","Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ( without paying the associated court fees ) pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 1915. Upon direction from the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice all of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “ strikes ” under 28 you. S. C. § 1915 ( g ), which bars inmates in filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief. Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show because of proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show because order, Lomax argued ( among other things ) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they don't count as strikes. The District court denied Lomax ’ s motion as barred by the three - strikes provision, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed."
2080,Shawn Patrick Lynch,Arizona,"Shawn Patrick Lynch was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and burglary, with all the charges stemming from the 2001 kidnapping and murder of James Panzarella. Arizona sought the death penalty and moved to prevent Lynch’s counsel from informing the jury that the only alternative to sentence to death was life without parole. The trial court granted the motion, and after the first jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, the second jury sentenced Lynch to death. Lynch appealed and argued that, by granting Arizona’s motion, the trial court had violated Lynch’s Due Process Clause rights under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Simmons v. South Carolina. In that case, the Supreme Court established that, when a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and the only alternative to the death penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the Due Process Clause grants the defendant the right to inform the jury of his ineligibility for parole. The Supreme Court of Arizona vacated the sentence without addressing the Simmons argument, and on remand the jury again sentenced Lynch to death. Lynch again appealed and raised the Simmons argument, which the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected by holding that the failure to inform the jury of Lynch’s parole ineligibility was not error."
934,American Insurance Ass'n,Garamendi,"In 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. They also said the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the you.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."
1112,Michael J. Biestek,"Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration","Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a chronic disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied seeking SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2009, alleging his disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration ( SSA ) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the district judge ’ s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical - expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently obvious hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek became disabled after May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ ’ s determination, and the district Court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence challenged the ALJ ’ s finding that Biestek did not meet the back - pain - related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert."
1067,"Jon B. Cutter, et al.","Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.","The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a ""compelling government interest."" Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their ""nonmainstream"" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws ""respecting an establishment of religion""). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."
1822,Katz,United States,"Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari."
213,"Esther Kiobel, et al.","Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.","The she will Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their liberty, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the she will Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District, New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified the order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross - appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach any liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2008, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit dismissed the petitioners'request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en injunction and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case in reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a because of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."
67,United States,"Mississippi Tax Commission, et al.","The Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations. The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations. The MTC sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could face criminal charges. The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government. The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government. Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government."
1693,Blanche Dick,New York Life Insurance Company,"William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage she would and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body. The county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the because of death as “suicide.” New York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body."
1014,United States Postal Service,"Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., et al.","When the you.S. Postal Service ended its mail-sack contract with Flamingo Industries, Flamingo sued in you.S. district court. Flamingo claimed the Postal Service declared a ""fake emergency in the supply of mail sacks"" so it could give no-bid contracts to cheaper foreign manufacturers without allowing you.S. companies to compete for them. Flamingo claimed this violated federal antitrust laws (among other charges). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim reasoning that the federal government is protected by sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the antitrust immunity count. It ruled that the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act waived the Postal Service's sovereign immunity and that it could be sued under federal antitrust laws as a ""person."""
1002,"Cyan, Inc., et. al.","Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.","Since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under federal law. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation & Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state law securities class actions, and amended the 1933 Act to eliminate that limitation on bankruptcy court claims. Beaver County Employees'Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California superior court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the denial of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject Matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims."
439,"Curtis Reid, Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail",Claris Covert,"Mrs. Johnson killed her husband at an airbase in England. Pursuant in a 1961 status - of - war ” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court - martial without a jury trial in the Uniform Code of Military Justice ( 1963 ). She petitioned a writ on habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried without a jury after indictment by a grand jury."
588,Immigration and Naturalization Service,Yueh-Shaio Yang,"Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, former Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain Yang's citizenship. While Yang's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show because why he should not be deported at the time of entry. Yang conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act with the Attorney General. An Immigration Judge denied Yang's request. In affirming, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Yang was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. In vacating, the Court of Appeals held that the Board had abused its discretion by considering the adverse factors of Yang's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, secondly, his fraudulent naturalization application. The court reasoned that Yang's actions in his wife's fraudulent entry were ""inextricably intertwined"" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an ""extension"" of that initial fraud."
532,Arizona,Ronald William Roberson,"On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The same officer read him his Miranda Rights, and then asked to contact an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial jury suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right against life. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for relief."
784,"Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al.",United States,"In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted for advocating the political overthrow by the US government or for their violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the rise or fall of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed implementing the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld this conviction."
1354,"Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al.",City of Chicago,"African-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded the scores and placed applicants in three categories: ""well qualified,"" ""qualified,"" and ""not qualified."" Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 ""well qualified"" applicants, ""qualified"" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as ""qualified."" An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the ""qualified"" category and that the city would be hiring those in the ""well qualified"" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed."
839,Gitlitz,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"In 1991, P. D. W. & A., Inc., an insolvent corporation taxed under Subchapter S, excluded its entire discharge of indebtedness amount from its gross income. David Gitlitz and other shareholders were assessed tax deficiencies because they used the untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. Ultimately, the Tax Court held that Gitlitz and others could not use an S corporation's untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in corporate stock. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the discharge of indebtedness amount first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation and that only the leftover amount could be used to increase their basis. In so holding, the court assumed that the excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to passthrough to shareholders."
442,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.",Board of Education of Topeka,"After its decision in Brown v. Board Of Education of Topeka ( Brown I ), which declared racial discrimination in higher education unconstitutional, the Court began to issue the directives which would help to implement all newly enacted constitutional amendments. The cases stemmed off many different regions of the Southern States with distinctive conditions and problems."
413,Office of Personnel Management,Charles Richmond,"Charles Richmond worked as a welder at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, California until 1981, when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved his application to for a disability retirement. OPM determined that Richmond’s poor eyesight prevented him from performing his job and entitled him to receive the benefits for disabled federal employees who have completed five years of service. Before 1982, an individual was ineligible for disability benefits if, in each of the two succeeding calendar years, the individual earns at least 80 percent of the current pay of the position occupied immediately prior to retirement. In 1982, this requirement was amended so that an individual becomes ineligible if he earns at least 80 percent of the pay of the previous position in any succeeding calendar year. Until 1985, Richmond worked part time and his earnings were low enough to keep him eligible for disability benefits. In 1985, he had the opportunity to earn more money, so he contacted OPM to make sure he would remain eligible. OPM provided him with the old requirements but not the new ones. Richmond subsequently accepted overtime work, earned more, and became ineligible for disability benefits. He lost six months of disability pay. Richmond appealed the denial of benefits to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and argued that the fact that he received incorrect information from OPM prevented them from denying his benefits. The MSPB denied Richmond’s appeal for review. Richmond appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the decision."
892,"Juan Bravo-Fernandez, et al.",United States,"In May 2005, Juan Bravo - Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, with Hector Martinez - Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo - Fernandez and Martinez - Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo - Fernandez ’ s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez - Maldonado ’ s support to legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of a federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose - - in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute after the defendant was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case. Based on this decision, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court ’ s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district Court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could only be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed."
1346,"Otis McDonald, et al.",City of Chicago,"Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed."
883,"Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC","Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office","Cuozzo Speed Technologies, Corp. ( Cuozzo ) owns the US patent, “ Speed Time Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit, ” and Garmin International, Inc. ( Garmin ) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ( Board ) for inter partes review of claims regarding the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead using the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were unpatentable. Cuozzo filed a motion to remedy by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with patents 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term “ integrally attached ” regarding claim 14 and the components of the “ Speed Limit Indicator. ” Cuozzo appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board ’ s finding under its broadest reasonable interpretation."
319,Turner,Murray,"In July 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner entered a jewelry store and killed the proprietor. Turner was disarmed, arrested, and charged with capital murder. During the jury selection process, Turner's counsel requested that the trial judge ask potential jurors if they would be biased by the fact that Turner was black while the victim was white. The judge declined to ask the question regarding racial prejudice and instead asked the prospective jurors if they thought that they would be able to be impartial and fair. Turner was convicted and sentenced to death. After exhausting his appellate options at the state level, Turner filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. Because the facts of the case ""did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might [have] infect[ed the defendant's] trial,"" the district court held that the trial judge's refusal to question potential jurors about racial prejudice was not unconstitutional. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
1587,"Tracey L. Johnson, et al.","City of Shelby, Mississippi","Tracey L. Johnson and David James, Jr., were police officers for the city of Shelby, Mississippi. In September 2009, the city's board of aldermen, which has sole authority over the city's employment decisions, fired Johnson and James supposedly for violations of police procedure and residents' rights. Johnson and James sued the city in district court and argued that they were fired because they refused to ignore the criminal activities of Harold Billings, one of the city's aldermen. Therefore, the city's decision to fire Johnson and James violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights and maliciously interfered with their employment in violation of state law. The city moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Johnson and James failed to include a civil action for deprivation of rights under Section 1983 in their complaint. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and denied James and Johnson's subsequent motion to amend their complaint. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decisions."
259,Bruce J. Abramski,United States,"In November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his grandfather wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ( "" ATF "" ) on which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person. In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $ 400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on his ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the gun dealer, and that he made the false statement about a "" material fact "" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski. Abramski sought to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did to have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from wherever the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant to his uncle, Abramski withheld a "" material fact "" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $ 200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
2091,"Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, et al.","Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company, et al.","The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act protects foreign sovereigns from suits in American courts unless one of a set of specifically enumerated exceptions applies. One of these exceptions is when the foreign sovereign takes you.S. property (the expropriation exception), and another is when the action of the foreign sovereign has direct effect on you.S. commercial activity (the commercial activity exception). Oklahoma-based company Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company owns a subsidiary that contracts with the Venezuelan state-owned corporation that controls the exploration, production, and exportation of oil in Venezuela. In 2007, the two companies executed contracts for the Venezuelan corporation to use Helmerich & Payne’s drilling rigs. By 2008, the unpaid debt from those contracts totaled more than $63 million, and when the debt was over $100 million in 2009, Helmerich & Payne announced it would not be renewing the contract and packed up its drills. Employees of the Venezuelan corporation, assisted by members of the Venezuelan National Guard blockaded the yards in which Helmerich & Payne was keeping its equipment, and then-President Hugo Chavez issued a Decree of Expropriation. Helmerich & Payne sued Venezuela and its state-owned corporation in federal district court under the expropriation and commercial activity exceptions to the FSIA. Venezuela moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion with respect to the expropriation claim but denied it with respect to the commercial activity claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that, because the expropriation claim was neither insubstantial nor frivolous, the district court should not have granted the motion to dismiss that claim."
602,City of Boerne,Flores,"The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari."
791,"W. A. Gayle, Mayor of Montgomery",Aurelia Browder,"While the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a boycott over the racially segregated bus system in Montgomery Alabama, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP challenged racial segregation on the bus system in the federal courts. This lawsuit arose in federal court as a breach of Reconstruction - era civil law statutes and constituted a violation of the Equal Protection clause of its First Amendment. A three - judge district court held that state enforcement over the segregated but privately owned bus service in Montgomery violated the Equal Protection Clause. The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
184,Frank O’Neal Addington,Texas,"Frank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights."
1399,"J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.","Robert Nicastro, et al.","An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive you.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its you.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state."
178,City of Mobile,Bolden,"Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden."
707,Jacob Abrams et al.,United States,"In 1918, the United States participated in the military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated letters advocating for a general strike of ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets falling from a New York City window. One denounced the transfer of American troops to Russia, and the second opposed the war and advocated for complete cessation of the production of ammunition to be used against "" Workers Soviets of Russia "". They were sentenced for 20 years in prison."
375,"Texas Monthly, Inc.","Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas et al.","The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision."
1565,"Halliburton Co., et al","Erica P. John Fund, Inc.","Former shareholders of Halliburton Company (Halliburton) filed a class action lawsuit against the company and argued that Halliburton falsified its financial statements and misrepresented projected earnings between 1999 and 2001. In their petition for class certification, the shareholders invoked the ""fraud on the market"" presumption to demonstrate their class-wide reliance on Halliburton's statements. The ""fraud on the market"" theory assumes that, in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects any material, public representation affecting that security. Therefore, under this theory, the law presumes that investors have relied on a material misstatement when they purchase a security at an artificially high or low price. The federal district court certified the shareholders as a class and prevented Halliburton from introducing evidence that the statements did not impact its stock prices at all. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Halliburton could not rebut the presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the statements until a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims."
461,Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus,United States,"Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist ’ s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that she had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “ Mark ”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation ( “ FBI ” ) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel. FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( “ INS ” ) a report on Abel as a suspected spy ; four FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. In June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel ’ s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found few prints or evidence of alienage ; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial. Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI / INS agents held him for four weeks. On the third night, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel ’ s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell ; he then learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him with espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel ’ s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel ’ s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant."
99,"Republic of Austria, et al.",Maria V. Altmann,"Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by The Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover her paintings from the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ( FSIA ), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases concerning "" rights to property deemed in violation of international law. "" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - yet equally extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively ( that is, to actions taken before it was passed ) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of protection. The district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed."
1184,Bell Atlantic Corp. et al.,William Twombly et al.,"William Twombly and other consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Bell Atlantic Corp. and other telecommunications companies. Twombly alleged that the companies had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to end competition among themselves and to stifle new competition. In the suit, Twombly claimed that the companies had agreed not to branch out into and compete in one another's territories, even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 might have made it relatively inexpensive to do so. The District Court granted Bell Atlantic's motion to dismiss the suit, however, because Twombly had failed to ""allege sufficient facts from which a conspiracy can be inferred."" In order to sufficiently claim a Section 1 violation, the court held, the plaintiffs needed to establish a ""plus factor"" - a piece of evidence showing that the defendants' behavior would be against their economic self-interest unless there was a conspiratorial agreement. Twombly had not established a plus factor, the court held, because the companies' defensive behavior could have been motivated by economic factors rather than conspiracy. Twombly appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Second Circuit ruled that Twombly needed only to allege a conspiracy and specific facts that would support a Section 1 violation. Since he had alleged that the companies had engaged in suspicious ""parallel conduct"" and conspired to preserve monopoly conditions, his claim was sufficient and the suit could proceed."
2270,"PDR Network, LLC, et al.","Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.","Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.” On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss. Carlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text."
1327,"Jerry N. Jones, et al.",Harris Associates L.P.,"Plaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees."
676,Munn and Scott,Illinois,Illinois encouraged grain elevator / elevator use by establishing local rates for domestic use.
212,Minnesota,Clover Leaf Creamery Company,"Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk products in non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf Creamery sued to overturn the law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision."
437,"Curtis Reid, Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail",Claris Covert,"Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airplane in England. Pursuant to a “ status - of - forces ” executive agreement with England, she was indicted and convicted by US court - martial without any jury trial under the UC Code on Military Justice ( UCMJ ). She petitioned a writ against habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction ended their Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury."
858,Danny Birchfield,State of North Dakota,"Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field chemical tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Bernard was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the Minnesota law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and attempted to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired ( DWI ) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first - degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving in the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal age, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued, the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable because that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
1281,Clemente Avelino Pereida,"Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General","Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain benefits. The Department of Homeland Security initiated disciplinary proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude ; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida ’ personal burden to establish his eligibility for termination of removal. Furthermore, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his obligations. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals ’ finding that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida ’ s petition for review."
1016,Jose Francisco Sosa,"Humberto Alvarez-Machain, et al.","A you.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent was kidnapped and murdered by a Mexican drug cartel in 1985. After an investigation, the DEA concluded that Humberto Alvarez-Machain had participated in the murder. A warrant for his arrest was issued by a federal district court. The DEA, however, was unable to convince Mexico to extradite Alvarez-Machain, so they hired several Mexican nationals to capture him and bring him back to the United States. His subsequent trial went all the way to the Supreme Court, which found that the government could try a person who had been forcibly abducted, but that the abduction itself might violate international and provide grounds for a civil suit. When the case went back to the district court for trial, Alvarez-Machain was found not guilty for lack of evidence. Alvarez-Machain then filed a group of civil suits in federal court against the United States and the Mexican nationals who had captured him under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows the federal government to be sued on tort claims, and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which permits suits against foreign citizens in American courts. The government argued that the FTCA applied only to claims arising from actions that took place in the United States and therefore did not cover Alvarez-Machain's case because the arrest took place in Mexico. Further, the government and the Mexican nationals argued that the ATS gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear tort claims against foreign citizens, but did not allow private individuals to bring those suits. The federal district court disagreed with the government's contention that the FCTA claim did not apply, finding that plan to capture Alvarez-Machain was developed on you.S. soil and therefore covered. However, the court then ruled that the DEA had acted lawfully when they arrested Alvarez-Machain and was therefore not liable. On the ATS claims, the court rejected the argument that private individuals could not bring suit under the Act. The court found that Jose Francisco Sosa, one of the Mexican nationals who kidnapped Alvarez- Machain, had violated international law and was therefore liable under the ATS. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court's FTCA decision, ruling that the DEA could not authorize a citizen's arrest of Alvarez-Machain in another country and was therefore liable. The appeals court did, however, affirm the lower court's finding on the ATS claim, upholding the judgment against Sosa."
1223,"Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al.",Christopher M. Sulyma,"In 2012, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company ’ s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee and Income Security Act ( ERISA ), which sets out the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment ( and thus investment ) periods of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint "" time - barred under the you. S. C. § 1113 ( 2 ), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “ three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation. ” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “ actual knowledge ” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court ’ s grant of summary judgment and called for further proceedings."
610,Avondale Lockhart,United States,"In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15,000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart’s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of first-degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre-sentencing report for Lockhart’s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart’s argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision."
49,Harold Omond Spence ,Washington,"Harold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA. When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed. Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. The state supreme court rejected Spence’s argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague."
1313,"Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al.",United States,"In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code (""Code""), ""debt relief agency,"" and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that the BAPCPA did not apply to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of ""debt relief agency"" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide ""bankruptcy assistance"" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of ""debt relief agency."" However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional."
574,Glickman,Wileman Brothers & Elliot,"In 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by assessments imposed on activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari."
928,Scheidler,"National Organization for Women, Inc.","The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through ""a pattern of racketeering activity"" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted ""property"" that was ""obtained"" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)"
1973,Lambdin P. Milligan et al.,United States,Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War for engaging in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.
665,Forney,Apfel,"Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal."
502,"West Lynn Creamery, Inc.",Healy,"On January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed."
1296,Brett Jones,Mississippi,"When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law found him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and appeal. In a post - conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court in Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he became entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 you. S. 460 ( 2012 ), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 you. S. _ _ ( 2016 ). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment ’ s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without a possibility or parole “ for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. ” The circuit Court held the hearing weighing all factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was also entitled to parole eligibility."
1887,Coolidge,New Hampshire,"In the wake of a ""particularly brutal"" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment."
1149,United States of America,Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover,"On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm without relation to a crime of violence ( a “ Hobbs Act robbery ” ) and the illegal use or carrying of that firearm to aid and abet conspiracy or commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals from the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants ’ challenges and affirming the district court ’ s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court ’ s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 you. S. _ _ ( 2018 ), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting more briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( c ) contains both an “ elements clause ” and a “ residual clause. ” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “ has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or properties of another, ” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “ by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. ” In Dimaya, the Court addressed ( and invalidated ) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924 ( c ) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924 ( c ) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to in aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies in the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause."
866,Ring,Arizona,"At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency."
65,"William B. Saxbe, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee","Robert Bustos, et al.","These are two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the you.S. to work. The practice granted the aliens “special immigrant” status and authorized them to be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” even though the workers did not intend to reside in the you.S. permanently. This “special” status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements. The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice. The district court dismissed the case, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for daily workers, but not for seasonal workers."
342,"Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Beaty Mae Gilliard, et al.","Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive. In 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
967,Illinois,Fisher,"Gregory Fisher was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine in 1988. He filed a motion for discovery, asking that the white powdery substance he had had in his possession be made available as evidence at trial so that he could have it independently tested in an attempt to disprove the four tests conducted by police showing that it was cocaine. The state agreed to make the substance available at a future date. The defendant was released on bond, but in July of 1989 he failed to appear in court. He remained a fugitive for 10 years, during which time the police destroyed the substance in keeping with the standard practice of destroying old evidence. When Fisher was captured and brought to trial again in 1999, he claimed that the state had violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights by destroying evidence that could possibly have proved his innocence after he had filed a motion for discovery. The trial court denied his motion, holding that the police had acted in ""good faith"" in accordance with Arizona v. Youngblood. Fisher was subsequently convicted. The Illinois Appellate Court overturned the conviction, however, holding that the case was different from Youngblood because Fisher had filed a discovery motion. The state Supreme Court declined to hear the case."
412,"Baker Botts, LLP","ASARCO, LLC","Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $ 120 million in damages for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, after which Asarco had emerged since 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $ 117 million to pay the fees in addition to $ 5 million from expenses incurred defending the fee petition. The district court affirmed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that California Bankruptcy Code did not allow law firms to recover $ 5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition."
1061,Russell Bucklew,"Anne Precythe, et al.","Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bill was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He had filed an action in federal district court alleging the execution by Missouri ’ s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely because him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood. ” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also proposed discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for that they are hired. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state ’ s execution method “ presents a risk that is sure or very likely ( because serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers, ” and failed to propose “ an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain, ” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew ’ s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “ assume that Missouri police personnel who are incompetent or unqualified in perform their assigned duties. ” Reviewing the district court ’ s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for an Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court."
1803,Loving et ux.,Virginia,"In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years)."
666,Proprietors of Charles River Bridge,Proprietors of Warren Bridge,"In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to design another bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature incorporated the Warren Bridge Company to build a free span there. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, saying its railroad had defaulted in its initial contract."
325,Julie Heimeshoff,Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores,"Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal-Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007. Heimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three-year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1024,Willard Stewart,Dutra Construction Company,"Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a ""vessel in navigation"" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
596,"Rebecca Friedrichs, et al.","California Teachers Association, et al.","California law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees within that district, therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range or conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “ agency shop ” ', which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of wages to the union in the form of a “ fair share service fee. ” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable parts of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year. Petitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well other school districts and claimed that the agency shop arrangement and the opt - out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1816,Wayne Darnell Bumper,North Carolina,"Wayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper’s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper’s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to the search. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed."
1814,Witherspoon,Illinois,"Witherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with ""conscientious scruples"" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment. Witherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an ""impartial jury"" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no constitutional violation took place."
1020,"State of Ohio, et al.","American Express Company, et al.","In the credit-card industry, there is what is called a “two-sided market.” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card. In the United States, credit-card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they do not directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees. In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex’s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non-discriminatory provisions (NDPs). In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti-steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti-steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex’s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “rule of reason.”"
2357,"BP P.L.C., et al.",Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,"In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore’s motion for remand back to state court. The defendants appealed the remand order, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 you.S.C. § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the suit."
1287,Donald J. Trump,"Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al.","The district attorney of New York County awarded a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction, dismissed that case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no reasonable basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals from the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did indeed apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue, remanded the case to the lower court."
1881,Griggs,Duke Power Company,"Willie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's ""inside"" transfer policy, requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court granted certiorari."
163,"Altria Group, Inc., et al.",Stephanie Good et al.,"A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court from Maine. The smokers asserted : Altria's advertisement claiming that its smoke was "" light "" and had "" lowered tar and nicotine "" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed its trial court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, under another similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and thus Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act."
743,Frank Palko,Connecticut,Frank Palko had been charged with first - degree murder. He got charged instead of second - degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new verdict ; this time the court found Palko guilty of first - degree murder and sentenced her to death.
2058,"Encino Motorcars, LLC","Hector Navarro, et al.","Encino Motorcars, LLC (Encino) sold and serviced Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Hector Navarro was employed there as a service advisor, which involved him greeting customers and assessing their needs as they entered the business. Navarro, along with other similarly-situated plaintiffs, sued Encino for failing to pay overtime compensation when they worked more than forty hours a week. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “service advisors” engaged in servicing automobiles are not entitled to overtime compensation, so the district court dismissed their overtime claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held that Navarro and other employees were not exempted from overtime compensation. In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on the Department of Labor’s 2011 determination that service advisors were not exempt under the FLSA, which was a reversal of the position that the Department had taken in 1987."
1393,"Chase Bank USA, N.A.","James A. McCoy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated","A class of Chase Bank (""Chase"") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act (""TILA""). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice."
668,Proprietors of Charles River Bridge,Proprietors of Warren Bridge,"In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a road and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, a new bridge deprived an old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the bridge only relied on state bank loans."
693,Homer Adolph Plessy,John Ferguson,"Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which provided separate railway cars for blacks or whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven - eighths Caucasian - agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He felt solicited by the Comite des Citoyens ( Committee of Citizens ), a group of New Orleans citizens who sought to repeal the Act. They wanted Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "" whites only "" car aboard a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it believed the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was forced to vacate the whites - only car, he refused and was arrested. At trial, Plessy ’ s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted."
837,Franchise Tax Board of California,Gilbert P. Hyatt,"Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California ( FTB ) based on the FTB ’ s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state records for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB for Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case was on trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based upon California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the you. S. Supreme Court, which held the Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity. At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $ 300 million in damages. The parties cross - appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from this suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. Furthermore, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed."
1397,Donald Bullcoming,New Mexico,"Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this you.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify."
294,United States,James Rual Miller,"An indictment issued by a grand jury charged James Miller with fraud. The indictment alleged he conspired with a burglar and overstated the value of the stolen items so his insurer would pay him more in damages recovery. The prosecution presented evidence proving that Miller had overstated the value of the items but did not try to establish that he had conspired with the burglar. The jury found his overstatement of value sufficient to convict him of fraud. Miller argued that by convicting him despite the fact that the prosecutors only addressed part of the indictment, the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on a grand jury indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction."
1658,Cole,Young,"The Food and Drug Administration (""FDA"") fired Kendrick Cole when it determined that his employment was not ""clearly consistent with the interests of national security."" Mr. Cole was a food and drug inspector and a ""preference-eligible veteran,"" but was charged with having ""a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists."" Mr. Cole appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which denied his appeal, finding that the Veterans' Preference Act did not afford Mr. Cole a right of appeal under the circumstances. Mr. Cole brought an action seeking declaratory judgment in the District of Columbia federal district court alleging that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission improperly denied his appeal. The district court dismissed the case and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed."
902,Lawrence Eugene Shaw,United States,"Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one for his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with his daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu ’ s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which they opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu ’ s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu ’ s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $ 307, 000 of Hsu ’ s assets to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $ 131, 000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $ 106, 000. Hsu lost about $ 170, 000 by not notifying the banks within 60 minutes of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures allow. The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “ to defraud a financial institution. ” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not merely to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed."
747,"Adarand Constructors, Inc.",Slater,"In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I)(512 you.S. 200 (1995)), the you.S. Supreme Court held that the you.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) use of race-based measures is subject to strict scrutiny. On remand, the District Court held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause required by the Small Business Act, which rewards prime contractors for subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises, and its race-based presumption, failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored (Adarand II). After Adarand II, Colorado altered its disadvantaged business enterprise status certification procedure. Under the new procedures, Adarand Constructors, Inc. requested and received disadvantaged-business status from the Colorado DOT (CDOT). Upon learning that CDOT had given Adarand disadvantaged-business status, the Court of Appeals held that Adarand's because of action was moot and vacated the District Court's judgment in Adarand II."
884,Lapides,Board of Regents of University System of Georgia,"Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal."
296,Heckler,Chaney,"Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 you.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion."
859,"Terry L. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Robert Douglas Smith,"Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Smith filed a series of petitions for state postconviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Superior Court denied Smith's claims, finding them waived under Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) because he failed to raise them in his previous Rule 32 petitions. The court rejected Smith's argument that his failure to raise these claims was also due to ineffective assistance because his prior appellate and Rule 32 counsel, who are members of the Arizona Public Defender's office, refused to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims because his trial counsel was also a member of the Public Defender's office. The Federal District Court held that Smith's claim was barred by the lower court's procedural ruling. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the state procedural default was not independent of federal law and thus did not bar federal review of the merits of Smith's claim. The appellate court reasoned that Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) applies a different standard for waiver depending on whether the claim asserted in a Rule 32 petition was of sufficient constitutional magnitude and that determination whether a claim is of sufficient magnitude required consideration of the merits of the claim."
1021,Josue Leocal,"John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.",A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.
481,Spectrum Sports Inc. and Kenneth B. Leighton ,"Shirley and Larry McQuillan, dba Sorboturf Enterprises","Shirley and Larry McQuillan were the southwest distributors for products made with sorbothane, a patented elastic polymer. They had an agreement with the manufacturer to be one of five regional distributors. Gradually, the manufacturer began to take away the McQuillan’s right to distribute certain types of products, eventually revoking their rights altogether. The manufacturer only allowed one national distributor, Spectrum Sports, Inc., which was co-owned by the president of the manufacturer’s son. When the McQuillan’s business failed, they sued Spectrum for violations of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act makes it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of the interstate commerce. The district court instructed the jury to infer specific intent and dangerous probability of monopolization if they found that Spectrum engaged in predatory conduct. The jury found Spectrum guilty. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was enough evidence to show specific intent and a dangerous probability of monopolization even if the jury only considered Spectrum’s predatory conduct."
1634,"Bank of America, N.A.",David B. Caulkett,"David Caulkett’s property was subject to two mortgage liens when he filed for bankruptcy. Because the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the property, the second mortgage, which Bank of America held, was considered “underwater.” When Caulkett filed for bankruptcy, he moved the bankruptcy court to void Bank of America’s lien on the second mortgage and argued that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allowed a debtor filing for bankruptcy to void a second mortgage when the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the collateral property. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and both the district court and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with a similar case, Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, which had substantially the same facts and an identical procedural history."
2011,Pete Hernandez,Texas,"Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican-Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that ""Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race"" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a ""special class"" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that ""so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality"" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian."
1252,Eddie Lee Shular,United States of America,"The Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “ violent felony ” or a “ serious drug offense ” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the you. S. Supreme Court has adopted a “ - ” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “ violent felony ” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the general definition for the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a recent conviction constitutes a “ serious drug offense ” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the count of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance possession — five for possession of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “ knowledge of the illicit uses of the substance, ” that is, that the substance possessed and sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular ’ s Florida convictions would qualify as a “ serious drug offense ” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “ requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances. ”"
989,David Patchak,"Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior","The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band of Detroit Indians ( the Gun Lake Tribe ) is an Indian tribe in western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the you. S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe ’ s use under the Indian Reorganization Act ( IRA ), 25 you. S. C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2004. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property. David Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural location and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put The Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the you. S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating to the Bradley Property “ shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed. ”"
258,Bruce J. Abramski,United States,"In November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ( "" ATF "" ) on which it checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person. In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found one receipt showing that he gave the handgun to his uncle In exchange for $ 400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the false statement about a "" material fact "" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski. Abramski moved to dismiss the indictment and destroy evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he merely returned the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper license to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for the uncle, Abramski withheld a "" material fact "" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $ 200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
916,National Labor Relations Board,"SW General, Inc.","In 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act ( FVRA ), which provided that, if a position, which the President nominates and the Senate confirms ( PAS position ) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an “ acting officer serving for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB ), a PAS position, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians ( EMTs ), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “ longevity pay, ” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten weeks were paying annual salary. In December 2012, upon the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an ineffective labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of allegations, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an a capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the, court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon ’ s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA."
2168,Robert McCoy,State of Louisiana,"Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel."
1246,Johnnie Corley,United States,"In September 2004, Johnnie Corley was convicted on counts of armed bank robbery and the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress his oral and written confessions. The federal district court dismissed the motion. After his conviction, Mr. Corley appealed arguing his motion was improperly dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court recognized that federal statutes require federal officials to bring persons they arrest before judicial officers without unnecessary delay. Confessions received after such delays and before the arrested person is presented before a federal magistrate should be suppressed. Mr. Corley's confessions fell under these guidelines. However, the court reasoned that the voluntariness of a confession was an overriding factor in determining admissibility. Mr. Corley voluntarily confessed. Therefore, his confessions were admissible."
1392,"Keith Smith, et al.",Bayer Corp.,"Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the you.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class. Counsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010."
788,"Friends of the Earth, Inc.","Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.","After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered."
465,Robert R. Freeman et al.,Willie Eugene Pitts et al.,"In 1969, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) to eliminate its previously legal racial segregation and its inequitable byproducts under judicial control. However, in 1986, DCSS officials filed a motion, intending for the District Court to declare the DCSS officially desegregated and withdraw supervision. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, outlines 6 categories in which a school district should achieve desegregation, and the District Court found that the DCSS was successful in 4 of these categories. Consequently, the court decided to relinquish control over the DCSS in these 4 areas, while it maintained control and mandated further improvements in the areas in which segregation still existed. Both the respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, and the petitioners, the DCSS officials, appealed the District Court's decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed it. The Court of Appeals argued that the District Court should have authority over the DCSS until it is fully desegregated in all 6 categories for several years."
288,"Ellen Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice","Gregory Martin, et al.","In 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address. He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred."
969,"Ricky Henson, et al.","Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.","The petitioners are a group or individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, restored them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount in money for which CitiFinancial purchased the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA ( Santander ), which attempted another collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “ debt collector ” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did therefore originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc."
776,Julius A. Wolf,Colorado,"Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton, charged with conspiracy against perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to publishing material and admissible as such his co - ordination would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all four convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have proved inadmissible to a prosecution for violation of the federal law in a federal court."
319,Freddie Lee Hall,Florida,"Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida to habeas corpus relief based on a Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and found that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a claim to vacate his sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non - record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with "" unquantifiable weight, "" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted to and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare to sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from would death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test — whether he had an IQ below 70 — could not of met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed."
1837,Adam Clayton Powell,"John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives","Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him."
1362,The Hertz Corporation,"Melinda Friend, et al.","Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not New Jersey. The federal district court agreed and remanded the case to the state court. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the ""place of operations test"" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction and the district court had no authority over the case."
875,Correctional Services Corporation,Malesko,"In 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 you.S. 388, in which the you.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations."
593,Antoine Bruce,"Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al.","Several prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit ( SMU ) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gang - affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons ( BOP ) officials and claimed that they violation the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang - affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival organizations. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which will allow them to waive filing charges. The parties then engaged in various back - and - forth filings regarding the nature of filing fees and the ability of other prisoners to intervene in the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners in completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage from their monthly income to cover filing fees."
2024,Maryland,James Kulbicki,"In 1993, James Kulbicki fatally shot his 22-year-old mistress the weekend before a scheduled hearing on unpaid child support in an ongoing paternity suit between the two. At Kulbicki’s trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the bullet removed from the victim’s brain and the bullet taken from Kulbicki’s gun were a close enough match that they likely came from the same package. After being presented with this ballistics evidence, as well as other physical evidence and witness testimony, the jury convicted Kulbicki of first-degree murder. Kulbicki filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to question the legitimacy of the ballistics evidence. Kulbicki’s petition was denied at the trial level, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Kulbicki’s conviction."
1537,State of Kansas,Scott D. Cheever,"On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels at the residence of Darrell and Belinda Coopers in Hilltop, Kansas. Samuels had gone to the Coopers' residence based on a tip to arrest Cheever for outstanding warrants. He found the Coopers, Cheever, and two others cooking and ingesting methamphetamines. In the following attempts to arrest Cheever and retrieve the injured Samuels, Cheever also shot at several other officers. At trial, Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication defense and argued that the methamphetamine use rendered him mentally incapable of the premeditation required for murder. During the course of the trial, the judge ordered Cheever to undergo a psychiatric examination conducted by a psychiatric hired by the government. The prosecution sought to bring the transcript of the interview into evidence to impeach Cheever's testimony regarding the order of events at the Coopers' residence, which the court allowed. After the defense rested their case, the prosecution called the psychiatrist to the stand as a rebuttal witness to respond to the defense's claims regarding Cheever's mental capacity at the time of the crime. The trial court allowed the psychiatrist's testimony as a rebuttal witness. The jury found Cheever guilty and, at a separate sentencing hearing, sentenced him to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the admission of the government psychiatrist's testimony into evidence violated Cheever's Fifth Amendment rights."
323,Larry Witters,Washington Department of Services for the Blind,"Larry Witters attended the Inland Empire School for the Blind, seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law. Witters applied to Washington’s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington’s constitution. The commission denied Witters’ application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission’s ruling, also citing Washington’s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters’ application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, it held that approving his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion."
995,Oil States Energy Services LLC,"Greene’s Energy Group, LLC","During hydraulic fracturing (known as “fracking”) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2,195,118 (the ’118 Application) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “mandrel” into the wellhead through which the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism (described in Patent No. 6,179,053, or the ’053 Patent), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene’s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the ’053 Patent to be distinct from the ’118 Application using the “ordinary meaning” standard. Greene’s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the you.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO’s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the constitutional right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum before having their patent invalidated."
567,Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark,"William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al.","In 2001, Heidi Scott - Clark inherited a $ 300, 000 personal retirement account ( IRA ) at her mother's estate. The you. S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband ( the "" Clarks "" ), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement In order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund under Section 522 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the original IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject from creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district attorney reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
1235,"Ritzen Group, Inc.","Jackson Masonry, LLC","Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline. Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 you.S.C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits. Ritzen appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines: the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal."
531,Arizona,Ronald William Roberson,"On April 16, 1983, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him some Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering the questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery had happened on April 15. During this interrogation, Roberson issued an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial attorney suppressed the statement and held that any interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition seeking review."
2008,Heman Marion Sweatt,Theophilis Shickel Painter,"In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students."
146,Homero Gonzalez,United States,"Homero Gonzalez were tried with a co - accused on several drug - related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, another magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for both government and Justice Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did already have his personal authority for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews."
331,Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.,Hepps,"In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true."
215,"City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX",Federal Communications Commission,"Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (""FCC"") to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following ""reasonable time"" limits for zoning requests: 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures. The local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long-standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation."
218,"City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX",Federal Communications Commission,"Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speeds up the process, Congress amended its 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission ( "" FCC "" ) to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these extension requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following "" reasonable time "" requirements for zoning requests : 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures. The local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long - standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should only defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular statute. However, the Supreme Court had never determined how this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether its Chevron doctrine applies in this situation."
1938,Franconia Associates,United States,"Under the Housing Act of 1949, the Farmers Home Administration makes direct loans to private, nonprofit entities to develop and/or construct rural housing for the elderly and low-or middle-income individuals and families. Franconia Associates is a property owner that entered into such loans before December 21, 1979. The promissory notes Franconia executed authorized ""prepaymen[t] of scheduled installments, or any portion thereof...at any time at the option of Borrower."" In 1988, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), which amended the Housing Act of 1949 to impose permanent restrictions upon prepayment of mortgages entered into before December 21, 1979. In 1997, Franconia filed suit, charging that ELIHPA abridged the absolute prepayment right set forth in their promissory notes and thereby effected a repudiation of their contracts. In dismissing Franconia's contract claims as untimely, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claims first accrued on the ELIHPA regulations' effective date. In affirming on statute of limitations grounds, the Federal Circuit ruled that, if the Government's continuing duty to allow Franconia to prepay their loans was breached, the breach occurred immediately upon ELIHPA's enactment date."
1698,"International Association of Machinists, et al.","S. B. Street, et al.",Several labor unions entered into a union shop agreement that authorized spending union funds to support political causes. Many union employees opposed those causes and sued to enjoin enforcement of the union shop agreement. The employees argued that forcing union members to fund political activities they disagree with unconstitutionally restrained free speech. The Superior Court of Bibb County granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
993,Merit Management Group,"FTI Consulting, Inc.","Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $ 55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money through Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30 % shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $ 16. 5 million debt to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( b ), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers "" made by or to "" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within a language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “ made by or to ” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer, don't benefit from it. The Seventh Circuit held that section 546 ( e ) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between self - named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this provision in The same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held on the contrary."
1202,R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.,"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.","Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a publicly held for - profit corporation that operates several funeral homes throughout Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived being presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home ’ s owner and employees that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) alleging that she had been terminated based in unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen ’ s employment upon the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex - based stereotypes. The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home ’ s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in light of Title VII."
1309,"William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission","American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al.","Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address unnecessary / unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act — the automatic call ban — prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “ any automatic telephone dialing system or any artificial or prerecorded voice. ” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the law : automated calls “ for emergency purposes ” and those made to a cell phone with “ the prior express consent of the called operator. ” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “ to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States. ” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban. The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content - based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review ( testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a "" compelling state interest, "" that the law is "" narrowly tailored "" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the "" least restrictive means "" to achieve that purpose ) to the debt - collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the you. S. Court Of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt - collection exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that the provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision."
266,"Lexmark International, Inc.","Static Control Components, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc. ( Lexmark ) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark founded Static Control Components, Inc. ( SCC ) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured equipment used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, like other things, violate the Copyright Act by engaging in false advertising. The district courts dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the above test to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit relied on the "" reasonable interest "" test to establish standing under the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must have 1 ) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2 ) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage reasonable interest."
390,United States,Sokolow,"Drug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine."
1697,Ellen Goett as administratrix of the estate of Marvin Paul Goett ,Union Carbide Corp. and Amherst Barge Corp.,"Ellen Goett sought recovery for her husband’s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin Paul Goett, drowned while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did not owe a duty of seaworthiness to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were."
1153,"MedImmune, Inc.","Genentech, Inc., et al.","Genentech held the patent for ""Cabilly I"", a process for using cell cultures to manufacture human antibodies. MedImmune had a licensing agreement with Genentech under which MedImmune paid royalties to Genentech in return for the use of the patent. Later, Genentech also obtained the patent to ""Cabilly II,"" a continuation of the Cabilly I process. Under the licensing agreement, MedImmune became a licensee for Cabilly II as well. Genentech informed MedImmune that it would have to pay royalties on one of its most lucrative products, Synagis, which uses the Cabilly II process. MedImmune sued Genentech, claiming that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. However, MedImmune kept paying the royalties. A federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not present a controversy. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ""cases or controversies."" This is implemented in the Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that a suit involve an ""actual controversy."" Genentech argued that since MedImmune was still paying royalties on the patent, there was no controversy. MedImmune countered that though it was indeed still paying royalties on the patent it claimed was invalid, it was paying ""under protest."" It would be unreasonable, MedImmune argued, for the company to be required to break its contractual obligations by stopping royalty payments before suing. This might jeopardize MedImmune's legal rights to one of its best-selling products. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled for Genentech and upheld the District Court, holding that the suit presented no actual controversy."
863,United States Army Corps of Engineers,"Hawkes Co., Inc., et al.","Hawkes Co., Inc. ( Hawkes ) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high - quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers ( Corps ) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for their permit to begin extracting peat from the land after they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and he urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes ’ plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “ waters of the other States, ” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an appeal for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the original determination had not a “ final agency action ” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to Judicial review. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, the jurisdictional determination was a first agency action and remanded the action for judicial review."
716,Haddle,Garrison,"Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had ""injured [him] in his person or property"" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
403,Peel,Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois,"Gary Peel, an attorney licensed to practice in three states, received a ""Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy"" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). This certificate is earned by compiling extensive trial experience, completing continuing legal education classes, and passing a day-long examination. In addition to listing the three states in which he was licensed to practice, Peel listed his NBTA certification on his letterhead. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against Peel and argued that he was publicly presenting himself as a certified legal specialist in violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. At Peel's disciplinary hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and held that Peel's letterhead was commercial speech that could be governed by the lawyer advertising regulations. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Peel's letterhead amounted to an unwarranted claim of superior quality of service because it could lead the public to believe that his authority to practice trial advocacy was derived from his NBTA certification."
125,Village of Arlington Heights,Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,"The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights (""Arlington"") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari."
1845,United States,"Concentrated Phosphate Export Association, Inc. et al.","After World War II, the United States made funds available through the ‘Marshall Plan’ to many countries to pay for commodities sold by American companies and shipped from the United States and other free-world sources. Congress made foreign aid funds available to bring commodities to the Republic of Korea, beginning with the Mutual Security Act of 1954. In 1961, the Concentrated Phosphate Export Association (CPEA) organized to act as an export-selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its member corporations. CPEA organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which Congress passed to help American firms compete with foreign cartels. The process began when Congress allocated funds to various Agency for International Development (AID) programs. The United States thus directly financed the purchase of commodities allocated to Korea, approved via a complicated, tightly regulated application procedure. The United States assigned two of the CPEA contracts, and the Republic of Korea assigned the other nine, subject to detailed regulation by AID. The contracts only circulated in the United States. The United States filed an action to enjoin price fixing and business allocation activities among the CPEA’s five major member corporations. The district court held that CPEA’s sales were ‘export trade’ for the purposes of the Sherman Act; hence, although CPEA conceded that its members were coordinating their sales actions, CPEA did not violate the Sherman Act. On January 1, 1967, the State Department amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on contracts where the procurement was limited to United States suppliers; in response, the CPEA dissolved on December 28, 1967, despite the district court’s favorable ruling."
1152,"Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office",Erik Brunetti,"Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “ fuct, ” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent - to - use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2 ( a ) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or embarrassing matter ( the meaning of “ fuct ” sounds like a vulgar word ) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which reversed the examining attorney ’ s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found : while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2 ( d ) of the Sherman Act, that section's bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional form of free speech."
1212,"Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al.","Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.","The Indiana legislature passed two laws at issue in this case. The first related to the use of fetal remains by care providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and pathological waste, thereby preventing abortion providers from incinerating fetal remains with mechanical means. The laws also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, which Indiana law could not allow for human remains. The second provision of Indiana law authorized the knowing provision of sex -, race -, or disability - selective abortions by abortion providers. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky challenged the laws on constitutional grounds but still did not make the argument that either law burdened a human right."
446,"William G. Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al.","John Aaron, et al.","The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas both resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board for Education. On February 20, 1970, five months after the integration crisis involving the Little Rock Nine, members of the school board ( along with the Superintendent of Schools ) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, urging suspension of the plan of implementation. The relief the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation in the desegregation plan to be halted for two and a half years. The district court granted the school board's request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed."
2037,"Husky International Electronics, Inc.","Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr.","Husky International Electronics, Inc. (Husky) sold and delivered electronic equipment to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (Chrysalis), headed by Daniel Ritz. Chrysalis owed Husky $163,999.38 in purchases between 2003 and 2007. In 2007, Ritz started transferring funds from Chrysalis to various other ventures in which he owned stock. In 2009 Husky sued Ritz for payment of his outstanding debt, and Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In 2011, Husky filed a complaint against the discharge of Ritz’s debt and argued that Ritz had fraudulently moved funds from Chrysalis to other accounts in order to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that Ritz had not fraudulently filed for bankruptcy and that it could not “pierce the veil” to go after Ritz’s personal finances for the debt Chrysalis owed. Husky appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination and found that Ritz had not committed “actual fraud” by false representation and that Husky had not proven that Ritz acted “maliciously and willfully.” The United States Appeals Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to discharge Ritz’s debt."
1194,James K. Kahler,Kansas,"Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2007, his marriage began to falter, and his wife had an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and separate from their daughter. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti - anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife ’ s grandmother ’ s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler remained arrested, charged, but sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution argued that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, neo - compulsive, borderline, paranoid, possibly narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler ’ s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “ completely lost control. ” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “ that the person lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. ” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “ whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions. ” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence."
1236,"No. 07-582	 Title: 	 Federal Communications Commission, et al.","Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.","In 2002 and 2003, Fox Television Stations broadcast the Billboard Music Awards, an annual program honoring top-selling musicians. During the broadcasts, one musician used an explicative in his acceptance speech, and a presenter used two expletives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although it had previously taken the position that such fleeting and isolated expletives did not violate its indecency regime, issued notices of liability to Fox for broadcasting the profane language. The FCC argued that previous decisions referring to ""fleeting"" expletives were merely staff letters and dicta and did not accurately represent its position on the matter. Fox appealed the FCC sanctions to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit held that the FCC's liability order was ""arbitrary and capricious"" under the governing Administrative Procedure Act because the FCC had completely reversed its position on fleeting expletives without giving a proper justification. The Second Circuit also failed to find any evidence that the expletives were harmful."
1004,"Cyan, Inc., et. al.","Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.","Since the enactment of the Securities Act in 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under that statute. Congress has passed a Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state law securities class actions, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect that limitation on state court claims. Beaver County Employees'Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in Southern California superior courts against claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act prevents state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court accepted Cyan's objection for the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims."
2298,Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla,William P. Barr,"Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable."
797,Alexander,Sandoval,"Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a because of action to enforce the regulation."
1486,The Standard Life Insurance Co.,Greg Knowles,"On March 10, 2010, Greg Knowles' home was damaged in a hailstorm, and he requested payment from his insurer, Standard Fire Insurance Company, for the full amount of the damage. On April 13, 2011, Knowles filed a class action lawsuit against Standard Fire Insurance Company alleging that he and others had been denied the full payment for damages that their contracts provided. According to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), defendants in a class action lawsuit can move the case to federal court if the potential damages exceed $5 million. In the past, plaintiffs have attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by stipulating that the potential damages in a given case are worth less than $5 million, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has allowed such a stipulation. The defendant, Standard Fire Insurance Company moved the case from the Miller County Circuit Court to the Western District of Arkansas. The district court held that the plaintiffs' stipulation that the potential damages were less than $5 million was sufficient to prove with ""legal certainty"" that was the case. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1353,Agron Kucana,"Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General","Agron Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 1995 and did not leave when his visa expired. Mr. Kucana applied for asylum but failed to appear at his hearing, after which he was ordered removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen his case, which was denied. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. After failing to remove himself from the United States, Mr. Kucana once again moved to reopen his case, contending that conditions in Albania had deteriorated to the extent where his life would be in danger upon his return. His motion was denied. On appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he argued that the BIA ""abused its discretion"" in denying his claim when it failed to consider an affidavit testifying to the dangerous conditions existing in Albania. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It found that the BIA's decision not to reopen Mr. Kucana's case was ""discretionary."" 8 you.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that ""no court has jurisdiction to review"" any decision that is under the discretion of the BIA. Therefore, the court reasoned that Mr. Kucana's claim was not reviewable by a federal court of appeals."
1359,Curtis Darnell Johnson,United States,"Curtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted ""violent felonies."" Mr. Curtis appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a ""violent felony."" On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a ""violent felony"" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a ""violent felony"" was satisfied by the ""touching or striking"" element under the state battery law."
1335,"Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., et al.","Regal-Beloit Corporation, et al.","Shippers sued the ocean carrier and rail carrier it used to ship products from China to the United States in a California state court to recover for damages. During the transport of the shippers' products, a train derailed damaging the products. The case was removed to a California federal district court only to be dismissed. The district court held that the contracts between the parties did not cover claims for cargo damage. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis. The court reasoned that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (""COGSA"") does not govern the inland transport of goods, unless the parties opted out of coverage by the Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act. The Carmack Amendment governs damage claims against motor and rail carriers, and narrowly limits the venues in which such suits can be brought. Because the district court did not consider whether the parties opted out of the COGSA by the Carmack Amendment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for that determination."
667,Proprietors of Charles River Bridge,Proprietors of Warren Bridge,"In 1825, a Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature incorporated the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new span deprived the old one of traffic and traffic. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted upon their initial loans."
1182,Kevin C. Rotkiske,"Paul Klemm, et al.","Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit on Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, until Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered that judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). Klemm moved to dismiss this claim as time - barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “ within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. ” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “ discovery rule, ” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “ delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury. ” The district court rejected this argument, arguing that under a second reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of the district court."
1329,"Conrad M. Black, John A. Boultbee, and Mark S. Kipnis",United States,"Four former executives of Hollinger International were convicted of mail and wire fraud under 18 you.S.C. Section 1346 by an Illinois federal district court. In part, they had paid themselves $5.5 million in fees without the knowledge of the company's audit committee or board of directors. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendants guilty if it deemed they had schemed to deprive Hollinger and its shareholders ""of their intangible right to the honest services of the corporate officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of Hollinger,"" and if the objective of the scheme was ""private gain."" On appeal, the defendants explained that while their objective was ""private gain,"" the compensation had been crafted in order to avoid paying taxes to the Canadian government. Therefore, they argued that because their ""private gain"" was intended to be purely at the expense of the Canadian government and not the company, their actions did not violate the intent of Section 1346. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. It held that the deprivation of honest services owed to an employer is not mitigated simply because the inducement was a tax benefit obtained from a third party. The court reasoned that had the defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit committee and board of directors that the compensation was meant to bring about tax benefits, the committee and board very well may have reduced the pay-out in light of the tax benefits."
1068,"Jill L. Brown, Warden",William Charles Payton,"A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a ""catch-all factor"" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of you.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence."
594,Walker L. Chandler,Zell  D. Miller,"Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
1109,Carl Kircher et al.,Putnam Funds Trust et al.,"The Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation ""in connection with the purchase or sale"" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the appeal because 28 you.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA."
87,Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America,Walsh,"In order to achieve savings for Medicaid sales above federal cost - saving measures, its "" Maine Rx "" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with other manufacturers. If a company does not enter in a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre - empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without citing any factual issues, the District Court entered the preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's enforcement is sufficient to warrant pre - emption. The Court on Appeals reversed."
1492,Maryland,"Alonzo Jay King, Jr.","The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification purposes."
873,"United States, et al.","Texas, et al.","In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ( DACA ) system, charged with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce federal laws using DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS implemented a similar process for parents for citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ( DAPA ) program. Texas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice - and - comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The trial court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice - and - comment claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held, the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims."
507,Ryder,United States,"James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto."
650,County of Sacramento,Lewis,"Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
286,Executive Benefits Insurance Agency,Peter H. Arkison,"Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. ( BIA ) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the first commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long - time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. ( EBIA ). Pearce then deposited over $ 100, 000 into an account held simultaneously by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of his final judgment on the Trustee'd claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent mortgage claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court."
1104,Paul Gregory House,"Ricky Bell, Warden","Paul House was sentenced to death for murder based on circumstantial evidence. House then submitted a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that he had new evidence demonstrating his innocence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition, finding he had failed to show that it was ""more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence,"" the standard of review established for habeas petitions in Schlup v. Delo. Even though the evidence cast some doubt on the original evidence, it was not sufficient to warrant a habeas petition."
39,"Communist Party of Indiana, et al.","Edgar D. Whitcomb, etc., at al.","In 1972, the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party, wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party’s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied the motion."
858,McKune,Lile,"A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an ""Admission of Responsibility"" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged."
1663,Butler,Michigan,"John H. Griffin’s book <i>The Devil Rides Outside</i> traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to a police officer, he was arrested and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler’s application for leave to appeal."
298,Ford Motor Company,United States,"When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled to interest from the government for the period between the date of withdrawal and the ultimate refund, but the "" date of overpayment "" is not specifically defined. The Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) informed the Ford Motor Company ( Ford ) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS that covered the underpayment. Ford later requested that the deposits be considered to cover additional taxes the Ford owed. The parties eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a refund. Ford held that the date of overpayment was the date where it first submitted the deposits to the IRS for the underpayment of taxes, and the Government argued that the day of overpayment was the date when Ford asked that the payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district court, and the court found in favor of the Government. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
777,Julius A. Wolf,Colorado,"Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with attempting to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to the material and admissible arguments to whether co - defendants to be inadmissible if he were tried guilty. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld his three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violations in a Colorado law in a federal court."
703,"Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A.","Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.","Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of insolvency, or already insolvent, that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
769,Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu,United States,"In response to another Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the you. S. government decided to require Japanese - Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national emergency. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 10 February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese - American man living outside San Francisco, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu'death conviction."
318,Bowers,Hardwick,"Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari."
1245,"James J. Thole, et al.","U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.","Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against you.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
1412,"Howard K. Stern, Executor of the Estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall","Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall","The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith. The Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims."
590,Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty.,Brown,"Jill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns."
618,Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin,"United States, et al.","Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin ( Menominee Tribe ) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to its self - determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services ( HHS ). The self - determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS while those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government recover those costs via annual funding agreements. In 2004, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS ’ s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six - year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The federal court rejected the Menominee Tribe ’ s argument. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for final consideration, and federal district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were not exceptional circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from running."
576,Kansas,Colorado,"Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states'disputes. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The you. S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was due to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's judgment against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations on the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas had requested a "" river master "" to resolve a dispute regarding computer modeling of the river."
428,Leathers,Medlock,"In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services."
1190,James K. Kahler,Kansas,"Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence."
2206,"Theodore H. Frank, et al.","Paloma Gaos, et al.","In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 you.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013. Among the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”). The district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class. The Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above."
1369,Schindler Elevator Corporation,United States ex re. Daniel Kirk,"Daniel Kirk served with the you.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans. Using documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings."
340,Illinois,"Albert Krull, George Lucas, Salvatore Mucerino","The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant. Krull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed."
1483,"Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services",Auburn Regional Medical Center et al.,"Hospitals receive compensation from the federal government based on the number of low-income patients they serve. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) decides how much this payment will be. In an unrelated case, it came out that CMS miscalculated this payment between 1993 and 1996 so hospitals received less than they were due. In 2006, a group of hospitals filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) for full payment from the Department of Health and Human Services for years 1987-1994. Although the statute of limitations for such claims is 180 days, the hospitals argued that the limitations period should be tolled because CMS knowingly and unlawfully failed to disclose its error. The PRRB held that it did not have the authority to toll the statute of limitations, so the claims were untimely. The hospitals sued in district court, but the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the PRRB's decision was not final. The court also held that the relevant statute does not allow for tolling the statute of limitations. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that it did have jurisdiction because the PRRB decision was final. It also held that tolling the statute of limitations for ""good because"" is possible, but whether it is appropriate in this case is a question for remand. The court of appeals denied a petition for a rehearing en banc."
61,Dempsey,Martin,"Pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the you. S. Supreme Court citing Rule 39 with respect to a motion for certiorari. In October 1992, the Court had invoked Rule 39. 2 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39. 8 denial Dempsey had filed two petitions for certiorari and one petition for an extraordinary writ. After the 39. 8 denial, Dempsey submitted five petitions for certiorari. All eighteen of John's previous petitions are deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent."
1325,Gregory Greer,United States,"In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, the you.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 you.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review."
572,Department of State,"Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.","Prior to 1989, Hong Kong automatically granted Vietnamese immigrants temporary refuge. Due to increasing immigration rates from Vietnam, Hong Kong revoked the privilege in 1989 and began requiring that Vietnamese immigrants prove refugee status or be ""screened-out"" (advised to leave Hong Kong). The United States consulate continued to process visas for ""screened-out"" applicants until 1993, when the State Department specifically instructed the consulate to buttress Hong Kong's immigration policy by sending ""screened-out"" applicants back to Vietnam. Two applicants claimed that the department had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by denying visas to a class of applicants on the basis of their nationality and place of residence (8 you.S.C. 1152(a)). A district court held that the case was moot and granted summary judgment to the State Department. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (LAVAS) appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the decision and mandated that the foreign consulate continue to process the visa applications. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with Le v. United States Dept. of State."
1187,"United States Department of Commerce, et al.","State of New York, et al.","Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to put a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could because a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be barred from responding. The coalition claim the Secretary ’ s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and statutory provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought — and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized — depositions of high - ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross ’ s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government ’ s previous stay application without prejudice, “ provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken. ” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high - ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed. The government filed a petition of mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact - finding beyond the official records, or, in the interim, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the appeals court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reviewing the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction."
2056,Microsoft Corporation,"Seth Baker, et al.","The plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and alleged that, during regular game play on the Xbox 360, the discs would come loose due to vibrations and scratch against internal components of the gaming system, which rendered them permanently broken. Because only 0.4% of consoles caused this issue with regular players, the district court determined that a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own. The parties then stipulated a dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the dismissal, and the plaintiffs appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that the district court had misapplied applicable law and, therefore, abused its discretion in striking the class action allegations."
1968,Thomas Gibbons,Aaron Ogden,"A New York state law gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a 20-year monopoly over navigation on waters within state jurisdiction. Aaron Ogden and other competitors tried to forestall the monopoly, but Livingston and Fulton largely succeeded in selling franchise or buying competitors’ boats. Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license – formed a partnership with Ogden, which fell apart after three years when Gibbons operated another steamboat on a New York route belonging to Ogden. Ogden filed suit against Gibbons in New York state court, and received a permanent injunction. The New York state court rejected Gibbons’ argument asserting that you.S. Congress controlled interstate commerce."
1225,James Erin McKinney,State of Arizona,"By way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder. At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 you.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 you.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the you.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring."
851,Department of Housing and Urban Development,Rucker,"The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each ""public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be because for termination of tenancy."" Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to ""assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises."" After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the ""innocent"" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals."
1825,Flast,Cohen,Florence Flast and a group of taxpayers challenged federal legislation that financed the purchase of secular textbooks for use in religious schools. Flast argued that such use of tax money violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A district court held that the federal courts should defer when confronted with taxpayer suits directed against federal spending programs.
591,Lindh,Murphy,"Aaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning the motives of the State's psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment."
810,Lorillard Tobacco Company,Thomas F. Reilly,"The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid."
845,Brandon Thomas Betterman,State of Montana,"Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence hearing did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail-jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman’s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial."
1099,"Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.",Federal Election Commission,"The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) ran a series of television advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two you.S. Senators and tell them to oppose judicial filibusters. WRTL anticipated that the ads would probably run afoul of BCRA and sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking an order barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against the ads. WRTL's suit alleged that BCRA is unconstitutional as it applies to the ads, which it claimed are ""grassroots lobbying advertisements"" unrelated to electoral campaigning. The FEC argued that the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) had ruled out all ""as-applied"" challenges to BCRA. The you.S. District Court for D.C. agreed and denied WRTL's motion."
744,Roe,Flores-Ortega,"Lucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised him that he had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words ""bring appeal papers."" Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent."
380,Duckworth,Eagan,"When first questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer ""if and when you go to court."" The following day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible."
2157,"Philip D. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey, et al.","National Collegiate Athletic Association, et. al.","In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 you.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the gambling. In 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act (""2012 Act""), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events. Five sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law (""2014 Law"") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion of the panel."
1507,Arkansas Game & Fish Commission,United States,"From 1993 through 2000, the United States Army Corps of Engineers imposed a temporary flood regime around the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area. The flood regime caused flooding across the region encompassed by the wildlife management area, which restricted access to and destroyed or degraded thousands of timber trees. The petitioners brought a case in federal court in an attempt to recover under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment for the loss of their property resulting from the United State's flood regime. The federal court held that the flood regime constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and that the United States owed petitioners approximately $5.6 million as just compensation. The government appealed, and the appellate court reversed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court reasoned that the flood regime was a temporary government action, and that only a permanent flooding condition would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The petitioners appealed the appellate court's decision."
1173,"Fort Bend County, Texas",Lois M. Davis,"Lois Davis was an information technology ( IT ) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director ’ s resignation, her supervisor — who was a personal friend of the director — retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “ previous religious commitment, ” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “ intake questionnaire ” "" which she wrote in the word “ religion ” next to a checklist labeled “ Employment Harms or Actions ” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued its right - to - sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both sexual and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of the fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VI. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge suit, the district court dismissed Davis ’ s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative. by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement ( which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived ) or merely a prerequisite to suit (. thus subject to waiver ). Relying on the Supreme Court ’ s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 you. S. 500 ( 2006 ), in which the Court held that the Title VII ’ s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits."
670,Lewis,United States,"While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that ""whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment,"" Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder."
154,"Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama",Yvonne Kennedy et al.,"In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention, held that the original state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama Democrats, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama. The you. S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, ruling that because the local law was the most recent precleared rule put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being overturned."
212,"Esther Kiobel, et al.","Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.","The she will Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that these respondents, including the she will Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, citing the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants taking part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross - appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding because the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners'request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the proceedings, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a course of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."
1931,Robert R. Tolan,Jeffrey Wayne Cotton,"In the early morning hours of New Year's Eve 2008, Jeffrey Cotton, a police officer, fired three shots at Robert Tolan in front of Tolan's parents' home in Bellaire, Texas. Cotton mistakenly believed that Tolan and his cousin, Anthony Cooper, had stolen a black Nissan, because another officer had incorrectly entered the license plate number of Tolan's black Nissan Xterra. One bullet hit Tolan, collapsed his right lung, and pierced his liver. Tolan sued Cotton in district court and argued that he had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cotton filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity, which protects government officials from litigation when their conduct has not violated a clearly established right. The district court ruled in favor of Cotton and found that Cotton's use of force was not unreasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but declined to adopt the lower court's reasoning. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether he violated the Fourth Amendment because he did not violate a ""clearly established"" right. In support of its ruling, the Court of Appeals cited evidence that would lead a reasonable officer in Cotton's position to believe that Tolan presented an immediate threat to his safety."
1732,Charles Townsend,"Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois","The Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a ""truth serum."" While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction. Townsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to undisputed portions of the record."
7,Furman,Georgia,"Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively)."
990,"F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, et al.","Empagran S.A., et al.","Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), the Sherman Act (which regulates monopolies and attempts to unfairly raise prices) does not apply to foreign commerce unless that commerce significantly harms domestic commerce, American imports, or American exporters. In this case, several companies that purchase and resell vitamins sued several vitamin manufacturers for illegal attempts to raise prices, both within the United States and in foreign countries. The manufacturers asked the district judge to dismiss several of the vitamin purchasers from the case because they only did business in other countries and, the manufacturers argued, could therefore not bring claims under the Sherman Act. The purchasers countered that the foreign price-fixing attempts were linked to the domestic attempts and could therefore be heard under the exception to the FTAIA. The district court sided with the manufacturers. On appeal, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the price fixing schemes were independent of each other but that Congress' intent had been to prevent price-fixing both at home and abroad, and that even the foreign claims could therefore be brought under the exception to the FTAIA."
1028,"Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea",United States of America,"Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant ’ s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant ’ s sentence under 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( e ) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government ’ s motion and reduced the defendant, s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( a ) ( 2 ), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “ a defendant who has already sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission... if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ” The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and required in these five cases the sentence be based instead on the mandatory levels and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court."
1087,"Wachovia Bank, National Association","Daniel G. Schmidt, III, et al.","Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 you.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are ""deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located."" The Circuit Court interpreted ""located"" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both ""located"" and ""established"" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is ""established"" in the state where its main office is located, and ""located"" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was ""located"" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction."
84,Nevada Department of Human Resources,Hibbs,"William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( FMLA ). The law entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid labor annually for the onset of a "" serious health condition "" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he could report to work by a specified date. When Hibbs failed to say so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "" against any employer "" that "" assisted with, restrained, or denied the exercise. "" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for these violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed."
1793,Peter H. Klopfer ,North Carolina,"The State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a nolle prosequi with leave. This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state’s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute."
1129,Terance Martez Gamble,United States,"Charles Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in finding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by a State of Alabama. The Florida Supreme Court held in Abbate J. United States, 359 you. S. 187 ( 1959 ), that prosecution in federal and federal court of the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns ( the so - called “ separate sovereigns ” exception ). In this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court."
1126,Terance Martez Gamble,United States,"John Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a weapon as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the Federal government in prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 you. S. 187 ( 1959 ), that prosecution in federal and state governments of the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns ( the so - called “ separate sovereigns ” exception ). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court."
220,Missouri,Tyler G. McNeely,"On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit. The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision."
733,United States,"William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.","In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended help solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which were causing many farmers to go under. Authority for determine which crops would become affected was granted to his Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax credit as a receivers of American Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor."
384,Price Waterhouse,Ann B. Hopkins,"Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership. Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year. The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, 7 were women. The partnership selection process relied on recommendations by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with office staff. The district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board’s decision. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination."
1429,"Chantell Sackett, et vir","Environmental Protection Agency, et al.","Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the you.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition. The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the you.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an ""any information available"" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order."
122,Neil Randall et al.,William H. Sorrell et al.,"In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign expenditure law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's limitations, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of these contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $ 400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limit would stay constitutional as long as they were "" narrowly tailored "" to the state's interests."
394,"M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.","John Kerry, Secretary of State","In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to grandparents who became United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested to the you. S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as "" Israel, "" in accordance with Section 214 ( d ) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 ( Act ). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport and listed "" Jerusalem "" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214 ( c ). The district court dismissed the case on the basis that it presented a non - justiciable international question. The you. S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214 ( d ) "" impermissibly intereferes "" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope for Congress's limited power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch."
2103,James W. Ziglar,"Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi, et. al.","The respondents in this case are a group of male, non-you.S. citizens, most of whom are Muslim of Middle Eastern origin who were detained after the September 11, 2001 attacks and treated as “of interest” in the government’s investigation of these events. In their original claims, the plaintiffs alleged that they were detained without notice of the charges against them or information about how they were determined to be “of interest,” that their access to counsel and the courts was interfered with, and that they were subjected to excessively harsh treatment during their detention. They also asserted that their race, ethnicity, and national origin played a determinative role in the decision to detain them. The plaintiffs sued a number of government officials and argued that the government used their status as non-citizens to detain them when the government’s real purpose was to investigate whether they were terrorists and that the conditions of their confinement violated their Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. After a series of motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims regarding the length of confinement but allowed the Constitutional claims to proceed. Both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed various aspects of that ruling. While that appeal was pending, some of the plaintiffs settled their claims against the government and the you.S. Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that a complaint must allege sufficient facts to be plausible on its face and to allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the claimed conduct. Based on these events, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the length of confinement claims but remanded the conditions of confinement claims and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The appellate court again dismissed some of the claims and allowed others to proceed."
1771,Freedman,Maryland,"Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional."
174,"United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC",Weber,"The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber."
33,Paris Adult Theatre I,Slaton,"State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were ""hard core"" pornography unprotected by the Constitution."
1200,R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.,"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.","Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes. The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII."
310,Edward Lane,Steven Franks,"In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth (""CITY"") program at Central Alabama Community College (""CACC""). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public employee."
1036,"Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP",R. Scott Appling,"R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP ( “ Lamar ” ) to represent him in the proceedings against the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant legal fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In relying upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his pocket rather than paying the debt he owed with Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to settle the debt, and the bankruptcy court ruled that the amount was not owed pursuant to 11 you. S. C. § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling ’ s fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed. The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how to construe the statute at issue, this court explained that because Appling ’ s fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing and qualified as statements “ respecting [ his ]... financial condition ” under § 501 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ), the debt could be discharged."
688,Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board,College Savings Bank,"Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
2133,"District of Columbia, et al.","Theodore Wesby, et al.","On March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department officers responded to a noise complaint for a house party. Upon arrival, the officers heard loud music coming from the house. The officers then entered the house and observed party guests, including Theodore Wesby, drinking and watching “scantily clad women with money tucked into garter belts.” The partygoers claimed that a woman called “Peaches” was the host of the party, and that she had received permission from the owner, from whom Peaches was leasing the house. One partygoer called Peaches on the phone for an officer, since Peaches was not present. Peaches confirmed that she had permission from the owner, but when an officer called the owner, the owner claimed that the lease had not been executed and that he had not given permission for the party. The officers subsequently arrested the partygoers. Sixteen of the arrested partygoers sued the officers and the District of Columbia for false arrest. The district court ruled in favor of the partygoers. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed and held both that the officers did not have probable because for entry and were not entitled to immunity from liability. Probable because to arrest for unlawful entry under D.C. law exists where a reasonable officer concludes from information known at the time that the arrestee knew or should have known that they entered the house against the will of the owner. The court reasoned that, because the partygoers believed in good faith that the owner had given Peaches permission for the party, they could not have intended to enter unlawfully. The court also ruled that the officers were not entitled to immunity because it was unreasonable for them to believe that they were not violating the partygoers’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights against false arrest."
902,Clay,United States,"Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that runs from ""the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final."" The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
779,Illinois,Wardlow,"Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to ""specific reasonable inferences"" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to ""go on one's way."""
1879,United States,W.G. Reynolds and Mary N. Reynolds,"The United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land for use in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided “just compensation”. The Reynolds’ claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds’ $20,000 as compensation for all the land taken. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury’s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that the “scope of the project” issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury."
1332,Bridget Hardt,Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,"A Virginia federal district court remanded Bridget Hardt's claim for long-term disability benefits from Reliance Standard Life Insurance (""Reliance""). The court asked Reliance to reconsider its denial of Ms. Hardt's claim. Upon remand and after Ms. Hardt presented new evidence, Reliance changed its earlier stance and awarded Ms. Hardt full long-term disability benefits. Ms. Hardt then filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on her status as a prevailing party. The district court granted her motion and awarded her $39,149 in fees. On appeal, Reliance argued that Ms. Hardt was not a ""prevailing party"" as understood by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and thus was not eligible for an award of attorneys' fees. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. The court held that the district court's decision to remand Ms. Hardt's claim to Reliance did not constitute an enforceable judgment that Ms. Hardt prevailed on her claim because Reliance could have decided to deny her coverage."
17,Francis Haines,"Otto J. Kerner, former Governor of Illinois","Francis Haines was placed in solitary confinement for 15 days because he hit another inmate over the head with a shovel during a confrontation. Haines was 66 years old and suffered from a foot disability. He claimed his foot disability worsened due to being kept in solitary confinement, where he had to sleep on the floor with only blankets for support. Haines sued the State of Illinois and argued that the conditions of his solitary confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The State of Illinois moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Haines failed to state a because of action. The district court granted the dismissal, and stated that courts can only intercede with the internal operations of state prisons under exceptional circumstances. The district court also found that Haines had failed to show that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal and determined that state penitentiaries were entitled to their own discretion when punishing inmates."
1170,"Fort Bend County, Texas",Lois M. Davis,"Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 you.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits."
1295,Jean Marc Nken,"Eric Holder, Attorney General","The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied Jean Marc Nken's petition to reopen his case regarding his deportation. He appealed arguing that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion and should have used its sua sponte power to reopen his proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mr. Nken's claim that the Board failed to use its sua sponte power in order to reopen his case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Nken's motion for a stay of his removal until further proceeding by the Court."
159,"Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.",New York,"A New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the Town Justice, who determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, “the following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation” and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, the store’s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal."
900,Lawrence Eugene Shaw,United States,"Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu’s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu’s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu’s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $307,000 of Hsu’s money to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $131,000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $106,000. Hsu lost about $170,000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require. The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “to defraud a financial institution.” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1883,Tilton,Richardson,"The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose."
434,Florida,Jimeno,"A Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed."
878,Rocky Dietz,Hillary Bouldin,"Hillary Bouldin ’ s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz's in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The plaintiff made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz ’ s favor and awarded $ 300 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re - empaneled the jury. He asked Congress to re - determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties ’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $ 15, 000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred in recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors had not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal."
2035,Halo Electronics,"Pulse Electronics Inc., et al.","Halo Electronics, Inc. (Halo) and Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Pulse) are both suppliers of electronic components. Halo owns three patents regarding surface mount electronic packages; Pulse designs and sells surface mount electronic packages and does its manufacturing in Asia. In 2002, Halo unsuccessfully attempted to license their patents to Pulse. In 2007, Halo sued Pulse for patent infringement. The district court held that Pulse infringed on Halo’s patents with products shipped into the United States, had induced others to infringe on products delivered outside of the you.S. but ultimately imported into the you.S. as finished products, and found that it was highly probable that Pulse’s infringement was willful. The court later found that Pulse’s infringement was not willful. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that there was no “willful infringement.” In determining that there was no willful infringement, the appellate court applied a rigid two-part test established in In re Seagate that required that willfulness be proven on both an objective and subjective basis. In this case, the appellate court held that the objective prong was not met. This two-part test is similar to one the Supreme Court struck down last term in Octane Fitness, LLc v. ICON Health & Fitness, which dealt with a test for awarding attorneys fees. In the consolidated case, Stryker Corporation (Stryker) sued Zimmer, Inc. (Zimmer) over patent infringement of medical equipment. Stryker and Zimmer are both competitors in the market for pulsed lavage devices, which deliver pressurized irrigation for certain medical procedures in orthopedic medicine. Stryker holds three patents for pulsed lavage devices that it claimed Zimmer had infringed. The district court found Zimmer liable for patent infringement. The jury awarded Stryker treble damages as allowed under 35 you.S.C. § 284 on the grounds that Zimmer intentionally violated Stryker’s patents. Zimmer appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which requires that the patent-holder prove the infringement was willful to be eligible for treble damages. Therefore, the appellate court overturned the award for treble damages on the grounds that Zimmer did not intentionally violate Stryker’s patents."
2377,"HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al.","Renewable Fuels Association, et al.","Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship. The you.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011."
1643,"James Obergefell, et al.","Richard Hodges, Director of the Ohio Department of Health, et al.","Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process."
2315,Nidal Khalid Nasrallah,"William P. Barr, Attorney General","Nidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year. In 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 you.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah a deferral, and it ordered his removal. Nasrallah appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 you.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah’s claim for lack of jurisdiction."
686,Geissal,Moore Medical Corporation,"The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a ""qualifying event,"" such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of ""the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan."" The Court of Appeals affirmed."
448,"William G. Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al.","John Aaron, et al.","The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court'earlier decision in Brown v. Board of Education. On February 20, 1958, five months after the integration crisis involving the Little Rock Nine, members of the school board ( along with the Superintendent of Schools ) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, for suspension of its plan of desegregation. The relief that plaintiffs requested were for the African American children to be returned to segregated homes and for the suspension of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The district court granted the school board's request, and the United States Court on Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed."
62,"Allen F. Breed, Director of California Your Authority ",Gary Steven Jones,"A juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult. Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy. The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ. The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree. Jones again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before juvenile court and criminal trials are so different that double jeopardy did not apply. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts. The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system."
102,"San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.","City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.","The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the plaintiff in state Court, arguing a $ 567, 000 lease fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued to federal district court that the transaction violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state - court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, prevented litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court ( the rule of "" issue preclusion "" ). The plaintiff asked a district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause."
68,"Harris County Commissioners Court, et al.","Richard E. Moore, et al.","The Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts. This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms. The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection and state constitutional violations. Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial. A three-judge federal district court held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed some officials but not others. The court did not decided the state constitutional issue."
2277,Evangelisto Ramos,State of Louisiana,"Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review."
0,Jane Roe,Henry Wade,"In 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff’s identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor’s orders to save a woman’s life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments."
238,United States,Ross,"Acting on a tip that Ross was selling drugs from his car in the District of Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, and discovered a bag of heroin. After returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant in each search."
1188,Parents Involved In Community Schools,Seattle School District No. 1 et al.,"The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Under the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a ""compelling government interest"" and must be ""narrowly tailored"" to that interest. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. The District then petitioned for an ""en banc"" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point."
431,Exxon Corporation,"Central Gulf Lines, Inc.","For certain contract disputes within admiralty jurisdiction, an action in rem is authorized against the vessel herself, even when jurisdiction cannot be asserted over her owner or operator. To satisfy a judgment for the plaintiff, the court may order the vessel sold at public auction. Such an action is permitted those who go unpaid after furnishing a vessel with supplies essential for her continued voyaging. But maritime law long distinguished the contracts of middlemen, that is, agents or brokers procuring supplies for a vessel from other sources. Such intermediary contracts were considered ordinary agency agreements, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. The Supreme Court embraced this distinction in Minturn v. Minyard, 58 you.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854). In this case, EXXON sued a cargo ship, the William Hopper, in rem and her owner, Central Gulf Lines, in personam for the price of fuel delivered to the ship in the ports of New York and Jeddah. Exxon had a contract with Waterman Steamship Company to supply fuel for its fleet anywhere in the world. Sometimes EXXON furnished its own fuels; otherwise, EXXON procured fuels from other sellers. Among the vessels operated by Waterman was the William Hopper, leased from Central Gulf Lines. When she visited New York, Exxon supplied her with its own fuel. When she visited Jeddah, EXXON got her fuel from Arabian Marine Operating Company. EXXON paid Arabian Marine, but Waterman went bankrupt before paying EXXON. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Central Gulf agreed to pay EXXON if a court found the William Hooper liable in rem. Invoking Minturn and its progeny, the Southern District of New York agreed with Central Gulf Lines that Exxon's claim for the fuel procured in Jeddah was one of agency, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without opinion."
194,"Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.","Michael B. Whiting, et al.","Various business and civil - rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ( "" LAWA "" ) in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E - Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted by or directly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ( "" IRCA "" ). The court reasoned that IRCA because IRCA expressly preempts all state and local rules or sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws ( like LAWA – from federal reach. The court also reasoned that mandating and creation of E - Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E - Verify participation."
202,Ventura E. Ybarra,State of Illinois,"On March 1, 1976, an Illinois Circuit Court judge authorized a warrant to search the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern and the person of the bartender Greg for heroin and other drug paraphernalia, based on information the Illinois Bureau of Investigation obtained from an informant. When officers arrived to conduct the search, they also conducted a cursory pat down for weapons on all of the patrons in the bar, pursuant to an Illinois state statute that allows officers to search persons on the premises during the execution of a valid search warrant. During the pat down, an officer found and retrieved a cigarette pouch from the pocket of one of the patrons, Ventura Ybarra, that contained tin foil packets of a substance later confirmed to be heroin. Ybarra was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the contraband that had been seized from his person during the search at the bar. The trial court denied the motion. Ybarra was found guilty. On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to the facts of this case because it was obvious that there was a connection between Ybarra and the premises being searched. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra’s petition for appeal."
44,Idaho,Laura Lee Wright,"Laura Lee Wright and her ex - husband Louis Wright had previously agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half - sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright ’ later, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen with her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly reminiscent of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor. During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of their defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall within a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted, children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction."
421,New York,Bernard Harris,"On January 1, 1984, officers of the New York City Police Department found Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Various facts of the case linked Bernard Harris to the crime. On January 16, police officers responded to Harris’ house to take him into custody. Although the police had not obtained an arrest warrant, when they knocked on his door, Harris let them enter. The police officers read Harris his Miranda rights, and Harris admitted to committing the murder. The police officers arrested Harris and took him to the police station, where he was read his Miranda rights again and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and the district attorney, despite Harris' requests to cease the interrogation. The trial court suppressed Harris’ initial confession and video interview but allowed the signed statement into evidence. After a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and found the signed statement inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest."
466,Crown Kosher Super Market,Gallagher,"The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Monday until sundown next Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted over one - third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts ’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing no labor, service, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect traditional religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of alcohol."
1493,Steven A. Levin,"United States, et al.","On March 12, 2003, Steven Levin was scheduled to undergo cataract surgery performed by Lieutenant Commander Frank Bishop, M.D., a United States Navy surgeon in Guam. Levin previously gave his written consent to the procedure but claims that he attempted to orally withdraw it prior to the surgery. He suffered complications from the surgery and faces continuing treatment with unclear likelihood of success. Levin sued Dr. Bishop for battery and negligent medical malpractice. The United States substituted itself for Dr. Bishop and filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the negligent medical malpractice claim, not the battery claim. The United States then filed for dismissal of the battery claim and alleged that the Federal Tort Claims Act preserved sovereign immunity against battery claims. The district court dismissed the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
546,Gray,Netherland,"Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims."
1754,New York Times Company,Sullivan,"During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed."
1627,Anthony Elonis,United States,"Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 you. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a ""true threat,"" which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that ""true threats"" require a subjective intent to threaten. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the ""true threat"" exception was created to prevent."
64,Julian Vell,Ford Motor Company,"Julian Vella, a seaman on the SS Robert MacNamara, suffered a severe head injury while doing a repair on the ship. This caused damage to Vella’s inner ear, making it difficult for him to balance. Doctors ruled the condition permanent and incurable. A jury awarded Vella maintenance and cure for his injury. The district court denied the ship owner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The ship owner argued that because the injury was permanent, maintenance and cure was not permissible. The appellate court reversed."
482,"Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.",City of Hialeah,"The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities."
253,Raymond L. Dirks,Securities and Exchange Commission,"In 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York-based firm that specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. On March 6, he received insider information that Equity Funding of America, a corporation engaged primarily in selling life insurance and mutual funds, had vastly overstated assets as a result of fraudulent company policies. Dirks did not do any business with Equity Funding, but he decided to investigate and, during the investigation, discussed his information with investors who did hold Equity Funding stock. Some of these people sold their stock based on Dirks’ information. Dirks also urged the Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud allegations, but it would not for fear of the story being libelous. The drop in Equity Funding’s share price caused the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal ran a story that was based largely on Dirks’ information, and the SEC then began investigating Dirks’ role in the affair. In their investigation of Dirks’ actions, the SEC found that he had aided and abetted the violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by informing other members of the investment community of the fraud allegations. However, because he assisted in exposing the fraud, Dirks was only censured. Dirks appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision."
2123,"Ray White, et al","Daniel T. Pauly, as personal representative of the estate of Samuel Pauly, et al.","Officer Kevin Truesdale responded to a report of a drunk driver and interviewed the two women who called 911. They gave him the license plate of the car that they observed driving recklessly, and the officer ran a search that showed the car was registered to the address of Daniel and Samuel Pauly. Officer White and Officer Mariscal joined Officer Truesdale, and they determined that there was probable because to arrest the driver and wanted to speak with him. Officer White stayed behind, and the other two officers proceeded to the address. They found two residences at the addresses and approached the one with lights and in which they saw people moving. They yelled to the occupants to open the door or they were coming in. The Pauly brothers heard people yelling but claimed that the voices never identified themselves as police officers. The Pauly brothers yelled back that they had guns, and Daniel Pauly fired out the door. Officer White arrived on the scene as this was happening. He took cover, then fired at Samuel, who was leaning out the door and pointing his gun in Officer White’s direction. Officer White’s shot killed Samuel. Daniel and Samuel’s estate sued the officers and argued that the officers violated the brothers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. The officers moved for summary judgment and argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. The district court denied the motion, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that reasonable officers should have known that their conduct would because the Pauly brothers to defend their home in a manner that required the police to respond with deadly force. Especially in the case of Officer White, who arrived later to the scene, the court determined that a reasonable officer would have determined that a warning was required before firing. The appellate court also held that these rules were clearly established at the time of the incident."
1470,Luis Mariano Martinez,"Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections","Luis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. The you.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel."
720,City of West Covina,Perkins,"Police officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with the information he was already provided. This meant the search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it."
2219,"Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.","Rochelle Garza, as Guardian ad Litem to Unaccompanied Minor J. D.","Jane Doe entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor when she was eight weeks pregnant. She was detained by immigration authorities, and placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). She was later placed in a federally funded shelter in Texas, where, after a medical examination, she requested an abortion. ORR denied her request on the grounds that agency policy prohibited shelter staff from taking any action to facilitate an abortion without direction and approval from the ORR director absent emergency circumstances. Doe’s guardian ad litem, Rochelle Garza, filed a putative class action challenging the constitutionality of ORR’s policy on behalf of Doe and “all other pregnant unaccompanied minors in ORR custody.” On October 18, 2017, the district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) permitting Doe to have an abortion immediately. The next day, Doe attended pre-abortion counseling, which was required under Texas law to take place at least 24 hours in advance of the procedure, and with the same doctor who would perform the abortion. On October 20, a panel of the D.C. Circuit court vacated the pertinent portions of the TRO on the grounds that ORR’s policy did not constitute an “undue burden.” However, sitting en banc, on October 24 the appellate court vacated the panel order and remanded the matter to the district court. The same day, Garza asked the court for an amended restraining order, requesting that the government make Doe available to repeat the required pre-abortion counseling. The district court granted Garza’s request, and arrangements were made for Doe to have the counseling appointment at 7:30 a.m. on October 25. The details of the subsequent events were disputed, but the government, under the impression that the soonest the abortion would happen was October 26, informed Garza’s counsel that they planned to appeal the new order early on the morning of October 25. However, the same doctor who conducted Doe’s pre-abortion counseling became available for her October 25 appointment, so the appointment was moved up to 4:15 a.m. and Doe had the abortion instead of repeating the counseling with a new doctor. Because the abortion made the government’s claim moot, it did not ask the Supreme Court to review the en banc order as planned, but instead filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the appellate court’s en banc ruling so that it would not stand as precedent. The government also sought sanctions against Garza’s lawyers, arguing that they had made misrepresentations in an attempt to avoid Supreme Court review."
649,"Lexecon, Inc.",Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach,"Lexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact ""to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,"" but provides that the Panel ""shall"" remand any such action to the original district ""at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings."" After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to ""transfer"" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment."
1180,Kevin C. Rotkiske,"Paul Klemm, et al.","Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule,” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court."
305,Manuel Jose Lozano,Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez,"Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally ""very happy together."" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved. After Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in you.S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would because undue harm. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
516,Wilson,Arkansas,"In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to ""knock and announce"" before entering."
132,"First National Bank of Boston, et al.","Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts","The National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute."
864,United States Army Corps of Engineers,"Hawkes Co., Inc., et al.","Hawkes Co., Inc. ( Hawkes ) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high - quality peat. They applied to the Army Corps of Engineers ( Corps ) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed, said the permit process would be very costly and would require a long time and he urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes ’ plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “ oceans of the United States, ” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a “ final agency action ” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject for judicial review. The you. S. Court for Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final federal action and dismissed the action for judicial review."
140,Jose Ernesto Medellin,State of Texas,"Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the you.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution."
1774,Time Inc.,James J. Hill,"In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine (""Life"") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. (""Time"") certiorari."
2159,"Carlo J. Marinello, III",United States of America,"Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution. One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 you.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who ""in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title."" Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase ""the due administration of this title"" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence."
165,"Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York","The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.","In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non-public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association (CHA), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks' compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act (FHA) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication."
13,Gravel,United States,"In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning you.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers."
1196,Andre Martello Barton,"William P. Barr, Attorney General","A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B - 2 visitor visa. Three years later, by 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies : aggravated assault, first - degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating a Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security issued Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable ( deportable ) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 you. S. C. § 1229b ( a ), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful temporary resident if, for other things, the individual “ has resided outside the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status. ” This residency requirement is subject to a “ stop - time rule ” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when that individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “ inadmissible ” or “ removable. ” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time - stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1995 crimes did not trigger the stop - time rule because as an already - admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “ rendered inadmissible ” within the meaning of § 1229b ( a ). The immigration judge ruled in the government ’ s favor, and in a non - precedential single - member decision, of Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge ’ s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission ( or readmission ) to be “ rendered inadmissible. ”"
451,Junius Irving Scales,United States,"The Smith Act's secrecy clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally associated with membership in the Communist Party of the United States ( "" Party "" ) because it advocated the overthrow of the government "" as much as circumstances would permit. "" Challenging his previous charge, Scales claimed, the Internal Security Act of 1950 ( "" Security Act "" ) provided that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se breach of any criminal statute. After hearing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review."
980,Raytheon Company,Joel Hernandez,"In 1991, Joel Hernandez tested positive for cocaine use in a drug test administered by his employer. As a result of the incident, he was forced to resign. In 1994, he reapplied for a job from the company. His application was rejected. Hernandez claimed that the company was discriminating against him because of his drug and alcohol addiction (though at the time he reapplied he had been sober for two years) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The district court sided with the company, dismissing the case before it ever went to trial. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed, however, holding that Raytheon's decision not to rehire Hernandez because of an incident related to his past addiction could constitute discrimination under the act."
954,John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner,Texas,"Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 you.S. 186 (1986), controlling."
1778,"A Book Named ""John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure""",Attorney General of Massachusetts,"A special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings against an ""obscene"" book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. The book, also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750. Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene."
480,Lamb's Chapel,Center Moriches Union Free School District,"A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court."
1012,United States,Carlos Dominguez Benitez,"Carlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a ""plain error"" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a ""plain error"" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision."
280,Minnesota,Marshall Donald Murphy,"In 1974, Marshall Murphy was questioned by Minneapolis police about the rape and murder of a teenage girl, but he was never charged. In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in an unrelated criminal sexual conduct case and was sentenced to a 16-month suspended prison sentence and three years probation. During probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders at Alpha House and to see a probation officer. While at Alpha House, Murphy admitted to the 1974 rape and murder. An Alpha House counselor contacted Murphy’s probation officer about the admission and the officer called Murphy in for a meeting. During the meeting Murphy became angry and said he “felt like calling a lawyer” but still admitted to the rape and murder. The probation officer relayed the information from the meeting to the police, and Murphy was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Murphy tried to suppress testimony about the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession, and the confession was not compelled or involuntary. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the confession violated the Fifth Amendment because Murphy’s parole officer knew that Murphy’s answers were likely to be incriminating."
205,Barion Perry,New Hampshire,"Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was ""unnecessarily suggestive"" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction."
366,Coy,Iowa,"John Coy was tried in an Iowa court for sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. When the girls were testifying against Coy, the court placed a large screen in front of him so that the girls would not have to see him. The jury proceeded to convict him. Coy argued that Iowa Code 910A, which provides for the use of a screen in child sexual abuse cases, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers face-to-face. He also claimed that the code violated his right to due process, since having a screen placed between him and the girls made him appear guilty before he was properly tried. The trial court dismissed these claims and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed."
529,Shaw,Hunt,"Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court."
1029,Illinois,Roy I. Caballes,"During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, ""unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."""
560,Meghrig,"KFC Western, Inc.","Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an ""imminent and substantial endangerment"" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for ""equitable restitution"" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a because of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an ""imminent and substantial endangerment"" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues."
1045,"Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et al.","Grokster, Ltd., et al.","Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1038,"Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP",R. Scott Appling,"R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP ( “ Lamar ” ) to represent him in legal proceedings involving the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant court fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar Lamar was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to collect his debt, and the trial court determined that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 you. S. C. § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling ’ s fraudulent disclosure. The district court affirmed. The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how to construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling ’ that fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing "" qualified as statements “ respecting [ his ]... financial condition ” under § 523 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ), the debt could be discharged."
1218,New York State Board of Elections et al.,Margarita Lopez Torres et al.,"New York trial court judges are appointed by way of a ""district convention system."" Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates. A District Court found that the system unnecessarily and excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a ""single successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders."" The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association."
1284,Clemente Avelino Pereida,"Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General","Clemente Avelino Pereida, a businessman and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent homeland security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies with a crime involving moral turpitude ; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida ’ s right to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, as Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did indeed establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals ’ ruling that he did not show his eligibility and denied Pereida ’ s petition for review."
292,Keeton,"Hustler Magazine, Inc.","Kathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the longest in the United States had not run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The Court of Appeals also found the application of the ""single publication rule,"" which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire."
1749,Winston Massiah ,United States,"After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
1811,Lee E. A. Parker,Clarence T. Gladden,"On May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During the trial, the bailiff stated to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, “Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.” Misses Inwards and Drake, both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court. After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs’ statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror who was sure of the bailiffs’ statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff’s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman’s. Parker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff’s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff’s statements did not violate Parker’s state or federal constitutional rights."
914,Chavez,Martinez,"Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed."
2064,"Amgen Inc., et al.",Steve Harris,"Current and former employees of Amgen, Inc. (Amgen) and Amgen Manufacturing, Limited (AML) participated in two employer-sponsored pension plans (the Plans). The Plans included holdings in the Amgen Common Stock Fund which held only Amgen common stock. The plaintiffs were a group of employees who filed a class action suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against Amgen, AML, Amgen’s board of directors, and the Fiduciary Committees of the Plans when the value of the Amgen common stock fell. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by allowing the participants to purchase and hold Amgen stock while knowing its price was artificially inflated. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds that the district court did not properly apply the “presumption of prudence” as illustrated in Quan v. Computer Science Corp. The presumption of prudence explains that the fiduciary who invests assets in the employer’s stock is entitled to a presumption that they acted consistently with ERISA. The court found that even if the presumption of prudence did apply, the plaintiffs had sufficiently argued a violation of the defendant’s fiduciary duty. On remand, the district court again dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals again reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded the case in light of its decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, which held that ERISA fiduciaries who administer employee stock ownership plans are not entitled to a presumption of prudence but are “subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general, except that they need not diversify the fund’s assets.” The appellate court again reversed the dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds."
232,"Ted Engle, Superintendant, Chillicothe Correctional Institute","Lincoln Isaac, et al.","In 1974, Ohio enacted a statute that stated, while the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense rested on the defendant. From 1974 until 1976, Ohio state courts operated as though this statute did not affect Ohio's traditional rule that a defendant had to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute placed only the burden of production of such evidence — as opposed to the burden of persuasion — on the defendant, and jury instructions were altered accordingly. The respondents, Lincoln Isaac, Kenneth Bell, and Howard Hughes, each had separate trials that occurred after the 1974 statute was put in place, but before the 1976 decision. At the time of their trials, none of the respondents objected to the jury instructions regarding how the jury should consider evidence of self-defense. The Ohio Criminal Code required defendants to raise any objections to jury instructions at the time the instructions are given. The respondents filed petitions in federal district courts for writs of habeas corpus and used the 1976 decision to challenge the jury instructions trial. The courts denied the writs. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and rejected the argument regarding the jury instructions because it had not been made at the time of the trial. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case."
1085,"Apple, Inc.","Robert Pepper, et al.","This lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale. Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 you.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing."
480,"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.",United States,"Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II."
1135,"Bertram Rice, Warden, et al.",Steven Martell Collins,"At Collins' state-court drug trial, he alleged that the prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on account of her race. The prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations for the strike, which the trial court accepted. Upon being convicted, Collins appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. According to the Court of Appeal, the juror's youth and demeanor were both valid reasons for striking her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Collins' habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to a state-court finding of fact unless it is an ""unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."" Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit had acted correctly."
656,Philip and Mendes Cohen,Virginia,"An act of Congress authorized the holding of a lottery in the District from Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D. C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities prosecuted and prosecuted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to become the final arbiters of competition between the states and the national economy."
307,City of Renton,"Playtime Theatres, Inc.","The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of ""any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school."" Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement."
1536,United States,Quality Stores Inc. et al.,"In October 2001, Quality Stores -- a national company -- and its affiliates commenced bankruptcy proceedings. When laying off employees, Quality Stores issued severance pay as part of its employees' gross income and reported the payments for federal income tax purposes as ""wages"" on W-2 forms. As required for ""wages"", the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax was paid on severance payments. FICA is a tax imposed on wages earned to fund Social Security and Medicare; both employer and employee pay part of the tax. The employee's part is withheld from his paycheck. Quality Stores contends that severance pay does not qualify as ""wages"", but rather payments under a Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) plan that are not taxable under FICA. SUB is a corporate program that creates severance payments in the event of involuntary termination; SUB payments do not qualify as ""wages"" under FICA because they are given after termination of a job rather than for work completed. Based on this line of reasoning, Quality Stores filed for a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS did not respond to Quality Stores' request for a refund, neither by allowing the claim nor denying it, and Quality Stores sued the IRS. The federal district court agreed with Quality Stores' view on severance payments. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that severance pay satisfies the elements Congress set out to determine SUB payments, which therefore makes such payments exempt from FICA taxes."
728,Bank of America,203 North LaSalle Partnership,"Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association issued a $93 million loan to 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, part of a Chicago office building. When the debtor defaulted on the loan, the bank began foreclosure. LaSalle filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's purposed reorganization plan called for only previous equity holders to contribute new capital in exchange for the debtor's entire ownership of the reorganized entity. The Bank of America objected. The bank's objection prevented confirmation of the plan. LaSalle resorted to a judicial ""cramdown"" process for imposing the plan on Bank of America. The cramdown process requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the creditors so a judge will authorize it. Bank of America argued the plan violated the cramdown's ""absolute priority rule,"" which prevents debtor's equity holders from receiving ownership when claims will not be paid in full and, thus, the plan should have been denied. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision."
711,Lilly,Virginia,"Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes and because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial."
897,Marcelo Manrique,United States,"Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a prison term for supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did not include an amount for mandatory restitution and damages that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeals before the amended judgment was entered. When the amended judgment became entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that it did still have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award."
513,Campbell-Ewald Company,Jose Gomez,"On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message advertising the you. S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership by the Navy and the Campbell - Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list by targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics. Gomez sued and asserted that that Campbell - Ewald broke the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third - party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell - Ewald ’ s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell - Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez ’ s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell - Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity if it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The I. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell - Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects."
1229,Michael A. Watson,United States,"Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 you.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who ""uses or carries"" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs ""uses"" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that ""use"" means ""active employment"" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of ""use."""
1111,Bobby Lee Holmes,South Carolina,"Bobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to death after he was convicted of murder and several other crimes. At trial, he was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting that another person had committed the crimes. Under South Carolina law, defendants ""seeking to present evidence of third-party guilt must [limit the evidence] to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence."" Evidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another person is not admissible. Using this standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to allow the evidence."
291,Heckler,Day,"Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) establishes a four-step review process of disputed disability benefit claims. First, a state agency determines if a claimant has a disability and when the condition began or ended. Second, state agencies' disability determinations can be reviewed upon the claimant's request. Third, if upon review the claimant suffers an adverse finding he or she may demand an evidentiary hearing by an administrative law judge. Fourth, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, they may appeal to the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Claiming delays in excess of 90 days, during steps two and three, Leon Day sued on behalf of several similarly aggrieved Vermont claimants alleging a violation of the ""reasonable time"" hearing limitation. On appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling upholding a district court's imposition of disability hearing deadlines, the Supreme Court granted HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler certiorari."
1431,"Pacific Operators of Offshore, LLP, et al.",Luisa L. Valladolid,"Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (""OCSLA"") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (""LHWCA""). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the ""situs-of-injury"" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is ""a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf."" Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results."
118,"Hazelwood School District; C. O. McDonald, Superintendent; Robert Bischof, Robert Coleman, Dorothy Smith, Charles Sweeney, Donald Mattox and Milton Strauss, Members of the Board of Education of the Hazelwood School District",United States,"The you.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment for Hazelwood, finding that the government’s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located."
172,"Harrah Independent School District, et al.",Mary Jane Martin,"Mary Jane Martin, a tenured teacher at Harrah Independent School District, was required to earn five college credits every three years as continuing education. Martin refused to comply with this requirement and did not receive a pay increase each year her contract was renewed. The Oklahoma legislature passed a law requiring a mandatory pay increase every year regardless of compliance with the continuing education. Looking for an alternative consequence, the school board warned Martin that they would not renew her contract the following year if she did not complete her continuing education. Martin refused, and the school board voted to terminate her for “willful neglect of duty”. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain administrative relief, Martin sued the school district for Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the case, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the termination violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
1161,"Thomas L. Carey, Warden",Mathew Musladin,"Mathew Musladin was convicted of the murder of Tom Studer. At Musladin's trial, Studer's family wore buttons showing pictures of the victim. Musladin's defense attorney requested that the trial judge tell the family to take off the buttons because they were prejudicial to the defense, but the judge denied the motion. Musladin later appealed his conviction to a state appellate court, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. The appellate court held that though the buttons were an ""impermissible factor"" and should be discouraged, they were not so prejudicial that he had been denied his Due Process right to a fair trial. Musladin filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, but it was denied. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the appellate court, and sent the case back the District Court. Under 28 you.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1), a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court can grant habeas relief to a defendant convicted in state court only if the state court decision was ""contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."" The Ninth Circuit found that this standard had been met, because the state court decision had been ""objectively unreasonable."" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court should have recognized the buttons as inherently prejudicial to the defense. In addition to Supreme Court precedents, the majority of the Circuit Court panel relied on one of the Circuit's own precedents that specifically dealt with buttons in the courtroom. The dissent argued that this reliance contradicted AEDPA's requirement that habeas courts consider the law ""as determined by the Supreme Court."" The majority considered the use of the Circuit precedent appropriate because it applied general principles set down by the Supreme Court."
497,Bernard Shapiro,Vivian Marie Thompson,"Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen - year - old mother of one child who applied for aid under her Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC ) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not have the state's one - year residency requirement. This issue was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that They had not resided in the District of Columbia for another year immediately preceding the filing in their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania in at least a year prior to their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code."
2271,Gerald P. Mitchell,State of Wisconsin,"In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222. Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts. Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it."
257,Illinois,"Lance Gates, et ux","The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons."
1258,Edward Jerome Harbison,"Ricky Bell, Warden","Edward Jerome Harbison was convicted in a Tennessee state court of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through the Tennessee courts, a federal district court appointed Mr. Harbison a federal public defender to represent him in filing a federal habeas corpus petition. That petition was denied by the both the federal district court as well as the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As Tennessee law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as counsel in state clemency proceedings, Mr. Harbison's federal public defender requested to represent him in his state clemency proceedings. Both the district court and Sixth Circuit denied the request, holding that federal law does not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state matters."
998,Engine Manufacturers Association and Western States Petroleum Association,"South Coast Air Quality Management District, et al.","The Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) sued the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) - established under the California Health and Safety Code - in federal district court. The EMA alleged that the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempted SCAQMD's ""fleet rules"" - rules that required new commercial vehicles to meet specific emissions standards - and that the rules were therefore illegal. The EMA pointed to section 209 of the act, which prohibits states from enforcing ""any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles."" Reasoning that the regulations affected the standards at which engines could be sold, not the standards to which they must be manufactured, and finding that Congress's purpose was to protect manufactures from ""having to build engines in compliance with a multiplicity of standards,"" the district court ruled that the CAA did not preempt California's fleet rules. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
1097,"Howard Delivery Service, Inc., et al.",Zurich American Insurance Co.,"Under West Virginia law, employers are required to either participate in a state-run workers' compensation fund or demonstrate that they are financially capable of covering any workers' compensation claims that may arise. Howard Delivery service, a West Virginia freight carrier, chose to fulfill its obligation by purchasing insurance from Zurich American Insurance Company. In January of 2002, however, the company cancelled its policy (still owing thousands of dollars in unpaid premiums) and filed for bankruptcy. Zurich filed for special status as a creditor, arguing that the money owed to them consisted of ""contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,"" and that under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code they should therefore be given priority in recovering the premiums. The bankruptcy court rejected Zurich's claims, however, finding that the provision did not apply to the workers compensation insurance premiums because they were not wage-substitute-type benefits for which the company could bargain (because Howard was required by law to have some form of insurance). A federal district court affirmed the decision, but a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that contributions to an employee benefit plan did not need to be voluntary to meet the Chapter 11 definition."
1206,"CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al.","Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.","In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1, 900 - mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needs to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit by the Corps of Engineers. As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an unseen anchor, causing approximately 264, 000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $ 143 million. Frescati originally paid for its cleanup and was then reimbursed $ 88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati, the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil. At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third - party beneficiary of CITGO ’ s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati ( thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories ). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( NOAA ), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO ’ s liability by 50 %. The government, CITGO, and Frescati in appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part, claims. "
1550,"Randy White, Warden",Robert Keith Woodall,"On January 25, 1997, a sixteen-year-old girl was kidnapped, murdered, and raped. After an investigation, the police arrested Robert Woodall, who subsequently pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. At trial, Woodall invoked his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination and declined to testify, and so he asked the judge to instruct the jury not to make any adverse inferences from that decision. The judge refused to issue the ""no adverse inference"" instruction and stated that, by entering a guilty plea, Woodall waived his right to be free from self-incrimination. The jury found Woodall guilty on all charges and the judge sentenced him to the death penalty and two subsequent life sentences. Woodall appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed both Woodall's conviction and sentence. In 2006, Woodall filed a habeus corpus petition in federal court, and that court held that the trial court violated Woodall's Fifth Amendment right when it refused to offer the requested jury instruction. In addition, that court also held that Woodall's Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court allowed the state to dismiss an African-American juror without a mandatory hearing for because. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue of self-incrimination but did not address the other issues."
445,"William G. Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al.","John Aaron, et al.","The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. On February 20, 1958, five months after the integration crisis involving the Little Rock Nine, members of the school board (along with the Superintendent of Schools) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, urging suspension of its plan of desegregation. The relief the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The district court granted the school board's request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed."
509,James Higginbotham,Stella Connell,"Stella Connell applied for a teaching job with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as his substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign any loyalty oath required on all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “ will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida ” and “ don't believe in the unity of the government of the two States or overthrow the State in Florida by force or violence. ” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to State Supreme Court."
287,Lynch,Donnelly,"The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading ""Seasons Greetings,"" and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket."
79,Medical Board of California,Hason,"The California Medical Board denied Hason a license to practice medicine regardless of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that those rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by its 11th Amendment's requirement of sovereign immunity, that prohibits a private party from suing a non - consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the Act "" and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II. """
833,Palazzolo,Rhode Island,"Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected ""coastal wetlands,"" on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of ""all economically beneficial use"" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property."
360,Andre Lee Coleman,"Todd Tollefson, et al.","The ""three strikes"" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The you.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a ""strike."""
101,"San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.","City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.","The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $ 567, 000 conversion fee they had to pay until 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had previously resolved in their state - court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing any federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court ( the rule of "" issue preclusion "" ). The state requested the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause."
23,Barry Goldwater et al.,"James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al.","President Jimmy Carter acted against congressional interference, ending a peace treaty with Taiwan."
1370,"PLIVA, Inc., et al.",Gladys Mensing,"Gladys Mensing took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug gave her a severe neurological movement disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label. Metoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the lawsuit to be thrown out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide. A federal judge on the you.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the you.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks."
143,Jose Ernesto Medellin,State of Texas,"Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post - conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a month the right to use his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court ( see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) holding that the you. S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals ( including Medellin ) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him some individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez - Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited the memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by deciding the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez - Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted in the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, of that, imply a law -, power not allocated to him by the Constitution."
1027,"Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea",United States of America,"Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants was convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of one defendant ’ s trial, their government moved to reduce the defendant ’ s sentence under 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( e ) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government ’ s motion and reduced the defendant ’ s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “ a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission... if such a reduction is consistent with previous policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ” The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ) increases. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentences be based on the range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court."
871,United States,"Fior D'Italia, Inc.","Employers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, calculated as a percentage of the wages, including tips, that their employees receive. In 1991 and 1992, Fior D'Italia restaurant paid FICA taxes based on the tip amount its employees reported, but the reports also showed that the tips listed on customers' credit card slips far exceeded the reported amount. The IRS made a compliance check and assessed additional FICA taxes using an ""aggregate estimation"" method, under which it examined the credit card slips; found the average percentage tip paid by those customers; assumed that cash-paying customers paid at same rate; calculated total tips by multiplying the tip rates by Fior D'Italia's total receipts; subtracted the tips already reported; applied the FICA tax rate to the remainder; and assessed additional taxes owed. Fior D'Italia filed a refund suit, claiming that the tax statutes did not authorize the IRS to use the aggregate estimation method. The District Court ruled for Fior D'Italia, and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
1785,Raymond Dennis et al.,United States,"Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board."
55,Arnett,Kennedy,"Wayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim."
944,"Expressions Hair Design, et al.","Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.","The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, As well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated its Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment and that the statute was legally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that this statute was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the legislation impermissibly distinguished between surcharges for discounts, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the consumers and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and found that the statute qualified as permissible regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague."
880,"Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC","Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office","Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. (Cuozzo) owns the 074 patent, “Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit,” and Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) for inter partes review of claims regarding the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead of the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were unpatentable. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term “integrally attached” regarding claim 14 on the components of the “Speed Limit Indicator.” Cuozzo appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board’s finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation."
1158,Jamar Alonzo Quarles,United States of America,"Jamar Quarles was charged for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C § 922 ( g ). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles ’ s conviction for third - degree home invasion was another violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( “ ACCA ” ) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon - in - possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court ’ s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 you. S. _ _ ( 2015 ), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan ’ s crime of third - degree home invasion constituted a “ violent felony ” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months ’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic assault is “ an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. Because Michigan law defines the crime of third - degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering the dwelling and while entering or being in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles ’ s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent - upon - entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at or, so the Michigan of of third - degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary."
942,Massaro,United States,"Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal."
2178,"Ashley Sveen, et al.","Kaye Melin, et al.","Mark A. Sveen and Kaye L. Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy that year, and the following year he named Melin the primary beneficiary, and his children the contingent beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007, and Sveen died in 2011. Minnesota had changed its probate code in 2002 to apply a revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance beneficiary designations. Sveen had never changed the designation on his life insurance policy, and Melin was therefore still listed as the primary beneficiary at the time of his death. The insurance company filed an interpleader to establish whether the revocation-upon-divorce statute nullified this designation. Sveen’s children and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the children, rejecting Melin’s contention that retroactively applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that under its own precedent, the dispositive issue in this context was the right of the policyholder to have his wishes carried out in accordance with his intentions at the time he signed the contract. Applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively would deprive him of that right in violation of the Contract Clause."
1320,National Collegiate Athletic Association,"Shawne Alston, et al.","In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 you.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law."
515,Hurley,"Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.","In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech."
1088,"Apple, Inc.","Robert Pepper, et al.","This lawsuit arose out of Apple ’ s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “ closed system, ” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does at the “ App Store. ” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third - party developer, Apple receives 30 % of the sale price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone application market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the price after the sale. Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court ’ s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 you. S. 720 ( 1977 ). Under Illinois Brick, “ only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution ” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if users are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple. The district court found that those plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal,. Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court ’ s decision. novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,. plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple, the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing."
1371,"Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary",Randy Joseph Moore,"Randy Moore pled no-contest to felony murder in an Oregon trial court and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. After exhausting his post-conviction state court remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an Oregon federal district court. Mr. Moore argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Moore's counsel's failure to suppress Mr. Moore's confession was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The court was careful to note that even the state conceded the means by which the state elicited Mr. Moore's confession were unconstitutional because Mr. Moore's request for counsel had been ignored by the police."
957,"Charles S. Turner, et al.",United States,"In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in the apartment. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical records that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 investigations, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner or three of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on the appeal. Nearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their cases vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld new evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established why they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants."
1191,James K. Kahler,Kansas,"Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his marriage after many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly separated couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and criminal compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti - anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife ’ s grandmother ’ s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death in the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive - compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and split personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler ’ s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “ completely lost control. ” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “ that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. ” In effect, this law makes clear “ whether the plaintiff is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong by reference to his actions. ” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence."
1407,Michael D. Turner,"Rebecca L. Rogers, et al.","In January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."
835,Penry,Johnson,"In 1989, the you.S. Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, Penry was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding Penry's mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that Penry would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of Penry's former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine Penry's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original Penry case. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. Penry's petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed."
155,"City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, et al.","Marie Manhart, et al.","A class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out of the employee’s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men. The women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1049,"Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al.",Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard."
987,David Patchak,"Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior","The Match - E - Be - Nash - She - Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians ( or Gun Lake Tribe ) is an Indian tribe of western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the you. S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe ’ s purposes under the Indian Reorganization Act ( IRA ), 25 you. S. C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property. David Bradley lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to take the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the you. S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which requires, among other things, that any legal action relating to this Bradley Property “ shall not be filed or brought in a Federal court and may be immediately dismissed. ”"
696,Wright,Universal Maritime Service Corporation,"Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was referred, discovered that he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
2313,"June Medical Services L.L.C., et al.","Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals","In June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required “that every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.’” Several abortion clinics and doctors challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the you.S. Supreme Court struck down a “nearly identical” Texas law in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion while bringing about no “health-related benefit” and serving no “relevant credentialing function.” The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that “admitting privileges also do not serve ‘any relevant credentialing function,’” and that “physicians are sometimes denied privileges … for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.” The district court further determined that the law would “drastically burden women’s right to choose abortions.” A panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the panel majority reviewed the evidence de novo and concluded that the district court erred by overlooking “remarkabl[e] differen[ces]” between the facts in this case and in WWH. The panel concluded that “no clinics will likely be forced to close on account of the Act,” and thus, the law would not impose an undue burden on women’s right to choose abortions. A divided Fifth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc."
468,"Simon & Schuster, Inc.",Members of New York State Crime Victims Board,"To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 ""Son of Sam"" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal."
382,Dethorne Graham,M.S. Connor,"On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry’s car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away. Graham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry’s car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham’s vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident. Graham filed § 1983 charges against Connor, other officers, and the City of Charlotte, alleging a violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers, unlawful assault, unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed for a directed verdict, which the district court granted. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, contending that the district court incorrectly applied a four-part substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick that takes into account officers’ “good faith” efforts and whether they acted “maliciously or sadistically”. He instead argued for a standard of “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected this argument, reasoning that concepts such as ""good faith"" are relevant to determining the degree of force used. It affirmed the directed verdict, holding that a reasonable jury could not have found in Graham’s favor."
821,"W. Kevin Hughes, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al.","Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al.","The Federal Power Act ( FPA ) was passed in 1998 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ( FERC ) with control over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To that end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, ( PJM ) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing To adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, when the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, ( CPV ) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, ( PPL ) and other existing energy plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM - regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. That case then consolidated with CPV ’ s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants."
455,James Draper,United States,"John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag. Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable because to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed."
1124,Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation,"Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.","Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces investigative journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to their articles. Wall - Street. com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall - Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from a website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall - Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although still filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district judge dismissed the action, finding “ registration required under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “ register the claim, ” and that step had not happened. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
1250,AT&T Corporation,Noreen Hulteen et al.,"Four employees sued their employer, AT&T, alleging that the company's policy for calculating employee pension and retirement benefits discriminated against women who had taken leave time due to pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The AT&T policy considered temporary disability leave as service time for the purposes of calculating retirement benefits except when the leave was taken by pregnant women. The employees argued that the policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which clarified that Title VII prohibits discrimination ""because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."" The main issue in the case was one of timing: although the employees' pregnancy leave was taken before the PDA came into effect, AT&T's calculation of benefits took place after. The employees argued that under the Court's decision in Pallas the time of calculation should govern the applicability of the PDA. AT&T countered that another decision, Landgraf directly opposed Pallas and had created a ""sea change"" in retroactivity principles such that the PDA should not apply to pregnancy leave taken before it was enacted. The district court sided with the employees and granted summary judgment in their favor. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the lower court, agreeing with AT&T that Pallas gave impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA. On rehearing, the full court reversed and ruled in favor of the employees, avoiding the retroactivity problem by holding that the PDA applies to the actual calculation of pension and retirement benefits regardless of when the leave itself was taken. Because AT&T performed this calculation after the PDA had gone into effect, the denial of benefits violated Title VII."
949,"Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO",Simon Shiao Tam,"Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band ’ s name with the you. S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it believed that the name would likely be disparaging towards “ persons of Asian descent. ” The office cited the Commerce Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that'[ consist ] of or [ comprise ] immoral, deceptive, or misleading matter ; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or contempt. ” Tam appealed the trademark officer ’ s decision, and the name was refused a second appeal by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under that Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the copyright application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment."
798,David Anthony Taylor,United States,"David Anthony Taylor was a member of the “ Southwest Goonz, ” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted for two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate / foreign traffic. At Taylor ’ s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from gathering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore does violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government ’ s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to setting aside the verdict on the grounds that the state did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor ’ s motion, and the you. S. Court on Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction."
957,Overton,Bazzetta,"In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling."
1041,State of Washington,"United States of America, et al.","In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “ Stevens Treaties, ” which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off - reservation fishing. This so - called “ fishing clause ” guaranteed the Tribes “ the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations... in common with all citizens of the Territory. ” Since those treaties, there have been recurring but ongoing disputes between the Tribes and ( possibly ) other white settlers there and ( today ) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes ’ contention when the government was building and maintaining culverts ( channels carrying water under roads or canals ) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20 + Tribes represented in the suit argued that this diminishment amounts to infringement of the fishing clause of the treaties. Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties. The district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
1706,Chaunt,United States,"Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a you.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt’s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
267,"Lexmark International, Inc.","Static Control Components, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc. ( Lexmark ) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. ( ISO ) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured products used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Patriot Act claims for lack of standing. The you. S. Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed that wrong test to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit relied on the "" reasonable interest "" test to establish stood for the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must demonstrate 1 ) a reasonable interest of the alleged false advertising and 2 ) a reasonable basis for assuming that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest."
1444,"Marcy Hardy, Warden",Irving L. Cross,"At a trial for kidnapping and sexual assault, Irving Cross' victim, known as A.S., was terrified to testify against him, but did so anyway. The jury found Cross not guilty of kidnapping, but was unable to reach a decision on the sexual assault charges. The judge declared a mistrial and the State opted to retry Cross on the sexual assault charges. A.S. said she would testify at the second trial, but about a month beforehand, the State discovered that A.S. was missing. After an exhaustive search, which included visits to her parent's and old boyfriend's homes on multiple occasions, the State moved to declare A.S. unavailable and enter her prior testimony into evidence in the new trial. The trial court granted the motion and a clerk read the testimony at trial. The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault, but found him guilty of criminal sexual assault. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Cross' petition for leave to appeal and the you.S. Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari. Cross then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the you.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that the testimony in the second case violated the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment. According to Cross, the State had not made good faith efforts to locate A.S.. The district court denied the writ, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court of appeals stressed the importance of the testimony, and several avenues of inquiry the State did not exhaust in its search."
1118,Anthony Ash et al.,"Tyson Foods, Inc.","Ash, an African American and an employee at a Tyson Foods poultry plant, was passed over for a promotion and sued the company for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A jury found for Ash and awarded damages, but the District Court granted Tyson's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and ordered a new trial. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's order, finding that the evidence presented by Ash was insufficient to support the damages awarded. Tyson claimed that Ash had been passed over for a more qualified employee, and in response Ash introduced evidence of his own superior qualifications in order to show that Tyson's reason was merely a pretext. The Circuit Court held that Ash's evidence did not meet the standard for establishing pretext: the disparity in qualifications needed to be ""so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face."" In the course of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit also held that the Tyson plant manager's use of the word ""boy"" to refer to Ash was not evidence of racial animus, because it was never coupled with racial classifications."
1408,"Talk America, Inc.","Michigan Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T Michigan, et al.","Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so. Competitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
77,United States,Ralph Feola,"On August 21, 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties. At trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents’ true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges."
1757,"Cocheyse J. Griffin, et al.","County School Board of Prince Edward County, et al.","In 1951, a group of African American students in Prince Edward County, Virginia filed a complaint in district court alleging that the Virginia laws requiring segregated schools denied them their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law. When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, this case and others like it were remanded to the lower courts to order desegregation. Prince Edward County resisted desegregation by refusing to levy and collect the school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, which forced the public schools in the county to close. The Prince Edward School Foundation formed to ensure private education for the white students. African American students did not receive formal education from 1959 until 1963, when federal, state, and county authorities collaborated to hold desegregated classes in county-owned buildings. In 1960, the Prince Edward Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants for the children attending the private schools of the Prince Edward School Foundation. In 1961, the petitioners amended their original complaint to include new respondents and the elements of failing to provide public free schools in the county and using public funds to pay for segregated private schools. The district court held that the county could not pay the tuition grants as long as the public school remained closed, but the court refrained from making a decision regarding the closed public schools until the Virginia courts ruled on the issue. Later, without waiting for the decision of the Virginia courts, the district court held that the public schools must reopen. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decisions on the grounds that the district court should have waited until the state courts determined the validity of the tuition grants and the closing of the public schools."
2132,Erick Daniel Davila,"Lorie Davie, Director, Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","In February 2009, Erick Daniel Davila was found guilty of capital murder for the killings of Annette Stevenson and her granddaughter, Queshawn Stevenson. The jury sentenced Davila to death. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and the you.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Davila pursued habeas relief in the state courts, which was denied at the trial and appellate levels. Davila then sought federal habeas relief and claimed, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and state habeas counsel. Because Davila did not raise the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the state habeas proceedings, the federal district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted and denied habeas relief. Davila appealed and argued that Supreme Court precedent that ineffective state habeas counsel can overcome the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial claim should also apply to the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief."
495,"Central Bank of Denver , N. A.","First Interstate Bank Of Denver, N. A., et al.","In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds’ outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds. First Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed."
1510,Giridhar C. Sekhar,United States,"In 2008 the General Counsel for the Office of the State Comptroller of New York advised against investing in a fund managed by FA Technology Ventures. The investment would have given FA Technology millions in service fees. The General Counsel received an anonymous email of ""blackballing a recommendation on a fund"" and threatened to disclose the General Counsel's extramarital affair to his wife, to the Comptroller, and to others if he did not change his recommendation within 36 hours. On the advice of law enforcement, the General Counsel asked for more time, which the individual granted. The FBI traced the emails to Giridahr Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology. Sekhar later admitted to sending the emails. Sekhar was charged with one account of extortion and six counts of interstate transmission of extortionate threats under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property by threats. Sekhar moved to dismiss, arguing that the General Counsel's recommendation was not property. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the General Counsel's right to make professional decisions without outside influence was intangible personal property. Sekhar was convicted on six of the seven counts and sentenced to 15 months in jail. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
853,"Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al.","Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al.","Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of their you. S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act ( Recovery Act ), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the you. S. Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs in this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico ’ s public entities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ( PREPA ), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The company sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code, that prevents state corporation debt restructuring laws from binding creditors until their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The u. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."
1222,"Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al.",Christopher M. Sulyma,"In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company ’ s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ), which sets forth the standard for care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment ( and thus investment ) period of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time - barred under 29 you. S. C. § 1113 ( 2 ), which requires that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “ three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the investments or violation. ( The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery over the question of federal statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “ actual knowledge ” does not mean that the plaintiff knew how the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 defendant, this means a plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were unlawful. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court ’ s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings."
586,Timmons,Twin Cities Area New Party,"Under Minnesota law, candidates for political office are prohibited from appearing on more than one party's ballot. When the Twin Cities Area New Party, a chapter of the national New Party, nominated someone for state representative who was already another political party's candidate, Minnesota election officials declined its petition. When the New Party challenged Minnesota's election laws the District Court upheld their constitutionality, but was reversed by the state's Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari."
614,United States,Wells,"Jerry E. Wells and Kenneth R. Steele were charged with knowingly making false and ""material"" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law. At the trial's end, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's request, that withholding a ""material fact"" made a statement or representation false and that materiality of an allegedly false statement was for the judge, not the jury, to determine. Subsequently, the jury treated Wells and Steele's statements as material and convicted them. The you.S. Supreme Court then decided that materiality was a question for the jury to decide. On appeal, Wells and Steele argued that materiality was an element of knowingly making false and ""material"" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law and it was a question for the jury to decide. The Government then argued materiality was not an element of the crime, so that no harm had been done when the trial judge had dealt with the issue. The Court of Appeals agreed with Wells and Steele, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial."
1742,Best,Humboldt Placer Mining Company,"In order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to allow the United States to have the validity of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary."
734,United States,"William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.","In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a new tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended would solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing the farmers to suffer under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary for State. He decided which one of the inputs should be cotton, so Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor."
2142,Charmaine Hamer,Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago,"Charmaine Hamer, a former intake specialist for the Housing Services of Chicago (NHS) and Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Help Center, filed suit against her former employers, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae and NHS on September 14, 2015. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 you.S.C. Section 2107(a), Hamer had until October 14, 2015 to appeal the judgment. On October 8, 2015, her attorney filed a motion to extend the appeal deadline to December 14, 2015, which the district court granted. Hamer filed her appeal on December 11, 2015. In a brief requested by the appellate court, Fannie Mae and NHS argued that Hamer’s appeal was untimely under Rule 4(a)(5)(C) and thus that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. That rule states that “[n]o extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.” Hamer argued that the rule is at odds with 28 you.S.C. Section 2107(a), which provides that “the district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good because.” The appellate court found Hamer’s argument unpersuasive and dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction."
245,Marsh,Chambers,"Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court."
877,Rocky Dietz,Hillary Bouldin,"Hillary Bouldin ’ s vehicle collided at Rocky Dietz ’ s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries suffered from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Trump ’ s favor but awarded $ 0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re - empaneled the jury. He asked them to re - determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties ’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $ 15, 000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed, the district court erred at recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The T. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s decision and held that dismissing another jury, then recalling the jurors, constituted also an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration before their dismissal."
888,"Verizon Maryland, Inc.",Public Service Commission of Maryland,"The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims."
1257,Luis E. Melendez-Diaz,Massachusetts,"Luis Melendez-Diaz was arrested while making a cocaine sale in a parking lot in Massachusetts. At trial, bags of the cocaine alleged to have been distributed by Melendez-Diaz were introduced into evidence along with drug analysis certificates prepared by the lab technician who analyzed the drugs and identified them as cocaine. A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine in violation of Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz appealed, arguing that the State's introduction of the drug analysis certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him under the Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford had held that so-called ""testimonial"" evidence cannot be introduced at trial unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the witness providing the evidence. Melendez-Diaz characterized the lab analysis as testimonial and argued that Crawford required the lab technician to testify on the results. The State argued that Massachusetts had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Verde, that lab reports were not testimonial. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals rejected Melendez-Diaz's claims in an unpublished opinion, referring to them in a short footnote as ""without merit."" The Massachusetts Supreme Court also denied his appeal."
700,Reno,American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,"Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), were marked for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The PFLP is characterized by the government as an international terrorist and communist organization. The resident aliens filed suit alleging the Attorney General and other federal parties had targeted them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Initially, the District Court enjoined the deportation proceedings. During the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The IIRIRA restricts judicial review of the Attorney General's ""decision or action"" to ""commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act."" Reno then filed motions arguing that the IIRIRA deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the aliens' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision on the merits."
249,"Falls City Industries, Inc.","Vanco Beverage, Inc.","From 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's ""meeting-competition"" defense under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
2370,Mahanoy Area School District,"B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy","B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year. B.L. sued the school under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed."
1497,University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center,Naiel Nassar,"Dr. Naiel Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent, was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) in 1995 to work at the Amelia Court Clinic (Clinic), which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment. After three years there, he left to pursue additional training and returned in 2001 as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases and Associate Medical Director of the Clinic. His immediate supervisor at the Clinic was Dr. Philip Keiser, whose supervisor at UTSW was Dr. Beth Levine. After being hired in 2004, Levine immediately began inquiring into Nassar's productivity and billing practices. In 2005, after interviewing a candidate who was of Middle Eastern descent, Levine stated in Nassar's presence, ""Middle Easterners are lazy."" In 2006, after hiring the candidate, Levine made a similar statement in Keiser's presence. Keiser informed Nassar of these comments as well as the fact that Levine scrutinized Nassar's productivity more than any other doctor. Around this time, Nassar applied for a promotion that Levine actively undermined. In 2006, Nassar resigned from the UTSW faculty and cited Levine's harassment and the creation of an unhealthy work environment in his resignation letter. Nassar resigned with the understanding that he would be offered a position at the Amelia Court Clinic unaffiliated with the UTSW, but the Clinic was forced to withdraw its offer after heavy opposition from the UTSW faculty, who have an agreement with the Clinic regarding positions to be filled by faculty doctors. In 2008, Nassar sued UTSW under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that UTSW had constructively discharged and retaliated against him. The jury found in favor of Nassar and awarded him back pay and compensatory damages. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim but insufficient evidence to support the claim of constructive discharge."
1240,"State of Georgia, et al.","Public.Resource.Org, Inc.","The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites. The Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia’s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “official” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created—finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations."
1015,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Warren Wesley Summerlin,"Warren Summerlin killed a loan collector with a hatchet in 1982 and was subsequently convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death by a state trial judge because of the heinous nature of the crime and his previous criminal history. He appealed the sentence, arguing that his attorney's romantic relationship with the prosecutor and the trial judge's proven use of marijuana had prevented him from receiving a fair trial, but the Arizona state courts rejected his appeals. In June 2002, however, the you.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona. The decision found that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial meant that only juries, not judges, could sentence someone to death. The Ring decision gave Summerlin new hope. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the decision changed the substance of the law rather than just the procedure used to apply it, and that it should therefore be applied retroactively. The state countered that the change dealt only with who did the actual sentencing, not with the burden of proof, and was therefore only procedural. Because procedural changes are not applied retroactively under the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, the state argued that Summerlin's sentence should be upheld. A divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding instead with Summerlin and ordering the state to reopen his trial for re-sentencing."
127,Adrian Martell Davis,Washington,"Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator how he had attacked her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 caller was offered as testimony about the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the testimony without giving him an opportunity to cross - examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the you. S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the testimony was not "" testimonial "" and was therefore different from the testimony at issue in Crawford."
848,Brandon Thomas Betterman,State of Montana,"Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges involving partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get into the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of breaking bail. A sentence hearing did not come until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was given a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had come between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail - jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman ’ s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial."
1167,"Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.","United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt","The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $ 60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was because Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing munitions cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts — including forgery, deception, and threats — to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. The employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $ 1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated a fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup. Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors ’'scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act ( FCA ), 31 you. S. C. § § 3729 – 33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the,, and Hunt ’ s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt ’ s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 you. S. C. § 3731 ( b ) ( 1 ), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of ( 1 ) “ 6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed ” or ( 2 ) “ 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances …. ” The district court granted the contractors ’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt ’ s claim would be time - barred. Reviewing the district court ’ s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt ( the relator ) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim."
1206,Florida Department of Revenue,"Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.","In 2003, Piccadilly Cafeterias filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in federal court in Florida asking the bankruptcy court for permission to auction off its assets in order to fund a reorganization plan. Piccadilly sought a tax exemption under 11 you.S.C. 1146(c) which states that certain asset transfers ""under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax."" Florida vehemently opposed this exemption and sought to collect $32,000 in taxes from Piccadilly. The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all found in favor of Piccadilly, holding that 11 you.S.C. 1146(c) allowed courts to exempt from taxes pre-confirmation asset sales that were essential to the completion of a reorganization plan. In urging the Court to grant certiorari, Florida pointed to both Third and Fourth Circuit decisions holding that such pre-confirmation asset sales were subject to state taxation, while Piccadilly Cafeterias contended that these so-called ""circuit splits"" only involve a small handful of cases and require no resolution by the Court."
1864,United States,James A. White,"A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence."
941,Black & Decker Disability Plan,Nord,"With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."
2141,Marion Wilson,"Eric Sellers, Warden","A Georgia jury convicted Marion Wilson of malice murder and several other felonies. At sentencing, Wilson’s attorney argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and presented evidence of his difficult childhood. The trial court sentenced Wilson to death, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Wilson filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, in which he argued ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in the sentencing phase of his trial. His argument rested on lay testimony that could have been used as evidence of his difficult childhood and expert testimony that could have explained his poor judgment skills. The superior court denied the petition in a written order. Wilson then filed an application for a certificate of probable because to appeal, which the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied in a one-sentence order. Wilson then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court denied him relief on the grounds that the state trial court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. However, the district court granted Wilson a certificate of appealability on the issue of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that “the one-line decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia . . . is the relevant state-court decision for our review because it is the final decision on the merits.” In his petition for rehearing en banc, Wilson argued that the panel should have examined the last reasoned decision by a state court. Georgia originally argued a federal court should “look through” a summary order to see whether it was based on procedural grounds or merits, but then it changed its position and argued that the court should look to the reasoned opinion. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, appointed an amicus curiae to argue Georgia’s original position on the matter. The Eleventh Circuit en banc ultimately concluded that federal courts do not need to “look through” a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of a lower court."
2283,Gerald Lynn Bostock,"Clayton County, Georgia","Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision. This case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623."