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+,first_party,second_party,Facts
+397,"Stephen Kimble, et al.","Marvel Enterprises, Inc.","In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider - Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a model that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued under patent protection, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court. The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreements was a "" hybrid "" agreement, in which patent and non - patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over - compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond their intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non - patent rights were transferred. Kimble sued and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non - patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended in the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district,."
+559,Republic of Argentina,"NML Capital, Ltd.","During an economic crisis in 2001, the Republic of Argentina ( Argentina ) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. ( NML ), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling more than US $ 2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to enforce their subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( FSIA ) by requiring the disclosure of assets which are immune from collection by NML. The appeals court ordered the banks to deal with the disclosure requests. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that an FSIA did not respond to the subpoena because it was a discovery order directed at financial entities that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity."
+401,Rutan,Republican Party of Illinois,"In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination."
+923,Immigration and Naturalization Service,Fredy Orlando Ventura,"Fredy Orlando Ventura illegally entered the United States in 1993. In 1998, an immigration judge heard Orlando Ventura’s request for asylum in the United States; he claimed that his political views made him a target for guerilla armies in Guatemala. The judge denied Orlando Ventura’s request, despite recognizing that Orlando Ventura’s fears of prosecution may be legitimate, because the political climate in Guatemala had drastically changed since Orlando Ventura had arrived in the United States and therefore he was no longer in danger. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the judgment of the immigration judge, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was “compelled” by Orlando Ventura’s testimony to reverse the lower court’s decision and subsequently denied remand to the BIA."
+334,"Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.","United States, ex rel. Benjamin Carter","In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root ( KBR ), a you. S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the you. S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for illegal billing practices under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of carrying out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the you. S. Government for services rendered in Iraq. In 2010, just before trial, the you. S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit is related to Carter ’ s complaint and dismissed the suit under the FCA ’ s “ first - to - file ” requirement, which bars a suit if a prior one is pending. In 2011, Carter withdrew his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA ’ s six - year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter ’ s complaint did not satisfy the first - to - file requirements because there was yet another related matter filed. The district court dismissed Carter ’ s complaint, but the you. S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ( WSLA ), which provides the applicable six - year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter ’ s claim from proceeding."
+1726,Robinson,California,A jury found defendant guilty under a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court.
+1653,Robert Montanile,Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan,"In late 2008, Robert Montanile was involved in a car accident that resulted in significant injuries. Montanile was covered by an employee welfare benefit plan administered by the Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan (Plan). After Montanile’s accident, the Plan dispersed over $120,000 to cover Montanile’s medical expenses. Montanile later sued the driver of the other car involved in the accident, eventually obtaining a $500,000 settlement. Per its terms, the Plan then requested that Montanile reimburse the initial $120,000 disbursement. When Montanile and the Plan were unable to reach an agreement, the Plan sued Montanile. The Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which allows plan administrators to recover overpayment from a beneficiary when the recovery would constitute “appropriate equitable relief”. The trial court held that the terms of the Plan required Montanile to repay the initial $120,000, and that this repayment was appropriate equitable relief in part because the Plan was able to identify a source of funds within Montanile’s possession—the $500,000 settlement. Montanile appealed and claimed that the repayment would not be equitable relief because the settlement had been spent or disbursed to other parties. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, because the Plan had a right to reimbursement, the Plan’s lien against Montanile’s $500,000 settlement attached before Montanile spent or disbursed the funds. Therefore, Montanile could not evade the repayment by claiming the settlement funds had been spent or disbursed."
+1905,"Hustler Magazine, Inc.",Falwell,"A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a ""parody"" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed."
+1899,"Stanley Taylor, et al.","Karen Barkes, et al.","On November 13, 2004, Christopher Barkes was arrested for violating his probation. As part of his intake procedure, a nurse performed a medical evaluation, as required by the institution in which he was being held. Despite Barkes’ long history of mental health and substance abuse problems, neither his responses nor the nurse’s observations reached the threshold necessary under the institution’s protocols to initiate suicide prevention measures, so he was placed in a cell by himself. Barkes was awake and behaving normally at several points the following morning, but when an officer arrived to deliver lunch, Barkes had hanged himself with a sheet. Barkes’ wife and children sued Stanley Taylor, Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction, and Raphael Williams, the warden of the institution in which Barkes had been held. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated Barkes’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to properly supervise the contractor that provided medical treatment at the institution. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, and the district court denied the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment."
+1455,Evan Miller,Alabama,"In July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon's trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller's petition for writ of certiorari. In the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision."
+855,Danny Birchfield,State of North Dakota,"Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable because that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
+548,South Carolina,Baker,"In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Assistance Act ( TEFRA ). The statute created the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly traded long - term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states / municipalities had been free from taxation since Anderson v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co ( 1895 ). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free of taxation ; rather it regulated the types of bond to become exempt."
+1666,Lambert,California,"Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, no convicted felon could stay in the city for more than five days without registering. Lambert, a convicted felon, stayed in Los Angeles for seven years without registering and was convicted of violating the ordinance. On appeal, she argued that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required the ordinance to include some mental state element, and she was not aware of it."
+1116,Dennis Obduskey,"McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.","Dennis Obduskey obtained his mortgage loan for $ 329, 940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey ’ s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non - judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). The district court granted the defendants ’ motions to dismiss virtually all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to Non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. Upon Obduskey ’ s appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for The Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute ’ s statutory language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court ’ s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not an debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to pay a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned the you. S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari,. will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non - judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC."
+344,Nollan,California Coastal Commission,The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.
+1277,United States Patent and Trademark Office,Booking.com B.V.,"Booking. com operates a website on which customers may make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING. COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking. com filed with the you. S. Patent and Trademark Office ( USPTO ) four generic applications for the use of BOOKING. COM as a word mark and three stylized versions of the mark. Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “ distinctive ” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking. com ’ s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING. COM became generic as applied to the services for which it obtained registration ( online hotel reservation services, among others ). The Lanham Act also allows protection for “ descriptive ” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the purchase or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking. com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection. Booking. com appealed through the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking. com ’ s applications. The Board found that BOOKING. COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “ booking ” generically refers to “ a reservation or arrangement to buy another travel ticket or stay in a hotel room ” and “. com ” indicates the commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term “ BOOKING. COM ” to refer to an online reservation service for travel — the same services proposed in Booking. com ’ s applications. The district court reversed, ruling Booking. com had acquired secondary meaning. A panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal."
+410,Alabama,Vanessa Rose White,"An anonymous caller told Montgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attaché case in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car and White’s future movements. Following that tip, police followed Vanessa Rose White as she drove from an apartment complex to Doby’s Motel Court, where they pulled her over. When asked, White gave the officers permission to search her car and an attaché case found in the car. Police found marijuana in the case and arrested White. During processing at the police station, officers also found 3 milligrams of cocaine in White’s purse. After being charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine, White moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court denied the motion and White plead guilty. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the motion, finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and search White’s car. This search violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures."
+1174,"Fort Bend County, Texas",Lois M. Davis,"Lois Davis was an information technology ( IT ) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed or assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director ’ s resignation, her supervisor — who was a personal friend of the director — retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “ previous religious commitment, ” and the court did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an employee intake questionnaire ” in which she wrote in the word “ religion ” next to a checklist labeled “ Employment Harms or Actions ” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had issued a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right - to - sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first instance that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the religion discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis ’ s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement ( which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived ) or merely a prerequisite to suit ( and thus subject to waiver ). Relying on the Supreme Court ’ s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 you. S. 500 ( 2006 ), in which the Court held that the Title VII ’ s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits."
+1308,Terrance Jamar Graham,Florida,"When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment."
+2188,WesternGeco LLC,ION Geophysical Corporation,"The US Supreme Court issued a 2016 order granting certiorari in this patent infringement case, vacating a 2015 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remanding the matter for further consideration in light of , 579 you.S. __ (2016). On remand, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment for enhanced damages for willful infringement under 35 you.S.C. § 284, but reinstated its 2015 opinion in all other respects. The underlying dispute in the case related to patent-practicing devices sold by ION Geophysical Corporation (“ION”) which were combined and used in non-infringing streamer systems at sea, but that would infringe on patents belonging to WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) if used in that manner in the US. The jury found infringement by ION, found no invalidity as to any asserted claims, and awarded WesternGeco, among other amounts, $93.4 million in lost profits. In a subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit, ION asked, among other things, that the lost profits award be reversed. In its 2015 opinion, the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed that award on the grounds that under 35 you.S.C. § 271(f), WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits arising from foreign uses of its patented invention. As stated above, the court then reinstated this portion of that opinion in 2016."
+2324,Roxanne Torres,"Janice Madrid, et al.","In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle. In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
+222,Missouri,Tyler G. McNeely,"On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above its speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, but that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered his sample taken anyway, and the blood test determined McNeely's blood alcohol content was far above the legal limit. The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk in McNeely's blood alcohol concentration decreasing over time is an exigent circumstance requiring a random draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law ; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision."
+1783,Sheppard,Maxwell,"After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+1395,Glen Scott Milner,Department of the Navy,"Glen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act (""FOIA"") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are ""predominantly"" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation."
+888,Bassam Yacoub Salman,United States,"Maher Kara joined Citigroup ’ s healthcare investment banking group in 2003, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2005 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman ’ s son and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his company with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through another brother - in - law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman ’ s account cost $ 2. 1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The lower court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information."
+1275,United States Patent and Trademark Office,Booking.com B.V.,"Booking.com operates a website on which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING.COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com filed with the you.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING.COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark. Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “distinctive” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking.com’s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING.COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration (online hotel reservation services, among others). The Lanham Act also allows protection for “descriptive” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking.com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection. Booking.com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking.com’s applications. The Board found that BOOKING.COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “booking” generically refers to “a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room” and “.com” indicates a commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term “BOOKING.COM” to refer to an online reservation service for travel—the very services proposed in Booking.com’s applications. The district court reversed, ruling Booking.com had acquired secondary meaning. A panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal."
+999,United States,"Abel C. Galletti, et al.","Abel Galletti and his wife, along with another couple, the Briguglios, formed a business partnership. The partnership underpaid its federal employment taxes, and the IRS assessed the unpaid taxes against the partnership (meaning the partnership would be forced to pay the taxes). According to the Internal Revenue Code, if a tax debt is assessed within three years after the return was filed, the government has 10 additional years to collected the money. More than three years later, the Gallettis and the Briguglios separately filed for bankruptcy. The IRS made a claim in bankruptcy court against the two couples for the taxes assessed against the partnership. The couples objected, arguing that because the partners themselves had not been separately assessed, the statute of limitations had not been extended to the partners. The bankruptcy court ruled against the IRS, holding that the IRS must assess tax claims against individual partners, not just the partnership, in order to later collect on those claims from the individuals. The district court and a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed the decision."
+978,United States,Manuel Flores-Montano,"When Manuel Flores-Montano approached the you.S.-Mexico border, you.S. Customs inspectors noticed his hand shaking; an inspector tapped Flores-Montano's gas tank with a screwdriver and noticed that the tank sounded solid; a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle. After a mechanic began disassembling the car's fuel tank, inspectors found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks in the tank. Flores-Montano was charged in federal district court in California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Flores-Montano moved to suppress the marijuana finding on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that the search that yielded the marijuana finding was intrusive and non-routine and therefore required reasonable suspicion (which, he argued, was not present in his case). Relying on you.S. v. Molina-Tarazon, a case decided by the you.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002 (with similar circumstances), the district court agreed that the search was non-routine and thus required reasonable suspicion. The government, the court held, failed to prove that reasonable suspicion prompted its search. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
+175,"Mohawk Industries, Inc.",Norman Carpenter,"In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. He argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants. Before trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney-client privilege did not qualify for exception."
+94,Buckley,Valeo,"In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute."
+542,Lawrence,Chater,"Kemmerlyn Lawrence asserted entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependant, unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. Under the Social Security Act, which requires paternity to be decided by state law, Lawrence acknowledged that her claim appeared defeated, but agued that the relevant North Carolina law's proof of paternity requirements are unconstitutional. After the Federal Government argued that a state paternity law's constitutionality need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Lawrence's benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security Administration reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. The Solicitor General thus invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) to the Court of Appeals to decide the case or remand it to the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration."
+341,United States,Salerno,The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.
+1833,George William Bruton,United States,"George William Bruton and William James Evans were tried together for robbing a jewelry store that also operated as a you.S. Postal Service contract station. At trial, the judge admitted in to evidence Evans’ confessions, made to the postal inspector and later to police. In the confession, Evans names Bruton as his accomplice. The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession for Evans’ guilt or innocence, but to disregard it as inadmissible hearsay for Bruton’s charges. The jury convicted both men. Evans and Bruton appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction, finding that the confession to the postal inspector should not have been received into evidence. The court upheld Bruton’s conviction because the district court properly instructed the jury not to use the confession when considering Bruton’s charges."
+1027,"Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc., and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Inc.",Saudi Basic Industries Corporation,"Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the you.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction."
+679,Munn and Scott,Illinois,Illinois regulated grain warehouse and grain companies and establishing maximum rates for their products.
+711,Charles Schenck,United States,"During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated its Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The newspapers urged the public to approve their draft, while advised only peaceful action. White was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to because insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck & Baer were convicted of violating labor law and appealed upon the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment."
+306,Oregon,Elstad,"Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession."
+393,"M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.","John Kerry, Secretary of State","In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was raised in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that his you. S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as "" Israel, "" in accordance with Section 214 ( d ) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 ( Act ). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed "" Jerusalem "" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State in his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214 ( d ). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds of it presented a self - justiciable political question. The you. S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214 ( d ) "" impermissibly intereferes "" with the President's exclusive power to visit foreign states. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is one realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch."
+1764,City of El Paso,Simmons,"Since the late 19th century, Texas sold land to facilitate settlement in the state and construction of schools. If, however, a purchaser missed an interest payment on the property, the land was immediately forfeited back to the state unless the owner made the payment before the land could be re-sold. Under this program, Greenbury Simmons purchased and then forfeited some land in 1947. Just over five years later he offered to pay the interest to re-acquire the property. The state refused to comply with his wishes citing a 1941 amendment to its law which gave individuals five years to claim their forfeited land. Simmons's land was sold to the City of El Paso in 1955."
+1204,R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.,"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.","Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for - profit corporation which operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her tenure at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home ’ s owner and operator that she wanted to shift from male to female, Stephen was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen ’ s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and the refusal to conform to sex - based stereotypes. The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home ’ s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII."
+1310,"Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John",State of Washington,"Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “winner-take-all” electoral system, which means that all of a state’s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law. The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed. This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020."
+326,"Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services; John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture; Walter Cohen, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ",Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller,"Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause of the First Amendment provided an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would “rob the spirit” of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy’s request for damages."
+414,Georgia,South Carolina,"The Charter of the Colony of Georgia described the Savannah River as its border with South Carolina. The Treaty of Beaufort (Treaty) further refined this boundary, which has since been disputed several times. This case was the third case since the Treaty that disputed this boundary. A Special Master was appointed to help resolve the dispute and filed two reports on the issue. This case was brought before the Supreme Court after Georgia and South Carolina filed disputes with the Special Master's reports ."
+180,"Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship","Leo P. Martinez, et al.","The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (CLS) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow ""any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs."" In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that ""I believe in: The Bible as the inspired word of God; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins; His bodily resurrection and His personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; [and] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life."" The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights."
+208,Gary Keith Steagald,United States,"On January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds of cocaine. Steagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
+1009,"Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division",Michael Wayne Haley,"Haley was convicted in Texas state courts of a felony theft and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (extending his sentence). After a failed appeal to the Texas appellate court, Haley filed a state habeas application in the trial court, arguing that his past crimes did not qualify him as a habitual offender and that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel when he failed to object to the extended sentence. The court dismissed his claims on procedural grounds, because he had not raised the issue during his trial and therefore could not raise it in the habeas petition. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his habeas application based on the trial court's findings. Haley then filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Pointing to the procedural-default doctrine, Texas argued that Haley's claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Under the procedural-default doctrine, federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if the last state court rejected the appeal for procedural violations of state law; the only exception is if the petitioner is actually innocent. The district court held that Haley showed he was ""actually innocent"" of earlier violations on which his sentence enhancement was based. The court ruled that Haley's sentence was therefore improperly extended. It never reached his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, having already found grounds for overturning the extended sentence. The you.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Texas's argument that the actual-innocence exception applies only to cases involving capital offenses."
+753,Walter Chaplinsky,New Hampshire,"On the public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing signs that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and advocated more conventional forms in religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "" a God - hating racketeer "" and "" a damned Fascist. "" Chaplin was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on several grounds that it was overly vague."
+589,Harbor Tug & Barge Company,Papai,"John Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. The Pt. Barrow is operated by Harbor Tug & Barge Co., which hired Papai to do the work, which involved no sailing with the vessel. Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on twelve previous occasions in the two months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union hiring hall, which had provided Papai with short term jobs with various vessels for about two years. Most of Papai's jobs were deckhand work, which Papai said involved manning the lines on and off board vessels while they dock or undock. Papai sued Harbor Tug, claiming negligence under the Jones Act, which serves to protect seamen or workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. The District Court granted Harbor Tug summary judgment upon finding that Papai did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial Papai's seaman status and his corresponding Jones Act claim. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry was not whether Papai had a permanent connection with the vessel, but whether his relationship with a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels was substantial in duration and nature, and found that this required consideration of his employment's total circumstances. Moreover, the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Papai satisfied this test, for if the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment, rather than a permanent employment system."
+312,Lockhart,McCree,"During the capital trial of Ardia McCree, a judge removed prospective jurors who stated that under no circumstances would they be able to impose the death penalty. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the judge's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. A.L. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court."
+336,"William R. Turner, et al.","Leonard Safley, et al.","In the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a “complex prison”. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all of Safley’s attempts to directly contact Watson. A Missouri Division of Corrections regulation permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so. The district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others for injunctive relief and damages. The district court applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC’s security concerns."
+219,"Metromedia, Inc. et al.",City of San Diego et al.,"The city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only ""onsite"" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment."
+477,Withrow,Williams,"During his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted. Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went further, ruling that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 you.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument."
+355,"American Trucking Associations, Inc.",Scheiner,"One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was ""deemed"" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed."
+644,State Oil Company,Khan et al.,"Barkat you. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of Albrecht v. Herald Co. in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful."
+1059,"Douglas Spector, et al.",Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,"A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA."
+757,Smith Betts,"Patrick J. Brady, Warden","Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for himself. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of theft, though was eventually surrendered to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully violating his rights to counsel."
+450,Lujan,Defenders of Wildlife,The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.
+1279,Betty Vaden,"Discover Bank, et al.","Discover Bank filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in order to compel arbitration on certain counterclaims brought by Betty Vaden, a card member, in a state court suit against her. Discover had originally brought the state suit to recover on Vaden's outstanding credit card balance, but Vaden counterclaimed that certain fees and interest rates had been charged in violation of state law. The district court held that Vaden's usury claims were preempted by federal law and that the agreement clearly contained a provision compelling arbitration in such cases The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Discover was the ""real party in interest"" and that Vaden's claims were therefore preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Furthermore, Vaden had failed to overcome the presumption that she received the properly mailed arbitration agreement. Based on these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit granted Discover's motion to compel arbitration."
+1304,Thedrick Edwards,"Darrel Vannoy, Warden","Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards ’ s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least a person tried to convict Edwards, a black man, on each ballot. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction with a 10 - 2 vote, so Edwards ’ s conviction became final in 2010. on April 20, 2020, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Ramos B. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would probably have been convicted if he had been prosecuted within one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana."
+2250,Ricky Lee Smith,Nancy A. Berryhill,"In 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit. Smith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration. Smith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith’s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014. The Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council’s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council’s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 you.S.C. § 405(g)."
+1124,"Keith Lance, et al.","Gigi Dennis, Colorado Secretary of State","When the Colorado legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan in 2000, the state courts created one at the request of a group of voters. The legislature succeeded in passing a redistricting plan in 2003. The state attorney general brought suit in the Colorado State Supreme Court to require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered plan, and the Colorado General Assembly defended its own plan. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the legislature's plan violated Article V of the State Constitution. A group of citizens including Keith Lance brought another suit in federal court alleging that Article V of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections Clause of the you.S. Constitution. Under the Supreme Court's Rooker-Feldman doctrine, no federal court except the Supreme Court may hear appeals from state courts. The District Court held that since Lance was in privity with the General Assembly - that is, their claims were similar enough to constitute a mutual interest - Lance's suit was in effect an appeal of the General Assembly's loss in state court. Therefore, the District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and declined to hear the case."
+133,BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"BCI Coca - Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles fired African - American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part because on a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non - African American employees less harshly. EEOC filed suit in BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703 ( a ) of Title IX of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado was subordinate biased, it dismissed the case because the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado's discriminatory bias. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case to trial. The Tenth Circuit cited the subordinate bias theory of dismissal, which holds any company liable for a discriminatory firing even if that employee who made its correct decision to fire was not the employee harboring racial bias."
+1031,Brosseau,Haugen,"Brosseau, a police officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried to flee in his vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed."
+1024,"State of Ohio, et al.","American Express Company, et al.","In the credit - card industry, there is what is called a “ two - sided market. ” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card. In the United States, credit - card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks : Visa ( 45 % ), American Express ( 26. 4 % ), MasterCard ( 23. 3 % ), and Discover ( 5. 3 % ). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they don't directly set certain fees, but merely raise these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees. In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing financial institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex ’ s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as counter - discriminatory provisions ( NDPs ). In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of The Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti - steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded the anti - steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex ’ s ruling violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the and court ’ s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs ’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “ rule of reason. ”"
+1818,Jerry Douglas Mempa,B. J. Rhay,"Jerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa’s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa’s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition."
+1305,South Carolina,North Carolina,"This case originates in the Supreme Court. South Carolina seeks an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River, which starts in North Carolina and flows into South Carolina. The Special Master recommends that the Supreme Court (1) permit the City of Charlotte, N.C., the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC to intervene as defendants, and (2) deny South Carolina's motion for clarification of the Special Master's order."
+150,"Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama",Yvonne Kennedy et al.,"In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama. The you.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented."
+177,John B. Greenholtz,Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,"The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board."
+122,Whalen,Roe,"In 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs. The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health. The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and age."
+990,Merit Management Group,"FTI Consulting, Inc.","Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30% shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $16.5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548(a)(1)(b), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers ""made by or to"" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “made by or to” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and do not benefit from it. The Seventh Circuit held that section 546(e) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non-named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary."
+489,"National Organization for Women, Inc.",Scheidler,"The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a ""racketeering enterprise"" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+1692,"Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255","Sax Enterprises, Inc.","In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification. In March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac. The hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law."
+1106,Helsinn Healthcare S.A.,"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.","Helsinn owns four patents regarding intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy - induced nausea and vomiting ( “ CINV ” ). All four claim priority to a provisional patent, filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on - sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on - sale bar provision of 35 you. S. C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was the exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn ’ s patents and rejected Teva ’ s “ on sale ” defense. The Federal Circuit appealed, finding that the inventions were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before its critical date was'overwhelming. ”"
+1623,"Raul Lopez, Warden",Marvin Vernis Smith,"On December 15, 2005, Minnie Smith was found dead in the home she shared with her husband, Marvin Smith. Smith was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his wife. At the end of the trial, the prosecution asked for and received an aiding-and-abetting instruction, which would allow the jury to convict Smith even if they found that he had not delivered the fatal blow. The jury convicted Smith but did not specify which theory of guilt they adopted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and rejected Smith's argument that he had not been given adequate notice of the possibility of the aiding-and-abetting instruction. The California Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith filed a petition for habeas relief. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the relief, and the district court agreed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that Smith should have been aware that the aiding-and-abetting instruction was possible because under California law aiding and abetting the crime is part of the same substantive offense as the commission of the crime itself. However, the appellate court held that Smith's Sixth Amendment right had been violated because the prosecution had tried the case on a single theory before adding the second instruction at the very end of the trial. In reaching this decision, the appellate court relied on its own precedent, which it claimed faithfully applied Supreme Court precedent."
+680,George Reynolds,United States,"George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion."
+1155,"Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.","PSKS, Inc., dba Kay's Kloset . . . Kay's Shoes","Leegin Creative Leather Products, a manufacturer of women's accessories, entered into vertical minimum price agreements with its retailers. The agreements required the retailers to charge no less than certain minimum prices for Leegin products. According to Leegin, the price minimums were intended to encourage competition among retailers in customer service and product promotion. When one retailer, PSKS, discounted Leegin products below the minimum, Leegin dropped the retailer. PSKS sued, arguing that Leegin was violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive price fixing. Under the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., mandatory minimum price agreements are per se illegal under the Act - that is, they are automatically illegal regardless of the circumstances. Leegin argued that this rule was based on outdated economics. It contended that a better legal analysis would be the ""rule of reason,"" under which price minimums would be held illegal only in cases where they could be shown to be anticompetitive. Both the District Court and you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments. The courts felt compelled to follow the Supreme Court's rule in the Dr. Miles case, under which Leegin's practices were illegal regardless of the economic arguments put forward by the company."
+103,Woodson,North Carolina,"The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. This case is one of the five ""Death Penalty Cases"" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Roberts v. Louisiana ."
+494,United States,Alvarez-Sanchez,"Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 you.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari."
+964,Kentel Myrone Weave,Commonwealth of Massachusetts,"On August 30, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot or killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver ’ s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver ’ s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first trial. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of its Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial court denied Weaver ′ s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver ’ s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel ’ s failure to object to the court ruling. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “ structural error, ” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice."
+2338,"The State of California, et al.","The State of Texas, et al.","In 2012, the you.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate. The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review."
+603,De Buono,NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,"New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, which administers a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees and their dependents. The Fund's trustees discontinued paying the New York tax and filed to enjoin the state from making future assessments and to obtain a refund. Lawyers for the Fund alleged that the HFA is preempted by the ERISA, as it applies to hospitals run by it. The District Court ruled that the HFA is not preempted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the HFA directly reduces the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could because the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan members higher fees; therefore, the HFA was preempted by the ERISA."
+1646,"Jeffrey Woods, Warden",Cory Donald,"Cory Donald, Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya decided to rob Mohammed Makki, a local drug dealer. During the course of the robbery, several shots were fired and Makki was later discovered dead. Liggins and Zaya pled guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore and Saine for one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. When the government sought to admit evidence of phone communication among the defendants on the day in question, Donald’s lawyer indicated that evidence did not affect his client, so the judge allowed testimony to proceed when Donald’s lawyer was not in the courtroom. The jury convicted Donald on all three counts. He appealed and argued that his lawyer’s absence from the courtroom during the phone call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Donald moved for federal habeas relief, which the district court granted, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed by holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not properly apply the precedent established by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cronic. In that case, the Court held that courts may presume a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated when he is denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in his trial, which the appellate court found happened in this case."
+1415,Nevada Commission on Ethics,Michael A. Carrigan,"Nevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority."
+800,Buckman Company,Plaintiffs' Legal Committee,"The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices ""present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury"" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory consultant to medical device manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was ""substantially equivalent"" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed."
+2161,"Digital Realty Trust, Inc.",Paul Somers,"Paul Somers worked as Vice President of Digital Realty Trust from 2010 to 2014. According to his complaint, Somers filed several reports to senior management regarding possible securities law violations by the company, after which reports the company fired him. He did not report his concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he was terminated. Somers then sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of state and federal laws, including Section 21F of the Exchange Act, which includes the anti-retaliation protections created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the Section 21F claim on the ground that, because Somers did not actually report the possible violations to the SEC, he was not a ""whistleblower"" as defined in the Act and thus not entitled to protection under its provisions. The Fifth Circuit in 2013 had strictly applied the Act's definition of ""whistleblower"" to the anti-retaliation provision, while the Second Circuit, finding the statute itself ambiguous and applying Chevron deference to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of it, had held in 2015 that the provision extends to all those who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless of whether the disclosures are made internally or to the SEC. The district court in this case followed the Second Circuit's approach and denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision."
+1159,Jamar Alonzo Quarles,United States of America,"Jamar Quarles was charged with being another felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C § 922 ( g ). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles ’ s conviction for third - degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( “ ACCA ” ) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon - in - possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court ’ s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 you. S. _ _ ( 2015 ), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, and US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan - s crime of second - degree home invasion constituted "" “ violent felony ” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months ’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic burglary is both an unlawful or unprivileged entry to, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. ” Michigan law defines the crime of third - degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles ’ or argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent - upon - entry element - is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third - degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary."
+584,"Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.",Town of Harrison,"Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) operates a children's church camp in Maine and finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of Maine's tax exemption statute. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine."
+1228,Brent Taylor,"Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al.","Greg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the FAA refused to turn over the plans as ""protected trade secrets,"" Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed suit in federal court in the District of Columbia. The district court determined that Taylor had been ""virtually represented"" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This judgment was affirmed by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue."
+659,Textron Lycoming,United Automobile Workers,"Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to ""subcontract out"" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over ""suits for violation of contracts"" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the because of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed."
+1645,"Patrick Glebe, Superintendent of the Stafford Creek Corrections Center",Joshua James Frost,"Over the course of eleven days in April 2003, Joshua James Frost and two associates committed a series of armed robberies in the state of Washington. Frost was charged with robbery and related offenses. During closing arguments, Frost's lawyer expressed his desire to argue both that the prosecution did not meet their burden and that Frost acted under duress. The trial judge made the defense choose between the two alternative defenses, and the defense chose duress. The jury convicted Frost of multiple counts. The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court's restriction of the closing argument violated Frost's rights to due process and assistance of counsel. However, that decision constituted trial error, which makes the mistake reviewable, rather than structural error, which would require automatic reversal. Upon such review, the Washington Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Frost and upheld the conviction. Frost filed a petition for a writ of habeas of corpus that the district court denied, and a panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Upon rehearing en banc, the appellate court reversed and directed the district court to grant the petition because the Washington Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established law by failing to classify the trial court's restriction of the defense's closing argument as structural error."
+612,United States,Alaska,"The United States disputed the ownership of submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast. The Alaska Statehood Act expressly provided that the federal Submerged Lands Act (Act) applies to Alaska. The Act entitles Alaska to submerged lands beneath tidal and inland navigable waters and submerged lands extending three miles seaward of the State's coastline. The United States claimed a right to submerged lands along the Alaska's Arctic Coast for mineral leasing. Alaska, in a counterclaim, sought to quiet its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, formerly known as the Arctic National Wildlife Range."
+510,Campbell-Ewald Company,Jose Gomez,"On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message advertising the you.S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics. Gomez sued and argued that that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell-Ewald’s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell-Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez’s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell-Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell-Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects."
+1838,Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation,Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,"The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. The district court dismissed the suit, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion."
+885,Bassam Yacoub Salman,United States,"Maher Kara joined Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2004 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman’s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother-in-law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman’s account reached $2.1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information."
+1374,"David Bobby, Warden",Harry Mitts,"Harry Mitts drank bourbon until he became intoxicated and then shot and killed an African American man, while speaking racial epithets. During the police shoot-out that followed, Mitts shot and killed one police officer and wounded two others before being apprehended. At trial, Mitts did not contest the evidence proving that he had killed two men, but he instead attempted to establish that he was too intoxicated to form the required intent to kill. After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty on both aggravated murder counts and terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The trial court sentenced Mitts to death for the aggravated murders and to terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Mitts' convictions and sentences, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences and denied rehearing, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury to merge duplicative death penalty specifications, but holding that the error did not influence the jury and was resolved by re-weighing on appeal. Mitts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A federal judge in Cleveland affirmed the sentence, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to vacate."
+621,Jorge Luna Torres,"Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General","In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( INS ) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “ alien accused of a crime involving moral turpitude. ” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal, unless he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony ; the Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres ’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA ’ s ruling but concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute ’ s electronic commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres ’ application for cancellation of the removal order."
+83,Nevada Department of Human Resources,Hibbs,"William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department and Human Resources, sought leave for care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( FMLA ). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "" serious health condition "" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's requests for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he is fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "" against his employer "" that "" interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of "" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money back for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed."
+541,Gasperini,Center for Humanities Inc.,"William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted ""industry standard"" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award ""deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation."" Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, ""the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."" Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict ""materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation."" The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000."
+844,Jermaine Simmons et al. ,Walter J. Himmelreich,"Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, namely a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act ( FTCA ) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect them from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeals, the you. S. Court of Appeals for this Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by ruling that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 you. S. C. § 2676, that prohibits “ any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim. ” The appellate court again reversed and remanded the lower court ’ s judgment. It held that Himmelreich ’ s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and ordered by prison administrators to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich ’ s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 you. S. C § 2676."
+2237,Franchise Tax Board of California,Gilbert P. Hyatt,"In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies surrounding Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt’s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties. Hyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns. FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction over Hyatt’s declaratory relief because of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and comity. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded FTB was not entitled to complete immunity under any of these principles, but was entitled to partial immunity equal to the immunity a Nevada government agency would receive. Thus, the court concluded that FTB was immune from the negligence because of action, but not from the intentional tort causes of action. FTB appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the court’s determination that FTB was entitled only to partial immunity under comity principles. Two other questions from this litigation made their way to the US Supreme Court, and the Court (1) split 4–4 as to whether it should overrule Nevada v. Hall, which provides “that one State … can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State … without the other State’s consent,” and (2) held that the Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under its state law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. With these preliminary legal questions resolved, a Nevada jury finally found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, over $1 for special damages for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court issued upholding the damages, subject to the statutory caps to which FTB is entitled, consistent with the US Supreme Court’s holding on that issue. FTB asked the US Supreme Court to reconsider the first question again, whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall."
+598,"Rebecca Friedrichs, et al.","California Teachers Association, et al.","California law allows employers to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “ agency shop ” arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of dues to the union in the case of a “ fair share service fee. ” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year. Petitioners are a group representing public school employees which sued both California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and claims that the agency shop arrangement and the opt - out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district courts held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
+58,Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company,Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurance to fully deduct "" loss reserves, "" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves would constitute "" reserve strengthening, "" or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in the tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and a Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law as say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening amounted only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss deposits."
+522,"Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services","Margaret Whitecotton, et al.","On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function. In order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision."
+1307,"Monsanto Co., et al.","Geerston Seed Farms, et al.","Geertson Seed Farms (""Geertson"") and Trask Family Seeds (""Trask"") sought an injunction against Monsanto Company (""Monsanto"") in a California federal district court. Geertson and Trask feared that the wide-scale sale of a new Monsanto alfalfa variety, resistant to one of the company's herbicides, would lead to cross-pollination with Geertson's and Trask's conventional alfalfa variety and thereby lead to its disappearance. The district court granted the injunction pending an Environmental Impact Statement (""EIS"") about the effect of Monsanto's new alfalfa variety. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the injunction was appropriate and that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the issuance of the injunction."
+2045,CRST Van Expedited Inc.,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit on behalf of approximately 270 female employees against CRST Van Expedited (CRST). Two years after filing the suit, the EEOC failed to identify the 270 women, and the district court ordered the EEOC to amend its list of 270 women to include only the women who wished to continue with the suit and to ensure that those women be available for deposition. The EEOC complied with the first court order and failed to fulfill the second before the deadline. CRST had filed seven motions to dismiss, and the district granted (or granted in part) six of the motions. CRST subsequently filed a bill of costs against the EEOC for $4,560,285.11, and the district court granted the fee award. The EEOC appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the fee award. The appellate court held that the EEOC’s pre-suit obligations were not elements of the claim and did not constitute a ruling on the merits that was eligible for fees."
+463,American National Red Cross,S.G.,"Plaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 you.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to ""sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States,"" 36 you.S.C. Section 2, conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district court."
+1048,"Dennis Bates, et al.",Dow Agrosciences LLC,"A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'."
+1003,"Cyan, Inc., et. al.","Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.","Since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under that statute. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which covered certain federal law securities class cases, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect a limitation on state court claims. Beaver County Employees'Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California state court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved for dismiss the claims, arguing that its amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims directly. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims."
+149,Homero Gonzalez,United States,"Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co - defendant on several drug - abuse charges. He found not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had acted on several pretrial matters stated that she would conduct voir dire, and requested consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly refused. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate or conduct the jury interviews."
+1177,"Jeffrey Uttecht, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary",Cal Coburn Brown,"A Washington State jury sentenced Cal Brown to death for murder. Brown protested that unfair jury selection had guaranteed a ""verdict of death."" One potential juror who expressed willingness to impose the death penalty only in ""severe situations"" was dismissed by the judge for because. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. Brown appealed first to a federal district court and then to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the dismissed juror was not ""substantially impaired"" in his ability to follow the law. Supreme Court precedent required that jurors only be dismissed if their personal views prevent them from performing their duties. The prosecution unsuccessfully petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act required appeals courts to give deference to trial judges' evaluations of jurors."
+556,Republic of Argentina,"NML Capital, Ltd.","During an economic crisis in 2001, the Republic of Argentina ( Argentina ) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such investor, NML Capital, Ltd. ( NML ), later failed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which issued judgments totaling more than US $ 2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML imposed subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( FSIA ) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The appeals court ordered the banks to comply with the subpoena requests. The you. S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the FSIA could not apply to the subpoena because this was a discovery order directed at commercial companies that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity."
+1758,Danny Escobedo,Illinois,"Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession had been admissible even though it was obtained after he had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel."
+965,"Department of Transportation, et al.","Public Citizen, et al.","In 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers. When the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed."
+361,O'Connor,Ortega,"In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf."
+2179,"Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al.","Joe Mansky, et al.","Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define “political”, so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request. This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote. Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights. Initially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts’ ruling was correct. EIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit’s ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned."
+2361,"Willie Earl Carr, et al.","Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security","Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court. While his case in the district court was pending, the you.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the you.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency. In response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court."
+10,United States,"Mississippi Chemical Corporation, Costal Chemical Corp","Mississippi Chemical Corp. and Costal Chemical Corp. were “cooperate associations” within the meaning of the Agricultural Marketing Act. The associations qualified for membership in a “bank for Cooperatives”, which allowed them to borrow money. The Farm Credit Act of 1955 required that the associations buy Class “C” stocks valued at $100. The associations claimed a $99 interest deduction on their taxes for every stock purchased. When the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, the associations paid the deficiency and then sued for a refund. The district court found for the associations and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
+301,Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang,"FMR LLC, et al.","The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their current employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments ( Fidelity ), alleging that the company unlawfully fired employees in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ( OSHA ) that they believed that Fidelity has violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security Securities Exchange Commission ( SEC ) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson brought several separate claims against her contract with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged. Zang and Lawson each launched separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated "" whistleblower "" protection sections of the Sarbanes - Oakley Act by launching retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees, private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act."
+1857,Chimel,California,"Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction."
+230,Duane Youngberg,Nicholas Romeo,"Nicholas Romeo was a 33-year-old man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child. Following the death of his father, Romeo’s mother was unable to adequately care for Romeo and had him involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State School and Hospital (“Pennhurst”) on a permanent basis. During his time in the state facility, Romeo suffered injuries on numerous occasions and was physically restrained at times. Romeo’s mother became concerned, and after objecting to Romeo’s treatment several times, sued the facility on behalf of Romeo. Romeo’s mother claimed that his treatment violated the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Romeo’s mother claimed Romeo had the right to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and access to habilitation (training or treatment with the goal of eventual release). At trial, the court instructed the jury that they could only find that Pennhurst violated Romeo’s constitutional rights if the officials had been “deliberately indifferent” to Romeo’s medical and psychological needs, and the jury found in favor of Pennhurst. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable, because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not the involuntarily committed. However, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Romeo had liberty interests in freedom from restraint, safe conditions, and minimally adequate habilitation, which could only be violated if three distinct standards were met. An infringement of the right to safe conditions can only be justified by “substantial necessity,” the right to freedom from bodily restraints can only be infringed for “compelling necessity,” and the access to habilitation must be “acceptable in the light of present medical or other scientific knowledge."
+113,Poelker,Doe,A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.
+1516,Adrian Moncrieffe,"Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General","Adrian Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 2008, police arrested Moncrieffe while he was in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. In 2010, the department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings against Moncrieffe for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. Moncrieffe did not dispute his conviction but argued that that the conviction was not an ""aggravated felony"" and did not make him removable. An immigration judge ruled that Moncrieffe was removable, holding that the petitioner's conviction was an aggravated felony because Moncrieffe was convicted under a state law which was similar to a federal law which made possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe appealed and argued that possession of such a small amount of marijuana would not be a felony under federal law, but rather a misdemeanor. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moncrieffe's argument and dismissed the appeal. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the deportation order."
+450,Junius Irving Scales,United States,"The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States (""Party"") because it advocated the overthrow of the government ""as speedily as circumstances would permit."" Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 (""Security Act"") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review."
+435,Robert S. Minnick ,Mississippi,"Robert S. Minnick and James Dyess escaped from the Clark County Jail. The next day, they broke into a mobile home to search for weapons. While in the home, the owner returned with a friend and the friend’s infant son. Minnick and Dyess shot and killed the two adults and tied up two young women who arrived later. Minnick and Dyess fled to Mexico, but after a falling out, Minnick went to California alone where police arrested him on a warrant for the Mississippi murders. After the arrest, two FBI officers came to interview Minnick at the San Diego Jail. Minnick refused, asking the officers to “Come back Monday when I have a lawyer.” Minnick did meet with an appointed lawyer on two or three occasions. The next Monday, the deputy sheriff of Clark County came to question Minnick. Prison officials told Minnick he “could not refuse” to speak to the sheriff. The deputy sheriff advised Minnick of his rights and Minnick refused to sign a waiver form. Minnick then confessed to one of the murders, saying that Dyess forced him to shoot. At trial, Minnick moved to suppress those statements, but the court denied the motion, reasoning that Edwards v Arizona only required counsel to be made available to an accused. Minnick argued that he was entitled to have counsel present at all questioning. The jury found Minnick guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that Minnick’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied because he had met with counsel."
+1738,"Louis McNeese, Jr., a minor, by Mabel McNeese, his mother and next friend et al. ","Board of Education for Community Unit School Dist. 187, Cahoka, IL et al.","African American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian and African American students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed."
+697,Curt Muller,Oregon,"Oregon enacted a bill that limited employees to ten hours of work at factories and laundries. The owner of his laundry business, Curt Muller, was fined $ 10 when she violated the law. Muller appealed this conviction. The state supreme court upheld a law ’ for constitutionality."
+1007,"Jenny Rubin, et. al.",Islamic Republic of Iran,"In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight you. S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, Iranian governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( "" FSIA "" ) provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state - sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D. C. entered a $ 71. 5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy their judgment. The case at hand involves four pieces of ancient Persian artifacts within its possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach or execute Iran's property under subsections ( a ) and ( g ) of 28 you. S. C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ( "" TRIA "" ). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610 ( a ) permits execution on a foreign state's property "" used for a commercial activity in The United States, "" that provision allows use by the foreign state itself, not a third party ( such as a museum ). The district court also held, as the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610 ( g ) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either. The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610 ( g ) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state the of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject the execution under section 1610."
+488,Curtis Publishing Company,Wallace Butts,"In New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan ( 1964 ) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was written "" with knowledge that it was false or with total disregard of whether it was false or not. "" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "" Bear "" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama'S favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the reporters. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for no new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court - ordered enrollment of an African - American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in various state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but a judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York State was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case."
+474,Poe,Ullman,"Paul and Pauline Poe, a lesbian couple, continued to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after her first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second abortion that could be life - threatening. Since early late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited widespread distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued both the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment."
+2344,"Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.","Maria Angelica Guzman Chavez, et al.","Respondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings. The respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 you.S.C. § 1231, and bond hearings were denied. The noncitizens argued that 8 you.S.C. § 1226, rather than 8 you.S.C. § 1231, governs their detention. Section 1226 provides for detention ""pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States"" and allows for discretionary release on bond. The district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that § 1226 applied. The court held that § 1231 does not come into play until the government has “the present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.” A divided three-judge panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
+975,Pennsylvania State Police,Nancy Drew Suders,"Nancy Drew Suders quit her job as a dispatcher for the Pennsylvania State Police in August 1998. She claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors since she got the job in March of that year, and that she had finally decided to quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, photographed and questioned. Two days before quitting, she had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because, Suders claimed, the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic. Suders then filed suit in federal district court, charging that the harassment had forced her to quit. The district court judge, however, granted summary judgment to the state police before the case went to trial. He found that Suders had failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could not bring suit unless the police had taken a ""tangible employment action"" that substantially changed her employment status. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned the district judge's decision, ruling that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit. While the police had not fired Suders, they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense."
+318,Freddie Lee Hall,Florida,"Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was convicted without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence to the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision on Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather as just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non - record facts that has not been considered in the previous review. The conviction was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with "" unquantifiable weight, "" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty could unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall would eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test — whether he had an IQ below 70 — could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed."
+266,Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,"Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. et al.","The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single “bubble”. Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality."
+17,"Sears, Roebuck and Co.",County of Los Angeles and City of Compton,"The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Phelps and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for objects manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were sold for sale both in or out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears ’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive monopoly over domestic goods. This made the state tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce."
+1328,Gregory Greer,United States,"In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon by possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C. § 922 ( g ), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “ punishable as an Armed Career Criminal ” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months ’ imprisonment. In 2015, the you. S. Supreme Court invalidated the “ residual clause ” of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( g ), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding only his convictions qualified under the ACCA ’ s enumerated - offenses clause, not the residual clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. Associated States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so by 18 you. S. C. § 922, the prosecution must find both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer ’ s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for trial in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was no felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer ’ s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review."
+483,"Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America","City of Jacksonville, Florida, et al.","In 1984, the Minority Business Enterprise Participation ordinance was passed in Jacksonville, Florida which set aside 10 percent of the budget for city contracts to hire minority-owned businesses. On April 4, 1989, the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, an association of individuals and companies that worked in construction in Jacksonville, filed an action against the city and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in favor of the association, but when the city appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the association lacked standing to file the action because it did not demonstrate that one or more of its members would have received a reserved city contract but for the ordinance."
+661,Steel Company,Citizens for Better Environment,"In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic-and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations."
+683,George Reynolds,United States,"George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter - day Saints, was charged with bigamy in the federal Morrill Anti - Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds ruled that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to have two women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right and free exercise of religion."
+27,Gottschalk,Benson,"Engineers Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot invented a faster and more efficient mathematical procedure for transforming the normal ""decimal"" type of numbers (base 10) into true ""binary"" numbers (base 2) which are simpler to process within computers. Their mathematical procedure was somewhat akin to long division, albeit with different steps. Their attorney argued before the patent examiner that the inventors were entitled to a broad patent covering any use of their new mathematical procedure, even use of it by a human using pencil and paper. The examiner rejected their invention. An appellate court overruled the examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney backed down from his earlier position and argued that the inventors were entitled to a patent covering all uses of their new mathematical procedure in computers, but not necessarily to its use by humans using pencil and paper. (The members of the Supreme Court at that time knew very little about computers.)"
+2317,United States of America,Michael J.D. Briggs,"In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 you.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 you.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal."
+1605,"Clyde Reed, et al.","Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al.","Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication."
+142,Ballew,Georgia,"Ballew was found in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting an obscene motion picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a jury of five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case."
+666,Rivet,Regions Bank of Louisiana,"In 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state because of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question."
+2038,"Whole Woman’s Health, et al.","John Hellerstedt, Commissioner, Texas Department of State Health Services, et al.","In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion."
+592,Robinson,Shell Oil Company,"Charles T. Robinson, Sr., was fired by she will Oil Co. Thereafter, Robinson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a job with another company, which contacted she will for an employment reference. Robinson, claiming that she will gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, then filed suit under Title VII, which makes it unlawful ""for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment"" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the term ""employees"" in Title VII refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not justicible under Title VII."
+648,Baker,General Motors Corp.,"After working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+1409,Vincent E. Staub,Proctor Hospital,"As a member of the you.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias."
+634,Michael Musacchio,United States,"Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services ( ETS ), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services ( TTS ), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $ 10 million. In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and their government did not object. After it was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts were barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this charge at trial. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court ’ s instructional error had indeed become the point of the case because the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial."
+359,"Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.","The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.","Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal income credits distributed to low - income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by the housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project ( ICP ), a non - profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in a Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs ( TDHCA ), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low - income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated itself in violation of the Fair Housing Act. At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard on disparate impact claims that the you. S. Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less favorable alternatives existed, so a district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the you. S. Court on Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act."
+549,"Leavitt, Governor of Utah",Jane L.,"A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early-term abortions was unconstitutional. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable."
+626,"Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.","Greg Manning, et al.","The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. ( Escala ), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs ’ shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs ’ claims largely based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 ruling that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The court sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court had jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to send the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court make the plaintiffs a motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should also be heard in state court."
+1824,Sam Umans,United States,"Sam Umans was a certified public accountant. Between 1959 and 1961, the Internal Revenue Service audited six couples represented by Umans. According to Louis R. Deitsch, an IRS employee, Umans approached Deitsch before each audit to “work something out together on it”. They agreed upon a disallowance for each audit and Umans gave Deitsch an envelope containing $50 for each case. Five other IRS employees described similar transactions between the years 1961 and 1963, wherein smaller disallowances were given during audits followed by cash payments to the auditing IRS employees. Umans and the six IRS employees, including Deitsch, were indicted in August 1964. Umans was charged with aiding and abetting IRS employees in receiving illegal fees. He was also charged with giving money to government officials. On March 25, 1965, Umans and the six IRS employees were re-indicted. The grand jury additionally charged Umans with giving money to government officials with the intent to influence their actions. The evidence before the grand jury consisted solely of an IRS agent summarizing statements made by witnesses who would later testify at Umans’ trial. At trial, Umans requested access to statements made by the IRS employees that they took bribes from persons other than Umans; the court denied this request and sealed the documents in question. The government’s case was based almost entirely on the testimonies of three of the IRS employees, including that of Deitsch. Judge Sterry R. Waterman, writing for a unanimous United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of Umans’ charge for aiding and abetting IRS employees, but that this instruction was not in plain error. He held that the instruction was not sufficiently prejudicial, noting that it was not objected to at trial. Judge Waterman did, however, reverse the sentence for giving money to officials, holding that this sentence could not be concurrent with the sentence for giving money to officials with intent to influence their actions. He noted that the charges were identical but for the higher requirement of proof in the latter charge. Looking to the statute itself, Judge Waterman determined that Congress intended to make the charge for giving money to officials a lesser, included offense. Judge Waterman held that the trial court properly excluded the IRS employees’ statements about taking bribes from other persons from the record. He reasoned that it would have been within the court’s discretion to prevent Umans from cross-examining the IRS employees on this subject for impeachment purposes, as the government did not broach the subject during the employees’ direct examination. Judge Waterman also held that the government properly indicted Umans with hearsay evidence, holding that this evidence was competent. He dismissed Umans’ concerns about inconsistencies between the evidence presented to the grand jury and evidence presented at trial. He noted that Umans had access to affadavits used by the government to indict him; thus, he could have objected to any inconsistencies at trial, but did not do so."
+889,Barnes,Gorman,"Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right."
+746,"Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell",Connecticut,"Newton Cantwell and his son, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door - to - doorway and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti - Catholic message. Cantwell and the sons were arrested and charged with : ( 1 ) interfering with a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds for the public, and ( 2 ) inciting a common - purpose breach of the peace."
+62,Dempsey,Martin,"Pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey sought leave to proceed pro forma pauperis in the you. S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In October 1992, the Court had invoked Rule 39. 8 to deny proceeding in forma constitutional status with respect to a petition for relief. Before the 39. 8 denial Dempsey had filed eleven petitions for certiorari and his application for an extraordinary hearing. After the 39. 8 denial, Dempsey filed five petitions for certiorari. All eighteen from Dempsey's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent."
+97,"Republic of Austria, et al.",Maria V. Altmann,"Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six paintings from the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976 ( FSIA ), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving "" rights to property taken in violation of federal law. "" Austria, however, claimed that her FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings was taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the artist. Because the Act did not itself state that it applied retroactively ( that is, to artworks taken before it was passed ) Austria claimed that it was subject to this broader definition of immunity. The district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed."
+2352,Colorado Department of State,"Micheal Baca, et al.","Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich. The three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state’s popular vote. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca’s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding the state’s removal of Mr. Baca and nullification of his vote were unconstitutional."
+391,"M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.","John Kerry, Secretary of State","In 2002, Manachem himself was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the you. S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as "" Israel, "" in accordance of Section 214 ( d ) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 ( Act ). The State Department declined and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed "" Jerusalem "" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214 ( d ). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non - justiciable political question. The you. S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214 ( d ) "" impermissibly intereferes "" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The you. S. Court of Appeals for this District of Columbia Circuit reversed but held that that section goes beyond the scope under Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves to the executive branch."
+1503,"Jerry Gunn, et al.",Vernon Minton,"In the early 1990s, Vernon Minton, a former securities broker, developed the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN) software that allowed financial traders to execute trades on their own. R.M. Stark & Co. (Stark) agreed to lease TEXCEN. More than one year later, Minton filed for a patent that was granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on January 11, 2000. Minton later sued the NASDAQ and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and alleged that their services infringed on his patent. NASD and NASDAQ argued that a patent is invalid when the invention claimed is sold more than a year before the patent application is filed. The district court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ. Minton retained new counsel to argue his case under the experimental use exception, which states that the patent remains valid if the invention was sold primarily for experimental, rather than commercial, use. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Minton sued his original attorneys (collectively referred to as Gunn) for legal malpractice and argued that their failure to argue the experimental use exception in the original suit cost him the case. Gunn filed for summary judgment arguing no-evidence due to the fact that the attorneys did not know of the earlier sale in order for the experimental use exception to be relevant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunn. Minton appealed to the Second Court of Appeals for Texas. Shortly after he filed his appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in malpractice suits arising from patent litigation. Minton filed a motion to dismiss his case from the Second Court of Appeals for Texas, but the court denied his motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and dismissed the case."
+1517,Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.,Karen L. Bartlett,"In December 2004, Karen Bartlett's doctor prescribed Sulindac, a generic anti-inflammatory medication, to help treat her shoulder pain. Within months she began suffering from a severe reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, which caused the skin condition toxic epidermal necrolysis. This condition deteriorated over 60 percent of her skin to the point of causing open wounds. As a result, she has suffered permanent and serious injuries, including near-blindness. Bartlett filed a lawsuit against the Sulindac medication manufacturer, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company. Bartlett initially presented several negligence and product liability claims, but only her design defect product liability claim made it to trial. Beginning in August 2009, a jury at the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire heard evidence that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous to consumers and therefore was defectively designed. Mutual countered, among several other defenses, that federal law governs generic drug manufacturers' conduct; therefore Karen could not pursue a state design defect claim. After 14 days of trial, the jury deliberated and sided with Bartlett, awarding over $20 million in compensatory damages. Mutual appealed the decision for several reasons, including the following: the district court misunderstood New Hampshire product liability law; and, the court improperly admitted several pieces of evidence and the jury award of damages was excessive. Mutual also reasserted its claim that federal law should prevail over a state defective design claim. Despite Mutual's arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. Mutual appealed further to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari."
+886,United States,Craft,"When Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to ""all [of his] property and rights to property,"" pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties property under Michigan law."
+2068,"Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., et al.",Apple Inc.,"In April 2011, Apple Inc. (Apple) sued Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. (Samsung) and argued that certain design elements of Samsung’s smartphones infringed on specific patents for design elements in the iPhone that Apple holds. The jury held that Samsung had infringed on Apple’s patents and awarded over $1 billion in damages. The district court ordered a partial retrial on the issue of damages because some damages had been awarded for a period in which Samsung did not have notice of some of the asserted patents. On retrial, the jury awarded nearly $300 million in damages. On appeal, Samsung argued that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on Samsung’s entire profits, rather than the fraction of profits directly attributable to the infringed patents themselves. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of damages because Samsung did not argue that there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the award."
+828,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,"Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al.","In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal judge had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro Garcia, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and since Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals closed this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the you. S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double murder was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed."
+1377,"Delbert Williamson, et al.","Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al.","Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action ""to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt."" On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (""NHTSA"") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions."
+145,Homero Gonzalez,United States,"Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews."
+1449,Patrick Wood,"Kevin Milyard, Warden, Sterling Correctional Facility, et al.",Patrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against double jeopardy and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court.
+1802,Abbott Laboratories,Gardner,"In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (""FFDCA"") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the ""established name"" of the drug ""prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,"" on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices. The act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name every time its corresponding proprietary name is used. Abbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act (""DJA"") and the Administrative Procedure Act (""APA""). Abbott Laboratories argued that the ""every time"" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress. Chief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's ""every time"" interpretation. The you.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 other drug manufacturers appealed the decision."
+167,Bell,Wolfish,"A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction."
+537,Supreme Court of Virginia,Friedman,"Myrna Friedman, a resident in Maryland, had hired at a night school located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia Bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was upheld in federal district court."
+843,Swierkiewicz,Sorema N.A.,"Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 you.S. 792."
+825,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,"Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al.","In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the you.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed."
+1909,Boos,Barry,"A provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to ""bring that government into public odium or public disrepute."" Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front of that country's embassy."
+1250,Eddie Lee Shular,United States of America,"The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the you.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.”"
+1797,"Edward J. Garrity, et al.",State of New Jersey,"The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the Attorney General to investigate alleged irregularities in the handling of cases in the municipal courts of certain boroughs. As part of that investigation, police officers were brought in for questioning. They were told that anything they said might be used against them in a state criminal proceeding and that they could refuse to answer, but such refusal might be grounds for dismissal. The appellants represent a group of police officers who answered the questions and were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants were convicted and they appealed by arguing that their statements were coerced by the threat of the loss of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions."
+536,Supreme Court of Virginia,Friedman,"Myrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state in Virginia. Virginia law makes permanent residency a requirement for admission to The Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was dismissed in federal district court."
+91,"Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.",Henson,"Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and application thereof a chlordimeform - based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba - Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state - court action were dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson could proceed. Syngenta then removed the case to another federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state - court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating its dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly allow removal of the state - court case."
+1106,Gary Kent Jones,Linda K. Flowers et al.,"In 1993, Gary Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house would be sold. The letter was returned as ""unclaimed"" (because Jones was not living at the house and no one was present to sign for its receipt) and the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands sold the property in a private sale to Linda Flowers. Jones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the you.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights."
+996,Oil States Energy Services LLC,"Greene’s Energy Group, LLC","During hydraulic fracturing ( known as “ fracking ” ) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas fields to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2, 195, 118 ( the ’ 118 Application ) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “ hydraulic ” into the wellhead through which the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism ( described in Patent No. 6, 179, 053, called the ’ 053 Patent ), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene ’ s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found that ’ 053 Patent should be distinct from the ’ 118 Application using the “ ordinary meaning ” standard. Greene ’ s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks that you. S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO ’ s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or design. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the fundamental right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum before having their patent revoked."
+840,Arkansas,Sullivan,"In 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police Department stopped Kenneth Andrew Sullivan for traffic violations. When Officer Taylor saw Sullivan's license, he realized that he was aware of narcotics intelligence regarding him. Sullivan was then arrested. Afterwards Officer Taylor conducted an inventory search of Sullivan's vehicle and discovered methamphetamine as well as items of drug paraphernalia. Ultimately, Sullivan was charged with various state-law drug offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding. Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was merely a ""pretext and sham to search"" him and, therefore, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted the motion and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. In petitioning for rehearing, the State argued that the court had erred by taking into account Office Taylor's subjective motivation using Whren v. United States, which makes ""the ulterior motives of police officers...irrelevant so long as there is probable because for the traffic stop."" The court rejected the argument and denied the petition."
+716,"Walter M. Pierce, Governor",Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,"The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or educators to educate boys under the ages of eight and sixteen in public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care to orphans, educated youths, and established and supported academies or institutions. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy."
+1198,Clifford B. Meacham et al.,"Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, aka KAPL, Inc., et al.","When the New York-based federal research laboratory Knolls Atomic Power Lab instituted a downsizing program, it asked supervisors to rank employees based on three factors: performance, flexibility, and the criticality of their skills, and then to add points for years of service in order to determine who would be dismissed. Of the thirty-one employees who were let go, all but one were over the age of forty. Twenty-six of these dismissed employees filed suit against Knolls for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A jury found for the employees and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. However the you.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, relying on its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson to hold that ""an employer is not liable under the ADEA so long as the challenged employment action, in relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer's legitimate goals."" On remand, the Second Circuit vacated its previous decision and held that the employees had failed to carry their burden of proving the evaluation system unreasonable. In seeking Supreme Court review, the employees argued that it should be Knolls, not them, who must prove the reasonableness of an action that would otherwise be prohibited."
+227,Monty Lee Eddings,Oklahoma,"On April 4, 1977, sixteen-year-old Monty Lee Eddings and several of his friends ran away from home. Before leaving, Eddings took three of his father’s firearms, including a .410 gauge shotgun with a shortened barrel. Before reaching the Turner Turnpike near Tulsa, the group stopped at a Howard Johnson restaurant. As they were leaving, Eddings lost control of the car, briefly sending it over a curb and into a ditch before regaining control. A witness observed this and informed an officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Patrolman Larry Crabtree, who followed their car and pulled it over. When Crabtree was within about six feet of the car, Eddings stuck the shotgun out of the window and fired it, killing Crabtree, then immediately drove the car away. At trial, the defense presented evidence of circumstances mitigating Eddings’ guilt, including the details of his extensive juvenile record in Missouri. Eddings’ parents divorced when he was five, after which he was shuffled between his mother’s house and his father’s house and also spent some time in a group home. Witnesses testified that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and at a level several years below his age in terms of mental and emotional development. A state psychologist testified that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial personality disorder. The state provided evidence of aggravating circumstances. Oklahoma alleged 1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, and 3) that there was a probability that the defendant would commit more criminal acts of violence constituting a threat to society. The trial judge found that the state proved all three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge also found that Eddings’ age was a mitigating factor of great weight, but would not consider evidence of Eddings’ “violent background.” The judge then found that the aggravating circumstances proven by the state outweighed the fact of Eddings’ age and sentenced him to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence, also holding that Eddings' death penalty sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
+1386,CIGNA Corp. and CIGNA Pension Plan,"Janice C. Amara, et al.","Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a ""summary plan description"" (SPD), as well as a ""summary of material modifications"" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class-action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The you.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself."
+801,"Robert J. Wittman, et al.","Gloria Personhuballah, et al.","In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, what was already majority African - American, and reduced the percentage of African - American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice as preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants beyond their official capacities and argued that Virginia ’ s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district Court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal ; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority ’ s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial interests predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which election. On remand, the District court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan."
+430,Grogan,Garner,"Frank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by ""actual fraud."" The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the ""preponderance of the evidence"" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a ""clear and convincing evidence"" standard. The Court found that most states used the ""clear and convincing"" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a ""fresh start"" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding ""clear and convincing"" standard)."
+1695,National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,Alabama ex rel. Patterson,Alabama filed a civil contempt order against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) when it refused to present a list of the names and addresses of all its members and agents within the state. The NAACP claimed the order violated the NAACP’s constitutional rights. The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review a final contempt judgment.
+328,Julie Heimeshoff,Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores,"Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal - Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave home. In August 2003, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. ( Hartford ) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007. Heimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit with time barred and the plan unambiguously took legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three - year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The U. S. Court Of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
+1337,"City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities","Hotels.com, L.P., et al.","In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class - action lawsuit against various online travel companies ( OTCs ), such as Hotels. com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “ cost of occupancy, which therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "" an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing two supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties. "" The OTCs second proposed order stated that "" costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39. "" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC ’ s proposed order. Then the OTCs entered a bill of costs in the district court of over $ 2. 3 million, which included over $ 2 million for “ post - judgment interest ” and “ premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds. ” San Antonio objected and petitioned the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond tax sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce one of the bond rates. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite."
+849,Zelman,Simmons-Harris,"Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
+1220,"Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al.",Christopher M. Sulyma,"In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 you.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings."
+1815,"Ruth Elizabeth Chapman, Thomas LeRoy Teale",California,"On October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club’s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman’s general description and Adcock stood in front of the club’s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door. The next day, the Spot Club’s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body’s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found. Officers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman’s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting. Chapman and Teale were charged with the first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman’s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants’ failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. State of California that California’s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants’ silence against them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice."
+913,State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,"United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al.","Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies : One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government officials might apply for flood damage claims ; therefore, there was an incentive for the insurance to classify damage as caused in flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. ( State Farm ) is one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was simply seeking to maximize its policyholders ’ flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA ’ s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the defendant, and a violation of the FCA seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement could not warrant immediate dismissal."
+650,Robert Fletcher,John Peck,"In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the law and declared all rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the original sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract."
+1072,Merck KGaA,"Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., et al.","Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages."
+1023,Melvin T. Smith,Massachusetts,"Melvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury. Smith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding."
+636,"Tyson Foods, Inc.","Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.","Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. ( Tyson ) at the company ’ s meat - processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on their “ gang - time ” system, which means they were paid only on time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law, not paying appropriate compensation from the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and awarded damages of several million dollars. Tyson appealed then argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the company ’ s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s certification for the plaintiff class."
+106,State of Michigan,Richard Bert Mosley,"On April 8, 1971, Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill’s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion, and he was found guilty and given the mandatory sentence of life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that the trial court’s failure to suppress Mosley’s statement was a per se violation of Mosley’s Miranda rights. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review."
+473,"Hazen Paper Co., Robert Hazen, Thomas N. Hazen ",Walter F. Biggins,"Hazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years. Biggins’ pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service. Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and “willfully” violated the ADEA. The willful violation gave rise to liquidated damages. The district court judge granted Hazen’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing a “reckless disregard” for the matter."
+660,John Barron ex rel. Tiernan,Mayor of Baltimore,"Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down."
+1398,Bob Camreta,"Sarah Greene, et al.","Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable because or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she ""does not like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she does not like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap."" After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the you.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants."
+510,United States,"X-Citement Video, Inc.","The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act."
+181,New York City Transit Authority,Carl Beazer et al.,"Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision."
+882,City of Columbus,"Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.","Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers ""shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."" Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to ""a State [or] political subdivision of a State,"" while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the ""authority of a State."" The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone."
+1385,"Kelly Harrington, Warden",Joshua Richter,"A California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. However, upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that ""counsel's performance was deficient."" And, the defendant must show that ""the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."" Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce."
+1298,Brett Jones,Mississippi,"When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a prison sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The district court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In another post - conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Miller case. Alabama, 567 you. S. 460 ( 2012 ), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 you. S. _ _ ( 2016 ). In Miller, the Court ruled that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of life sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment ’ s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “ for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes involve permanent incorrigibility. ” The circuit court held the hearing violated several factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility."
+796,Cleveland,United States,"Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as ""any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations."" The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of ""property."" The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
+387,William A. Frazee ,"Illinois Dept. of Employment Security; Sally Ward, Director of the Illinois Dept. of Employment Security; Bruce W. Barnes, Chairman of the Board of Review; Kelly Services","William A. Frazee was laid off from his job with the state of Illinois. Kelly Services, a temp agency, offered him a job at a department store working Wednesday through Sunday. Frazee “as a Christian” refused to work Sundays. The store did not give Frazee the job. Frazee did not claim that he was part of a particular religious sect or church or that working on Sundays violated a tenant of an established religious body. When Frazee applied for unemployment benefits, the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied his claim because he turned down a job offer. The Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit of Illinois affirmed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the free exercise clause does not require accommodations for “personal professed religious belief[s]”."
+431,"Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator",Federal Election Commission,"In early 2002, a 20 years - old effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for - - and spent during - - political campaigns culminated in the passage of a Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ( the also - called McCain - Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA ). Its key provisions were a ) a ban on unrestricted ( "" soft money "" ) donations made directly to political parties ( often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals ) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials ; b ) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non - profit entities can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election ; and c ) restrictions on political parties'use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates ( In the form of "" issue ads "" called "" coordinated expenditures "" ). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for the early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by - passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three - judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft - money donations but upheld some in the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals."
+1271,Seila Law LLC,Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB ) was investigating Seila Law LLC, another law firm that provides debt - relief services, among others. As part of its investigations, the CFPB filed a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law required a comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law challenged the district court ’ s order on two grounds, one on which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB ’ s structure violates the Constitution ’ s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by no single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for because. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling : Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States, 295 you. S. 602 ( 1935 ), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 you. S. 654 ( 1988 ). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for - because removal from protecting the CFPB ’ s Director does not “ impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty ” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed."
+1332,"Jose Santos Sanchez, et al.","Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.","Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who enter the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 then again in 1998. Following the series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status ( TPS ) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and his wife petitioned and become lawful permanent residents under 8 you. S. C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ( USCIS ) denied these applications, finding that Sanchez was “ statutorily ineligible ” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255 ( a ) ’ s requirement that an alien must be “ inspected and admitted or paroled ” not be eligible for change of status. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an option for those who entered the United States illegally."
+639,Cass County,Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,"In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of ""taxation"" in the proviso expressed ""unmistakably clear"" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band."
+472,Minnesota,Timothy Dickerson,"On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision."
+545,South Carolina,Baker,"In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co (1895). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt."
+65,Breuer,"Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.","Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court ""unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress."" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
+2232,"Michael Sexton, Warden",Nicholas Beaudreaux,"Nicholas Beaudreaux shot and killed Wayne Drummond in 2006. Two witnesses to the shooting recognized or were able to describe Beaudreaux but did not know his name. Seventeen months later, one of the witnesses was arrested for an unrelated crime, and while in custody, was shown a middle-school yearbook with Beaudreaux's photograph. The witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter in the Drummond murder. Officers interviewed the second witness the following day, and the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter from a photo array that included Beaudreaux and five other men. Later, the witness was shown a different photo array that used a different photograph of Beaudreaux, and again the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter. At a preliminary hearing, the witness positively identified Beaudreaux after seeing him in person. Beaudreaux was tried in 2009 for first-degree murder and attempted second-degree robbery. Both witnesses testified and identified Beaudreaux as the shooter, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 50 years to life. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and his first state habeas petition was denied. He filed a second state habeas petition claiming, among other things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the second witness’s identification testimony. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Beaudreaux filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was not reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness of the procedures and that counsel’s failure to move to suppress the identification prejudiced Beaudreaux’s case."
+397,Paul Davis,Michigan Department of the Treasury,"Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 you.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals."
+214,"Esther Kiobel, et al.","Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.","The she will Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or her children, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of state property, and forced into exile with the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the she will Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against their corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. All parties cross - appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against companies. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners'request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and another motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when The Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a warrant of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."
+688,United States,E. C. Knight Company,"The Congress passed the Sherman Anti - Trust Act in 1890 as its response to the public concern in the growth in giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and manufacturing. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of very few. It outlawed "" every contract, in... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade "" or interstate commerce, and it deemed every attempt to monopolize any form of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E. C. Knight Company was such the combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar - cane business in the United States."
+356,Booth,Maryland,"John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement ""describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family"" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime."
+405,Larry Whitfield,United States,"On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery. A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate because of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
+1348,Florida,Georgia,"This involves one important matter of legal dispute, the facts for which are presented here. In sum, the case involves another water - rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the management of the Apalachicola - Chattahoochee - Flint River Basin."
+18,"Sears, Roebuck and Co.",County of Los Angeles and City of Compton,"The County of Los Angeles imposed an et valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck Manufacturing Co. paid this tax under protest and found an infringement of that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears ’ appeal for summary judgment and granted the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This saw the county impose an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce."
+1830,Jones,Alfred H. Mayer Company,"Jones, a black man, charged that a real estate company in Missouri's St. Louis County refused to sell him a home in a particular neighborhood on account of his race."
+739,West Coast Hotel Company,"Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife","Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $ 14. 50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the Pacific Coast Hotel Company, demanded an amount paid for her wage. Parrish brought another suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the federal courts relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital ( 1923 ), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women."
+1788,"E. S. Evans, et al.","Charles E. Newton, et al.","In his will, you.S. Senator Augustus Bacon left a piece of real estate to the city of Macon in Georgia. He intended the land to be used as a park that only whites could access. The city, as the named trustee, created a board of managers to operate the park, and it eventually allowed African Americans to use it. Trying to effectuate the Senator's will, individual managers of the park sued to remove the city as trustee because it was constitutionally unable to enforce the racially restrictive component of the will. After the city complied and resigned as trustee, private trustees appointed by a state court resumed excluding African Americans. A group of African Americans then brought an action on the grounds that the racial exclusion still violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state courts upheld the appointment of the private trustees."
+1435,"Carol Howes, Warden",Randall Lee Fields,"A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time. Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda. Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 you.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the you.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
+544,Henderson,United States,"Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint ""forthwith,"" or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because ""forthwith"" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost on appeal. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+1750,Harold Fahy and William Arnold ,Connecticut,"A jury convicted Harold Fahy and William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy’s garage. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless."
+663,John Barron ex rel. Tiernan,Mayor of Baltimore,"Baltimore wharf owner John Barron asserted that construction by the city had reduced water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep wells, which limited his profits. He sued the city seeking recover a portion for his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $ 4, 500 in damages, which the state appellate court handed down."
+892,United States Postal Service,Gregory,"Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness."
+476,"Robert Kennedy, Attorney General",Francisco Mendoza-Martinez,"Francisco Mendoza - Martinez ( Martinez ) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate actions, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 3 of his Selective Training and Service Act of 1942 ( the "" Act "" ) and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on the violation of Section 401 ( i ) of the Act which divested immigration dodgers of their you. S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of all you. S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401 ( j ) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort."
+770,Gutierrez,Ada,"The Organic Act of Guam provides that that ""if no [slate of] candidates [for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Guam] receives a majority of the votes cast in any election...a runoff election shall be held."" The Election Commission certified that the Democratic slate of Carl T.C. Gutierrez for governor and Madeleine Z. Bordallo for lieutenant governor had defeated the Republican slate, Joseph F. Ada and Felix P. Camacho. Gutierrez and Bordallo had received a majority of the votes cast for gubernatorial slates in the 1998 Guam general election, but did not receive a majority of the total number of ballots that voters cast due to voters selecting write-in candidates, people voting for both slates, and blank ballots. The opposing Republican slate sought a writ of mandamus ordering a runoff election. According to Ada and Camacho, the phrase ""in any election"" means the majority as measured by the votes cast in the entire election, not simply in the race for governor. Gutierrez responded that ""votes cast"" meant actual votes cast for governor and lieutenant governor, rather than ballots in which the governor's contest is left blank. The District Court issued the writ and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, interpreting the statutory phrase ""majority of the votes cast in any election"" to require that a slate receive a majority of the total number of ballots cast in the general election."
+2249,"Return Mail, Inc.",United States Postal Service,"Return Mail, Inc. owns a US patent directed to the processing of mail items that are undeliverable due to an inaccurate or obsolete address of the intended recipient. Return Mail sought to license the patent to the US Postal Service (“USPS”) and when it was unsuccessful, it filed a lawsuit against USPS alleging unlicensed and unlawful use and infringement of the patent. USPS filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) asking that the patent be declared unpatentable on several grounds. In response, Return Mail addressed the unpatentability arguments and further argued that USPS lacked statutory standing to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). The Board held that USPS was not statutorily barred from filing the petition for review, and on the merits determined that all of the challenged patent claims were unpatentable under 35 you.S.C. § 101. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed."
+2139,Rodney Class,United States of America,"In May 2013, Rodney Class was arrested in the District of Columbia for possession of three firearms on United States Capitol Grounds in violation of 40 you.S.C. §5104(e). Class, representing himself, pleaded guilty in the district court. He appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on grounds of constitutional error and statutory error. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court and found Class guilty due to his guilty plea. The appellate court explained that the its precedent in United States v. Delgado-Garcia—which held that, “[you]nconditional guilty pleas that are knowing and intelligent...waive the pleading defendant[‘s] claims of error on appeal, even constitutional claims”—is binding on this case. Delgado articulates two exceptions to this rule in which a defendant may appeal: (1) “the defendant’s claimed right to not be haled into court at all” and (2) “that the court below lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case…” However, the court held that neither exception applies here."
+1123,Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation,"Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.","Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles for websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall - Street. com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under its license agreement, Wall - Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall - Street closed its account, it began to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for patent infringement, although it filed an application to remove its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered the claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding a registration ” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “ register, claim, ” and that infringement had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
+1326,Gregory Greer,United States,"In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 you. S. C. § 302 ( g ), along with numerous related charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “ punishable as an Armed Career Criminal ” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio Law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months ’ imprisonment. In 2015, the you. S. Supreme Court invalidated the “ residual clause ” of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACCA ), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district judge denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA ’ s enumerated - offenses clause, not the residual clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the you. S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 you. S. C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer ’ s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. In remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced and the errors or that they affected to fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer ’ s previous convictions, the merely the evidence submitted of the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for,."
+1107,Kansas,"Michael Lee Marsh, II","Michael Lee Marsh II was convicted of murdering a mother and her young daughter. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that the mitigating factors and aggravating factors were in equipoise (i.e., of equal weight). The Kansas capital punishment statute specifically provided for the imposition of the death penalty in that circumstance, so Marsh was sentenced to death. After Marsh's sentencing, however, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Kleypas found fault with the concept of the death penalty as a ""tie-breaker."" The ruled in Kleypas that ""fundamental fairness requires that a 'tie goes to the defendant' when life or death is at issue."" The State argued that while the prosecution has the burden of proof during the trial, the burden can be shifted to the defendant during the sentencing phase, so that the defendant must show that he deserves less than a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, and overturned Kansas's death penalty statute as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment."
+1349,Florida,Georgia,". is an ongoing dispute with original jurisdiction, the facts surrounding it are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water - rights case between Georgia & Florida concerning the waters of their Apalachicola - Chattahoochee - Flint River system."
+816,"Atkinson Trading Company, Inc.",Shirley,"Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. owns the Cameron Trading Post, which is located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Cameron Trading Post consists of a hotel, restaurant, cafeteria, gallery, curio shop, retail store, and recreational vehicle facility. In 1992, the Navajo Nation enacted a hotel occupancy tax, which imposed an 8 percent tax upon any hotel room located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Atkinson challenged the tax under Montana v. United States. Under Montana, with two limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. The District Court upheld that tax. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax fell under Montana's first exception because a ""consensual relationship exists in that the nonmember guests could refrain from the privilege of lodging within the confines of the Navajo Reservation and therefore remain free from liability for the [tax]."""
+265,Garcia,San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,"The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a ""traditional"" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act."
+1640,"Charles E. Harris, III",Mary K. Viegelahn,"In February 2010, Charles Harris filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The approved plan instructed Harris to make monthly payments to the trustee Mary Viegelahn for sixty months, as well as monthly payments directly to Chase, which held his mortgage. After the mortgage and secured creditors debts were paid off, the payments would go to Harris' unsecured creditors. In October 2010, Chase moved to lift the automatic stay of Harris' home for his failure to make the mortgage payments, and Harris moved out of his house when the stay was lifted in November 2010. At that point, Viegelahn held the portion of the monthly payments intended to go to Chase. After Harris voluntarily converted his bankruptcy case to Chapter 7, Viegelahn distributed those funds to Harris' creditors. Harris sued for that money and argued that Viegelahn had no authority to disburse funds after conversion of the case. The bankruptcy court issued an order compelling the return of the funds and the district court affirmed. However, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the undistributed payments that the Chapter 13 trustee holds at the time of the case's conversion to Chapter 7 must be distributed to creditors pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan."
+1234,Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.,"Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, et al.","The California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called ""spot market"" in which utilities purchased electricity on the day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities' contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes."
+553,Benjamin Robers,United States,"Benjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan [UNK] misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the house and repay the [UNK] allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold out to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise. After government officials discovered the scheme just prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds of the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically ( wired ) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ( MVRA ) in the amount of $ 5, 952. 99 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan plus the resale amount of each house which was foreclosed ( the offset value ). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong property value was used in its calculation ; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and "" other expenses "" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum."
+1933,Anthony Ray Hinton,Alabama,"Between February and July of 1985, there were a series of restaurant robberies in Birmingham, Alabama. During the commission of the first two robberies, the manager of each restaurant was shot and killed by a .38 caliber bullet. The manager of the restaurant that was the target of the third robbery, however, survived and identified Anthony Ray Hinton in a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and found in his house a .38 caliber revolver. After Alabama's Department of Forensic Sciences analyzed the bullets and found that they had been fired from that revolver, Hinton was charged with two counts of capital murder for the killings during the first two robberies. At trial, the prosecution's case rested on the connection between the bullets located at the scenes of the crimes and the gun located at Hinton's house; no other physical evidence was presented. Hinton's defense attorney filed a motion for funding to hire an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's experts, which the judge granted. Because the judge did not know how much funding he could grant, he invited the attorney to file additional requests for further funding if necessary. Hinton's attorney did not take the judge up on this invitation because he did not know that Alabama law allowed for funding in excess of what the judge had already granted. With this amount of money, the defense attorney was only able to find one expert who was willing to testify, and that expert was badly discredited during cross-examination. Hinton was convicted and sentenced to death. In his post-conviction petition, Hinton argued that his trial attorney was ineffective because he did not seek additional funds to obtain more effective expert testimony. The circuit court denied the petition and held that the jury had not been prejudiced against Hinton due to the testimony. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held that the trial court did not rule on whether or not Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify. On remand, the circuit court held that Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the case."
+1921,"Pom Wonderful, LLC",The Coca-Cola Company,"Pom Wonderful, LLC (Pom Wonderful), a California-based beverage company, sold various types of juice, including a pomegranate blueberry juice blend. In 2007, Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) announced its own version of a pomegranate blueberry juice. In 2008, Pom Wonderful sued Coca-Cola in federal district court and argued that Coca-Cola misled consumers into believing that Coca-Cola's product contained pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contained 99% apple and grape juices and only 0.5% pomegranate and blueberry juice. Specifically, Pom Wonderful claimed that Coca-Cola violated provisions of the Lanham Act, a federal law prohibiting false advertising, as well as California's false advertising and unfair competition laws. The lawsuit challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's product. The district court held that Pom Wonderful's claims regarding the name and label of the juice were barred by a separate law, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). The FDCA allows the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the labels on, among other items, juices. Because the FDA has exclusive authority to file claims for violations of the FDCA, the court feared that a decision under the Lanham Act would undercut the FDA's authority to regulate juice labels. After both parties gathered evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola on the name and label issues. Although the court gave Pom Wonderful the opportunity to proceed to trial on the remaining issues, Pom Wonderful conceded that it could not win without the name and label issues. Pom Wonderful appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to bar Pom Wonderful's claim with respect to the name and labeling of Coca-Cola's juice. It vacated the lower court's ruling in favor of Coca-Cola, instead allowing Pom Wonderful's case to proceed on the remaining claims."
+909,"Star Athletica, LLC","Varsity Brands, Inc., et al.","Varsity Brands, Inc. ( Varsity ) designs & manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such for colors, shapes, lines, etc., and don't consider the functionality of the sports clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two - dimensional artwork for the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC ( Star ) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have these copyrights because the designs were for “ useful articles, ” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non - functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the clothing. The you. S. Court of Appeals for a Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “ useful article. ”"
+691,Arizona Department of Revenue,Blaze Construction Company,"Over several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review."
+772,United States,Johnson,"Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired."
+872,United States,Arvizu,"In 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one."
+675,Munn and Scott,Illinois,Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.
+1160,North Carolina Department of Revenue,The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,"In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed."
+585,Lynce,Mathis,"Beginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of ""provisional credits"" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable because."
+1664,Clinton D. Jencks ,United States,"Clinton Jencks, a union leader, was charged with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer with the National Labor Relations Board. Two undercover informants for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified against Jencks, and reported that he had been seen at Communist Party events and working with Communist Party members. The evidence provided against Jencks was entirely circumstantial, and the prosecution's evidence rested largely on the testimonies and reports of the undercover informants. Jencks requested the testimony of the informants to review their credibility and admissibility in court. The trial court denied his request without stating the reasons, and Jencks was found guilty on two counts of communist activity and sentenced to five years imprisonment for each offense. Jencks appealed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the informants' reports should have been provided for review to determine their use in the trial and on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the definitions of political party membership. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court."
+150,"Flagg Bros., Inc., et al.","Shirley Herriott Brooks, et al.","On June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she did not settle her account within 10 days. Ms. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen’s Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed."
+1053,Herman Avery Gundy,United States,"Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing domestic assault in Maryland while on supervised release for no prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the journey, but did not register as a Sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 you. S. C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act ( SORNA ), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and reduced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the you. S. Supreme Court to hear the case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the you. S. Attorney General under 42 you. S. C. § 16913 to impose the law ’ s registration requirement upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted."
+700,"W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney",Roland H. Dagenhart et al. ,The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.
+617,"William R. Pounders, Judge",Penelope Watson,"A California trial judge convicted attorney Penelope Watson of summary contempt for her conduct in court. After the judge had stated repeatedly not to discuss punishment, Watson asked her client whether he was facing the death penalty and whether he was facing life without possibility of parole. The judge found that Watson had willfully refused to comply with his order not to discuss punishment and that Watson's questions had permanently prejudiced the jury in favor of her client. On appeal, Watson argued that her due process rights were violated because she did not have notice of the prohibited conduct and because the trial judge could not have known without a hearing whether her conduct was willful. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, in reversing, concluded that Watson had not engaged in a pattern of repeated violations that had pervaded the courtroom and threatened the dignity of the court."
+1892,"George K. Wyman, Commissioner of the State of New York Department of Social Services",Barbara James et al.,"Barbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed."
+1249,"James J. Thole, et al.","U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.","Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against you. S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Individual Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( ERISA ) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited dealings with another subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the plans engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded ; that is, it contained more money than was needed and meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and proceeded toward dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any tax relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
+205,New York,Roger Belton,"A New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway. Roger Belton was a passenger in that car. When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana. The officer also found that none of the car’s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car. After asking the four occupants of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside one of the pockets. At trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted."
+470,Marc Gilbert Doggett,United States,"In 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted in the you.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges. When Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents went to his home to arrest him, they found he had left for Colombia four days earlier. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. The DEA agent in charge did not follow up on the case and Doggett reentered the United States without issue in 1982 where he lived openly under his own name and in accordance with the law. No one looked into Doggett’s whereabouts, but in 1988 a random credit check of individuals with outstanding warrants revealed his place of residence. After being arrested, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A federal magistrate found that the length of time between indictment and arrest was presumptively prejudicial, but recommended dismissal of Doggett’s motion because he did not show actual prejudice. The district court followed the magistrate’s recommendation. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the subsequent conviction on the speedy trial claim. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed."
+348,Arizona State Legislature,"Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters approved Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Control Commission ( IRC ). In 2012, after the IRC approved a revised congressional districts map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and arguing that the new district map remained unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from creating, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did specifically violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution."
+582,"Dollar General Corporation, et al.","Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.","Dollar General Corporation ( Dollar General ) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians ( Tribe ). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with The Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13 - year - old member of the Tribe alleged that he was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at their store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate. In 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both tribes moved to dismiss the case for violation of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe at federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal law. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its evidence to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
+1002,United States,Lashawn Lowell Banks,"On July 15, 1998 police officers, with a warrant, knocked on the door of suspected drug dealer Lashawn Banks. They waited between 15 and 20 seconds, and when Banks did not come to the door they smashed it open with a battering ram. Banks was arrested but, before his trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment because, he claimed, the forced entry had been unlawful. When the request was denied, he pled guilty, but eventually attempted to retract his guilty plea on the advice of a new attorney. The new attorney, Randall Roske, argued that the search was unconstitutional because officers did not wait long enough before breaking down the door, and had no evidence that waiting longer would have had negative consequences. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling the search unconstitutional and suppressing the evidence found during it."
+1554,Vance Plumhoff,Whitne Rickard,"At midnight on July 18, 2004, West Memphis Police Officer Forthman pulled over Donald Rickard's vehicle because of an inoperable headlight. After Officer Forthman noticed damage on the vehicle and asked Rickard to step out of the car, Rickard sped away. Officer Forthman called for backup and pursued Rickard from West Memphis, Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee. The police officers were ordered to continue the pursuit across the border and ultimately surrounded Rickard in a parking lot in Memphis, Tennessee. When Rickard again attempted to flee, the police fired shots into the vehicle, ultimately killing both Rickard and Kelley Allen, a woman who had been a passenger in the vehicle. The entire exchange was captured on police video. Rickard and Allen's families sued the police officers, the chief of police, and the mayor of West Memphis under federal and state law claims. The families argued that the police used excessive force when pursuing and ultimately killing Rickard and Allen and that using that force violated the Fourth Amendment. They also brought claims of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. The government argued that, because the police acted in their official capacity, they were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from any lawsuit. The district court refused to dismiss the case against the government, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that qualified immunity only applies when officers are acting reasonably, and after reviewing subsequent cases, held that the police did not act reasonably in this case. Additionally, because the video evidence showed that the police fired on unarmed, fleeing drivers, a jury could determine that the police were not acting reasonably."
+290,Block,Rutherford,"Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to embrace his family is ""a matter of great importance"" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling."
+502,"George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis","Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz","George Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state courts on criminal anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court To prevent continuation of their trial. They argued that the New York laws violated due processes, First Amendment freedoms, and equal rights. The district court held these laws constitutional and agreed to grant the injunction. The N. S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal"
+130,Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education,Fred Doyle,"Fred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elected president of the Teachers’ Association during a period of tension between the board and the Teacher’s Association. Doyle was also involved with a series of incidents beginning in 1970 where he allegedly behaved inappropriately toward students and other staff members; in one incident, Doyle made obscene gestures to two students. Finally, in February 1971, Doyle conveyed the substance of an internal memorandum regarding a proposed staff dress code to a disc jockey at WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station. The disc jockey promptly announced the dress code as a news item. One month later, the superintendent of the school district recommended that the board not renew Doyle’s contract, along with the contracts of nine other teachers. The board adopted the superintendent’s recommendations. In response to Doyle’s request for an explanation, the board stated that Doyle displayed a “lack of tact in handling professional matters,” and cited both the call to the disc jockey and the obscene gestures Doyle made toward students. Doyle brought a § 1331 federal question action against the board for reinstatement with damages, claiming that the board’s refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. While the district court found that all of the incidents occurred, it held that Doyle was still entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The court concluded that Doyle’s call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the call played a substantial part in the board’s decision not to rehire Doyle, a violation of Doyle’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion."
+2046,"Randy White, Warden",Roger L. Wheeler,"In October 1997, Nigel Malone and Nairobi Warfield were found dead in their apartment. Blood at the crime scene matched Roger L. Wheeler’s, and he was arrested for the murders. During voir dire, one of the potential jurors gave equivocal responses in response to questions regarding his beliefs about the death penalty. The prosecution moved to strike the juror for because and cited these replies. The defense opposed the motion and argued that the responses indicated nothing more than an ability to consider all penalty options. The judge struck the juror, and Wheeler was subsequently convicted of the murders and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the sentence and held that the trial judge appropriately struck all the jurors who could not impose the death penalty. Wheeler exhausted his state post-conviction proceedings and petitioned for a writ of habeas from the federal district court. The federal district court denied the petition, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, granted the petition, and held that the exclusion of the juror in question was an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent in Witherspoon v. Illinois. In that case, the Supreme Court held that only a juror who is “substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty” can be excused for because. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in interpreting the juror’s responses that he did not know if he could consider the death penalty as meaning that he could not consider the death penalty."
+471,Poe,Ullman,"Paul and Pauline Poe, a married women, continued to use contraceptives to avoid a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that may be life - threatening. Since The late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution / use of medical advice on contraceptives, though these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and sisters argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment."
+635,Oubre,Entergy Operations Inc.,"In 1994, Dolores Oubre, a scheduler at a power plant run by Entergy Operations, Inc., was given the option of either improving her job performance or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. Accepting a severance package, Oubre signed a release of all claims against Entergy. Entergy failed to comply with several requirements for a release under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). After receiving all of her severance pay, Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Oubre then sued Entergy, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Entergy argued that Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return the $6,258 in severance she had received. The District Court entered summary judgment for Entergy. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
+987,South Florida Water Management District,"Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, et al.","The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades sued the South Florida Water Management District under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in federal district court. The suit alleged that the water district violated the Clean Water Act by releasing pollutants from a pump system without a discharge elimination system permit. The Clean Water Act prohibits the ""addition of any pollutant... from any point source"" without a specific permit. The water district defended its action by claiming that it was not actually adding pollutants to the water, but merely transporting polluted water from one body of water to another, less polluted, body. The district court ruled against the water district and found that it had violated the CWA by using the pump. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on this point, ""conclud[ing] that the release of water caused by the... pump station's operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point source."""
+493,Harris,"Forklift Systems, Inc.","Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an ""abusive work environment"" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a ""close case"" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision."
+1242,"State of Georgia, et al.","Public.Resource.Org, Inc.","The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “ consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case histories, editor ’ s notes, selections from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references. ” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “ shall be merged with annotations, ” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves don't have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an Agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state maintains direct supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. Public. Resource. Org ( PRO ) is a non - profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the published version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites. The Commission sent PRO several cease - and - desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia ’ s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court, for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On of, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,, that because of the way they are written and of into the “ official ” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created — finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations."
+38,John Doe,United States,"John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was tried by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury ’ s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment prohibition against self - incrimination regarding any other transactions. The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe ′ s foreign banks, asking them to release Doe ’ s information. The banks refused and release this information without Doe ’ s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information. The district court refused, arguing that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “ fishing license ” for incriminating documents ; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he does not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed."
+910,State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,"United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al.","Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies: One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government funds would pay for flood damage claims; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders’ flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA’s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the defendant, and that violation of the FCA seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal."
+1609,"Glenn Tibble, et al.","Edison International, et al.","Edison International is a holding company for electric utilities and energy interests. Since 1999, Edison International and its related benefits and investment committees (collectively, Edison) have offered retail-class mutual funds as part of its 401(k) employee benefits plan, even though otherwise identical institutional-class funds that charged lower fees were available. Those mutual funds also give a portion of the fees collected back to plan service providers, including Edison's, which thereby reduces Edison's administrative costs. In 2007, Glenn Tibble and other Edison employees (Employees) sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which requires fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan to administer the plan prudently for the exclusive benefit of the participants. The Employees argued that the continued inclusion of the higher-cost funds in the benefit plan was a ""continuing violation"" of ERISA. Edison argued that ERISA's statute of repose, which bars claims filed more than six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the violation, prevented Employees' claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Edison and held that there was no ""continuing violation"" theory under ERISA. The court stated that the act of designating an investment for inclusion started the six-year period, and since Edison had not made any misstatements or actively concealed any breach following the initial inclusion, the six-year period had passed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
+85,Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America,Walsh,"In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the ""Maine Rx"" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed."
+760,West Virginia State Board of Education,Walter Barnette,"In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency."
+244,Exxon Corporation,Ralph P. Eagerton Jr.,"Since 1945, Alabama had imposed a severance tax on oil and gas operations. Exxon Corporation (Exxon), along with other gas and oil producers in Alabama, had contractual agreements regarding the tax with the owners of the land on which operations occurred and with oil and gas purchasers. The owners were paid a royalty on all gas and oil produced, but were contractually assessed a portion of the severance tax, and the purchasers were required to reimburse the producers for any severance tax paid by them. In 1979, the Alabama Legislature passed a statute altering the severance tax. The statute increased the severance tax, exempted royalty landowners from the increase, and prohibited gas and oil operators from passing the tax increase on to oil and gas purchasers. Exxon and other oil and gas producers sued Ralph Eagerton, the Commissioner of Revenue in Alabama and argued that the National Gas Policy Act, which allowed natural gas producers to take steps to recoup state severance tax, preempted the prohibitions on passing along the costs to purchasers. Furthermore, the oil and gas producers argued that the exemption and the prohibition violated the oil and gas producers’ Constitutional rights under the Contract Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County ruled the new severance tax provisions unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the Contract Clause. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed the lower court’s decision, holding any constraints imposed by the new tax were generally applicable and therefore valid."
+1762,"Arthur Hamm, Jr., Frank James Lupper","City of Rock Hill, Arkansas","On June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory’s Five and Ten Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them. The city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing at McCrory’s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. The Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation."
+622,Associates Commercial Corp.,Rash,"In 1992, Elray Rash filed a repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) was listed in the bankruptcy petition as a creditor holding a secured claim because it held a valid loan and lien on Rash's tractor truck. Ultimately to gain confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan and retain the truck, Rash invoked the ""cram-down"" provision of the Code. The cram-down provision allows a debtor to keep collateral over the objection of the creditor and requires the debtor to provide the creditor with payments that will total the present value of the collateral. At an evidentiary hearing, ACC maintained, under the ""replacement-value"" standard, that Rash would have to pay approximately $41,000 for a similar truck. Under the ""foreclosure-value"" standard, Rash maintained that the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral, or approximately $31,875. The Bankruptcy Court adopted Rash's valuation figure and approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
+420,Michael Milkovich ,"Lorain Journal Co., The News Herald, J. Theodore Diadiun ","Michael Milkovich, Maple Heights High School’s wrestling coach, testified at a hearing concerning a physical altercation at a recent wrestling meet. After the hearing, Theodore Diadiun published an article in the local newspaper saying that anyone at the wrestling meet “knows in their heart” that Milkovich lied at the hearing. Milkovich sued Diadiun and the paper for defamation, alleging that the article accused him of perjury, damaged his occupation, and constituted libel. The court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that Milkovich failed to show the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that the article was a constitutionally-protected opinion. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded, holding that Milkovich was not a public figure and the defamatory statements were factual assertions, not constitutionally-protected opinions."
+420,Louis B. Bullard,"Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank","Louis Bullard borrowed $387,000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then put the rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order was appealable because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over ""final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees."""
+1212,United States,"Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company, et al.","In 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 you.S.C Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations. Both the Court of Federal Claims and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances."
+2111,"Midland Funding, LLC",Aleida Johnson,"In 2014, Aleida Johnson filed for bankruptcy in Alabama bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 2003 and years prior, Midland Funding had purchased a bundle of debt worth almost $2,000 from Johnson, so after she filed for bankruptcy, Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in the same court. Because the date of the last transaction in the account in question occurred in 2003 and the statute of limitations for collecting unpaid debt in Alabama is six years, Johnson sued Midland Funding in federal district court argued that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prevented bankruptcy actions that had passed their statutes of limitations. Midland Funding moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court determined determined that, while the FDCPA prohibited the filing of a proof of claim known to be barred by the statute of limitations, the you.S. Bankruptcy Code allowed a creditor to file a proof of claim even after the statute of limitations has run. The district court resolved that conflict by holding that the creditors’ right to file a claim precluded debtors from challenging that practice under the FDCPA. Johnson appealed, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that, although the Bankruptcy Code allowed creditors to file claims barred by the statute of limitations, that did not preclude them from liability under the FDCPA for filing the claim."
+1082,Texaco Inc.,Fouad N. Dagher et al.,"In 1998, Texaco and she will Oil agreed to stop competing for the you.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and she will gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se rule against price-fixing, under which all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price-fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal."
+1059,Denard Stokeling,United States of America,"In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he is a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Having had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, and an element of that offense was "" overcoming victim resistance. ” Some state courts had interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “ violent felonies ” in the context of criminal sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( e ), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling ’ s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal."
+1081,"Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.",John Warren et al.,"The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and a Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) enforces some provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, another uranium deposit was discovered in Fairfax County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals ( both plaintiffs in this case ). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “ until a program for permitting uranium mining is established through statute. ” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on the mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Blue Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in The Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state ’ s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non - federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court ’ s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
+533,Arizona,Ronald William Roberson,"On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested in a scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had provided counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave another incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement, held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated the Fifth Amendment right as counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed, though the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review."
+2365,"Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York","Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of New York","In an effort to curb rising infections of COVID-19, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order identifying clusters of COVID-19 cases and restricting the surrounding area. The area immediately around a cluster was classified as a “red” zone, where attendance at worship services is limited to 10 people. The concentric area around a red zone was an “orange” zone, where attendance at worship services there is limited to 25 people. And the area around an orange zone was a “yellow” zone, where attendance was limited to 50% of the building’s capacity. In contrast, certain secular businesses deemed “essential” were permitted to remain open in these zones, subject to different restrictions. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and two Orthodox Jewish synagogues sued to block enforcement of the executive order as it affected them. The organizations claimed that the order violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, particularly as secular businesses in the same areas remained open."
+466,James Gomez and Daniel Vasquez,United States District Court for the Northern District of California,"In 1979, a California state court convicted Robert Allen Harris of kidnapping and murdering two teenage boys in San Diego and sentenced him to death. On April 18, 1992, three days before his scheduled execution date, Harris and other death-row inmates filed a civil rights class action lawsuit in federal district court. The complaint alleged that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Just hours before Harris was scheduled to be executed, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an order to stay the execution, and the state appealed the stay to the Supreme Court."
+898,Marcelo Manrique,United States,"Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal appeals court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did not include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment had entered. When the original judgment was entered while the appeal was pending, it included that amount of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that it did indeed have grounds to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not submit a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award."
+705,Jacob Abrams et al.,United States,"In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against ""Workers Soviets of Russia"". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison."
+631,Michael Musacchio,United States,"Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services ( ETS ), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services ( TTS ), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new head of Microsoft became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $ 10 million. In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Before trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The you. S. Court Of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court ’ the instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by declining to raise it at trial."
+1300,Thedrick Edwards,"Darrel Vannoy, Warden","Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010. On April 20, 2020, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana."
+1443,"Toby Douglas, Director, California Department of Health Care Services","Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., et al.","The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid. The Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services."
+800,"Robert J. Wittman, et al.","Gloria Personhuballah, et al.","In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African-American, and increased the percentage of African-American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia’s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority’s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan."
+984,"Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi, as Next Friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi","Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.","In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the you.S., declared an ""enemy combatant,"" and was held in Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning he was an American citizen, he was transferred to a military prison in Virginia. Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming himself as Hamdi’s “next friend,” in an attempt to have Hamdi’s detention declared unconstitutional. The district court granted Hamdi’s petition, and appointed the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham, Jr., as counsel for the petitioners. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States ""enemy combatants"" and thus restrict their access to the court system. The district court refused to answer the question of whether the declaration of ""enemy combatant"" was sufficient to justify his detention without review of materials and criteria used in making the determination. It ordered the government to produce these materials for a review by the court. Not wanting to produce these materials, the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because ""the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not."" The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's ""enemy combatant"" determination."
+1615,Samuel Johnson,United States,"In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Samuel Johnson based on his involvement in an organization called the National Social Movement. Later in 2010, Johnson left that group to found the Aryan Liberation Movement. In November of that year, Johnson told an undercover FBI agent that he manufactured napalm, silencers, and other explosives for the Aryan Liberation Movement in addition to possessing an AK-47 rifle, several semi-automatic weapons, and a large cache of ammunition. In April 2012, Johnson was arrested at a meeting with his probation officer and admitted to possessing some of the previously mentioned weapons. A grand jury charged Johnson with six counts of firearm possession, three of which relied on his classification as an ""armed career criminal."" This classification was based on the fact that he had three prior felony convictions that the district court designated as ""violent felonies""—attempted simple robbery, simple robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Johnson was then subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Johnson argued that the convictions in question should not be considered violent felonies and that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the felony convictions in question were in fact violent felonies and that Johnson was an armed career criminal for the purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
+1260,Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One,"Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.","Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (""Northwest"") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits ""covered jurisdictions"" – states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting – from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the you.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning that it did not qualify as a ""political subdivision"" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 for another 25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in ""covered jurisdictions"", Congress acted rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional."
+1672,"Leon F. Carroll, Daniel J. Stewart",United States,"Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable because. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of evidence was appealable."
+1636,Noel Reyes Mata,"Loretta Lynch, Attorney General of the United States","Noel Reyes Mata, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of assaulting a woman he was dating; he was deported in 2010. His appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed after his attorney failed to file an appellate brief. Mata subsequently moved to reopen his case based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the BIA denied Mata's motion as untimely because it was filed well after the 90 days allowed. Mata appealed the BIA's denial of his motion to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and argued that the BIA should not have enforced the filing period limitation because his attorney's failure to file a brief deprived him of his due process rights. The appellate court held that such a motion was subject to the complete discretion of the BIA, and thus the appellate court lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision."
+582,Maryland,Wilson,"After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari."
+1330,"Jose Santos Sanchez, et al.","Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.","Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 you.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally."
+61,Anthony Pasquall Faretta ,California,"Anthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but later called Faretta back in to question him about his knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta’s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge’s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review."
+1010,Charles Murphy,"Robert Smith, et al.","Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 42 you.S.C. § 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state-law claims where the officials or employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 you.S.C. § 1997e(d) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage."
+2299,Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico,"Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al.","Since it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a “death spiral” and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico’s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers. A number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama’s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the you.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within the scope of this Clause. The federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled against the creditors, finding the board is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth government established pursuant to Congress’s plenary powers under the Territorial Clause and that the board members are not “Officers of the United States.” The you.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Territorial Clause does not supersede the application of the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory and that the board members are “Officers of the United States” because: (1) they occupy “continuing positions,” (2) exercise “significant authority” that is the same or more than that exercised by other officers the you.S. Supreme Court has found to be “Officers of the United States,” and (3) exercise their authority “pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Moreover, these officers are “principal” officers subject to the Appointments Clause because they are answerable to and removable only by the President and are not directed or supervised by others who were appointed by the President with Senate confirmation."
+1796,Gault,Arizona,"Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21."
+907,"Star Athletica, LLC","Varsity Brands, Inc., et al.","Varsity Brands, Inc. ( Varsity ) designs and sells clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for athletic clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and don't consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two - colored artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar as ones that Star Athletica, LLC ( Star ) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have these copyrights because the designs were for “ useful articles, ” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non - functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had therefore infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “ useful article. ”"
+586,Abigail Noel Fisher,"University of Texas at Austin, et al.","Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas'Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to only top ten percent of every in - state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of color as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The higher court held because the University ’ s admissions process was constitutional, which the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University ’ the admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court ’ s decision by holding that the University of Texas ’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of greater educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny."
+1032,"O. John Benisek, et al.","Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.","In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state followed two parallel procedures : a public - facing procedure led by the Governor ’ s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland ’ s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC - developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was any of the ones developed by NCEC ; rather, former Governor Martin O ’ Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan became implemented, the “ Cook Partisan Voting Index ” rated the Sixth District as a “ likely ” Democratic seat, whereas before this 2011 plan, The Sixth District was a “ safe ” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20. 9 % margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring Maryland State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring Washington State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case citing the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court."
+1613,Gregory Houston Holt,"Ray Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Corrections, et al.","Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy. The district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
+950,Washington State Department of Health and Human Services,Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,"The State of Washington, through its Department of Social and Health Services, provides foster care to certain children. It also receives and manages Social Security benefits, which it uses to cover its costs, for many of those children. Such beneficiary children filed suit, alleging that the Department's use of their benefits to reimburse itself for the foster care costs violated the ""anti-attachment"" provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, which protects certain benefits from ""execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process."" The trial court enjoined the Department from continuing to charge its foster care costs against Social Security benefits and ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding that the Department's practices violated the anti-attachment provision."
+249,Walter Fernandez,California,"On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identifies as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives began to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search personally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the appeals court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant held that the trial court improperly denied his motion to stay. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co - tenant consented."
+1948,Timothy Tyrone Foster,"Bruce Chatman, Warden","In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. At the trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes against all four of the qualified black jurors. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the defense objected to those strikes, and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that there were race-neutral explanation for the strikes. The prosecution provided reasons, and the trial court held that the reasons were sufficient. An all-white jury convicted Foster of murder and imposed the death penalty. Foster filed a motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the prosecution’s notes during jury selection and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, and the you.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court and submitted a new Batson challenge based on the prosecutor's notes obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act. The court denied Foster's petition. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. The you.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+132,BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"BCI Coca - Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles fired African - American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part because of a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non - African American employees less harshly. EEOC filed claims against BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703 ( c ) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado was racially biased, it dismissed the case because the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado's discriminatory bias. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case for trial. The Tenth Circuit established the subordinate bias theory of liability, which holds a company liable for a workplace firing even if any employee who made the actual attempt to fire was not the employee harboring racial bias."
+1011,David L. Nelson,"Donal Campbell, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. ","David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002, when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003. Nelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse, the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein that could carry the toxins. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by you.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution procedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays, exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, and should therefore be thrown out. The federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. It was therefore functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition, which was barred by Section 2254. A divided 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the decision. After the 11th Circuit declined to rehear the case as a whole (en banc), the you.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of execution and then accepted the case for appeal."
+1224,"Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al.",Christopher M. Sulyma,"In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company ’ s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for illegally investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ), which setting forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment ( and thus investment ) period of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint "" time - barred under 29 you. S. C. § 1113 ( 2 ), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “ three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation. ” The appeal court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the appeals court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “ actual knowledge ” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of that alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the company must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court ’ s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings."
+1352,"Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP","Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.","The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board's members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President's ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the Constitution's separation of powers."
+308,Manuel Jose Lozano,Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez,"Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met whilst living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, since 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening a rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally "" very happy together. "" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after her stay at her women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post - traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that a family had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved. After Lozano received all remedies for the UK to attempt and locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in you. S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would because undue harm. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
+1751,"WMCA, Inc.",Lomenzo,"The WMCA, acting on behalf of several New York City registered voters, challenged the constitutionality of Article III, Sections 2-5 of the New York State constitution alleging that its apportionment formula resulted in unfair weighting of both state legislature houses by favoring lesser populated rural areas over densely populated urban centers. On appeal from a dismissal of their complaint by a three-judge district court, the Supreme Court granted the WMCA certiorari."
+724,Ruhrgas AG,Marathon Oil Company,"In 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the you.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist."
+766,Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu,United States,"In retaliation for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, "" you. S. government decided to require Japanese - Americans to relocate into relocation camps as a matter for national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months before Pearl Harbor. A Japanese - American man living on San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at the residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction."
+1316,"Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio","Commerce Energy, Inc., et al.","In-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers sued Ohio's Tax Commissioner in an Ohio federal district court alleging that Ohio's tax scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that because four local natural gas distribution companies benefited from certain tax exemptions that did not benefit the plaintiffs, despite their similar circumstances, the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Sixth Circuit held that federal comity concerns do not bar an action that challenges the tax benefits provided to just four specific entities, but not others similarly situated. The court recognized a circuit split over whether federal comity concerns prevent federal court jurisdiction over a matter. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have interpreted Hibbs v. Winn to mean that comity prevents federal court jurisdiction only when state taxpayers seek federal court orders allowing them to avoid paying state taxes. This was not at issue in this case, and the plaintiffs' success would not significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio; thus, the federal court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in order for it to proceed."
+821,"United Dominion Industries, Inc.",United States,"Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry back its ""product liability loss"" up to 10 years in order to offset prior years' income. United Dominion Industries, Inc. predecessor in interest, AMCA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated group filing consolidated returns for the years 1983 through 1986. AMCA calculated its product liability loss (PPL) on a consolidated basis, or a ""single-entity"" approach. The government's ""separate-member"" approach would have prohibited 5 of AMCA's 26 members from contributing to the group's total PPL. In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for a refund based on its PPL calculations. Ultimately, the District Court applied AMCA's single-entity approach, concluding that if the affiliated group's consolidated return reflects consolidated net operating losses in excess of the group's aggregate product liability expenses, the total of those expenses is a PLL that may be carried back. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied the separate-member approach."
+721,"Kumho Tire Company, Ltd.",Carmichael,"In 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died in the accident and several others were severely injured. Subsequently, the Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the Kumho Tire Company and others, claiming that the tire was defective. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: ""If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion."" The Federal District Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's ""gatekeeping"" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill-or experience-based."
+982,U.S. Bank National Association,"Village at Lakeridge, LLC","The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, ( Lakeridge ) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC ( MBP ), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge ’ s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP ’ s board. you. S. Bank National Association, which formerly held a claim to Lakeridge ’ s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin ’ s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. you. S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate it as both a statutory and non - statutory insider, neither of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim of MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was the affiliate of Lakeridge. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that such status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only consider a lower court ’ s finding if it is clear from the evidence that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non - statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member on MBP ’ s board to be considered an insider."
+941,"Expressions Hair Design, et al.","Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.","The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that the statute was too vague under the Due Process Clause or The Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the statute appeared unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and advertisements, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the statute qualified as the regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague."
+1025,"Deneice A. Mayle, Warden",Jacoby Lee Felix,"A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's ""conduct, transaction or occurrence."" Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same ""conduct, transaction, or occurrence."" The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction."
+1603,B&B Hardware Inc.,Hargis Industries Inc.,"B&B Hardware (B&B) sells a fastener product in the aerospace industry under the trademark ""Sealtight,"" which it registered in 1993. Hargis Industries (Hargis) sells self-drilling screws under the mark ""Sealtite"" in the construction industry. After Hargis applied to register its mark in 1996, B&B opposed the application and sued Hargis for infringement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) eventually determined that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks and denied Hargis' application. On appeal, the district court held that, because the TTAB is not an Article III court, it need not give deference to the TTAB decision and refused to admit the decision into evidence. A jury then found in favor of Hargis. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that, since the Eighth Circuit uses a slightly different likelihood of confusion test from the TTAB, the TTAB did not decide the same likelihood of confusion issues presented to the district court."
+1014,Charles Murphy,"Robert Smith, et al.","Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fractured his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 you. S. C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under Illinois law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 43 you. S. C. § 1982. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state - law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state - law claims where the officials and employees violated federal or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 you. S. C. § 1997e ( d ) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 % of the damage award and that the district judge does not have discretion to limit that maximum percentage."
+989,"Aetna Health Inc., fka Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc. and Aetna U.S. Healthcare of North Texas Inc.","Ruby R. Calad, et al.","Juan Davila sued his HMO in state court because it had refused to provide certain procedures, and the refusal led to certain injuries. He brought the suit under a Texas law that requires HMOs ""to exercise ordinary care"" for their patients. The HMO asked that the case be moved to federal court, arguing that the case should be governed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) rather than the Texas law, because ERISA is a federal law the takes precedence over any state laws dealing with the same subject matter. Davila objected, arguing that the case did not fall under ERISA and should be heard in state court. The federal district court sided with the HMO, finding that ERISA prohibits individuals from filing state suits against HMOs when they refuse to pay for a particular treatment. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed."
+123,National Socialist Party of America,Village of Skokie,"The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist (""Nazi"") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with ""Jewish names"", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community. Collin wrote a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions. The district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court."
+2222,"Gilberto Garza, Jr.",Idaho,"On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers. Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 you.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights. The Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice."
+390,"M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.","John Kerry, Secretary of State","In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the you.S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as ""Israel,"" in accordance with Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (Act). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed ""Jerusalem"" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non-justiciable political question. The you.S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214(d) ""impermissibly intereferes"" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch."
+565,Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark,"William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al.","In 2001, Heidi Heffron-Clark inherited a $300,000 individual retirement account (IRA) from her mother's estate. The you.S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband (the ""Clarks""), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund under Section 522 of the you.S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject to creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
+293,Allen,Wright,"In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright."
+333,"Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.","United States, ex rel. Benjamin Carter","In early 2005, Benjamin Carter contracted for Kellogg Brown & Root ( KBR ), a you. S. Government contractor providing logistical services for the you. S. military in Iraq. In 2007, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act ( FCA ). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the you. S. Government for services rendered in Iraq. In 2010, just before trial, the you. S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter ’ s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA ’ s “ first - to - file ” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2012, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA ’ s six - year statute of limitations had ended, and Carter ’ his complaint did not satisfy the first - to - file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter ’ s complaint, but the you. S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ( WSLA ), which provides the applicable six - year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter ’ s claim from proceeding."
+2115,"Water Splash, Inc.",Tara Menon,"Water Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that makes aquatic playgrounds known as “splash pads” that are popular in urban areas. Tara Menon is a Canadian citizen who lives in Quebec, Canada, and at one point worked for Water Splash as a regional sales representative. Later, Menon began to work for South Pool, a Water Splash competitor. Sometime in 2012, Water Splash learned that South Pool had used some of its drawings and designs when it submitted a bid to the City of Galveston to construct splash pads at two of its city parks, and Water Splash subsequently sued Menon in Texas state court. Water Splash served Menon by mail, as allowed by a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. When Menon did not respond, the trial court award Water Splash a default judgment. Menon filed a motion for a new trial seeking to set aside the default judgment because service was not accomplished pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”), a treaty that governs service of process from one member state to another. Both the United States and Canada are signatories to the treaty. The trial court denied Menon’s motion for a new trial but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Hague Service Convention did not authorize service by mail. The Texas Court of Appeals denied a motion for a rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied review."
+216,Michigan,Summers,"The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin⎯not the heroin found in the basement⎯that formed the basis of charges against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers’ motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers’ detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to the house when the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court."
+778,Julius A. Wolf,Colorado,"Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton was indicted as conspiracy To perform an abortion. At trials, Wolf objected whether evidence material and admissible as to his co - defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which Wolf was admitted that would have been inadmissible by a prosecution for violation of a federal law or a federal court."
+1073,New Prime Inc.,Dominic Oliveira,"Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. ( Prime ), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “ substantially identical ” to those he had as an independent contractor. Oliveira then brought a class - action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), a state minimum - wage system, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration in the Federal Arbitration Act ( FAA ), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is void under Section 1 of this FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide. The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to determine, and it then held that “ provision of employment of transportation companies ” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district judge therefore denied Prime ’ s motion to compel arbitration. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court ’ s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent - contractor relationship."
+812,Shaw,Murphy,"While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests."
+1264,"CSX Transportation, Inc.",Thurston Hensley,"Thurston Hensley sued his longtime employer CSX Transportation Inc. (CSX) under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)in a Tennessee state court alleging that the railroad had negligently caused him to contract asbestosis. He sought pain and suffering damages for, among other things, his fear of developing lung cancer. Despite the objections of CSX, the trial court refused to provide a jury instruction as to the standard for awarding ""fear of cancer"" damages. Subsequently, the jury awarded Mr. Hensley $5 million in damages. On appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, CSX argued that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers where the Court established a standard for finding ""fear of cancer"" damages. The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the trial court. In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, CSX argued that the Tennessee Court of Appeals misapplied the Court's decision in Ayers and that the jury should have been instructed that Mr. Hensley needed to prove that his fear of cancer was ""genuine and serious"" in order to collect damages."
+758,Smith Betts,"Patrick J. Brady, Warden","Betts became indicted on robbery in Maryland. He was unable t afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case granted his request, and Betts subsequently pled not to. He remained accused of robbery, which he subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel."
+1223,Brian Michael Gall,United States,"While a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in you.S. v. Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.) The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the ""extraordinary variance"" was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit ordered a new sentence."
+1877,Elliot Ashton Welsh II,United States,"On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded ""No"" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as ""religious,"" Welsh's conviction was valid."
+577,Kansas,Colorado,"Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of its Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out would resolve the states'dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The you. S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 this Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court sided with the Special Master. Kansas later took action with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it became entitled with interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact between 1950 to 1984. Kansas also requested a "" river master "" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river."
+104,"San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.","City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.","The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $ 567, 000 conversion fee they had to charge in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of that property. The California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in state district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state - court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred parties to suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court ( the rule of "" issue preclusion "" ). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from these statute issues brought under the takings clause."
+91,United States,Mitch Miller,"Mitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor."
+1233,United States,Michael Williams,"Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of ""pandering"" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of ""any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to because another to believe"" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any ""braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar"" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography."
+245,Walter Fernandez,California,"On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co-tenant consented."
+1262,Arthur James Lomax,"Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.","Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ( without paying the usual court fees ) pursuant to 28 you. S. C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court review and review three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the basis that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “ strikes ” under 28 you. S. C. § 1915 ( g ), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying all associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits was frivolous or malicious that did not properly state a legal claim for relief. Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show because before proceeding in forma court. In response to the show because order, Lomax argued ( among other things ) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they don't count as strikes. The district court denied Lomax ’ s motion as barred by the three - struck provision, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
+1188,"United States Department of Commerce, et al.","State of New York, et al.","Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision that reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court in a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging losing the question could because a tax undercount because some households with parents who are unlawfully present in the country may be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary ’ s decision was arbitrary or capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought — and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized — depositions of high - ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross ’ s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government "" s previous stay application without prejudice, “ provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken. ” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high - ranking officials, so the government granted its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed. The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact - finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the district court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction."
+1208,"CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al.","Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.","In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1, 900 - mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the estuary in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps, Engineers, but no government authority is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers. As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264, 000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $ 143 million. Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $ 88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs for CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil. At the beginning of what turned out To be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a 3rd - party beneficiary of CITGO ’ s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati ( thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories ). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and. Administration ( NOAA ), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and, CITGO ’ s liability by 50 %. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims. "
+956,"Charles S. Turner, et al.",United States,"In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was dumped in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of ten teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, found guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of these other defendants put forth alibi defenses, though some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of his other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Nearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences overturned and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had never shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants."
+1644,Michael B. Kingsley,Stan Hendrickson,"In May 2010, Michael Kingsley, who was being held as a pretrial detainee in Monroe County Jail, was ordered to take down a piece of paper covering the light above his cell bed but refused to do so. After Sergeant Stan Hendrickson ordered Kingsley to take down the paper several times and each time was met with refusal, Lieutenant Robert Conroy, the jail administrator, ordered the jail staff to take down the paper and transfer Kingsley to another cell. During the transfer, Kingsley refused to act as ordered, so the officers pulled him to his feet in such a manner that his feet hit the bedframe, which caused pain and made him unable to walk or stand. In the new cell, when Kingsley resisted the officers' attempts to remove the handcuffs, Hendrickson put his knee in Kingsley's back and Kingsley yelled at him. Kingsley also claimed that Hendrickson smashed his head into the concrete bunk. After further verbal exchange, another officer applied a taser to Kingsley's back. Kingsley sued Hendrickson and other jail staff members and claimed that their actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury found the defendants not guilty. Kingsley appealed and argued that the jury was wrongly instructed on the standards for judging excessive force and intent. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
+802,Darryl Sinkfield,Peggy C. Kelley,"With the acknowledged purpose of maximizing the number of majority-minority districts -- i.e., districts in which a majority of voters belong to a minority group -- Alabama implemented a redistricting plan for its state legislative districts. White Alabama voters, who are residents of various majority-white districts (the appellees), brought suit in District Court challenging their own districts as the products of racial gerrymandering in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, a three-judge court held that seven of the challenged majority-white districts were the product of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering and enjoined their use in any election. The judicial panel found that the group had standing on the ground that injury-in-fact could be conclusively presumed from the mere fact of residence in a gerrymandered district, independent of the plaintiff's subjective assessment of harm, because of the bizarre shapes of their districts. On direct appeal, Alabama state officials and a group of African-American voters argued that the appellees lacked standing to maintain the suit."
+1383,William Freeman,United States,"William Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the you.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly. But in December 2008, the you.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."
+1649,Torrey Dale Grady,North Carolina,"Between 1997 and 2006, Torrey Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released for the second time, a trial court civilly committed Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring program for the duration of his life. The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that authorities can make sure that participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking amounted to an unreasonable search that was prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search."
+780,Slack,McDaniel,"Antonio Tonton Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The District Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal."
+1050,Arthur Andersen LLP,United States,"As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to ""knowingly...corruptly persuade another person"" to ""withold"" or ""alter"" documents in an ""offical proceeding."" The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a ""corrupt persuasion"" conviction - specifically, that a ""consciousness of wrongdoing"" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction."
+1343,Tarahrick Terry,United States,"Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one act of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a barely detectable ” component of cocaine base ( 3. 9 grams ), thus triggering the penalties in the you. S. C. § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced Terry to 188 months ’ imprisonment with 6 years ’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841 ( b ) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “ covered offense ” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the criminal penalties for all offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ), Terry ’ s offense was not a “ covered offense. ” The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
+1424,KPMG LLP,Robert Cocchi et al.,"Respondents, 19 individuals and entities, bought limited partnerships, which were invested with Bernard Madoff. After losing millions, Respondents sued Petitioner KPMG LLC, a financial auditor, alleging use of improper accounting standards. KPMG moved to compel arbitration under an audit services agreement between KPMG and Tremont, a fund who managed the limited partnerships. This agreement stated that any claim arising out of KPMG's services, including claims by any person for whose benefit the services were provided, would be resolved in mediation or arbitration. The Florida Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County denied the motion. The Court of Appeal of Florida, 4th Circuit affirmed. The court found that Respondents never expressly consented to the arbitration agreement, so the only claims derived from KPMG's services for the management fund were subject to arbitration. The court concluded that two of the claims were direct and not covered under the arbitration agreement. Because these claims were not arbitrable the court refused to compel arbitration of any part of the complaint."
+116,"Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections",Robert Douglas Smith,"In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death for murder, kidnapping, or attempted assault at an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus in district court that was denied. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that he was physically retarded and therefore could not be executed. The appellate court held that the issue of whether or not Smith remained mentally retarded had to be decided before that court."
+1835,Robert Watts,United States,"On August 27, 1966 while attending a protest and discussing police brutality, eighteen-year-old Robert Watts stated, ""I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J."" A federal statute makes it a crime to ""knowingly and willfully"" threaten the life of the President. Watts was arrested, tried, and convicted in federal court for violating this statute. Watts argued the statement ""did not constitute a 'threat' within the language of the statute."" On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected this argument, finding that the statement violated the statute even if Watts had no intention of carrying out his threat, and affirmed the lower court's judgment."
+191,"Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.","Michael B. Whiting, et al.","Various business and civil - rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ( "" LAWA "" ) in a Arizona federal district court. They claimed that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the existing E - Verify employment permit system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ( "" IRCA "" ). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or employing unauthorized aliens, it excepts all laws – which LAWA – from its reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E - Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E - Verify participation."
+475,"Salvador Godinez, Warden",Richard Allan Moran,"Richard Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court. After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial. Two and a half months later, Moran told the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty. Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence. After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran’s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas. The court sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders. After sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court. The court rejected Moran’s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal. Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, but the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a “reasoned choice” among the alternatives given. The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of making a reasoned choice."
+1224,United States,Gino Gonzaga Rodriquez,"When Gino Rodriquez was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez's Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered ""serious,"" the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law."
+1820,United States,O'Brien,David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.
+23,Sharron Frontiero,"Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense","Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down."
+1626,"T-Mobile South, LLC","City of Roswell, Georgia","Telecommunications service provider T-mobile South, LLC (T-mobile) submitted an application to construct a 108–foot cell tower resembling a man-made tree (monopine) in Roswell, Georgia. The location of the site, though planned inside a vacant lot, would be in an area zoned for single-family residences within a well-established residential neighborhood. Following an outpouring of public opposition to the tower, Roswell's Planning and Zoning Division recommended that the Mayor and city council, who ultimately approve applications after a public hearing, impose certain conditions before approving the application. Specifically, the Planning and Zoning Division recommended that T-Mobile should relocate the site to another part of the property, erect a fence around the tower, and plant pine trees to shield it from residential owners' view. At the public hearing, city council members voted to deny the application. Two days later, Roswell sent T-Mobile a letter notifying the company that the application was denied and referred the company to the minutes of the public hearing. T-Mobile sued Roswell and claimed that the city had not provided substantial evidence that would support a denial of the application. T-Mobile also alleged that, by prohibiting T-Mobile from building the structure, Roswell violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The district court did not rule on the substantial evidence question and instead held that Roswell had not met the ""in writing"" component of the TCA, which required the government to state the reason(s) for denying an application. The district court ordered Roswell to grant the permit, and Roswell appealed. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Roswell had met the ""in writing"" requirement by issuing a written denial and referring to the minutes of the hearing for the reasoning."
+2274,Kansas,"Ramiro Garcia, et al.","The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue. In State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law. In State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses. In State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law. All three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions."
+381,"City of Canton, Ohio",Geraldine Harris,"Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized. Harris sued the city of Canton for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in police custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions."
+757,Apprendi,New Jersey,"Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed."
+752,Rice,Cayetano,"The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, ""native Hawaiians,"" defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and ""Hawaiians,"" defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only ""Hawaiians"" may vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a ""Hawaiian"" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii ""may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be."""
+335,Colorado,John Leroy Spring,"In February 1979, John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly after, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received information from an informant that Spring was involved in the transportation of stolen firearms across state lines. The informant also told the agents the Spring had been talking about killing Walker. The agents set up an undercover operation and arrested Spring on March 30. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest and again at the police station. He then signed a document stating that he understood and waived his rights and was willing to make a statement. After asking Spring about the firearms transactions, the agents asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone, and if he had shot Walker in Colorado. Spring admitted to shooting someone but denied shooting Walker, and the interview ended. On May 26, Colorado police officers visited Spring in jail intending to question him about the Walker murder. They read Spring his Miranda rights, and he signed a document stating that he waived them. During the course of the interview, Spring confessed to the murder. Spring was charged with first-degree murder in Colorado state court. He moved to suppress both the March 30 and May 26 statements by arguing that he invalidly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court held that the police’s failure to inform Spring of the topics that would be covered in questioning did not affect the the waiver, but the content of the March 30 interview was not relevant. The trial court suppressed the March 30 statement and admitted the May 26 statement into evidence. Spring was convicted. On appeal, Spring renewed his argument about the waiver of his Miranda rights for the March 30 statement and argued that the May 26 statement was the “illegal fruit” of the March 30 statement. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible because the ATF agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker murder before questioning him about it. The Court of Appeals also held that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the earlier illegal statement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed."
+475,"Robert Kennedy, Attorney General",Francisco Mendoza-Martinez,"Francisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the ""Act"") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their you.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his you.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort."
+608,"Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board",Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,"Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ( Liberty Mutual ) operates a self - regulated employee health plan through a third - party administrator. Vermont state statute requires : all health plans, including self - insured plans, file reports containing financial data and other information for the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. As Vermont subpoenaed claims data with the third - party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( ERISA ) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that Massachusetts preempted the state statute because the state statute ’ s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted."
+895,Marcelo Manrique,United States,"Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did not include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment was entered. When the amended judgment was entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award."
+1241,"State of Georgia, et al.","Public.Resource.Org, Inc.","The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is any compilation of Georgia statutes preceded by various annotations, “ consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor ’ s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references. ” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “ shall be merged with annotations, ” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves don't have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker for the Georgia House of Assembly, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. Public. Resource. Org ( PRO ) is a non - profit organization with a mission of improving public access of government documents and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print copies of the OCGA of its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites. The Commission sent PRO several cease - and - desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia ’ s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable of in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the of Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “ official ” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created — finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations."
+192,"World Wide Volkswagen Corp., Seaway Volkswagen Inc.","The Honorable Charles Woodson, District Judge of Creek County, State of Oklahoma; Key Eloise Robinson; Eva May Robinson; Harry Robinson; George Samuel Robinson","New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state."
+925,Barnhart,Peabody Coal Company,"Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security ""shall, before October 1, 1993,"" assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
+696,Curt Muller,Oregon,"Oregon enacted a law that gave women only ten hours of service in factories and laundries. The head of a laundry business, Curt Muller, got fined $ 10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed the conviction. The State supreme court upheld his law ’ s constitutionality."
+764,West Virginia State Board of Education,Walter Barnette,"In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools must use salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children from a family of Jehovah'S Witnesses refused not perform the ceremony and were sent home from school for non - compliance. They were also faced with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for committing child delinquency."
+432,"Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator",Federal Election Commission,"In early 2004, after many years - long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for - - and spent during - - political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ( the so - called McCain - Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA ). Its key provisions were a ) a ban on unrestricted ( "" soft money "" ) donations made directly to political parties ( often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals ) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials ; b ) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non - profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election ; and c ) restrictions upon political parties'use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates ( in the form of "" issue ads "" or "" coordinated expenditures "" ). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by - passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three - man panel voted down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft - money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of campaigns that parties can engage on. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals."
+899,Marcelo Manrique,United States,"Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court with possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did indeed include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment was entered. When his amended decision was entered while the appeal is pending, he included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the size of the award in their briefs. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a final notice of action regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award."
+1154,Rockwell International Corp. et al.,United States and United States ex rel James S. Stone,"Stone sued his employer, nuclear weapons plant operator Rockwell International, under the False Claims Act (FCA). He took advantage of the FCA's ""qui tam"" provision, which allows an individual to sue on behalf of the government. Stone alleged that Rockwell had made false claims about the environmental safety of ""pondcrete,"" a mixture of cement and sludge used for nuclear waste storage. In a qui tam action under the FCA, the person bringing the suit must be the ""original source"" of the information on which his claim is based. Rockwell argued that Stone was not an original source because he did not have ""direct and independent knowledge"" of the information at issue in the suit, as required by the FCA. The District Court ruled that Stone qualified as an original source, and a divided panel of the you.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to resolve the question of how much and what kind of knowledge an FCA qui tam plaintiff must have."
+677,New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz,Reed,"The Extradition Act implements the Constitution's extradition clause and provides for the extradition from one state of a fugitive from justice when a demand for the fugitive's extradition is made by another state. Manuel Ortiz, a parolee from the Ohio correctional system, fled to New Mexico after Ohio prison officials told him that they planned to revoke his parole status. The governor of New Mexico issued a warrant directing Ortiz's return upon Ohio's demand. Ortiz then sought habeas corpus relief in New Mexico. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief. The court expressed the view that Ortiz was a refugee from injustice and that the New Mexico constitution, which guarantees the right of seeking and obtaining safety, prevailed over the state's duty under the extradition clause."
+507,James Higginbotham,Stella Connell,"Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “ will support the Constitution and the United States and not the State of Florida ” and “ don't believe in the destruction of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence. ” The district court held that the provision on the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but a provision not to overthrow that government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
+2180,Erik Lindsey Hughes,United States of America,"Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 you.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 you.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding."
+1390,Astra USA,"Santa Clara County, Calif.","In 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on you.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The you.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision."
+1648,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.","Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) is a national chain of clothing stores that requires its employees to comply with a ""Look Policy"" that reflects the store's style and forbids black clothing and caps, though the meaning of the term cap is not defined in the policy. If a question arises about the Look Policy during the interview or an applicant requests a deviation, the interviewer is instructed to contact the corporate Human Resources department, which will determine whether or not an accommodation will be granted. In 2008, Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for a position at an Abercrombie store. She wore a headscarf, or hijab, every day, and did so in her interview. Elauf did not mention her headscarf during her interview and did not indicate that she would need an accommodation from the Look Policy. Her interviewer likewise did not mention the headscarf, though she contacted her district manager, who told her to lower Elauf's rating on the appearance section of the application, which lowered her overall score and prevented her from being hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf and claimed that the company had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to hire Elauf because of her headscarf. Abercrombie argued that Elauf had a duty to inform the interviewer that she required an accommodation from the Look Policy and that the headscarf was not the expression of a sincerely held religious belief. The district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Abercrombie because there is no genuine issue of fact that Elauf did not notify her interviewer that she had a conflict with the Look Policy."
+335,"Mach Mining, LLC",Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC (Mach Mining) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable because to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants' behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to its suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate. Nonetheless, the court certified the question to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure-to-conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure-to-conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases."
+24,Mahan,Howell,"In 1971, the Virginia legislature reapportioned itself. The plan for the House of Representatives provided for 100 representatives from 52 districts with each House member representing an average of 46,485 constituents(with a variance between largest and smallest being 16.4 percent, compared to the ideal 3.89 percent). Henry Howell challenged the plan as unconstitutional because its population deviations were too large to satisfy the principle of ""one person, one vote."" This case was decided together with City of Virginia Beach v. Howell and Weinberg v. Prichard."
+1722,Wong Sun and James Wah Toy,United States,"Police arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man named “Blackie Toy” once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as “Blackie Toy”, but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy’s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in you.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
+600,"Wesley Harris, et al.","Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were under-populated in Democratic-leaning districts and over-populated in Republican-leaning ones, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission argued that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor of the Commission and held that the redrawn districts represented a good faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act."
+295,California,Charles R. Carney,"On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney’s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell. Carney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Carney pleaded no contest, was convicted, and placed on probation. He appealed, and the California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds that the motor home fell under the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed."
+1437,"PPL Montana, LLC",Montana,"In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's ""school trust lands."" The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act. The federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the ""equal footing doctrine."" The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state."
+283,California,Trombetta,"In 1980 and 1981, in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a “breathalyzer test”) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that the test results be excluded from all the trials."
+592,Antoine Bruce,"Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al.","Several prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit ( SMU ) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Philadelphia, which is for gang - associated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons ( BOP ), and claimed that SMUs violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang - affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and unconstitutional because the BOP officials did not know members of rival organizations. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The parties then engaged in extensive back - and - forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and the ability of other prisoners to join in the case. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the District Of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filed fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees."
+1963,Denny Martin,Hunter's Lessee,"During the American Revolution, Virginia created laws allowing the state to seize property of Loyalists. In 1781, Denny Martin, a British subject, inherited land from his uncle, a Loyalist. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. A federal treaty dictated that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's law permitting the confiscation of property, even though it conflicted with the federal treaty. The you.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty superseded state law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. On remand, the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to follow the ruling and argued that the law granting the Supreme Court appellate review over state court decisions, section 25 of the Judiciary Act (the Act), was unconstitutional."
+546,South Carolina,Baker,"In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity for Capital Responsibility Act ( TEFRA ). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly traded long - term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered denominations. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered notes issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co ( 1895 ). The Georgia government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxes ; rather it regulated the need for bonds to be exempt."
+2112,"Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc.",Jodie Nevils,"Jodie Nevils was a federal employee with a Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) health insurance plan that was governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly preempts state laws and regulations governing health insurance and benefits plans. After Nevils was awarded a settlement in a personal injury case, Coventry enforced a claim to the settlement money. Nevils sued Coventry and argued that Missouri law prevented insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and held that the FEHBA preempted state law regarding insurance companies’ claims to the proceeds of personal injury settlement. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the FEHBA did not preempt state law in this case because an insurance company’s claim to a personal injury settlement does not clearly relate to “the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.” After the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, the Office of Personnel Management created a new formal rule. That rule stated that an insurance carrier’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the settlement of an individual covered by that insurance carrier’s plan “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” for the purpose of the FEHBA. The you.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for this case and vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of this new rule. On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there is no precedent that establishes that a federal agency’s interpretation of a preemption clause receives judicial deference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri again determined that the FEHBA did not preempt Missouri state law."
+942,"Expressions Hair Design, et al.","Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.","The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued simultaneously that a statute violated the Free Speech Clause of this First Amendment and that this statute was too vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that the statute was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and discounts, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that this statute qualified as permissible expression of economic activity. The appellate court determined that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague."
+543,"Bank One Chicago, N.A.",Midwest Bank & Trust Company,"The Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a ""person other than [a] depository institution"" sues a ""depository institution,"" or when a depositor sues a bank."
+2351,"Chike Uzuegbunam, et al.","Stanley C. Preczewski, et al.","In July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on GGC’s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC’s “Freedom of Expression Policy,” which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them. Later, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford—another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs—have attempted to speak publicly or distribute literature on campus. Uzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school’s policies, both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its “Freedom of Expression Policy” to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the school filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot. The district court dismissed the case as moot, concluding that the claims for nominal damages could not save otherwise moot constitutional challenges. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
+60,Dempsey,Martin,"Pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the you.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In October 1992, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial Dempsey had filed eleven petitions for certiorari and one petition for an extraordinary writ. After the 39.8 denial, Dempsey filed five petitions for certiorari. All eighteen of Dempsey's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent."
+924,"Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, et al.","David Harris, et al.","After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for you. S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees selected a redistricting coordinator to design the proposed districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally ; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads for the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such is the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be adjusted to have a “ Black Voting Age Population ” ( BVAP ) of 50 % plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50 %, which meant that there were two more majority - black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. David Harris and Christine Bowser represented you. S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued but argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act ’ s requirements as a pretext to place more white voters in those two counties to reduce black voters ’ influence in other districts. The Supreme court determined that race was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause."
+195,"Jasper F. Williams, et al.","David Zbaraz, et al. ","These are three consolidated cases. Jasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Initially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional."
+1075,Thomas Joe Miller-El,"Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division",Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the you.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Miller-El appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.
+404,Department of Homeland Security,Robert J. MacLean,"In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration ( TSA ) knew of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and some members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to stop the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in his 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure in sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position. MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board ( Board ) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act ( WPA ). The Board determined that MacLean's acts did not fall under the WPA since they were explicitly prohibited by law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA."
+161,Mackey,Montrym,"After he collided with a motorcycle in Acton, Massachusetts, Donald Montrym was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). A state court later dismissed the DUI charges, but the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspended Montrym’s driver’s license for ninety days because Montrym had refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the statute that required drivers to submit to breathalyzer tests violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not provide for a pre-suspension hearing. The district court found in favor of Montrym and ordered the Registrar to return the plaintiffs’ licenses. The Registrar appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
+1915,Clark,Jeter,"A Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. The statute of limitations on suits seeking to establish paternity was six years from the birth of the illegitimate child. However, the state allowed legitimate children to seek support from their parents at any time. Cherlyn Clark sought child support from Gene Jeter, whom she claimed was the father of her daughter, Tiffany. Blood tests indicated that there was a 99.3% probability that Jeter indeed was Tiffany's father. A state court dismissed Clark's suit because it was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired."
+1241,Republic of Iraq,Jordan Beaty et al.,"In 2003, plaintiffs sued the Republic of Iraq in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging they had been tortured and taken hostage during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The plaintiffs relied on 28 you.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7), an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allowed for lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq moved to dismiss arguing that Section 1605(f) provides a limitations period of ten years for any action filed under Section 1605(a)(7). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit. After the plaintiffs' appeal, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which revised Section 1605(a)(7) granting the President authority to waive the exception to the FSIA with respect to Iraq, which he did. Iraq subsequently contended that because of the revision, the case should be dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court. It held that the district court had jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed on time and not barred by the President's waiver."
+2138,Stephanie C. Artis,District of Columbia,"In 2007, Stephanie Artis was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Health (DOH) as a code inspector. She alleges that she and her supervisor developed a contentious relationship and that he singled her out for unfair treatment in the workplace. On April 17, 2009, Artis took her first administrative step against DOH by filing a discrimination claim with the you.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and while that claim was pending, DOH terminated Artis’s employment in November 2010. In December 2011, Artis filed a lawsuit against the District in federal court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and invoked the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction to assert claims based on the District’s Whistleblower Act, False Claims Act, and common law. The district court granted the District’s motion on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim, violation of Title VII, as facially deficient. It thus found it had no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Fifty-nine days after her claims were dismissed in federal court, Artis filed the remaining claims in a D.C. trial court. The District alleged that Artis’s claims were time barred based on the respective statutes of limitations, and the trial judge agreed, finding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 you.S.C. § 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of the unsuccessful federal filing."
+39,John Doe,United States,"John Williams, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for alleged fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury ’ s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his 4th Amendment right against self - incrimination regarding any related documents. The United States government served subpoenas on three of Doe ’ s foreign banks, ordering it to release Doe ’ s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe ’ s consent. The government then attempted to have the district court order Doe to sign the legal forms authorizing his banks to release the information. The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “ fishing expedition ” for incriminating evidence ; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed."
+376,Department of Justice,Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,"CBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of ""public record"" and ""interest."" On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the you.S. Department of Justice certiorari."
+462,Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus,United States,"Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist ’ s studio in Brooklyn Bridge, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “ Mark ”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation ( “ FBI ] ) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek or obtain a warrant to arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel. FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( “ INS ” ) a report on Abel as a suspected spy ; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside cleaned up all of Abel ’ s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but discovered no weapons or evidence of alienage ; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial. Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel ’ s arrest was issued dated August 7, 1957 while Abel stayed in his Texas cell ; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search.. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel ’ s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel ’ s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant."
+520,City of Lakewood,Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,"Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever ""terms and conditions"" which he ""deemed necessary and reasonable."" On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari."
+166,"Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York","The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.","In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non - public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association ( CHA ), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( OCC ), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, is appropriately responsible for regulating the banks'compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act ( NBA ) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act ( FHA ) provided an exception to the OCC's voluntary stewardship of the NBA and therefore halted his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped The Attorney General's investigation. Upon appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used its decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of an NBA was not ripe for adjudication."
+1199,Plains Commerce Bank,"Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc.","The Long family, members of the Sioux nation, owned a cattle company that had been doing business with the Plains Commerce Bank for seven years when the family patriarch died. Because Plains Commerce was reluctant to grant operating loans to younger generation family members, it struck a deal with the Longs agreeing to provide the operating loans if the Longs deeded their farmland and house to the bank. According to the Longs the bank never followed through on its promise to provide the operating loans, and after the bank attempted to foreclose on the land the Longs brought suit in a local tribal court seeking a temporary restraining order blocking the land transfer as well as charging the bank with tortuous discrimination. The tribal court returned an award of $700,000 for the Longs, after which Plains Commerce filed suit in federal district court claiming that the tribal court had improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case. The district court decided that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claim, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In seeking Supreme Court review, Plains Commerce argued that the tribal court should not have had jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit erred in deciding so, because the claim did not fit into one of the exceptions granting such jurisdiction set forth by the Supreme Court in _Montana v. you.S. _ On the other hand, the Longs argued that federal courts whose geographic reach encompasses tribal lands have repeatedly allowed tribal courts to adjudicate civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members."
+1902,Marvin Green,"Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General","Marvin Green began working for the United States Postal Service in 1973. In 2002, he became the postmaster at the Englewood, Colorado, post office. In 2008, a postmaster position opened in Boulder, and Green applied but did not receive the position. He filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) charge regarding the denial of his application, and the charge was settled. In 2009, Green filed an informal EEO charge and alleged that his supervisor and supervisor’s replacement had been retaliating against him for his prior EEO activity. Throughout that year, Green was subject to internal Postal Service investigations including a threat of criminal prosecution. He ultimately signed an agreement that he would immediately give up his position and either retire or accept a much lower paying position. Green chose to retire and filed subsequent charges with the EEO Office, which dismissed his claim. Green then sued in district court and alleged, among other claims, that he had been constructively discharged. The district court held that Green’s constructive discharge claim was barred because he did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of signing the agreement, which was the last allegedly discriminatory act, and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
+918,Khanh Phuong Nguyen,United States,"Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions."
+1425,Panagis Vartelas,"Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General","Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported. Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed. Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 you.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 you.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision."
+1019,"Los Rovell Dahda, et al.",United States of America,"Los and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the defendants was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co - conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district attorney in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap order exceeded the district court't territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced. The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court in appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court't territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not "" directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “ core concerns ” of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 — privacy and uniformity — that were not implicated by the Dahdas ’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court ’ s jurisdiction."
+570,"American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al.","Aereo, Inc.","Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) provides a service that allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet-enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions: that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo is currently only available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the copyright holders of the programs to record or transmit their programs. Two groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their right to ""publicly perform"" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different from another that had been determined non-violative of the rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs' businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling to deny the motion."
+347,"Gloria Richardson, Warden",Clarissa Marsh,"Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh’s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams’ confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal. Marsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed."
+842,Jermaine Simmons et al. ,Walter J. Himmelreich,"Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act ( FTCA ) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials attempted to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration under the First and Eighth Amendment claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich has failed to perform his administrative remedies on the claims and that the Prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 you. S. C. § 2676, that prohibits “ any action by the same claimant, without reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim. ” The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court ’ s judgment. It held that Himmelreich ’ s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich ’ s claim based on discretionary exceptions to the FTCA rules applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 you. S. C § 2676."
+751,California Democratic Party,Jones,"In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
+1885,Cohen,California,"A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with ""FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR"" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits ""maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct."" Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail."
+664,"Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.",Sierra Club,"Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was ""ripe for review,"" there was no need to wait ""until a site-specific action occurs,"" held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA."
+1454,"Dianne Knox, et al.","Service Employees International Union, Local 1000","All California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a ""Political Fight Back Fund"" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed."
+707,Davis,Monroe County Board of Education,"Aurelia Davis sued the Monroe County Board of Education (the ""Board""), on behalf of her fifth grade daughter LaShonda, alleging that school officials failed to prevent Lashonda's suffering sexual harassment at the hands of another student. Davis claimed that the school's complacency created an abusive environment that deprived her daughter of educational benefits promised her under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). On appeal from successive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Davis certiorari."
+683,Feltner,"Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.","In 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including ""who is the Boss,"" ""Silver Spoons,"" ""Hart to Hart,"" and ""T. J. Hooker,"" to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages."
+1289,Donald J. Trump,"Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al.","The district courts in New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal prosecutor to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction that dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like another grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did indeed apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to the precedent and remanded its case to the lower court."
+47,Lawyer,Department of Justice,"Based on the 1990 census, The Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan involving State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to review the plan and it appeared that if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, with other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to another settlement which placed District 21 under his new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's contention that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement."
+198,United States,California,"Rincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding."
+44,Jenkins,Georgia,"An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film ""Carnal Knowledge."" The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret."
+1427,"M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.","Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State","Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as ""Jerusalem, Israel."" United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record ""Jerusalem"" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received. On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as ""Jerusalem, Israel"" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording ""Israel"" as Zivotofsky's place of birth. On remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if ""Israel"" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such ""unilateral action"" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians ""would critically compromise"" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question."
+1043,Carman L. Deck,Missouri,"After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the you.S. Constitution."
+24,Barry Goldwater et al.,"James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al.",President Jimmy Carter decided without Congressional authorization on ending a defense war in Taiwan.
+973,"Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, et al.",Joshua Davey,"The Washington State Promise Scholarship, created by the state legislature in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is taught to because belief. Washington's constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this ban to college financial aid. Joshua Davey forfeited his Promise Scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at a private Christian college. Davey filed suit in you.S. district court, claiming the state constitution's ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the you.S. Constitution). The district court rejected Davey's claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Davey's free exercise rights were violated."
+1684,National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,Patterson,"Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists."
+828,Director of Revenue of Missouri,CoBank ACB,"The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because the Act's current version is silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the banks are exempt."
+197,Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation,Public Service Commission of New York,"The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals."
+1812,United States,"Sealy, Inc.","Until about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers. In 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940’s, Sealy’s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories. The Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.’s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.’s price fixing violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.’s licensing structure."
+2193,Wescley Fonseca Pereira,"Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General","Wescley Fonseca Pereira entered the United States in June 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to stay until December 21, 2000. Pereira overstayed his visa, and in May 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personally served him with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The notice did not specify the date and time of his initial removal hearing, but instead ordered him to appear before an immigration judge “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” When the immigration court set a date and time, it mailed Pereira a notice with such information. However, the notice was sent to Pereira’s street address on Martha’s Vineyard rather than his post office box, so Pereira never received it. When Pereira did not appear for his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia. Pereira was not removed and instead remained in the country. In March 2013, he was arrested for a motor vehicle violation and detained by DHS. Through his attorney, Pereira filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, claiming he had never received the hearing notice with the time and place. Although Pereira conceded that he could be removed, he sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 you.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), a provision that gives the attorney general discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. This continuous period ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Pereira contends that because he did not receive notice of the time and place of his removal hearing, his presence in the country was continuous and over ten years under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the hearing is nonetheless effective to end the period of continuous physical presence. However, Pereira challenges this reading of the statute. The First Circuit determined that the relevant provisions of the INA are ambiguous as to whether notice must include the date and time of the hearing to be effective, but the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and thus subject to Chevron deference."
+1366,Jason Pepper,United States,"Jason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release – a 20% downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant."
+623,"Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc.",Hilton Davis Chemical Company,"Warner Jenkinson Co. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Davis's ""'746 patent,"" which was issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the ""ultrafiltration"" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. In 1986, Jenkinson developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Davis sued for infringement of the '746 patent. Davis's suit relied solely on the ""doctrine of equivalents,"" under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is an ""equivalence"" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Jenkinson argued that the Patent Act of 1952 had supplanted the doctrine. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Jenkinson after a jury had found that Jenkinson had infringed upon the '746 patent. The en banc Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that petitioner's process was not substantially different from the process disclosed in the '746 patent."
+1141,Jason J. Mont,United States of America,"Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug - related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months ’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by the sentence he was subject for supervised release until March 6, 2017. While on the release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state - criminal offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state - court charges in exchange for a predetermined six - year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a string of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont ’ s probation judge informed the federal district court of Mont ’ s state - court convictions and sentences, and that court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months ’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state - court convictions. Mont challenged the district court ’ s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction."
+995,"Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense","Jose Padilla and Donna R. Newman, as Next Friend of Jose Padilla","Jose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after returning from Pakistan in 2002. He was initially detained as a material witness in the government's investigation of the al Qaeda terrorist network, but was later declared an ""enemy combatant"" by the Department of Defense, meaning that he could be held in prison indefinitely without access to an attorney or to the courts. The FBI claimed that he was returning to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism. Donna Newman, who had represented him while he was being held as a material witness, filed a petition for habeas corpus on his behalf. The you.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that Newman had standing to file the petition despite the fact that Padilla had been moved to a military brig in South Carolina. However, the court also found that the Department of Defense, under the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and the statutory authorization provided by Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force, had the power to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant. The district judge rejected Newman's argument that the detention was prohibited by the federal Non-Detention Act, which states that no ""citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."" On appeal, a divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court's ""enemy combatant"" ruling. The panel found that the Authorization for Use of Military force did not meet the requirement of the Non-Detention Act and that the President could not, therefore, declare American citizens captured outside a combat zone as enemy combatants."
+2113,Lester Gerard Packingham,North Carolina,"Lester Packingham was convicted of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month supervised release. Aside from being told to “remain away from” the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile, thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North Carolina’s laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender’s access to social media websites. In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual predators off of social media websites for the “protection of minors.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and held that the social media website provision of the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law was a “limitation on conduct” and not a restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest in “forestalling the illicit lurking and contact” of registered sex offenders and their potential future victims."
+1157,Jamar Alonzo Quarles,United States of America,"Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 N. S. C § 922 ( g ). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles ’ s conviction for third - degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( “ ACCA ” ) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon - in - possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court ’ s decision in Johnson v. Associated States, 576 you. S. _ _ ( 2015 ), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for its Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan ’ s crime of third - degree home invasion constituted a “ violent felony ” by the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 years ’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic burglary is “ an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. ” Michigan law defines the crime of third - degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling ; while entering is present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of choice is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles ’ s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent - upon - entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third - degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary."
+784,Williams,Taylor,"After Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found that the death sentence was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision ""was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court."
+1755,Jim Garrison,Louisiana,"On November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’ inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression."
+444,"Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.",Board of Education of Topeka,"Following a decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ( Brown I ), which rejected racial discrimination as public education policy, the Court convened to issue further directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The decision stemmed from many different regions of the United States with differing conditions and problems."
+2205,"Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.","Mony Preap, et al.","Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 you.S.C. § 1226(c). The district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 you.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays."
+723,Benjamin Gitlow,People of the State of New York,"Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for producing a “ Left Wing Manifesto "" that called for the establishment a socialism through strikes and class struggle of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York's Criminal Defense Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. During the trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto'and publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The trial division affirmed the conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state."
+916,Dow Chemical Company,Stephenson,"In 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson."
+1391,"Doretha H. Henderson, Authorized Representative of David L. Henderson, Deceased","Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs","David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the you.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 you.S.C. § 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling."
+417,Maryland,Jerome Edward Buie,"On February 3, 1986, two men robbed a Godfather’s Pizza in Prince George’s County, Maryland. One of the men was wearing a red running suit. Later that day, the police obtained warrants for the arrest of Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen and put Buie’s house under surveillance. On February 5, the police arrested Buie in his house. Police found him hiding in the basement. Once Buie emerged and was handcuffed, an officer went down to determine if there was anyone else hiding. While in the basement, the officer saw a red running suit in plain view and seized it as evidence. The trial court denied Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit evidence, and he was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed."
+377,"Georgia Brower, et al.","County of Inyo, et al.","On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached. After Caldwell’s death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
+550,Benjamin Robers,United States,"Benjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan applications⎯by misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the house and repay the mortgage⎯then allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise. After government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically (wired) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in the amount of $218,952.18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan and the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed (the offset value). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and ""other expenses"" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum."
+1048,Adaucto Chavez-Mesa,United States of America,"In 2013, Adaucto Chavez - Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135 – 168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135 - month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez - Meza either sought or was granted a sentence reduction under 18 you. S. C. § 3582 ( c ) ( 2 ). He requested that the court reduce his sentence from 108 days, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “ tak [ en ] into account the policy statement set forth by USSG § 1B1. 3 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 you. S. C. § 3553 ( a ). ” Chavez - Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553 ( a ) factors in deciding on the 114 - month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553 ( a ) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation to its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits each held that the form language is sufficient."
+261,Kevin Loughrin,United States,"Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and trading the purchases for cash. When the scheme came from an end, he or Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and found violations of the Speedy Trial Act ; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to show that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to prove him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin remained convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months of prison. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
+1679,First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles,County of Los Angeles et al.,"These are two consolidated cases concerning property tax exemption under the California Constitution and California Revenue and Taxation Code (CRTC) for real property and buildings used solely for religious worship. The California Constitution requires denial of tax exemption to any person or organization who advocates the overthrow of the you.S. Government or the State of California by violent or unlawful means. To enforce this, a provision of the CRTC requires those applying for tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they do not engage in that prohibited activity. In both cases, the Los Angeles assessor denied tax exemption because the churches refused to agree to the oath. The churches paid their taxes under protest and sued the County of Los Angeles for a refund. The churches argued that requiring them to agree to the oath violated the you.S. Constitution. In 382, the trial court upheld the oath and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. In 385, the court upheld the oath under the you.S. Constitution, but held that it violated the California Constitution because it excluded householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed."
+197,United States,"Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.","Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share from the business and giving professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $ 7, 472, 405. They also transferred the profits from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially the Treasury Bonds on the open market with $ 7, 359, 043. This transaction created "" outside basis, "" or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed. Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers ( except Home Oil ) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $ 10, 623, 348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step - up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers'outside basis. Home Concrete again reduced its outside basis to $ 10, 527, 250. 53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home oil reported a $ 69, 125. 08 gain from the sale of its assets. The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "" solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners. "" On September 7, 2006 the IRS to a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment ( FPAA ), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers'reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers'taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) seeking to recover the increase. As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS ) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six - year period for assessing tax remains open for "" all taxable years … that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction … in which a decision had not become final. "" The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs."
+1209,"CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al.","Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.","In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1, 900 - mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, where no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for it in this area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers. As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264, 000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $ 143 million. Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $ 88 million by its federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the sole recipient of the oil. At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third - party beneficiary of CITGO ’ s safe berth warranty and that CITGO owes a duty of care to Frescati ( thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories ). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard,, National, and Atmospheric Administration ( NOAA ), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO ’ s liability by 50 %. The government, CITGO, in Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims. "
+86,United States,Santana,"Using marked money, police officers made an undercover heroin buy from a third party who, upon taking money from the officers, entered ""Mom Santana's"" house and emerged with heroin. Officers then arrested the third party and returned to Santana's house where they identified themselves as police officers, entered the house after Santana fled into it from the porch, and, after ordering her to empty her pockets, discovered some of the marked money. The search was done without a warrant."
+1102,Keanu D.W. Ortiz,United States,"Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active - duty military officers may hold a "" civil office,'including those that require "" an appointment by the President by or with the advice and consent of the Senate. "" 10 you. S. C. § 973 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( ii ). After President Obama resigned and the Senate nominated Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review ( CMCR ), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ( CCA ). A judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years'imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ( CAAF ), asking this court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from service on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The panel rejected both of Ortiz's arguments. Note : This case was original consolidated under Dalmazzi v. United States ( 16 - 961 ), and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there."
+94,"Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.",Henson,"Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a plant - based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in the similar case, Price v. Ciba - Geigy Corp., in Federal district court, the Louisiana court rejected his lower court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state - court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state - court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the case, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act would not properly support removal of the state - court action."
+110,United States,"Gabriel Francis Antelope, et al.","On February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d’Alene Indians—William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison—broke into the home of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder. The defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a “racially based disadvantage.”"
+144,Lockett,Ohio,"An Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death."
+803,Seling,Young,"Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of ""sexually violent predators,"" or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, therefore, it could not violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive ""as applied"" to Young."
+193,"Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.","Michael B. Whiting, et al.","Various business and civil - rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ( "" LAWA "" ) in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E - Verify employment license system and revokes employment licenses of those who work unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ( "" IRCA "" ). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing of – like and – from preemptive legislation. The judge also reasoned that mandating the use of E - Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly mandate states form requiring E - Verify participation."
+337,Colorado,Francis Connelly,"In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily."
+316,United States,American College of Physicians,"The American College of Physicians, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, published a monthly medical journal. Within the journal were paid advertisements for products useful in the field of medicine specifically covered by the journal. Section 511(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on ""unrelated business taxable income"" of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS asserted that the advertising income from the medical journal fell under this category. The American College of Physicians countered that the advertisements were ""substantially related"" to its tax-exempt purpose of maintaining high standards in medicine, and that they were therefore tax-exempt. When the IRS refused to give the organization a tax refund, it filed suit in United States Claims Court. The Claims Court held that the advertisements were not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose and that the income was therefore taxable. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the advertisements helped to educate the journal's readers and was therefore substantially related."
+1924,David Leon Riley,State of California,"David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed."
+1290,Ford Motor Company,"Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.","In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question."
+370,Gregory P. Warger,Randy D. Shauers,"In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter-suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection. The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606(b) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606(b) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
+853,Gisbrecht,Barnhart,"Under 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing a ""lodestar"" method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
+933,"Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General",Luis Ramon Morales-Santana,"Luis Ramon Morales - Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales - Santana "" s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales - Santana was “ legitimated ” by his father ’ s citizenship, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales - Santana ’ s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non - citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States or one of its possessions for a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child ’ s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales - Santana ’ s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 17th birthday, when he left to settle in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales - Santana upon his birth. In 2000, Morales - Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued if he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales - Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued that the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers ( which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child ’ s birth ), and the gender - based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, but the you. S. Court in Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender - based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
+1898,"Alton J. Lemon, et al. ","David H. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.","Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries. The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment."
+265,"Lexmark International, Inc.","Static Control Components, Inc.","Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. (SCC) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit relied on the ""reasonable interest"" test to establish standing under the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must demonstrate 1) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest."
+662,John Barron ex rel. Tiernan,Mayor of Baltimore,"Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged barge construction by the city had diverted sea levels in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial courts awarded him $ 4, 500 in damages, which another state district court struck back."
+839,Franchise Tax Board of California,Gilbert P. Hyatt,"Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California ( FTB ) based on the FTB ′ s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that could not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes every time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith, eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based around California law that granted it sovereign independence. The case then went before the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB sovereign immunity. At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $ 300 million of damages. The parties cross - appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental institutions are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed."
+1451,"Michael Martel, Warden",Kenneth Clair,"Facts of the case: Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to ""exhaust"" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being. The June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion."
+671,Hopkins,Reeves,"Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred."
+552,Robinson,United States,"Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 you.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who ""uses or carries a firearm"" both ""during and in relation to"" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting ""use"" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an ""accessibility and proximity"" test."
+1506,Federal Trade Commission,Actavis Inc. et al.,"In 2000, Solvay Pharmaceuticals successfully patented AndroGel, a topical gel medication. Shortly after the FDA approved the medication, generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories began developing generic versions of the gel. Solvay filed a patent infringement suit against Watson and Paddock, but the manufacturers counter-claimed that Solvay's patent was invalid to begin with. As the infringement suit progressed, Solvay feared that it would lose its monopoly on AndroGel. To prevent this, Solvay entered into a reverse payment agreement with the two manufacturers. In return for dropping the suit and maintaining exclusivity, Solvay agreed to pay the manufacturers a sizeable fee. The agreement allowed Solvay to maintain its monopoly, despite the possible invalidity of the patent, in exchange for sharing some of the profits with its potential competitors. Shortly after entering the agreement, the Federal Trade Commission (""FTC"") filed a complaint against the pharmaceutical companies. The FTC claimed that Solvay was unlikely to win the patent infringement suit; therefore the settlement unfairly protected an invalid patent monopoly. By limiting competition in the AndroGel market, the manufacturers were restraining trade in violation of antitrust laws. The manufacturers argued that the FTC failed to state a valid claim because the agreement merely protected Solvay's already existing patent rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the manufacturers and dismissed the case. The FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court explained that the manufacturers' reverse payment settlement is lawful as long as it restrains competition in the same way that patent protection typically restrains competition."
+1715,Western Union Telegraph Company,Pennsylvania,"Western Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large sum of money from payees who never claimed the money sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed."
+110,DaimlerChrysler Corp.,"Charlotte Cuno, et al.","As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the you.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce."
+1988,Jay Near,Minnesota ex rel. Olson,"In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person ""engaged in the business"" of regularly publishing or circulating an ""obscene, lewd, and lascivious"" or a ""malicious, scandalous and defamatory"" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court."
+2320,"John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware",James R. Adams,"James R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and member of that state’s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat. Adams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (“constitutional”) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, but that because he had prudential standing to the other provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the you.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge’s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing."
+945,Illinois ex rel. Madigan,"Telemarketing Associates, Inc.","VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on you.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment."
+1232,Indiana,Ahmad Edwards,"Ahmad Edwards was arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings. After his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran 509 you.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 you.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be ""literate, competent, and understanding"" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 you.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts the need for self-representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision."
+681,New Jersey,New York,"Under an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time."
+1292,Keith Haywood,"Curtis Drown, et al.","Keith Haywood, while incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York, was charged with several misbehavior reports in 2003 and 2004, including assaulting a corrections officer, failing a urinalysis test, and improperly soliciting mail. After being found guilty of these charges, Haywood commenced actions in state court against two of the corrections officers responsible for reviewing the claims under 42 you.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute protecting civil rights. He asserted that the guilty verdicts had been handed down without sufficient evidence, that the officers had tampered with the urinalysis test, and that they had conspired to fabricate the facts set forth in the misbehavior reports. The defendants moved to dismiss Haywood's claims, basing their argument on a New York law prohibiting civil claims such as Haywood's brought against corrections officers in their official capacities. Haywood responded by arguing that when Congress created Section 1983 it intended the statute to supersede any state laws contradicting it. Because Section 1983 allowed these claims, Haywood argued, the New York law prohibiting them violated the Supremacy Clause of the you.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of New York (the state's lowest-level court) agreed with the defendants and dismissed Haywood's claim based on the New York law. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that the Supremacy Clause permits states to deny enforcement of a federal right in a case where a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a neutral state rule regarding the courts' administration. Because Haywood's claim would be barred if brought under either Section 1983 or an applicable state law, the New York law barring the claim was valid and neutral and did not violate the Supremacy Clause."
+2006,Illinois ex rel. Vashti McCollum,"Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois","The case tested the principle of ""released time"", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
+643,Samuel Ocasio,United States,"Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was arrested in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop ( Majestic ). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing he unlawfully obtain cash or property under color of contract from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and then appealed by arguing that he could be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the police in Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, but the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio ’ s conviction."
+1638,Stephen D. McFadden,United States,"Stephen McFadden sold overstocked products on the Internet to augment his income. In 2011, McFadden noticed that a lot of businesses where he lived were selling a product known as ""bath salts,"" an aromatherapy product that emits a stimulating vapor when burned. After confirming that bath salts were not illegal, McFadden began selling them like his other products. He continued to sell them until he learned they had been placed on the list of substances that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibited. The government prosecuted McFadden under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, which allows substances not listed as ""controlled"" to be treated as illegal if the analogue has effects and a chemical make-up that are ""substantially similar"" to those listed in the CSA. At trial, McFadden argued that the state needed to prove that he was aware, or actively resisted finding out, that the bath salts were substantially similar to a controlled substance and constituted an analogue. Instead, the district court held that the state only needed to prove that the petitioner knew ""the products were intended for human consumption."" The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
+1096,Washington State Department of Licensing,"Cougar Den, Inc.","Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "" the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways. "" Cougar Den is a Yakama - owned fuel distributor that imports millions and gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $ 3. 6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state highways without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department ’ s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department ’ s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe ’ s right to privacy. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees from commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, The Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "" any trade, traveling, and importation "" by members of the Yakama tribe “ that requires the use of public roads, ” even those outside the reservation. Based on its interpretation, the state, s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes."
+917,National Labor Relations Board,"SW General, Inc.","In 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act ( FVRA ), which provided that, if a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms ( PAS "" ) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an “ acting officer ” for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB ), a PAS position, the President directed for Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months during his tenure, the President nominated himself for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals within Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians ( EMTs ), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “ longevity pay, ” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor management claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim the Acting General Counsel is serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee the the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant had for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon ’ s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA."
+2177,Fane Lozman,"The City of Riviera Beach, Florida","Fane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the “City”), where he was a vocal critic of the City’s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate the City’s approval of the plan due to insufficient public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman’s claim. On November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember’s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest Lozman. Lozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable because for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely. In February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. On appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury’s finding of probable because on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable because bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the district court’s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury’s probable because finding defeated Lozman’s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the lower court’s jury instructions regarding the City’s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues."
+1011,Charles Murphy,"Robert Smith, et al.","Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 you. S. C. § 1983 and other legal theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the District court awarded him attorney fees under 42 you. S. C. § 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state - law claims but that the Prison Litigation Reform Act required a 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state - law claims where the officials or employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which Charles Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 you. S. C. § 1997e ( d ) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does indeed have discretion to impose that maximum percentage."
+355,"Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.","The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.","Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low-income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a non-profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act. At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch , the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act."
+1,Dunn,Blumstein,"A Tennessee law required a one - year residence in the county and another two - month residence in the county as a requirement before voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had recently returned to Tennessee, challenged this legislation by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal district court."
+1057,Jay Shawn Johnson,California,"NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a ""strong likelihood"" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show ""strong likelihood"" that the challenges were race-based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder. Johnson appealed and argued that the ""strong likelihood"" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference"" standard the you.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The you.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case."
+418,United States,Kokinda,"Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits ""soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises."" They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no significant interest in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional."
+1149,Powerex Corp.,"Reliant Energy Services, Inc., et al.","The state of California suffered an energy crisis in 2001. Citizens filed suit against energy company Reliant Energy Services et al (Reliant) for conspiring to fix energy price levels. Reliant filed cross-claims against multiple energy companies and regulatory agencies involved in the price fixing, including the Canadian company Powerex Corporation. PowerEx exported surplus Canadian hydropower on behalf of its owner, the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro). Since BC Hydro was a governmental corporation and Powerex was its subsidiary, both argued that they were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). FSIA defines a foreign sovereign as an ""organ of a foreign state"" (28 you.S.C. Section 1603(b)). Reliant claimed that the two companies were exempt from FSIA sovereign immunity because their commercial activity had a ""direct effect"" on California energy markets. A District Court ruled that BC Hydro was a foreign sovereign, but PowerEx was not. The District Court issued a remand order sending the case back to state court. Powerex appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it operated for the ""public interest"" as an instrumentality of the government. The Ninth Circuit held that PowerEx was not a ""foreign sovereign"" because BC Hydro, not the Canadian government, owned PowerEx's shares."
+563,"O'Hare Truck Service, Inc.",City of Northlake,"O'Hare Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of because. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the because of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+899,Demore,Kim,"Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC section 1226(c), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an aggravated felony. After Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged him with being deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. Kim filed a habeas corpus action challenging section 1226(c) on the ground that his detention violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court granted Kim's petition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest."
+1151,"Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office",Erik Brunetti,"Erik Brunetti owns the American brand “ fuct, ” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent - to - use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2 ( a ) of the Lanham Act, as it comprised immoral or disgusting matter ( the pronunciation'“ fuct ” sounds like a vulgar insult ) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to its Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney ’ s failure to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that although the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2 ( a ) of the Lanham Act, that section ’ s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech."
+799,David Anthony Taylor,United States,"David Anthony Taylor was a member with the “ Southwest Goonz, ” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor ’ s second trial, after his indictment resulted in a hung vote, the government moved to prevent Taylor from giving evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot breach the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government ’ s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the condition that the government did not present compelling evidence that his robbery affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor ’ s motion, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned the conviction."
+462,Bray,Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,"Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 you.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive ""any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."" The protesters had sought to deny women their ""right to abortion"" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim."
+327,Julie Heimeshoff,Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores,"Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal - Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and depression. By June, her condition was so severe, she had to leave hospital. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed the claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. ( Hartford ) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several attempts by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claims for a final decision in November 2007. Heimsehoff sued in district court, finding that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the claim as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three - year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
+1142,Jason J. Mont,United States of America,"Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug - related offenses in 2005 and sentenced at 120 months ’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 21, 2012, so after his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 20, 2017. While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state - law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state - court charges in exchange for a predetermined six - year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont ’ s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont ’ s state - court conviction, sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months ’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state - court convictions. Mont challenged the district court ’ s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction."
+1358,Jeffrey Skilling,United States,"A Texas federal district court convicted Jeffrey Skilling of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was the former C.E.O. of Enron Corp. On appeal, he argued that the government prosecuted him under an invalid legal theory and that the jury was biased. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated Mr. Skilling's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court first held that the government's theory under the ""Honest Services"" fraud statute was valid. It reasoned that it was immaterial whether Enron's board of directors knew or even tacitly approved of Mr. Skilling's fraudulent conduct when he withheld information that would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Moreover, the court held that while Mr. Skilling proved that there was sufficient inflammatory and pervasive pretrial publicity to require a presumption that prejudice tainted the jury, the government met its burden to show that jury screening was adequate, and that the district court did not empanel any juror who was unconstitutionally prejudiced."
+948,Georgia,"John Ashcroft, Attorney General","Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The you.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan."
+1064,Russell Bucklew,"Anne Precythe, et al.","Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew is scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri ’ s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical disorder from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely because him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood. ” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state ’ an execution method “ presents a risk that is sure or very likely to because serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers, ” and failed to propose “ an alternative that was feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain, ” neither of which steps are required by US Supreme Court rules. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew ’ s request for discovery, finding that it felt inappropriate to “ assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties. "" Reviewing the district court ’ s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court."
+131,Judge Harold D. Stump,Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman,"In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity."
+1279,United States Patent and Trademark Office,Booking.com B.V.,"Book. com operates a website on which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING. COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking. com filed with the you. S. Patent and Trademark Office ( FCC ) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING. COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark. Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “ distinctive ” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking. com ’ s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING. COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration ( and hotel reservation services, among other ). The Lanham Act also allows protection for “ descriptive ” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking. com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection. Booking. com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking. com ’ s applications. The Board found that BOOKING. COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “ booking service generically refers to “ a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room ” and “. com ” indicates a commercial transaction, the Board reasoned that consumers would use the resulting term “ BOOKING. COM ” to refer to an online reservation service for travel — the very services proposed in Booking. com ’ s applications. The district court appealed, ruling Booking. com had acquired secondary meaning. A panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal."
+1564,Justus C. Rosemond,United States,"In August 2007, Justus Rosemond and Ronald Joseph met Ricardo Gonzalez in a Tooele, Utah, park to sell him a pound of marijuana. When Gonzalez attempted to take the marijuana without paying, he was fired upon while fleeing. The government charged Justus Rosemond with several drug-and firearm-related offenses. At trial, the government alleged that Rosemond was either the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter. The jury convicted Rosemond on all charges.On appeal, Rosemond argued that the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the aiding and abetting theory were insufficient and that the jury must find that Rosemond ""intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of a firearm"" to convict. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Rosemond's conviction."
+112,DaimlerChrysler Corp.,"Charlotte Cuno, et al.","As part to Ohio's capital development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo with exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $ 300 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio also violated the Commerce Clause of the you. S. Constitution by offering state tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, while on appeal a panel of one Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce."
+1005,"Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr.",Washington,"Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds ""substantial and compelling reasons"" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an ""exceptional"" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with ""deliberate cruelty."" Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review."
+1682,Wiener,United States,"By the War Claims Act of 1948, Congress established the War Claims Commission for the purpose of adjudicating claims for compensating internees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations. Wiener was confirmed as a member of the Commission by President Truman in 1950. In 1953, when President Eisenhower requested Wiener's resignation, Wiener refused. Eisenhower subsequently appointed a substitute to Wiener's post. The Commission was abolished in 1954, and Wiener brought a claim to recover his salary from the time of his removal to the last day of the Commission's existence."
+918,National Labor Relations Board,"SW General, Inc.","In 1998, Congress approved the Federal Vacancies Reform Act ( FVRA ), which provided that, if any position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms ( PAS position ) becomes vacant, the first assistant director takes office as an “ acting officer ” for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of its National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB ), a PAS member, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him to the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians ( EMTs ), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “ longevity pay, ” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration from one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the you. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon ’ s tenure as in General Counsel violated the FVRA."
+793,Calcano-Martinez et al.,INS,"The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising ""jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of ""a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony."" Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas action."
+32,"Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover",United States,"Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud a United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district attorney held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 4 ( b ). There was insufficient evidence other than that charge of juror misconduct. Tanner & Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine at the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the you. S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing."
+647,Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson,Community Bank of Raymore,"Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson ’ s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC ( PHC ). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore ( Community ) made four loans totaling more than $ 2, 000, 000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans could be on default, accelerated the loans, and denied payment. Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their debts because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted payment based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ( AC ). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands ’ loans, could not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
+424,Louis B. Bullard,"Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank","Louis Bullard raised $ 387, 000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was backed by the actual property and then put the money in the home loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy panel rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated that order was appealable because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over "" judicial decisions, judgments, orders and decrees. """
+1070,"National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al.","Brand X Internet Services, et al.","Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of ""telecommunications service"" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a ""telecommunications service."""
+1996,United States,F. W. Darby Lumber Company and Fred W. Darby,"In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause."
+1159,Scott Louis Panetti,"Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division","Scott Louis Panetti was convicted of the murder of his wife's parents and sentenced to death. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, claiming mental illness. The Supreme Court had ruled in Ford v. Wainwright that execution of the mentally ill is barred by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. A psychiatric evaluation found that Panetti believed that the State was ""in league with the forces of evil"" and was executing him in order to ""prevent him from preaching the Gospel."" However, doctors also found Panetti to be aware of his crime, of the fact that he was to be executed, and of the State's stated reason for executing him. The District Court concluded that he was sufficiently sane to be executed. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's argument that an inmate cannot be executed if he lacks a rational understanding of the State's motivation for the execution. The Court of Appeals instead relied on Justice Lewis Powell's concurrence in Ford, holding that an inmate need only have an awareness of the State's reason for execution, not necessarily a rational understanding of it."
+275,National Labor Relations Board,Noel Canning,"The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five-year terms. In 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi-Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 (Union). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning. Noel Canning appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress."
+490,United States,Eugene Frank Robel,"Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “defense facility”. The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the you.S. Supreme Court."
+2163,Terrence Byrd,United States of America,"Terrence Byrd was driving on a divided four-lane highway near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was pulled over allegedly for violating a state law requiring drivers to use the left lane for passing only. Recognizing the car as a rental car, the officers asked Byrd for his license and rental agreement, which he had difficulty locating. Once he did locate them, the officers noted that the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver, and when they ran his identification, they noted that he was using an alias and had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey. Despite the warrant’s indication that it did not request extradition from other jurisdictions, the officers attempted to contact authorities in New Jersey to confirm they did not seek Byrd’s arrest and extradition, allegedly following protocol for such situations. The officers experienced difficulty with their communications, however, and returned to Byrd’s car, where they asked him to exit the vehicle and about his warrant and alias. The officers asked whether Byrd had anything illegal in the car and then requested Byrd’s consent to search the car, noting that they did not actually need his consent because he was not listed on the rental agreement. The officers allege that Byrd gave his consent, but Byrd disputes this contention. The subsequent search turned up heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car. At trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the initial stop, the extension of the stop, and the search. The district court determined that the violation of the traffic law justified the initial stop and that the extension of the stop was justified by the officers’ developing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Byrd maintains that he did not consent to the search, so the issue remains whether he needed to consent at all—that is, whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. If he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the officers’ search of the vehicle did not require his consent. There is a circuit split as to whether an unlisted driver of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, and the Third Circuit (where the district court in this case sits) has held that such a driver does not. Thus, the district court denied Byrd’s motion to suppress, and the Third Circuit, reviewing the factual questions for clear error and the legal question de novo, affirmed the judgment of the district court."
+736,West Coast Hotel Company,"Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife","Per Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $ 14. 50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, earned an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the balance between minimum wages paid to workers and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for her hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital ( 1923 ), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women."
+973,California Public Employees' Retirement System,"ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.","Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as an global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2006 and January 2008, the company raised over $ 31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees ’ Retirement System ( CPERS ), The oldest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed another putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund ’ s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved with the first suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it decided to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
+2321,"Department of Homeland Security, et al.",Vijayakumar  Thuraissigiam,"Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. Thuraissigiam entered the United States via its southern border, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers arrested him and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. Thuraissigiam indicated a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, but an asylum officer determined he had not established a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal. A supervisor affirmed the officer’s finding, and an immigration judge affirmed it as well in a check-box decision. Thuraissigiam filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that his expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 8 you.S.C. § 1252(e) did not authorize jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims and rejecting his argument that the removal process to which he was subjected effectively suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the Suspension Clause. A panel of the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Because the administrative scheme governing credible fear determinations in this context is “meager,” and § 1252(a)(2) disallows judicial review of whether DHS complied with the procedures, the process does not meet minimum constitutional requirements."
+601,"Wesley Harris, et al.","Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.","In 2013, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were under - populated in Democratic - leaning districts and over - populated in Republican - leaning ones, arguing therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection rights of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission found that the population deviations were the result of attempts to compliance with the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor for the Commission and held that the redrawn districts represented a good faith effort and comply with the Voting Rights Act."
+901,Pierce County,Guillen,"The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials ""compiled or collected"" for purposes of the program ""shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding."" In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution."
+2085,Bobby James Moore,Texas,"In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder for the shooting of James McCarble, a seventy-year-old store clerk, in Houston, Texas. Moore was sentenced to death, and his conviction and sentence were both affirmed on appeal. After a federal court granted habeas corpus relief, a new punishment hearing occurred in 2001, and Moore was again sentenced to the death penalty. His sentence was again affirmed on appeal. Moore sought state habeas relief and argued that the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia should apply to his case; therefore, because he was intellectually disabled, he was exempt from execution. The habeas court granted relief based on the Atkins argument. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, however, reversed and held that Moore had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the requisite intellectual disability for the Atkins precedent to apply based on Texas case law that used a 1992 definition of intellectual disability."
+293,Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley,United States,"In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2005, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these cases was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $ 500, 000, which the Kaleys planned to use to pay their defense attorneys. Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring nor disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prevented them from hiring defense attorneys in defense of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the you. S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited this to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys'offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court decided to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that she should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision."
+1459,Billy Joe Reynolds,United States,"Billy Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is ""actually innocent"" of violating SORNA's registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction."
+1244,"State of Georgia, et al.","Public.Resource.Org, Inc.","The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is the compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “ consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, chapter notations, editor ’ s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General Of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other such references. ” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “ shall be merged with annotations, ” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves don't have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., a operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. Public. Resource. Org ( PRO ) is a non - profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital materials to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites. The Commission sent PRO several cease - and - desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia ’ s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA of denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in, Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not the domain material. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “ official ” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created — finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations."
+905,Archer,Warner,"In 1991, Leonard and Arlene Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the sale. In settling the lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy ""to the extent"" it is ""for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud."" The Bankruptcy Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
+935,"Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General",James Garcia Dimaya,"James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the you.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial."
+887,Bassam Yacoub Salman,United States,"Maher Kara joined Citigroup ’ s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, directly about certain aspects of his job. From 2004 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman ’ s sister while Michael began to share some of the insider information he learned from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother - in - law, Ahmed Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman ’ s fortune reached $ 2. 1 million. Salman was charged for conspiracy to commit securities fraud for insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was really insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on personal information."
+95,"Republic of Austria, et al.",Maria V. Altmann,"Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six paintings from the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving ""rights to property taken in violation of international law."" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively (that is, to actions taken before it was passed) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity. The district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed."
+108,United States,Freddie J. Booker,"In Blakely v. Washington ( 2004 ) the you. S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase their sentence beyond the maximum range. Following you. S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on what the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the statute exceeded the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge. In that decision, you. S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge could sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188 - 235 months in prison based upon facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the you. S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases."
+1044,Smith,Texas,"Before the Texas jury in Smith's murder trial reached its sentence, the judge issued a ""nullification instruction."" The judge told the jury to consider mitigating evidence when filling out the verdict form. That form consisted of two ""yes"" or ""no"" questions: whether Smith acted deliberately and whether he posed a future danger. The judge told jurors that even if they believed the state had proved that the answer to both questions was ""yes,"" jurors should answer ""no"" to at least one of them if they believed the death sentence should not be imposed because of the mitigating evidence. The jury answered ""yes"" to both questions and sentenced Smith to death. Smith lost his appeal in state court."
+479,Wisconsin,Mitchell,"On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed."
+370,United States Catholic Conference,"Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.","Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. and a collection of tax-paying and tax-exempt abortion rights supporters (ARM) sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferences). ARM alleged that the Conferences participated in political activities in violation of you.S. laws governing tax-exempt organizations and that this participation created an unfair advantage over other, rule-abiding tax-exempt groups and infringed upon the plaintiffs’ ability to participate in the political process as voters. After the court granted the Conferences motion to be dismissed as parties to the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ARM sought financial documents and other information from the Conferences to support their claims against the remaining defendants. When the Conferences refused to comply, the district court held them in civil contempt. On appeal, the Conferences contended that ARM lacked standing to bring its case against the government officials and, therefore, the court did not have the power to issue the contempt citation under Article III. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and held that witnesses may challenge a contempt citation only on the grounds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute."
+1126,"Michael Hartman, Frank Kormann, Pierce McIntosh, Norman Robbins, and Robert Edwards","William G. Moore, Jr.","William Moore sued six postal inspectors in federal court, alleging that they had brought criminal charges against him in retaliation for lobbying efforts he undertook on behalf of his company. The inspectors claimed that they had qualified immunity (that is, because they filed the charges in their official capacity on good faith, they could not be sued) and also that the case should be dismissed because they had probable because to charge Moore. The district court sided with Moore, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that, even with probable because, they must show that that the prosecution was not motivated by a desire for retaliation."
+255,Bruce J. Abramski,United States,"In November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (""ATF"") on which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person. In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the false statement about a ""material fact"" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski. Abramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski withheld a ""material fact"" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."
+1254,State of Kansas,Donnie Ventris,"In January 2003, Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend entered the apartment of Ernest Hicks who was subsequently robbed and killed. Mr. Ventris was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated battery by the District Court of Montgomery County in Kansas. To rebut the testimony of Mr. Ventris at trial, the State relied on the testimony of his former cell mate, Johnnie Doser. The government recruited Mr. Doser to keep his ""ear open"" and listen for incriminating statements made by Mr. Ventris. Mr. Ventris appealed claiming this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas. The court held that ""[w]ithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the admission of the defendant's uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State agent violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights."" It reasoned that the fact finding responsibilities of the trial court do not outweigh individuals' constitutional rights."
+169,"Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York","The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.","In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non - public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association ( CHA ), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( OCC ), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks'compliance with activities who fall under the National Bank Act ( NBA ) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act ( FHA ) provided an exception to the OCC'S sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction that stopped the Attorney General's investigation. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different counsel, to do so. Here, that court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA gave an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication."
+28,United States,Russell,"At the conclusion of an undercover drug investigation, Richard Russell was arrested by Washington police and eventually convicted in a district court for drug manufacturing crimes. Russell challenged his conviction as the result of unconstitutional entrapment practices, since an undercover agent supplied him with an essential ingredient of his drug manufacturing operation. On appeal from an adverse Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari."
+216,"City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX",Federal Communications Commission,"Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this delay, the local approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission ( "" FCC "" ) to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long such zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following "" reasonable time "" limits for zoning requests : 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures. The local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long - standing interpretation doctrine of interpretation, agencies should always respond to an agency's interpretation of a particular law. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred before the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation."
+863,Carey,Saffold,"The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, but excludes from that period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. In 1990, Tony Saffold was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. Saffold filed a state habeas petition in California seven days before the federal deadline. Five days after the state trial court denied his petition, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. Four and one-half months after that petition was denied, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence. The Federal District Court dismissed Saffold's subsequent federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that the federal statute of limitations was not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next because no application was pending during that time. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Saffold's petition was timely because the State Supreme Court based its decision not only on lack of diligence, but also on the merits."
+1965,Trustees of Dartmouth College,William H. Woodward,"In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees."
+581,Arkansas,Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas,"The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal ""district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."" In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 you.S. 355, the you.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the you.S. sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered corporate financial institutions organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the you.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
+486,Cardinal Chemical Company,"Morton International, Inc.","Acting upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical (""Cardinal"") violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton International (""Morton"") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of its validity counterclaim and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
+163,"Roosevelt Green, Jr.",Georgia,"On December 12, 1976, Roosevelt Green, Jr. and Carzell Moore allegedly raped and murdered Teresa Allen outside Macon, Georgia. Green and Moore were tried separately, and each was convicted and sentenced to death. At Green's trial, the defense introduced the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified at Moore's trial. According to Pasby, Moore admitted to him that he had killed Allen alone. The trial court refused to allow Pasby's testimony, considering it to be hearsay under Georgia law. On appeal, Green argued the refusal to allow Pasby's testimony constituted a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court of Georgia denied his claim."
+1038,"Ricky Bell, Warden",Gregory Thompson,"A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the you.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate."
+2042,Michael Ross,Shaidon Blake,"On June 21, 2007, Lieutenants Michael Ross and James Madigan were escorting Shaidon Blake from his cell when Madigan shoved Blake several times. The incident escalated to Madigan punching Blake in the face several times with a key ring wrapped around his fingers while Ross held him. Blake was then taken to the medical unit and later diagnosed with nerve damage. Blake reported the incident to senior corrections officers, and the Internal Investigative Unit of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services conducted an investigation and issued a formal report. The formal report determined that Madigan had used excessive force against Blake and that Blake was not at fault in any way. Blake subsequently sued Ross and Madigan in addition to two supervisors and three government entities under 42 you.S.C. § 1983 and argued that they violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force. Nearly two years after Blake initially filed the suit, Ross filed an amended answer to the complaint that alleged that Blake had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required. Ross also moved for summary judgment based on the same argument, and the district court granted the motion. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was met in this case. Because the internal investigation provided the correction officials time and opportunity to address the complaints internally and Blake reasonably believed that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by participating in an internal investigation, the requirements for the “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA were met."
+130,BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles fired African-American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part because of a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non-African American employees less harshly. EEOC filed suit against BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado was racially biased, it dismissed the case because the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado's discriminatory bias. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case to trial. The Tenth Circuit cited the subordinate bias theory of liability, which holds a company liable for a discriminatory firing even if the employee who made the actual decision to fire was not the employee harboring racial bias."
+1229,James Erin McKinney,State of Arizona,"By way of relevant background, James McKinney ’ s childhood was “ horrific ” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse — also detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half - brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before state juries. McKinney ’ s jury found him guilty of two counts of first - degree murder ( without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder ), and Hedlund ’ s jury found him guilty of one count of first - degree murder and one count of second - degree murder. At McKinney ’ s capital sentencing hearing ( before a judge ), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “ resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered. ” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence may trigger McKinney ’ s childhood trauma and produce “ diminished capacity. ” The trial judges credited the psychologist ’ s testimony, and under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non - statutory mitigating evidence which the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney ’ s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney ’ s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied the, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and of that the Arizona courts had violated the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 you. S. 104 ( 1982 ), by refusing to consider McKinney ’ s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a, penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney ’ s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court ; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the you. S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 you. S. 584 ( 2002 ), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘ final ’ before the you. S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring."
+1851,Glen A. Williams et al.,"James A. Rhodes, Governor of Ohio","To be placed on the ballot in a presidential election, Ohio law required a new political party obtain voter signatures totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Both the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party sought ballot access in Ohio for the 1968 presidential election. The American Independent Party, formed by supporters of George C. Wallace, obtained the requisite number of signatures but failed to file its petition for ballot access prior to the February 7, 1968 deadline. The Socialist Labor Party, which until 1948 had been on the ballot, failed to collect enough signatures and was also kept off the ballot. The parties filed separate suits in you.S. District Court against several state officials, including Governor James A. Rhodes, contending that being kept off the ballot violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases were consolidated, and the court ruled that each party must be given write-in access but did not require the state to print the parties' candidates' names on the ballot. The American Independent Party requested and was granted an injunction forcing the state to add the party's candidates to the ballot while the case was on appeal. The Socialist Labor Party filed a similar request, but did so much later, and was denied primarily to avoid confusion in requiring the reprinting of another set of ballots."
+891,"Juan Bravo-Fernandez, et al.",United States,"In May 2005, Juan Bravo - Fernandez, the owner of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez - Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo - Fernandez and Martinez - Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo - Fernandez ’ s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez - Maldonado ’ s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the Federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose - - in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the state bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to do. The appellate court remanded the case. Based on this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court ’ s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for The Travel Act and conspiracy have prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury of already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The of court denied the,, and the to court affirmed."
+761,West Virginia State Board of Education,Walter Barnette,"In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students becoming a mandatory part of school instruction. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school as non - compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used to physically active children, and their teachers faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency."
+136,Keith Lance et al.,"Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State","After the 2000 census, the you. S. Congress increased Colorado ’ s representation in the you. S. House of Representatives from six congressmen to seven. The Colorado state legislature failed to determine the districts before the 2002 elections, so the state courts redrew the districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district map, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado state constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and therefore the courts ’ 2002 redistricting took precedence with the redistricting by the state legislature. Keith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district court and argued because the Colorado Supreme Court ’ s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I of the you. S. Constitution, and those individuals ’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file for redress of grievances. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Lance appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court, which held that the federal courts did have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue preclusion, since Lance is an individual citizen not directly affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to the you. S. Supreme Court."
+868,"Joseph P. Murr, et al.","Wisconsin, et al.","The parents of Joseph P. Brown and his siblings ( the Murrs ) purchased two adjacent lots ( Lots E and F ) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately. 98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs ’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County ’ s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance defined the individual development and sale between adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified, if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs ’ application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the city and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property that deprived them of “ all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot. ” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property."
+1195,Andre Martello Barton,"William P. Barr, Attorney General","A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 you.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.”"
+1978,Joseph Lochner,New York,"The state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process."
+497,Dee Farmer,"Edward Brennan, Warden","Dee Farmer, a biological male, underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants and underwent unsuccessful sex reassignment surgery. Farmer was convicted and sentenced to prison on federal criminal charges. Prison medical personnel diagnosed Farmer as a transsexual. Farmer was generally kept separate from the general male population, in part because of Farmer’s misconduct, but also because of safety concerns. Farmer was transferred to the you.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute and placed in the general male population in accordance with prison policy. Within two weeks, a cellmate allegedly beat and raped Farmer. Farmer sued in federal district court, alleging that prison officials deliberately and indifferently failed to protect a prisoner. This violated Farmer’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer sought damages and an injunction against future incarceration in any prison. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, noting that Farmer never complained or expressed any safety concerns prior to the incident. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed."
+817,Texas,Cobb,"In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged."
+517,Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.,Dobson,"In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime ""Termite Protection Plan"" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate."
+262,United States,Esmail Yermian,"In 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. He signed a certificate stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” Government investigators later discovered that Yermian’s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information. At his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had knowledge that a federal agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction."
+1147,Gary Davenport et al.,Washington Education Association,"In some states, public sector labor unions are allowed to collect fees from non-union members. The Supreme Court has ruled that unions may use these fees for political purposes, but only if the non-union member does not object. Washington state also has a ""paycheck protection"" law, RCW 42.17.760, which requires unions to obtain specific permission from non-members before using their fees for political activity. Davenport, a non-union teacher, sued the Washington Education Association (WEA) teacher's union for violating the law. WEA appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that Washington's requirement that unions get prior permission was an unconstitutional burden on the unions' First Amendment right to associate for political purposes. Davenport countered that his own First Amendment rights were being violated when his fees went to political causes he did not agree with. The state Court of Appeals ruled in favor of WEA. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the burden must lie on the nonmember to assert his rights and object to the political fees."
+446,United States,Fordice,"After 17 years of litigation, Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral policies to dismantle its de jure segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. Fordice."
+964,United States,Billy Jo Lara,"Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer. A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion. A panel of the you.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority."
+314,Murray,Carrier,"Clifford Carrier was arrested on charges of rape and abduction in 1977. Before his trial, Carrier's attorney filed a motion asking the court to give him access to the victim's statements about her assailants, their vehicle, and the location of the rape. The court rejected the motion. Carrier was subsequently convicted, and his attorney filed an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The appeal did not mention the trial judge's decision about the victim's statements. That appeal was rejected. A year later, Carrier filed a new appeal in state court claiming that he had been denied his 14th Amendment right to Due Process by the trial judge's refusal to grant him access to the victim's statements. The court dismissed his case, however, citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21, which states that claims left out of an initial appeal cannot be raised in later appeals. Because Carrier's attorney had not mentioned the victim's statements in the first appeal, Carrier could not raise them in the second. Carrier then filed a similar appeal in federal district court, again citing the 14th Amendment Due Process claims. The state argued that the appeal was procedural barred because it dealt with issues not raised during the initial appeal. Carrier countered that the omission of the claim had been his attorney's mistake (rather than a tactical decision), and that it should therefore not be held against him. The federal district court rejected the argument, dismissing the case. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, finding that the omission had been the attorney's mistake and therefore represented a failure of the attorney to provide effective counsel in that particular part of the case (though the representation as a whole was not unconstitutionally poor). The panel stated that because the omission resulted from ineffective counsel, it should not be held against Carrier."
+1181,Kevin C. Rotkiske,"Paul Klemm, et al.","Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his attorneys referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but became unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst of Rotkiske, someone in that location accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA ). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim was time - barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “ within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. ” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “ discovery rule, ” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “ at the beginning of a limiting period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury. ” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appeal panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the ruling of the district court."
+250,"Fifth Third Bancorp, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer, et al.","John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss."
+1207,Exxon Shipping Company et al.,Grant Baker et al.,"The Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989 while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated compensatory damages at $287 million, and then awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court's denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee."
+823,"W. Kevin Hughes, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al.","Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al.","The Federal Power Act ( FPA ) was passed in 1935 to regulate federal electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ( FERC ) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, ( PJM ) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, ( CPV ) won the bid. Maryland EnergyPlus, LLC, ( LLC ) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM - regulated market. The district courts held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal oversight of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with and ’ the lawsuit against PPL and the other existing power plants."
+187,"Russell Bruesewitz, et al.","Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.","Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six - month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three - years - old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The couple's petition was denied. Three years later, by 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of drugs used in Hannah's inoculation from the market. The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safe vaccine and should be held accountable for any harm caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth for lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed."
+726,Roy Olmstead et al.,United States,"Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without congressional approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's home ( where he maintained an office ) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted using documents obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along a Green case. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally recorded wire - tapped conversations, for conspiracy To violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States."
+886,Bassam Yacoub Salman,United States,"Maher Kara joined Citigroup's healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older son, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. from 2004 to 2010 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for securities trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman ’ s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but only through his brother - in - law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman ’ s account reached $ 2. 1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trades in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a fair trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the C. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information."
+1180,Philip Morris USA,"Mayola Williams, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse D. Williams, Deceased","Jesse Williams died of lung cancer at age 67 after a life spent smoking three packs of Marlboro cigarettes per day. His widow sued Phillip Morris, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes, alleging that the company had engaged in a deliberate, wide-spread campaign of misinformation on the dangers of smoking. The jury found for Williams and awarded her $821,485.50 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial judge found the punitive damages excessive and reduced them to $32 million. Under the Supreme Court's decision BMW v. Gore, punitive damages must be reasonably related to the harm done to the plaintiff, but larger punitive damage awards may be appropriate if the defendant displayed reprehensible conduct. Citing Gore, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million award, holding that Phillip Morris's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant the large amount. The Oregon Supreme Court declined to take the case. However, the you.S. Supreme Court sent the case back for consideration in light of State Farm v. Campbell, which held that punitive damages can normally only be as much as nine times greater than compensatory damages. The Oregon Court of Appeals again affirmed the $79.5 million award, ruling that the reprehensibility of Phillip Morris's conduct justified the larger ratio. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the decision. Phillip Morris appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court had unreasonably exceeded federal guidelines on punitive damages. Phillip Morris also argued that it was unfair to punish the company for its actions toward other smokers who were not parties to the suit."
+542,Guy Rufus Huddleston,United States,"Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32, 000 old videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market price. Huddleston was later convicted with possessing and selling stolen video tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court also instructed the defense that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston ’ prior knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the decision and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court for Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard."
+1122,Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation,"Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.","Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a nonprofit organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles and websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall - Street. com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall - Street was required to register all of its content produced by Fourth Estate from its account before cancelling its account. However, when Wall - Street cancelled its account, websites continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright violation, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “ registration ” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of claims “ register the claim, ” and that step had actually occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
+228,"Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General","AU Optronics Corporation, et al.","On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a pair of liquid crystal display ( LCD ) manufacturers and claimed, they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. Beginning June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ). Class action, mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court in the CAFA. The State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court granted a motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the lawsuit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable."
+1346,Florida,Georgia,"This is an ongoing continuing and original dispute, all facts of which is explained here. In particular, the case involves a land - related dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola - Chattahoochee - Flint River Basin."
+2013,Spotswood Thomas Bolling et al.,C. Melvin Sharpe et al.,"The D.C. Board of Education denied a petition by a group of parents in Anacostia to racially integrate John Phillip Sousa Junior High School. The following year, in 1950, the parents sought admission to the all-white school for 11 African-American children. When the request was again denied by the Board, a Howard University law professor brought a lawsuit. The claim was dismissed by the trial court."
+569,Matsushita Elec. Industrial Company,Epstein,"In 1990, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. made a tender offer for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which resulted in Matsushita's acquisition of MCA. Subsequently, two lawsuits followed. First, a class action filed in Delaware, alleged that, among other things, Matsushita and MCA conspired violating Delaware law. The second suit, filed in federal court, alleged that Matsushita's tender offer violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission Rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts in such suits. After Matsushita won the federal case, and while it was on appeal, the parties to the state action reached a settlement. The class-action settlement stated that class members who did not opt out of the class would waive all claims in connection with the tender offer, including those asserted in the federal action. As members of both state and federal plaintiff classes, who neither opted out of the settlement class nor appeared to contest the settlement or the representation of the class, pursued the federal appeal, Matsushita argued that the Delaware judgment was a bar to further prosecution under the Full Faith and Credit Act."
+336,"Mach Mining, LLC",Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"The Equal Employment Rights Commission ( EEOC ) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC ( Mach Mining ) denied her a job because of its gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable because to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants'behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to the suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made any sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate. Nonetheless, the court certified the question to its U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted, Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure - to - conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure - to - conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases."
+2167,Mark Janus,"American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al.","In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer. Illinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason."
+1987,Ozie Powell,Alabama,"Nine black youths -- described as, ""young, ignorant, and illiterate"" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama."
+354,City of Los Angeles,"Naranjibhai Patel, et al.","David and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code ( 1984 ) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The ordinance also authorizes police forces to inspect hotel records at any time without a special warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that businesses are "" closely regulated "" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections. The district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized "" closely regulated "" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels don't have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit later affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private "" papers "" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre - compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records."
+607,"Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board",Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,"Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ( Liberty Mutual ) operates a self - regulated employee health plan through a third - party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including self - insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information it required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third - party administrator, Liberty Mutual challenged the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1976 ( ERISA ) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the statute and held that it did not preempt the Vermont statute. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted the state legislation because the state statute ’ s claims were connected to the ERISA requirements and reports were preempted."
+550,Rutledge,United States,Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.
+2131,BNSF Railway Co.,"Kelli Tyrrell, Special Administrator for the Estate of Brent T. Tyrrell, Deceased, et al.","In March 2011, Robert Nelson was employed by BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) and sued the company for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) based on knee injuries sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court granted the motion and Nelson appealed. Brent Tyrrell also worked for BNSF and was allegedly exposed to carcinogens that caused him to develop ultimately fatal kidney cancer. In May 2014, Kelli Tyrell, the administrator of Brent’s estate, sued BNSF on Brent’s behalf under FELA for damages based on the injuries Brent sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF filed a motion to dismiss Tyrrell’s claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court denied the motion, and BNSF appealed. Both cases were filed in Montana state court because Supreme Court precedent for FELA decisions allows state courts jurisdiction to hear FELA cases solely due to the railroad doing business in the forum state. However, the injuries did not occur in Montana, and BNSF is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas. The Supreme Court of Montana consolidated both cases to decide whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law. BNSF argued that, under the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the state courts cannot exercise general jurisdiction. However, the Montana Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that, because BNSF does business in Montana, under FELA, Montana courts have personal jurisdiction. Montana’s Supreme Court also held that the state has general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law because BNSF “maintains substantial, continuous, and systematic” contacts with Montana."
+678,United States,Balsys,"Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari."
+2063,V.L.,"E.L., et al.","V.L. and E.L., a lesbian couple, were in a long-term relationship and raised three children together, of which E.L. was the biological parent. They eventually decided that V.L. should adopt the children and filed a petition to do so in Georgia state court, which granted the petition. In 2011, while living in Alabama, V.L. and E.L. ended their relationship. V.L. filed a petition in Alabama state court that alleged the E.L. had denied her access to her children and interfered with her parental rights. V.L. asked the Alabama state court to register the Georgia adoption judgment and order custody or visitation, which the court did, and E.L. appealed. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the lower court had failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held that the Georgia state court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an adoption order for V.L. while still recognizing E.L.’s parental rights and therefore the Alabama courts did not have to recognize that judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause."
+170,"Kenneth F. Fare, Acting Chief Probation Officer ",Michael C.,"Police arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder. Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses. Before questioning, policed informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 you.S. 436(1966). Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available. Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused. During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder. At trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney."
+1201,R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.,"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.","Aimee Stephens worked as a sales director at R. G. & G. R. Harris Heritage Homes, Inc., which is an closely held for - profit corporation that operates several historic homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens acted and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home ’ s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) claiming that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminated Stephen ’ s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex - based stereotypes. The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home ’ s termination of Stephens resulting in her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII."
+332,"Ohio Civil Rights Commission, et al.","Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., et al.","Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton) is a private, non-profit corporation formed by two churches for the purposes of providing private education at the primary and secondary levels. The corporate charter includes a section that requires employees to subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including a resolution of disputes through the “Biblical chain of command,” which means that all disputes must be handled internally, without redress in civil court. p> Linda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She agreed to the requirement of the corporate charter, including the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, Hoskinson informed her principal that she was pregnant and was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of the organization’s belief that mothers should stay home with their young children. Rather than appealing the decision internally, Hoskinson contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if her employment contract was not renewed. Hoskinson was suspended and then fired for going outside of the internal dispute resolution system. Hoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which filed an order that required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay. When Dayton did not respond, the Commission filed suit. Dayton responded by arguing that that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from having jurisdiction over the exercise of religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton sued the commission in district court and sought an injunction against the state proceedings because they violated the First Amendment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss and argued that federal abstention doctrines meant that the district court should let the administrative proceedings run their course. The district court refused the issue the injunction without addressing the abstention argument. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that allowing the Commission jurisdiction over Dayton would violate the First Amendment."
+806,Americold Realty Trust,"Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.","The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust ( Americold ) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because to the diversity of the trust ’ s board. No party challenged the propriety of its removal, and the district court dismissed the case solely upon its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing its issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate the diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust ’ s beneficiaries ( who are its shareholders ), not just the trustees."
+1476,"Greg McQuiggin, Warden",Floyd Perkins,"Floyd Perkins was convicted for the murder of Rodney Henderson in Michigan state court. The conviction became final on May 5, 1997 and under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Perkins should have filed a writ of habeas corpus by May 5, 1998, but he did not file until July 13, 2008 in the you.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Perkins claimed problems with the sufficiency of evidence, jury instruction, trial procedure, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. Perkins objected, arguing that the ""new evidence"" provision, which extends the statute of limitations to one year from when the ""factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence"", applied. In support of his objection, Perkins produced three previously unpresented affidavits that alluded to his innocence. The affidavits were signed in 1997, 1999 and 2002, so the district court denied the writ, holding that the ADEPA statute of limitations extension expired in 2003, one year after the last affidavit was signed. Perkins then asked the court to extend the statute of limitations because he was actually innocent of the crime. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the ""new"" evidence was not the type needed to pursue an actual innocence claim, and even if it were, Perkins did not pursue his claims with reasonable diligence. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the you.S. Supreme Court has held that tolling the statute of limitations requires parties to be reasonably diligent in pursuit of their claims, no court has analyzed whether actual innocence claims must be pursued in the same way."
+195,United States,"Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.","Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created ""outside basis,"" or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed. Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets. The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed ""solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners."" On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase. As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for ""all taxable years… that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction… in which a decision had not become final."" The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs."
+818,Major League Baseball Players Association,Garvey,"After the Major League Baseball Players Association filed grievances against the Major League Baseball Clubs, arbitrators found that the Clubs had colluded in the market for free-agent services in violation of the industry's collective bargaining agreement. To cover damages, the Association and Clubs entered into an agreement, which provided funds and framework to resolve individual player's claims. Steve Garvey, a first baseman, submitted a claim alleging that the San Diego Padres did not extend his contract to the 1988 and 1989 seasons due to collusion. Under the framework, the Association denied Garvey's claim. Agreeing, the arbitrator determined that Garvey did not receive a contract extension due to collusion and found that Garvey had not shown a specific offer of extension. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's denial of Garvey's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. The appellate court, under the Labor Management Relations Act, directed the arbitration panel to enter an award for Garvey because it concluded from the arbitration proceedings that an offer was made to Garvey and that it was withdrawn due to collision."
+1276,United States Patent and Trademark Office,Booking.com B.V.,"Booking. com operates a website on which customers can make travel and online reservations and has used the name BOOKING. COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking. com filed with the you. S. Patent and Trademark Office ( USPTO ) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING. COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark. Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “ distinctive ” still be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected travel. com ’ s applications, finding that generic marks were not protectable because BOOKING. COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration ( online hotel reservation services, among others ). The Lanham Act also allows protection for “ descriptive ” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in our minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking. com had tried to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection. Booking. com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking. com ’ s applications. The Board found that BOOKING. COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “ booking ” generically refers to “ a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel permit or stay in a hotel. ” and “. com ” indicates a commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term “ BOOKING. COM ” to refer to an online reservation service for travel — the very services proposed in Booking. com ’ s applications. The district court reversed, ruling Booking. com had acquired secondary in. A panel of the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal."
+2175,Michael N. Currier,Commonwealth of Virginia,"Michael N. Currier was indicted by a single grand jury and charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, the defense and prosecution agreed to sever the firearm charge from the grand larceny and burglary charges. The case proceeded to trial on the burglary and grand larceny charges, and a jury acquitted Currier of both charges. When the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to try Currier on the remaining charge of felon in possession of a firearm, he objected that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial. Notwithstanding his objections, Currier was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Currier filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, and the trial court denied his motion. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s conviction, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia."
+622,Jorge Luna Torres,"Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General","In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( INS ) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “ alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. ” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he was a new residence convicted of an aggravated felony ; the Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) had already held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the original ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres ’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the BIA ’ s ruling and concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute ’ s interstate commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres ’ petition for cancellation of the removal order."
+141,Jose Ernesto Medellin,State of Texas,"Jose Medellin, a Mexican immigrant, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating on the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post - conviction argument arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to name his relatives. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court ( see Medellin v. Dretke ), Sánchez's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) holding that the you. S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals ( including Medellin ) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez - Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also obtained a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with an ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez - Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law - making power of allocated to him by the Constitution."
+140,"American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.","Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.","During a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the Board’s order."
+549,South Carolina,Baker,"In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act ( TEFRA ). The Act removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long - term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. Coastal Carolina declared that both bearer or registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer'd Loan and Trust Co ( 1895 ). The Federal government claimed that the Act did not increase the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation ; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt."
+576,Raines,Byrd,"Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court."
+30,"California, et al.","Robert LaRue, et al.","After receiving reports of the type of sexual activity occurring on the premises of licensed liquor sellers, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control promulgated a series of regulations pertaining to the conduct on such licensed premises. The appellees, a group of holders of various liquor licenses, sought discretionary review of the new regulations. The district court held that the regulations unconstitutionally limited freedom of expression."
+718,Amoco Production Company,Southern Ute Indian Tribe,"Land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term ""coal"" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term ""coal"" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas."
+1577,"Lori Scialabba, Acting Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al.","Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio, et al.","The respondents are all immigrants to the United States and are considered lawful permanent residents. At various times each of the respondents applied for family-sponsored visas. However, because of the delays caused by visa quotas and serious backlogs in the you.S. immigration system meant that all of their children had turned twenty-one and, based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), had ""aged out"" of eligibility for any derivative child-visas. As a result, their visa applications converted from child-applications to adult-applications and were moved to the bottom of the adult-application list, which potentially added years to their wait to receive a visas. In 2009, after the Board of Immigration Appeals converted several child visa petitions to adult petitions, the respondents filed two cases in federal district court in the you.S. District Court for the Southern District of California asking hat the court order the Board to retain use of their children's original visa filing dates. That court denied the request. The respondents then appealed to the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, the petitioners argued that certain provisions in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) should allow the use of the children's original application dates for certain visa applications. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the language of both CSPA and the INA allow the child-status petition to convert to an adult petition while still retaining the original date when the visa petition was filed."
+1100,"Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General",Michelle Thomas et al.,"A South African family sought asylum in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which grants asylum to those who cannot return to another country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Their application for asylum claimed that they feared persecution if they returned to South Africa because of their (1) political opinions and (2) “membership in a particular social group,” which they argued included both their race and their kinship with a particular well-known white South African. The immigration judge denied their application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that association with a particular family may fall within the scope of the “particular social group” language in the INA."
+1592,State of Ohio,Darius Clark,"On March 17, 2010, a preschool teacher at Cleveland's William Patrick Day Head Start Center noticed some facial injuries on one of her three-year-old students. When the teacher inquired about the injuries, the student indicated that his mother's boyfriend, Darius Clark, caused them. The teacher forwarded her concerns to a child-abuse hotline, which resulted in the arrest and subsequent charging of Clark for child abuse. Prior to trial, a judge ruled the three-year-old child was incompetent to testify but refused to exclude the child's out-of-court identification of Clark as his abuser. Clark was found guilty. On appeal Clark claimed that the admission of the child's out-of-court statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's ruling and held that, because state law required the teacher to report suspected incidences of child abuse, the teacher was acting as an agent for law enforcement when inquiring about the child's injuries. Therefore, the child's out-of-court statements could only be admitted if the primary purpose of the teacher's questioning was to address an ongoing emergency, as opposed to attempting to establish past events. Because the child was not in immediate danger of further injury, the out-of-court statement could not be admitted."
+2101,Shaun Michael Bosse,Oklahoma,"In 1987, the you.S. Supreme Court decided in Booth v. Maryland that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing jury in a death penalty case from considering victim impact evidence that does not directly relate to the circumstances of the crime. In Payne v. Tennessee, four years later, the Supreme Court determined that the ban only applied to victim impact testimony. Because Payne did not deal with the victim’s family member’s characterizations of the defendant, the crime, or the sentence as Booth had, the Payne Court did not address these types of evidence. Shaun Michael Bosse was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder for killing Katrina Griffin and her two children. The prosecution sought the death penalty and, over Bosse’s objection, asked three of the victims’ family members to recommend a sentence to the jury. All three recommended the death penalty, and the jury sentenced Bosse to death. Bosse appealed and argued that the sentencing process had violated the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Booth. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence and held that Payne had “implicitly overruled” Booth as it related to characterizations of the defendant and opinions about the sentence."
+2089,"Life Technologies Corp., et al.",Promega Corp.,"Promega Corporation owned four patents and was the exclusive licensee of another one for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing. The kits are usually used for the purposes of identifying forensic or paternity matches. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for infringing on the patents in question, and LifeTech filed counterclaims that argued that the asserted claims of the patents were invalid. The district court determined that LifeTech had directly infringed on the patents and the case proceeded to damages. During the damages phase, there was a dispute about whether or not Promega had met its burden to prove that it was eligible for damages based on its worldwide sales. The jury determined that Promega was eligible for the worldwide damages, but the district court granted LifeTech’s motion to vacate the judgment because it determined that, as a matter of law, Promega had failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain that jury verdict. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and determined that there was substantial evidence that LifeTech was liable for worldwide damages."
+753,Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,United States ex rel. Stevens,"Jonathan Stevens, a former attorney for the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, filed suit against his former employer, the agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to induce the EPA to disburse more grant money than it was entitled to receive. Stevens filed suit under the False Calms Act (FCA), which provides for a private person to bring a qui tam civil action ""in the name of the [Federal] Government,"" against ""any person"" who ""knowingly presents...to...the...Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment."" The State of Vermont moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a State or state agency is not a ""person"" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. Vermont then filed an interlocutory appeal. Thereupon, the court stayed its proceedings and the United States intervened in the appeal in support of Stevens. The Court of Appeals affirmed."
+921,Roell,Withrow,"The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct ""any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case"" with ""the consent of the parties."" When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate."
+1145,Massachusetts et al.,Environmental Protection Agency et al.,"Massachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these ""greenhouse gases"" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate ""any air pollutant"" that can ""reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."" EPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on ""the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it."" Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA."
+612,Avondale Lockhart,United States,"In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number for videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, agents executed a death warrant and discovered over 15, 000 images and of least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart ’ s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of first - degree sexual abuse related to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre - sentencing report for Lockhart ’ s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve any minor. The district court rejected Lockhart ’ s argument and held that the mandatory minimum had applied. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court ’ s conviction."
+2062,Melene James,"City of Boise, Idaho","Melene James filed a complaint against City of Boise police officers after she was bitten by a police dog as the officers were responding to a call about a burglary in progress. The officers mistakenly thought James was a burglar. James brought claims of assault, battery, false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers. The Idaho Tort Claims Act provides that a governmental entity is liable for negligent or wrongful acts of its employees if the acts were committed in the course and scope of their employment, but is not liable for intentional torts. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District dismissed the claim because the officers had immunity for their intentional torts and James failed to show that they acted negligently. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed and awarded the defendants appellate attorney fees under the civil rights attorney fee statute. The court awarded these fees without determining that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” as required under the you.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hughes v. Rowe. The Idaho Supreme Court decided that Hughes did not apply because the you.S. Supreme Court did not have the authority to limit the discretion of state courts without a limit in the relevant statute."
+1217,Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al.,"Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, et al.","After the California legislature passed laws prohibiting the use of state funds to ""assist, promote, or deter union organizing,"" a group of California companies brought suit claiming the state laws were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 you.S.C. Section 7. The Act provides that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered evidence of unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers. The California companies argued that the state laws infringe upon their ""safe harbor"" for anti-labor speech embodied in the Act. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after entering two panel decisions holding the California law preempted, issued a split en banc opinion holding that it was not. The Second Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The Court's decision in this case will affect roughly a dozen other states currently considering adopting legislation substantially similar to the California law."
+534,United States et al.,Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia et al.  516 U.S. 415,"To prevent ""local media monopolies,"" Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC- controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that ""video programming"" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a ""content-neutral"" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not ""narrowly tailored"" to serve the statute's objective. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open ""ample alternative channels for communication"" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp."
+400,Department of Homeland Security,Robert J. MacLean,"In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position. MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA."
+766,New York,Hill,"The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights."
+491,Consolidated Rail Corporation,Gottshall,"Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were ""genuine and severe."" The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury. Conrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle."
+1128,Terance Martez Gamble,United States,"Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession in a firearm as a convicted felon. He found that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by a State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 you. S. 187 ( 2005 ), that prosecution in federal / state court for the same conduct does not violate a Double Jeopardy Clause because neither state and federal governments are separate sovereigns ( the so - called “ separate sovereigns ” exception ). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court."
+1512,Randy Curtis Bullock,"BankChampaign, N.A.","In 1978, Randy Curtis Bullock became the trustee of his father's trust. The trust's only asset was his father's life insurance policy, and Bullock and his four siblings were the trust's only beneficiaries. As trustee, Bullock was only allowed to borrow from the trust to pay the life insurance premiums and to satisfy a withdrawal request from another trustee. Despite these restrictions, Bullock borrowed from the trust three times: to satisfy a debt on his father's business, to allow him and his mother to purchase certificates of deposit, and to allow him and his mother to purchase real estate. All of the loans were fully repaid. When Bullock's two brothers learned of the existence of the trust and their brother's actions, they sued him in Illinois state court. They claimed that Bullock had breached his fiduciary duty by taking loans that violated the guidelines of the trust. The brothers moved for summary judgment and the court granted it. The court ordered Bullock to pay $250,000 in damages for the benefits he received from his dealings with the trust, $35,000 in attorneys' fees, and placed the property Bullock purchased—a mill in Ohio—in a constructive trust. The constructive trust was awarded to BankChampaign, which replaced Bullock as the trustee of his father's trust. Bullock was unable to sell the mill to satisfy the Illinois judgment. In 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to discharge his debt from the Illinois judgment. The bank started an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court where it argued that debts arising out of ""fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity"" are not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The bank moved for summary judgment and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Bullock appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment to district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court recognized that the only way for Bullock to satisfy the judgment debt was to sell the mill, and the bank could not hold it in perpetuity, so the district court concluded that the bank was abusing its power; however, it still affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and held that Bullock's conduct met the standard for defalcation because it was objectively reckless and constituted a known breach of a fiduciary duty."
+1163,North Carolina Department of Revenue,The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,"In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice ’ s descendants as the primary beneficiaries ( none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation ). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice ’ s children. One with these assets was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust ( “ the Trust ” ), benefitting his daughter Mary Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were available. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim requesting a refund of taxes paid to a North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department ’ s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed appeals for summary conviction as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust ’ s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “ minimum contacts "" connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non - contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme and affirmed."
+485,Curtis Publishing Company,Wallace Butts,"In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made ""with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul ""Bear"" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case."
+1022,"Cooper Industries, Inc.","Aviall Services, Inc.","Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs."
+70,United States,White Mt. Apache Tribe,"Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim."
+1373,"James Walker, Warden, et al.",Charles W. Martin,"A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions. On appeal, the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition."
+1060,"Richard Gerald Rousey, et ux.",Jill R. Jacoway,"Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: ""a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract."" The exemption had to be ""on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...."" The Rouseys said an IRA was a ""similar plan or contract."" The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a ""similar plan or contract."" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are ""similar plans or contracts,"" the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be ""on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service."" The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits."
+867,"Joseph P. Murr, et al.","Wisconsin, et al.","The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings ( the Murrs ) purchased two adjacent lots ( Lots E and F ) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately. 500 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs ’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County ’ s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development / sale of adjacent lots under common property, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be sold together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the state wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the state their application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “ all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot. ” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the court and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property."
+893,Edelman,Lynchburg College,"Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ""within [a specified number of] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."" An EEOC regulation permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired. In November 1997, Leonard Edelman faxed a letter to the EEOC, claiming that Lynchburg College had subjected him to gender-based, national origin, and religious discrimination after it denied him tenure. The EEOC informed Edelman of the 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint, finding that the letter was not a charge under Title VII because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that because a charge requires verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows that a charge must be verified within that period."
+2255,"City of Escondido, California, et al.",Marty Emmons,"In April 2013, Escondido police officers responded to a domestic violence call, which ended in the arrest of Maggie Emmons’s husband. He was later released. In May 2013, police received a 911 call about another domestic disturbance at the same residence. The same officer responded, along with a second officer, and the 911 dispatcher informed the officers that two children could be in the residence and attempts to return the 911 call had gone unanswered. When the officers arrived at the residence, they knocked on the door but received no answer. Through a side window, the officers spoke with Emmons wife and convinced her to open the door so they could perform a welfare check. As officers were speaking with her, an unidentified man told Emmons to back away from the window. A few minutes later, and after additional officers had arrived, a man opened the apartment door and came outside. One of the officers told the man not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried to walk past the officer. The officer stopped him, took him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Police body-camera video shows that the officer did not hit the man or display any weapon, and that the man was not in any visible or audible pain either as a result of the takedown or while on the ground. Minutes later, officers helped the man up and arrested him for the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest and delaying a police officer. The man turned out to be Emmons’s father, Marty Emmons. Marty Emmons sued all of the police officers present and the City of Escondido for use of excessive force, among other claims, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal district court rejected the excessive force claim as to all but the officer who took down Marty Emmons. With respect to that officer, the district court found that the law was not clearly established that the officer could not act the way he did in that situation, so he was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the excessive force claims against two of the officers, finding that the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at the time of the events in question."
+776,Williams,Taylor,"Michael Wayne Williams was sentenced to death after he was convicted of two capital murders. Ultimately, Williams sought federal habeas relief, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, regarding the fairness of his trial, which he had tried unsuccessfully to develop in the state-court proceedings. The District Court granted Williams' evidentiary hearing. However, before any hearing could be held, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's requests for an emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The Commonwealth argued that Williams' evidentiary hearing was prohibited by federal law as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court dismissed Williams' petition citing the AEDPA statute and finding that Williams failed to show ""actual innocence."" In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Williams could not satisfy the statute's conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts of his claims and barred him from receiving an evidentiary hearing."
+1826,Duncan,Louisiana,"Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied."
+271,"Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers","Pat Quinn, in his official capacity as governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31","Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in - home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services ( Disabilities Program ). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in Either their Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services ( Rehabilitation Program ). In 2003, a majority of the Veterans Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a "" fair share "" agreement, which required all personal employees who are not union members to pay their proportionate share of the fees of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership in 2009. In 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair shares fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom in association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'claims. On appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, or personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review."
+2316,Google LLC,"Oracle America, Inc.","When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The you.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari. Upon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law."
+1556,"Town of Greece, NY",Susan Galloway et al.,"The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented. In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers."
+878,Owasso Independent School District No. I-011,Falvo,"Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' ""education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)"" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as ""records, files, documents, and other materials"" containing information directly related to a student, which ""are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution."" Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not ""education records."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are ""education records,"" such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader."
+2066,Gregory Welch,United States,"Police entered Gregory Welch’s apartment because they had reason to believe that a robbery suspect was on the premises. After obtaining Welch’s consent to search the apartment, the police located a gun and ammunition that Welch later identified as his own. Welch was subsequently arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he pleaded guilty. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed his sentence and argued that one of his felonies, a conviction for “strong arm” robbery in Florida state court in 1996, did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a conviction of robbery with a much lower level of force than the federal law required. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Welch’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law was a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because it involved force that was “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” In 2013, Welch filed a collateral challenge to his conviction and argued that his prior conviction for strong arm robbery vague and that his trial counsel had been ineffective in allowing him to be sentenced under the ACCA. He sought a certificate of appealability to the appellate court, which the district court denied. Welch then sought a certificate of appealability from the appellate court and noted that there was a challenge to the ACCA based on its vagueness pending in the Supreme Court, Johnson v. United States. The appellate denied the certificate of appealability. Three weeks later, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States and held that the residual clause of the ACCA, which included action that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” in the definition of a violent felony, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments because it was so vague that it failed to give people adequate notice of the conduct it punished. In order to apply the residual clause to a case, courts had to assess the “hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version” of the crime in question, which made the application of the clause unconstitutionally arbitrary and unpredictable."
+1148,United States of America,Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover,"On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six grounds, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence ( a “ Hobbs Act robbery ” ) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty of seven counts, including the five counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2018, rejecting both defendants ’ challenges and affirming the district court ’ s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court ’ s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 you. S. _ _ ( 2018 ), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 you. S. C. § 924 ( c ) contains both an “ elements clause ” and a “ residual clause. ” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “ has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, ” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “ by its nature, involves a substantial risk that such force against the person or properties of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. ” In Dimaya, the Court addressed ( and invalidated ) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924 ( c ) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924 ( c ) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment to to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause."
+1662,Williamson,"Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.",An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law.
+174,Union Pacific Railroad Company,"Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region","The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad ( UPR ), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ( BLET ), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board ( NRAB ) dismissed their claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that because BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved workers had held a conference with the company to attempt to resolve their disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed. Following appeal, the you. S. Court of Appeals for a Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by leaving evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a similar requirement, which it imposed retroactively."
+1051,Herman Avery Gundy,United States,"Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his term for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. While a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not registered as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required per state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 you. S. C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act ( SORNA ), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the you. S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the you. S. Attorney General under 42 you. S. C. § 16913 to place the law ’ s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted."
+548,Ornelas,United States,"Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but for different reasons."
+455,Burson,Freeman,"Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari."
+628,Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners,Continental Insurance Company,"Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners, an association of condominium owners, sued Continental Insurance Company in Maryland state court, seeking to compel it to pay a judgment the association had obtained against an insured condominium developer. The company removed the case to federal court. As a matter of Maryland law, the case involved the extent of the developer's coverage under a general liability insurance policy. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, the appellate court denied a petition for rehearing. Later, the association's counsel learned of a recent decision by Maryland's highest court in another case that also involved liability insurance coverage. The association brought this decision to the Court of Appeals' attention in a motion to stay or recall the court's mandate. The appellate court denied the motion."
+685,United States,E. C. Knight Company,"The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed ""every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade"" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States."
+833,"Stephen Voisine, et al.",United States,"In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman ( with whom he was in a domestic relationship ) under a Maine state ordinance that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “ knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person. ” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend ’ s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess the firearm. Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine ’ s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes don't constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “ recklessness ” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied these motions, and the you. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the you. S. Supreme Court, which remanded the, in light of that Court ’ in decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “ physical force ” requirement of the federal statute. On,, the appellate court again held that Maine ’ s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute."
+730,United States,"William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.","In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor."
+2226,"James Dawson, et ux.","Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner","West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 you.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption. The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 you.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed."
+433,"Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator",Federal Election Commission,"In early 2002, a many years - long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the system that money is raised by - - and spent during - - political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ( the so - titled McCain - Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA ). Its key provisions were a ) a ban on advertising ( "" soft money "" ) donations made directly to political parties ( often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals ) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials ; ii ) limits on the activities that unions, businesses, and non - profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election ; and c ) restrictions on political parties'use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates ( in the form of "" issue ads "" or "" coordinated ads "" ). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by - passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three - judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft - money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed and the Supreme Court will hear and decide the resulting appeals."
+992,Merit Management Group,"FTI Consulting, Inc.","Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $ 55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank, Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as part of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30 % shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $ 16. 5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( b ), and 550, which are Safe harbor provisions for transfers "" made by or to "" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are distinct institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “ made by or to ” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and do therefore benefit from it. The Seventh Circuit held that section 546 ( e ) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non - named entities where a given entities merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary."
+1055,Denard Stokeling,United States of America,"In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “overcoming victim resistance.” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “violent felonies” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 you.S.C. § 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling’s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal."
+1487,Carolyn M. Kloeckner,"Hilda L. Solis, Secretary of Labor","Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging hostile work environment as well as sex and age discrimination. When her employer charged her with being ""absent without leave,"" she amended her complaint to include retaliation. Kloeckner never returned to work, and eventually her employer terminated her. Kloeckner challenged the termination while her initial complaint was still pending, making it a ""mixed case."" Kloeckner appealed the termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but then requested a dismissal so she could amend her EEOC complaint. The MSPB granted the dismissal, giving her a set period to refile. When the EEOC found there had been no discrimination or retaliation, Kloeckner appealed the decision to the MSPB. While the appeal was within 30 days of the EEOC decision, it was 10 months after the refilling period set by the MSPB. The MSPB dismissed the case as untimely. Kloeckner filed an appeal in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was removed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction because the MSPB had not ruled on the merits of the case."
+1321,Lawrence Joseph Jefferson,"Stephen Upton, Warden","A Georgia state court convicted Lawrence Jefferson of murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal at the state and then federal court level, Mr. Jefferson argued that his lawyers were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to investigate a traumatic head injury that he suffered as a child. On appeal to the you.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, it accepted the state court's factual findings and affirmed Mr. Jefferson's conviction and sentence."
+1823,"Edward J. Hardin, Mayor of Tazewell, Tennessee, Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, Tennessee Valley Authority",Kentucky Utilities Company,"Dixie Power and Light Company provided service to several locations in Claiborne County, Tennesee, including the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell. Kentucky Utilities Company (KU) held a non-exclusive county franchise to occupy county roads. In 1954, Dixie Power and Light transferred its assets to KU and dissolved, giving KU control over the vast majority of the market in Tazewell and New Tazewell. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended in 1959, barred the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from expanding its sales outside the area for which the TVA or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957. On that date, the area of Claiborne County had 3,564 users of TVA power compared to 1,839 users of KU power; the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell, however, had 28 TVA users and 561 KU users. KU’s retail rates for electricity in the towns were approximately two-and-one-half times higher than those offered by TVA. Citizens in Tazewell and New Tazewell responded to this rate disparity by demanding access to the TVA’s cheaper power. After three years of complaints, planning and consultations, the towns’ governments contracted to hook up a new municipal system to TVA’s power grid. KU filed suit against TVA, the mayors of Tazewell and New Tazewell, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor. KU charged the defendants with conspiracy to destroy its business in Tazewell and asked the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system. Shortly before trial, the TVA Board of Directors determined that TVA was the primary source of power for Claiborne County on July 1, 1957, and that Claiborne County was the relevant area for the purposes of the act. The district court upheld the board’s decision, but the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed. Comparing the number of customers served by KU and TVA in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the Sixth Circuit held that the two towns and KU’s original county road corridor were an ‘area’ for the purposes of the act and that TVA was barred from extending its service to that area."
+1678,Francisco Romero,"International Terminal Operating Company Compania Trasatlantica, also known as Spanish Line, Garcia & Diaz, Inc., and Quin Lumber Co., Inc.","While the Spanish ship S.S. Guadalupe was docked in Hoboken, NJ, a cable struck Francisco Romero and seriously him. He sued for negligence under the Jones act and maritime law. The Jones Act provides jurisdiction for claims under the Constitution and treaties of the you.S. for persons of diverse citizenship. Both Romero and his employer were aliens, so there was no diversity of citizenship. Also, the maritime laws did not arise from the Constitution or treaties of the you.S.. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The district court also held that Romero could receive adequate remedies under Spanish law. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed."
+1509,Los Angeles County Flood Control Distric,"Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.","The level of pollution detected in the Santa Clara River, the Los Angeles River, the San Gabriel River, and Malibu Creek—collectively known as the Watershed Rivers—far exceeds what is allowed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit held by Los Angeles County. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental organizations brought legal action against the county and the district, alleging that the county violated the Clean Water Act. The allegations stem from the fact that the county and district allowed untreated storm water that had collected myriad pollutants to run unchecked through storm sewers and into the rivers. The county and district did not contest the fact that the amount of pollutants was high but rather contested the allegations that they were solely responsible. The federal district court found for county and the district and held that there was no evidence that they were directly responsible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision with respect to the Santa Clara River and the Malibu Creek but reversed the decision with respect to the San Gabriel River and the Los Angeles River."
+131,BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles,Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"BCI Coca - Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles fired African - American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part because to a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non - African American employees less harshly. EEOC entered suit against BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703 ( a ), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado had not biased, it dismissed the suit when the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado's discriminatory actions. The you. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case to trial. The Tenth Circuit cited the subordinate bias theory of liability, which holds a company liable for a discriminatory firing even if the employee who made the actual decision to fire knew not the employee harboring racial bias."
+323,"Clifton Sandifer, et al.",United States Steel Corporation,"Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the storage room to their work stations. The Act states that the employer may not need to compensate employees for time spent "" changing clothes. "" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for washing clothes but not in relation to pay for transit time. The company appealed, where the you. S. Court on Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not allow the company to compensate the employees for either their time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work Station."
+2069,Jamie Caetano,Massachusetts,"Jamie Caetano was convicted of possession of a stun gun in Massachusetts state court. Caetano appealed and claimed her conviction violated her Second Amendment right to possess a stun gun in public for the purpose of self-defense, which was necessary to protect herself from her abusive ex-boyfriend. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Caetano’s conviction and held that a stun gun is not eligible for Second Amendment protection."
+1282,"John Van de Kamp, et al.",Thomas Lee Goldstein,"Thomas Lee Goldstein was released on habeas corpus from a California prison in 2004 after serving twenty-four years of a murder sentence. Goldstein then brought suit against the prosecutor and chief deputy from his trial alleging that he had been wrongly convicted. Goldstein argued that he had been prejudiced by the testimony of a jailhouse informant claiming to have heard Goldstein confess to the murder. The informant had stated that he had never, either before or during the trial, received benefits for cooperating with the government; in fact, the informant had worked with the government in the past and was getting reduced sentences in exchange for his testimony. Goldstein's claim alleged that the prosecutor and deputy had failed to fulfill their obligation to ensure that information regarding jailhouse informants was adequately shared among prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors argued that their actions during the trial were immune from suit. The district court held that the actions were administrative rather than prosecutorial and were therefore not subject to immunity. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that the prosecutor had failed to show the necessary close association with the judicial phase of the trial in order to invoke immunity."
+457,Georgia,Thomas McCollum et al.,"In 1990, white respondents, Thomas McCollum, William Joseph McCollum, and Ella Hampton McCollum, were charged with assaulting two black individuals. Before the criminal trial, the prosecution moved to bar the defense from using its peremptory challenges to eliminate black people from the juror pool. The term ""preemptory challenge"" refers to the right to reject a potential juror during jury selection without giving a reason. The trial judge denied the prosecution's motion, and, when the prosecution appealed, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decision."
+1008,"General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.","Dennis Cline, et al.","General Dynamics Land Systems renegotiated its union contract to provide full health care benefits only to retirees who were more than 50 years old by a July 1, 1997, deadline. Union member Dennis Cline fell two years short of 50 at the time of the deadline and was excluded permanently from receiving health benefits. Cline - along with 196 other 40-to 49-year-old employees - filed suit against General Dynamics under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). ADEA protects workers over 40 from age discrimination. Since the contract excluded workers between the ages of 40 and 49, Cline alleged that providing benefits only to retirees 50 and up was illegal age discrimination. A you.S. district court in Ohio rejected Cline's claims. The court ruled that the ADEA does not recognize claims for ""reverse discrimination"" or preferential treatment for older people within the same over-40 class. Cline appealed and the you.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court ruled that General Dynamics was guilty of plain age discrimination, since the ADEA protects all persons over 40 from age discrimination by their employers."
+129,Curtis Craig and Carolyn Whitener,"David Boren, Governor of Oklahoma","An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of ""nonintoxicating"" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory."
+1121,Washington,Arturo R. Recuenco,"Arturo Recuenco was convicted of second degree assault in Washington state court after the jury found that he had attacked his wife ""with a deadly weapon."" The trial court then applied a 3-year enhancement to his sentence based on its own finding that a firearm had been involved, even though the jury never specifically found that a gun was used. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the enhancement was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 you.S. 296, a 2004 you.S. Supreme Court decision that held that only those factors found by a jury, not a judge, may be considered for sentencing enhancements. The court disagreed with Washington state's argument that, while a Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely had indeed occurred, that violation could be found legally harmless."
+42,Idaho,Laura Lee Wright,"Laura Lee Wright and her ex - husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half - sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright ’ s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her older sister. Goodman reported this information to Idaho police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that have occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor. During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the elder daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify against certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted in both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued, the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of this hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted how children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction."
+203,"Supreme Court of Virginia, et al.","Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., et al.","The Code of Virginia authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate and discipline attorneys. Under this authority, the Virginia court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Bar Code), and the content makes it clear that the Virginia court holds all legislative and regulatory power over the legal profession in the state. The court also adjudicates alleged violations of the Bar Code. In 1974, Consumers Union of the United States sought to prepare a legal directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions about legal representation. Consumers Union attempted to canvass all of the attorneys of Arlington County, Virginia, for the information for their directory. Many attorneys refused to provide the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code’s prohibition against attorney advertising and providing the type of information the Consumers Union sought to publish. On February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council sued the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and other individuals. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration and an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant section of the Bar Code. The district court held that the section of the Bar Code unconstitutionally restricted access to information concerning the attorneys’ initial consultation fees, but did not enjoin the enforcement of the code as it relates to advertising. Consumers Union appealed to the you.S. Supreme Court, which held that the prohibition of attorney advertising violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that the section of the Bar Code was unconstitutional in its entirety and enjoined its enforcement. Consumers Union moved for the awarding of attorneys fees, which the Virginia Court objected to on the grounds that it had judicial immunity. The district court awarded attorneys fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia."
+156,Citizens United,Federal Election Commission,"Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ( BCRA ) to its film Hillary : The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "" big money "" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "" electioneering communications. "" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents employers or labor unions from funding such communication from the general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that : 1 ) Section 203 constitutes a First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2 ) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached a determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertising. The court noted that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "" might become unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular because, "" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim."
+1054,"Town of Castle Rock, Colorado","Jessica Gonzales, Individually and as Next Best Friend of Her Deceased Minor Children, Rebecca Gonzales, Katheryn Gonzales, and Leslie Gonzales","Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: ""No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..."" The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a ""protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order,"" which the police had violated."
+539,Supreme Court of Virginia,Friedman,"Myrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency the restriction on admission in any Virginia bar without taking state bar exams. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was handed down, her claim was upheld in federal district court."
+1119,Illinois Tool Works Inc. et al.,"Independent Ink, Inc.","Independent Ink manufactured printing ink that was compatible with the printheads manufactured by (and patented by) Trident, a company owned by Illinois Tool Works. Trident, however, required that anyone who used their printheads also use their ink, which was not patented. Independent Ink brought suit in federal district court under the Sherman Act, which forbids companies from tying a license to use one product (in this case Trident's printheads) to a customer's agreement to use another product (Trident's ink). The district court ruled in favor of Trident, finding that Independent Ink had failed to show that Trident's control of the printhead allowed them to raise prices above the competitive market rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, however, finding that when the product for which a license is granted is under patent, the ability to raise prices of that product above market rates must be assumed, and the burden is on the defendant to show that such power did not exist."
+732,Department of the Army,"Blue Fox, Inc.","Verdan Technology, Inc.,, a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a ""services contract,"" and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an ""equitable lien"" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien."
+1819,James Marchetti,United States,A Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an occupational tax for accepting wagers. Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment. He argued that the requirements to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The you.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.