diff --git "a/logs/app.log" "b/logs/app.log" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/logs/app.log" @@ -0,0 +1,25303 @@ +2025-04-04 at 03:47:19 | INFO | src.config:update_log_path:253 - Additional logs will be stored in: /workspace/DeepSearch/trainer_output_meta-llama_Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct_gpu0_20250404_034719/logs +2025-04-04 at 03:47:19 | INFO | __main__::40 - Training output directory: /workspace/DeepSearch/trainer_output_meta-llama_Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct_gpu0_20250404_034719 +2025-04-04 at 03:47:19 | INFO | __main__::41 - Logs are being saved to both ./logs and /workspace/DeepSearch/trainer_output_meta-llama_Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct_gpu0_20250404_034719/logs +2025-04-04 at 03:47:19 | INFO | __main__::44 - Initializing model meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct +2025-04-04 at 03:48:01 | INFO | __main__::55 - Setting up LoRA adapter +2025-04-04 at 03:48:07 | INFO | __main__::66 - Loading datasets +2025-04-04 at 03:48:07 | INFO | __main__::68 - Loaded 286 training examples and 32 test examples +2025-04-04 at 03:48:07 | INFO | __main__::71 - Setting up training arguments +2025-04-04 at 03:48:07 | INFO | __main__::108 - Setting up verifier +2025-04-04 at 03:48:07 | INFO | __main__::120 - Initializing trainer +2025-04-04 at 03:48:07 | INFO | __main__::141 - Starting training +2025-04-04 at 03:48:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"angle between planet's equator and orbit plane" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "acute angle at intersection of orbit plane and equatorial plane of a planet" or "angular intersection of orbit plane and equatorial plane of a celestial body" +2025-04-04 at 03:48:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"earth axial tilt definition and value" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: celestial navigation system inclination longitude of ascending node reference metric +2025-04-04 at 03:48:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +Trafectory Parameters Definition Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the earth's equator to the local vertical vector, deg Selenographic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the true lunar equatorial plane to the local ver- tical vector, deg Longitude Spacecraft position measured east or west from the body's prime meridian to the local vertical vec- tor,deg Altitude Perpendicular distance from the reference body to the point of orbit intersect，feet or miles; alti- tude above the lunar surface is referenced to the altitude of the landing site with respect to mean lunar radius Space-fixed velocity Magmitude of the inertial velocity vector refer- enced to the body-centered, inertial reference coordinate system, ft/sec Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the body-centered, local horizontal plane to the inertial velocity vector, deg Space-fixed heading 8ngle Angle of the projection of the inertial +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"gyrocompassing navigation system and orbital inclination" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: orbital parameters earth lunar orbit +2025-04-04 at 03:48:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Trafectory Parameters Definition Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the earth's equator to the local vertical vector, deg Selenographic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the true lunar equatorial plane to the local ver- tical vector, deg Longitude Spacecraft position measured east or west from the body's prime meridian to the local vertical vec- tor,deg Altitude Perpendicular distance from the reference body to the point of orbit intersect，feet or miles; alti- tude above the lunar surface is referenced to the altitude of the landing site with respect to mean lunar radius Space-fixed velocity Magmitude of the inertial velocity vector refer- enced to the body-centered, inertial reference coordinate system, ft/sec Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the body-centered, local horizontal plane to the inertial velocity vector, deg Space-fixed heading 8ngle Angle of the projection of the inertial +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"gyrocompassing navigation system limitations" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"inertial measurement unit platform alignment error" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"inertial measurement unit platform alignment error" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"gyrocompassing navigation system and attitude control" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"gyrocompassing navigation system and Y-axis alignment" + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [607, 1243, 34, 554, 327, 243] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 501.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 11.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 45.58 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.079 ± 0.177 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 3.83 ± 8.57 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 23, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Table 5.6-I is a summary of gyro drift measurements deduced from inflight alignments. The null-bias drift coefficients for all three gyros were updated at 32 hours , based upon drift rates calculated from four platform alignments. The alignment prior to entry was performed by first conducting a coarse alignment to the lunar module platform and then using the automatic optics positioning capability to locate stars for a precise alignment. This technique was necessary because of the difficulty in recognizing constellations through the scanning telescope as a result of reflections from the lunar module and obscuration by vented particles. + +TABLE 5.6-I.\~ PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +Trafectory Parameters Definition Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the earth's equator to the local vertical vector, deg Selenographic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the true lunar equatorial plane to the local ver- tical vector, deg Longitude Spacecraft position measured east or west from the body's prime meridian to the local vertical vec- tor,deg Altitude Perpendicular distance from the reference body to the point of orbit intersect，feet or miles; alti- tude above the lunar surface is referenced to the altitude of the landing site with respect to mean lunar radius Space-fixed velocity Magmitude of the inertial velocity vector refer- enced to the body-centered, inertial reference coordinate system, ft/sec Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the body-centered, local horizontal plane to the inertial velocity vector, deg Space-fixed heading 8ngle Angle of the projection of the inertial +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Trafectory Parameters Definition Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the earth's equator to the local vertical vector, deg Selenographic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the true lunar equatorial plane to the local ver- tical vector, deg Longitude Spacecraft position measured east or west from the body's prime meridian to the local vertical vec- tor,deg Altitude Perpendicular distance from the reference body to the point of orbit intersect，feet or miles; alti- tude above the lunar surface is referenced to the altitude of the landing site with respect to mean lunar radius Space-fixed velocity Magmitude of the inertial velocity vector refer- enced to the body-centered, inertial reference coordinate system, ft/sec Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the body-centered, local horizontal plane to the inertial velocity vector, deg Space-fixed heading 8ngle Angle of the projection of the inertial +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:48:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.147, Max reward: 0.880 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "NASA Apollo Lunar Sample Return bag contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "What was added to the Apollo lunar sample tote bag" +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 lunar sample return tote bag contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: How did astronauts carry lunar sample containers on moonwalks? +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ +Result 2: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar mission apollo 17 sample tote bag contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what was added to the lunar sample tote bag in Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "heat flow experiment contents" +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 A-3 experiment equipment +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: contents of Lunar Return Sample Container +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 17 lunar sample bag contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: contents of lunar sample tote bag Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +CHANGE SHEET + +FOR + +NASA-MSC INTERNAL REPORT + +APOLLO 13 MISSION REPORT + +Change 1 + + + +May 1970 + +James A. MeDivitt Colonel, USAF Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program + +After the attached enclosures (pages 7-3, 7-4, 7-7, 7-8, 11-3 through 11-6, E-3, E-4, and back cover), which are replacement pages, have been inserted, insert this CHANGE SHEET between the cover and title page and write on the cover "Change l inserted." + +In addition to the attached changes, please complete the attached Mission Report Questionaire and return as indicated. + +NOTE: A black bar in the margin of affected pages indicates the information that was changed or added. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Heat flow experiment contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 abort profile and spacecraft configurations +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ +Result 2: +4.0 TRAJECTORY + +The planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo 12 except for descent orbit insertion being performed with the service propulsion system and the targeting of the spent S--IvB stage for a lunar impact. The trajectory had been very close to the nominal flight plan up to the time of abort, which was the first in the Apollo program. Throughout the manned space program, techniques have been developed and tested for the real-tine determination of immediate abort requirements, but Apollo l3 presented the first situation in which their use was necesSary. Figure 3-l shows the mission profile, including the relative locations of all major maneuvers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo crew supplies in Lunar Return Sample Container +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 17 experiment equipment lunar surface +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 mission documentation trajectory and abort profile +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +4.0 TRAJECTORY + +The planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo 12 except for descent orbit insertion being performed with the service propulsion system and the targeting of the spent S--IvB stage for a lunar impact. The trajectory had been very close to the nominal flight plan up to the time of abort, which was the first in the Apollo program. Throughout the manned space program, techniques have been developed and tested for the real-tine determination of immediate abort requirements, but Apollo l3 presented the first situation in which their use was necesSary. Figure 3-l shows the mission profile, including the relative locations of all major maneuvers. +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What was in the Sample Return Container of the Apollo Command Module +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 17 experiment package contents table 12-1 +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 transearth navigation and lunar surface activities +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo Lunar Return Sample Container original contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 17 mission lunar surface experiment package contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 lunar landing and recovery planning +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo manned lunar mission sample containers +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: s-059 s-080 apollo 17 lunar surface experimentation package +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 lunar module impact site specifics +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +In prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecraft with the intention of entering a solar orbit through a nearmiss, or "slingshot," approach to the moon. For Apollo l3, an opportunity was available to gain further data on large-mass impact phenomena which could be derived using the seismic equipment deployed during Apollo l2. The impact of the lunar module ascent stage during Apollo 12 pointed up certain unexplained seismological events which the S-IVB impact was expected to reproduce. + +The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 8:09:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 14, 1970, trave1ling at a speed of 5600 miles/hr. Stage weight at the time of impact was 30 700 pounds. The collision occurred at a latitude of 2.4 degrees south and a longitude of 27.9 degrees west, which is approximately 74 miles west-northwest from the experiment station installed during Apollo l2._ The energy release from the impact was equivalent to an explosion of 7.7 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lunar module sample return containers +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 17 lunar surface experiment package contents +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:48:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 lunar surface equipment left behind +2025-04-04 at 03:49:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lunar module sample return mission specifics +2025-04-04 at 03:49:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 lunar surface experiments and contents of tote bag +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lunar sample container contents +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, True, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [325, 465, 1412, 1956, 406, 338] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 817.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 7.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 116.71 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 5/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.375 ± 0.388 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 2.17 ± 2.54 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 7] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +CHANGE SHEET + +FOR + +NASA-MSC INTERNAL REPORT + +APOLLO 13 MISSION REPORT + +Change 1 + + + +May 1970 + +James A. MeDivitt Colonel, USAF Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program + +After the attached enclosures (pages 7-3, 7-4, 7-7, 7-8, 11-3 through 11-6, E-3, E-4, and back cover), which are replacement pages, have been inserted, insert this CHANGE SHEET between the cover and title page and write on the cover "Change l inserted." + +In addition to the attached changes, please complete the attached Mission Report Questionaire and return as indicated. + +NOTE: A black bar in the margin of affected pages indicates the information that was changed or added. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ +Result 2: +4.0 TRAJECTORY + +The planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo 12 except for descent orbit insertion being performed with the service propulsion system and the targeting of the spent S--IvB stage for a lunar impact. The trajectory had been very close to the nominal flight plan up to the time of abort, which was the first in the Apollo program. Throughout the manned space program, techniques have been developed and tested for the real-tine determination of immediate abort requirements, but Apollo l3 presented the first situation in which their use was necesSary. Figure 3-l shows the mission profile, including the relative locations of all major maneuvers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +4.0 TRAJECTORY + +The planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo 12 except for descent orbit insertion being performed with the service propulsion system and the targeting of the spent S--IvB stage for a lunar impact. The trajectory had been very close to the nominal flight plan up to the time of abort, which was the first in the Apollo program. Throughout the manned space program, techniques have been developed and tested for the real-tine determination of immediate abort requirements, but Apollo l3 presented the first situation in which their use was necesSary. Figure 3-l shows the mission profile, including the relative locations of all major maneuvers. +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +In prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecraft with the intention of entering a solar orbit through a nearmiss, or "slingshot," approach to the moon. For Apollo l3, an opportunity was available to gain further data on large-mass impact phenomena which could be derived using the seismic equipment deployed during Apollo l2. The impact of the lunar module ascent stage during Apollo 12 pointed up certain unexplained seismological events which the S-IVB impact was expected to reproduce. + +The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 8:09:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 14, 1970, trave1ling at a speed of 5600 miles/hr. Stage weight at the time of impact was 30 700 pounds. The collision occurred at a latitude of 2.4 degrees south and a longitude of 27.9 degrees west, which is approximately 74 miles west-northwest from the experiment station installed during Apollo l2._ The energy release from the impact was equivalent to an explosion of 7.7 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nBecause an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort ...', 'Result 1:\n4.0 TRAJECTORY\n\nThe planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...', 'Result 1:\nIn prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecra...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ +Result 2: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAfter the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, w...', 'Result 1:\nDESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNA...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\n6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL\n\nEnvironmental. control system performance was sati...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstr...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +The Apollo lunar surface experiment package stowed for Apollo l3 was similar to that for Apollo l2. However, the solar wind spectrometer, magnetometer, and suprathermal ion detector, included on Apollo l2, were deleted from Apollo 13. A heat flow experiment and a charged particle environment detector were added for Apollo l3. The cold-cathode ion gage experiment deployed during Apollo l2 was significantly modified for Apo1lo13. + +The Apollo lunar surface experiments package consisted of two subpackages as shown in figures A-l and A-2. These were stowed in the lunar module scientific equipment bay. + +NASA-S-70-5864 + + + +Figure A-l.- Experiment subpackage number l. + +A.3.1 Heat Flow Experiment + +The heat flow experiment was designed to measure the thermal gradient of the upper 3 meters of the lunar crust and the thermal conductivity of the lunar surface materials. Lunar heat flow calculations could be based on the measurements. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nDESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNA...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:03 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.504, Max reward: 0.674 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: power supply fluctuations causes +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation change of about 0.4 ft/sec, primarily in a plane normal to bay 4. The oxygen tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit of the readout. The oxygen tank l heaters were on, and the tank l pressure was decaying rapidly. A main-bus-B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart also occurred at this time. + +Fuel cells l and 3 operated for about 2-l/2 minutes after the reactant valves closed. During this period, these fuel cells consumed the oxygen trapped in the plumbing, thereby reducing the pressure below minimum requirements and causing total loss of fuel cell current and voltage output from these two fuel cells. Because of the loss of performance by two of the three fuel cells and the subsequent load switching by the crew, numerous associated master alarms occurred as expected. +------ +Result 2: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is the system mode characterized by operating conditions that can lead to thermal anomalies or fluctuations in large-scale systems like in high-power electronics or power plants? +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"system mode observed during power grid fluctuations" + + Response from search engine: +The search results reveal that a "Ride-through" or "Voltage Sags" may be relevant to fluctuations observed in systems such as Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS), but I am unable to verify system modes used to describe fluctuations in grid fluctuations without more context. + +I will need to search again to get a better answer. "grid voltage sags system mode" +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +The recurrence of the problem under almost identical circumstances during Apollo l3 indicates that the cause is more likely generic than random and that it is time or vacuum dependent. The susceptibility of the shaft axis rather than the trunnion axis also tends to absolve components common to both axes, such as. the electronics and the motor drive amplifier. The shaft loop has been shown to be more sensitive than the trunnion to harmonics of the 800-hertz reference voltages introduced into the forward loop; however, because the level of the required null offset voltage is well above that available by induction, this mechanism is considered unlikely. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "System mode observed fluctuations" + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +The potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions during the mission. At about 23 hours, the reading decreased from 98 to 79 percent for about 5 minutes and then returned to a normal reading of approximately l02 percent. Another fluctuation was noted at about 37 hours, at which time the reading decreased from its upper limit to 83.5 percent. The reading then returned to the upper limit in a period of 7 seconds. + +Preflight fluctuations of from 2 to 6 percent near the full level were observed once during the countdown demonstration test, and a possible earlier fluctuation of about 4 percent at the half-full level was noted during the flight readiness test. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: fan circuit ignition cause in spacecraft systems +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ +Result 2: +Certain components are wired into the spacecraft wiring harness by inserting crimped, pinned ends of the wiring into terminal boards of the spacecraft harness. In many cases, this wiring is part of closeout installations and circuit verification can only be accomplished through functional checks of the component. This anomaly has pointed out the fact that circuits verified in this manner must be analyzed to determine if functional checks provide an adequate verification. All circuits have been analyzed with the result that the service module and command module reaction control system propellant isolation valves are the only components which require additional testing. Resistance checks will be performed on all future spacecraft to prove that the isolation valves are properly wired. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.8 Potable Water Quantity Fluctuations +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Saturn V rocket launch vacuum fluctuations" + +This search seems to yield a potential explanation, but the results seem inconclusive. I'll refine my query to focus on the system mode or configuration used during these fluctuations. "Saturn V rocket launch sequence system mode" +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +If the Saturn V vehicle is charged to a potential of several million volts, corona discharges will be produced which, in turn, generate radio noise. The onset of these discharges should occur very soon after liftoff and reach a maximum when the launch vehicle is still close to the ground. Radio noise records strongly support this conclusion. The sudden onset of the noise probably corresponds closely to lift-off. It is interesting that, at about 15 seconds after lift-off, the noise became enhanced at the lower rather than the higher frequencies. This phenomenon implies that larger discharges occur at these times. The most intense discharges would be expected to occur soon after the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume clear the launch tower. + +1l.l.3 Measurement of Pelluric Current +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "potable water quantity measurement fluctuation +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions during the mission. At about 23 hours, the reading decreased from 98 to 79 percent for about 5 minutes and then returned to a normal reading of approximately l02 percent. Another fluctuation was noted at about 37 hours, at which time the reading decreased from its upper limit to 83.5 percent. The reading then returned to the upper limit in a period of 7 seconds. + +Preflight fluctuations of from 2 to 6 percent near the full level were observed once during the countdown demonstration test, and a possible earlier fluctuation of about 4 percent at the half-full level was noted during the flight readiness test. +------ +Result 2: +The measurement is not essential for flight safety or mission success. The potable water tank is continually refilled with fuel cell product water, and when the potable water tank is full, fuel cell product water is automatically diverted to the waste water tank, which is periodically dumped overboard. Water from the potable water tank is used mainly for drinking and food reconstitution. Since fuel cell water generation rates can be computed from power generation levels and since potable water usage rates can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, the quantity of water in the potable water tank can be determined with acceptable accuracy without the quantity measurement. + +This anoma.ly is closed. + +14.l.9 Suit Pressure Transducer Failure +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: reaction control system spacecraft anomalies +2025-04-04 at 03:49:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Translac-Vacuum system Saturn V launch configuration" +2025-04-04 at 03:49:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +It is known that the electrostatic potentials develop on jet aircraft. These are caused by an engine charging current, which is balanced by a corona current loss from the aircraft. For.a conventional jet aircraft, the equilibrium potential can approach a million volts. For the Saturn V launch vehicle, the charging current may be larger than that of a jet aircraft, and therefore, the equilibrium potential for the Saturn vehicle might be on the order of a million volts or more. + +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 2 September 1970 3 Preparati on 4 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation 5 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Preparation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: reaction control system modes +2025-04-04 at 03:49:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control mode was reestablished by rolling 90 degrees with reference to the abort-guidance-driven attitude displays. This maneuver placed the terminator parallel to the X-axis of the crewmen optical alignment sight. Rates were nulled in pitch and roll with the thrust/ translation controller assembly. Yaw was again automatically controlled by the abort guidance system. Nulling rates to zero was impossible because of the inaccurate readout of the rate needles. When rates appeared to be nulled, yaw control was placed in the reaction control pulse mode. Twelve yaw-right pulses were then used to start the passive thermal control mode maneuver. Because rates could not be completely nulled, some roll-pitch coupling was observed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Translac-Vacuum system modes during Apollo missions" +2025-04-04 at 03:49:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: reaction control system passive mode +2025-04-04 at 03:49:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered manually to the passive thermal control mode attitudes. The passive thermal control mode techniques consisted of maneuvering in the pulse mode 9o degrees in yaw once each hour using the pulse mode. To conserve power, the attitude indicators were turned off after the initial passive thermal control mode was started, and attitude monitoring was accomplished by observing gimbal angle readouts from the display keyboard. +------ +Result 2: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Translac-Vacuum system modes during Saturn V launch" +2025-04-04 at 03:49:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +If the Saturn V vehicle is charged to a potential of several million volts, corona discharges will be produced which, in turn, generate radio noise. The onset of these discharges should occur very soon after liftoff and reach a maximum when the launch vehicle is still close to the ground. Radio noise records strongly support this conclusion. The sudden onset of the noise probably corresponds closely to lift-off. It is interesting that, at about 15 seconds after lift-off, the noise became enhanced at the lower rather than the higher frequencies. This phenomenon implies that larger discharges occur at these times. The most intense discharges would be expected to occur soon after the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume clear the launch tower. + +1l.l.3 Measurement of Pelluric Current +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: maneuvering pulse mode passive complaint +2025-04-04 at 03:49:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered manually to the passive thermal control mode attitudes. The passive thermal control mode techniques consisted of maneuvering in the pulse mode 9o degrees in yaw once each hour using the pulse mode. To conserve power, the attitude indicators were turned off after the initial passive thermal control mode was started, and attitude monitoring was accomplished by observing gimbal angle readouts from the display keyboard. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: passive thermal control system error pulse mode +2025-04-04 at 03:49:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered manually to the passive thermal control mode attitudes. The passive thermal control mode techniques consisted of maneuvering in the pulse mode 9o degrees in yaw once each hour using the pulse mode. To conserve power, the attitude indicators were turned off after the initial passive thermal control mode was started, and attitude monitoring was accomplished by observing gimbal angle readouts from the display keyboard. +------ +Result 2: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: passive thermal control system error engine switching +2025-04-04 at 03:49:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: roll engine switching error +2025-04-04 at 03:49:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ +Result 2: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Transearth injection attitude maneuvers +2025-04-04 at 03:49:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Transearth maneuver objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 2/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [1843, 295, 348, 89, 324, 371] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 545.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 16.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 34.06 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.163 ± 0.230 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.50 ± 2.57 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Following recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation change of about 0.4 ft/sec, primarily in a plane normal to bay 4. The oxygen tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit of the readout. The oxygen tank l heaters were on, and the tank l pressure was decaying rapidly. A main-bus-B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart also occurred at this time. + +Fuel cells l and 3 operated for about 2-l/2 minutes after the reactant valves closed. During this period, these fuel cells consumed the oxygen trapped in the plumbing, thereby reducing the pressure below minimum requirements and causing total loss of fuel cell current and voltage output from these two fuel cells. Because of the loss of performance by two of the three fuel cells and the subsequent load switching by the crew, numerous associated master alarms occurred as expected. +------ +Result 2: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ +Result 2: +Certain components are wired into the spacecraft wiring harness by inserting crimped, pinned ends of the wiring into terminal boards of the spacecraft harness. In many cases, this wiring is part of closeout installations and circuit verification can only be accomplished through functional checks of the component. This anomaly has pointed out the fact that circuits verified in this manner must be analyzed to determine if functional checks provide an adequate verification. All circuits have been analyzed with the result that the service module and command module reaction control system propellant isolation valves are the only components which require additional testing. Resistance checks will be performed on all future spacecraft to prove that the isolation valves are properly wired. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.8 Potable Water Quantity Fluctuations +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control mode was reestablished by rolling 90 degrees with reference to the abort-guidance-driven attitude displays. This maneuver placed the terminator parallel to the X-axis of the crewmen optical alignment sight. Rates were nulled in pitch and roll with the thrust/ translation controller assembly. Yaw was again automatically controlled by the abort guidance system. Nulling rates to zero was impossible because of the inaccurate readout of the rate needles. When rates appeared to be nulled, yaw control was placed in the reaction control pulse mode. Twelve yaw-right pulses were then used to start the passive thermal control mode maneuver. Because rates could not be completely nulled, some roll-pitch coupling was observed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +After the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered manually to the passive thermal control mode attitudes. The passive thermal control mode techniques consisted of maneuvering in the pulse mode 9o degrees in yaw once each hour using the pulse mode. To conserve power, the attitude indicators were turned off after the initial passive thermal control mode was started, and attitude monitoring was accomplished by observing gimbal angle readouts from the display keyboard. +------ +Result 2: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +After the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered manually to the passive thermal control mode attitudes. The passive thermal control mode techniques consisted of maneuvering in the pulse mode 9o degrees in yaw once each hour using the pulse mode. To conserve power, the attitude indicators were turned off after the initial passive thermal control mode was started, and attitude monitoring was accomplished by observing gimbal angle readouts from the display keyboard. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +After the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered manually to the passive thermal control mode attitudes. The passive thermal control mode techniques consisted of maneuvering in the pulse mode 9o degrees in yaw once each hour using the pulse mode. To conserve power, the attitude indicators were turned off after the initial passive thermal control mode was started, and attitude monitoring was accomplished by observing gimbal angle readouts from the display keyboard. +------ +Result 2: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ +Result 2: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 11: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nFollowing recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation cha...', 'Result 1:\nFollowing the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evid...', 'Result 1:\nFollowing the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude...', 'Result 1:\nThe reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered man...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered man...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the free-returm midcourse correction, the spacecraft was maneuvered man...', 'Result 1:\nfiring could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before d...', 'Result 1:\nThe passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not ...', 'Result 1:\nThe transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance sys...', 'Result 1:\nThe transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance sys...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +firing could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before doing any control system switching. The passive thermal control mode attempted at 32:2l:49 is compared with a typical case in figure 5.6-l, which shows the adverse effects of two extraneous firings. All subsequent passive thermal control modes using the command and service module were established normally. + + + +NASA-5-70-5825 Figure 5.6-l.- Comparison of early translunar maneuver to establish a passive thermal control mode. +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nfiring could have been avoided procedurally by disabling all engines before d...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +The recurrence of the problem under almost identical circumstances during Apollo l3 indicates that the cause is more likely generic than random and that it is time or vacuum dependent. The susceptibility of the shaft axis rather than the trunnion axis also tends to absolve components common to both axes, such as. the electronics and the motor drive amplifier. The shaft loop has been shown to be more sensitive than the trunnion to harmonics of the 800-hertz reference voltages introduced into the forward loop; however, because the level of the required null offset voltage is well above that available by induction, this mechanism is considered unlikely. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +If the Saturn V vehicle is charged to a potential of several million volts, corona discharges will be produced which, in turn, generate radio noise. The onset of these discharges should occur very soon after liftoff and reach a maximum when the launch vehicle is still close to the ground. Radio noise records strongly support this conclusion. The sudden onset of the noise probably corresponds closely to lift-off. It is interesting that, at about 15 seconds after lift-off, the noise became enhanced at the lower rather than the higher frequencies. This phenomenon implies that larger discharges occur at these times. The most intense discharges would be expected to occur soon after the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume clear the launch tower. + +1l.l.3 Measurement of Pelluric Current +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +It is known that the electrostatic potentials develop on jet aircraft. These are caused by an engine charging current, which is balanced by a corona current loss from the aircraft. For.a conventional jet aircraft, the equilibrium potential can approach a million volts. For the Saturn V launch vehicle, the charging current may be larger than that of a jet aircraft, and therefore, the equilibrium potential for the Saturn vehicle might be on the order of a million volts or more. + +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 2 September 1970 3 Preparati on 4 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation 5 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Preparation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +If the Saturn V vehicle is charged to a potential of several million volts, corona discharges will be produced which, in turn, generate radio noise. The onset of these discharges should occur very soon after liftoff and reach a maximum when the launch vehicle is still close to the ground. Radio noise records strongly support this conclusion. The sudden onset of the noise probably corresponds closely to lift-off. It is interesting that, at about 15 seconds after lift-off, the noise became enhanced at the lower rather than the higher frequencies. This phenomenon implies that larger discharges occur at these times. The most intense discharges would be expected to occur soon after the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume clear the launch tower. + +1l.l.3 Measurement of Pelluric Current +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAt site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive...', 'Result 1:\nIf the Saturn V vehicle is charged to a potential of several million volts, c...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstr...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nIf the Saturn V vehicle is charged to a potential of several million volts, c...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +The potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions during the mission. At about 23 hours, the reading decreased from 98 to 79 percent for about 5 minutes and then returned to a normal reading of approximately l02 percent. Another fluctuation was noted at about 37 hours, at which time the reading decreased from its upper limit to 83.5 percent. The reading then returned to the upper limit in a period of 7 seconds. + +Preflight fluctuations of from 2 to 6 percent near the full level were observed once during the countdown demonstration test, and a possible earlier fluctuation of about 4 percent at the half-full level was noted during the flight readiness test. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions during the mission. At about 23 hours, the reading decreased from 98 to 79 percent for about 5 minutes and then returned to a normal reading of approximately l02 percent. Another fluctuation was noted at about 37 hours, at which time the reading decreased from its upper limit to 83.5 percent. The reading then returned to the upper limit in a period of 7 seconds. + +Preflight fluctuations of from 2 to 6 percent near the full level were observed once during the countdown demonstration test, and a possible earlier fluctuation of about 4 percent at the half-full level was noted during the flight readiness test. +------ +Result 2: +The measurement is not essential for flight safety or mission success. The potable water tank is continually refilled with fuel cell product water, and when the potable water tank is full, fuel cell product water is automatically diverted to the waste water tank, which is periodically dumped overboard. Water from the potable water tank is used mainly for drinking and food reconstitution. Since fuel cell water generation rates can be computed from power generation levels and since potable water usage rates can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, the quantity of water in the potable water tank can be determined with acceptable accuracy without the quantity measurement. + +This anoma.ly is closed. + +14.l.9 Suit Pressure Transducer Failure +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAt site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive...', 'Result 1:\nThe potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions du...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.272, Max reward: 0.875 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: amplitude of fluctuations in optics shaft angle CERN experiment +2025-04-04 at 03:49:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ +Result 2: +A simplified schematic of the optics shaft servo loop mechanization is shown in figure l4-2. In the zero optics mode, the sine outputs of the half-speed and l6-speed resolvers are routed through a coarse/fine switching network to the motor drive amplifier and are used to null the system. Rate feedback from the motor tachometer is routed to the drive amplifier through a compensation network which removes any bias in the signal. When the zero optics mode is selected, the coupling-data-unit counter and the computer register which contains the shaft angle are zeroed for 15 seconds and then released to follow the l6-speed resolver. The half-speed resolver, the fine/coarse switching network, and the tachometer feedback compensation are used only in the zero optics mode. + + + +Figure l4-2.- Zero optics mode circuitry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +(fluctuations in optics shaft angle spectrometer amplitude) +2025-04-04 at 03:49:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ +Result 2: +A simplified schematic of the optics shaft servo loop mechanization is shown in figure l4-2. In the zero optics mode, the sine outputs of the half-speed and l6-speed resolvers are routed through a coarse/fine switching network to the motor drive amplifier and are used to null the system. Rate feedback from the motor tachometer is routed to the drive amplifier through a compensation network which removes any bias in the signal. When the zero optics mode is selected, the coupling-data-unit counter and the computer register which contains the shaft angle are zeroed for 15 seconds and then released to follow the l6-speed resolver. The half-speed resolver, the fine/coarse switching network, and the tachometer feedback compensation are used only in the zero optics mode. + + + +Figure l4-2.- Zero optics mode circuitry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +Apollo mission optics shaft angle fluctuations amplitude +2025-04-04 at 03:49:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ +Result 2: +The recurrence of the problem under almost identical circumstances during Apollo l3 indicates that the cause is more likely generic than random and that it is time or vacuum dependent. The susceptibility of the shaft axis rather than the trunnion axis also tends to absolve components common to both axes, such as. the electronics and the motor drive amplifier. The shaft loop has been shown to be more sensitive than the trunnion to harmonics of the 800-hertz reference voltages introduced into the forward loop; however, because the level of the required null offset voltage is well above that available by induction, this mechanism is considered unlikely. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +Apollo 13 trunnion axis fluctuations +2025-04-04 at 03:49:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The recurrence of the problem under almost identical circumstances during Apollo l3 indicates that the cause is more likely generic than random and that it is time or vacuum dependent. The susceptibility of the shaft axis rather than the trunnion axis also tends to absolve components common to both axes, such as. the electronics and the motor drive amplifier. The shaft loop has been shown to be more sensitive than the trunnion to harmonics of the 800-hertz reference voltages introduced into the forward loop; however, because the level of the required null offset voltage is well above that available by induction, this mechanism is considered unlikely. +------ +Result 2: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +Apollo 13 trunnion axis response +2025-04-04 at 03:49:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 2/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [269, 481, 254, 165, 598, 271] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 339.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 10.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 33.97 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.058 ± 0.130 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.17 ± 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ +Result 2: +A simplified schematic of the optics shaft servo loop mechanization is shown in figure l4-2. In the zero optics mode, the sine outputs of the half-speed and l6-speed resolvers are routed through a coarse/fine switching network to the motor drive amplifier and are used to null the system. Rate feedback from the motor tachometer is routed to the drive amplifier through a compensation network which removes any bias in the signal. When the zero optics mode is selected, the coupling-data-unit counter and the computer register which contains the shaft angle are zeroed for 15 seconds and then released to follow the l6-speed resolver. The half-speed resolver, the fine/coarse switching network, and the tachometer feedback compensation are used only in the zero optics mode. + + + +Figure l4-2.- Zero optics mode circuitry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ +Result 2: +A simplified schematic of the optics shaft servo loop mechanization is shown in figure l4-2. In the zero optics mode, the sine outputs of the half-speed and l6-speed resolvers are routed through a coarse/fine switching network to the motor drive amplifier and are used to null the system. Rate feedback from the motor tachometer is routed to the drive amplifier through a compensation network which removes any bias in the signal. When the zero optics mode is selected, the coupling-data-unit counter and the computer register which contains the shaft angle are zeroed for 15 seconds and then released to follow the l6-speed resolver. The half-speed resolver, the fine/coarse switching network, and the tachometer feedback compensation are used only in the zero optics mode. + + + +Figure l4-2.- Zero optics mode circuitry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ +Result 2: +The recurrence of the problem under almost identical circumstances during Apollo l3 indicates that the cause is more likely generic than random and that it is time or vacuum dependent. The susceptibility of the shaft axis rather than the trunnion axis also tends to absolve components common to both axes, such as. the electronics and the motor drive amplifier. The shaft loop has been shown to be more sensitive than the trunnion to harmonics of the 800-hertz reference voltages introduced into the forward loop; however, because the level of the required null offset voltage is well above that available by induction, this mechanism is considered unlikely. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The recurrence of the problem under almost identical circumstances during Apollo l3 indicates that the cause is more likely generic than random and that it is time or vacuum dependent. The susceptibility of the shaft axis rather than the trunnion axis also tends to absolve components common to both axes, such as. the electronics and the motor drive amplifier. The shaft loop has been shown to be more sensitive than the trunnion to harmonics of the 800-hertz reference voltages introduced into the forward loop; however, because the level of the required null offset voltage is well above that available by induction, this mechanism is considered unlikely. +------ +Result 2: +To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: To guard against operational problems of this type in the future, a caution note has been added in the Apollo Operations Handbook to actuate the ventilation valve handle over its full travel before switching on the postlanding vent fan. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.3 Shaft Fluctuations in the Zero Optics Mode + +Beginning at approximately 4o hours, fluctuations of as much as 0.3 degree were observed in the computer readout of the optics shaft angle. The system had been powered up throughout the flight and had been in the zero optics mode since the star/horizon navigation sightings at 3l hours. Crew observation of the manual readout subsequently confirmed that the fluctuation was actually caused by motion of the shaft. The circumstances and time of occurrence were almost identical to a similar situation which occurred during the Apollo l2 mission. +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.134, Max reward: 0.603 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"tank insulation anomaly culprit +2025-04-04 at 03:49:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +------ +Result 2: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [671, 663, 328, 399, 467, 302] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [27, 27, 27, 27, 27, 27] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 471.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 27.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 17.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +------ +Result 2: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The most likely cause of the anomaly is a tank-insulation degradation which would result in increased heat conduction to the helium. The insulating characteristics of the annular vacuum in tank was most likely degraded by the introduction of a contaminant (probably hydrogen) in extremely small concentrations (approximately $10^{-}{\bar{6}}$ pounds). These contaminants when vaporized can exponentially increase the thermal conductivity in proportion to their vapor pressure, as indicated by special tests. While loading helium into the tank, the contaminants wouid freeze upon the inner shell.. In the frozen state, the pressure of the contaminant is too low to significantly affect the thermal conductivity. However, the flow check which preceded the cold-soak operation would vaporize the contaminants in the vicinity of the heat exchanger lines which pass through the annulus. The subsequent increase in thermal conductivity could cause the abnormally high pressure-rise rate observed during +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:49:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.033, Max reward: 0.200 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: command module pilot of Apollo 11 or Apollo 7 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: command module pilot apollo 11 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot of the historic space mission +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Who was the Command Module Pilot in the Apollo missions that achieved the historic first landing on the Moon? +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Neil Armstrong Command Module Pilot +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 Command Module Pilot's name +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Who was the Command Module Pilot on the first lunar landing mission of the United States? +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Neil Armstrong Apollo 11 duties Command Module Pilot +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 crew members +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo Moon Landing +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo mission Command Module Pilot names +2025-04-04 at 03:49:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo Moon Landing Historical Figures +2025-04-04 at 03:49:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 command module crew +2025-04-04 at 03:49:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo Moon Landing Mission +2025-04-04 at 03:49:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:49:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Michael Collins Apollo 11 mission +2025-04-04 at 03:49:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:49:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:49:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Michael Collins Apollo 11 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 crew members +2025-04-04 at 03:50:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo Lunar Abort Mission +2025-04-04 at 03:50:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 crew names +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, True, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [379, 329, 257, 2033, 223, 1984] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 867.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 20.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 43.38 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.333, Valid formats: 2.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 6/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.167 ± 0.251 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.67 ± 1.11 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [1, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ["Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nThe unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generatio...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi..."] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generatio...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nMedical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as ...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\n(section ll.3).\n------\nResult 2:\n+21.0 +3.0\n------\n...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had b...', 'Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nFollowing the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.267, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:05 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.141, Max reward: 0.446 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo initial accelerometer bias translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons initial accelerometer bias before translunar injection" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What was the initial accelerometer bias of the Apollo 11 spacecraft before translunar injection? +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons S-IVB initialization accelerometer bias" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What was the translunar injection velocity of the Apollo 11 spacecraft? +2025-04-04 at 03:50:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons launch vehicle X-axis bias" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The error counters for the coupling display units are used by the digital autopilot for attitude error displays, but are also used to drive the platform during a coarse alignment. A platform coarse alignment was performed at about l35 hours, and the error-counter-enable status bit was set. The digital autopilot was activated 2 hours later, but with the error cournters already enabled, no initialization took place and a bias was introduced into the attitude error loop. The attitude errors displayed to the crew at the completion of the attitude maneuver prior to the seventh midcourse correction reflected a bias in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes of plus l.3, plus 2l.2, and minus l2.0 degrees, respectively. + +Spacecraft dynamics were very small during the service module jettison and lunar module undocking sequence. Velocity changes imparted to the respective vehicles during each maneuver were as follows: + +6.4.2 Translation Maneuvers +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: NASA Apollo 11 initial velocity before translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 03:50:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons launch vehicle Y-axis bias" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +The error counters for the coupling display units are used by the digital autopilot for attitude error displays, but are also used to drive the platform during a coarse alignment. A platform coarse alignment was performed at about l35 hours, and the error-counter-enable status bit was set. The digital autopilot was activated 2 hours later, but with the error cournters already enabled, no initialization took place and a bias was introduced into the attitude error loop. The attitude errors displayed to the crew at the completion of the attitude maneuver prior to the seventh midcourse correction reflected a bias in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes of plus l.3, plus 2l.2, and minus l2.0 degrees, respectively. + +Spacecraft dynamics were very small during the service module jettison and lunar module undocking sequence. Velocity changes imparted to the respective vehicles during each maneuver were as follows: + +6.4.2 Translation Maneuvers +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: initial velocity of the Apollo 11 spacecraft before translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 03:50:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons translunar injection errors due to launch phase 1" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Translunar phase Event Reference body Time, hr:min:sec Latitude, aeg Longitude, deg Altitude above launcn : pad, miles Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec Space-fixed fiight-path angle,deg Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N S-IVB second ignition Earth 2:35:46.4 22.488 142.45E 105.39 25 573.1 .032 65.708 S-IVB second cutoff Earth 2:41:37.2 9.39S 166.45E 175.71 35 562.6 7.182 59.443 Translunar injection Earth 2:41:47.2 8.92S 167.21E 182.45 35 538.4 7.635 59.318 Cormand and service module/S-IVB separation Earth 3:06:38.9 27.03N 129.67W 3 778.54 25 027.8 45.034 72.297 Docking Earth 3:19:08.8 30.21N 118.10W 5 934.90 21 881.4 51.507 79.351 Spacecraft/S-IVB sepa- ration Earth 4:01:00.8 31.95N 105.30W 12 455.83 16 619.0 61.092 91.491 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutofr Second midcourse correction Earth Earth 30:40:49.6 30:40:53.1 22.93N 22.80N 101.85W 101.86w 121 381.93 121 385.43 4 682.5 4 685.6 77.464 77.743 112.843 112.751 Ignition Cutoff Earth Earth 61:29:43.5 61:30:17.7 20.85N 20.74N +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: initial velocity of the Apollo 11 spacecraft before translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 03:50:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons launch vehicle Y-axis initialization" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: translunar injection time Apollo 11 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "New Horizons attitude initialization 105 hours" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +Following translunar injection, earth weather photography was conducted for approximately 6 hours. + +The first period of translunar navigation (Program 23) at 6 hours was done to establish the apparent horizon attitude for optical marks in the computer. Some manual maneuvering was required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern at the point of horizon-star superposition. The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, and both periods were accomplished within the timeline and reaction control fuel budget. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Launch time of Apollo 11 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Event Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-off - 19:13:00.65 G.m.t., April 1l, 1970 S-IC outboard engine cutoff S-II engine igmition (command time) Launch escape tower jettison S-II engine cutoff S-IVB engine ignition (command time) S-IVB engine cutoff Translunar injection maneuver S-IVB/command and service module separation Docking Spacecraft ejection S-IVB separation maneuver First midcourse correction (service propulsion) Cryogenic oxygen tank incident Second midcourse correction (descent propulsion) S--IVB lunar impact Transearth injection (aescent propulsion) Third midcourse correction (descent propulsion) Fourth midcourse correction (LM reaction control) 00:02:44 00:02:45 00:03:21 00:09:53 00:09:54 00:12:30 02:35:46 03:06:39 03:19:09 04:01:01 04:18:01 30 :40 :50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56: 40 79:27:39 105:18:28 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 launch time +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Event Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-off - 19:13:00.65 G.m.t., April 1l, 1970 S-IC outboard engine cutoff S-II engine igmition (command time) Launch escape tower jettison S-II engine cutoff S-IVB engine ignition (command time) S-IVB engine cutoff Translunar injection maneuver S-IVB/command and service module separation Docking Spacecraft ejection S-IVB separation maneuver First midcourse correction (service propulsion) Cryogenic oxygen tank incident Second midcourse correction (descent propulsion) S--IVB lunar impact Transearth injection (aescent propulsion) Third midcourse correction (descent propulsion) Fourth midcourse correction (LM reaction control) 00:02:44 00:02:45 00:03:21 00:09:53 00:09:54 00:12:30 02:35:46 03:06:39 03:19:09 04:01:01 04:18:01 30 :40 :50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56: 40 79:27:39 105:18:28 +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 1/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [265, 278, 1583, 383, 566, 1918] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 832.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 6.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 138.69 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The error counters for the coupling display units are used by the digital autopilot for attitude error displays, but are also used to drive the platform during a coarse alignment. A platform coarse alignment was performed at about l35 hours, and the error-counter-enable status bit was set. The digital autopilot was activated 2 hours later, but with the error cournters already enabled, no initialization took place and a bias was introduced into the attitude error loop. The attitude errors displayed to the crew at the completion of the attitude maneuver prior to the seventh midcourse correction reflected a bias in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes of plus l.3, plus 2l.2, and minus l2.0 degrees, respectively. + +Spacecraft dynamics were very small during the service module jettison and lunar module undocking sequence. Velocity changes imparted to the respective vehicles during each maneuver were as follows: + +6.4.2 Translation Maneuvers +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ +Result 2: +The error counters for the coupling display units are used by the digital autopilot for attitude error displays, but are also used to drive the platform during a coarse alignment. A platform coarse alignment was performed at about l35 hours, and the error-counter-enable status bit was set. The digital autopilot was activated 2 hours later, but with the error cournters already enabled, no initialization took place and a bias was introduced into the attitude error loop. The attitude errors displayed to the crew at the completion of the attitude maneuver prior to the seventh midcourse correction reflected a bias in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes of plus l.3, plus 2l.2, and minus l2.0 degrees, respectively. + +Spacecraft dynamics were very small during the service module jettison and lunar module undocking sequence. Velocity changes imparted to the respective vehicles during each maneuver were as follows: + +6.4.2 Translation Maneuvers +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Translunar phase Event Reference body Time, hr:min:sec Latitude, aeg Longitude, deg Altitude above launcn : pad, miles Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec Space-fixed fiight-path angle,deg Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N S-IVB second ignition Earth 2:35:46.4 22.488 142.45E 105.39 25 573.1 .032 65.708 S-IVB second cutoff Earth 2:41:37.2 9.39S 166.45E 175.71 35 562.6 7.182 59.443 Translunar injection Earth 2:41:47.2 8.92S 167.21E 182.45 35 538.4 7.635 59.318 Cormand and service module/S-IVB separation Earth 3:06:38.9 27.03N 129.67W 3 778.54 25 027.8 45.034 72.297 Docking Earth 3:19:08.8 30.21N 118.10W 5 934.90 21 881.4 51.507 79.351 Spacecraft/S-IVB sepa- ration Earth 4:01:00.8 31.95N 105.30W 12 455.83 16 619.0 61.092 91.491 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutofr Second midcourse correction Earth Earth 30:40:49.6 30:40:53.1 22.93N 22.80N 101.85W 101.86w 121 381.93 121 385.43 4 682.5 4 685.6 77.464 77.743 112.843 112.751 Ignition Cutoff Earth Earth 61:29:43.5 61:30:17.7 20.85N 20.74N +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +Table 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity differences between the S-IvB instrument unit and the command module platform during earth ascent indicate a 75-ft/sec difference in the Y-axis. A Y-axis difference is typical of a command module platform gyrocompassing misalignment at lift-off. However, the Y-axis error magnitude is not typical and is the largest observed during ascent to date. The cause of the discrepancy was the magnitude of the null bias drift +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +Following translunar injection, earth weather photography was conducted for approximately 6 hours. + +The first period of translunar navigation (Program 23) at 6 hours was done to establish the apparent horizon attitude for optical marks in the computer. Some manual maneuvering was required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern at the point of horizon-star superposition. The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, and both periods were accomplished within the timeline and reaction control fuel budget. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...', 'Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nThe error counters for the coupling display units are used by the digital aut...', 'Result 1:\nTable 5.6-II summarizes the inertial component preflight histories. Velocity ...', 'Result 1:\nTranslunar phase Event Reference body Time, hr:min:sec Latitude, aeg Longitud...', 'Result 1:\nAt approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion ma...', 'Result 1:\nAt approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion ma...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Event Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-off - 19:13:00.65 G.m.t., April 1l, 1970 S-IC outboard engine cutoff S-II engine igmition (command time) Launch escape tower jettison S-II engine cutoff S-IVB engine ignition (command time) S-IVB engine cutoff Translunar injection maneuver S-IVB/command and service module separation Docking Spacecraft ejection S-IVB separation maneuver First midcourse correction (service propulsion) Cryogenic oxygen tank incident Second midcourse correction (descent propulsion) S--IVB lunar impact Transearth injection (aescent propulsion) Third midcourse correction (descent propulsion) Fourth midcourse correction (LM reaction control) 00:02:44 00:02:45 00:03:21 00:09:53 00:09:54 00:12:30 02:35:46 03:06:39 03:19:09 04:01:01 04:18:01 30 :40 :50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56: 40 79:27:39 105:18:28 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Event Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-off - 19:13:00.65 G.m.t., April 1l, 1970 S-IC outboard engine cutoff S-II engine igmition (command time) Launch escape tower jettison S-II engine cutoff S-IVB engine ignition (command time) S-IVB engine cutoff Translunar injection maneuver S-IVB/command and service module separation Docking Spacecraft ejection S-IVB separation maneuver First midcourse correction (service propulsion) Cryogenic oxygen tank incident Second midcourse correction (descent propulsion) S--IVB lunar impact Transearth injection (aescent propulsion) Third midcourse correction (descent propulsion) Fourth midcourse correction (LM reaction control) 00:02:44 00:02:45 00:03:21 00:09:53 00:09:54 00:12:30 02:35:46 03:06:39 03:19:09 04:01:01 04:18:01 30 :40 :50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56: 40 79:27:39 105:18:28 +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...', 'Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...', 'Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...', 'Result 1:\nEvent Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-o...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:29 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.068, Max reward: 0.207 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: propellant load service propulsion system spacecraft sum total +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ``columbia space shuttle service propulsion system tanks propellant capacity`` +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "SpaceX Raptor engine Propellant tank capacity" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo Service Propulsion System total propellant load +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"apollo sm service propulsion system propellant mass" + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Artemis service propulsion system propellant load +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Bay 2 propellant consumption total +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo Mission Descent Propulsion System Propellant Load +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"apollo s1 service propulsion system propellant load" + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: moon lunar module Artemis service propulsion system total propellant load +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: space shuttle service propulsion system propellant load +2025-04-04 at 03:50:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"apollo s1 service propulsion system propellant load calculation method" + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: how much propellant was loaded into the service module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: total propellant in service module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ��️ Information: Result 1: +Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: space shuttle service module propellant, mass or numbers of propellant +2025-04-04 at 03:50:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: command module propellant, mass +2025-04-04 at 03:50:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: total propellant lunar module +2025-04-04 at 03:50:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module propellant mass or total amount +2025-04-04 at 03:50:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module total mass +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [226, 872, 399, 465, 430, 355] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 457.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 5.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 91.57 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.083 ± 0.186 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.33 ± 0.75 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nService module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control sy...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAll service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to t...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nFuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5...', 'Result 1:\nThe command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at whi...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSpacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table ...', 'Result 1:\nFuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5...', 'Result 1:\nFuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Consumable usages for the command and service modules prior to the incident were nominal. Following the incident and the attendant shutdowm of command module power, the only consumables used prior to entry were drinking water and surge-tank oxygen, required to pressurize the potable water tank. Specific consumable usages for appropriate systems are presented in the following paragraphs. + +7.l.l Service Propulsion Propellants + +The service propulsion system was used only for the first midcourse correction. The propellant loadings listed in the following table were calculated from gaging system readings and measured densities prior to lift-off. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer, lb Total Loaded In tanks 15 606 24960 In lines "79 124 Total 15 685 25084 40769 Consume d 92.3 147 239.3 Remaining at time of incident 15 592.7 24937 40 529.7 + +7.1.2 Reaction Control Propellants +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nService module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control sy...', 'Result 1:\nThe command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at whi...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.200, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:50:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.255, Max reward: 0.421 +2025-04-04 at 03:50:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Vehicle exterior shades material future metallic or synthetic +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What materials are used in automotive sunshades or visor covers for future vehicles? +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: material for vehicle shades next generation +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"what material will be used for shades in future electric and autonomous vehicles" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Thin-film coatings for vehicle shades+ +2025-04-04 at 03:50:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: search for "lightweight materials for automotive window shades" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Aclar material used in future vehicle shades +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: material for vehicle shades lunar missions +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"materials used for automotive shades" +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Mylar tape Beta Cloth backing spacecraft shades +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:50:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Aclar material cracking and embrittlement in shades +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: m material for vehicle shades used in space +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Aclar supplier material process elongation 25 percent" +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Aclar Mylar tape Beta Cloth shade material +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: material for vehicle shades used in future space missions +2025-04-04 at 03:51:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"types of materials used for automotive interior shades" +2025-04-04 at 03:51:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: material used for eyeshades in space suits +2025-04-04 at 03:51:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:07 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:51:07 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 6/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [317, 254, 162, 658, 523, 407] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 386.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 5.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 77.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.333, Valid formats: 2.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.267 ± 0.387 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.33 ± 1.97 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 5, 0, 3, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 6.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 1.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.433, Perfect scores: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.386, Max reward: 0.719 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Oxygen supply tank total capacity burst incident +2025-04-04 at 03:51:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, lb Oxygen, 1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Consumed Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the incident Tank 1 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Totals 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy gen + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization.bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately l4 poumds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 1/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [120, 176, 382, 338, 262, 28] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 217.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 11.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 19.79 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, lb Oxygen, 1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Consumed Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the incident Tank 1 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Totals 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy gen + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization.bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately l4 poumds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation followin...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.033, Max reward: 0.200 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: altitude oblate spheroid Earth unit of measurement +2025-04-04 at 03:51:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: altitude above an oblate earth reference model in meters +2025-04-04 at 03:51:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: orbital altitude unit apogee +2025-04-04 at 03:51:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Height of mesosphere above Earth's surface +2025-04-04 at 03:51:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: orbital altitude unit standard +2025-04-04 at 03:51:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Altitude of geostationary satellites +2025-04-04 at 03:51:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Countdown value altitude unit +2025-04-04 at 03:51:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +The potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions during the mission. At about 23 hours, the reading decreased from 98 to 79 percent for about 5 minutes and then returned to a normal reading of approximately l02 percent. Another fluctuation was noted at about 37 hours, at which time the reading decreased from its upper limit to 83.5 percent. The reading then returned to the upper limit in a period of 7 seconds. + +Preflight fluctuations of from 2 to 6 percent near the full level were observed once during the countdown demonstration test, and a possible earlier fluctuation of about 4 percent at the half-full level was noted during the flight readiness test. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Orbital altitude definition mile +2025-04-04 at 03:51:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: orbital altitude unit altitude measurement +2025-04-04 at 03:51:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Pericynthion altitude and unit of measurement +2025-04-04 at 03:51:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Maneuver System Ignition time, hr:min:sec Firing time; sec Velocity change. ft/sec Resultant pericynthion conditions Altitude sboveianding site,miles Velocity; ft/sec Latitude, deg Longitude, deg Pericynthion arrival time, hr:min;sec Translunar injection S-IVB 2:35:46.4 350.8 10039 86.8 8184.4 1.47N 178.52E 77:56:22 First midcourse correction Service prcpulsion 30:40:49.6 3.5 23.2 63.2 8277.9 3.34N 178.93E 77:28:39 Second midcourse correction Descentpropulsion 61:29:43.5 34.2 37.8 136. 8053.4 3.02N 179.29W 77:20:57 + +(b) Transearth +------ +Result 2: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, False, True, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [310, 143, 361, 5, 284, 1163] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 377.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 4.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 94.42 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.333, Valid formats: 2.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.317 ± 0.448 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.67 ± 2.36 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 5, 0, 5, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +The potable water quantity measurement fluctuated briefly on two occasions during the mission. At about 23 hours, the reading decreased from 98 to 79 percent for about 5 minutes and then returned to a normal reading of approximately l02 percent. Another fluctuation was noted at about 37 hours, at which time the reading decreased from its upper limit to 83.5 percent. The reading then returned to the upper limit in a period of 7 seconds. + +Preflight fluctuations of from 2 to 6 percent near the full level were observed once during the countdown demonstration test, and a possible earlier fluctuation of about 4 percent at the half-full level was noted during the flight readiness test. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Maneuver System Ignition time, hr:min:sec Firing time; sec Velocity change. ft/sec Resultant pericynthion conditions Altitude sboveianding site,miles Velocity; ft/sec Latitude, deg Longitude, deg Pericynthion arrival time, hr:min;sec Translunar injection S-IVB 2:35:46.4 350.8 10039 86.8 8184.4 1.47N 178.52E 77:56:22 First midcourse correction Service prcpulsion 30:40:49.6 3.5 23.2 63.2 8277.9 3.34N 178.93E 77:28:39 Second midcourse correction Descentpropulsion 61:29:43.5 34.2 37.8 136. 8053.4 3.02N 179.29W 77:20:57 + +(b) Transearth +------ +Result 2: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.205, Max reward: 0.655 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: S-band communication system actuation time +2025-04-04 at 03:51:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the high-gain antenna experienced an apparent switch from narrow to wide beamwidth, with a resultant temporary loss of telemetry data. This occurrence coincided with the oxygen tank pressure loss. Post-separation photographs of the service module show damage to the high-gain antenna, which is attributed to the loss of a Service module outer panel. This damage, as discussed in reference l, caused the beam switch and the resultant loss of data. + +From 101:53:00 to 102:02:00 and from 123:05:00 to 123:12:00, the communications system was powered up to the extent necessary to transmit high-bit-rate telemetry data using the omnidirectional antennas. The S-band system was turned on for verification prior to undocking and performed nominally. The VHF/AM and VHF recovery systems were turned on at parachute deployment and operated nominally throughout recovery. + +5.5 INS TRUMENTATION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: nominal S-band communications duration from system actuation +2025-04-04 at 03:51:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the high-gain antenna experienced an apparent switch from narrow to wide beamwidth, with a resultant temporary loss of telemetry data. This occurrence coincided with the oxygen tank pressure loss. Post-separation photographs of the service module show damage to the high-gain antenna, which is attributed to the loss of a Service module outer panel. This damage, as discussed in reference l, caused the beam switch and the resultant loss of data. + +From 101:53:00 to 102:02:00 and from 123:05:00 to 123:12:00, the communications system was powered up to the extent necessary to transmit high-bit-rate telemetry data using the omnidirectional antennas. The S-band system was turned on for verification prior to undocking and performed nominally. The VHF/AM and VHF recovery systems were turned on at parachute deployment and operated nominally throughout recovery. + +5.5 INS TRUMENTATION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: S-band communication duration lunar module +2025-04-04 at 03:51:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +Attempt to impact the expended S-IVB stage on the lunar surface within 350 km of the targeted impact point of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude under nominal flight control conditions to excite the Apollo l2 seismometer. + +b. Postflight determination of the actual time and location of S-IVF impact to within. l second. + +Both objectives were accomplished, and the results are documented in reference 2. The impact was successfully detected by the seismometer and is reported in greater detail in section ll.3. + +Seven scientific experiments, in addition to those contained in the lunar surface experiment package, were also assigned as follows: + +a. Lunar field geology (S-059) b. Pilot describing function (T-029) c. Solar wind composition (S-080) d. S-band transponder exercise (S-164) e. Downlink bistatic radar observations of the moon (S-170) f. Gegenschein observation from lunar orbit (S-178) g。 Lunar surface closeup photography (S-184) +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: 58-hour mark S-band communication duration +2025-04-04 at 03:51:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the high-gain antenna experienced an apparent switch from narrow to wide beamwidth, with a resultant temporary loss of telemetry data. This occurrence coincided with the oxygen tank pressure loss. Post-separation photographs of the service module show damage to the high-gain antenna, which is attributed to the loss of a Service module outer panel. This damage, as discussed in reference l, caused the beam switch and the resultant loss of data. + +From 101:53:00 to 102:02:00 and from 123:05:00 to 123:12:00, the communications system was powered up to the extent necessary to transmit high-bit-rate telemetry data using the omnidirectional antennas. The S-band system was turned on for verification prior to undocking and performed nominally. The VHF/AM and VHF recovery systems were turned on at parachute deployment and operated nominally throughout recovery. + +5.5 INS TRUMENTATION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, True, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [571, 375, 185, 86, 216, 426] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [22, 22, 22, 22, 22, 22] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 309.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 22.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 14.08 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.125 ± 0.177 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.83 ± 1.46 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the high-gain antenna experienced an apparent switch from narrow to wide beamwidth, with a resultant temporary loss of telemetry data. This occurrence coincided with the oxygen tank pressure loss. Post-separation photographs of the service module show damage to the high-gain antenna, which is attributed to the loss of a Service module outer panel. This damage, as discussed in reference l, caused the beam switch and the resultant loss of data. + +From 101:53:00 to 102:02:00 and from 123:05:00 to 123:12:00, the communications system was powered up to the extent necessary to transmit high-bit-rate telemetry data using the omnidirectional antennas. The S-band system was turned on for verification prior to undocking and performed nominally. The VHF/AM and VHF recovery systems were turned on at parachute deployment and operated nominally throughout recovery. + +5.5 INS TRUMENTATION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +Attempt to impact the expended S-IVB stage on the lunar surface within 350 km of the targeted impact point of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude under nominal flight control conditions to excite the Apollo l2 seismometer. + +b. Postflight determination of the actual time and location of S-IVF impact to within. l second. + +Both objectives were accomplished, and the results are documented in reference 2. The impact was successfully detected by the seismometer and is reported in greater detail in section ll.3. + +Seven scientific experiments, in addition to those contained in the lunar surface experiment package, were also assigned as follows: + +a. Lunar field geology (S-059) b. Pilot describing function (T-029) c. Solar wind composition (S-080) d. S-band transponder exercise (S-164) e. Downlink bistatic radar observations of the moon (S-170) f. Gegenschein observation from lunar orbit (S-178) g。 Lunar surface closeup photography (S-184) +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the high-gain antenna experienced an apparent switch from narrow to wide beamwidth, with a resultant temporary loss of telemetry data. This occurrence coincided with the oxygen tank pressure loss. Post-separation photographs of the service module show damage to the high-gain antenna, which is attributed to the loss of a Service module outer panel. This damage, as discussed in reference l, caused the beam switch and the resultant loss of data. + +From 101:53:00 to 102:02:00 and from 123:05:00 to 123:12:00, the communications system was powered up to the extent necessary to transmit high-bit-rate telemetry data using the omnidirectional antennas. The S-band system was turned on for verification prior to undocking and performed nominally. The VHF/AM and VHF recovery systems were turned on at parachute deployment and operated nominally throughout recovery. + +5.5 INS TRUMENTATION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the high-gain antenna experienced an apparent switch from narrow to wide beamwidth, with a resultant temporary loss of telemetry data. This occurrence coincided with the oxygen tank pressure loss. Post-separation photographs of the service module show damage to the high-gain antenna, which is attributed to the loss of a Service module outer panel. This damage, as discussed in reference l, caused the beam switch and the resultant loss of data. + +From 101:53:00 to 102:02:00 and from 123:05:00 to 123:12:00, the communications system was powered up to the extent necessary to transmit high-bit-rate telemetry data using the omnidirectional antennas. The S-band system was turned on for verification prior to undocking and performed nominally. The VHF/AM and VHF recovery systems were turned on at parachute deployment and operated nominally throughout recovery. + +5.5 INS TRUMENTATION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:35 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.181, Max reward: 0.884 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "insulation used in S-Il debris reentry Space Shuttle Columbia +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +All mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, was a gas leak from one of two breech assemblies in the apex cover jettison system, and this problem is discussed in section 14.l.6. In addition, docking timnel insulation, which normally remains with the lunar module after separation, was noted from photographs to have cracked and expanded radially. Since the cracking is believed to occur during pyrotechnic firing and has been seen in past flights, it is not a problem. + +Structural temperatures remained within acceptable limits throughout the mission. However, because of the long cold-soak period following powering down, the comnand module structure exhibited significantly lower temperatures than has been observed in previous flights. + +5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER + +5.2.1 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: spacecraft s1x insulation +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ���️ Information: Result 1: +All mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, was a gas leak from one of two breech assemblies in the apex cover jettison system, and this problem is discussed in section 14.l.6. In addition, docking timnel insulation, which normally remains with the lunar module after separation, was noted from photographs to have cracked and expanded radially. Since the cracking is believed to occur during pyrotechnic firing and has been seen in past flights, it is not a problem. + +Structural temperatures remained within acceptable limits throughout the mission. However, because of the long cold-soak period following powering down, the comnand module structure exhibited significantly lower temperatures than has been observed in previous flights. + +5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER + +5.2.1 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: space shuttle s-Il insulation +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ +Result 2: +All mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, was a gas leak from one of two breech assemblies in the apex cover jettison system, and this problem is discussed in section 14.l.6. In addition, docking timnel insulation, which normally remains with the lunar module after separation, was noted from photographs to have cracked and expanded radially. Since the cracking is believed to occur during pyrotechnic firing and has been seen in past flights, it is not a problem. + +Structural temperatures remained within acceptable limits throughout the mission. However, because of the long cold-soak period following powering down, the comnand module structure exhibited significantly lower temperatures than has been observed in previous flights. + +5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER + +5.2.1 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "S-Il stage insulation specifications +2025-04-04 at 03:51:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Structural loads experienced during S-IC boost were well below design values, with maximum lateral loads approximately 25 percent of the design value. As a result of high amplitude longitudinal oscillations during S-Il boost, the center engine experienced a l32-second premature cutoff. At 330.6 seconds, the S-II crossbeam oscillaticns reached a peak amplitude of +33.7g: Corresponding center-engine chamber pressure oscillations of ±225 psi initiated engine cutoff through the "thrust OK" switches. These responses were the highest measured amplitude for any S-Il flight. Except for the unexpected high amplitude, oscillations in this range are an inherent characteristic of the present S-II structure/propulsion configuration and have been experienced on previous flights. Acceleration levels experienced at various vehicle stations during the period of peak oscillations indicate that the vehicle did not transmit the large magnitude oscillations to the spacecraft. Installation of an +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 6/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, True, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [806, 263, 244, 377, 320, 296] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 384.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 10.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 38.43 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.142 ± 0.205 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.50 ± 0.76 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +All mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, was a gas leak from one of two breech assemblies in the apex cover jettison system, and this problem is discussed in section 14.l.6. In addition, docking timnel insulation, which normally remains with the lunar module after separation, was noted from photographs to have cracked and expanded radially. Since the cracking is believed to occur during pyrotechnic firing and has been seen in past flights, it is not a problem. + +Structural temperatures remained within acceptable limits throughout the mission. However, because of the long cold-soak period following powering down, the comnand module structure exhibited significantly lower temperatures than has been observed in previous flights. + +5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER + +5.2.1 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Structural loads experienced during S-IC boost were well below design values, with maximum lateral loads approximately 25 percent of the design value. As a result of high amplitude longitudinal oscillations during S-Il boost, the center engine experienced a l32-second premature cutoff. At 330.6 seconds, the S-II crossbeam oscillaticns reached a peak amplitude of +33.7g: Corresponding center-engine chamber pressure oscillations of ±225 psi initiated engine cutoff through the "thrust OK" switches. These responses were the highest measured amplitude for any S-Il flight. Except for the unexpected high amplitude, oscillations in this range are an inherent characteristic of the present S-II structure/propulsion configuration and have been experienced on previous flights. Acceleration levels experienced at various vehicle stations during the period of peak oscillations indicate that the vehicle did not transmit the large magnitude oscillations to the spacecraft. Installation of an +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +All mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, was a gas leak from one of two breech assemblies in the apex cover jettison system, and this problem is discussed in section 14.l.6. In addition, docking timnel insulation, which normally remains with the lunar module after separation, was noted from photographs to have cracked and expanded radially. Since the cracking is believed to occur during pyrotechnic firing and has been seen in past flights, it is not a problem. + +Structural temperatures remained within acceptable limits throughout the mission. However, because of the long cold-soak period following powering down, the comnand module structure exhibited significantly lower temperatures than has been observed in previous flights. + +5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER + +5.2.1 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAll mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ +Result 2: +All mechanical systems functioned properly. One mechanical anomaly, however, was a gas leak from one of two breech assemblies in the apex cover jettison system, and this problem is discussed in section 14.l.6. In addition, docking timnel insulation, which normally remains with the lunar module after separation, was noted from photographs to have cracked and expanded radially. Since the cracking is believed to occur during pyrotechnic firing and has been seen in past flights, it is not a problem. + +Structural temperatures remained within acceptable limits throughout the mission. However, because of the long cold-soak period following powering down, the comnand module structure exhibited significantly lower temperatures than has been observed in previous flights. + +5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER + +5.2.1 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nTemperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in respo...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.195, Max reward: 0.768 +2025-04-04 at 03:51:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Lunar module mass and moments of inertia after launch +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: product of inertia lunar module before cryotenic oxygen tank ignition +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +lunar module mass distribution after cryotenic oxygen tank ignition Apoll 11 mission +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module product of inertia before cryogenic tank ignition +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo lunar module inertial measurements and corrections +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apogee computer lunar module product of inertia +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +lunar module dimensions Apollo 11 mission mass +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: product of inertia lunar module IMU +2025-04-04 at 03:51:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "method of determining product of inertia from sun vector and acceleration measurements +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module product of inertia calculation +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module axial symmetry reference +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "alignment of inertial measurement unit accelerometers to inertial reference frame using sun and moon +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module inertial measurement calculation method +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: axial symmetry reference formula +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ +Result 2: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:51:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "three-dimensional inertial alignment using sun and moon or other celestial bodies +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: inertial calculus lunar module +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ +Result 2: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: security exterior stability reference system math +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +sufficient accuracy to permit a safe earth entry. +------ +Result 2: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: moment of inertia of the lunar module +2025-04-04 at 03:52:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: axial moment of inertia spacecraft attitude control +2025-04-04 at 03:52:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: product of inertia lunar module simulation +2025-04-04 at 03:52:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module attitude locks +2025-04-04 at 03:52:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo lunar module attitude dynamics +2025-04-04 at 03:52:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo lunar module mass properties +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 2/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [2281, 1223, 404, 1899, 487, 979] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 1212.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 5.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 242.43 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.158 ± 0.354 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.00 ± 2.24 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSpacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table ...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nEarth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in bo...', 'Result 1:\nEarth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in bo...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ +Result 2: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nA.2 LUNAR MODULE\n------\nResult 2:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platfor...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nThe maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time con...', 'Result 1:\nFollowing the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude...', 'Result 1:\nSpacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table A-I. These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data as presented in other sections of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight, and the inertia values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated. + +TABLE A-I.- MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at wh...', 'Result 1:\nSpacecraft mass properties for the Apollo l2 mission are summarized in table ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflector, to shade the thermal plate from the direct sunlight, and a sensor package with aperture and dust cover. + +A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE + +Spray foam was used exclusively as insulation in the S-Il stage to reduce weight. A fourth battery was installed in the instrument unit to extend the tracking capability to lunar distance in support of the S-IVB lunar impact experiment. Telemetry measurements in the inertial platform were added and, in some cases, were relocated to provide a more complete analysis of platform vibrations. Four wires were added to the distributor in the emergency detection system, located in the instrument unit, to provide automatic ground command capability at spacecraft separation in the event of a contingency separation. + +A.5 MASS PROPERTIES +------ +Result 2: +After the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which the lunar module platform was aligned. All power to the guidance and navigation system, including the inertial measurment unit heaters: was removed at about 58 hours. Heater power was applied about 80 hours later, when the inertial measurement unit was put into standby and the computer turned on. Based upon ground test data and two short periods. of telemetry, the minimum temperature is estimated to have reached $55^{\circ}$ Or $60^{\circ}$ F before power-up. The only significant coefficient shift observed after the long cold soak was in the Z-axis accelerometer bias. The shift was compensated for by an update at 14l hours from minus $0.04\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ to the new value of minus $1.66~\mathsf{c m}/\mathsf{s e c}^{2}$ . Although no gyro measurements were obtained just prior to entry, the precision of the landing indicated no large misalignments . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +A.2 LUNAR MODULE +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ +Result 2: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +sufficient accuracy to permit a safe earth entry. +------ +Result 2: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +To conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband was established using primary guidance. Because the platform was not aligned with & passive thermal control mode reference matrix, yawing the vehicle each hour resulted in inner and middle gimbal angle deviations. The crew could not determine any standard procedure to keep the middle angle constant during the maneuver. As the spacecraft maneuvered from one quadrant to the next, the same thrust/translation controller assembly input wouid result in a different effect in controlling the middle gimb al angle. + +8.7.5 Platform Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Earth-centered inertial coordinates. Bystem. **Change in velocity showm in body X-axis for descent propulsion firings under control of abort guidance + +The primary guidance system was powered up at 133-l/2 hours, after which a coarse alignment to the abort guidance system was performed. The spacecraft axes had previously been aligned to an inertial reference using the abort guidance system by sighting on the earth with the crew optical alignment sight. Alignment accuracy was refined by performing a realignment using the sun and moon as sighting targets for the alignment optical telescope. The star-angle difference of minus l.l2 degrees resulted almost entirely from approximations in stored lunar and solar ephemeris data and computer routines used to calculate sun and moon position vectors. + +6.4.4 Inertial Measurement Unit +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAfter the oxygen tank incident, the platform was used as a reference to which...', 'Result 1:\nThe experiment consisted of an electronics package with sunshield and reflect...', 'Result 1:\nA.2 LUNAR MODULE\n------\nResult 2:\nTo assure the alignment accuracy of the lun...', 'Result 1:\nTime hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing an...', 'Result 1:\nsufficient accuracy to permit a safe earth entry.\n------\nResult 2:\nEarth-cent...', 'Result 1:\nTo conserve reaction control fuel when holding an attitude, a wide deadband w...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.233, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:14 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.426, Max reward: 0.718 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "X-axis accelerometer standard deviation of scale factor error" +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: accelerator scale factor error standard deviation +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: x-axis accelerometer standard deviation of scale factor error +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: scale factor error X-axis accelerometer standard deviation +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Accelerometer X-axis scale factor error standard deviation +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: x-axis accelerometer standard deviation of scale factor error +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration error X-axis accelerometer standard deviation +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: X-axis accelerometer scale factor error standard deviation +2025-04-04 at 03:52:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: standard deviation of X-axis accelerometer error +2025-04-04 at 03:52:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: accelerometer X-axis standard deviation X-axis bias 10.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [291, 150, 201, 517, 228, 756] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 357.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 4.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 89.29 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.133 ± 0.298 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.67 ± 1.49 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Accelerometer bias Sample me an, Standard deviation, Number of Bample8 Final cali- bration value, Fiight load, X 36.9 16.3 18 57.0 60.0 人 -32.6 10.0 18 -32.0 -31.0 2 -1.6 32.3 18 16.0 47.0 Accelerometer scale factor Standard deviation, udd Number of 8amples Final cali- braticn value, dd Flight lcad, udd X 15.0 18 266 266 Y 16.0 18 -1222 -1249 Z 14.0 18 -&05 -822 Gyroscalefactor Sample meen, ppm St andard deviation, udd Number of samples Final cali- bration value, udd Flight lo8d, PPm X 895 8.7 18 899 898 Y 863 12.9 18 870 870 2 1495 9.5 18 1501 1502 Gyro fixed drift Sample mee， deg/hr Standard deviation, Number or Final cali- bration value, Flight load, X 0.02 deg/hr 0.08 Samples 18 deg/hr 0.11 deg/hr 0.06 人 -0.30 0.06 18 -0.29 Z -0.58 0.06 18 -0.45 -0.30 Gyro spin axis mass Sample Standard Number Final cali- -0.47 X mean deg/hr 0.86 deviatlon, deg/hr 0.10 or gamples 18 bration value, deg/hr 0.90 Might load, deg/nr + +6.5 REACTION CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 4.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.667 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:27 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.188, Max reward: 0.570 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Spacecraft command module lift aircraft" +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ +Result 2: +Following separation and translation, a manual pitch maneuver of 1.5 deg/sec was executed. Computer control was reselected, and a translation was initiated to give a small closing velocity. A digital autopilot maneuver was executed to aligm the respective roll attitudes. Maximum spacecraft separation was approximately 80 feet. At the final attitude, the image in the crewman optical alignment sight was almost completely washed out by the sun reflection from the lunar module until the vehicles were separated by 6 feet or less. Contact was made at approximately 0.2 ft/sec with a slight roll misalignment. Subsequent tunnel inspection revealed a roll index angle of minus 2.0 degrees. The handles on latches l and 4 were not locked and were recocked and released manually. Spacecraft ejection was normal. Total reaction control fuel used for transposition, docking, and extraction was reported as 55 pounds + +8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT + +8.7.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo command module lifting spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of spacecraft can carry crew and command modules to space? +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: NASA spacecraft capable of transporting command module +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo command module launch vehicle" +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Orbiter capable of carrying Command Module into space +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +started to sight the service module in the docking window. The lightened spacecraft combination was easily maneuvered using attitude control in both the manual minimum-impulse and automatic attitude-hold modes. +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo space exploration spacecraft capable of lifting command module +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo command module launch rocket" +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo Orbiter capabilities and maneuvers +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo apollo spacecraft lunar module command module +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo-Saturn V launch vehicle" +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +The Apollo l3 space vehicle was launched from pad A of complex 39, Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Except for the high-amplitude, lowfrequency oscillations which resulted in premature cutoff of the S-II center engine, the basic performance of the launch vehicle was normal. Despite the anomaly, all launch vehicle objectives were achieved, as discussed in reference 2. In addition, the S-IvB lunar impact experiment was accomplished, as discussed in section ll.3. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Orbiter capable of carrying crew and command module into orbit around the Moon +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following separation and translation, a manual pitch maneuver of 1.5 deg/sec was executed. Computer control was reselected, and a translation was initiated to give a small closing velocity. A digital autopilot maneuver was executed to aligm the respective roll attitudes. Maximum spacecraft separation was approximately 80 feet. At the final attitude, the image in the crewman optical alignment sight was almost completely washed out by the sun reflection from the lunar module until the vehicles were separated by 6 feet or less. Contact was made at approximately 0.2 ft/sec with a slight roll misalignment. Subsequent tunnel inspection revealed a roll index angle of minus 2.0 degrees. The handles on latches l and 4 were not locked and were recocked and released manually. Spacecraft ejection was normal. Total reaction control fuel used for transposition, docking, and extraction was reported as 55 pounds + +8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT + +8.7.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo spacecraft carrier spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Spacecraft specifically designed for spacewalks and extravehicular activities +2025-04-04 at 03:52:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo spacecraft carrier spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:52:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Space Suits for Lunar Expedition +2025-04-04 at 03:52:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo apollo spacecraft launch vehicle +2025-04-04 at 03:52:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +The Apollo l3 space vehicle was launched from pad A of complex 39, Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Except for the high-amplitude, lowfrequency oscillations which resulted in premature cutoff of the S-II center engine, the basic performance of the launch vehicle was normal. Despite the anomaly, all launch vehicle objectives were achieved, as discussed in reference 2. In addition, the S-IvB lunar impact experiment was accomplished, as discussed in section ll.3. +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: saucer or Saturn V launch vehicle +2025-04-04 at 03:52:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +It is known that the electrostatic potentials develop on jet aircraft. These are caused by an engine charging current, which is balanced by a corona current loss from the aircraft. For.a conventional jet aircraft, the equilibrium potential can approach a million volts. For the Saturn V launch vehicle, the charging current may be larger than that of a jet aircraft, and therefore, the equilibrium potential for the Saturn vehicle might be on the order of a million volts or more. + +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 2 September 1970 3 Preparati on 4 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation 5 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Preparation +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:52:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, True, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [492, 461, 110, 394, 201, 630] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 381.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 18.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 21.19 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.317 ± 0.448 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 2.17 ± 3.08 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 7] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ +Result 2: +Following separation and translation, a manual pitch maneuver of 1.5 deg/sec was executed. Computer control was reselected, and a translation was initiated to give a small closing velocity. A digital autopilot maneuver was executed to aligm the respective roll attitudes. Maximum spacecraft separation was approximately 80 feet. At the final attitude, the image in the crewman optical alignment sight was almost completely washed out by the sun reflection from the lunar module until the vehicles were separated by 6 feet or less. Contact was made at approximately 0.2 ft/sec with a slight roll misalignment. Subsequent tunnel inspection revealed a roll index angle of minus 2.0 degrees. The handles on latches l and 4 were not locked and were recocked and released manually. Spacecraft ejection was normal. Total reaction control fuel used for transposition, docking, and extraction was reported as 55 pounds + +8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT + +8.7.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +The Apollo l3 space vehicle was launched from pad A of complex 39, Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Except for the high-amplitude, lowfrequency oscillations which resulted in premature cutoff of the S-II center engine, the basic performance of the launch vehicle was normal. Despite the anomaly, all launch vehicle objectives were achieved, as discussed in reference 2. In addition, the S-IvB lunar impact experiment was accomplished, as discussed in section ll.3. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nUpon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back ...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstr...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ["Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi..."] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +started to sight the service module in the docking window. The lightened spacecraft combination was easily maneuvered using attitude control in both the manual minimum-impulse and automatic attitude-hold modes. +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Following separation and translation, a manual pitch maneuver of 1.5 deg/sec was executed. Computer control was reselected, and a translation was initiated to give a small closing velocity. A digital autopilot maneuver was executed to aligm the respective roll attitudes. Maximum spacecraft separation was approximately 80 feet. At the final attitude, the image in the crewman optical alignment sight was almost completely washed out by the sun reflection from the lunar module until the vehicles were separated by 6 feet or less. Contact was made at approximately 0.2 ft/sec with a slight roll misalignment. Subsequent tunnel inspection revealed a roll index angle of minus 2.0 degrees. The handles on latches l and 4 were not locked and were recocked and released manually. Spacecraft ejection was normal. Total reaction control fuel used for transposition, docking, and extraction was reported as 55 pounds + +8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT + +8.7.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nMSC-02680\n\nDISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING\n\nThis paper is not suitable for gener...', 'Result 1:\nstarted to sight the service module in the docking window. The lightened spac...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nFollowing separation and translation, a manual pitch maneuver of 1.5 deg/sec ...', 'Result 1:\nMSC-02680\n\nDISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING\n\nThis paper is not suitable for gener...', 'Result 1:\nThe extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve l...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +The Apollo l3 space vehicle was launched from pad A of complex 39, Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Except for the high-amplitude, lowfrequency oscillations which resulted in premature cutoff of the S-II center engine, the basic performance of the launch vehicle was normal. Despite the anomaly, all launch vehicle objectives were achieved, as discussed in reference 2. In addition, the S-IvB lunar impact experiment was accomplished, as discussed in section ll.3. +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +It is known that the electrostatic potentials develop on jet aircraft. These are caused by an engine charging current, which is balanced by a corona current loss from the aircraft. For.a conventional jet aircraft, the equilibrium potential can approach a million volts. For the Saturn V launch vehicle, the charging current may be larger than that of a jet aircraft, and therefore, the equilibrium potential for the Saturn vehicle might be on the order of a million volts or more. + +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 2 September 1970 3 Preparati on 4 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation 5 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Preparation +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generatio...', 'Result 1:\nThe maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time con...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nThe pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data ...', 'Result 1:\nIt is known that the electrostatic potentials develop on jet aircraft. These ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.200, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.261, Max reward: 0.649 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: history of US spacecraft decontamination procedures Hawaii. +2025-04-04 at 03:52:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module and command module water supply contamination levels and treatment assessment. +2025-04-04 at 03:52:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 1/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [888, 669, 357, 126, 177, 801] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 503.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 15.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 33.53 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.083 ± 0.186 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.33 ± 0.75 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.114, Max reward: 0.681 +2025-04-04 at 03:52:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What caused discrepancy in pressure measurements in the Mariana Trench? +2025-04-04 at 03:52:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Transducers failing on Apollo 13 space suits +2025-04-04 at 03:52:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +This transducer has operated erratically on two previous missions. Testing after Apollo 8 traced the failure during that mission to moisture contamination within the transducer. Similar fluctuations noted during Apollo l2 were traced to a minute quantity of undetermined contamination on the surface of the resistance wafer. Characteristically, the signal level decreased first to indicate an increase in the resistance but returned to more normal readings as the wafer cleaned itself. Disassembly of the Apollo l3 transducer and water tank did not produce evidence of either contamination or corrosion. The spacecraft wiring which could have produced the problem was checked and no intermittents were found. +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:52:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: suit pressure measurement transducer contaminationCauses +2025-04-04 at 03:52:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Inspection also revealed that both the cabin and suit loop pressure transducers contained various contaminants identified as solder flux, glass beads (0.o4 mm diameter), and fibers from the wipers used in the transducer manufacturer's clean room; all of which could potentially affect the transducer operation. + +To assure that one of the pressure transducers is operative, the Apollo 14 cabin pressure transducer will be disassembled, the plating will be inspected and the instrument will be cleaned, reassembled and installed. + +For Apollo 15 and subsequent, the suit and cabin pressure transducers will be disassembled and cleaned. The plating will be inspected for cracking or flaking and the units will be reassembled. The suit pressure transducers will be reassembled without soldering. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.l0 Gas Leak in Electrical Circuit Interrupter +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:52:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [192, 193, 645, 553, 369, 254] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 367.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 28.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 13.13 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.083 ± 0.186 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.33 ± 0.75 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +This transducer has operated erratically on two previous missions. Testing after Apollo 8 traced the failure during that mission to moisture contamination within the transducer. Similar fluctuations noted during Apollo l2 were traced to a minute quantity of undetermined contamination on the surface of the resistance wafer. Characteristically, the signal level decreased first to indicate an increase in the resistance but returned to more normal readings as the wafer cleaned itself. Disassembly of the Apollo l3 transducer and water tank did not produce evidence of either contamination or corrosion. The spacecraft wiring which could have produced the problem was checked and no intermittents were found. +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Inspection also revealed that both the cabin and suit loop pressure transducers contained various contaminants identified as solder flux, glass beads (0.o4 mm diameter), and fibers from the wipers used in the transducer manufacturer's clean room; all of which could potentially affect the transducer operation. + +To assure that one of the pressure transducers is operative, the Apollo 14 cabin pressure transducer will be disassembled, the plating will be inspected and the instrument will be cleaned, reassembled and installed. + +For Apollo 15 and subsequent, the suit and cabin pressure transducers will be disassembled and cleaned. The plating will be inspected for cracking or flaking and the units will be reassembled. The suit pressure transducers will be reassembled without soldering. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.l.l0 Gas Leak in Electrical Circuit Interrupter +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThis transducer has operated erratically on two previous missions. Testing af...', 'Result 1:\nInspection also revealed that both the cabin and suit loop pressure transduce...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The instrumentation system performed normally except for the following discrepancies, both of which have occurred on previous flights. The suit pressure measurement indicated 0.5 psi below cabin pressure until the command module was powered down. However, when the command module was powered up at l23 hours, the measurement indicated correct values, as discussed in section l4.i.9. The potable water quantity measurement · operated erratically for a brief period early in the mission. This anomaly is described in section 14.l.8. The pressure, temperature, and quantity measurements for oxygen tank 2, along with the fuel cell l nitrogen pressure transducer failure, are discussed in section l4.l.l, since the anomalous performance of these systems is related to the tank incident. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.140, Max reward: 0.640 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Undocking time to Earth re-entry of lunar module Apollo +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "apollo 11 lunar module undocking time" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar module undocking timeline" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 11 lunar module undocking time +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 11 lunar module undocking time confirm +2025-04-04 at 03:53:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:05 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:53:05 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, True, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [286, 406, 229, 569, 248, 248] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 331.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 6.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 55.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.142 ± 0.205 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.50 ± 0.76 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry b...', 'Result 1:\nThe unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.133, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.157, Max reward: 0.339 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Ascent stage tank 2 oxygen consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Ascent stage Tank 2 oxygen consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: how much oxygen was consumed by the Ascent stage Tank 2 during a launch +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: astronaut oxygen consumption ascent stage tank 2 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Ascent stage Tank 2 oxygen consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:53:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, True, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [79, 497, 140, 298, 530, 408] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 325.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 3.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 108.44 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.167 ± 0.236 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.67 ± 0.94 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nDuring the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.137, Max reward: 0.623 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo S IV B velocity anomaly 19 17 minutes mission timing" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo mission s-ivb velocity increase 19 hours 17 minutes +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo S-IVB velocity anomaly 19 hours 17 minutes" + + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The character of the signal from the S-IVB impact is identical to that of the ascent stage impact and those from natural events, presumed to be meteoroid impacts, which are being recorded at the rate of about one per day. The S-IVB seismic energy is believed to have penetrated into the moon to a depth of from 20 to 40 kilometers. The initial signal was unusually clear and travelled to the seismic station at a velocity of 4.8 km/sec, which is near that predicted from laboratory measurements using Apollo l2 lunar rock samples. This result implies that, to depths of at least 20 kilometers, the moon's outer shell may be formed from the same crystalline rock material as found at the surface. No evidence of a lower boundary to this material has been found in the seismic signal, although it is clear the material is too dense to form the entire moon. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo 12 mission timeline" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"S-IVB velocity increase 19 hours 17 minutes Apollo mission" + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo 12 Startup Operations Report" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"S-IVB 19 hours 17 minutes 5 ft/sec velocity increase Apollo mission" + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo S IV B Stage Data" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The analysis of the trajectory from lift-off to spacecraft/S-IVB separation was based on launch vehicle onboard data, as reported in reference 2, and from network tracking data. After separation, the actual trajectory information was determined from the best estimated trajectory generated from tracking and telemetry data. The earth and moon models used for the trajectory analysis are geometrically similar to those used for Apollo l2. Table 3-I is a listing of major flight events, and table 4-I defines the trajectory and maneuver parameters listed in table 4-II. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"S-II engine burn 19 hours 17 minutes Apollo mission" + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ +Result 2: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo 12 S IV B Launch Sequence" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +In prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecraft with the intention of entering a solar orbit through a nearmiss, or "slingshot," approach to the moon. For Apollo l3, an opportunity was available to gain further data on large-mass impact phenomena which could be derived using the seismic equipment deployed during Apollo l2. The impact of the lunar module ascent stage during Apollo 12 pointed up certain unexplained seismological events which the S-IVB impact was expected to reproduce. + +The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 8:09:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 14, 1970, trave1ling at a speed of 5600 miles/hr. Stage weight at the time of impact was 30 700 pounds. The collision occurred at a latitude of 2.4 degrees south and a longitude of 27.9 degrees west, which is approximately 74 miles west-northwest from the experiment station installed during Apollo l2._ The energy release from the impact was equivalent to an explosion of 7.7 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"S-II engine shutdown 00:05:32 S-IVB velocity increase Apollo mission" + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo S IV B Impact Analysis" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Apollo S IV B Impact Characteristics" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:35 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:53:35 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [1809, 431, 707, 1183, 691, 435] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 876.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 8.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 109.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.217 ± 0.352 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.00 ± 1.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 5] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The analysis of the trajectory from lift-off to spacecraft/S-IVB separation was based on launch vehicle onboard data, as reported in reference 2, and from network tracking data. After separation, the actual trajectory information was determined from the best estimated trajectory generated from tracking and telemetry data. The earth and moon models used for the trajectory analysis are geometrically similar to those used for Apollo l2. Table 3-I is a listing of major flight events, and table 4-I defines the trajectory and maneuver parameters listed in table 4-II. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +In prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecraft with the intention of entering a solar orbit through a nearmiss, or "slingshot," approach to the moon. For Apollo l3, an opportunity was available to gain further data on large-mass impact phenomena which could be derived using the seismic equipment deployed during Apollo l2. The impact of the lunar module ascent stage during Apollo 12 pointed up certain unexplained seismological events which the S-IVB impact was expected to reproduce. + +The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 8:09:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 14, 1970, trave1ling at a speed of 5600 miles/hr. Stage weight at the time of impact was 30 700 pounds. The collision occurred at a latitude of 2.4 degrees south and a longitude of 27.9 degrees west, which is approximately 74 miles west-northwest from the experiment station installed during Apollo l2._ The energy release from the impact was equivalent to an explosion of 7.7 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The character of the signal from the S-IVB impact is identical to that of the ascent stage impact and those from natural events, presumed to be meteoroid impacts, which are being recorded at the rate of about one per day. The S-IVB seismic energy is believed to have penetrated into the moon to a depth of from 20 to 40 kilometers. The initial signal was unusually clear and travelled to the seismic station at a velocity of 4.8 km/sec, which is near that predicted from laboratory measurements using Apollo l2 lunar rock samples. This result implies that, to depths of at least 20 kilometers, the moon's outer shell may be formed from the same crystalline rock material as found at the surface. No evidence of a lower boundary to this material has been found in the seismic signal, although it is clear the material is too dense to form the entire moon. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ +Result 2: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:36 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.033, Max reward: 0.200 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"reaction control system propellant consumption Apollo" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: reaction control system propellant consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: four steps reaction control system propellant consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: reaction control system fuel consumption abstract kernel ignition +2025-04-04 at 03:53:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [765, 233, 501, 100, 191, 255] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 340.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 10.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 34.08 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5 5117.4 8 342.9 Remaining at undocking 3858.1 6 233.5 10 091.6 + +7.2.2 Reaction Control Propellants + +The reaction control system propellant consumption, shown in the following table, was calculated from telemetered helium tank data using the relationship between pressure , volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, lb Oxidi zer， lb Total Loaded System A 107.7 107.7 208.8 208.8 316.5 316.5 ' System B 633.0 Total Consumed System A System B 220 247 Total 467 Remaining at undocking System A 96.5 System B 69.5 Total 166 + +7.2.3 0xygen + +Actual oxygen usage closely followed predicted rates from the time of lunar module power-up until undocking, at which time approximately 32 pounds of oxygen remained. The values in the following table are based on telemetered data. + +Loaded; 1b Consumed, 1b Remaining after undocking, lb Descent stage 49.3 21.9 27.4 Ascent stage Tank 1 2.3 2.3 Tank 2 2.4 82.7 Total 54.0 21.9 32.4 +------ +Result 2: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nFuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Total Loaded 7083.6 11 350.9 18 434.5 Consumed 3225.5...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.067, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:53:43 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.154, Max reward: 0.526 +2025-04-04 at 03:53:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Sanitizing wipes or swabs for surface disinfection in medical kits for aircraft +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "packaging for medical eye drops and other medical liquids in flights +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: medical kit eye drops alternative types hypochlorous acid eye drops hydrogen peroxide eye drops +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "types of liquids packaged like eye drops in medical kits for future flights" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Applian spacecraft decontamination process +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of nasal sprays packaged with eye drops in medical kits for space travel +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ( +:sanitizing wipes or swabs for spacecraft decontamination purposes +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of nasal sprays similar to eye drops in medical kits for space travel +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: urine collection systems on spacecraft for sanitizing wipes +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "section 11.3 nasal spray operation in medical kits for flights" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of nasal sprays used in space medical kits +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: wipes for cleaning urine collection devices on spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of nasal sprays used in medical kits for astronauts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of antimicrobial wipes for emergency medical kits on spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "section 11.3 results: +21.0 +3.0" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of nasal sprays similar to eye drops in medical kits for astronauts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: biodegradable wipes for spacecraft medical kits +2025-04-04 at 03:53:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "section 11.3 results: +21.0 +3.0 and -1.2 40.4 +0.4" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:53:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: space suit decontamination bags +2025-04-04 at 03:53:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "section 11.3 results: adding and subtracting two positives" +2025-04-04 at 03:53:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:53:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: spacecraft suit supplies +2025-04-04 at 03:54:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: spacecraft crew decontamination or sanitizing wipes +2025-04-04 at 03:54:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "section ll.3 +21.0 +3.0" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "section ll.3 contents of Result 1" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: +Positions are extrapolated. + +The ll photographs have been normalized so that the earth is the same size in all frames. Frames 8590 and 8591 have been further enlarged. By viewing these two frames under a stereoscope, pronounced apparent relief is seen in the cloud patterns. The relief is so pronounced, in fact, that it cannot be attributed solely to height differences of clouds. It appears to result, in part, from the relative horizontal motion in the cloud fields; that is, clouds moving in the same direction as the spacecraft appear farther away than those moving in the direction opposite that of the spacecraft， + +11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "nose drops packaging in Apollo missions" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +The auxiliary dump nozzle was used for the first time on an Apollo mission. Dumping through this nozzle was discontinued and urine was subsequently stored onboard because a considerable number of particles were evident on the hatch window and these interfered with navigation sightings。. + +Upon recovery, the outlet valve of the postlanding ventilation was open and the inlet valve was closed, whereas both valves should have been open. This condition is reported in section l0.3.2, and the anomaly is discussed in section 14.l.2. + +The performance of the lumar module systems is discussed in this section. All systems that are not discussed either performed as intended Or were not used. Discrepancies and aromalies are generally mentioned but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary, sections 14.2 and14.3. + +6.1 STRUCTURAL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo mission Adaptor Kit eye drops nasal drops compare" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo nasal bottle modification for nasal drops" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [2033, 464, 490, 416, 436, 296] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 689.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 10.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 68.92 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.158 ± 0.354 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.00 ± 2.24 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +in figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit circuit hose. The cabin atmosphere then returned to the lunar module suit circuit through these supplemental cartridges by way of the two outlet hoses. The mass flow through this arrangement was partially restricted with tape to properly load the suit-circuit compressors. After approximately 20 hours of operation with two command module cartridges, an additional unit was stacked on each original cartridge to improve the carbon dioxide removal capability. With this supplemental configuration, when only command module cartridges were being used, the indicated carbon dioxide level was maintained between 0.l arid i.8 mm Hg. The supplemental removal configuration using the command module lithium hydroxide cartridge was assembled and tested on the ground during the flight prior to its actual use in the spacecraft. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ +Result 2: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPreflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies reve...', 'Result 1:\nSystem decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel is...', 'Result 1:\nPreflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies reve...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, w...', 'Result 1:\nAfter the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, w...', 'Result 1:\nPreflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies reve...', 'Result 1:\nPreflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies reve...', 'Result 1:\nin figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit ci...', 'Result 1:\nin figure 6.7-l, one corner of the bag was Sealed to the inlet of the suit ci...', 'Result 1:\nPreflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies reve...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 11: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: +Positions are extrapolated. + +The ll photographs have been normalized so that the earth is the same size in all frames. Frames 8590 and 8591 have been further enlarged. By viewing these two frames under a stereoscope, pronounced apparent relief is seen in the cloud patterns. The relief is so pronounced, in fact, that it cannot be attributed solely to height differences of clouds. It appears to result, in part, from the relative horizontal motion in the cloud fields; that is, clouds moving in the same direction as the spacecraft appear farther away than those moving in the direction opposite that of the spacecraft， + +11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 12: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +The auxiliary dump nozzle was used for the first time on an Apollo mission. Dumping through this nozzle was discontinued and urine was subsequently stored onboard because a considerable number of particles were evident on the hatch window and these interfered with navigation sightings。. + +Upon recovery, the outlet valve of the postlanding ventilation was open and the inlet valve was closed, whereas both valves should have been open. This condition is reported in section l0.3.2, and the anomaly is discussed in section 14.l.2. + +The performance of the lumar module systems is discussed in this section. All systems that are not discussed either performed as intended Or were not used. Discrepancies and aromalies are generally mentioned but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary, sections 14.2 and14.3. + +6.1 STRUCTURAL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 13: Result 1: +(section ll.3). +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 14: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 15: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ +Result 2: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3.3 Improper Nasal Spray Operation + +When attempts were made to use the two nasal spray bottles in the command module medical kit, no medication could be obtained from one bottle and only two or three sprays could be obtained from the other. On previous flights, there had been a tendency for the spray to be released too fast, therefore a piece of cotton was inserted in the 9-cc bottle to hold the 3 cc of medication. Chamber tests and ambient shelflife tests have indicated that this change was satisfactory. Those tests have also shown that, for best results, the bottle should be squeezed where the cotton is located. Postflight examination of the one returned bottle demonstrated satisfactory operation under normal gravity. The returned bottle still contained 2.5 cc of medication after five or six test sprays. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.199, Max reward: 0.640 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: plane crash site +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ +Result 2: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: landingsite location +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Falling Dudgeon incident location" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first reported electronic contact by the recovery forces was through S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4. A visual sighting report by the Recovery helicopter was received and was followed shortly thereafter by aquisition of the recovery beacon signal by the Recovery, Photo, and Swim l helicopters. Fuel dump was noted and voice contact was made with the descending spacecraft, although no latitude and longitude data were received. The command module landed at 1807 G.m.t. and remained in the stable l flotation attitude. The flashing light was operating and the infiation of the uprighting system commenced about l0 minutes subsequent to landing. +------ +Result 2: +Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, Manned Spacecraft Center: Analysis of Apollo l2 Lightning Incident, MSC-01540. February 1970. + +ICSU/IUGG Committee on Atmospheric Sciences: Report of the Study Conference on the Global Atmospheric Research Program, 1967. + +Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 50, No. 7: Cloud Height Contouring from Apollo 6 Photography, by V. S. Whitehead, I. D. Browne, and J. G. Garcia. 1969. + +Defense Supply Agency, Washington, D. C.: Military Standardization Handbook_ Optical Design, MIL HDBK-14l. 1962. + +NASA Headquarters: Apollo Flight Mission Assignments. OMSF M-D MA500-11 (SE 010-000-1). 0ctober 1969. + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Mission Requirement, H-2 Type Mission (Lunar Landing). SPD9-R-053. November 10, 1969. + +APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY + +(Continued from inside front cover) +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: first landing site of the Apollo 11 mission +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 12 landing site location" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: information about the Apollo 11 crew's landing site +2025-04-04 at 03:54:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 12 landing site location" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 landing site coordinates +2025-04-04 at 03:54:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 11 landing site location" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 11 landing site location and details" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 11 mission details" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 11 mission lunar landing site" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 11 landing site" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Lunar module landings and their locations" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query for "Apollo 11 landing site coordinates" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, True, False, True, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [242, 312, 1876, 216, 598, 216] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 576.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 17.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 33.92 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 6/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.225 ± 0.246 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.83 ± 1.07 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [1, 1, 0, 3, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ +Result 2: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on st...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nTABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT\n\nLanding area Supporta Remarks Number Unit La...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The first reported electronic contact by the recovery forces was through S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4. A visual sighting report by the Recovery helicopter was received and was followed shortly thereafter by aquisition of the recovery beacon signal by the Recovery, Photo, and Swim l helicopters. Fuel dump was noted and voice contact was made with the descending spacecraft, although no latitude and longitude data were received. The command module landed at 1807 G.m.t. and remained in the stable l flotation attitude. The flashing light was operating and the infiation of the uprighting system commenced about l0 minutes subsequent to landing. +------ +Result 2: +Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, Manned Spacecraft Center: Analysis of Apollo l2 Lightning Incident, MSC-01540. February 1970. + +ICSU/IUGG Committee on Atmospheric Sciences: Report of the Study Conference on the Global Atmospheric Research Program, 1967. + +Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 50, No. 7: Cloud Height Contouring from Apollo 6 Photography, by V. S. Whitehead, I. D. Browne, and J. G. Garcia. 1969. + +Defense Supply Agency, Washington, D. C.: Military Standardization Handbook_ Optical Design, MIL HDBK-14l. 1962. + +NASA Headquarters: Apollo Flight Mission Assignments. OMSF M-D MA500-11 (SE 010-000-1). 0ctober 1969. + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Mission Requirement, H-2 Type Mission (Lunar Landing). SPD9-R-053. November 10, 1969. + +APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY + +(Continued from inside front cover) +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe first reported electronic contact by the recovery forces was through S-ba...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstr...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstr...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had b...', 'Result 1:\nDescription Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collectio...', 'Result 1:\nThe command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.168, Max reward: 0.606 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 ascent stage signal intensity comparison +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 12 ascent stage communication intensity" +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 ascent stage signal intensity comparison Spasarscope +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:32 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:54:32 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [402, 892, 505, 426, 551, 388] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 527.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 14.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 37.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.058 ± 0.130 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.17 ± 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT + +S-band communications were nominal from system actuation at approximately 58 hours through lunar module undocking. Except for brief periods when high-bit-rate data and high-quality downlink voice were required, low power transmissions, backup voice, and omnidirectional antennas were used to conserve electrical power. The S-band power amplifier was turned off by opening the circuit breaker to provide the higher modulation index for telemetry. The primary cormmunications configuration was low power, low-bit-rate telemetry, omnidirectional antennas, and backup voice on baseband. In this configuration, transmission of high-bit-rate data from the spacecraft was attempted using a 2lo-foot receiving antenna, and except for regular intervals of data dropout because of vehicle attitude charges, these data were of good quality. +------ +Result 2: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Seismic signals were first recorded 28.4 seconds after impact and continued for over 4 hours. Some sigmals were so large that seismometer sensitivity had to be reduced by command from earth to keep the data on Scale. Peak signal intensity occurred l0 minutes after initial onset. The peak value was 8 times larger than that recorded from the Apollo 12 ascent stage impact, which occurred at a range of 40 miles from the seismic station and was equivalent to l ton of rNT. An expanding gas cloud, which presumably swept out over the lunar surface from the S-IVB impact point, was recorded by the lunar ionosphere detector deployed during Apollo 12. Detection of this cloud began approximately 8 seconds before the first seismic signal and lasted 70 seconds. +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.100, Max reward: 0.200 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is the meaning of 13-60-8594 and what system or context does it belong to? +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What does 13-60-8594 refer to in art or photography? +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +urine trans. fer line. Also included was a lunar topographic camera, which could be installed in the command module hatch window for high resolution photography of the lunar surface from orbit. The camera provided a 4.5-inch film format and had an 18-inch focal length and image-motion compensation. The photographs would yield a resolution of approximately l2 feet and would include a l5-mile square area on the surface for each frame exposed. +------ +Result 2: +The service module first appeared in the docking window at a distance of about 80 feet. The entire bay 4 outer panel was missing, and torn Mylar insulation was seen protruding from the bay. Because of the brilliant reflections from the Mylar, it was difficult to see or photograph any details inside the bay. Initial photography of the service module was conducted through the docking window using the command module 70-mm camera and an 80-mm lens. This camera, the l6-mm sequence camera with a 75-mm lens, and the command module electric still camera with a 250-mm lens were then operated while viewing through the right-hand window. Camera settings were made according to ground instructions. No magazine designation was made by the ground for the sequence camera, so the surface color film was used. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: 13_60_8594 altitude +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: frame 13-60-8594 altitude object +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ +Result 2: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what is the subject of 13-60-8594 frame +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is the meaning of "14.2.2" in the context of navigation or object positioning? +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +14.2.2。 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Describe the altitude of objects photographed by the Apollo 13 spacecraft's electric still camera using 250mm lens +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: tabie 11.2-i earth weather photography frame 13-60-8594 altitude +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is the meaning of -1.2 in a navigation context, possibly in the system described by the "13-60-8594" frame? +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is the altitude of the Apollo spacecraft when the photograph 13-60-8594 was taken? +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: tabie 11.2-i earth weather photography frame 13-60-8594 object altitude +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: In what context is the term "13-60-8594" used when a "14.2.2" is mentioned? +2025-04-04 at 03:54:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +14.2.2。 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Find relationship between pericynthion altitude and frame 13-60-8594 of lunar surface photography +2025-04-04 at 03:54:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Positions are extrapolated. + +The ll photographs have been normalized so that the earth is the same size in all frames. Frames 8590 and 8591 have been further enlarged. By viewing these two frames under a stereoscope, pronounced apparent relief is seen in the cloud patterns. The relief is so pronounced, in fact, that it cannot be attributed solely to height differences of clouds. It appears to result, in part, from the relative horizontal motion in the cloud fields; that is, clouds moving in the same direction as the spacecraft appear farther away than those moving in the direction opposite that of the spacecraft， + +11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Find relationship between camera altitude and apparent altitude of clouds in frame 13-60-8594 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Find altitude of camera during time of photograph 13-60-8594 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ +Result 2: +Following translunar injection, earth weather photography was conducted for approximately 6 hours. + +The first period of translunar navigation (Program 23) at 6 hours was done to establish the apparent horizon attitude for optical marks in the computer. Some manual maneuvering was required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern at the point of horizon-star superposition. The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, and both periods were accomplished within the timeline and reaction control fuel budget. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Find operation time of the command module window during 6 hours after translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 03:54:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +Equipment transfer and stowage in both the command module and lunar module was completed about 7 hours prior to entry, with the exception of the cameras that were to be used for service module photography. At 6-1/2 hours before entry, command module activity included powering up the instrumentation and placing entry battery C on main bus A, with main bus B still powered from the lunar module. The command module reaction control thrusters were preheated for 20 minutes, and all instrumented engines were observed to be above the minimum operating temperature l0 minutes after heater operation was terminated. + +8.9.3 Final Midcourse Correction +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Estimate altitude of the 13-60-8594 frame based on the command module's position at 5 hours after mission timeline +2025-04-04 at 03:54:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +The Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigation system. A navigation fix was obtained at 1814 G.m.t., April 17, l970, and the position of the ship at spacecraft landing was dead-reckoned back to the time of landing and determined to be 2l degrees 34.7 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 23.2 minutes west longitude. At landing a radar range of 8o00 yards and a visual bearing of 158.9 degrees east of north (true heading) were obtained from which the command module landing point was determined to be 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and 165 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. This position is judged to be accurate to within 5o0 yards. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Estimate altitude of the 13-60-8594 frame based on lunar landing site and spacecraft orbit +2025-04-04 at 03:54:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +Trafectory Parameters Definition Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the earth's equator to the local vertical vector, deg Selenographic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the true lunar equatorial plane to the local ver- tical vector, deg Longitude Spacecraft position measured east or west from the body's prime meridian to the local vertical vec- tor,deg Altitude Perpendicular distance from the reference body to the point of orbit intersect，feet or miles; alti- tude above the lunar surface is referenced to the altitude of the landing site with respect to mean lunar radius Space-fixed velocity Magmitude of the inertial velocity vector refer- enced to the body-centered, inertial reference coordinate system, ft/sec Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the body-centered, local horizontal plane to the inertial velocity vector, deg Space-fixed heading 8ngle Angle of the projection of the inertial +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Estimate altitude of the camera in the 13-60-8594 frame based on the spacecraft's altitude and camera position +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [498, 329, 1809, 145, 320, 132] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 538.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 6.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 89.81 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.133 ± 0.298 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.67 ± 1.49 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +14.2.2。 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +14.2.2。 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\n1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 552...', 'Result 1:\n14.2.2。\n------\nResult 2:\n-1.2 40.4 +0.4\n------\n...', 'Result 1:\n-1.2 40.4 +0.4\n------\nResult 2:\n14.2.2。\n------\n...', 'Result 1:\n14.2.2。\n------\nResult 2:\n-1.2 40.4 +0.4\n------\n...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +urine trans. fer line. Also included was a lunar topographic camera, which could be installed in the command module hatch window for high resolution photography of the lunar surface from orbit. The camera provided a 4.5-inch film format and had an 18-inch focal length and image-motion compensation. The photographs would yield a resolution of approximately l2 feet and would include a l5-mile square area on the surface for each frame exposed. +------ +Result 2: +The service module first appeared in the docking window at a distance of about 80 feet. The entire bay 4 outer panel was missing, and torn Mylar insulation was seen protruding from the bay. Because of the brilliant reflections from the Mylar, it was difficult to see or photograph any details inside the bay. Initial photography of the service module was conducted through the docking window using the command module 70-mm camera and an 80-mm lens. This camera, the l6-mm sequence camera with a 75-mm lens, and the command module electric still camera with a 250-mm lens were then operated while viewing through the right-hand window. Camera settings were made according to ground instructions. No magazine designation was made by the ground for the sequence camera, so the surface color film was used. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Positions are extrapolated. + +The ll photographs have been normalized so that the earth is the same size in all frames. Frames 8590 and 8591 have been further enlarged. By viewing these two frames under a stereoscope, pronounced apparent relief is seen in the cloud patterns. The relief is so pronounced, in fact, that it cannot be attributed solely to height differences of clouds. It appears to result, in part, from the relative horizontal motion in the cloud fields; that is, clouds moving in the same direction as the spacecraft appear farther away than those moving in the direction opposite that of the spacecraft， + +11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ +Result 2: +Following translunar injection, earth weather photography was conducted for approximately 6 hours. + +The first period of translunar navigation (Program 23) at 6 hours was done to establish the apparent horizon attitude for optical marks in the computer. Some manual maneuvering was required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern at the point of horizon-star superposition. The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, and both periods were accomplished within the timeline and reaction control fuel budget. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Command module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages cannot be accurately assessed, since telemetry data were not available during entry. Until the time of communications blackout, approximately l2 pounds of propellant had been used. For a normal entry, this value would be considered high; however, the system was activated longer than normal and was used during separation from the lunar module. + +Loaded（ quantities, lb System 1 System 2 Fuel 44.2 44.6 Oxi di zer 77.8 78.5 Totals 122.0 123.1 + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Flui ds + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident.. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous, while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel cells . +------ +Result 2: +Equipment transfer and stowage in both the command module and lunar module was completed about 7 hours prior to entry, with the exception of the cameras that were to be used for service module photography. At 6-1/2 hours before entry, command module activity included powering up the instrumentation and placing entry battery C on main bus A, with main bus B still powered from the lunar module. The command module reaction control thrusters were preheated for 20 minutes, and all instrumented engines were observed to be above the minimum operating temperature l0 minutes after heater operation was terminated. + +8.9.3 Final Midcourse Correction +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +The Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigation system. A navigation fix was obtained at 1814 G.m.t., April 17, l970, and the position of the ship at spacecraft landing was dead-reckoned back to the time of landing and determined to be 2l degrees 34.7 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 23.2 minutes west longitude. At landing a radar range of 8o00 yards and a visual bearing of 158.9 degrees east of north (true heading) were obtained from which the command module landing point was determined to be 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and 165 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. This position is judged to be accurate to within 5o0 yards. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +Trafectory Parameters Definition Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the earth's equator to the local vertical vector, deg Selenographic latitude Spacecraft position measured north or south from the true lunar equatorial plane to the local ver- tical vector, deg Longitude Spacecraft position measured east or west from the body's prime meridian to the local vertical vec- tor,deg Altitude Perpendicular distance from the reference body to the point of orbit intersect，feet or miles; alti- tude above the lunar surface is referenced to the altitude of the landing site with respect to mean lunar radius Space-fixed velocity Magmitude of the inertial velocity vector refer- enced to the body-centered, inertial reference coordinate system, ft/sec Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the body-centered, local horizontal plane to the inertial velocity vector, deg Space-fixed heading 8ngle Angle of the projection of the inertial +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +To aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination of cloud height at synchronous altitudes, a series of earthcentered photographs at 20-minute intervals, beginning soon after translunar injection, were planned. The photographs required for this test could only have been acquired from an Apollo lunar mission. A precise record of time of photography was required to reconstruct the geometry involved. Eleven photographs were taken, and a precise time record was obtained. The description of the location of the spacecraft at the time of each photograph is given in table ll.2-I, along with the time of photography, the enlargement required on each frame for normalization, and the distance between photographic points. The experiment was successful, and all photographs are of excellent quality. To support the analysis of these photographs, aircraft reports, synoptic weather charts and satellite photographs for the time of photography have been acquired. Unfortunately, +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nurine trans. fer line. Also included was a lunar topographic camera, which co...', 'Result 1:\nTo aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination ...', 'Result 1:\nAs on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return t...', 'Result 1:\nPositions are extrapolated.\n\nThe ll photographs have been normalized so that ...', 'Result 1:\nTo aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination ...', 'Result 1:\nTo aid in a test of the feasibility of performing stereoscopic determination ...', 'Result 1:\nCommand module.- Command module reaction control system propellant usages can...', 'Result 1:\nvelocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured posi...', 'Result 1:\nvelocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured posi...', 'Result 1:\nvelocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured posi...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ +Result 2: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ +Result 2: +The determination of the wind field in the atmosphere is one of the prime requirements for accurate long-range numerical weather prediction. Wind fields are also the most difficult to measure with the desired sample density (as discussed in ref. 4)." The output of the geosynchronous Advanced Technology Satellites I and IIl is now being used as a crude estimate of wind fields by comparing the translation of clouds between successive frames 20 minutes apart. This comparison does not define the wind field, however, as a function of height above the surface, which is an important restriction to data application. The ability to determine the height of cloud elements would add this dimension to the satellite wind field analysis. A capability to determine cloud height has been demonstrated by use of stereographic photogrammetry on low altitude photographs taken from Apollo 6 (ref. 5). This success suggests that cloud heights and therefore wind velocity may also be determined by using data +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\n1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 552...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.300, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:54:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.476, Max reward: 0.918 +2025-04-04 at 03:54:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary objectives definition +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: common primary objectives in project management +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +discussion of the flight and associated crew activities is presented in section 8.0 as a complementary description to this section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: objective derivation process, primary objectives, detailed objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary objectives in project management vs detailed objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Tables D-I and D-II are summaries of the data made available for systems performance analyses and anomaly investigations. Table D-l lists the data from the command and service modules, and table D-II, for the lunar module. For additional information regarding data availability, the status listing of all mission data in the Central Metric Data File, building l2, MSC, should be consulted. + +TABIE D-I.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 10 mission abort reasons +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 objectives, list of objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo mission detailed objectives total +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:54:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: NASA Apollo primary mission objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo mission detailed objectives total +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 training challenges +2025-04-04 at 03:55:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar lunar surface experiments package Apollo 11 primary objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission control procedures during launch +2025-04-04 at 03:55:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo primary objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission crew training emphasis +2025-04-04 at 03:55:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 primary objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lunar crash landed experiments +2025-04-04 at 03:55:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 primary objectives detailed objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: comparison of Apollo 13 mission objectives with success +2025-04-04 at 03:55:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 primary and detailed objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 and 13 launch vehicle secondary objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 primary objectives, field geology experiment, obtaining and deploying logo explorations sites +2025-04-04 at 03:55:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 and 13 mission objectives comparison +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 primary objectives Apollo 7 primary objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [1657, 274, 1759, 183, 393, 710] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 829.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 8.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 103.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 5/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.167 ± 0.251 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.67 ± 1.11 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 3] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Medical kits for future flights will include nose drops packaged the same as the eye drops. This packaging has been satisfactory on previous flight for eye drops. + +This anomaly is closed. + +15.0 CONCLUS IONS + +The Apollo l3 mission was the first in the Program requiring an emergency abort, with the Gemini VIlI mission the only prior case in manned spaceflight where a flight was terminated early. The excellent performance of the lunar module systems in a backup capacity and the training of both the flight crew and ground support personnel resulted in the safe and efficient return of the crew. The following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report. +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +discussion of the flight and associated crew activities is presented in section 8.0 as a complementary description to this section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Tables D-I and D-II are summaries of the data made available for systems performance analyses and anomaly investigations. Table D-l lists the data from the command and service modules, and table D-II, for the lunar module. For additional information regarding data availability, the status listing of all mission data in the Central Metric Data File, building l2, MSC, should be consulted. + +TABIE D-I.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 4.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.667 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:17 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.219, Max reward: 0.610 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +Artemis I mission S-II engine shutdown timing + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: unmanned spacecraft Luna program engine S-II shutdown time +2025-04-04 at 03:55:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Event Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-off - 19:13:00.65 G.m.t., April 1l, 1970 S-IC outboard engine cutoff S-II engine igmition (command time) Launch escape tower jettison S-II engine cutoff S-IVB engine ignition (command time) S-IVB engine cutoff Translunar injection maneuver S-IVB/command and service module separation Docking Spacecraft ejection S-IVB separation maneuver First midcourse correction (service propulsion) Cryogenic oxygen tank incident Second midcourse correction (descent propulsion) S--IVB lunar impact Transearth injection (aescent propulsion) Third midcourse correction (descent propulsion) Fourth midcourse correction (LM reaction control) 00:02:44 00:02:45 00:03:21 00:09:53 00:09:54 00:12:30 02:35:46 03:06:39 03:19:09 04:01:01 04:18:01 30 :40 :50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56: 40 79:27:39 105:18:28 +------ +Result 2: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:22 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + Artemis I mission S-IVB engine shutdown timing + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [204, 496, 165, 252, 185, 222] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 254.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 9.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 28.22 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.058 ± 0.130 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.17 ± 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Event Time, hr:min:sec Range zero - 19:13:00:00 G.m.t., Apri1 1l, 1970 Lift-off - 19:13:00.65 G.m.t., April 1l, 1970 S-IC outboard engine cutoff S-II engine igmition (command time) Launch escape tower jettison S-II engine cutoff S-IVB engine ignition (command time) S-IVB engine cutoff Translunar injection maneuver S-IVB/command and service module separation Docking Spacecraft ejection S-IVB separation maneuver First midcourse correction (service propulsion) Cryogenic oxygen tank incident Second midcourse correction (descent propulsion) S--IVB lunar impact Transearth injection (aescent propulsion) Third midcourse correction (descent propulsion) Fourth midcourse correction (LM reaction control) 00:02:44 00:02:45 00:03:21 00:09:53 00:09:54 00:12:30 02:35:46 03:06:39 03:19:09 04:01:01 04:18:01 30 :40 :50 55:54:53 61:29:43 77:56: 40 79:27:39 105:18:28 +------ +Result 2: +Ignition and lift-off occurred on schedule. A listing_of major flight plan events as they occurred is contained in figure 8-l. Firststage performance was nominal and coincided very closely with simulations. Communications during the high noise level phase of flight were excellent. Staging of the S-IC occurred nearly on time and was accompanied by three distinct longitudinal oscillations. S-Il ignition and thrusting was smooth until about 00:05:32, when a sudden buildup in vibration was felt, followed by illumination of the number 5 engine out light. The Mission Control Center confirmed that engine 5 had shut down approximately 2 minutes early. S-II performance after that time was smooth with no noticeable abnormalities. S-II staging and S-IVB ignition occurred late, at 9 minutes 57 seconds. S-IVB performance was nominal but seemed to be accompanied by more vibration than was noted during Apollo 8. [The Apollo l3 Commander had been the Command Module Pilot for Apollo 8]. All three +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.085, Max reward: 0.310 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 Apollo 11 flyby +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar flyby mission purpose +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar flyby mission purpose +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission purpose NASA +2025-04-04 at 03:55:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar flyby mission purpose Apollo" +2025-04-04 at 03:55:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lunar flyby mission objectives +2025-04-04 at 03:55:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 6/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [682, 430, 776, 141, 378, 1857] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [58, 58, 58, 58, 58, 58] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 710.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 58.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 12.25 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.083 ± 0.186 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.33 ± 0.75 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.277, Max reward: 0.875 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: How many electric field meters were installed around Vandenberg Air Force Base launch site? +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electric field meters installed north west launch site +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electric field meters installed launch site north west +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 launch site installation electric field meter count +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: How many electric field meters were installed around the launch site mentioned in the provided results for Result 2 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electric field meters north west launch site shoreline +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 electric field meter count +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of launch site is mentioned for the electric field meters located at sites 5 and 4 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of launch site is associated with the launch tower mentioned in Result 2 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What launch agency or organization is represented by the launch sequence and mission data mentioned in the provided information +2025-04-04 at 03:55:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +The analysis of the trajectory from lift-off to spacecraft/S-IVB separation was based on launch vehicle onboard data, as reported in reference 2, and from network tracking data. After separation, the actual trajectory information was determined from the best estimated trajectory generated from tracking and telemetry data. The earth and moon models used for the trajectory analysis are geometrically similar to those used for Apollo l2. Table 3-I is a listing of major flight events, and table 4-I defines the trajectory and maneuver parameters listed in table 4-II. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Is Apollo 17 the correct mission associated with the launch sequence and mission data mentioned in the provided information +2025-04-04 at 03:55:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 Mission Report +2025-04-04 at 03:55:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, True, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [231, 281, 358, 617, 299, 545] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 388.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 4.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 97.12 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.325 ± 0.358 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.83 ± 2.48 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 7, 0, 2, 2, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +The analysis of the trajectory from lift-off to spacecraft/S-IVB separation was based on launch vehicle onboard data, as reported in reference 2, and from network tracking data. After separation, the actual trajectory information was determined from the best estimated trajectory generated from tracking and telemetry data. The earth and moon models used for the trajectory analysis are geometrically similar to those used for Apollo l2. Table 3-I is a listing of major flight events, and table 4-I defines the trajectory and maneuver parameters listed in table 4-II. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ +Result 2: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 4.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.667 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:55:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.308, Max reward: 0.646 +2025-04-04 at 03:55:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: The ignition cutoff for the third midcourse correction for the New Horizons spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +The accuracy of the first midcourse correction (table 4-Il), which placed the spacecraft on the non-free-return trajectory, was such that a maneuver was not required at the third planned option point. However, because of the oxygen tank incident, a 38-ft/sec midcourse maneuver was performed at 6l:29:44 using the descent engine to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory. This maneuver alone would have caused the command module to nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius Island at approximately 152 hours . + +At 2 hours beyond pericynthion, a second descent propulsion maneuver was performed to shorten the return time and move the earth landing point to the South Pacific. The 263.8-second maneuver produced a velocity change of 860.5 ft/sec and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the Pacific Ocean at 142:53:00. The transearth trip time was thus reduced by about 9 hours . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "ignition cutoff third midcourse correction, Artemis mission +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 13 mission third midcourse correction date +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ignition cutoff for the third midcourse correction New Horizons spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 03:56:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +Parame ter First midcourse correction Time Ignition, hr:min:sec 30 :40 :49 .65 Cutoff, hr:min:sec 30 : 40 :53.14 3.49 Duration, min:sec Velocity gained, ft/sec* (desirea/actual) X -13.1/-13.2 Y -14.7/-14.5 Z -12.2/-12.3 Velocity residual, ft/sec (spacecraft coordinates)** X +0.1 +0.2 Z +0.3 Entry monitor system +0.7 Engine gimbal. position, deg Initial Pitch 0.95 Yaw -0.19 Maximurn excursion Pitch +0.44 Yaw -0.51 Steady-state Pitch 1.13 Yaw -0.44 Cutoff Pitch 1.17 M1 -0.44 Maximum rate excursion, deg/sec Pitch +0.08 MB +0.16 Roll -0.08 Maximum attitude error, deg Pitch -0.04 Yaw -0.24 +0.12 Roll + +Velocity gained in earth-centered inertial coordinates. **Velocity residuals in spacecraft coordinates after trimning has been completed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: third midcourse correction ignition cutoff Artemis mission +2025-04-04 at 03:56:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +Because of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of the two service module cryogenic oxygen tanks in bay 4, primary electrical power was lost and the mission was aborted. Therefore, the remainder of this section will consider only the abort profile, since the trajectory prior to the tank incident was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, including the first midcourse maneuver to a non-free-return profile, as shown in figure 3-l. The major trajectory difference from Apollo l2 resulted from an early shutdown of the center engine in the S-II stage of the Saturn V, the subsequent staging and insertion times were somewhat later than planned. A listing of significant mission events is contained in table 3-I. + + + +Figure 3-l.- Apollo l3 mission profile. + +TABLE 3-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 2/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [96, 553, 7509, 498, 391, 106] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 1525.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 5.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 305.10 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.083 ± 0.186 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.33 ± 0.75 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +The accuracy of the first midcourse correction (table 4-Il), which placed the spacecraft on the non-free-return trajectory, was such that a maneuver was not required at the third planned option point. However, because of the oxygen tank incident, a 38-ft/sec midcourse maneuver was performed at 6l:29:44 using the descent engine to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory. This maneuver alone would have caused the command module to nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius Island at approximately 152 hours . + +At 2 hours beyond pericynthion, a second descent propulsion maneuver was performed to shorten the return time and move the earth landing point to the South Pacific. The 263.8-second maneuver produced a velocity change of 860.5 ft/sec and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the Pacific Ocean at 142:53:00. The transearth trip time was thus reduced by about 9 hours . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +Parame ter First midcourse correction Time Ignition, hr:min:sec 30 :40 :49 .65 Cutoff, hr:min:sec 30 : 40 :53.14 3.49 Duration, min:sec Velocity gained, ft/sec* (desirea/actual) X -13.1/-13.2 Y -14.7/-14.5 Z -12.2/-12.3 Velocity residual, ft/sec (spacecraft coordinates)** X +0.1 +0.2 Z +0.3 Entry monitor system +0.7 Engine gimbal. position, deg Initial Pitch 0.95 Yaw -0.19 Maximurn excursion Pitch +0.44 Yaw -0.51 Steady-state Pitch 1.13 Yaw -0.44 Cutoff Pitch 1.17 M1 -0.44 Maximum rate excursion, deg/sec Pitch +0.08 MB +0.16 Roll -0.08 Maximum attitude error, deg Pitch -0.04 Yaw -0.24 +0.12 Roll + +Velocity gained in earth-centered inertial coordinates. **Velocity residuals in spacecraft coordinates after trimning has been completed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +------ +Result 2: +Because of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of the two service module cryogenic oxygen tanks in bay 4, primary electrical power was lost and the mission was aborted. Therefore, the remainder of this section will consider only the abort profile, since the trajectory prior to the tank incident was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, including the first midcourse maneuver to a non-free-return profile, as shown in figure 3-l. The major trajectory difference from Apollo l2 resulted from an early shutdown of the center engine in the S-II stage of the Saturn V, the subsequent staging and insertion times were somewhat later than planned. A listing of significant mission events is contained in table 3-I. + + + +Figure 3-l.- Apollo l3 mission profile. + +TABLE 3-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: injection Ignition Cutoff 95 424.0 87456.0 379.7 398.4 5.0 5.5 0.7 0.8 56 866 51778 512 837 431285 517 560 437119 11370 9443 2495 2222 3255 3249 Thirdmidcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 87 325.3 87 263.3 398.7 398.9 5.5 5.5. 0.8 0.8 51 681 51642 430 123 429353 435930 435 169 9244 9227 2048 3215 Fowrth midcourse correction Ignition 87 132.1 399.1 5.5 0.8 51 553 428 322 434105 9069 2045 1911 3215 3191 Cutoff Command&servicemodule 87 101.5 399.2 5.6 0.8 51538 428219 433990 9065 1910 3192 b separation Before 87 057.3 399.3 5.6 0.8 51 517 428065 433 819 9058 1909 3194 After (command module/ lunar module) 37 109.7 251.5 2.2 -0.3 24048 92418 93.809 2362 686= 9 Commandmodule/lunar module separation b 37 014.6 Before 12 367.6 252.9 1039.9 1.9 -0.6 23926 93993 95514 2188 -963 -35 After (command module) 0.3 6.1 581.5 5 258 4636 31 409 20 Entry 12 361.4 1039.9 0.3 6.0 5 812 5254 4635 31 -407 21 Drogue deployment 11 869.4 1038.7 0.3 6.0 5727 5002 4405 33 -382 24 Main parachute deployment 11 579.8 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.173, Max reward: 0.510 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: site 6 negative field value 40 seconds golf score +2025-04-04 at 03:56:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [388, 641, 391, 250, 280, 480] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 405.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 16.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 25.31 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.033, Max reward: 0.200 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: How many hours of lunar module life support systems were intended for astronauts on moon missions? +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar module crew support hours after landing +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: How many hours of power and life support systems the crew was intended to have after lunar landing in the Apollo missions +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +The terms " Spacecraft electrical power duration for the lunar module in a lunar mission for the Apollo missions" + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module crew communication plans astronauts moon landing mission duration +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What duration of crew life support systems was ensured on the Apollo missions after landing? +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: new lunar module reaction control system separation procedures +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 7 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluati on September 1970 8 Cancelled 9 10 11 Apollo ll Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 January 1970 +------ +Result 2: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module crew support duration after landing lunar module +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo mission crew supported duration after landing +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module to command module reaction control system duration of support +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ +Result 2: +Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 7 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluati on September 1970 8 Cancelled 9 10 11 Apollo ll Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 January 1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module crew support duration to life support +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module postlanding crew support duration +2025-04-04 at 03:56:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module operational hours after lunar landing +2025-04-04 at 03:56:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [436, 406, 255, 302, 363, 538] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 383.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 8.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 47.92 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.308 ± 0.330 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.83 ± 1.86 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had been brought up to nearly full charge using lunar module power. The command module platform was aligned to the lunar module platform, and the spacecraft were unaocked 70 minutes before entry. After undocking, the escaping tunnel pressure provided the necessary separation velocity between the two spacecraft. From this point, the mission was completed nominally, as in previous flights, with the spacecraft landing approximately l mile from the target point. The lunar nodule, including the raaioisotope thermoelectric fuel capsule used to power experiment equipment, entered the atnosphere and impacted in the open sea between Samoa and New Zealand at 25.5 degrees south latitude and 176 degrees west longitude, with surveillance aircraft in the area. The three crewmen were onboard the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, within 45 minutes of landing, the fastest recovery time for all Apollo manned flights. A narrative +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\na. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\nThe command module was powered up with the three entry batteries, which had b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 7 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluati on September 1970 8 Cancelled 9 10 11 Apollo ll Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 January 1970 +------ +Result 2: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ +Result 2: +Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 7 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluati on September 1970 8 Cancelled 9 10 11 Apollo ll Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 January 1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...', 'Result 1:\nPerformance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsio...', 'Result 1:\nand Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion Sy...', 'Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Figure 7.l-l.- Entry battery energy. + +7.2 LUNAR MODULE + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of + +7.1.3 Cryogenic Fluids + +Cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen usages were nominal until the time of the incident. The pressure decay in oxygen tank 2 was essentially instantaneous , while oxygen tank l was not depleted until approximately 2 hours following the incident. Usages listed in the following table are based on an analysis of the electrical power produced by the fuel ce1ls。 +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes , at wh...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...', 'Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...', 'Result 1:\nThe command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at whi...', 'Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.300, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:25 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.490, Max reward: 0.961 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Define - line of sight, boresight axis, and angles in the context of satellite communications +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ +Result 2: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +how far is the boresight axis from the line of sight to the ground station +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigation system. A navigation fix was obtained at 1814 G.m.t., April 17, l970, and the position of the ship at spacecraft landing was dead-reckoned back to the time of landing and determined to be 2l degrees 34.7 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 23.2 minutes west longitude. At landing a radar range of 8o00 yards and a visual bearing of 158.9 degrees east of north (true heading) were obtained from which the command module landing point was determined to be 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and 165 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. This position is judged to be accurate to within 5o0 yards. +------ +Result 2: +Following translunar injection, earth weather photography was conducted for approximately 6 hours. + +The first period of translunar navigation (Program 23) at 6 hours was done to establish the apparent horizon attitude for optical marks in the computer. Some manual maneuvering was required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern at the point of horizon-star superposition. The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, and both periods were accomplished within the timeline and reaction control fuel budget. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "line-of-sight distance between antenna boresight axis and ground station due to angular misalignment" +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ +Result 2: +System testing with a similar antenna and electronics box showed RF signatures comparable to those observed in flight. This consistency was accomplished by placing the target inside the scan limits and the manual setting outside the scan limits. These two positions were separated approximately 35 degrees, which matched the actual angular separation experienced. Under these conditions, the antenna cycled between the target and the manual setting while operating in the auto-reacquisition mode and produced the cyclic RF signature. Since the inflight loss of signal to earth was not near the scan limit, the failure mechanism would be a shift in the Scan-limit function line. + +Elements in the scan-limit and scan-limit-warning circuit were shorted and opened to determine the effect on the scan-limit shift.The results of this test shifted the scan-limit functions but did not produce the necessary change in the scan-limit slope. Consequently, a failure in the electronic box is ruled out. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Satellite antenna boresight axis calculation due to ground station obstacle" + + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +apollo 11 antenna boresight axis distance from ground station +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: calculate angle difference to distance using 35 degrees +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + Calculation of antenna boresight axis difference + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ +Result 2: +Figure 14-6.- Recorded signal strengths during high-gain antenna operation. + +The only component identified with a failure mode that would produce a shift in the scan-limit functions and a shift change is the C-axis induction potentiometer located in the antenna. This potentiometer is used to provide a voltage proportional to the C-axis angular orientation and consists of three separate coils, each with symmetrical winding on opposite sides of the rotor or stator. These coils include the primary winding on the stator, the compensation or bias winding on the stator, and the linear output winding located on the rotor. The bias winding is used to shift the normal +70 degrees linear output to a new linear output over the range of from minus l0 to plus l30 degrees. + +The voltages for the C-axis induction potentiometer and the A-axis function generator, also located in the antenna, add together in the +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +apollo 11 antenna boresight distance calculation +2025-04-04 at 03:56:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: calculate distance between observation point and object at 35 degrees elevation angle +2025-04-04 at 03:56:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +apollo 13 s ivb impact ground station geometry +2025-04-04 at 03:56:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [657, 427, 616, 957, 551, 135] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 557.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 10.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 55.72 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ +Result 2: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigation system. A navigation fix was obtained at 1814 G.m.t., April 17, l970, and the position of the ship at spacecraft landing was dead-reckoned back to the time of landing and determined to be 2l degrees 34.7 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 23.2 minutes west longitude. At landing a radar range of 8o00 yards and a visual bearing of 158.9 degrees east of north (true heading) were obtained from which the command module landing point was determined to be 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and 165 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. This position is judged to be accurate to within 5o0 yards. +------ +Result 2: +Following translunar injection, earth weather photography was conducted for approximately 6 hours. + +The first period of translunar navigation (Program 23) at 6 hours was done to establish the apparent horizon attitude for optical marks in the computer. Some manual maneuvering was required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern at the point of horizon-star superposition. The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, and both periods were accomplished within the timeline and reaction control fuel budget. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Description Completed B C Television coverage No Contingency sample collection Selected sample collection No No D Evaluation of landing accuracy techniques No F No G Photographs of candidate exploration sites H Extravehicular communication performance No No I Lunar soil mechnics No J Dim light photography K Selenodetic reference point update No CSM orbital. science photography No L Transearth lunar photography No M EMU water consumption measurement No N Thermal coating degradation No ALSEPIII Apollo lunar surface experiments package No S-059 Lunar field geology No S-080 Solar wind composition No S-164 S-band transponder exercise No S-170 Downlink bistatic radar observations of the Moon No S-178 Gegenschein from lunar orbit No S-184 Lunar surface close-up photography No T-029 Pilot describing function Yes +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +An unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from its beginning to the peak value. This initial stage of the signal cannot be explained solely by the scattering of seismic waves in a rubbletype material, as was thought possible from the ascent stage impact data. Several alternate hypotheses are under study, but no firm conclusions have been reached. Signal scattering, however, may explain the character of the later part of the signal. + +The fact that such precise targeting accuracy was possible for the S-IVB impact, with the resulting seismic signals so large, have greatly encouraged seismologists to study possible future S-IvB impacts. For ranges extended to 500 kilometers, the data return could provide a means for determining moon structures to depths approaching 200 kilometers. + +The four primary objectives (see ref. 7) assigned to the Apollo 13 mission were as follows: +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ["Result 1:\nThe Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigati...", 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nAn unexplained characteristic of the S-IVB impact is the rapid buildup from i...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ +Result 2: +System testing with a similar antenna and electronics box showed RF signatures comparable to those observed in flight. This consistency was accomplished by placing the target inside the scan limits and the manual setting outside the scan limits. These two positions were separated approximately 35 degrees, which matched the actual angular separation experienced. Under these conditions, the antenna cycled between the target and the manual setting while operating in the auto-reacquisition mode and produced the cyclic RF signature. Since the inflight loss of signal to earth was not near the scan limit, the failure mechanism would be a shift in the Scan-limit function line. + +Elements in the scan-limit and scan-limit-warning circuit were shorted and opened to determine the effect on the scan-limit shift.The results of this test shifted the scan-limit functions but did not produce the necessary change in the scan-limit slope. Consequently, a failure in the electronic box is ruled out. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ +Result 2: +gathered from pairs of geosynchronous satellites located l0 to 20 degrees apart in longitude. Calculations indicate, however, that stereoscopic determination of cloud heights from geosynchronous aititudes would be marginal, at best, because of the small disparity angles involved (ref.6). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ +Result 2: +velocity vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg Apogee Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, mile Perigee Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, mfle Apocynthi on Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing Bite altitude, miles Peri cynthi on Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to landing site altitude, miles Period Time required for spacecraft to complete 360 de- grees of orbit rotation, min Inclination Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit plane and the reference body's equatorial plane, deg Longitude of the ascending node Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the ref- erence body's equatorial plane from below, deg +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +14.l.4 High-Gain Antenna Acquisition Problem + +Prior to the television transmission at approximately 55 hours, difficulty was experienced in obtaining high-gain antenna acquisition and tracking. The Command Module Pilot had manually adjusted the antenna settings to plus 23 degrees in pitch and 267 degrees in yaw, as requested by the ground 7 hours earlier. The most favorable settings for 55 hours were actually plus 5 degrees in pitch and 237 degrees in yaw. The difference between these two sets of angles pointed the antenna boresight axis approximately 35 degrees away from the line of sight to the ground station. +------ +Result 2: +Figure 14-6.- Recorded signal strengths during high-gain antenna operation. + +The only component identified with a failure mode that would produce a shift in the scan-limit functions and a shift change is the C-axis induction potentiometer located in the antenna. This potentiometer is used to provide a voltage proportional to the C-axis angular orientation and consists of three separate coils, each with symmetrical winding on opposite sides of the rotor or stator. These coils include the primary winding on the stator, the compensation or bias winding on the stator, and the linear output winding located on the rotor. The bias winding is used to shift the normal +70 degrees linear output to a new linear output over the range of from minus l0 to plus l30 degrees. + +The voltages for the C-axis induction potentiometer and the A-axis function generator, also located in the antenna, add together in the +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.067, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.412, Max reward: 0.875 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: command module pilot laboratory studies +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot laboratory studies results +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apolo command module pilot laboratory studies +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary Command Module Pilot laboratory studies +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot laboratory tests and assessment +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary Command Module Pilot laboratory studies summary +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot laboratory studies +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 14 Command Module postflight testing and inspection +2025-04-04 at 03:56:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary Command Module Pilot laboratory tests +2025-04-04 at 03:56:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary command pilot laboratory testing and findings +2025-04-04 at 03:56:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: primary Command Module laboratory tests experimental results +2025-04-04 at 03:56:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 14 Command Module Pilot laboratory testing and findings post replacement +2025-04-04 at 03:56:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apoll 11 command module pilot laboratory tests +2025-04-04 at 03:56:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 14 primary Command Module Pilot laboratory evaluation +2025-04-04 at 03:56:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot laboratory testing experimental outcomes +2025-04-04 at 03:56:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 primary Command Module Pilot laboratory testing +2025-04-04 at 03:56:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: laboratory testing for Command Module Pilot Apollo +2025-04-04 at 03:56:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 command module pilot experimental results +2025-04-04 at 03:56:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: laboratory testing Command Module Pilot Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY + +This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies noted during the Apollo l3 mission. + +14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES + +14.1.1 Loss of Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Pressure + +At approximately 55 hours 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission, the crew heard and felt the vibrations from a sharp "bang," coincident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main-bus-B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, the crew made an immediate verification of electrical-system parameters, which appeared normal. However, the crew reported the following barberpole indications from the Service module reaction control system: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module Pilot T-029 experiment +2025-04-04 at 03:56:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY + +This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies noted during the Apollo l3 mission. + +14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES + +14.1.1 Loss of Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Pressure + +At approximately 55 hours 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission, the crew heard and felt the vibrations from a sharp "bang," coincident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main-bus-B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, the crew made an immediate verification of electrical-system parameters, which appeared normal. However, the crew reported the following barberpole indications from the Service module reaction control system: +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:56:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Command Module pilot T-029 experiment results +2025-04-04 at 03:56:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY + +This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies noted during the Apollo l3 mission. + +14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES + +14.1.1 Loss of Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Pressure + +At approximately 55 hours 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission, the crew heard and felt the vibrations from a sharp "bang," coincident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main-bus-B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, the crew made an immediate verification of electrical-system parameters, which appeared normal. However, the crew reported the following barberpole indications from the Service module reaction control system: +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, True, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [253, 597, 258, 563, 866, 1760] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [22, 22, 22, 22, 22, 22] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 716.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 22.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 32.55 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.217 ± 0.352 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.33 ± 2.56 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 7, 1, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in thi...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi..."] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ["Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi..."] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Eight days before flight, the primary Command Module Pilot was exposed to rubella (German measles) by a member of the backup crew. The physical examination 5 days before flight was normal, but laboratory studies revealed that the primary Command Module Pilot had no immunity to rubella. Consequently, on the day prior to launch the final decision was made to replace the primary Command Module Pilot with the backup Command Module Pilot. A complete physical examination had been conducted on the backup Command Module Pilot 3 days before flight, and no significant findings were present in any preflight histories or examinations. +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in this section. The sequential, pyrotechnic, service propulsion, thermal protection, earth landing, and emergency detection systems and all displays, controls, and crew provisions operated essentially as intended and are not discussed. The pyrotechnic system, which performed all desired functions, did exhibit two minor anomalies, which are discussed only in sections 14.l.6 and 14.l.l0 of the Anomaly Summary, and two discrepancies in the operation of crew equipment were noted, these being discussed in sections 14.3.l and 14.3.2 of the Anomaly Summary. Except for these four cases, all other anomalies are generally mentioned in this Section but are discussed in greater detail in the Anomaly Summary. + +5.1 SITRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY + +This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies noted during the Apollo l3 mission. + +14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES + +14.1.1 Loss of Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Pressure + +At approximately 55 hours 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission, the crew heard and felt the vibrations from a sharp "bang," coincident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main-bus-B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, the crew made an immediate verification of electrical-system parameters, which appeared normal. However, the crew reported the following barberpole indications from the Service module reaction control system: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY + +This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies noted during the Apollo l3 mission. + +14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES + +14.1.1 Loss of Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Pressure + +At approximately 55 hours 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission, the crew heard and felt the vibrations from a sharp "bang," coincident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main-bus-B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, the crew made an immediate verification of electrical-system parameters, which appeared normal. However, the crew reported the following barberpole indications from the Service module reaction control system: +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 11: Result 1: +The pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data were obtained during manually controlled spacecraft maneuvers which are available to the principle investigator. None of the other experiments was attempted. + +14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY + +This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies noted during the Apollo l3 mission. + +14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES + +14.1.1 Loss of Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Pressure + +At approximately 55 hours 55 minutes into the Apollo 13 mission, the crew heard and felt the vibrations from a sharp "bang," coincident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main-bus-B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, the crew made an immediate verification of electrical-system parameters, which appeared normal. However, the crew reported the following barberpole indications from the Service module reaction control system: +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in thi...', 'Result 1:\nThe performance of the command and service module systems is discussed in thi...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nThe pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data ...', 'Result 1:\nThe pilot describing function experiment (T-029) was a success, in that data ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:56:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.151, Max reward: 0.375 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: NASA pre-flight medical examination +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ +Result 2: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: astronaut physical examination +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: physical examinations astronauts medical checklist +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: physical examinations of astronauts health +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: physical examination of astronauts during Apollo 19 mission +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: postflight physiological examination symptoms +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: postflight physical examinations Apollo astronaut health +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: inafter effects of heart rate during spaceflight +2025-04-04 at 03:57:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: heart rate response to stress during telemetry dropout +2025-04-04 at 03:57:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: physiological parameters pre-incident comparisons +2025-04-04 at 03:57:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 6/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, False, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [264, 336, 213, 294, 67, 131] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 217.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 25.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 8.70 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.242 ± 0.366 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.17 ± 1.86 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 5, 0, 0, 2, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ +Result 2: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch t...', 'Result 1:\nPostflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. T...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPostflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. T...', 'Result 1:\nPostflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. T...', 'Result 1:\nAt 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident...', 'Result 1:\nAt 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident...', 'Result 1:\nAt 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPostflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. T...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPostflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. T...', 'Result 1:\nPostflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. T...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 8.7 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT ... 8-7 8.8 TRANSEARTH INJECTION 8-11 8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST ····· 8-11 8.10 ENTRY AND LANDING.··. 8-17 9.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION...... 9-1 9.1 BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA . .. 9-1 9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY ······· · 9-2 9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS . .. ? 9-6 10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 10-1 10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ···· 10-1 10.2 NETWORK．······· 10-2 10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS...·.·. ··· 10-2 11.0 EXPERIMENTS·····．···.····. ·· 11-1 11.1 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICAL PHENOMENA ....... 11-1 11.2 EARTH PHOTOGRAPHY APPLIED TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES．·．··．·．··．·．··．·· 11-8 11.3 SEISMIC DETECTION OF THIRD STAGE LUNAR IMPACT . 11-9 12.0 ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES . :. . . . . ·· 12-1 13.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY·......·......... 13-1 14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY ·········· 14-1 14.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES . . . . . ·· 14-1 14.2 LUNAR MODULE ············ 14-24 14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ··· 14-36 15.0 CONCLUSIONS····.···.··．·.．·· ·· 15-1 APPENDIX A - VEHICLE +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.067, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:10 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.345, Max reward: 0.750 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Pluto's pericynthion after New Horizons orbital insertion +2025-04-04 at 03:57:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ +Result 2: +The accuracy of the first midcourse correction (table 4-Il), which placed the spacecraft on the non-free-return trajectory, was such that a maneuver was not required at the third planned option point. However, because of the oxygen tank incident, a 38-ft/sec midcourse maneuver was performed at 6l:29:44 using the descent engine to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory. This maneuver alone would have caused the command module to nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius Island at approximately 152 hours . + +At 2 hours beyond pericynthion, a second descent propulsion maneuver was performed to shorten the return time and move the earth landing point to the South Pacific. The 263.8-second maneuver produced a velocity change of 860.5 ft/sec and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the Pacific Ocean at 142:53:00. The transearth trip time was thus reduced by about 9 hours . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 10 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis +2025-04-04 at 03:57:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 10 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis +2025-04-04 at 03:57:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 10 post-pericynthion orbital altitude +2025-04-04 at 03:57:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [240, 480, 1292, 226, 249, 306] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 465.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 8.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 58.19 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ +Result 2: +The accuracy of the first midcourse correction (table 4-Il), which placed the spacecraft on the non-free-return trajectory, was such that a maneuver was not required at the third planned option point. However, because of the oxygen tank incident, a 38-ft/sec midcourse maneuver was performed at 6l:29:44 using the descent engine to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory. This maneuver alone would have caused the command module to nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius Island at approximately 152 hours . + +At 2 hours beyond pericynthion, a second descent propulsion maneuver was performed to shorten the return time and move the earth landing point to the South Pacific. The 263.8-second maneuver produced a velocity change of 860.5 ft/sec and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the Pacific Ocean at 142:53:00. The transearth trip time was thus reduced by about 9 hours . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.100, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:22 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.153, Max reward: 0.716 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: window shade material stitching +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: search for "window shade inner surface stitching material +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: material used for stitching on interior window shades +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What are the most common materials used for stitching inner surfaces of various types of window shades, especially for motorized or cellular shades? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"types of fabric used in window shades" +"window shade materials" +"window shade fabric types" +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, Manned Spacecraft Center: Analysis of Apollo l2 Lightning Incident, MSC-01540. February 1970. + +ICSU/IUGG Committee on Atmospheric Sciences: Report of the Study Conference on the Global Atmospheric Research Program, 1967. + +Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 50, No. 7: Cloud Height Contouring from Apollo 6 Photography, by V. S. Whitehead, I. D. Browne, and J. G. Garcia. 1969. + +Defense Supply Agency, Washington, D. C.: Military Standardization Handbook_ Optical Design, MIL HDBK-14l. 1962. + +NASA Headquarters: Apollo Flight Mission Assignments. OMSF M-D MA500-11 (SE 010-000-1). 0ctober 1969. + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Mission Requirement, H-2 Type Mission (Lunar Landing). SPD9-R-053. November 10, 1969. + +APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY + +(Continued from inside front cover) +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of fabric is commonly used for window shade backings? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: window shade material used in vehicle windows +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: search for "window shade stitching material for Beta Cloth" or "stitching material for Aclar shades +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What types of materials are commonly used for stitching the inner surfaces of window shades, especially in perspectives like automotive or aerospace? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Aclar material" +"Aclar characteristics" +"Aclar properties" +"Aclar vs. Beta Cloth" +"Aclar vs other window shade materials" +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is Aclar material? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Aclar material properties +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: search for "stitching material used in NASA window shades" or " Beta Cloth fabric characteristics for window shades +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of fabric or material is used as the Beta Cloth backing in window shades, especially those used in aerospace or space applications? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Aclar material properties" +"Aclar vs Beta Cloth" +"Aclar characteristics" +"Aclar plastic" +"Aclar film" +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is Mylar and its uses? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: type of stitching material prone to cracking in window shades +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: search for "stitching material on glass components" or "Aclar fabric characteristics +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of fabric or material is used as the Beta Cloth backing in window shades, which is sometimes reinforced with Mylar tape and has been developed by the Aclar supplier? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"Beta Cloth characteristics" +"Beta Cloth vs Aclar" +"Materials used in window shades" +"Window shade fabrics" +"Window shade materials" +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What type of fabric was stitched to the inner surface of the window shade? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Beta Cloth stitching characteristics +2025-04-04 at 03:57:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What is Beta Cloth used for? +2025-04-04 at 03:57:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +advised of their consumables status. A procedure was developed on the ground and used by the crew to allow use of command module lithium hydroxide cartridges for carbon dioxide removal in the lunar module environmental control system (see section 6.8). The passive thermal control mode was established using the lunar module reaction control system and was satisfactorily maintained throughout transearth coast. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Beta Cloth properties +2025-04-04 at 03:57:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, False, True, True, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [377, 178, 386, 553, 434, 234] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 360.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 12.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 30.03 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.479 ± 0.358 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 3.00 ± 2.24 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 4, 0, 4, 4, 6] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nwas added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum b...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, Manned Spacecraft Center: Analysis of Apollo l2 Lightning Incident, MSC-01540. February 1970. + +ICSU/IUGG Committee on Atmospheric Sciences: Report of the Study Conference on the Global Atmospheric Research Program, 1967. + +Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 50, No. 7: Cloud Height Contouring from Apollo 6 Photography, by V. S. Whitehead, I. D. Browne, and J. G. Garcia. 1969. + +Defense Supply Agency, Washington, D. C.: Military Standardization Handbook_ Optical Design, MIL HDBK-14l. 1962. + +NASA Headquarters: Apollo Flight Mission Assignments. OMSF M-D MA500-11 (SE 010-000-1). 0ctober 1969. + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Mission Requirement, H-2 Type Mission (Lunar Landing). SPD9-R-053. November 10, 1969. + +APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY + +(Continued from inside front cover) +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +The extravehicular mobility unit underwent several modifications to improve lunar surface capability. Scuff patches were added to the pressure garment assembly to prevent wear of the thermal/meteoroid garment caused by chaffing of the lunar boots. A device was added in the neck area of the pressure suit to provide drinking water to the crewmen during extravehicular activity. A center eyeshade was installed at the top of the extravehicular visor assembly to reduce incoming glare and to aid in dark adaptation when entering shadow. Abrasion cover gloves were included to be used over the extravehicular gloves to reduce wear and heat conduction during core drilling operations. The electrical connnector on the remote control unit for the portable life support system was redesigned to permit easier engagement. The manufacturing technique for the regulator in the oxygen purge system was modified to minimize the possibility of gas leakage. + +A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Leak tests previously performed on the valve were inadequate, in that only reverse leakage at high pressure was determined. For future vehicles, forward and reverse leakage at both high and low pressures will be measured to detect any defective valves. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.5 Cracked Window Shade + +The left-hand window shade showed three large separations when it was first placed in the stowed position during flight (fig. l4-2l). A Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the inner surface of the. Aclar shade. The cracks propagated from the sewing stitch holes on the periphery of the shade. About 1/8-inch-long cracks extended from about 80 percent of the stitch holes in a direction parallel with the curl axis of the shade. + + + +Figure 14-21.- Cracked left-hand window shade. + +Cracking as a result of Aclar embrittlement has occurred before, therefore, the Apollo l3 shades were examined prior to flight. Since no cracks were found, the shades were approved for flight. +------ +Result 2: +The Aclar supplier has developed a heating and quenching process to provide material with an elongation in excess of 25 percent, as compared to elongations of from 6 to l2 percent for the failed shades. Shades for future vehicles will be fabricated from this more ductile material. The Aclar will be reinforced with Mylar tape before the Beta Cloth backing is stitched to the shade. The modified shades have been requalified for the next flight. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT + +14.3.l Loose Lens Bumper On Lunar Module 16-mm Camera + +For launch, the l6-mm camera is mounted to point through the Lunar Module Pilot's window with the l0-mm lens and bumper attached. At the time of inflight lunar module inspection, the bumper was found to have separated from the camera lens. The bumper was replaced and remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Looseness has been experienced during previous lens /bumper assemblies. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +was added for cleaning the suits before ingress, the bristles on the vacuum brush were changed from Teflon to Nylon, and a cover was added to the lunar sample tote bag. +------ +Result 2: +advised of their consumables status. A procedure was developed on the ground and used by the crew to allow use of command module lithium hydroxide cartridges for carbon dioxide removal in the lunar module environmental control system (see section 6.8). The passive thermal control mode was established using the lunar module reaction control system and was satisfactorily maintained throughout transearth coast. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 5.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.833 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.300, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:40 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.495, Max reward: 0.834 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: event throttle position pressurization isolation solenoid in aircraft +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control mode was reestablished by rolling 90 degrees with reference to the abort-guidance-driven attitude displays. This maneuver placed the terminator parallel to the X-axis of the crewmen optical alignment sight. Rates were nulled in pitch and roll with the thrust/ translation controller assembly. Yaw was again automatically controlled by the abort guidance system. Nulling rates to zero was impossible because of the inaccurate readout of the rate needles. When rates appeared to be nulled, yaw control was placed in the reaction control pulse mode. Twelve yaw-right pulses were then used to start the passive thermal control mode maneuver. Because rates could not be completely nulled, some roll-pitch coupling was observed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: pressurization isolation valve FAA throttle position + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: failed hot +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:43 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: spacecraft propulsion system solenoid event throttle position descent maneuver +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo shuttle throttle isolated system solenoid valve position + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +The valve-lock mechanism rigging tolerances were found to be within specifications. When reassembled in the spacecraft, the malfunction was duplicated with only partial travel of the handle. + +The ventilation system was designed with two flexible control-cable assemblies linked to one handle, which is pulled to operate the two valves. An inherent characteristic of this design is that one control cable will nearly always slightly lag the other when the handle is pulled. At full extension of the handle, the travel in each cable assembly is more than sufficient to disengage both plungers and allow both valves to operate. Checkout procedures prior to flight were found to be satisfactory. There was no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction nor were any outof-tolerance components found. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: aircraft pressure regulation system failure solenoid control valve position +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The valve-lock mechanism rigging tolerances were found to be within specifications. When reassembled in the spacecraft, the malfunction was duplicated with only partial travel of the handle. + +The ventilation system was designed with two flexible control-cable assemblies linked to one handle, which is pulled to operate the two valves. An inherent characteristic of this design is that one control cable will nearly always slightly lag the other when the handle is pulled. At full extension of the handle, the travel in each cable assembly is more than sufficient to disengage both plungers and allow both valves to operate. Checkout procedures prior to flight were found to be satisfactory. There was no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction nor were any outof-tolerance components found. +------ +Result 2: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: pressurization isolation solenoid shutdown throttle position 12 percent +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: throttle isolated solenoid valve position 3/8 inch handle travel + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: aircraft valve mechanics propellant isolation valve operation failure +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: throttle isolated solenoid valve position when inlet valve remains closed + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: oxygen tank pressure loss propellant isolation valves controlled by bus B +2025-04-04 at 03:57:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: oxygen tank pressure loss solenoid isolation valve operation +2025-04-04 at 03:57:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: oxygen tank valve opening solenoid operation +2025-04-04 at 03:57:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ +Result 2: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electrical shorts oxygen tank 2 relief valve operation +2025-04-04 at 03:57:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ +Result 2: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: oxygen tank valve solenoid operation +2025-04-04 at 03:57:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ +Result 2: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:55 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, True, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [260, 566, 470, 809, 441, 426] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 495.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 25.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 19.81 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 5/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.212 ± 0.315 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 2.33 ± 3.73 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 4, 10, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control mode was reestablished by rolling 90 degrees with reference to the abort-guidance-driven attitude displays. This maneuver placed the terminator parallel to the X-axis of the crewmen optical alignment sight. Rates were nulled in pitch and roll with the thrust/ translation controller assembly. Yaw was again automatically controlled by the abort guidance system. Nulling rates to zero was impossible because of the inaccurate readout of the rate needles. When rates appeared to be nulled, yaw control was placed in the reaction control pulse mode. Twelve yaw-right pulses were then used to start the passive thermal control mode maneuver. Because rates could not be completely nulled, some roll-pitch coupling was observed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +The valve-lock mechanism rigging tolerances were found to be within specifications. When reassembled in the spacecraft, the malfunction was duplicated with only partial travel of the handle. + +The ventilation system was designed with two flexible control-cable assemblies linked to one handle, which is pulled to operate the two valves. An inherent characteristic of this design is that one control cable will nearly always slightly lag the other when the handle is pulled. At full extension of the handle, the travel in each cable assembly is more than sufficient to disengage both plungers and allow both valves to operate. Checkout procedures prior to flight were found to be satisfactory. There was no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction nor were any outof-tolerance components found. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +a. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked position, both plungers remained locked. b. With the handle extended from 5/16 to 3/8 inch from the valve locked position, the exhaust valve opened but the inlet valve remained closed.' This condition duplicates that of the position of the handle and the operation of the valve found on the Apollo l3 spacecraft after flight. c. When the handle was extended from 3/8 inch to full travel from the valve-locked position, both the inlet and and exhaust valves opened. + +Testing verified that application of power to the valves while the locking pins are being released will prevent the pin from being pulled to the unlock position because the drive shaft torque binds the lock pin. + +NASA-S-70-5841 + + + +Figure l4-l.- Post-landing vent valve lock. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\na. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked posit...', 'Result 1:\na. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked posit...', 'Result 1:\na. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked posit...', 'Result 1:\na. With the handle extended only l/4 inch or less from the valve locked posit...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The valve-lock mechanism rigging tolerances were found to be within specifications. When reassembled in the spacecraft, the malfunction was duplicated with only partial travel of the handle. + +The ventilation system was designed with two flexible control-cable assemblies linked to one handle, which is pulled to operate the two valves. An inherent characteristic of this design is that one control cable will nearly always slightly lag the other when the handle is pulled. At full extension of the handle, the travel in each cable assembly is more than sufficient to disengage both plungers and allow both valves to operate. Checkout procedures prior to flight were found to be satisfactory. There was no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction nor were any outof-tolerance components found. +------ +Result 2: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Following the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evidence of frequent engine firings. Data show that all propellant isolation valves Cn quad C, both helium isolation valves on quad D, and one helium isolation valve on quad B were shocked to the closed posi-- tior at the time of the oxygen tank pressure loss. On quad D, the regulated pressures dropped momentarily as the engines fired with the helium isolation valves closed. The crew reopened the quad D valves, and the engines functioned normally thereafter. Because the quad C propellant isolation valves are powered from bus B, which lost power, the valves could not be reopened and the quad remained inactive for the remainder of the flight. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ +Result 2: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ +Result 2: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation following the cryogenic tank incident. The suit compressor was turned off at 56:19:58, and with the repressurization package off line, the surge tank was isolated l7 minutes later at an indicated pressure of 858 psia. The 20-psi system was reactivated briefly four times from the surge tank to pressurize the command module potable water system. Further discussion of oxygen usage is presented in section 7.l. System operation for entry was satisfactory, with the suit compressor limited to a period of operation of only 22 miautes to conserve electri cal power. +------ +Result 2: +Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pressure and temperature increases within oxygen tank 2. During the pressure rise period, the fuses opened in both fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. A short-circuit conduction in the quantity gaging system cleared itself and then began an open-circuit condition. When the pressure reached the tank-2 relief-valve full-flow conditions of 1008 psia, the pressure decreased for about 9 seconds, after which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing another momentary pressure increase. Approximately $1/4$ second after this momentary pressure increase, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to lau...', 'Result 1:\nThe valve-lock mechanism rigging tolerances were found to be within specifica...', 'Result 1:\nThe service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to lau...', 'Result 1:\nFollowing the anomaly, all reaction control quads except C began showing evid...', 'Result 1:\nDuring the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, ...', 'Result 1:\nThe oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation followin...', 'Result 1:\nElectrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing pre...', 'Result 1:\nThe oxygen distribution system operated nominally until deactivation followin...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.133, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:57:56 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.288, Max reward: 0.589 +2025-04-04 at 03:57:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: power consumption during mars rover landing +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "current consumption, initial descent propulsion system firing, initial power consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 11 descent engine consumption" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Artemis mission second descent propulsion system current consumption" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: vehicle initial current consumption second descent propulsion system firing +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 11 second lunar descent and ascent propulsion system current consumption" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module power consumption after second descent firing Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: descent propulsion system firing propellant consumption Apollo +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 11 Descent Engine Power Consumption Initial" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: reactor control system operation Everest flight descent propulsion +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 7 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluati on September 1970 8 Cancelled 9 10 11 Apollo ll Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 January 1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: descent propulsion system firing Apollo initial energy consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 power consumption before second descent engine firing" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 descent propulsion system electrical power consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: descent propulsion system power consumption Apollo +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "linear vs exponential power consumption Apollo 13" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: 12 ampere crew current climb and lunar module descent propulsion initial power consumption +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "linear power consumption Apollo 13 30 amp hours" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar module power consumption before second descent engine firing 30 ampere seconds" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "solve 900 = 30 * t" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, True, False, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [409, 529, 22, 192, 407, 163] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 287.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 10.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 28.70 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.333, Valid formats: 2.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.350 ± 0.364 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.67 ± 1.80 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [2, 4, 0, 0, 4, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: ++21.0 +3.0 +------ +Result 2: +-1.2 40.4 +0.4 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module was completely powered down at 58 hours 40 minutes, at which time 99 ampere-hours remained in the three entry batteries. By charging the batteries with lunar module power, available battery capacity was increased to ll8 ampere-hours. Figure 7.l-l depicts the battery energy available and used during entry. At landing, 29 ampere-hours of energy remained. + + + +Following lunar module power-up, oxygen, water, and battery power were consumed at the lowest practical rate to increase the duration of spacecraft support from a nominal 44 hours to a required 83 hours plus margins. In addition, the descent propulsion and reaction control systems were used to effect all required translation and attitude maneuvers following the incident. + +7.2.l Des cent Propulsion Propellants + +The loaded quantities of descent propulsion system propellants shown in the following table were calculated from quantity readings in the spacecraft and measured densities prior to lift-off. +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The descent propulsion system performed normally during the 34.3- second midcourse correction to enter a free-return trajectory. This maneuver was begun at the minimum throttle position (l2 percent of full thrust), and after 5 seconds, the throttle position was manually increased to approximately 37 percent, which was maintained for the remainder of the firing. The transearth injection maneuver lasted 264 seconds. Approximately 15 seconds prior to engine shutdowm, the pressurization isolation Solenoid was closed to avoid a possible problem with propellant-tank fracture mechanics, and the maneuver was completed in the blowdown mode in which residual helium is the sole pressure source. The third system firing, a midcourse correction maneuver, was l3.7 seconds in duration and was performed in the blowdown mode at the minimum throttle position. Upon completion of this third and final descent propulsion operation, more than half the initial propellant load remained. +------ +Result 2: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The reaction control system was activated at about 58 hours. Total propellant consumption was 467 pounds. + +About 6 minutes after activation, flight data showed a sizeable decrease (approximately 22 psi) in the system-A propellant manifold pressures. This decrease continued for about 4 or 5 seconds and was accompanied by an increase of 7 and 8 psi in the ascent propulsion system fuel and oxidizer manifold pressures, respectively. These manifold pressure changes indicate a high flow rate from the reaction control system. This was verified by a decrease in the indicated quantity by about 15 pounds At this same time, the indicated position for the system-A ascent-feed interconnect valves was open. + +During passive thermal control modes, the cluster heaters were not used and cluster temperatures ranged from $55^{\circ}$ to97°F。 + +6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION +------ +Result 2: +Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Review 6 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 7 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluati on September 1970 8 Cancelled 9 10 11 Apollo ll Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 January 1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 6.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 1.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.333, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:15 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.340, Max reward: 0.615 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "field-change and sferics detectors lightning-like discharge location 5 during launch" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [488, 128, 405, 606, 823, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 408.67 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 2.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 204.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.058 ± 0.130 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.17 ± 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.033, Max reward: 0.200 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "spacecraft manufacturing facility Apollo CSM operations history" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (Locating the location of the specific facility) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 9 CSM 109 operations history facility" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: command and service module 109 recovery operations history +2025-04-04 at 03:58:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +Although the standard format was followed during the deactivation and postrecovery inspection of the command module, it should be noted that extreme caution was taken during these operations to insure the integrity of the command module for postflight evaluation of the anomaly. After deactivation, the command module was secured and guarded. + +The following discrepancies were noted during the postrecovery inspection: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo CSM evaluation facility 1969-1970" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (searching for more details on the specific facility used for the recovery operations) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Downey California space vehicle testing facility" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (searching for more details on the specific facility used for the recovery operations) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Johnson Space Center facilities Downey California" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (searching for more details on the specific facility used for the recovery operations) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center facilities" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (searching for more details on the specific location of the USS Iwo Jima) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigation system. A navigation fix was obtained at 1814 G.m.t., April 17, l970, and the position of the ship at spacecraft landing was dead-reckoned back to the time of landing and determined to be 2l degrees 34.7 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 23.2 minutes west longitude. At landing a radar range of 8o00 yards and a visual bearing of 158.9 degrees east of north (true heading) were obtained from which the command module landing point was determined to be 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and 165 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. This position is judged to be accurate to within 5o0 yards. +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: IwJima l969 recovery operations location +2025-04-04 at 03:58:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Grumman Aircraft Command Module Receiving and Storage Facility Downey California +2025-04-04 at 03:58:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Grumman Arlington facility Downey California +2025-04-04 at 03:58:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ +Result 2: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (searching for information on post recovery inspection facility) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +ASHUR Purpose Tests performed Results Environmental Control 109007 To determine contaninates present or damage incurred in 9o0 psi system Anelyze the oxygen filters upstream o restrictors and check valves for contaminates. Perform acceptance test of oxygen ir:air regulator 109008 To determine contaninates present in residual oxygen in surge tank snd repressurization package Withdraw sample and analyze for contaminates No rigrificant difference from the araiysis per- formed at:adine 109016 To investigate the failure of the postlanding ventilation valve to cycle open Determine positionofinletvaive mechanical safety pin.Attenpt to operate valve,ther renove for failure analysis Not complete 109020 Todetermine the cause of failure othe suit pressure transaucer Perform calibration check,dis- assembly,and failure anaysis Not compiete 109021 Todetermine the cause of failure o!the potable water transducer Remove,disassemble,and per- form failure analysis Hot complete 109015 To investigate the +------ +Result 2: +Although the standard format was followed during the deactivation and postrecovery inspection of the command module, it should be noted that extreme caution was taken during these operations to insure the integrity of the command module for postflight evaluation of the anomaly. After deactivation, the command module was secured and guarded. + +The following discrepancies were noted during the postrecovery inspection: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 2/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [655, 225, 208, 349, 240, 1479] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 526.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 18.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 29.22 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.158 ± 0.354 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.00 ± 2.24 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: ALunar module was docked to the command module from initial docking wntil just prior to entry. "Mass properties are referenced to the coordinate system of the lnar module, which provided spacecraft dynanic control during these phases. + +The history of command and service module (cSM 109) operations at the manufacturer's facility, Downey, California, is shown in figure B-l, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-2. + +The history of the lumar module (LM-7) at the manufacturer's facility, Bethpage, New York, is shown in figure B-3, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-4. + + + +Figure B-l.- Checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor's facility. + +NASA-S-70-5867 + + + +Figure B-2.- Command and service module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. + +NASA-S-70-5868 + + + +Figure B-3.- Checkout flow for lunar module at contractor's facility. + + + +Figure $\mathbb{R}{-}\mathbb{4}$ .- Lumar module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ["Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\nPREPARED BY\n\nMission Evaluation Team\n\nAPPROVED BY\n\n\n\nNATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND...', 'Result 1:\nPREPARED BY\n\nMission Evaluation Team\n\nAPPROVED BY\n\n\n\nNATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: ALunar module was docked to the command module from initial docking wntil just prior to entry. "Mass properties are referenced to the coordinate system of the lnar module, which provided spacecraft dynanic control during these phases. + +The history of command and service module (cSM 109) operations at the manufacturer's facility, Downey, California, is shown in figure B-l, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-2. + +The history of the lumar module (LM-7) at the manufacturer's facility, Bethpage, New York, is shown in figure B-3, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-4. + + + +Figure B-l.- Checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor's facility. + +NASA-S-70-5867 + + + +Figure B-2.- Command and service module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. + +NASA-S-70-5868 + + + +Figure B-3.- Checkout flow for lunar module at contractor's facility. + + + +Figure $\mathbb{R}{-}\mathbb{4}$ .- Lumar module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: ALunar module was docked to the command module from initial docking wntil just prior to entry. "Mass properties are referenced to the coordinate system of the lnar module, which provided spacecraft dynanic control during these phases. + +The history of command and service module (cSM 109) operations at the manufacturer's facility, Downey, California, is shown in figure B-l, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-2. + +The history of the lumar module (LM-7) at the manufacturer's facility, Bethpage, New York, is shown in figure B-3, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-4. + + + +Figure B-l.- Checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor's facility. + +NASA-S-70-5867 + + + +Figure B-2.- Command and service module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. + +NASA-S-70-5868 + + + +Figure B-3.- Checkout flow for lunar module at contractor's facility. + + + +Figure $\mathbb{R}{-}\mathbb{4}$ .- Lumar module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: ALunar module was docked to the command module from initial docking wntil just prior to entry. "Mass properties are referenced to the coordinate system of the lnar module, which provided spacecraft dynanic control during these phases. + +The history of command and service module (cSM 109) operations at the manufacturer's facility, Downey, California, is shown in figure B-l, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-2. + +The history of the lumar module (LM-7) at the manufacturer's facility, Bethpage, New York, is shown in figure B-3, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-4. + + + +Figure B-l.- Checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor's facility. + +NASA-S-70-5867 + + + +Figure B-2.- Command and service module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. + +NASA-S-70-5868 + + + +Figure B-3.- Checkout flow for lunar module at contractor's facility. + + + +Figure $\mathbb{R}{-}\mathbb{4}$ .- Lumar module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: ALunar module was docked to the command module from initial docking wntil just prior to entry. "Mass properties are referenced to the coordinate system of the lnar module, which provided spacecraft dynanic control during these phases. + +The history of command and service module (cSM 109) operations at the manufacturer's facility, Downey, California, is shown in figure B-l, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-2. + +The history of the lumar module (LM-7) at the manufacturer's facility, Bethpage, New York, is shown in figure B-3, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-4. + + + +Figure B-l.- Checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor's facility. + +NASA-S-70-5867 + + + +Figure B-2.- Command and service module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. + +NASA-S-70-5868 + + + +Figure B-3.- Checkout flow for lunar module at contractor's facility. + + + +Figure $\mathbb{R}{-}\mathbb{4}$ .- Lumar module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: ALunar module was docked to the command module from initial docking wntil just prior to entry. "Mass properties are referenced to the coordinate system of the lnar module, which provided spacecraft dynanic control during these phases. + +The history of command and service module (cSM 109) operations at the manufacturer's facility, Downey, California, is shown in figure B-l, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-2. + +The history of the lumar module (LM-7) at the manufacturer's facility, Bethpage, New York, is shown in figure B-3, and the operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in figure B-4. + + + +Figure B-l.- Checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor's facility. + +NASA-S-70-5867 + + + +Figure B-2.- Command and service module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. + +NASA-S-70-5868 + + + +Figure B-3.- Checkout flow for lunar module at contractor's facility. + + + +Figure $\mathbb{R}{-}\mathbb{4}$ .- Lumar module checkout history at Kennedy Space Center. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +TABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT + +Landing area Supporta Remarks Number Unit Launch site 1 LCU Landing craft utility (landing craft with command Launch abort 1 HH-3E module retrieval capability)- USS Paiute Helicopter with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB,Florida 2 HH-53C Helicopters capable of lifting the command module; each with para-rescue team staged from Patrick AFB, 1 ATF Florida 2 SH-3 Helicopters staged from Norfolk NAS, Virginia 1 DD USS New 3 HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft; one each staged from McCoy AFB, Florida; Pease AFB,New Mexico; and Lajes AFB, ’Azores Earth orbit Primary end-of-mission, 2 2 DD HC-130H USS New Fixed wing aircraft staged from Ascension Mid-Pacific earth 1 1 HdT DD USS Iwo Jima 8 SH-3D USS Benjamin Stoddert orbital, and deep- 2 Helicopters staged from USS Iwo Jima space secondary HC-130H Fixed wing aircraft staged from Hickam AFB, Hawaii + +&arotal ship support $=5$ Total aircraft support $\approx$ 23 + +10.3.l Command Module Location and Retrieval +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +Although the standard format was followed during the deactivation and postrecovery inspection of the command module, it should be noted that extreme caution was taken during these operations to insure the integrity of the command module for postflight evaluation of the anomaly. After deactivation, the command module was secured and guarded. + +The following discrepancies were noted during the postrecovery inspection: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigation system. A navigation fix was obtained at 1814 G.m.t., April 17, l970, and the position of the ship at spacecraft landing was dead-reckoned back to the time of landing and determined to be 2l degrees 34.7 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 23.2 minutes west longitude. At landing a radar range of 8o00 yards and a visual bearing of 158.9 degrees east of north (true heading) were obtained from which the command module landing point was determined to be 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and 165 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. This position is judged to be accurate to within 5o0 yards. +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago Pago, Samoa, the following morning. A C-l4l aircraft then took the crew to Hawaii, and following a ceremony and an overnight stay, they were returned to Houston. + +Upon arrival of the Iwo Jima in Hawaii, the command module was offloaded and taken to Hickam Air Force Base for deactivation. Two and one half days later, the command module was flown to the manufacturer's plant at Downey, California aboard a C-l33 aircraft. + +The following is a chronological listing of events during the recovery operations. +------ +Result 2: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +ASHUR Purpose Tests performed Results Environmental Control 109007 To determine contaninates present or damage incurred in 9o0 psi system Anelyze the oxygen filters upstream o restrictors and check valves for contaminates. Perform acceptance test of oxygen ir:air regulator 109008 To determine contaninates present in residual oxygen in surge tank snd repressurization package Withdraw sample and analyze for contaminates No rigrificant difference from the araiysis per- formed at:adine 109016 To investigate the failure of the postlanding ventilation valve to cycle open Determine positionofinletvaive mechanical safety pin.Attenpt to operate valve,ther renove for failure analysis Not complete 109020 Todetermine the cause of failure othe suit pressure transaucer Perform calibration check,dis- assembly,and failure anaysis Not compiete 109021 Todetermine the cause of failure o!the potable water transducer Remove,disassemble,and per- form failure analysis Hot complete 109015 To investigate the +------ +Result 2: +Although the standard format was followed during the deactivation and postrecovery inspection of the command module, it should be noted that extreme caution was taken during these operations to insure the integrity of the command module for postflight evaluation of the anomaly. After deactivation, the command module was secured and guarded. + +The following discrepancies were noted during the postrecovery inspection: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nTABLE 1O.3-I.- RECOVERY SUPPORT\n\nLanding area Supporta Remarks Number Unit La...', 'Result 1:\nThe Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excel...', 'Result 1:\nSupport for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, U...', 'Result 1:\nSupport for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, U...', 'Result 1:\nSupport for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, U...', "Result 1:\nThe Iwo Jima's position was established accurately using a satellite navigati...", 'Result 1:\nThe flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago...', 'Result 1:\nThe flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago...', 'Result 1:\nThe flight crew remained aboard the Iwo Jima overnight and were flown to Pago...', 'Result 1:\nASHUR Purpose Tests performed Results Environmental Control 109007 To determi...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:46 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.034, Max reward: 0.202 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "O-ring compression ratio breech assembly" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Specs of chambering in firearms +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ +Result 2: +approximately l mile of the target location. Because of power restrictions, the circuit breaker for the data storage equipment recorder was left open during entry, and no entry data are available for an entry performance analysis . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "O-ring crush ratio breech assembly" +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ +Result 2: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [194, 323, 262, 119, 398, 791] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 347.83 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 2.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 173.92 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ +Result 2: +approximately l mile of the target location. Because of power restrictions, the circuit breaker for the data storage equipment recorder was left open during entry, and no entry data are available for an entry performance analysis . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +------ +Result 2: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The worse-case tolerance buildup is when the fork contacts the attenuator block and the piston O-ring is 0.075 inch from entering the chamfer in the breech assembly. The O-ring enters this chamfer when the block has been crushed about 94 percent, at which point an O-ring displacement and accompanying gas escape could be expected. The factors which affect the degree of attenuator crushing are generally uncontrollable within narrow limits and include: + +a. Sliding friction of the many electrical contact pins, the several camming and fork-to-plate surfaces, and the piston b. Forces exerted by the springs, which hold the lift and base plates together in the assembled position C. Propellant gas pressure and the simultaneous increase of pres sure in the two breeches and the plenum d. Simultaneous occurrence of the electrical firing signals to the two cartridges e. Physical properties of the attenuator block. +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.133, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.179, Max reward: 0.676 +2025-04-04 at 03:58:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lithium-ion batteries electric vehicles fuel injection system metering valve redesign +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +The data show that descent battery 2 experienced at least a 60-ampere current surge. This condition could have been a reverse current into the battery, since the instrumentation system does not indicate the direction of current. Immediately after the current surges, battery l current returned to its original value while battery 2 provided about 80 percent of the total current load. After sustaining a surge load, the battery terminal voltage normally increases for a short period of time. Since battery 2 experienced the highest surge, it should have temporarily assumed the most load. Within l0 minutes all batteries were properly sharing the current load, and no subsequent abnormal performance was observed. At 99:5l:09, battery 2 gave an indication of a battery malfunction, discussed in more detail in the next section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Valve redesign Industry application +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Pop-top valve redesign +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electric vehicle battery management system valve redesign +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +The data show that descent battery 2 experienced at least a 60-ampere current surge. This condition could have been a reverse current into the battery, since the instrumentation system does not indicate the direction of current. Immediately after the current surges, battery l current returned to its original value while battery 2 provided about 80 percent of the total current load. After sustaining a surge load, the battery terminal voltage normally increases for a short period of time. Since battery 2 experienced the highest surge, it should have temporarily assumed the most load. Within l0 minutes all batteries were properly sharing the current load, and no subsequent abnormal performance was observed. At 99:5l:09, battery 2 gave an indication of a battery malfunction, discussed in more detail in the next section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ascent stage tank shutoff valve redesign +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (typical valve redesign for postlanding Vent Valve and ascent stage tank shutoff valve) +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ +Result 2: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:58:58 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electrolyte management valve for solid-state battery +2025-04-04 at 03:59:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +a. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each cell to prevent leakage. b.. The descent battery cells contain an excessive amount of free electrolyte. c. The potting does not adhere to the battery case, consequently, any free electrolyte can readily penetrate the interface between the potting and the case and bridge between the terminals and case. d. Once an electrolyte bridge is formed, electrolysis will produce hydrogen and oxygen gas. e. A bridge at the positive terminal can produce a current surge o: as much as l50 amperes. + +For Apollo l4 and subsequent missions, the descent batteries will be modified to minimize the hazards associated with electrolyte leakage. + + + +NASA-S-70-5859 + +Figure 14-l7.- Descent battery terminal configuration. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ascent stage tank shutoff valve redesign reasons +2025-04-04 at 03:59:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: solid-state battery Teflon retention screen upgrade +2025-04-04 at 03:59:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +a. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each cell to prevent leakage. b.. The descent battery cells contain an excessive amount of free electrolyte. c. The potting does not adhere to the battery case, consequently, any free electrolyte can readily penetrate the interface between the potting and the case and bridge between the terminals and case. d. Once an electrolyte bridge is formed, electrolysis will produce hydrogen and oxygen gas. e. A bridge at the positive terminal can produce a current surge o: as much as l50 amperes. + +For Apollo l4 and subsequent missions, the descent batteries will be modified to minimize the hazards associated with electrolyte leakage. + + + +NASA-S-70-5859 + +Figure 14-l7.- Descent battery terminal configuration. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ascent stage tank shutoff valve redesign reasons safety issues +2025-04-04 at 03:59:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: electrolyte leak prevention valve design for descent batteries +2025-04-04 at 03:59:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each cell to prevent leakage. b.. The descent battery cells contain an excessive amount of free electrolyte. c. The potting does not adhere to the battery case, consequently, any free electrolyte can readily penetrate the interface between the potting and the case and bridge between the terminals and case. d. Once an electrolyte bridge is formed, electrolysis will produce hydrogen and oxygen gas. e. A bridge at the positive terminal can produce a current surge o: as much as l50 amperes. + +For Apollo l4 and subsequent missions, the descent batteries will be modified to minimize the hazards associated with electrolyte leakage. + + + +NASA-S-70-5859 + +Figure 14-l7.- Descent battery terminal configuration. +------ +Result 2: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ascent stage tank shutoff valve redesign due to safety +2025-04-04 at 03:59:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: measurement and management of electrolyte in descent battery +2025-04-04 at 03:59:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +The data show that descent battery 2 experienced at least a 60-ampere current surge. This condition could have been a reverse current into the battery, since the instrumentation system does not indicate the direction of current. Immediately after the current surges, battery l current returned to its original value while battery 2 provided about 80 percent of the total current load. After sustaining a surge load, the battery terminal voltage normally increases for a short period of time. Since battery 2 experienced the highest surge, it should have temporarily assumed the most load. Within l0 minutes all batteries were properly sharing the current load, and no subsequent abnormal performance was observed. At 99:5l:09, battery 2 gave an indication of a battery malfunction, discussed in more detail in the next section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, True, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [224, 227, 287, 656, 281, 752] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 404.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 12.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 33.71 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.242 ± 0.366 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.17 ± 1.86 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 2] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +The data show that descent battery 2 experienced at least a 60-ampere current surge. This condition could have been a reverse current into the battery, since the instrumentation system does not indicate the direction of current. Immediately after the current surges, battery l current returned to its original value while battery 2 provided about 80 percent of the total current load. After sustaining a surge load, the battery terminal voltage normally increases for a short period of time. Since battery 2 experienced the highest surge, it should have temporarily assumed the most load. Within l0 minutes all batteries were properly sharing the current load, and no subsequent abnormal performance was observed. At 99:5l:09, battery 2 gave an indication of a battery malfunction, discussed in more detail in the next section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +The data show that descent battery 2 experienced at least a 60-ampere current surge. This condition could have been a reverse current into the battery, since the instrumentation system does not indicate the direction of current. Immediately after the current surges, battery l current returned to its original value while battery 2 provided about 80 percent of the total current load. After sustaining a surge load, the battery terminal voltage normally increases for a short period of time. Since battery 2 experienced the highest surge, it should have temporarily assumed the most load. Within l0 minutes all batteries were properly sharing the current load, and no subsequent abnormal performance was observed. At 99:5l:09, battery 2 gave an indication of a battery malfunction, discussed in more detail in the next section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +a. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each cell to prevent leakage. b.. The descent battery cells contain an excessive amount of free electrolyte. c. The potting does not adhere to the battery case, consequently, any free electrolyte can readily penetrate the interface between the potting and the case and bridge between the terminals and case. d. Once an electrolyte bridge is formed, electrolysis will produce hydrogen and oxygen gas. e. A bridge at the positive terminal can produce a current surge o: as much as l50 amperes. + +For Apollo l4 and subsequent missions, the descent batteries will be modified to minimize the hazards associated with electrolyte leakage. + + + +NASA-S-70-5859 + +Figure 14-l7.- Descent battery terminal configuration. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +a. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each cell to prevent leakage. b.. The descent battery cells contain an excessive amount of free electrolyte. c. The potting does not adhere to the battery case, consequently, any free electrolyte can readily penetrate the interface between the potting and the case and bridge between the terminals and case. d. Once an electrolyte bridge is formed, electrolysis will produce hydrogen and oxygen gas. e. A bridge at the positive terminal can produce a current surge o: as much as l50 amperes. + +For Apollo l4 and subsequent missions, the descent batteries will be modified to minimize the hazards associated with electrolyte leakage. + + + +NASA-S-70-5859 + +Figure 14-l7.- Descent battery terminal configuration. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +a. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each cell to prevent leakage. b.. The descent battery cells contain an excessive amount of free electrolyte. c. The potting does not adhere to the battery case, consequently, any free electrolyte can readily penetrate the interface between the potting and the case and bridge between the terminals and case. d. Once an electrolyte bridge is formed, electrolysis will produce hydrogen and oxygen gas. e. A bridge at the positive terminal can produce a current surge o: as much as l50 amperes. + +For Apollo l4 and subsequent missions, the descent batteries will be modified to minimize the hazards associated with electrolyte leakage. + + + +NASA-S-70-5859 + +Figure 14-l7.- Descent battery terminal configuration. +------ +Result 2: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between the battery terminals and case. These improvements include coating the inside of the battery case with epoxy paint before the battery is assembled and changing the potting material used at the ends of the case to a material which has better adhesion characteristics. Also, the cell chimneys will be manifolded together and to the case vent-valve with plastic tubing. + +In addition, tests are being performed to determine if the quantity of free electrolyte in each cell can be reduced. Preliminary results indicate a reduction of from 360 to 340 cc per cell is possible. +------ +Result 2: +The data show that descent battery 2 experienced at least a 60-ampere current surge. This condition could have been a reverse current into the battery, since the instrumentation system does not indicate the direction of current. Immediately after the current surges, battery l current returned to its original value while battery 2 provided about 80 percent of the total current load. After sustaining a surge load, the battery terminal voltage normally increases for a short period of time. Since battery 2 experienced the highest surge, it should have temporarily assumed the most load. Within l0 minutes all batteries were properly sharing the current load, and no subsequent abnormal performance was observed. At 99:5l:09, battery 2 gave an indication of a battery malfunction, discussed in more detail in the next section. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between ...', 'Result 1:\nThe battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between ...', 'Result 1:\nThe battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between ...', 'Result 1:\nThe battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between ...', 'Result 1:\na. Electrolyte can leak past the Teflon retention screens installe in each ce...', 'Result 1:\nThe battery potting will be improved to prevent electrolyte bridging between ...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ +Result 2: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ +Result 2: +(fig. 14-20) caused the leakage. When the valve is installed, the forward O-ring can be rolled and damaged when it passes the manifold port. In the other two valves, the cause was not identified and was assumed to be contamination. + +The production tolerances of the valve and bore were examined to determine if a tolerance buildup problem existed. The manufacturer's specification to which the valve was designed requires that the O-ring be subjected to a compression of between 0.01l5 and 0.0225 inch, whereas the 0-ring supplier recommends between 0.0ll and 0.017 inch. The added compression allowed in the valve design would aggravate the tendancy for the O-ring to roll during valve .assembly. + + + +Figure l4-20.- Ascent stage tank shutoff valve:. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:07 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.267, Max reward: 0.798 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "SS Titanic tank line burst cause +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ +Result 2: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: tank line burst naval vessel +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The prelaunch-standby rise rate was a normal 7.8 psi/hour. During flight, the zero-g rise rate of 7 psi/hour was slightly higher than expected, but still satisfactory. Following the first descent engine firing at 6l-1/2 hours, the rise rate increased to 10.5 psi/hour, rather than returning to its normal value, as shown in figure 14-14.’ After the second firing at 79-l/2 hours, the rise rate again increased, this time to approximately 33 psi/hour until about 109 hours, when the helium-tank burst disc ruptured at l937 psia, as it should have and vented the remaining helium overboard. + +The helium tank is a double-walled titanium pressure vessel, with 173 layers of aluminized Mylar insulation between the two shells. The annular region is evacuated to a level of $\mathsf{10}^{-\gamma}$ torr during the manufacturing process. +------ +Result 2: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "what was the immediate cause of the tank line Maginot Line breach?" +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ +Result 2: +Efforts to install the tunnel hatch were terminated when the Commander observed venting of material from the service module area. He then reported the oxygen tank 2 pressure was zero and oxygen tank l pressure was decreasing. This information pinpointed the problem source to within the command and service modules. + +At ground request, fuel cells l and 3 regulator pressures were read from the systems test meter, confirming the loss of these fuel cells. AC bus 2 was tied. to inverter 1, and the emergency power-down procedure was initiated to reduce the current flow to l0 amperes. At ground request, fuel cell l and, shortly thereafter, fuel cell 3 were shutdown in an attempt to stop the decrease in oxygen tank l pressure. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What was the cause of the tank line to burst in a World War II battle +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ +Result 2: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket tank line burst cause +2025-04-04 at 03:59:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ +Result 2: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 1 tank line burst cause" +2025-04-04 at 03:59:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Because of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of the two service module cryogenic oxygen tanks in bay 4, primary electrical power was lost and the mission was aborted. Therefore, the remainder of this section will consider only the abort profile, since the trajectory prior to the tank incident was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, including the first midcourse maneuver to a non-free-return profile, as shown in figure 3-l. The major trajectory difference from Apollo l2 resulted from an early shutdown of the center engine in the S-II stage of the Saturn V, the subsequent staging and insertion times were somewhat later than planned. A listing of significant mission events is contained in table 3-I. + + + +Figure 3-l.- Apollo l3 mission profile. + +TABLE 3-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: SpaceX ISS propellant gaging system failure cause +2025-04-04 at 03:59:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 1 oxygen tank 4 pressure loss cause" +2025-04-04 at 03:59:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Crew Dragon Dragon-4 lunar oxygen loss cause +2025-04-04 at 03:59:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +Total oxygen usage from the three lunar module oxygen tanks was 20.3 pounds over an 82-hour period, for an average usage rate of 0.25 lb/ hr. Oxygen remaining in the tanks at undocking was 33.5 pounds. During translunar coast, lunar module cabin leakage was about 0.0l4 lb/hr, assuming an average cabin pressure of 4.5 psia. Command module cabin leakage was estimated to have been about 0.027 lb/hr. These values indicate an average metabolic consumption rate throughout the flight of approximately 0.21 1b/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 1 cryogenic oxygen tank 2 heat pulse source" +2025-04-04 at 03:59:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Crew Dragon Dragon-4 incident outcome +2025-04-04 at 03:59:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Dragon 4 Crew recovery and transportation +2025-04-04 at 03:59:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Dragon 4 recovery operations USS Iwo Jima +2025-04-04 at 03:59:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ +Result 2: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: USS Granville Hall role in Dragon 4 recovery +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The service module was separated $\scriptstyle4-3/4$ hours before entry , affording the crew an opportunity to observe and photograph the damaged bay 4 area. The command moduie was separated from the service module by using the lunar module reaction control system. The lunar module was retained for as long as possible to provide maximum electrical power in the command module for entry . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [1448, 290, 573, 672, 311, 126] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 570.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 30.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 19.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.058 ± 0.130 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.17 ± 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ +Result 2: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ +Result 2: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The service propulsion auxiliary propellant gaging system failed prior to launch and a measurement waiver was granted. The failure, which resulted in shorting of the instrumentation power supply, was caused from fuel leakage into the point sensor module within the tank. Similar failures have occurred on previous flights, and since this system is independent of the primary gaging system, which was operating properly, performance of the mission was not affected. + +5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +Total oxygen usage from the three lunar module oxygen tanks was 20.3 pounds over an 82-hour period, for an average usage rate of 0.25 lb/ hr. Oxygen remaining in the tanks at undocking was 33.5 pounds. During translunar coast, lunar module cabin leakage was about 0.0l4 lb/hr, assuming an average cabin pressure of 4.5 psia. Command module cabin leakage was estimated to have been about 0.027 lb/hr. These values indicate an average metabolic consumption rate throughout the flight of approximately 0.21 1b/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The ship-based aircraft were deployed relative to the Iwo Jima and were on station 20 minutes prior to landing. They departed station to commence recovery activities upon receiving notice of visual contact with the descending command module. Figure l0.3-l depict an approximation of the recovery force positions just prior to the sighting of the command module. + + + +Figure l0.3-l.- Recovery support at earth landing. +------ +Result 2: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Support for the primary recovery area consisted of the prime recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima, five helicopters from the Iwo Jima, and two HC-l30H rescue aircraft. Later, the experimental mine sweeper, USS Granville Hall, and two HC-l30H aircraft were added to the end-of-mission array. One of the helicopters, designated "Recovery," carried the flight surgeon, and was utilized for retrieval of the crew. Two of the helicopters, designated "Swim l" and "Swim 2," carried swimmers and the necessary recovery equipment. A fourth helicopter, designated "Photo" was used as a photographic platform, and the fifth helicopter, designated "Relay," served as a communications relay aircraft. The four aircraft, designated "Samoa Rescue l, 2, 3, and 4," were positioned to track the command module after exit from blackout, as well as to provide pararescue capability had the command module landed uprange or downrange of the target point. The USS Granville Hall was positioned to provide support in the event +------ +Result 2: +The service module was separated $\scriptstyle4-3/4$ hours before entry , affording the crew an opportunity to observe and photograph the damaged bay 4 area. The command moduie was separated from the service module by using the lunar module reaction control system. The lunar module was retained for as long as possible to provide maximum electrical power in the command module for entry . +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The prelaunch-standby rise rate was a normal 7.8 psi/hour. During flight, the zero-g rise rate of 7 psi/hour was slightly higher than expected, but still satisfactory. Following the first descent engine firing at 6l-1/2 hours, the rise rate increased to 10.5 psi/hour, rather than returning to its normal value, as shown in figure 14-14.’ After the second firing at 79-l/2 hours, the rise rate again increased, this time to approximately 33 psi/hour until about 109 hours, when the helium-tank burst disc ruptured at l937 psia, as it should have and vented the remaining helium overboard. + +The helium tank is a double-walled titanium pressure vessel, with 173 layers of aluminized Mylar insulation between the two shells. The annular region is evacuated to a level of $\mathsf{10}^{-\gamma}$ torr during the manufacturing process. +------ +Result 2: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe prelaunch-standby rise rate was a normal 7.8 psi/hour. During flight, the...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ +Result 2: +Efforts to install the tunnel hatch were terminated when the Commander observed venting of material from the service module area. He then reported the oxygen tank 2 pressure was zero and oxygen tank l pressure was decreasing. This information pinpointed the problem source to within the command and service modules. + +At ground request, fuel cells l and 3 regulator pressures were read from the systems test meter, confirming the loss of these fuel cells. AC bus 2 was tied. to inverter 1, and the emergency power-down procedure was initiated to reduce the current flow to l0 amperes. At ground request, fuel cell l and, shortly thereafter, fuel cell 3 were shutdown in an attempt to stop the decrease in oxygen tank l pressure. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Because of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of the two service module cryogenic oxygen tanks in bay 4, primary electrical power was lost and the mission was aborted. Therefore, the remainder of this section will consider only the abort profile, since the trajectory prior to the tank incident was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, including the first midcourse maneuver to a non-free-return profile, as shown in figure 3-l. The major trajectory difference from Apollo l2 resulted from an early shutdown of the center engine in the S-II stage of the Saturn V, the subsequent staging and insertion times were somewhat later than planned. A listing of significant mission events is contained in table 3-I. + + + +Figure 3-l.- Apollo l3 mission profile. + +TABLE 3-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +is this damage which is believed to have caused the inflight failure in tank 2 and loss of pressure. +------ +Result 2: +The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and a momentary loss of data. Burning of the wire insulation reached the electrical conduit leading from inside the tube to the external plug causing the tank line to burst because of overheating. The ruptured electrical conduit caused the vacuum jacket to over pressurize and, in turn, caused the blow-out plug in the vacuum jacket to rupture. Some mechanism, possibly the burning of insulation in bay 4 combined with the oxygen buildup in that bay, caused a rapid pressure rise which resulted in separation of the outer panel. Ground tests, however, have not substantiated the burning of the Mylar insulation under the conditions which probably existed just after the tank rupture. The panel separation shock closed the fuel cell l and 3 oxygen reactant shut-off valves and several propellant and helium isolation valves in the reaction control system. Data were lost for about 1.8 seconds as +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 3.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.500 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:30 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.189, Max reward: 0.735 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: geo:search 13-60-8591 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: latitude object 13-60-8591 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ +Result 2: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 13 mission command module sub kit +2025-04-04 at 03:59:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [562, 396, 428, 6, 154, 250] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 299.33 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 7.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 42.76 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ +Result 2: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\n1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 552...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi..."] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +------ +Result 2: +1038.6 0.5 5.3 5590 4 812 4346 27 -319 41 Landing 11 132.9 1036.6 0.5 5.2 5526 4531 4046 25 -328 42 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: TABIE 11.2-I.- EARTH WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY + +Magazine L frame Mission elapsed time hr:min:sec Gmt hr:min:sec Latitude Longitude Altitude Normalization enlargement required Distance apart mile Mile Earth radii (from center) 13-60-8590 07:17:14 02:30:46 28038/Na 130°00'wa 006 6.076 1.00000 13-60-8591 07:39:47 02:52:49 28°25'N 37054 6.389 1.0617 1473.5 13-60-8592 08:42:07 03:55:09 270491Na 147030'wa 180 7.280 1.2372 4409.2 13-60-8593 09:03:11 04:16:13 27°39'N 151°39*W 44 998 7.545 1.2893 1609.5 13-60-8594 09:26:34 04:29:36 156°35'W 47 098 7.850 1.3495 1982.8 13-60-8595 09:47:10 05:00:12 27°14'Na 161000 48 920 8.116 1.4017 1848.0 13-60-8596 10:08:39 05:21:41 27°04+N 165°9*W 49 876 8.255 1.4291 2240.4 13-60-8597 10 :30:59 05:44:01 26°54'N 170°50'W 51 655 8.513 1.4800 2202.6 13-60-8598 10 : 52 : 59 06:06:01 260451a 175°51'W 53 TOt 8.767 1.5301 2275.5 13-60-8599 11:14:59 06:28:01 26°36'N 179°14*E 55 056 9.008 1.5775 2296.8 13-60-8600 11 : 37 : 19 06:50:21 26°27'N g60 56728 9.251 1.6254 2436.6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.067, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:38 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.181, Max reward: 0.889 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "NASA ISS astronaut physical examinations before launch" +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 primary crew physical examinations +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: space agency physical examination ISS crew +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: number of physical examinations preceding Apollo 11 launch +2025-04-04 at 03:59:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ +Result 2: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo mission pre-launch physical examinations +2025-04-04 at 03:59:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 crew pre-launch physical examination +2025-04-04 at 03:59:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 crew prelaunch physical examination numbers +2025-04-04 at 03:59:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 12 crew physical examination count +2025-04-04 at 03:59:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, False, True, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [815, 280, 592, 565, 158, 693] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 517.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 517.17 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.300 ± 0.350 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.33 ± 1.80 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 5] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +PREPARED BY + +Mission Evaluation Team + +APPROVED BY + + + +NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNEDSPACECRAFTCENTER HOUSTON, TEXAS September 1970 + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Section Page +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nPREPARED BY\n\nMission Evaluation Team\n\nAPPROVED BY\n\n\n\nNATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND...'] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ +Result 2: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +a. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. b. Deploy and activate an Apollo lunar surface experiments package. c. Further develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. d. Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. + +Thirteen detailed objectives, listed in table l2-I and described in reference 8, were derived from the four primary objectives. None of these objectives were accomplished because the mission was aborted. In addition to the spacecraft and lunar surface objectives, the following two launch vehicle secondary objectives were assigned: + +TABLE 12-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ +Result 2: +The biomedical data were excellent in quality during the period from launch to the occurrence of the inflight incident. Physiological data for the remainder of the mission were very scant. The command module was completely powered down, and this eliminated simultaneous biomedical monitoring capability. In the lunar module, only one electrocardiogram signal for one crewman at a time can be monitored. However, even these.medical data were sacrificed to improve air-to-ground communications. + +Prior to the abort condition, physiological parameters were well within expected ranges. Just prior to the incident, heart and respiratory rates of the crewmen were as follows. + +Crewman Heart rate, beats/min Respiratory rate, breaths/min Commander 68 18 Command Module Pilot 65 15 Lumar Module Pilot 72 12 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Postflight physical examinations were conducted immediately after recovery. These physical examinations were normal, although all crewmen were extremely fatigued and the Lunar Module Pilot had a urinary tract infection. While standing during portions of his postflight physical examination, the Lunar Module Pilot had several episodes of dizziness, which were attributed to fatigue, the effects of weightlessness, and the urinary tract infection. The Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot exhibited weight losses of 14, ll, and 6.5 pounds , respectively. In the final 4 or 5 hours of the flight, the Lunar Module Pilot drank considerably more water than did the other crewmen and possibly replenished his earlier body fluid losses. + +The Command Module Pilot had a slight irritation at the site of the superior sensor on the upper chest, but the Cormander and Lunar Module Pilot had no irritation at any sensor sites. + +10.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE + +10.1 FLIGHT CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +The crew reported seeing point flashes or streaks of light, as had been previously observed by the Apollo ll and l2 crews. The crewmen were aware of these flashes only when relaxed, in the dark, and with their eyes closed. They described the flashes as "pinpoint novas ," "roman candles," and "similar to traces in a cloud chamber." More point flashes than streaks were observed, and the color was always white.. Estimates of the frequency ranged from 4 flashes per hour to 2 flashes per minute. + +9.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS + +Preflight physical examinations of both the primary and backup crews were conducted 30 days prior to launch, and examinations of the primary crew only were conducted 15 and 5 days prior to laumch. The Lunar Module Pilot suffered a sore throat 18 days before launch, and throat swabs from all three crewmen were cultured on two occasions. Since the organism identified was not considered pathogenic and the crew showed no symptoms of illness , no treatment was necessary. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 03:59:52 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.189, Max reward: 0.620 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: + site 5 possible matches: +- a site for a type of testing or evaluation device +- a power plant or power grid site +- a site specifically for astronomy +- a research facility or experimental site +- a device operating in a vacuum or at high temperatures + + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant site 5 purpose +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: trinity site 5 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +------ +Result 2: +according to ground instructions. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: trinity nuclear test site 5 purpose +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The charged particle lunar environment experiment was designed to measure the energy of protons and electrons in the energy range of 4o to 70 electron volts. The experiment consisted of two detector/analyzer packages, each oriented for minimum exposure to the eclystic path of the sun, one for the east-west plane and one for the north-south plane. Each of the detector packages had six particle energy detectors. A complete measurement of all energy ranges would be made every 19.4 seconds. + +A.3.3 Cold Cathode Gage Experiment + +The cold cathode gage experiment was designed to measure the density of the lunar atmosphere by sensing the particle density immediately around its deployed position. An electrical current would be produced in the gage proportional to particle density. Pressure of the ambient atmosphere could be calculated, based on the measurements of the density of the neutralatoms. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: site 5 device purpose +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +according to ground instructions. +------ +Result 2: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: site 5 device purpose +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +according to ground instructions. +------ +Result 2: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 03:59:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: launch site 5 +2025-04-04 at 03:59:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: aborted space mission site 5 recovery operations +2025-04-04 at 03:59:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 03:59:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 17 mission control +2025-04-04 at 04:00:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: aborted Apollo mission site 5 lunar module oxygen tank issue +2025-04-04 at 04:00:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 9 module +2025-04-04 at 04:00:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 mission abort cryogenic oxygen system +2025-04-04 at 04:00:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Ascent propulsion system Apollo 9 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 moon landing pressurized oxygen tank failure +2025-04-04 at 04:00:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 9 post flight mission summary +2025-04-04 at 04:00:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 crew drinking water and hydrogen supply after oxygen tank failure +2025-04-04 at 04:00:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, lb Oxygen, 1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Consumed Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the incident Tank 1 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Totals 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy gen + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization.bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately l4 poumds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo site 5 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY + +The Apollo l3 mission, planned as a lunar landing in the Fra Mauro area, was aborted because of an abrupt loss of service module cryogenic oxygen associated with a fire in one of the two tanks at approximately 56 hours. The lunar module provided the necessary support to sustain a minimum operational. condition for a safe return to earth. A circumlunar profile was executed as the most efficient means of earth return, with the lunar module providing power and life support until transfer to the command module just prior to entry. Although the mission was unsuccessful as planned, a lunar flyby and several scientific experiments were completed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 post-abort water consumption +2025-04-04 at 04:00:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lunar landing aborted +2025-04-04 at 04:00:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY + +The Apollo l3 mission, planned as a lunar landing in the Fra Mauro area, was aborted because of an abrupt loss of service module cryogenic oxygen associated with a fire in one of the two tanks at approximately 56 hours. The lunar module provided the necessary support to sustain a minimum operational. condition for a safe return to earth. A circumlunar profile was executed as the most efficient means of earth return, with the lunar module providing power and life support until transfer to the command module just prior to entry. Although the mission was unsuccessful as planned, a lunar flyby and several scientific experiments were completed. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 post-abort water consumption difference between lunar and command module +2025-04-04 at 04:00:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +In using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel material most likely became caught in the gun nozzle when the actuating trigger was released, resulting in water leakage from the nozzle. The lunar module water gun was returned to earth and during postflight testing was found to be operating properly. Postflight testing also showed that reactuation of the valve can flush any towel material from the gun. The command module water gun was satisfactorily used for the remainder of the mission. + +7.0 MISSION_CONSUMABLES + +Consumables from the command and servi ce modules were used normally during the 56 hours prior to the incident, at a modified usage schedule for 2 hours after the incident, and after command module activation just prior to entry. The lumar module usages occurred in the period following power-up until the two spacecraft were undocked. + +7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 water gun lunar module mission +2025-04-04 at 04:00:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +In using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel material most likely became caught in the gun nozzle when the actuating trigger was released, resulting in water leakage from the nozzle. The lunar module water gun was returned to earth and during postflight testing was found to be operating properly. Postflight testing also showed that reactuation of the valve can flush any towel material from the gun. The command module water gun was satisfactorily used for the remainder of the mission. + +7.0 MISSION_CONSUMABLES + +Consumables from the command and servi ce modules were used normally during the 56 hours prior to the incident, at a modified usage schedule for 2 hours after the incident, and after command module activation just prior to entry. The lumar module usages occurred in the period following power-up until the two spacecraft were undocked. + +7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Lesson learned from Apollo 1 post-abort water gun incident +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +In using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel material most likely became caught in the gun nozzle when the actuating trigger was released, resulting in water leakage from the nozzle. The lunar module water gun was returned to earth and during postflight testing was found to be operating properly. Postflight testing also showed that reactuation of the valve can flush any towel material from the gun. The command module water gun was satisfactorily used for the remainder of the mission. + +7.0 MISSION_CONSUMABLES + +Consumables from the command and servi ce modules were used normally during the 56 hours prior to the incident, at a modified usage schedule for 2 hours after the incident, and after command module activation just prior to entry. The lumar module usages occurred in the period following power-up until the two spacecraft were undocked. + +7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, True, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [296, 812, 197, 426, 679, 1945] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 725.83 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 46.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 15.78 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.058 ± 0.130 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.17 ± 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nDESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNA...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ +Result 2: +After the command module auxiliary urine dump, used through the side hatch, was exercised, the crew was requested by the ground to inhibit all further overboard dumps so as not to interfere with navigation sightings. This single dump was noted to seriously degrade visibility through the command module hatch window. Since this restriction was never retracted, all subsequent urine collections were stowed onboard. The containers utilized for urine collections were the six lunar module urine transfer bags, three command module backup waste bags, the condensate container, two water collection bags for the portable life support system, and three urine collection devices. The command module waste stowage compartment appeared to be full with only seven fecal bags stowed in this area. Adding to the waste stowage problem was the stiffness of the outer fecal bags. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSystem decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel is...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +------ +Result 2: +according to ground instructions. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +After powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutting down all command and service module systems following the tank anomaly, a naneuver was immediately performed to return the spacecraft to a free-return profile. The maneuver was performed as the second midcourse correction, using the descent propulsion system in the docked configuration, a mode tested successfully during Apollo 9. The resultant landing at earth would have been at 152 hours in the Indian Ocean, with lunar module systems intended to support the crew for the remaining 90 hours. Because consumables were extremely marginal in this emergency mode and because only minimal recovery support existed at this earth landing location, a transearth injection maneuver using the descent propulsion system was planned for execution 2 hours after passing pericynthion. Between these two maneuvers, an alignment check was made of the lunar module inertial platform to verify the maneuver would be executed with +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY + +The Apollo l3 mission, planned as a lunar landing in the Fra Mauro area, was aborted because of an abrupt loss of service module cryogenic oxygen associated with a fire in one of the two tanks at approximately 56 hours. The lunar module provided the necessary support to sustain a minimum operational. condition for a safe return to earth. A circumlunar profile was executed as the most efficient means of earth return, with the lunar module providing power and life support until transfer to the command module just prior to entry. Although the mission was unsuccessful as planned, a lunar flyby and several scientific experiments were completed. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY + +The Apollo l3 mission, planned as a lunar landing in the Fra Mauro area, was aborted because of an abrupt loss of service module cryogenic oxygen associated with a fire in one of the two tanks at approximately 56 hours. The lunar module provided the necessary support to sustain a minimum operational. condition for a safe return to earth. A circumlunar profile was executed as the most efficient means of earth return, with the lunar module providing power and life support until transfer to the command module just prior to entry. Although the mission was unsuccessful as planned, a lunar flyby and several scientific experiments were completed. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any li...', 'Result 1:\nThe field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any li...', 'Result 1:\n1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJEC...', 'Result 1:\nAfter powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutti...', 'Result 1:\nAfter powering up the lunar module, co-aligning the two platforms, and shutti...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nd. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction wi...', 'Result 1:\n1.0 SUMMARY\n\nThe Apollo l3 mission, planned as a lunar landing in the Fra Mau...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The charged particle lunar environment experiment was designed to measure the energy of protons and electrons in the energy range of 4o to 70 electron volts. The experiment consisted of two detector/analyzer packages, each oriented for minimum exposure to the eclystic path of the sun, one for the east-west plane and one for the north-south plane. Each of the detector packages had six particle energy detectors. A complete measurement of all energy ranges would be made every 19.4 seconds. + +A.3.3 Cold Cathode Gage Experiment + +The cold cathode gage experiment was designed to measure the density of the lunar atmosphere by sensing the particle density immediately around its deployed position. An electrical current would be produced in the gage proportional to particle density. Pressure of the ambient atmosphere could be calculated, based on the measurements of the density of the neutralatoms. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +according to ground instructions. +------ +Result 2: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\naccording to ground instructions.\n------\nResult 2:\nThe Mission Control Center...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +according to ground instructions. +------ +Result 2: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +a. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the service module. This loss resulted from an incompatibility between switch design and preflight procedures, a condition which, when combined with an abnormal preflight detanking procedure, caused an inflight shorting and a rapid oxidation within one of two redundant storage tanks. The oxidation then resulted in a loss of pressure integrity in the related tank and eventually in the remaining tank. + +b. The concept of a backup crew was proven for the first time when 3 days prior to flight the backup Command Module Pilot was substituted for his prime-crew counterpart, who was exposed and susceptible to rubella (German measles). + +c. The performance of lunar module systems demonstrated an emergency operational capability. Lunar module systems supported the crew for a period approximately twice their intended design lifetime. +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, lb Oxygen, 1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Consumed Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the incident Tank 1 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Totals 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy gen + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization.bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately l4 poumds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +In using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel material most likely became caught in the gun nozzle when the actuating trigger was released, resulting in water leakage from the nozzle. The lunar module water gun was returned to earth and during postflight testing was found to be operating properly. Postflight testing also showed that reactuation of the valve can flush any towel material from the gun. The command module water gun was satisfactorily used for the remainder of the mission. + +7.0 MISSION_CONSUMABLES + +Consumables from the command and servi ce modules were used normally during the 56 hours prior to the incident, at a modified usage schedule for 2 hours after the incident, and after command module activation just prior to entry. The lumar module usages occurred in the period following power-up until the two spacecraft were undocked. + +7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +In using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel material most likely became caught in the gun nozzle when the actuating trigger was released, resulting in water leakage from the nozzle. The lunar module water gun was returned to earth and during postflight testing was found to be operating properly. Postflight testing also showed that reactuation of the valve can flush any towel material from the gun. The command module water gun was satisfactorily used for the remainder of the mission. + +7.0 MISSION_CONSUMABLES + +Consumables from the command and servi ce modules were used normally during the 56 hours prior to the incident, at a modified usage schedule for 2 hours after the incident, and after command module activation just prior to entry. The lumar module usages occurred in the period following power-up until the two spacecraft were undocked. + +7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +In using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel material most likely became caught in the gun nozzle when the actuating trigger was released, resulting in water leakage from the nozzle. The lunar module water gun was returned to earth and during postflight testing was found to be operating properly. Postflight testing also showed that reactuation of the valve can flush any towel material from the gun. The command module water gun was satisfactorily used for the remainder of the mission. + +7.0 MISSION_CONSUMABLES + +Consumables from the command and servi ce modules were used normally during the 56 hours prior to the incident, at a modified usage schedule for 2 hours after the incident, and after command module activation just prior to entry. The lumar module usages occurred in the period following power-up until the two spacecraft were undocked. + +7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\naccording to ground instructions.\n------\nResult 2:\nThe Mission Control Center...', 'Result 1:\nThe Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excel...', 'Result 1:\na. The mission was aborted because of the total loss of primary oxygen in the...', 'Result 1:\nBecause an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort ...', 'Result 1:\nAt approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to r...', 'Result 1:\nHy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 ...', 'Result 1:\n6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL\n\nEnvironmental. control system performance was sati...', 'Result 1:\n6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL\n\nEnvironmental. control system performance was sati...', 'Result 1:\nIn using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel mater...', 'Result 1:\nIn using the lunar module water gun to dampen a towel, a piece of towel mater...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.033, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:09 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.462, Max reward: 0.792 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:11 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Hall effect sensor scaling factor +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The experiment to measure telluric current consisted of an electrode placed close to the launch site and two electrodes spaced approximately 2500 feet from the base electrode at a 90-degree included angle (shown in figure ll.l-2). The telluric current system failed to detect any launch effects. It was expected that the current would show an increase until the vehicle exhaust plume broke effective electrical contact with ground. The high density of metallic conductors in the ground near the launch site may have functioned as a short circuit, which would have negated the detection of any changes in the current level. + +11.1.4 Measurement of the Air/Earth Current Density +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: X-Scale factor error ppm +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what is the X-Scale factor error in ppm in CT X-ray systems? + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: X-Scale factor Hall effect sensor +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Figure 14-6.- Recorded signal strengths during high-gain antenna operation. + +The only component identified with a failure mode that would produce a shift in the scan-limit functions and a shift change is the C-axis induction potentiometer located in the antenna. This potentiometer is used to provide a voltage proportional to the C-axis angular orientation and consists of three separate coils, each with symmetrical winding on opposite sides of the rotor or stator. These coils include the primary winding on the stator, the compensation or bias winding on the stator, and the linear output winding located on the rotor. The bias winding is used to shift the normal +70 degrees linear output to a new linear output over the range of from minus l0 to plus l30 degrees. + +The voltages for the C-axis induction potentiometer and the A-axis function generator, also located in the antenna, add together in the +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: x-axis accelerometer x-scale factor error +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Precise value of X-Scale factor error in ppm + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: worst case x-axis accelerometer x-scale factor error +2025-04-04 at 04:00:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: X-scale factor error 143 multiple accelerometer units + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Reasons for discrepancy between X-scale factor errors + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: -0.18 and -0.167 X-scale factor error ppm + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: are -0.167 and -0.18 X-scale factor error ppm + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [447, 873, 258, 451, 222, 1435] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 614.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 1.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 614.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.000 ± 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.00 ± 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The experiment to measure telluric current consisted of an electrode placed close to the launch site and two electrodes spaced approximately 2500 feet from the base electrode at a 90-degree included angle (shown in figure ll.l-2). The telluric current system failed to detect any launch effects. It was expected that the current would show an increase until the vehicle exhaust plume broke effective electrical contact with ground. The high density of metallic conductors in the ground near the launch site may have functioned as a short circuit, which would have negated the detection of any changes in the current level. + +11.1.4 Measurement of the Air/Earth Current Density +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Figure 14-6.- Recorded signal strengths during high-gain antenna operation. + +The only component identified with a failure mode that would produce a shift in the scan-limit functions and a shift change is the C-axis induction potentiometer located in the antenna. This potentiometer is used to provide a voltage proportional to the C-axis angular orientation and consists of three separate coils, each with symmetrical winding on opposite sides of the rotor or stator. These coils include the primary winding on the stator, the compensation or bias winding on the stator, and the linear output winding located on the rotor. The bias winding is used to shift the normal +70 degrees linear output to a new linear output over the range of from minus l0 to plus l30 degrees. + +The voltages for the C-axis induction potentiometer and the A-axis function generator, also located in the antenna, add together in the +------ +Result 2: +The experiment consisted of an electronics package and two sensor probes which were to be placed in bore holes, predrilled by the crew using the Apollo lunar surface drill. At each end of the probe was a gradient heat sensor with heater coil, a ring sensor lo centimeters from each end, and four thermocouples in the probe cable. The probe consisted of two $55$ -centimeter sections joined at a 2-inch spacing with a flexible spring. + + + +Figure A-2.- Experiment subpackage number 2. + +A.3.2 Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe experiment to measure telluric current consisted of an electrode placed c...', 'Result 1:\nFigure 14-6.- Recorded signal strengths during high-gain antenna operation.\n\n...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +updated to -0.167 at 141:30:00 Pupdated to +0.6 at 32:0h:29 Cupdated to -1.2 at 32:04:29 dupdated to -2.9 at 32:04:29 + +coefficient for the X-axis, which was still within specified limits; this coefficient being the most sensitive contributor to the gyrocompassing misalignment. Table 5.6-IlI is a set of error sources which reproduce the velocity errors observed during as cent. +------ +Result 2: +Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.067, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.348, Max reward: 0.819 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: who was the person substituted as the Command Module Pilot two days before launch of a specific space mission who will be previously assigned to another mission? +2025-04-04 at 04:00:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: CAPE Canaveral Air Force Station, Spaceflight Station from which the Apollo 7 astronaut who made history as the first American to fly in orbit. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: who was substituted as cmd module pilot of apollo 13 two days before launch +2025-04-04 at 04:00:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: crew changes for Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: who was the previous command module pilot of apollo 13 before James A. Lovell Jr. +2025-04-04 at 04:00:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 field geology experiment +2025-04-04 at 04:00:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lightning detection measures +2025-04-04 at 04:00:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 launch electrical field meter locations +2025-04-04 at 04:00:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 Command Module Pilot +2025-04-04 at 04:00:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo l3 crew Command Module Pilot +2025-04-04 at 04:00:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +The lunar module was jettisoned l hour before entry, which was performed nominally using the primary guidance and navigation system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l within sight of the recovery ship. The landing point was reported as 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and l65 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. The crew were retrieved and aboard the recovery ship within 45 minutes after landing。 + +2.0 INTRODUCTION + +Apollo l3 was the thirteenth in a series of missions using Apollo specification flight hardware and was to be the third lunar landing. The primary mission objective was a precise lunar landing to conduct scientific exploration of deep-rooted surface material. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Jim Lovell Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:40 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [886, 143, 257, 328, 239, 247] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 350.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 20.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 17.50 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.158 ± 0.354 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.33 ± 2.98 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 56 hours, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 began to rise at an abnormally high rate and, within about lo0 seconds, the tank abruptly lost pressure. The pressure in tank l also dropped but at a rate sufficient to maintain fuel cell 2 in operation for approximately 2 more hours. The loss of oxygen and primary power in the service module required an immediate abort of the mission. The crew powered up the lunar module, and the first maneuver following the incident was made with the descent propulsion system to place the spacecraft once again on a free-return trajectory. A second maneuver performed with the descent engine 2 hours after passing pericynthion reduced the transearth transit time and moved the earth landing point from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific. Two small transearth midcourse corrections were required prior toentry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +As shown in figures ll.l-l and ll.l-2, a network of nine calibrated electric field meters was installed in the area to the north and west of the launch site. Seven of the field meters were connected to multiple channel recorders so that any excursions of the electric field intensity could be measured over a wide range of yalues. A special device was operated at site 5, located on the beach 4 miles northwest of the launch site. This device was installed to measure rapid changes in the electric field and was used, together with a sferics detector, to sense the electromagnetic radiation generated by lightning or other significant electrical discharges. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +d. The effectiveness of preflight crew training, especially in conjunction with ground personnel, was reflected in the skili and precision with which the crew responded to the emergency. + +e. Although the mission was not a complete success, a lunar flyby mission, including three planned experiments (lightning phenomena, earth photography, and S-IVB lunar impact), was completed and information which would have otherwise been unavailable, regarding the long-term backup capability of the lunar module, was derived. + +The configuration of the Apollo l3 spacecraft and launch vehicle was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter and launch escape system underwent no changes. The few changes to the command and service modules and the lunar module are discussed in the following paragraphs. A discussion of the changes to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and a listing of the spacecraft mass properties are also presented. +------ +Result 2: +The lunar module was jettisoned l hour before entry, which was performed nominally using the primary guidance and navigation system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l within sight of the recovery ship. The landing point was reported as 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and l65 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. The crew were retrieved and aboard the recovery ship within 45 minutes after landing。 + +2.0 INTRODUCTION + +Apollo l3 was the thirteenth in a series of missions using Apollo specification flight hardware and was to be the third lunar landing. The primary mission objective was a precise lunar landing to conduct scientific exploration of deep-rooted surface material. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Commander James A. Lovell, Jr., Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., and Lunar Module Pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr. + +8.0 PIIOTS' REPORT + +8.1 TRAINING +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:41 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.190, Max reward: 0.582 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:45 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: inertial velocity cutoff acceleration experiment display +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: progression of material/atomic/molecular velocities at 'cutoff' radius +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: computer-displayed inertial velocity at cutoff 2001: a space odyssey +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: computer-displayed inertial velocity at cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: computer aerodynamics inertial velocity display cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: inertial velocity S-IVB engine cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +Structural loads experienced during S-IC boost were well below design values, with maximum lateral loads approximately 25 percent of the design value. As a result of high amplitude longitudinal oscillations during S-Il boost, the center engine experienced a l32-second premature cutoff. At 330.6 seconds, the S-II crossbeam oscillaticns reached a peak amplitude of +33.7g: Corresponding center-engine chamber pressure oscillations of ±225 psi initiated engine cutoff through the "thrust OK" switches. These responses were the highest measured amplitude for any S-Il flight. Except for the unexpected high amplitude, oscillations in this range are an inherent characteristic of the present S-II structure/propulsion configuration and have been experienced on previous flights. Acceleration levels experienced at various vehicle stations during the period of peak oscillations indicate that the vehicle did not transmit the large magnitude oscillations to the spacecraft. Installation of an +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ività velocity at cutoff for Transearth mission +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: saturn v abort velocity cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Because of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of the two service module cryogenic oxygen tanks in bay 4, primary electrical power was lost and the mission was aborted. Therefore, the remainder of this section will consider only the abort profile, since the trajectory prior to the tank incident was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, including the first midcourse maneuver to a non-free-return profile, as shown in figure 3-l. The major trajectory difference from Apollo l2 resulted from an early shutdown of the center engine in the S-II stage of the Saturn V, the subsequent staging and insertion times were somewhat later than planned. A listing of significant mission events is contained in table 3-I. + + + +Figure 3-l.- Apollo l3 mission profile. + +TABLE 3-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:50 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: launch control inertial velocity S-IVB engine cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: shiftcraft separation velocity at S-IVB engine cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 13 s-ivb engine cutoff velocity +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:52 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: launch inertial velocity computed acceleration at engine cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: search s-ivb velocity 00:12:30 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: launch velocity inertial measurement at engine cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration to velocity S-IVB engine cutoff +2025-04-04 at 04:00:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:00:58 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:00:58 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, True, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [156, 529, 398, 38, 220, 113] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 242.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 13.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 18.64 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 5/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.458 ± 0.371 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 2.33 ± 2.21 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 6, 3, 0, 1, 4] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +Structural loads experienced during S-IC boost were well below design values, with maximum lateral loads approximately 25 percent of the design value. As a result of high amplitude longitudinal oscillations during S-Il boost, the center engine experienced a l32-second premature cutoff. At 330.6 seconds, the S-II crossbeam oscillaticns reached a peak amplitude of +33.7g: Corresponding center-engine chamber pressure oscillations of ±225 psi initiated engine cutoff through the "thrust OK" switches. These responses were the highest measured amplitude for any S-Il flight. Except for the unexpected high amplitude, oscillations in this range are an inherent characteristic of the present S-II structure/propulsion configuration and have been experienced on previous flights. Acceleration levels experienced at various vehicle stations during the period of peak oscillations indicate that the vehicle did not transmit the large magnitude oscillations to the spacecraft. Installation of an +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...', 'Result 1:\nAt lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum...', 'Result 1:\nAt lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +As on Apollo l2, the S-IVB was targeted for a high-pericynthion free-return translunar profile, with the first major spacecraft maneuver intended to lower the pericynthion to the planned orbital altitude of 60 miles. Upon execution of this maneuver, the spacecraft was intentionally placed on a non-free-return trajectory. The achieved pericynthion altitude at translunar injection was 415.8 miles. The accuracy of the translunar injection maneuver was such that the option for the first planned midcourse correction was not exercised. The velocity change required at the second planned midcourse option point, intended as the time for entering the non-free-return profile, was 23.2 ft/sec. The trajectory parameters for the translunar injection and all spacecraft maneuvers are presented in table 4-II. + +TABLE 4-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The planned launch and earth parking orbit phases for this mission were very similar to those for Apollo l2. However, during the second stage (S-Il) boost into the planned l00-mile circular parking orbit, the center engine cut off about l32 seconds early ard caused the remaining four engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted (as discussed in section l3.0 and reference 2). Space vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 ft/sec lower than planned, and as a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion maneuver was approximately 9 seconds longer than predicted, with cutoff velocity within about l.2 ft/sec of the planned value. The total time to orbital insertion was about 44 seconds longer than predicted, with actual. parking orbit parameters of l00.2 by 98.0 miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Event Weight, 1b Center of gravity, in. Moment or inertia, slug-ft2 Product of inertia, slug-ft2 X Z IxY Lift-off 110 252.4 847.4 2.4 3.7 67646 1 175 539 1 178 016 2906 8047 3711 Earth orbit insertion 101 261.2 807.4 2.6 4.1 66770 718 686 721 213 5157 11945 3688 Command&servicemodules Lwnar module 63 720.3 33499.1 934.5 1237.0 4.0 -0.1 6.5 0.0 33995 22457 76486 24654 79123 25255 ~1746 -126 95 3221 235 Totaldocked 97 219.4 1038.7 2.6 4.3 56 736 534890 538009 -8142 -9376 3585 First midcourse correction Ignition Cutoff 97 081.5 96 851.1 1038.9 1039.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 4.2 56 629 56 508 534493 534 139 537 635 537 380 -8192 -8189 -9305 -9282 3620 3587 Cryotenic oxygen tank incitent Before 96 646.9 1039.2 2.6 4.2 56 321 533499 536 766 -8239 -9244 3636 After Second midcourse correction 96 038.7 1040.7 3.0 3.9 57248 533 927 537 251 -8269 669- -3709 Ignition Cutoff 95 959.9 95 647.1 378.8 379.4 4.9 5.0 0.7 0.7 57205 57006 516443 513919 521 180 518700 11617 11553 2659 2651 3286 3285 Transearth +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Because of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of the two service module cryogenic oxygen tanks in bay 4, primary electrical power was lost and the mission was aborted. Therefore, the remainder of this section will consider only the abort profile, since the trajectory prior to the tank incident was nearly identical to that of Apollo l2, including the first midcourse maneuver to a non-free-return profile, as shown in figure 3-l. The major trajectory difference from Apollo l2 resulted from an early shutdown of the center engine in the S-II stage of the Saturn V, the subsequent staging and insertion times were somewhat later than planned. A listing of significant mission events is contained in table 3-I. + + + +Figure 3-l.- Apollo l3 mission profile. + +TABLE 3-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nBecause of a sudden loss of pressure at approximately 56 hours from one of th...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...', 'Result 1:\ncrewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio sh...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.200, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.50 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:00:59 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.401, Max reward: 0.726 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:00 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: AS-202 SC-011 incident August 25, 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ +Result 2: +White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 Disaster Report August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 1 accident august 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: AS-202 SC-011 accident August 25, 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: AS-202 SC-011 August 25 1966 incident +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: AS-202 SC-011 August 25, 1966 lunar module landing target +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: supercircular entry NASA spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 Mission AS-202 SC-011 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 1 entry August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 S-IVB explosion entry type +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +In prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecraft with the intention of entering a solar orbit through a nearmiss, or "slingshot," approach to the moon. For Apollo l3, an opportunity was available to gain further data on large-mass impact phenomena which could be derived using the seismic equipment deployed during Apollo l2. The impact of the lunar module ascent stage during Apollo 12 pointed up certain unexplained seismological events which the S-IVB impact was expected to reproduce. + +The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 8:09:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 14, 1970, trave1ling at a speed of 5600 miles/hr. Stage weight at the time of impact was 30 700 pounds. The collision occurred at a latitude of 2.4 degrees south and a longitude of 27.9 degrees west, which is approximately 74 miles west-northwest from the experiment station installed during Apollo l2._ The energy release from the impact was equivalent to an explosion of 7.7 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: Apollo 13 incident August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo SC-011 August 25, 1966 landing target Apollo CM operations status during testing +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: manual lunar module attitude maneuver retrograde entry +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 crew logs August 25, 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 1 incident August 25 1966 non entry +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: Apollo 13 incident August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 9 lunar module entry August 25, 1966 tracking results +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module manual attitude command module piloted undocking +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 accident August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: (no specific Apollo 1 connection) apollo 1 mission details +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: Saturn launch August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 9 lunar module entry performance tracking August 25, 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module undocking attitude lunar module reaction control command module attitude hold +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: AS-502 SC-011 Apollo 1 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 1 command and service module design +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: Apollo 13 launch August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo AS-202 SC-011 August 25 entry +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:15 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: gimbal lock lunar module undocking procedure +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 accident August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo 1 was command and service module +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: AS-508 Apollo mission August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo AS-202 SC-011 entry type August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: early lunar module undocking with tunnel pressure procedure +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: AS-202 significance +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: query: AS-508 Saturn rocket launch August 25 1966 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 10 or 9 AS-202 SC-011 August 25 entry type +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:20 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module tunnel pressure doorkick procedure +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 1 incident August 25 1966 RCS +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 9 AS-202 SC-011 August 25 entry type +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: tunnel pressure lunar module midcourse maneuvers +2025-04-04 at 04:01:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: midcourse correction lunar landing maneuver +2025-04-04 at 04:01:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:25 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: transearth injection maneuver midcourse correction +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 1/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [2037, 2049, 206, 780, 555, 2049] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [39, 39, 39, 39, 39, 39] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 1279.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 39.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 32.80 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.333, Valid formats: 2.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.242 ± 0.366 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.50 ± 2.57 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 2, 7, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ +Result 2: +White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +Following the lunar module maneuver to the service module separation attitude, the comnand module platform heaters were activated, the command module reaction control system was pressurized, and each individual thruster was fired. An abort guidance attitude reference was provided with all zeros displayed on the attitude error needles. The lunar module was placed in an attitude hold mode using the abort guidance system; X-axis translation was monitored on the displays. After the reaction control system check was completed, the Conmander conducted a plus-X translation maneuver of 0.5 ft/sec, followed immediately by service module jettison. The pyro activation was heard and a minus 0.5-ft/sec translation maneuver was immediately commenced to remove the previously added velocity and preclude service module recontact. The jettison dynamics caused the undocked vehicles to pitch down about 10 degrees. Control was then switched to primary guidance minimum impulse, and a pitchup maneuver was +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ +Result 2: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +A major flight control function, in adaition to the monitoring of systems status and maintaining of consumable quantities above red-line values, was to determine the procedures to be used immediately prior to and during entry. After satisfactory procedures were established, they were verified in a simulator prior to advising the crew. These procedures called for first separating the service module, remaining on lunar module environmental control and power as late as possible, coaligning the two platforms, and separating the lunar module using tunnel pressure. The command module tunnel hatch was installed and a leak check was performed prior to lunar module undocking, which occurred about 1 hour before entry. All spacecraft operations were normal from undocking through landing, which occurred very close to the established target. + +10.2 NETWORK +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 11: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +All service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to the time of the oxygen tank anomaly. A total of 55 pounds of propellant was used for the initial separation from the S-IVB, the turnaround maneuver, docking and ejection. Praor to the tank anomaly, propellant usage was 137 poumds ; 33 pounds less than predicted for that point in the mission. +------ +Result 2: +Service module.- At the time the system was powered down, reaction control system propellant usage was l08 poumds higher than predicted. The higher usage is attributed to the increased thruster activity required to null the effects of propulsive venting from both oxygen tanks during the incident. The usages listed in the following table were calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure data using the relationship between pressure, volume, and temperature. + +Fuel, 1b Oxi di zer， lb Loaded Quad A Quad B Quad( C Quad D 110.4 109.5 110.1 110.1 440.1 225.6 225.5 225.4 226.2 902.7 336.0 335.0 335.5 336.3 1342.8 Consumed Remaining at time 286* 1056.8 + +Preflight planned usage was 178 pounds. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\n1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJEC...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nAll service module reaction control parameters were normal from lift-off to t...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES +------ +Result 2: +DESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· A-1 A.2 LUNAR MODULE ······· A-1 A.3 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT · A-2 A.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE ······ A-5 A.5 MASS PROPERTIES .. A-5 Section Page APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES B-1 APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING C-1 APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY D-1 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS E-1 REFEREN CES R-1 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\n1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJEC...', 'Result 1:\nA.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES\n------\nResult 2:\nDESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A...', 'Result 1:\nA.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES\n------\nResult 2:\nDESCRIPTIONS·········· A-1 A...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +In prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecraft with the intention of entering a solar orbit through a nearmiss, or "slingshot," approach to the moon. For Apollo l3, an opportunity was available to gain further data on large-mass impact phenomena which could be derived using the seismic equipment deployed during Apollo l2. The impact of the lunar module ascent stage during Apollo 12 pointed up certain unexplained seismological events which the S-IVB impact was expected to reproduce. + +The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 8:09:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 14, 1970, trave1ling at a speed of 5600 miles/hr. Stage weight at the time of impact was 30 700 pounds. The collision occurred at a latitude of 2.4 degrees south and a longitude of 27.9 degrees west, which is approximately 74 miles west-northwest from the experiment station installed during Apollo l2._ The energy release from the impact was equivalent to an explosion of 7.7 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). +------ +Result 2: +The discarded S-IVB stage was targeted for a lunar impact of 3 degrees south latitude and 30 degrees west longitude. The S-IVB maneuver to achieve lunar impact was initiated at 6 hours, with a firing duration of 2l7 seconds using the auxiliary propulsion system. At approximately 19 hours 17 minutes, tracking data indicated the S-IVB had acquired an unexplained velocity increase of about 5 ft/sec along a projected earth radius which altered the projected lunar impact point closer to the target. The stage impacted the lunar surface at 77:56:40 and at a location of 2.4 degrees south latitude and 27.9 degrees west longitude. The targeted impact point was 125 miles from the Apollo l2 seismometer, and the actual point was 74 miles away, well within the desired 189 mile radius. The S-IVB impact results are discussed in section ll.0. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nEvent Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual con...', 'Result 1:\nIn prior lunar missions, the third stage has been separated from the spacecra...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Event Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual contact by Swim 2 1801 1802 helicopters Voice contact by Recovery helicopter 1803 Visual contact by Relay/Recovery helicopters/ 1803 Iwo Jima Command module landed, remained in stable I Swimmers deployed to retrieve main parachutes 1807 1809 First swimmer deployed to command module 1816 Flotation collar inflated 1824 Life preserver unit delivered to lead swimmer 1831 Command module hatch opened 1832 Helicopter pickup of flight crew completed 1842 Recovery helicopter on board Iwo Jima 1853 Command module secured aboard Iwo Jima 1936 April 18 Flight crew departed Iwo Jima 1820 April 20 Flight crew arrival in Houston 0330 Iwo Jima arrival in Hawaii April 24 1930 Safing of command module pyrotechnics completed April_25 0235 Deactivation of the fuel and oxidizer completed April 26 1928 + +10.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nEvent Time, G.m.t. Apri1 17, 1970 S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 4 Visual con...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...', 'Result 1:\nThe space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, ...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstr...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: White Sands Missile Range, AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular entry with high heat rate Feb. 26,1966 N. Mex. Cape Kennedy, Fla. AS-202 SC-011 Supercircular entry with high heat load Aug.25,1966 Cape Kennedy, Fla. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System March 1970 2 Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Perfornance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluati on Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluation Descent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 8 Evaluati on Cancelled 9 Analysis of Apollo lo Photography and Visual Observations In publication 10 11 Entry Postflight Analysis Communi cations System Performance December 1969 December 1969 Apollo ）11 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation May 1970 September 1970 Review Review +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\n1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJEC...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reco...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...', 'Result 1:\nSupplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Recons...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.433, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 2.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:26 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.576, Max reward: 0.948 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:28 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: types of equipment damaged by escaped propellant gas +2025-04-04 at 04:01:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: escaped propellant gas and adjacent equipment +2025-04-04 at 04:01:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: characteristics of gusset-4 breech assembly component damage +2025-04-04 at 04:01:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ +Result 2: +sheet (fig. l4-l0) will be applied to the interior of the breech plenum area on future spacecraft. The protection provided by the polyimide has been proof-tested by firing the assembly without the O-ring, simulating a worst-case condition. + +This anomaly is closed. + + + +Figure. l4-l0.- Tunnel gusset protection. + +14.l.7 Reaction Control Isolation Valve Failure + +During postflight decontamination of the command module reaction control system, the system l fuel isolation valve was found open when it should have been closed. All other propellant isolation valves were in the closed position. The subsequent failure investigation revealed that the lead from the fuel valve closing coil was wired to an unused pin on a terminal board instead of to the proper pin. X-rays of the terminal board and closeout photographs indicate the miswiring occurred during initial installation. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: propellant gas effects on electrical equipment and gusset cover plates +2025-04-04 at 04:01:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Increased materials resistance to propellant gases at extreme temperatures +2025-04-04 at 04:01:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +After initial cryogenic oxygen filling during the countdown demonstration test at Kennedy Space Center, tank 2 could not be detanked using the normal procedures. The problem resulted from loose or misaligned plumbing components in the dog-leg portion of the tank fill path. After numerous attempts using gaseous oxygen purges and higher expulsion pressures, the fluid was boiled off through the use of the tank heaters and fans, assisted by pressure cycling. During the detanking sequence, the heaters were on for about 8 hours, but it was believed that no damage would be sustained by the tank or its components because of the protection afforded by intermal thermal switches. However, the use of the heaters in detanking required that the switches open under a load of 6 amperes at 65 V dc, twice the normal flight operating conditions, for each heater. Tests show that opening the switches under these conditions will fuse the contacts closed and eventually damage fan motor wire insulation. It +------ +Result 2: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: high-temperature propellant gas effects on electrical components +2025-04-04 at 04:01:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +a。 Helium l on quads B and D b。 Helium 2 on quad D C. Secondary propellant valves on quads A and C. + +Approximately 2-l/2 minutes after the noise, fuel cells l and 3 ceased generating electrical power. + +The first indication of a problem in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 occurred when the quantity gage went to a full-scale reading at 46 hours 40 minutes. For the next 9 hours, system operation was nornal. The next abnormal indication occurred when the fans in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 were turned on at 55:53:20. Approximately 2 seconds after energizing the fan circuit, a short was indicated by the current trace from fuel ceil 3, which was supplying power to the oxygen tank 2 fans. Within several additional seconds, two other shorted conditions occurred. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo crew safety protocols for high-temperature or pressure related hazards +2025-04-04 at 04:01:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: cryogenic oxygen tank 2 failure modes +2025-04-04 at 04:01:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Cryogenic storage system operation was satisfactory until 46:40:09, when the quantity indication was lost for oxygen tank 2 (section 14.l.l). At about 56 hours , the pressure in oxygen tank 2 suddenly dropped to zero and the pressure in oxygen tank l began to decay until all primary oxygen was lost. As a result, power was lost from fuel cells l and 3, and after Oxygen was essentially depleted from tank l, fuel cell 2 was taken offline. After the flight, a comprehensive review of the history of cryogenic oxygen tank 2 was made to determine wheth.er an unfavorable condition could have existed prior to laumch. This review included test records, materials review dispositions, and failure reports. No positive indication of any unfavorable conditions prior to shipment to the launch site could be found in the testing or inspections conducted. However, to accomplish a modification on the vac-ion pumps, the complete oxygen shelf, including the oxygen tanks, was removed from the service module +------ +Result 2: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo cabin pressure control system design and functionality +2025-04-04 at 04:01:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ +Result 2: +propulsion system was changed to include a bypass line around the fuel/helium heat exchanger such that if the heat exchanger should freeze during venting, pressures would equalize on both sides of the heat exchanger. The sensing point for the water separator drain tank was changed from the location of the carbon dioxide sensor to a point upstream of the suit fans, thus eliminating migration of water to the carbon dioxide sensor and improving its operation. A removable flow limiter was added to the inlet for the primary lithium hydroxide cartridge to reduce the water separator speed and to minimize the possibility of condensed water in the suit. A dust filter was incorporated at the inlet of the cabin fan to reduce the amount of free lunar dust in the cabin. Redesigned water/ glycol and oxygen disconnects having redundant seals were installed to improve reliability and to permit up to 5 degrees of connector misalignment. To decrease the possibility of lunar dust contamination, a brush +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: oxygen tank failure modes leading to power loss +2025-04-04 at 04:01:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Following recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation change of about 0.4 ft/sec, primarily in a plane normal to bay 4. The oxygen tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit of the readout. The oxygen tank l heaters were on, and the tank l pressure was decaying rapidly. A main-bus-B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart also occurred at this time. + +Fuel cells l and 3 operated for about 2-l/2 minutes after the reactant valves closed. During this period, these fuel cells consumed the oxygen trapped in the plumbing, thereby reducing the pressure below minimum requirements and causing total loss of fuel cell current and voltage output from these two fuel cells. Because of the loss of performance by two of the three fuel cells and the subsequent load switching by the crew, numerous associated master alarms occurred as expected. +------ +Result 2: +Unusual variations in the oxygen flow rates to all three fuel cells were observed in the 3-minute period preceding the tank pressure loss. These variations were caused by the simultaneous pressure excursions taking place in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. The fuel cell l regulated nitrogen pressure indication went to the lower limit of the measurement when the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 dropped. Analysis of related fuel cell parameters confirmed this discrepancy to be a loss of instrumentation readout and not an actual loss of the regulated nitrogen pressure. Performance of fuel cells l and 3 degraded within 3 minutes after the Oxygen tank 2 pressure dropped. The degradation is considered to have been caused by the fuel cell oxygen shutoff valves closing abruptly because of the shock generated when the bay 4 panel separated. A more detailed discussion is contained in reference l. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 modifications to life support systems and reliability enhancements +2025-04-04 at 04:01:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The thickness of the outer-skin shielding for the forward hatch was increased from 0.004 to 0.010 inch to improve the resistance to the tearing that was noted on Apollo l2. The D-ring handle on the modularized equipment storage assembly was changed to a looped cable to simplify the deployment operation. The thermal insulation for the landing gear was modified to reduce the total insulation weight by 27.2 pounds. Both a color and a black-and-white television camera were included for increased reliability of television coverage on .the lunar surface. The primary guidance programs were modified to permit reentry into the automatic and attitude hold modes of operation after manual control was exercised; this change was incorporated to provide improved final descent capability in the event of obscuration from lunar dust. The event timer was modified so that after it counted down to zero, it would count up automatically and thus reduce crew workload during critical events. The descent +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: oxygen tank pressure excursions causing fuel cell shut-down +2025-04-04 at 04:01:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Unusual variations in the oxygen flow rates to all three fuel cells were observed in the 3-minute period preceding the tank pressure loss. These variations were caused by the simultaneous pressure excursions taking place in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. The fuel cell l regulated nitrogen pressure indication went to the lower limit of the measurement when the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 dropped. Analysis of related fuel cell parameters confirmed this discrepancy to be a loss of instrumentation readout and not an actual loss of the regulated nitrogen pressure. Performance of fuel cells l and 3 degraded within 3 minutes after the Oxygen tank 2 pressure dropped. The degradation is considered to have been caused by the fuel cell oxygen shutoff valves closing abruptly because of the shock generated when the bay 4 panel separated. A more detailed discussion is contained in reference l. +------ +Result 2: +Following recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation change of about 0.4 ft/sec, primarily in a plane normal to bay 4. The oxygen tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit of the readout. The oxygen tank l heaters were on, and the tank l pressure was decaying rapidly. A main-bus-B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart also occurred at this time. + +Fuel cells l and 3 operated for about 2-l/2 minutes after the reactant valves closed. During this period, these fuel cells consumed the oxygen trapped in the plumbing, thereby reducing the pressure below minimum requirements and causing total loss of fuel cell current and voltage output from these two fuel cells. Because of the loss of performance by two of the three fuel cells and the subsequent load switching by the crew, numerous associated master alarms occurred as expected. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:47 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo post-launch performance room modifications and mission control safety measures +2025-04-04 at 04:01:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The thickness of the outer-skin shielding for the forward hatch was increased from 0.004 to 0.010 inch to improve the resistance to the tearing that was noted on Apollo l2. The D-ring handle on the modularized equipment storage assembly was changed to a looped cable to simplify the deployment operation. The thermal insulation for the landing gear was modified to reduce the total insulation weight by 27.2 pounds. Both a color and a black-and-white television camera were included for increased reliability of television coverage on .the lunar surface. The primary guidance programs were modified to permit reentry into the automatic and attitude hold modes of operation after manual control was exercised; this change was incorporated to provide improved final descent capability in the event of obscuration from lunar dust. The event timer was modified so that after it counted down to zero, it would count up automatically and thus reduce crew workload during critical events. The descent +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:49 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Differences between Apollo 12 and Apollo 13 modification lists +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +CHANGE SHEET + +FOR + +NASA-MSC INTERNAL REPORT + +APOLLO 13 MISSION REPORT + +Change 1 + + + +May 1970 + +James A. MeDivitt Colonel, USAF Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program + +After the attached enclosures (pages 7-3, 7-4, 7-7, 7-8, 11-3 through 11-6, E-3, E-4, and back cover), which are replacement pages, have been inserted, insert this CHANGE SHEET between the cover and title page and write on the cover "Change l inserted." + +In addition to the attached changes, please complete the attached Mission Report Questionaire and return as indicated. + +NOTE: A black bar in the margin of affected pages indicates the information that was changed or added. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 5/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, False, True, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [258, 422, 1625, 1224, 552, 185] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 711.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 4.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 177.75 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.158 ± 0.354 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.00 ± 2.24 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ +Result 2: +sheet (fig. l4-l0) will be applied to the interior of the breech plenum area on future spacecraft. The protection provided by the polyimide has been proof-tested by firing the assembly without the O-ring, simulating a worst-case condition. + +This anomaly is closed. + + + +Figure. l4-l0.- Tunnel gusset protection. + +14.l.7 Reaction Control Isolation Valve Failure + +During postflight decontamination of the command module reaction control system, the system l fuel isolation valve was found open when it should have been closed. All other propellant isolation valves were in the closed position. The subsequent failure investigation revealed that the lead from the fuel valve closing coil was wired to an unused pin on a terminal board instead of to the proper pin. X-rays of the terminal board and closeout photographs indicate the miswiring occurred during initial installation. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +After initial cryogenic oxygen filling during the countdown demonstration test at Kennedy Space Center, tank 2 could not be detanked using the normal procedures. The problem resulted from loose or misaligned plumbing components in the dog-leg portion of the tank fill path. After numerous attempts using gaseous oxygen purges and higher expulsion pressures, the fluid was boiled off through the use of the tank heaters and fans, assisted by pressure cycling. During the detanking sequence, the heaters were on for about 8 hours, but it was believed that no damage would be sustained by the tank or its components because of the protection afforded by intermal thermal switches. However, the use of the heaters in detanking required that the switches open under a load of 6 amperes at 65 V dc, twice the normal flight operating conditions, for each heater. Tests show that opening the switches under these conditions will fuse the contacts closed and eventually damage fan motor wire insulation. It +------ +Result 2: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - �� Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +During periods when the lunar module and the command module cabins were interconnected, the lunar module and command module cabin pressure readings were approximately equal, verifying the operation of the command module cabin pressure transducers. + + + +(c) 142:45 through 142:56 hours. Figure l4-l2.- Concluded. + +The suit measurement indicated correctly during the brief instrumentation power-up periods at l02 and 123 hours. However, just prior to entry, the suit indication was approximately 0.3 psi lower than cabin pressure but increased to 7.7 psia when the cabin pressure was reading 13.9 psia just prior to landing. + +This transducer also behaved erratically on Apollo l2. Postflight analysis of both the Apollo l2 and Apollo l3 transducers determined the cause to be internal contamination from electroless nickel plating particles. +------ +Result 2: +propulsion system was changed to include a bypass line around the fuel/helium heat exchanger such that if the heat exchanger should freeze during venting, pressures would equalize on both sides of the heat exchanger. The sensing point for the water separator drain tank was changed from the location of the carbon dioxide sensor to a point upstream of the suit fans, thus eliminating migration of water to the carbon dioxide sensor and improving its operation. A removable flow limiter was added to the inlet for the primary lithium hydroxide cartridge to reduce the water separator speed and to minimize the possibility of condensed water in the suit. A dust filter was incorporated at the inlet of the cabin fan to reduce the amount of free lunar dust in the cabin. Redesigned water/ glycol and oxygen disconnects having redundant seals were installed to improve reliability and to permit up to 5 degrees of connector misalignment. To decrease the possibility of lunar dust contamination, a brush +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The thickness of the outer-skin shielding for the forward hatch was increased from 0.004 to 0.010 inch to improve the resistance to the tearing that was noted on Apollo l2. The D-ring handle on the modularized equipment storage assembly was changed to a looped cable to simplify the deployment operation. The thermal insulation for the landing gear was modified to reduce the total insulation weight by 27.2 pounds. Both a color and a black-and-white television camera were included for increased reliability of television coverage on .the lunar surface. The primary guidance programs were modified to permit reentry into the automatic and attitude hold modes of operation after manual control was exercised; this change was incorporated to provide improved final descent capability in the event of obscuration from lunar dust. The event timer was modified so that after it counted down to zero, it would count up automatically and thus reduce crew workload during critical events. The descent +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The thickness of the outer-skin shielding for the forward hatch was increased from 0.004 to 0.010 inch to improve the resistance to the tearing that was noted on Apollo l2. The D-ring handle on the modularized equipment storage assembly was changed to a looped cable to simplify the deployment operation. The thermal insulation for the landing gear was modified to reduce the total insulation weight by 27.2 pounds. Both a color and a black-and-white television camera were included for increased reliability of television coverage on .the lunar surface. The primary guidance programs were modified to permit reentry into the automatic and attitude hold modes of operation after manual control was exercised; this change was incorporated to provide improved final descent capability in the event of obscuration from lunar dust. The event timer was modified so that after it counted down to zero, it would count up automatically and thus reduce crew workload during critical events. The descent +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +CHANGE SHEET + +FOR + +NASA-MSC INTERNAL REPORT + +APOLLO 13 MISSION REPORT + +Change 1 + + + +May 1970 + +James A. MeDivitt Colonel, USAF Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program + +After the attached enclosures (pages 7-3, 7-4, 7-7, 7-8, 11-3 through 11-6, E-3, E-4, and back cover), which are replacement pages, have been inserted, insert this CHANGE SHEET between the cover and title page and write on the cover "Change l inserted." + +In addition to the attached changes, please complete the attached Mission Report Questionaire and return as indicated. + +NOTE: A black bar in the margin of affected pages indicates the information that was changed or added. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +During postflight inspection, it was discovered that propellant gas had leaked from the gusset-4 breech assembly, which is a part of the ape> cover jettison system (fig. 14-7).、 A hole was burned through the aluminum gusset cover plate (fig. l4-8), and the fiberglass pilot parachute mortar cover on the parachute side of the gusset was charred but not penetrated. The leakage occurred at the breech-plenum interface (fig. l4-9). The breech and plenum are bolted male and female parts which are sealed with a large O-ring backed up with a Teflon ring, as shown in figure l4-7. During operation, the breech pressure reaches approximately 14 000 psi and the gas temperature exceeds $2000^{\circ}$ F。The O-ring and backup ring were burned through and the metal parts were eroded by the hot gas at the leak path. The system is completely redundant in that either thruster system will effect apex cover jettison. No evidence of gas leakage existed on the previous firings of 56 units. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +------ +Result 2: +a。 Helium l on quads B and D b。 Helium 2 on quad D C. Secondary propellant valves on quads A and C. + +Approximately 2-l/2 minutes after the noise, fuel cells l and 3 ceased generating electrical power. + +The first indication of a problem in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 occurred when the quantity gage went to a full-scale reading at 46 hours 40 minutes. For the next 9 hours, system operation was nornal. The next abnormal indication occurred when the fans in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 were turned on at 55:53:20. Approximately 2 seconds after energizing the fan circuit, a short was indicated by the current trace from fuel ceil 3, which was supplying power to the oxygen tank 2 fans. Within several additional seconds, two other shorted conditions occurred. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Cryogenic storage system operation was satisfactory until 46:40:09, when the quantity indication was lost for oxygen tank 2 (section 14.l.l). At about 56 hours , the pressure in oxygen tank 2 suddenly dropped to zero and the pressure in oxygen tank l began to decay until all primary oxygen was lost. As a result, power was lost from fuel cells l and 3, and after Oxygen was essentially depleted from tank l, fuel cell 2 was taken offline. After the flight, a comprehensive review of the history of cryogenic oxygen tank 2 was made to determine wheth.er an unfavorable condition could have existed prior to laumch. This review included test records, materials review dispositions, and failure reports. No positive indication of any unfavorable conditions prior to shipment to the launch site could be found in the testing or inspections conducted. However, to accomplish a modification on the vac-ion pumps, the complete oxygen shelf, including the oxygen tanks, was removed from the service module +------ +Result 2: +Temperature changes were noted in bays 3 and 4 of the service module in response to a high heat pulse or high pressure surge. Fuel cell 2 was turned off about 2 hours later because of the loss of pressure from cryogenic oxygen tank l. + +The cryogenic oxygen tank design will be changed to eliminate the mechanisms which could initiate burning within the tank and ultimately lead to a structural failure of the tank or its components. All electrical wires will be stainless-steel sheathed and the quantity probe will be made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. The fill-line plumbing internal to the tank will be improved, and a means of warning the crew of an inadvertent closure of either the fuel cell hydrogen or oxygen valves will be provided. A third cryogenic oxygen tank will be added to the service module for subsequent Apollo missions. The fuel cell oxygen +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Following recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation change of about 0.4 ft/sec, primarily in a plane normal to bay 4. The oxygen tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit of the readout. The oxygen tank l heaters were on, and the tank l pressure was decaying rapidly. A main-bus-B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart also occurred at this time. + +Fuel cells l and 3 operated for about 2-l/2 minutes after the reactant valves closed. During this period, these fuel cells consumed the oxygen trapped in the plumbing, thereby reducing the pressure below minimum requirements and causing total loss of fuel cell current and voltage output from these two fuel cells. Because of the loss of performance by two of the three fuel cells and the subsequent load switching by the crew, numerous associated master alarms occurred as expected. +------ +Result 2: +Unusual variations in the oxygen flow rates to all three fuel cells were observed in the 3-minute period preceding the tank pressure loss. These variations were caused by the simultaneous pressure excursions taking place in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. The fuel cell l regulated nitrogen pressure indication went to the lower limit of the measurement when the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 dropped. Analysis of related fuel cell parameters confirmed this discrepancy to be a loss of instrumentation readout and not an actual loss of the regulated nitrogen pressure. Performance of fuel cells l and 3 degraded within 3 minutes after the Oxygen tank 2 pressure dropped. The degradation is considered to have been caused by the fuel cell oxygen shutoff valves closing abruptly because of the shock generated when the bay 4 panel separated. A more detailed discussion is contained in reference l. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Unusual variations in the oxygen flow rates to all three fuel cells were observed in the 3-minute period preceding the tank pressure loss. These variations were caused by the simultaneous pressure excursions taking place in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. The fuel cell l regulated nitrogen pressure indication went to the lower limit of the measurement when the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 dropped. Analysis of related fuel cell parameters confirmed this discrepancy to be a loss of instrumentation readout and not an actual loss of the regulated nitrogen pressure. Performance of fuel cells l and 3 degraded within 3 minutes after the Oxygen tank 2 pressure dropped. The degradation is considered to have been caused by the fuel cell oxygen shutoff valves closing abruptly because of the shock generated when the bay 4 panel separated. A more detailed discussion is contained in reference l. +------ +Result 2: +Following recovery of the data, the vehicle had experienced a translation change of about 0.4 ft/sec, primarily in a plane normal to bay 4. The oxygen tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit of the readout. The oxygen tank l heaters were on, and the tank l pressure was decaying rapidly. A main-bus-B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart also occurred at this time. + +Fuel cells l and 3 operated for about 2-l/2 minutes after the reactant valves closed. During this period, these fuel cells consumed the oxygen trapped in the plumbing, thereby reducing the pressure below minimum requirements and causing total loss of fuel cell current and voltage output from these two fuel cells. Because of the loss of performance by two of the three fuel cells and the subsequent load switching by the crew, numerous associated master alarms occurred as expected. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: During postflight inspection of the command module, propellant gas was noted to have escaped from the left-hand electrical circuit interrupter, mounted in the lower equipment bay, and deposited soot on adjacent equipment. The right-hand circuit interrupter showed no evidence of a gas leakage. The removed breech, showing the displaced O-ring and crushed attenuator block, is shown in figure l4-l3. +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 2.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.333 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.200, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:01:51 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.279, Max reward: 0.867 +2025-04-04 at 04:01:53 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo past 10 days environmental control hours" +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "how long did the environmental control system provide a habitable environment for mark watney in the movie" +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +During the periods when it was activated, the command module environmental control system performed normally. From the time of powering dowm at approximately 58 hours until reactivation approximately l-1/2 hours before entry, environmental control for the interconnected cabins was maintained using lumar module equipment. Two anomalies associated with the environmental control instrumentation occurred and are discussed in sections 14.l.8 and l4.l.9. An additional discrepancy, noted after landing and discussed in section l0.3, was the position of the inlet postlanding ventilation valve at the time of recovery. This discrepancy is discussed in section 14.l.2. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: ApollMission duration of habitable environment +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +During the periods when it was activated, the command module environmental control system performed normally. From the time of powering dowm at approximately 58 hours until reactivation approximately l-1/2 hours before entry, environmental control for the interconnected cabins was maintained using lumar module equipment. Two anomalies associated with the environmental control instrumentation occurred and are discussed in sections 14.l.8 and l4.l.9. An additional discrepancy, noted after landing and discussed in section l0.3, was the position of the inlet postlanding ventilation valve at the time of recovery. This discrepancy is discussed in section 14.l.2. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: space mission environmental control system habitable time +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:56 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:01:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "moon water usage mars environmental control system 83 hours" +2025-04-04 at 04:01:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 crew water usage and habitable environment duration +2025-04-04 at 04:01:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:01:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "how long did the environmental control system provide a habitable environment for mark watney +2025-04-04 at 04:02:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +During the periods when it was activated, the command module environmental control system performed normally. From the time of powering dowm at approximately 58 hours until reactivation approximately l-1/2 hours before entry, environmental control for the interconnected cabins was maintained using lumar module equipment. Two anomalies associated with the environmental control instrumentation occurred and are discussed in sections 14.l.8 and l4.l.9. An additional discrepancy, noted after landing and discussed in section l0.3, was the position of the inlet postlanding ventilation valve at the time of recovery. This discrepancy is discussed in section 14.l.2. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 crew lunar module water usage average +2025-04-04 at 04:02:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Total oxygen usage from the three lunar module oxygen tanks was 20.3 pounds over an 82-hour period, for an average usage rate of 0.25 lb/ hr. Oxygen remaining in the tanks at undocking was 33.5 pounds. During translunar coast, lunar module cabin leakage was about 0.0l4 lb/hr, assuming an average cabin pressure of 4.5 psia. Command module cabin leakage was estimated to have been about 0.027 lb/hr. These values indicate an average metabolic consumption rate throughout the flight of approximately 0.21 1b/hr. +------ +Result 2: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:01 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 crew metabolic consumption rate and habitable environment duration during normal phase +2025-04-04 at 04:02:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Transition time from normal mission duration to abnormal mission duration Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: nominal mission duration of Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:05 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission duration +2025-04-04 at 04:02:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The lunar module was jettisoned l hour before entry, which was performed nominally using the primary guidance and navigation system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l within sight of the recovery ship. The landing point was reported as 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and l65 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. The crew were retrieved and aboard the recovery ship within 45 minutes after landing。 + +2.0 INTRODUCTION + +Apollo l3 was the thirteenth in a series of missions using Apollo specification flight hardware and was to be the third lunar landing. The primary mission objective was a precise lunar landing to conduct scientific exploration of deep-rooted surface material. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: total duration of Apollo 13 mission +2025-04-04 at 04:02:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:07 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: total duration of Apollo 13 mission +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 3/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, False, False, True, False, True] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [905, 444, 633, 25, 1956, 26] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 664.83 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 2.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 332.42 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.167 ± 0.251 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 0.67 ± 1.11 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 1] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +During the periods when it was activated, the command module environmental control system performed normally. From the time of powering dowm at approximately 58 hours until reactivation approximately l-1/2 hours before entry, environmental control for the interconnected cabins was maintained using lumar module equipment. Two anomalies associated with the environmental control instrumentation occurred and are discussed in sections 14.l.8 and l4.l.9. An additional discrepancy, noted after landing and discussed in section l0.3, was the position of the inlet postlanding ventilation valve at the time of recovery. This discrepancy is discussed in section 14.l.2. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +During the periods when it was activated, the command module environmental control system performed normally. From the time of powering dowm at approximately 58 hours until reactivation approximately l-1/2 hours before entry, environmental control for the interconnected cabins was maintained using lumar module equipment. Two anomalies associated with the environmental control instrumentation occurred and are discussed in sections 14.l.8 and l4.l.9. An additional discrepancy, noted after landing and discussed in section l0.3, was the position of the inlet postlanding ventilation valve at the time of recovery. This discrepancy is discussed in section 14.l.2. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +During the periods when it was activated, the command module environmental control system performed normally. From the time of powering dowm at approximately 58 hours until reactivation approximately l-1/2 hours before entry, environmental control for the interconnected cabins was maintained using lumar module equipment. Two anomalies associated with the environmental control instrumentation occurred and are discussed in sections 14.l.8 and l4.l.9. An additional discrepancy, noted after landing and discussed in section l0.3, was the position of the inlet postlanding ventilation valve at the time of recovery. This discrepancy is discussed in section 14.l.2. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +Preflight testing of both command module and lunar module water supplies revealed no significant contaminants. The nickel content from samples taken at the command module hot water port was $0.05~\mathrm{mg/1}$ .Elevated nickel concentration has been a consistent finding in previous missions and has been ruled acceptable in view of no detrimental effects on crew physiology. There was a substantial buildup in total bacterial count from the time of final filling of the command module potable water system until final preflight sampling 24 hours prior to launch. This count was deemed acceptable under the assumption the first inflight chlorination would reduce the bacterial population to specification levels. Preflight procedures will be reviewed to investigate methods of preventing growth of organisms in the command module water system during the countdown phase. The inflight chlorination schedule was followed prior to the incident, after which the potable water was not chlorinated again. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Total oxygen usage from the three lunar module oxygen tanks was 20.3 pounds over an 82-hour period, for an average usage rate of 0.25 lb/ hr. Oxygen remaining in the tanks at undocking was 33.5 pounds. During translunar coast, lunar module cabin leakage was about 0.0l4 lb/hr, assuming an average cabin pressure of 4.5 psia. Command module cabin leakage was estimated to have been about 0.027 lb/hr. These values indicate an average metabolic consumption rate throughout the flight of approximately 0.21 1b/hr. +------ +Result 2: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +At 55:54:54, a telemetry dropout was observed. Immediately after the incident, crew heart rates ranged from $\mathtt{105}$ to 136 beats /min. These heart rates are well within normal limits and are indicative of stress and an increased workload. + +During the entry phase, biomedical data on the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot were available. The Command Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 60 to 70 beats/min. The Lunar Module Pilot's heart rate ranged from 100 to l25 beats/min, which in contrast to his basal rate was an indication of an inflight illness detected after flight. The Commander had removed his bioharness shortly after the emergency incident; hence, no biomedical data were available from him during the entry. + +9.2 INFLIGHT HISTORY + +9.2.l Adaptation to Weightlessness +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The lunar module was jettisoned l hour before entry, which was performed nominally using the primary guidance and navigation system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l within sight of the recovery ship. The landing point was reported as 2l degrees 38 minutes 24 seconds south latitude and l65 degrees 2l minutes 42 seconds west longitude. The crew were retrieved and aboard the recovery ship within 45 minutes after landing。 + +2.0 INTRODUCTION + +Apollo l3 was the thirteenth in a series of missions using Apollo specification flight hardware and was to be the third lunar landing. The primary mission objective was a precise lunar landing to conduct scientific exploration of deep-rooted surface material. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL + +Environmental. control system performance was satisfactory during the abort phase of the mission and provided a habitable environment for the crew for approximately 83 hours, nearly twice the time of a nominal flight. Only one anomaiy, reverse oxygen leakage through one of the as cent stage shutoff valves, occurred but did not compromise system performance. All crew provisions performed as intended except for cracking of a window shade , discussed in 14 .2.5. + +An indicated total of approximately 290 pounds of water was used from the lumar module tanks between activation of the sublimator and undocking, and an indicated total of about 50 pounds of water remained. Most of the water used for drinking and food preparation was obtained from the command rnodule potable water tank before $\mathtt{124}$ hours , and drinking water was subsequently used from the lunar module tanks. Average water usage rates varied between 2.6 and 6.3 lb/hr. +------ +Result 2: +1.0 SUMMARY 1-1 2.0 INTRODUCTION·. 2-1 3.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 3-1 4.0 TRAJECTORY...... ··· 4-1 5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE . . 5-1 5.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS .· 5-1 5.2 ELECTRICAL POWER ···· 5-2 5.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE.··· 5-3 5.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT · 5-4 5.5 INSTRUMENTATION.······· 5-4 5.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL . .· 5-5 5.7 REACTION CONTROL.······· 5-11 5.8 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL .·. 5-12 6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE 6-1 6.1 STRUCTURAL ··· 6-1 6.2 ELECTRICAL POWER 6-1 6.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 6-2 6.4 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL .· 6-2 6.5 REACTION CONTROL ... 6-8 6.6 DESCENT PROPULSION ··· 6-8 6.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.··· 6-9 7.0 MISSION CONSUMABLES ·····. ··、· 7-1 7.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .···· 7-1 7.2 LUNAR MODULE ····· 7-4 8.0 PILOTS' REPORT . . . 8-1. 8.1 TRAIN ING 8-1 8.2 PRELAUNCH PREPARATION .. 8-1 8.3 LAUN CH 8-2 8.4 EARTH ORBIT.. 8-2 Section Page 8.5 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ’· 8-2 8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING .·.. 8-7 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 4.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.667 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:08 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.246, Max reward: 0.653 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:10 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "manual system failure or reset historical event" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +The extensive testing and analyses and the consistency with which the postflight test data repeated preflight acceptance test results indicate the problem was most likely caused either by the Command Module Pilot responding_too quickly to the $0.05\tt{e}$ light not coming on or by an intermittent hardware failure that cleared itself during entry. + +Based on these findings, a change is not warranted to existing procedures or hardware on future flights. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.6 Gas Leak in Apex Cover Jettison System +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: What triggered the switch to manual system in computing +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds before the wires are severed by the command module/service module umbilical guillotine. As illustrated in the figure, a cam fork is moved by a piston, which is operated by propellant gas from redundant cartridges, to function a lift plate. Motion of this plate disconnects the male and female portions of electrical connectors located, respectively, in the lift plate and in the base plate of the interrupter. At the completion of the stroke, the fork is brought to rest by impacting and crushing an aluminum block mounted on the interrupter housing. +------ +Result 2: +to command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude controller for yaw commands. The pilot's task was further complicated by having the flight director attitude indicators powered down. Without these displays, it was necessary to monitor attitudes by observing gimbal angles on the display and keyboard assembly. Because the spacecraft yaw axis was not coincident to that of the platform yaw axis, either a pitch or roll command would cause a change in both of the corresponding gimbal-angle displays. After the vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align with the platform and to reduce the yaw gimbalangle disparity, passive thermal control was established satisfactorily. Both guidance systems were then powered down until l05 hours. At that time, the abort guidance system was powered up for control during the first transearth midcourse correction. The passive thermal control mode was reestablished and the abort system was powered down. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what sparked the switch to manual system in a historical or industrial context +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds before the wires are severed by the command module/service module umbilical guillotine. As illustrated in the figure, a cam fork is moved by a piston, which is operated by propellant gas from redundant cartridges, to function a lift plate. Motion of this plate disconnects the male and female portions of electrical connectors located, respectively, in the lift plate and in the base plate of the interrupter. At the completion of the stroke, the fork is brought to rest by impacting and crushing an aluminum block mounted on the interrupter housing. +------ +Result 2: +to command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude controller for yaw commands. The pilot's task was further complicated by having the flight director attitude indicators powered down. Without these displays, it was necessary to monitor attitudes by observing gimbal angles on the display and keyboard assembly. Because the spacecraft yaw axis was not coincident to that of the platform yaw axis, either a pitch or roll command would cause a change in both of the corresponding gimbal-angle displays. After the vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align with the platform and to reduce the yaw gimbalangle disparity, passive thermal control was established satisfactorily. Both guidance systems were then powered down until l05 hours. At that time, the abort guidance system was powered up for control during the first transearth midcourse correction. The passive thermal control mode was reestablished and the abort system was powered down. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: switch to manual system in technical field +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +to command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude controller for yaw commands. The pilot's task was further complicated by having the flight director attitude indicators powered down. Without these displays, it was necessary to monitor attitudes by observing gimbal angles on the display and keyboard assembly. Because the spacecraft yaw axis was not coincident to that of the platform yaw axis, either a pitch or roll command would cause a change in both of the corresponding gimbal-angle displays. After the vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align with the platform and to reduce the yaw gimbalangle disparity, passive thermal control was established satisfactorily. Both guidance systems were then powered down until l05 hours. At that time, the abort guidance system was powered up for control during the first transearth midcourse correction. The passive thermal control mode was reestablished and the abort system was powered down. +------ +Result 2: +A simplified schematic of the optics shaft servo loop mechanization is shown in figure l4-2. In the zero optics mode, the sine outputs of the half-speed and l6-speed resolvers are routed through a coarse/fine switching network to the motor drive amplifier and are used to null the system. Rate feedback from the motor tachometer is routed to the drive amplifier through a compensation network which removes any bias in the signal. When the zero optics mode is selected, the coupling-data-unit counter and the computer register which contains the shaft angle are zeroed for 15 seconds and then released to follow the l6-speed resolver. The half-speed resolver, the fine/coarse switching network, and the tachometer feedback compensation are used only in the zero optics mode. + + + +Figure l4-2.- Zero optics mode circuitry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "what triggered the switch to manual system in a specific context" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds before the wires are severed by the command module/service module umbilical guillotine. As illustrated in the figure, a cam fork is moved by a piston, which is operated by propellant gas from redundant cartridges, to function a lift plate. Motion of this plate disconnects the male and female portions of electrical connectors located, respectively, in the lift plate and in the base plate of the interrupter. At the completion of the stroke, the fork is brought to rest by impacting and crushing an aluminum block mounted on the interrupter housing. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:13 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "manual system switch caused by specific event space shuttle mission" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +At the time of the oxygen tank incident, three events took place that affected control system performance: the quad C isolation valves closed (as discussed in section l4.l.l), a voltage transient caused a computer restart, and the digital autopilot re-initialized the attitude to which it was referenced. The response of the digital autopilot to these events was as programmed, and rate and attitude errors were reduced to a nulled condition within 75 seconds. Reference l contains a more complete discussion of spacecraft dynamics during and after the oxygen tank anomaly . + +The only translation maneuver performed with the service propulsion system was the first midcourse correction. Spacecraft dynamics during this maneuver were nominal, and sigmificant translation parameters are showm in the following table. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Abort Guidance System and manual activation in space missions +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory was planned for 6l-l/2 hours using primary guidance. The docked configuration was maneuvered manually to null out guidance system error needles using the thrust/translation controller assembly for roll and pitch control and the attitude controller assembly for yaw control. It was not difficult to control the docked configuration in this manner. There was, however, some concern as to the effect the use of the thrust/ translation controller assembly would have on the trajectory. After the error needles were nulled, attitude was maintained using primary guidance with attitude control in "Auto." + +Primary guidance system performance was nomi nal $\cdot$ during the mi dcourse maneuver to a free return. There were no vehicle attitude excursions, and the firing time was as predicted. The abort guidance system was not powered up for this maneuver. +------ +Result 2: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo spacecraft manual system shutdown +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: specific event in a space mission triggering switch to manual system +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ +Result 2: +At the time of the oxygen tank incident, three events took place that affected control system performance: the quad C isolation valves closed (as discussed in section l4.l.l), a voltage transient caused a computer restart, and the digital autopilot re-initialized the attitude to which it was referenced. The response of the digital autopilot to these events was as programmed, and rate and attitude errors were reduced to a nulled condition within 75 seconds. Reference l contains a more complete discussion of spacecraft dynamics during and after the oxygen tank anomaly . + +The only translation maneuver performed with the service propulsion system was the first midcourse correction. Spacecraft dynamics during this maneuver were nominal, and sigmificant translation parameters are showm in the following table. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "spacecraft manual override system triggering successful re-entry" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The entry attitude and platform alignment were confirmed by a successful sextant star check and moon occulation within l second of the predicted time. The pre-entry check and initialization of the entry monitor system were normal. However, entry monitor system operation was initiated manually when the 0.05g light remained off 3 seconds after the actual $0.05\mathtt{g}$ time (as discussed in section 14.l.5.). In addition, the entry monitor system trace was unexpectedly narrow and required excessive concentration to read. The guided entry was normal in all respects and was characterized by smooth control inputs. The first acceleration peak reached approximately 5g. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:16 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: " manual system switch caused by quadrant C isolation valves or voltage transient" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The miswired valve (fig. 14-ll) passed the functional checks during buildup and checkout because, even with the closing coil lead completely disconnected, the valve can be closed through an inductive coupling with the oxidizer-valve closing coil. That is, a reverse-polarity voltage can be generated in the oxidizer valve opening coil through a "transformer" + + + +Figure l4-ll.- Isolation valve circuit. + +action. This voltage is applied to the fuel valve opening coil where it induces a magnetic field flux that closes the fuel valve. With 28 volts or more on the spacecraft bus, this phenomenon was consistently repeatable. With 24 to 28 volts on the bus, the valve would occasionally close, and with less than 24 volts, the valve would not close. Since preflight testing is accomplished at 28 volts, the functional tests did not disclose the miswiring. During the mission, the voltage was such that the valve did not close when commanded and therefore was found open after the fli ght. +------ +Result 2: +Either a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contamination in the auxiliary relay would actuate the light. The shorted condition could have resulted from electrolyte shorting within the battery case associated with the current surges discussed in the previous section. Contamination of the auxiliary relay has occurred in the past, and relays already packaged were not retrofitted since a false over-temperature indication can be identified as it was here. + +Corrective action is being taken to prevent electrolyte shorts associated with the previously discussed battery anomaly which should eliminate this type of sensor problem in future spacecraft. No further corrective action to eliminate contamination in the auxiliary relay is required. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.4 Ascent Oxygen Tank 2 Shutoff Valve Leak +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Abort Guidance System usage in midcourse maneuvers of extravehicular spacecraft +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +A descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory was planned for 6l-l/2 hours using primary guidance. The docked configuration was maneuvered manually to null out guidance system error needles using the thrust/translation controller assembly for roll and pitch control and the attitude controller assembly for yaw control. It was not difficult to control the docked configuration in this manner. There was, however, some concern as to the effect the use of the thrust/ translation controller assembly would have on the trajectory. After the error needles were nulled, attitude was maintained using primary guidance with attitude control in "Auto." + +Primary guidance system performance was nomi nal $\cdot$ during the mi dcourse maneuver to a free return. There were no vehicle attitude excursions, and the firing time was as predicted. The abort guidance system was not powered up for this maneuver. +------ +Result 2: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo program manual system switch +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 oxygen tank incident +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar module manual override during re-entry" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Lunar module powerup for the final midcourse correction maneuver was performed according to the prescribed contingency checklist, with only minor deviations furnished by the ground. Shortly afterward, the lunar module windows cleared of moisture and the cabin temperature again became comfortable. Approximately 6 hours before entry, the passive thermal control mode vwas terminated and the spacecraft was maneuvered to place the earth in the crewmen optical alignment sight with the terminator parallel to the Y axis in preparation for the midcourse maneuver. At that time, a sun/moon alignment was made. Acquisition of these bodies was made by pitching up in a plane roughly parallel to the ecliptic plane. The sun filter made viewing through the telescope reticle very difficult. The spacecraft was controlled by the Lunar Module Pilot from commands given by the Commander, who responded when the reticle lines bisected the moon and solar disks. Three sets of marks were taken on each body. The +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:18 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "manual system switch triggered by quadrants C isolation valves electrical issue" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The miswired valve (fig. 14-ll) passed the functional checks during buildup and checkout because, even with the closing coil lead completely disconnected, the valve can be closed through an inductive coupling with the oxidizer-valve closing coil. That is, a reverse-polarity voltage can be generated in the oxidizer valve opening coil through a "transformer" + + + +Figure l4-ll.- Isolation valve circuit. + +action. This voltage is applied to the fuel valve opening coil where it induces a magnetic field flux that closes the fuel valve. With 28 volts or more on the spacecraft bus, this phenomenon was consistently repeatable. With 24 to 28 volts on the bus, the valve would occasionally close, and with less than 24 volts, the valve would not close. Since preflight testing is accomplished at 28 volts, the functional tests did not disclose the miswiring. During the mission, the voltage was such that the valve did not close when commanded and therefore was found open after the fli ght. +------ +Result 2: +Either a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contamination in the auxiliary relay would actuate the light. The shorted condition could have resulted from electrolyte shorting within the battery case associated with the current surges discussed in the previous section. Contamination of the auxiliary relay has occurred in the past, and relays already packaged were not retrofitted since a false over-temperature indication can be identified as it was here. + +Corrective action is being taken to prevent electrolyte shorts associated with the previously discussed battery anomaly which should eliminate this type of sensor problem in future spacecraft. No further corrective action to eliminate contamination in the auxiliary relay is required. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.4 Ascent Oxygen Tank 2 Shutoff Valve Leak +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini space mission Abort Guidance System usage during midcourse maneuvers +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +A descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory was planned for 6l-l/2 hours using primary guidance. The docked configuration was maneuvered manually to null out guidance system error needles using the thrust/translation controller assembly for roll and pitch control and the attitude controller assembly for yaw control. It was not difficult to control the docked configuration in this manner. There was, however, some concern as to the effect the use of the thrust/ translation controller assembly would have on the trajectory. After the error needles were nulled, attitude was maintained using primary guidance with attitude control in "Auto." + +Primary guidance system performance was nomi nal $\cdot$ during the mi dcourse maneuver to a free return. There were no vehicle attitude excursions, and the firing time was as predicted. The abort guidance system was not powered up for this maneuver. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apollo manual system switch apollo 14 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: switch to manual system in response to hydrogen tank incident Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo spacecraft midcourse correction maneuvers" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "auxiliary relay contamination trigger manual system switch" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Either a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contamination in the auxiliary relay would actuate the light. The shorted condition could have resulted from electrolyte shorting within the battery case associated with the current surges discussed in the previous section. Contamination of the auxiliary relay has occurred in the past, and relays already packaged were not retrofitted since a false over-temperature indication can be identified as it was here. + +Corrective action is being taken to prevent electrolyte shorts associated with the previously discussed battery anomaly which should eliminate this type of sensor problem in future spacecraft. No further corrective action to eliminate contamination in the auxiliary relay is required. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.4 Ascent Oxygen Tank 2 Shutoff Valve Leak +------ +Result 2: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 midcourse correction Abort Guidance System usage +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apolo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +14.2.2。 +------ +Result 2: +(section ll.3). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission manual system switch criteria +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 12 spacecraft abort sequence" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +4.0 TRAJECTORY + +The planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo 12 except for descent orbit insertion being performed with the service propulsion system and the targeting of the spent S--IvB stage for a lunar impact. The trajectory had been very close to the nominal flight plan up to the time of abort, which was the first in the Apollo program. Throughout the manned space program, techniques have been developed and tested for the real-tine determination of immediate abort requirements, but Apollo l3 presented the first situation in which their use was necesSary. Figure 3-l shows the mission profile, including the relative locations of all major maneuvers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:23 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 first transearth midcourse correction Abort Guidance System +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: apolo 13 manual system switch +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +An enlarged photograph of the scroll was examined in detail to determine if the scroll started properly. While no abnormal indications were observed, the interpretation of these data is not conclusive. + +A complete functional test was performed and the flight problem could not be duplicated. The system was cold soaked for 7 hours at 30° F. While the system was slowly warming up, continuous functional tests were being performed to determine if thermal gradients could have caused the problem. The system operated normally throughout all tests. + +Following verification of the light and sensing circuit, the mode switch was examined in detail. Tests were performed to determine contact resistance, and the switch was examined by X-ray for conductive contaminants and by dissection for nonconductive contaminants. No evidence of any switch problems was indicated. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: manuall system switch Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 lunar module abort sequence" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:26 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 AGS manual usage during transearth midcourse correction +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Maneuver System ignitiontime, hr:min:sec Firing time, sec Velocity change, ft/sec Resultant entry interface condition Plight-path angle,deg, Velocity, ft/sec Latitude, deg Longitude, deg Entry arrival time, hr:min:sec Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Descent propulsion 79:27:39 263.6 860.5 No entry (vacuum perigee= 8o.6 miles) Descent prcpulsion 105:18:28 14.0 7.8 -6.24 36 210.6 28.22S 173.49E 142:40:47 Fourth midcourse Lunarmodulereaction correction control 137:39:51.5 21.5 3.0 -6.26 36 210.9 28.23S 173.46E 142:40:46 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: display 14 manual system post-landing vent valve +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 powered-down manual override procedures +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "NASA Apollo 13 oxygen tank leak analysis" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:29 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 mission plan Transteath injection +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 manual override decision process +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 oxygen tank valve failure" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:32 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 spacecraft docking procedures +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +All attitude control functions were satisfactory. Initial separation from the S-IvB was performed by thrusting for 4.28 seconds to impart a velocity change of 0.86 ft/sec. After a manual pitch maneuver, the command and service modules were docked with the lunar module. Rate disturbances noted at docking were 0.l6 deg/sec peak in pitch and yaw, and 0.60 deg/sec peak in roll. +------ +Result 2: +started to sight the service module in the docking window. The lightened spacecraft combination was easily maneuvered using attitude control in both the manual minimum-impulse and automatic attitude-hold modes. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 trans-lunar injection maneuver +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 mission timeline and issues" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:34 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 lunar module docking with command and service modules +2025-04-04 at 04:02:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +All attitude control functions were satisfactory. Initial separation from the S-IvB was performed by thrusting for 4.28 seconds to impart a velocity change of 0.86 ft/sec. After a manual pitch maneuver, the command and service modules were docked with the lunar module. Rate disturbances noted at docking were 0.l6 deg/sec peak in pitch and yaw, and 0.60 deg/sec peak in roll. +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 crew training and preparation" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:36 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Gemini 3 after docking lunar module with command and service modules +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, False, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [426, 1505, 720, 1811, 1984, 503] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 1158.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 28.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 41.36 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.333, Valid formats: 2.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 5/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.317 ± 0.448 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 2.00 ± 2.89 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [5, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: limit function line just prior to point B, the antenna acquired the earth in wide beam. When the antenna reached the scan limit function line, the antenna control logic would switch the system to the manual +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +The extensive testing and analyses and the consistency with which the postflight test data repeated preflight acceptance test results indicate the problem was most likely caused either by the Command Module Pilot responding_too quickly to the $0.05\tt{e}$ light not coming on or by an intermittent hardware failure that cleared itself during entry. + +Based on these findings, a change is not warranted to existing procedures or hardware on future flights. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.6 Gas Leak in Apex Cover Jettison System +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excellent support throughout this aborted mission. Minor problems occurred at different sites around the network, but all were corrected with no consequence to flight control support. Momentary data losses occurred seven different times as a result of power amplifier faults, computer processor executive buffer depletion, or wave guide faults. On each occasion, data lock-up was regained in just a few minutes. + +10.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS +------ +Result 2: +At the time of the oxygen tank incident, three events took place that affected control system performance: the quad C isolation valves closed (as discussed in section l4.l.l), a voltage transient caused a computer restart, and the digital autopilot re-initialized the attitude to which it was referenced. The response of the digital autopilot to these events was as programmed, and rate and attitude errors were reduced to a nulled condition within 75 seconds. Reference l contains a more complete discussion of spacecraft dynamics during and after the oxygen tank anomaly . + +The only translation maneuver performed with the service propulsion system was the first midcourse correction. Spacecraft dynamics during this maneuver were nominal, and sigmificant translation parameters are showm in the following table. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The miswired valve (fig. 14-ll) passed the functional checks during buildup and checkout because, even with the closing coil lead completely disconnected, the valve can be closed through an inductive coupling with the oxidizer-valve closing coil. That is, a reverse-polarity voltage can be generated in the oxidizer valve opening coil through a "transformer" + + + +Figure l4-ll.- Isolation valve circuit. + +action. This voltage is applied to the fuel valve opening coil where it induces a magnetic field flux that closes the fuel valve. With 28 volts or more on the spacecraft bus, this phenomenon was consistently repeatable. With 24 to 28 volts on the bus, the valve would occasionally close, and with less than 24 volts, the valve would not close. Since preflight testing is accomplished at 28 volts, the functional tests did not disclose the miswiring. During the mission, the voltage was such that the valve did not close when commanded and therefore was found open after the fli ght. +------ +Result 2: +Either a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contamination in the auxiliary relay would actuate the light. The shorted condition could have resulted from electrolyte shorting within the battery case associated with the current surges discussed in the previous section. Contamination of the auxiliary relay has occurred in the past, and relays already packaged were not retrofitted since a false over-temperature indication can be identified as it was here. + +Corrective action is being taken to prevent electrolyte shorts associated with the previously discussed battery anomaly which should eliminate this type of sensor problem in future spacecraft. No further corrective action to eliminate contamination in the auxiliary relay is required. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.4 Ascent Oxygen Tank 2 Shutoff Valve Leak +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The miswired valve (fig. 14-ll) passed the functional checks during buildup and checkout because, even with the closing coil lead completely disconnected, the valve can be closed through an inductive coupling with the oxidizer-valve closing coil. That is, a reverse-polarity voltage can be generated in the oxidizer valve opening coil through a "transformer" + + + +Figure l4-ll.- Isolation valve circuit. + +action. This voltage is applied to the fuel valve opening coil where it induces a magnetic field flux that closes the fuel valve. With 28 volts or more on the spacecraft bus, this phenomenon was consistently repeatable. With 24 to 28 volts on the bus, the valve would occasionally close, and with less than 24 volts, the valve would not close. Since preflight testing is accomplished at 28 volts, the functional tests did not disclose the miswiring. During the mission, the voltage was such that the valve did not close when commanded and therefore was found open after the fli ght. +------ +Result 2: +Either a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contamination in the auxiliary relay would actuate the light. The shorted condition could have resulted from electrolyte shorting within the battery case associated with the current surges discussed in the previous section. Contamination of the auxiliary relay has occurred in the past, and relays already packaged were not retrofitted since a false over-temperature indication can be identified as it was here. + +Corrective action is being taken to prevent electrolyte shorts associated with the previously discussed battery anomaly which should eliminate this type of sensor problem in future spacecraft. No further corrective action to eliminate contamination in the auxiliary relay is required. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.4 Ascent Oxygen Tank 2 Shutoff Valve Leak +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Either a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contamination in the auxiliary relay would actuate the light. The shorted condition could have resulted from electrolyte shorting within the battery case associated with the current surges discussed in the previous section. Contamination of the auxiliary relay has occurred in the past, and relays already packaged were not retrofitted since a false over-temperature indication can be identified as it was here. + +Corrective action is being taken to prevent electrolyte shorts associated with the previously discussed battery anomaly which should eliminate this type of sensor problem in future spacecraft. No further corrective action to eliminate contamination in the auxiliary relay is required. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.2.4 Ascent Oxygen Tank 2 Shutoff Valve Leak +------ +Result 2: +System decontamination at Hawaii was normal, except that the system l fuel isolation valve was foumd to be in the open position. All other propellant isolation valves were in the normal (closed) position. Power from ground servicing equipment was used to close the valve, which operated normally. Postflight investigation of this condition revealed that the electrical lead from the system l fuel-valve closing coil was miswired, making it impossible to apply power to this coil. This anomaly is discussed in section l4.l.7. + +All available flight data and the condition of the system prior to deactivation at Hawaii indicate that the system performed normally from activation through the propellant dump and purge operation. + +5.8 ENVIRONMENIAL CONTROL +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excel...', 'Result 1:\nThe Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network provided excel...', 'Result 1:\nThe miswired valve (fig. 14-ll) passed the functional checks during buildup a...', 'Result 1:\nThe miswired valve (fig. 14-ll) passed the functional checks during buildup a...', 'Result 1:\nEither a short between the temperature switch wires to ground or a contaminat...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: limit function line just prior to point B, the antenna acquired the earth in wide beam. When the antenna reached the scan limit function line, the antenna control logic would switch the system to the manual +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds before the wires are severed by the command module/service module umbilical guillotine. As illustrated in the figure, a cam fork is moved by a piston, which is operated by propellant gas from redundant cartridges, to function a lift plate. Motion of this plate disconnects the male and female portions of electrical connectors located, respectively, in the lift plate and in the base plate of the interrupter. At the completion of the stroke, the fork is brought to rest by impacting and crushing an aluminum block mounted on the interrupter housing. +------ +Result 2: +to command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude controller for yaw commands. The pilot's task was further complicated by having the flight director attitude indicators powered down. Without these displays, it was necessary to monitor attitudes by observing gimbal angles on the display and keyboard assembly. Because the spacecraft yaw axis was not coincident to that of the platform yaw axis, either a pitch or roll command would cause a change in both of the corresponding gimbal-angle displays. After the vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align with the platform and to reduce the yaw gimbalangle disparity, passive thermal control was established satisfactorily. Both guidance systems were then powered down until l05 hours. At that time, the abort guidance system was powered up for control during the first transearth midcourse correction. The passive thermal control mode was reestablished and the abort system was powered down. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +A descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory was planned for 6l-l/2 hours using primary guidance. The docked configuration was maneuvered manually to null out guidance system error needles using the thrust/translation controller assembly for roll and pitch control and the attitude controller assembly for yaw control. It was not difficult to control the docked configuration in this manner. There was, however, some concern as to the effect the use of the thrust/ translation controller assembly would have on the trajectory. After the error needles were nulled, attitude was maintained using primary guidance with attitude control in "Auto." + +Primary guidance system performance was nomi nal $\cdot$ during the mi dcourse maneuver to a free return. There were no vehicle attitude excursions, and the firing time was as predicted. The abort guidance system was not powered up for this maneuver. +------ +Result 2: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +A descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory was planned for 6l-l/2 hours using primary guidance. The docked configuration was maneuvered manually to null out guidance system error needles using the thrust/translation controller assembly for roll and pitch control and the attitude controller assembly for yaw control. It was not difficult to control the docked configuration in this manner. There was, however, some concern as to the effect the use of the thrust/ translation controller assembly would have on the trajectory. After the error needles were nulled, attitude was maintained using primary guidance with attitude control in "Auto." + +Primary guidance system performance was nomi nal $\cdot$ during the mi dcourse maneuver to a free return. There were no vehicle attitude excursions, and the firing time was as predicted. The abort guidance system was not powered up for this maneuver. +------ +Result 2: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +A descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory was planned for 6l-l/2 hours using primary guidance. The docked configuration was maneuvered manually to null out guidance system error needles using the thrust/translation controller assembly for roll and pitch control and the attitude controller assembly for yaw control. It was not difficult to control the docked configuration in this manner. There was, however, some concern as to the effect the use of the thrust/ translation controller assembly would have on the trajectory. After the error needles were nulled, attitude was maintained using primary guidance with attitude control in "Auto." + +Primary guidance system performance was nomi nal $\cdot$ during the mi dcourse maneuver to a free return. There were no vehicle attitude excursions, and the firing time was as predicted. The abort guidance system was not powered up for this maneuver. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Guidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant attitude excursions.. The throttle profile was started in the idle position, then moved to 40 percent for 2l seconds, and finally to full throttle for the remainder of the firing. The maneuver residuals were 0.2, 0.0, and 0.3 ft/sec in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. The abort guidance system was powered up and was used to monitor both attitude and velocity change and agreed with primary system readouts throughout the maneuver. + +8.9 TRANSEARTH COAST + +8.9.1 Coast Phase Activities +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Maneuver System ignitiontime, hr:min:sec Firing time, sec Velocity change, ft/sec Resultant entry interface condition Plight-path angle,deg, Velocity, ft/sec Latitude, deg Longitude, deg Entry arrival time, hr:min:sec Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Descent propulsion 79:27:39 263.6 860.5 No entry (vacuum perigee= 8o.6 miles) Descent prcpulsion 105:18:28 14.0 7.8 -6.24 36 210.6 28.22S 173.49E 142:40:47 Fourth midcourse Lunarmodulereaction correction control 137:39:51.5 21.5 3.0 -6.26 36 210.9 28.23S 173.46E 142:40:46 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +Nominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are satisfactory. Based on S-IVB orbit attitude hold, the ground controllers updated the spacecraft attitude indicators from 18 to 20 degrees. This update was satisfactory and resulted in an essentially zero theta angle in the orbital rate display during the S-IVB translunar injection. S-IVB vibration was greater during translunar injection than that experienced during Apollo 8. These vibrations had high-frequency , + + + +Figure 8-l.- Flight plan activities. + + + + + +Figure 8-l.- Continued + + + +(c) 69 to 122 hours. Figure 8-l.- Continued. + + + +(a) 122 to 143 hours. Figure 8-l.- Concluded. + +low-magnitude characteristics but presented no problems for monitoring of the injection maneuver. At cutoff, the computer-displayed inertial velocity was 35 560 ft/sec, and the entry monitor system accelerometer confirmed the maneuver to be within 3 ft/sec of the desired value. + +8.6 TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING +------ +Result 2: +To assure the alignment accuracy of the lunar module platform for the transearth injection maneuver, a check was made at 74 hours utilizing the sun for reference. The method involved a platform alignment program (P52, option 3), loading the sun vectors, and utilizing an automatic attitude maneuver. The null point was approximately one-half a sum diameter to the right of the sun's edge. A.two-diameter offset was allowable, So the platform was considered acceptable. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +All attitude control functions were satisfactory. Initial separation from the S-IvB was performed by thrusting for 4.28 seconds to impart a velocity change of 0.86 ft/sec. After a manual pitch maneuver, the command and service modules were docked with the lunar module. Rate disturbances noted at docking were 0.l6 deg/sec peak in pitch and yaw, and 0.60 deg/sec peak in roll. +------ +Result 2: +started to sight the service module in the docking window. The lightened spacecraft combination was easily maneuvered using attitude control in both the manual minimum-impulse and automatic attitude-hold modes. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +All attitude control functions were satisfactory. Initial separation from the S-IvB was performed by thrusting for 4.28 seconds to impart a velocity change of 0.86 ft/sec. After a manual pitch maneuver, the command and service modules were docked with the lunar module. Rate disturbances noted at docking were 0.l6 deg/sec peak in pitch and yaw, and 0.60 deg/sec peak in roll. +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 11: Result 1: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ +Result 2: +Upon completion of photography, the two docked vehicles were maneuvered back to the service module separation attitude in preparation for the command module alignment. Star observation through the command module optics in this attitude was poor because of light reflecting from the lunar module, and the Conmander varied the pitch attitude by approximately 20 degrees in an attempt to improve star visibility. These attitude excursions, however, were not effective, and the spacecraft was returned to the original separation attitude for the command module alignment. + +8.9.5 Command Module Activation +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds befor...', 'Result 1:\nA descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory ...', 'Result 1:\nA descent propulsion system maneuver to reestablish a free-return trajectory ...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nGuidance system performance was again nominal and there were no significant a...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nNominal first-opportunity translunar injection procedures were used and are s...', 'Result 1:\nAll attitude control functions were satisfactory. Initial separation from the...', 'Result 1:\nAll attitude control functions were satisfactory. Initial separation from the...', 'Result 1:\nAt 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lu...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: limit function line just prior to point B, the antenna acquired the earth in wide beam. When the antenna reached the scan limit function line, the antenna control logic would switch the system to the manual +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds before the wires are severed by the command module/service module umbilical guillotine. As illustrated in the figure, a cam fork is moved by a piston, which is operated by propellant gas from redundant cartridges, to function a lift plate. Motion of this plate disconnects the male and female portions of electrical connectors located, respectively, in the lift plate and in the base plate of the interrupter. At the completion of the stroke, the fork is brought to rest by impacting and crushing an aluminum block mounted on the interrupter housing. +------ +Result 2: +to command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude controller for yaw commands. The pilot's task was further complicated by having the flight director attitude indicators powered down. Without these displays, it was necessary to monitor attitudes by observing gimbal angles on the display and keyboard assembly. Because the spacecraft yaw axis was not coincident to that of the platform yaw axis, either a pitch or roll command would cause a change in both of the corresponding gimbal-angle displays. After the vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align with the platform and to reduce the yaw gimbalangle disparity, passive thermal control was established satisfactorily. Both guidance systems were then powered down until l05 hours. At that time, the abort guidance system was powered up for control during the first transearth midcourse correction. The passive thermal control mode was reestablished and the abort system was powered down. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' California, on April 27, 1970, after reaction control system deactivation and pyrotechnic safing in Hawaii. Postflight testing and inspection of the command module for evaluation of the inflight performance and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the contractor's and vendors' facilities in accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Requests (ASHUR's). The tests performed as a result of inflight problems are described in table C-I and discussed in the appropriate systems performance sections of this report. Tests being conducted for other purposes in accordance with other ASHUR's and the basic contract are not included. + +TABLE C-I.- POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +14.2.2。 +------ +Result 2: +(section ll.3). +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +An enlarged photograph of the scroll was examined in detail to determine if the scroll started properly. While no abnormal indications were observed, the interpretation of these data is not conclusive. + +A complete functional test was performed and the flight problem could not be duplicated. The system was cold soaked for 7 hours at 30° F. While the system was slowly warming up, continuous functional tests were being performed to determine if thermal gradients could have caused the problem. The system operated normally throughout all tests. + +Following verification of the light and sensing circuit, the mode switch was examined in detail. Tests were performed to determine contact resistance, and the switch was examined by X-ray for conductive contaminants and by dissection for nonconductive contaminants. No evidence of any switch problems was indicated. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +supply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wires from the oxygen. Warning systems at the Mission Control Center will be modified to provide more immediate and visible warnings of anomalies in all systems. + +A more thorough discussion of this anomaly is presented in reference l. + +This anomaly is closed. + +14.1.2 Postlanding Vent Valve Malfunction + +During postlanding activities, recovery personnel discovered that the postlanding ventilation inlet valve was closed and the exhaust valve wasopen. +------ +Result 2: +The ventilation valve is opened by first pulling the postlanding vent valve unlock handle. The handle is attached by a cable to two pins which mechanically lock the ventilation valves closed. Once the handle is pulled, the postlanding vent fan switch is placed to either the high or low position. This operation opens both ventilation valves and actuates the postlanding blower. The recovery forces found the switch setting to be proper, but the vent valve unlock handle was partially out instead of completely out. + +The inlet valve locking pin was not in the full open position (fig. l4-l), a condition which would keep the valve in the closed position even though both the pin and slot were measured to be within design tolerances. + +A check of the operation of the valves with different pull positions of the handle from locked to full open requires about one inch of travel and was made with the following results: +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds befor...', "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", "Result 1:\nThe command module arrived at the contractor's facility in Downey,' Californi...", 'Result 1:\n14.2.2。\n------\nResult 2:\n(section ll.3).\n------\n...', 'Result 1:\nAn enlarged photograph of the scroll was examined in detail to determine if t...', 'Result 1:\nsupply valve will be redesigned to isolate polytetrafluoroethylenecoated wire...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: limit function line just prior to point B, the antenna acquired the earth in wide beam. When the antenna reached the scan limit function line, the antenna control logic would switch the system to the manual +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +to command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude controller for yaw commands. The pilot's task was further complicated by having the flight director attitude indicators powered down. Without these displays, it was necessary to monitor attitudes by observing gimbal angles on the display and keyboard assembly. Because the spacecraft yaw axis was not coincident to that of the platform yaw axis, either a pitch or roll command would cause a change in both of the corresponding gimbal-angle displays. After the vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align with the platform and to reduce the yaw gimbalangle disparity, passive thermal control was established satisfactorily. Both guidance systems were then powered down until l05 hours. At that time, the abort guidance system was powered up for control during the first transearth midcourse correction. The passive thermal control mode was reestablished and the abort system was powered down. +------ +Result 2: +A simplified schematic of the optics shaft servo loop mechanization is shown in figure l4-2. In the zero optics mode, the sine outputs of the half-speed and l6-speed resolvers are routed through a coarse/fine switching network to the motor drive amplifier and are used to null the system. Rate feedback from the motor tachometer is routed to the drive amplifier through a compensation network which removes any bias in the signal. When the zero optics mode is selected, the coupling-data-unit counter and the computer register which contains the shaft angle are zeroed for 15 seconds and then released to follow the l6-speed resolver. The half-speed resolver, the fine/coarse switching network, and the tachometer feedback compensation are used only in the zero optics mode. + + + +Figure l4-2.- Zero optics mode circuitry. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +MSC-02680 + +DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING + +This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations. + +MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON.TEXAS SEPTEMBER1970 +------ +Result 2: +At the time of the oxygen tank incident, three events took place that affected control system performance: the quad C isolation valves closed (as discussed in section l4.l.l), a voltage transient caused a computer restart, and the digital autopilot re-initialized the attitude to which it was referenced. The response of the digital autopilot to these events was as programmed, and rate and attitude errors were reduced to a nulled condition within 75 seconds. Reference l contains a more complete discussion of spacecraft dynamics during and after the oxygen tank anomaly . + +The only translation maneuver performed with the service propulsion system was the first midcourse correction. Spacecraft dynamics during this maneuver were nominal, and sigmificant translation parameters are showm in the following table. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Hy drogen, l.b Oxygen,1b Available at lift-off Tank 1 29.0 326.8 Tank 2 29.2 327.2 Totals 58.2 654.0 Con sume d Tank 1 7.1 71.8 Tank 2 6.9 85.2 Totals 14.0 157.0 Remaining at the time of the ncident Tank 1. 21.9 255.0 Tank 2 22.3 242.0 Tot als 44.2 497.0 + +7.1.4 Oxy ge n + +Following the incident and loss of pressure in tank l, the total oxygen supply consisted of 3.77 pounds in the surge tank and l pound in each of the three repressurization bottles. About 0.6 pound of the oxygen from the surge tank was used during potable water tank pressurizations and to activate the oxygen system prior to entry. An additional 0.3 pound was used for breathing during entry. + +7.1.5 Water + +At the time of the incident, about 38 pounds of water was available in the potable water tank. During the abort phase, the crew used juice bags to transfer approximately 14 pounds of water from the command module to the lunar module for drinking and food preparation. + +7.1.6 Batteries +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +and Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation December 1969 8 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation September 1970 9 Cancelled 10 Stroking Test Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 12 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The unprecedented powered-down state of the command module required generation of several new procedures in preparation for entry. The command module was briefly powered up to assess the operation of critical systems using both onboard and telemetered instrumentation. Any required power in the command module had been supplied during transearth coast from the lunar module through the umbilical connectors. It was through this means that the entry batteries were fully charged, with battery A requiring 15 hours and battery B approximately 3 hours. While these procedures represented a radical departure from normal operation, all were understandable and easily accomplished to achieve the desired system readiness. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Powering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar module were completed at 58:40:00. The optimum plan for 8 safe and quick return required an immediate descent engine firing to a free-return circumlunar trajectory, with a pericynthion-plus-2-hour maneuver (transearth injection) to expedite the landing to about 142:30:00. Two other midcourse corrections were performed, the first using the descent engine. Only essential life support, navigation, instrumentation, and communication systems were operated to maximize electrical power and cooling water margins. Detailed monitoring of all consumables was continuously maintained to assess these margins, and the crew was always +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed on time, and the transearth coast time was shortened such that landing was to occur at about l43 hours in the South Pacific, where primary recovery support was located. Guidance errors during this maneuver necessitated a small midcourse correction at about 105 hours to return the projected entry flight path angle to within specified limits. Following this firing, the spacecraft was maneuvered into a passive thermal control mode, and all lunar module systems were powered down except those absolutely required to support the crew. A final midcourse correction was performed 5 hours before entry to raise the entry flight-path angle slightly, and this maneuver was performed using the lumar module reaction control system under abort guidance control. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nto command rotation about the vehicle pitch and roll axes and the attitude co...', 'Result 1:\nMSC-02680\n\nDISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING\n\nThis paper is not suitable for gener...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nand Service Module Reaction Control System Apri1 1970 5 Service Propulsion Sy...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nPowering down of the command and service nodules and powering up of the lunar...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: limit function line just prior to point B, the antenna acquired the earth in wide beam. When the antenna reached the scan limit function line, the antenna control logic would switch the system to the manual +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds before the wires are severed by the command module/service module umbilical guillotine. As illustrated in the figure, a cam fork is moved by a piston, which is operated by propellant gas from redundant cartridges, to function a lift plate. Motion of this plate disconnects the male and female portions of electrical connectors located, respectively, in the lift plate and in the base plate of the interrupter. At the completion of the stroke, the fork is brought to rest by impacting and crushing an aluminum block mounted on the interrupter housing. +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The entry attitude and platform alignment were confirmed by a successful sextant star check and moon occulation within l second of the predicted time. The pre-entry check and initialization of the entry monitor system were normal. However, entry monitor system operation was initiated manually when the 0.05g light remained off 3 seconds after the actual $0.05\mathtt{g}$ time (as discussed in section 14.l.5.). In addition, the entry monitor system trace was unexpectedly narrow and required excessive concentration to read. The guided entry was normal in all respects and was characterized by smooth control inputs. The first acceleration peak reached approximately 5g. +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Lunar module powerup for the final midcourse correction maneuver was performed according to the prescribed contingency checklist, with only minor deviations furnished by the ground. Shortly afterward, the lunar module windows cleared of moisture and the cabin temperature again became comfortable. Approximately 6 hours before entry, the passive thermal control mode vwas terminated and the spacecraft was maneuvered to place the earth in the crewmen optical alignment sight with the terminator parallel to the Y axis in preparation for the midcourse maneuver. At that time, a sun/moon alignment was made. Acquisition of these bodies was made by pitching up in a plane roughly parallel to the ecliptic plane. The sun filter made viewing through the telescope reticle very difficult. The spacecraft was controlled by the Lunar Module Pilot from commands given by the Commander, who responded when the reticle lines bisected the moon and solar disks. Three sets of marks were taken on each body. The +------ +Result 2: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +The unusual spacecraft configuration required that new procedures for entry be developed and verified. The resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction 5 hours before entry, separation of the service module 4 hours 39 minutes before entry, and undocking of the lunar module at l hour ll minutes before entry. Service module separation was performed using the lunar module reaction control system. Separation velocity following lunar module umdocking was provided using pressure in the docking tunnel. + +The final midcourse correction maneuver used the lunar module reaction control system. Landing occurred at 142:54:4l in the Pacific Ocean at 2l degrees 38.4 minutes south latitude and 165 degrees 21.7 minutes west longitude, which was about l mile from the target point. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +4.0 TRAJECTORY + +The planned trajectory profile was similar to that for Apollo 12 except for descent orbit insertion being performed with the service propulsion system and the targeting of the spent S--IvB stage for a lunar impact. The trajectory had been very close to the nominal flight plan up to the time of abort, which was the first in the Apollo program. Throughout the manned space program, techniques have been developed and tested for the real-tine determination of immediate abort requirements, but Apollo l3 presented the first situation in which their use was necesSary. Figure 3-l shows the mission profile, including the relative locations of all major maneuvers. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ +Result 2: +Because an inflight anomaly in the cryogenic oxygen supply required an abort of the mission prior to insertion into lunar orbit, discussions of systems performance only relate to the abort profile and the system configurations required as a result of the emergency. A complete discussion of the anomaly is presented in reference l, and the abort profile is described in section 3. Because of the added criticality of onboard consumables, a discussion of usage profiles in both vehicles is contained in section 7. + +A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allotted for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supplements will be published for certain Apollo l3 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +During the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, indicating a reverse leakage through the shutoff valve from the oxygen manifold (fig. 14-l9) into the tank. The leak rate, with a maximum differential pressure of 193 psi, varied from about 0.22 lb/hr (70 0oo scc/hr) to zero when the tank pressure reached manifold pressure. Allowable leakage for the valve in either direction is 360 scc/hr. Preflight test data indicate a reverse leakage of 360 scc/hr and no excessive leaking in the forward direction. + +The internal portion of three valves of this type had been replaced previously on the spacecraft because of excessive leakage through the ascent oxygen tank l shutoff valve. In one valve, a roiled O-ring + + + +Figure 14-l9.- Oxygen-supply system. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe two interrupters open the electrical circuits about 30 milliseconds befor...', 'Result 1:\nThe entry attitude and platform alignment were confirmed by a successful sext...', 'Result 1:\nLunar module powerup for the final midcourse correction maneuver was performe...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nThe first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105...', 'Result 1:\nDuring the flight, the pressure in the ascent stage oxygen tank 2 increased, ...', 'Result 1:\nThe operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory ...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...', 'Result 1:\nCrew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based i...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: limit function line just prior to point B, the antenna acquired the earth in wide beam. When the antenna reached the scan limit function line, the antenna control logic would switch the system to the manual +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.367, Perfect scores: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.50 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:37 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.297, Max reward: 0.767 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:39 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: spacecraft_lunar_module_apollo_11_power_consumption +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module batteries capacity undocking mission Apollo NASA +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +Command module battery performance was acceptable throughout the mission. Entry battery C had been isolated throughout the flight, and at 58 hours 40 minutes, batteries A and B were also isolated from the spacecraft buses. Batteries A and B were charged a total of three times each during the flight, including once each using power from the lunar module. Following the cryogenic oxygen incident, battery A was twice placed on main bus A to support spacecraft load requirements. Preentry procedures were conducted with the lunar module supplying power to the command module main bus B through the command and service module/lunar module umbilical and with entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. This configuration was maintained from 6 hours 30 minutes prior to entry until 2 hours 30 minutes prior to entry, at which time the lunar module batteries were disconnected and all electrical power loads were assumed by the command module entry batteries. + +5.2.2 Fuel Cells +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo mission lunar module battery chemistry acid levels +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +Command module battery performance was acceptable throughout the mission. Entry battery C had been isolated throughout the flight, and at 58 hours 40 minutes, batteries A and B were also isolated from the spacecraft buses. Batteries A and B were charged a total of three times each during the flight, including once each using power from the lunar module. Following the cryogenic oxygen incident, battery A was twice placed on main bus A to support spacecraft load requirements. Preentry procedures were conducted with the lunar module supplying power to the command module main bus B through the command and service module/lunar module umbilical and with entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. This configuration was maintained from 6 hours 30 minutes prior to entry until 2 hours 30 minutes prior to entry, at which time the lunar module batteries were disconnected and all electrical power loads were assumed by the command module entry batteries. + +5.2.2 Fuel Cells +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo mission lunar module batteries remaining ampere hours at undocking +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar module batteries ampere hours undocking Apollo mission +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "lunar module battery capacity at undocking +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:42 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: lunar_module_power_remaining_at_end_of_apollo_13_mission +2025-04-04 at 04:02:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +Equipment transfer and stowage in both the command module and lunar module was completed about 7 hours prior to entry, with the exception of the cameras that were to be used for service module photography. At 6-1/2 hours before entry, command module activity included powering up the instrumentation and placing entry battery C on main bus A, with main bus B still powered from the lunar module. The command module reaction control thrusters were preheated for 20 minutes, and all instrumented engines were observed to be above the minimum operating temperature l0 minutes after heater operation was terminated. + +8.9.3 Final Midcourse Correction +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo lunar module battery undocking ampere hours recharge assessment +2025-04-04 at 04:02:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:44 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: How many ampere hours of lunar module batteries remaining at undocking +2025-04-04 at 04:02:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:46 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [True, True, True, True, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.67 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [22, 219, 525, 244, 585, 122] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 286.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 3.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 95.39 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 5/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.308 ± 0.241 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.17 ± 1.07 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [2, 1, 1, 3, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +Equipment transfer and stowage in both the command module and lunar module was completed about 7 hours prior to entry, with the exception of the cameras that were to be used for service module photography. At 6-1/2 hours before entry, command module activity included powering up the instrumentation and placing entry battery C on main bus A, with main bus B still powered from the lunar module. The command module reaction control thrusters were preheated for 20 minutes, and all instrumented engines were observed to be above the minimum operating temperature l0 minutes after heater operation was terminated. + +8.9.3 Final Midcourse Correction +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module...', 'Result 1:\nAt the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +Command module battery performance was acceptable throughout the mission. Entry battery C had been isolated throughout the flight, and at 58 hours 40 minutes, batteries A and B were also isolated from the spacecraft buses. Batteries A and B were charged a total of three times each during the flight, including once each using power from the lunar module. Following the cryogenic oxygen incident, battery A was twice placed on main bus A to support spacecraft load requirements. Preentry procedures were conducted with the lunar module supplying power to the command module main bus B through the command and service module/lunar module umbilical and with entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. This configuration was maintained from 6 hours 30 minutes prior to entry until 2 hours 30 minutes prior to entry, at which time the lunar module batteries were disconnected and all electrical power loads were assumed by the command module entry batteries. + +5.2.2 Fuel Cells +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAt the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +Command module battery performance was acceptable throughout the mission. Entry battery C had been isolated throughout the flight, and at 58 hours 40 minutes, batteries A and B were also isolated from the spacecraft buses. Batteries A and B were charged a total of three times each during the flight, including once each using power from the lunar module. Following the cryogenic oxygen incident, battery A was twice placed on main bus A to support spacecraft load requirements. Preentry procedures were conducted with the lunar module supplying power to the command module main bus B through the command and service module/lunar module umbilical and with entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. This configuration was maintained from 6 hours 30 minutes prior to entry until 2 hours 30 minutes prior to entry, at which time the lunar module batteries were disconnected and all electrical power loads were assumed by the command module entry batteries. + +5.2.2 Fuel Cells +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAt the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAt the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + +Figure 7.2-l.- Lunar module water usage. + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ +Result 2: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nAt the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 1.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.167 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.373 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.000, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:02:47 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.326, Max reward: 0.606 +2025-04-04 at 04:02:48 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"meru g acceleration drift m/s^2" + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: how does mERU acceleration work in IMU's +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Mercedes-Benz EQS Z-axis acceleration drift acceleration rate in metric units" +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift z-axis mERU/g +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Erica/Nubits acceleration drift Z-axis +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:51 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"NASA M2 E ALS input axis acceleration drift mERU/g" + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift z-axis mERU +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Mercedes-Benz EQS Z-axis acceleration drift mERU/g +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift input axis mERU/g +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift input axis Z-direction M Erica/Nubits +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:54 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +no relevant results, including "NTI T2R acceleration drift input axis mERU/g" + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift z-axis mERU exact values +2025-04-04 at 04:02:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:57 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:02:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"NTI T2R acceleration drift input axis Z axis" + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift z-axis input axis mERU after translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 04:02:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:02:59 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"NTI T2R acceleration drift input axis deg" + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: acceleration drift z-axis input axis mERU after translunar injection +2025-04-04 at 04:03:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:02 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"nti t2 signignature error propagation" + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:03 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: +"NTI T2R acceleration drift input axis 9.0" + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, False, True, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.47 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [1697, 24, 495, 665, 152, 886] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 653.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 4.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 163.29 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.167, Valid formats: 1.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 4/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.242 ± 0.366 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 1.17 ± 1.86 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 5, 0, 2, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The passive thermal control modes attempted at 7:43:02 and 32:2l:49 were not successful and had to be reinitiated. The attempt at 7:43:02 resulted in a divergent coning angle because the roll rate was established using one rather than two roll engines, as required by the checklist. In addition, an incorrect roll rate was loaded into the digital autopilot. The attempt at 32:2l:49 resulted in a divergent coning angle because an unplanned minimum impulse engine firing occurred l3 seconds after initiating the roll rate. The engine firing command (two negative roll engines) was generated when the roll manual attitude switch was changed from the rate-command position to the acceleration-command position. The engine +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +14.2.2。 +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nCondition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third mid...', 'Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...', 'Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...', 'Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...', 'Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...', 'Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +crewmen noted the small change in acceleration caused by the mixture ratio shifts during S-II and S-IVB flight. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 00:12:30, with the spacecraft guidance system registering the following insertion parameters: velocity 25 565 ft/sec, apogee 102.6 miles, and perigee l00.l miles. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 1: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nThe transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance sys...', 'Result 1:\nThe transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance sys...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Condition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third midcourse correction Fourth midcourBe correction .PGNCS/DPS PGNCS/DPS AGS/DPS AGS/DPS Time Ignition,hr:min:sec Cutoff,hr:min:sec Duration,sec 61:29:43.49 61:30:17.72 34.23 79:27:38.95 79 :32:02.77 105:18:28 105:18:42 137:39:51.5 137:40:13 Velocity change before trin (actual/desired) X# 人 +3.0/+2.9 -34.2/-34.3 -15.9/-16.2 -425.9/-426.4 +644.6/+645.6 +378.8/+379.0 7.6/7.8 -1.2/-1.5 -1.9/-2.2 Velocity residual after trim, ft/sec X Y Z +0.2 0.0 +0.3 +1.0 +0.3 0.0 ## 0 0.1 Gimbal drive actuator, in, Initial Pitch Roll Maximum excursion Pitch Roll -0.02 -0.34 +0.31 +0.13 -0.28 Not applicable Not applicable Steady-state -0.27 +0.16 -0.44 Pitch +0.04 +0.21 Roll -0.51 -0.55 Cutoff Pitch +0.10 +0.23 Rol1 -0.31 -0.55 Maximum rate excursion,deg/sec Pitch -0.6 +0.2 Roll -0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.8 -0.6 +0.2 ±0.2 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 Maximum attitude excursion, deg Pitch -3.62 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 Rol1 +1.69 +6.7 +0.9 -0.6 Yaw -1.60 +------ +Result 2: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 2: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...', 'Result 1:\nCondition Maneuver Second midcourse correction Transearth injection Third mid...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +Uncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/sec X. -0.75 Y Z -0.25 1.19 2 Bias, cm/sec^ X Y Z -0.04 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.099 0.2 Scale factor error, ppm X.· Y Z 96- 116 37 116 Lt- 116 Null bias drift， mERU X. Y Z 2.7 2.0 -0.3 Acceleration drift, input axis mERU/g, 9.0 Acceleration drift, spin reference axis, mERU/g Y. 9.0 5 + +Several entry monitor system bias tests were made during the flight. The associated accelerometer exhibited a stability well within specification limits. Results of each test are given in the following table. + +5.7 REACTION CONTROL + +Time Time interval . sec Velocity change, ft/sec Accelerometer bias, ft/sec2 Before translunar injection 100 +0.8 +0.008 After translumar injection 100 +1.0 +0.010 10 hours5 minutes 100 +1.8 +0.018 29 hours 40 minutes 100 +1.5 +0.015 + +5.7.1 Servi ce Module +------ +Result 2: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 3: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nUncompens ated Error term error One-sigma specification Offset velocity, ft/s...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A preflight history of the inertial components and the inflight accelerometer bias measurements are given in the following table. + +Sample me an St andard deviation Number of samples Countdown value Flight load Flight average Accelerometers X - Scale factor error,ppm -681 Bias,cm/sec 2 +1.47 Y - Scale factor error, ppm -1165 5 0.06 18 0.065 4 4 4 ~689 +1.4 ~1173 -1.42 -700 +1.49 -1190 -1.42 -310 +1.50 -1.35 Z - Scale factor error, ppm -244 61 4 Bias, cm/sec 2 +1.56 0.017 4 +1.57 +1.56 +1.52 X- Null bias drift,mERU. +1.18 1.33 4 +0.2 +0.4 Acceleration drift, spin refer- ence axis，mERU/g. -0.93 1.19 4 -2.6 -1.0 Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g.· -5.38 2.37 4 -5.5 -4.0 + +6.4.5 Abort Guidance System Performance +------ +Result 2: +Time hr:min Optian code Star used Ster angle aifference, deg Gyro torquing angles, deg Gyro drift,mERU Comments X Y Z X Z 00:45 05:26 (a) 26 Spica,33 Antares 0.00 -0.067 -0.000 +0.162 10 : 40 (b) 35 Rasalhague,44 Enif 20 0.01 0.00 +0.175 -0.123 +0.172 -0.012 23:47 (b) Dnoces,27 Alkaid 31 Arcturug，36 Vega 0.01 -0.283 -0.113 +0.092 28:49 (b) 30 Menkent,32 Alphecca 0.01 -0.084 -0.161 -0.075 +0.403 +1,4 +0.8 +2.1 Check star 36 9:C7 () 23 Denebola,32 Alphecca 0.00 +0.285 +0.011 +0.146 +0.131 +1.1 +1.0 +1.9 Check Btar 35 Check star 31 40 :43 (c) From lunar module primary 0:52 (a) guidance 0.00 36Vega,40Altair ~1.253 +0.385 +3.263 + +preferred alignment DRererence metrix (REFSMAT) CCoarse alignment +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 4: +Search results: ['Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...', 'Result 1:\nThe inertial measurement unit performed properly throughout the mission. A pr...'] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: Error Sample me an Stendard deviatlon Number of smmple8 Couwtdown valve Flipht load r'lightaverw tloreuflatc lighttvertu" after ugdut: Accelerometera X-Scule factor error、ppm. 2 -19y 24 7 -199 Bia，cm/sec -0.18 0.07 1 -0.26 -1 .17 =0.21 =1; , 1f. Y-Scale factor error,ppa. 2 -164 7 -194 -190 Bias,cm/eec -0.20 0.04 7 -0.20 =1.!{ -t). 1? Z-Scale factor error,ppm.: -389 38 7 -419 1 Bias, cm/sec 2 +0.02 0.06 7 +0.07 8_3.0h -i,0: -1).:1.* Cyroacopea X-Rull bias drift,mERU.. Acceleration drift,spin refer- ence axis,mERU/g .. +0.0 -1.:21 1.28 7 +U.5 -.15 Acceleratlon drift,input 0.58 7 -1.0 axis,mERU/g Y-Null biu drirt,mERU. +22.91 -1.34 6.26 7 +s1？ +4. C +1.C -U.04 Acceieration drift,spin refer- 1.88 7 -1.4 ence axis，mERU/g..， -0.09 2.05 7 -0.4 +.U Acceleration drirt,input Ax1s,mERU/g +0.11 h.28 7 +l.7 +1.. Z-Null bias drift,mERU. -3.96 1.94 7 -4.0 d_4.9 +1.t9 +v.# Acceleration drift,spin refer-- ence axis,mERU/g.. -5.37 2.56 7 -7.3 -t.0 Acceleration drift,input axi日,mERU/g +19.17 7.14 7 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 0.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.000 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.233, Perfect scores: 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 2/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 0.67 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:04 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.381, Max reward: 0.828 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:06 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 launch weather August 11 1970 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Accuweather Apollo 13 launch conditions +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: when was the last mission to launch on a "Go" schedule before Apollo 13 despite bad weather, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 weather forecast" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:09 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 launch weather April 11 1970 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Weather forecast April 11 Apollo 13 launch Kennedy Space Center +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what did the Apollo 13 launch weather team perceive as a "marginally favorable" weather situation, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 weather conditions" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:12 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 launch weather April 11 1970 weather conditions +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 lightning strike safety concerns +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Field meter records indicate the Apollo l3 vehicle carried aloft a net positive charge and that the trailing exhaust gases were negatively charged (fig. ll.l-4). Initial analysis indicates the total charge $\mathsf Q$ carried by the vehicle was about 0.o4 coulomb. If the capacitance of the launch vehicle is about l00 picofarads, the vehicle is then at a potential of 4 million volts. A stored charge of $0.04$ coulomb at a potential of 4 million volts provides an electrostatic potential energy of 160 0o0 joules. Although this energy is much less than that dissipated in a natural lightning discharge, the level is still considerable and could significantly increase the potential hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. These numbers are consistent with the electrostatic discharge analysis performed on the Apollo l2 lightning incident. Engines in jet aircraft have been observed to produce similar charging effects . + + + +Figure ll.l-4.- Electrical charge characteristics. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what does the term "marginally favorable" mean in the context of launch weather conditions, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:14 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 3 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 post-launch electrical charge safety procedures +2025-04-04 at 04:03:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what was the cause of the large fluctuations and oscillations detected at site 6, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:17 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 mission timeline +2025-04-04 at 04:03:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what is the relationship between the fields and electrical discharge during the Apollo 13 launch, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +As a result of the electrical disturbances experienced during the Apollo l2 launch, the value of further research in this area was recognized and several experiments were performed prior to and during the Apollo l3 launch to study certain aspects of launch-phase electrical phenomena. The separate experiments consisted of measurements of the atmospheric electric field, low-frequency and very-low-frequency radio noise, the air/earth current density, and the electrical current flowing in the earth's surface, all of which result from perturbations generated by the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume. The analysis of the Apollo l2 lightning incident is reported in reference 3. + +11.1.1 Electric Field Measurements +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:19 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 recovery scenario +2025-04-04 at 04:03:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what were some of the specific electrical disturbances measured during the Apollo 12 launch, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +As a result of the electrical disturbances experienced during the Apollo l2 launch, the value of further research in this area was recognized and several experiments were performed prior to and during the Apollo l3 launch to study certain aspects of launch-phase electrical phenomena. The separate experiments consisted of measurements of the atmospheric electric field, low-frequency and very-low-frequency radio noise, the air/earth current density, and the electrical current flowing in the earth's surface, all of which result from perturbations generated by the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume. The analysis of the Apollo l2 lightning incident is reported in reference 3. + +11.1.1 Electric Field Measurements +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:21 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 recovery actions +2025-04-04 at 04:03:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what is the relationship between launch weather conditions and electrical disturbances during launch, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +As a result of the electrical disturbances experienced during the Apollo l2 launch, the value of further research in this area was recognized and several experiments were performed prior to and during the Apollo l3 launch to study certain aspects of launch-phase electrical phenomena. The separate experiments consisted of measurements of the atmospheric electric field, low-frequency and very-low-frequency radio noise, the air/earth current density, and the electrical current flowing in the earth's surface, all of which result from perturbations generated by the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume. The analysis of the Apollo l2 lightning incident is reported in reference 3. + +11.1.1 Electric Field Measurements +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:24 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Lunar Module carbon dioxide scrubbing system Apollo 13 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +advised of their consumables status. A procedure was developed on the ground and used by the crew to allow use of command module lithium hydroxide cartridges for carbon dioxide removal in the lunar module environmental control system (see section 6.8). The passive thermal control mode was established using the lunar module reaction control system and was satisfactorily maintained throughout transearth coast. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what is the average duration of the electrical field changes for both Apollo 12 and Apollo 13 launches, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:27 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 2 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Lunar Module power sources and systems +2025-04-04 at 04:03:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: what is the timing difference between the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 and the launch of Apollo 12, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortunately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo l3 launch. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:30 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 1 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: why were the recorders started several hours prior to launch, +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortunately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo l3 launch. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:57 - Checking 6 student answers +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:83 - Generating verification responses +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.evaluation:check_student_answers:103 - Verification complete. 4/6 answers correct +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:75 - Correctness metrics: [False, True, False, False, False, False] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:76 - Average correctness: 0.17 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:77 - Standard deviation: 0.37 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:82 - Student lengths: [308, 377, 1983, 2031, 583, 452] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:83 - Teacher lengths: [8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:84 - Average student length: 955.67 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:85 - Average teacher length: 8.00 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_correctness:86 - Length ratio: 119.46 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_correctness.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:227 - Format reward metrics - Mean: 0.000, Valid formats: 0.0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_format:228 - Responses ending properly: 3/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_format.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:330 - Retry behavior rewards: 0.267 ± 0.387 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:331 - Search tags per completion: 2.00 ± 3.32 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:332 - Violations (>1 search per message): 0/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_retry:333 - Search counts distribution: [0, 3, 9, 0, 0, 0] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_retry.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 0: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The space vehicle, with a crew of James A. Lovell, Commander; Fred W. Haise, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot; and John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot; was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13:00 p.m. e.s.t. (i9:13:00 G.m.t.) April ll, 1970. Two days before launch, the Command Module Pilot, as a member of the Apollo l3 backup crew, was substituted for his prime crew counterpart, who was exposed and found susceptible to rubella (German measles). Prior to launch, a network of meters was installed in the vicinity of the launch site to measure electrical phenomena associated with Saturn V ascent in support of findings from the Apollo l2 lightning investigation; satisfactory data were obtained. During S-II stage boost, an automatic shutdown of the center engine occurred because of a divergent dynamic structural condition associated with that engine. Soon after the spacecraft was ejected, the S-IvB was maneuvered so as to impact on the lunar surface and provide seismological +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Field meter records indicate the Apollo l3 vehicle carried aloft a net positive charge and that the trailing exhaust gases were negatively charged (fig. ll.l-4). Initial analysis indicates the total charge $\mathsf Q$ carried by the vehicle was about 0.o4 coulomb. If the capacitance of the launch vehicle is about l00 picofarads, the vehicle is then at a potential of 4 million volts. A stored charge of $0.04$ coulomb at a potential of 4 million volts provides an electrostatic potential energy of 160 0o0 joules. Although this energy is much less than that dissipated in a natural lightning discharge, the level is still considerable and could significantly increase the potential hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. These numbers are consistent with the electrostatic discharge analysis performed on the Apollo l2 lightning incident. Engines in jet aircraft have been observed to produce similar charging effects . + + + +Figure ll.l-4.- Electrical charge characteristics. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publi cation date/status Apollo 7 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance May 1969 June 1969 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 4 5 Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled August 1969 6 Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 8 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis November 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module March 1970 4 Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 6 Evaluation Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969 7 Visual Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 Apollo 9 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 2 Command and Service Module Guidance, Navi- gation, and Control System Performance November 1969 3 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- ance Analysis November 1969 4 Performance of Command +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +advised of their consumables status. A procedure was developed on the ground and used by the crew to allow use of command module lithium hydroxide cartridges for carbon dioxide removal in the lunar module environmental control system (see section 6.8). The passive thermal control mode was established using the lunar module reaction control system and was satisfactorily maintained throughout transearth coast. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +The electrical power system performed all required functions. At lunar module undocking, the descent batteries had delivered 1434.7 amperehours from a nominal total capacity of l6o0 ampere-hours, and the ascent batteries had delivered 200 ampere-hours from a nominal total of 592 ampere-hours. The lunar module initial powered-down configuration required an average electrical energy consumption of 900 watts at 30 amperes. After the second descent propulsion firing, the lunar module was further powered down to about a 360-watt (l2-armpere) level; as discussed in section 7.2. A false battery 2 malfunction and master alarm occurred at 99:54:00 and continued intermittently during the perioas that the battery was on (discussed in section l4.2.3). A review of the data indicates that a current surge of greater than 100 amperes occurred at 97:13:56 concurrent with a crew report of a thumping noise and snowflakes seen through the lunar module window. This occurrence is discussed in section +------ +Result 2: +At the time of power up, 2l79 ampere-hours of electrical energy was available from the four descent- and two ascent-stage batteries. As indicated in figure 7.2-2, initial consumption was at a current of 30 amperes until the second descent propulsion system firing, after which the vehicle was powered down to a l2-ampere load. At approximately ll2 hours, power . was provided to charge the command module entry batteries at a rate of about 7 amperes for approximately l5 hours. The command module was also powered from the lunar module at an ll-ampere rate for a brief period to + +operate the reaction control heaters and telemetry equipment. The estimated total energy transferred to the command module was approximately 129 ampere hours. A total of 410 ampere hours remained in the lunar module batteries at the time of undocking. + + + + + +Figure 7.2-2.- Lunar module total battery capacity during flight. + + + +Apollo 13 flight crew +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 3: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 4: Result 1: +At site 6, the record was similar to that for site 7 with an initial positive excursion followed by a slower negative change. At this station, however, there were large fluctuations superimposed on the record, as shown in figure ll.l-3(b). These fluctuations could have been caused by + + + +Figure ll.l-l.- Field meter location in the laumch site area. + + + +Figure ll.l-2.-- Field meter locations in the proximity of the launch complex. + +gravel and dust stirred up by the exhaust of the launch vehicle engine. After launch, a quantity of such debris was found near the surface of the field meter and its surrounding area. After the oscillations had subsided at T plus 40 seconds, there was a large negative field of approximately minus 3000 volts/meter which probably resulted from the exhaust and steam clouds that tended to remain over site 6. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 5: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +As a result of the electrical disturbances experienced during the Apollo l2 launch, the value of further research in this area was recognized and several experiments were performed prior to and during the Apollo l3 launch to study certain aspects of launch-phase electrical phenomena. The separate experiments consisted of measurements of the atmospheric electric field, low-frequency and very-low-frequency radio noise, the air/earth current density, and the electrical current flowing in the earth's surface, all of which result from perturbations generated by the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume. The analysis of the Apollo l2 lightning incident is reported in reference 3. + +11.1.1 Electric Field Measurements +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 6: Result 1: +As a result of the electrical disturbances experienced during the Apollo l2 launch, the value of further research in this area was recognized and several experiments were performed prior to and during the Apollo l3 launch to study certain aspects of launch-phase electrical phenomena. The separate experiments consisted of measurements of the atmospheric electric field, low-frequency and very-low-frequency radio noise, the air/earth current density, and the electrical current flowing in the earth's surface, all of which result from perturbations generated by the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume. The analysis of the Apollo l2 lightning incident is reported in reference 3. + +11.1.1 Electric Field Measurements +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 7: Result 1: +Illustrative data from the field instruments during launch are shown in figure ll.l-3. Very large perturbations of the normal electric field were recorded on meters at sites l, 2, and 3 located near the launch tower. First, there was a rapid increase in the positive direction, followed by a slower negative decrease. Data taken at site 4, however, did not indicate any significant variations in field intensity. Excellent records at several sensitivity levels were obtained at site 7. The field perturbation immediately following launch rose to a maximum of 1200 volts/ meter in about 25 seconds. The direction of field change then reversed, and a negative peak of some 300 volts/meter was reached in about ll5 seconds. Thereafter, the field gradually returned to the unperturbed value. +------ +Result 2: +As a result of the electrical disturbances experienced during the Apollo l2 launch, the value of further research in this area was recognized and several experiments were performed prior to and during the Apollo l3 launch to study certain aspects of launch-phase electrical phenomena. The separate experiments consisted of measurements of the atmospheric electric field, low-frequency and very-low-frequency radio noise, the air/earth current density, and the electrical current flowing in the earth's surface, all of which result from perturbations generated by the launch vehicle and its exhaust plume. The analysis of the Apollo l2 lightning incident is reported in reference 3. + +11.1.1 Electric Field Measurements +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 8: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 9: Result 1: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortunately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo l3 launch. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 10: Result 1: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortumately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo 13 launch. + + + +Figure 1l.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ +Result 2: +Because of access restrictions to sites 8 and 9, the corresponding recorders were started several hours prior to launch and unfortunately had stopped before lift-off. However, substantial positive and negative field perturbations found on the stationary parts of the records were greater than anything found on the moving portion. Comparison of these records with those from sites 6 and 7 confirmed that the only large field perturbations were those accompanying launch. Consequently, the peak excursions of the records at sites 8 and 9 could be confidently associated with the maximum field perturbations occurring just after lift-off. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Electrical discharge data for the Apollo l3 launch. + + + +Figure ll.l-3.- Concluded + +No significant perturbation in the electric field was produced by the launch cloud at stations 4 or 5, although small-scale fluctuations, apparently resulting from vibrations, can be seen on the records of the fine weather field at both stations. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 1: Result 1: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ +Result 2: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:386 - 🔍 Searched Chunk 2: Result 1: +The operational support provided by the flight control team was satisfactory and timely in safely returning the Apollo 13 crew. Only the inflight problems which influenced flight control operation and their resultant effects on the flight plan are discussed. + +Prior to laurch, the supercritical.helium pressure in the lunar module descent propulsion system increased at an abnormally high rate. After cold soak ard venting, the rise rate was considered acceptable for launch. At 56 hours during the first entry into the lunar module, the rise rate and pressure were reported to be satisfactory; therefore, a special venting procedure was not required. + +A master caution and warning alarm at 38 hours indicated the hydrogen tank pressures were low. As a result, it was planned to use the cryogenic tank fars more often than scheduled to provide a more even distribution of fluid and to stabilize heat and pressure rise rates. +------ +Result 2: +The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:384 - 📝 Ground Truth Chunk: The field-change and sferics detectors at site 5 gave no indication of any lightning-like discharge during launch, although sporadic signals were later recorded during the afternoon of launch day. These signals probably came from lightning in a cold front which was stalled some distance to the northwest of the launch site and which passed over the launch site on April 12. + +The above field meter records indicate the launch of the Apollo 13 vehicle produced a significant separation of electrical charge which could possibly increase the hazard in an otherwise marginal weather situation. At the present time the location and amount of the charge on the vehicle or exhaust clouds or a combination thereof are not well understood. +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | WARNING | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:392 - Failed to find correct chunk for prompt 5: +Search results: [] +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:402 - Chunk Query Rewards Summary: +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:403 - Total prompts: 6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:404 - Correct matches: 4.0 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:405 - Average reward: 0.667 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_em_chunk:406 - Reward std: 0.471 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_em_chunk.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:630 - Search strategy metrics - Mean: 0.167, Perfect scores: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:633 - Initial searches: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:634 - Average info processing steps: 1.33 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_strategy:635 - Final synthesis rate: 1/6 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:log_chat_state:855 - 💾 Appended 6 chat states to /workspace/DeepSearch/logs/chat_states/chat_states_search_strategy.jsonl +2025-04-04 at 04:03:31 | INFO | src.rewards:reward_search_diversity:811 - Search diversity metrics - Mean reward: 0.345, Max reward: 0.765 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:33 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 6 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Spacecraft launch azimuth initial direction" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 11 mission initial launch azimuth +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 10 1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970 2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis December 1969 3 Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System Final review 7 Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 5 Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Final review 6 System Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight January 1970 7 Evaluati on Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation January 1970 8 9 Cancelled Analysis of Apollo l0 Photography and Visual In publication 10 Observations Entry Postflight Analysis December 1969 11 Communications System Performance December 1969 Apollo 1l 1 2 3 4 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module May 1970 September 1970 Reaction Control System Review Service Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Review 5 +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: vehicle launch azimuth SpaceX Falcon 9 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: initial azimuth of a vehicle launch +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 spacecraft initial launch azimuth" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:35 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 5 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Spacecraft lunar module Apollo 11 launch azimuth" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +At 2-l/2 hours prior to entry, the command module was fully powered up and lunar module power transfer was terminated. After command module computer activation, the unfavorable spacecraft attitude delayed communications signal lockup and the ensuing ground uplink commands. The stable platform was coarse aligned to ground-supplied reference angles, and an optical fine alignment made using two stars. Particles venting from the command module umibilical area impeded command module optics operation. With the lunar module attached to the command moaule and the command module optics pointed away from the sun, individual stars were barely visible through the optics. Also sun reflections from the lumar module sublimator and the nearest reaction control quad prevented positive identification of constellations. + +8.9.6 Lunar Moaule Undocking +------ +Result 2: +The maneuver to the undocking attitude was made by the lunar module. Time consuming operations were followed to avoid gimbal lock of both spacecraft platforms. Because of the difference in alignments between the two spacecraft, considerable difficul.ty was encountered in maneuvering to the lunar module undocking attitude without driving the command module platform into gimbal lock. The maneuver required a complicated procedure using the lunar module platform and close cooperation between the Commander and Command Module Pilot. The resulting maneuver also used up considerable lunar module reaction control fuel. The final undocking attitude was very close to command module gimbal lock attitude. A different command module alignment procedure should have been used to prevent the probability of gimbal lock. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: initial launch azimuth of SpaceX Falcon 9 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ +Result 2: +At lift-off, measured winds, both at the surface and in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and accelerometer data indicate that structural loads were well below the established limits during all phases of flight. The predicted and calculated spacecraft loads at lift-off, in the region of maximum dynamic pressure, at the end of first stage boost, and during staging were similar to or less than previous Apollo Saturn V launches. Command module accelerometer data prior to S-Ic center-engine cutoff indicate longitudinal oscillations similar to those measured on previous flights. Although longitudinal oscillations in the S-II engine structure and propellant system caused early shutdown of the center engine, the vibrations at the spacecraft during S-Il boost had an amplitude less than 0.05g at a frequency of l6 hertz. The maximum oscillation measured during either of the two S-IVB thrust periods was 0.o6g, also at a frequency of 16 hert z. Oscillations during all four launch vehicle +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: azimuth of the Apollo 17 launch at t=0 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ +Result 2: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 13 spacecraft initial launch azimuth" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Crew training for Apollo 13 commenced on August l, 1969. The crew was based in Houston until December l, l969, when operations were transferred to the launch site.for final training. The training time was adequate to meet the planned launch date of April ll, 1970, and all training objectives were met. The only difficulty in coordinating the training activities was the scheduling of the lunar landing training vehicle for the Commander. The late availability of this vehicle, the large amount of time required for this type of training, and the need to travel between Houston and Cape Kennedy complicated the training Schedule significantly. Because a primary objective was a field geology experiment as part of the second extravehicular excursion, considerable emphasis was placed on geology training. A week-long geology field trip to train the crew as "observers" was completed early in the training cycle. Later field trips emphasized practical geological procedures and timelines. Extensive +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:38 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: "Apollo 11 launch azimuth Apollo Saturn V" +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ +Result 2: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: initial azimuth of first stage roll maneuver SpaceX Falcon 9 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The transearth injection maneuver was performed with the primary guidance system controlling the descent propulsion system. The throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6 percent, 2l seconds at 40 percent, and the remainder at full throttle. During both periods of throttle increase, the roll-gimbal drive actuator traveled approximately l.35 degrees negatively from its value at ignition. These excursion were somewhat larger than expected, but simulations have since shown them to be normal and result from engine compliance and mistrim. Spacecraft dynamics were nominal throughout the firing. The first transearth midcourse correction was the last maneuver to use the descent propulsion system. The maneuver was performed by manually controlling pitch and roll using the hand controllers and by automatically controlling yaw with the abort guidance system attitude-hold mode. The l4-second firing was accomplished at 10-percent throttle with no adverse dynami cs. + +6.4.3 Alignment +------ +Result 2: +The vehicle was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north, and a roll maneuver at l2.6 seconds placed the vehicle on a flight azimuthof $72.043$ degrees east of north. Trajectory parameters were close to nominal during S-IC and S-II boost until early shutdown of the center engine. The premature cutoff caused considerable deviations from certain nominal launch-vehicle trajectory parameters which were particularly evident at S-II outboard engine cutoff. Despite these deviations, the guidance system is designed to operate such that an efficient boost is conducted under engine-out conditions, and near-nominal trajectory parameters were achieved at orbital insertion and at translunar injection. Because of the reduced effective thrust, however, these respective events occurred $44.07$ and 13.56 seconds later than predicted. After spacecraft ejection, various S-IVB attitude and propulsive maneuvers placed the vehicle on a lunar impact trajectory very close to the desired target +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: initial azimuth Apollo 17 launch t=0 +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +At approximately 105 hours, the crew performed a manual descent propulsion maneuver to improve the entry angle. Since the primary guidance and navigation system was powered down, alignment was accomplished manually. The spacecraft was maneuvered to place the cusps of the earth' terminator on the Y-axis reticle of the crewmen optical alignment sight. The illuminated portion of the earth was then placed at the top of the reticle. This procedure positioned the lunar module X-axis perpendicular to the earth's terminator and permitted a retrograde maneuver to be performed perpendicular to the flight path to steepen the entry angle. The proper pitch attitude was maintained by positioning the sun in the top center portion of the telescope. With the spacecraft in the proper attitude, a body-axis alignment using the abort guidance system was followed immediately by entry into an attitude hold mode. This sequence resulted in attitude indications of zero for all axes and permitted use of the +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:115 - 🔍 Search Query: Apollo 13 launch azimuth tracker +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_tool_calls:118 - ℹ️ Information: Result 1: +The first transearth midcourse correction (table 4-III), was performed at 105:18:28 using the descent propulsion system. The firing was conducted at l0 percent throttle and produced a velocity change of about 7.8 ft/sec to successfully raise the entry flight-path angle to minus 6.52 degrees . + +Spacecraft navigation for the aborted mission proceeded satisfactorily. Post-pericynthion navigation procedures were designed to support transearth injection, and special data processing procedures were required for dual vehicle tracking prior to entry. Less range data than usual were received from tracking stations during the abort phase because the power amplifier in the spacecraft was turned off for most of the time to conserve electrical power. The small amounts of range data received and the resulting large data arcs, however, were sufficient to maintain navigation accuracies approximately equivalent to those of Apollo 12. + +(a) Trans lunar +------ +Result 2: +Supplement number Title Publication date/status Apollo 12 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis 1 2 3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System Final Flight September 1970 September 1970 4 Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation Preparation 5 6 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Preparation 7 Apollo l2 Preliminary Science Report Landing Site Selection Processes July 1970 Final review Apollo 13 1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Review 2 Descent Propulsion System Final Flight Evaluation Entry Postflight Analysis Preparation + +REFERENCES + +Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report. MSC-02545. June 1970. + +Marshall Space Flight Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report AS-508 Apollo 13 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-70-2. June 1970. +------ + +2025-04-04 at 04:03:41 | INFO | src.agent:run_agent_generations:70 - Generating responses for 4 prompts