SEC Filing Document

Company: T. Rowe Price Active Crypto ETF
Ticker: 
CIK: 2089855
Filing Type: S-1/A
Document Type: S-1/A
Date Filed: 2026-03-16
Accession Number: 0001999371-26-005896
Exchange: 
SIC Code: 6221
SIC Description: Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2089855/000199937126005896/active-s1a_031626.htm

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which could negatively impact the value of ether In 2021, the Ethereum Network implemented the EIP 1559 upgrade. EIP 1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to ether validators in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of ether fees paid to validators. If the crypto asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expending validating power to validate blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum Network could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: ● A reduction in staked ether on the Ethereum Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor obtaining control of the network.

●	Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most crypto
asset networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Ethereum blockchain or a software
upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum Network, the cost of using ether may increase and the marketplace
may be reluctant to accept ether as a means of payment. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to
reject low transaction fees on the Ethereum Network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the
Ethereum Network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness
of the Ethereum Network, the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

●	To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment
of a transaction fee in blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not
be recorded on the Ethereum blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction
fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays or disruptions in the recording of transactions could result in
a loss of confidence in the Ethereum Network and could prevent the Fund from completing transactions associated with the day-to-day
operations of the Fund, including creations and redemptions of the Shares in exchange for ether with Authorized Participants.

●	During the course of the block validation processes, validators exercise the discretion to select
which transactions to include within a block and in what order to include these transactions. Beyond the standard block reward
and transaction fees, validators have the ability to extract what is known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) by strategically
choosing, reordering, or excluding certain transactions during block production in return for increased transaction fees or other
forms of profit for such validators. In blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum
Network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by offering additional fees to validators for effecting the order
or inclusions of transactions within a block. Certain software solutions, such as MEV Boost by Flashbots, have been developed which
facilitate validators and other parties in the ecosystem in capturing MEV. The presence of MEV may incentivize associated practices
such as sandwich attacks or front running that can have negative repercussions on DeFi users. A “sandwich attack” is
executed by placing two transactions around a large, detected transaction to capitalize on the expected price impact. For instance,
a market participant might identify a sizable transaction within the so-called memory pool (mempool) that will significantly alter
an asset’s price on a decentralized exchange. The participant could then, for example, orchestrate a transaction bundle:
one transaction to acquire the asset prior to the detected transaction, followed by the large transaction itself, and a final transaction
to sell the asset after the market price has increased due to the large transaction’s execution. Such transaction bundles
can be submitted to validators through mechanisms like MEV-Boost, with validators receiving a share of the profits as an incentive
to include the specific transaction bundle in the block. In the context of MEV, “front running” is said to occur when
a user spots a transaction in the publicly visible mempool of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation, and then
pays a high transaction fee to a validator to have their transaction executed on a priority basis in a manner designed to profit
from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction
execution, which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions
in the mempool are publicly visible, any potential perception of MEV as unfair manipulation may also discourage users and other
stakeholders from engaging with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum Network in general. In addition, regulators or legislators could
enact rules which restrict practices associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum Network among users
and validators. Any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ether and the corresponding value
of the Shares.

Layer 2 solutions on the
Ethereum Network were only recently conceived and may not properly function as intended, which could have an adverse impact on
the value of ether

Layer 2 solutions are protocols
built on top of an underlying smart contract platform blockchain intended to provide scalability to the underlying blockchain by
increasing transaction efficiency. For example, Arbitrum is a smart contract platform protocol built on top of the Ethereum Network;
it is intended to provide scalability to Ethereum Network by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on the
Ethereum Network. Under this model, the Ethereum Network functions as the base layer, or “Layer 1” blockchain. Such
solutions are intended to improve upon the transaction speed, cost and efficiency of transactions on their respective Layer 1.
Layer 2 solutions therefore rely, to various degrees, on the functionality of the underlying Layer 1 blockchain.