SEC Filing Document

Company: VanEck BNB ETF
Ticker: 
CIK: 2066824
Filing Type: S-1/A
Document Type: S-1/A
Date Filed: 2026-05-15
Accession Number: 0001628280-26-035722
Exchange: 
SIC Code: 6221
SIC Description: Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2066824/000162828026035722/vaneckbnbs-1a5.htm

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token trading. Similarly, in March 2020, a design flaw in the MakerDAO smart contract caused forced liquidations of crypto assets at significantly discounted prices, resulting in millions of dollars of losses to users who had deposited crypto assets into the smart contract. In another example, in February 2022, a vulnerability in a smart contract for Wormhole, a bridge between the Ethereum and Solana Networks led to a $320 million theft of Ethereum. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between blockchain networks and decentralized finance (“DeFi”) protocols have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators such that attackers syphoned over $3.8 billion worth of digital assets from smart contracts in 2022. Problems with the development, deployment, and operation of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of BNB, just as they have for other digital assets like Ethereum.

In some cases, smart contracts can be controlled by one or more “admin keys” or users with special privileges, or “super users”. These users may have the ability to unilaterally make changes to the smart contract, enable or disable features on the smart contract, change how the smart contract receives external inputs and data, and make other changes to the smart contract. Furthermore, in some cases inadequate public information may be available about certain smart contracts or applications, and information asymmetries may exist, even with respect to open-source smart contracts or applications; certain participants may have hidden informational or technological advantages, making for an uneven playing field. There may be opportunities for bad actors to perpetrate fraudulent schemes and engage in illicit activities and other misconduct, such as exit scams and rug pulls (orchestrated by developers and/or influencers who promote a smart contract or application and, ultimately, escape with the money at an agreed time), or Ponzi or similar fraud schemes.

Many DeFi applications are currently deployed on the BNB Smart Chain, and smart contracts relating to DeFi applications currently represent a significant source of demand for BNB. DeFi applications may achieve their investment purposes through self-executing smart contracts that may allow users to invest digital assets in a pool from which other users can borrow without requiring an intermediate party to facilitate these transactions. These investments may earn interest to the investor based on the rates at which borrowers repay the loan, and can generally be withdrawn by the investor. For smart contracts that hold a pool of digital asset reserves, smart contract super users or admin key holders may be able to extract funds from the pool, liquidate assets held in the pool, or take other actions that decrease the value of the digital assets held by the smart contract in reserves. Even for digital assets that have adopted a decentralized governance mechanism, such as smart contracts that are governed by the holders of a governance token, such governance tokens can be concentrated in the hands of a small group of core community members, who would be able to make similar changes unilaterally to the smart contract. If any such super user or group of core members unilaterally make adverse changes to a smart contract, the design, functionality, features and value of the smart contract, its related digital assets may be harmed. In addition, assets held by the smart contract in reserves may be stolen, misused, burnt, locked up or otherwise become unusable and irrecoverable. Super users can also become targets of hackers and malicious attackers. If an attacker is able to access or obtain the super user privileges of a smart contract, or if a smart contract’s super users or core community members take actions that adversely affect the smart contract, users who transact with the smart contract may experience decreased functionality of the smart contract or may suffer a partial or total loss of any digital assets they have used to transact with the smart contract. Furthermore, the underlying smart contracts may be insecure, contain bugs or other vulnerabilities, or otherwise may not work as intended. Any of the foregoing could cause users of the DeFi application to be negatively affected, or could cause the DeFi application to be the subject of negative publicity. Because DeFi applications may be built on the BNB Smart Chain and represent a significant source of demand for BNB, public confidence in the BNB Smart Chain itself could be negatively affected, such sources of demand could diminish and the value of BNB could decrease. Similar risks apply to any smart contract or decentralized application, not just DeFi applications.

Popular Decentralized Applications Running On the BNB Smart Chain May Cease To Operate Or May Migrate To Competing Blockchains, Which May Negatively Impact The Price Of BNB And Make The BNB Smart Chain Less Attractive.

Certain decentralized applications currently running on the BNB Smart Chain may cease operations due to regulatory concerns, lawsuits, or a decline in demand. Additionally, such decentralized applications may also migrate away from the BNB Smart Chain to an alternative competing blockchain.

Validation On the BNB Smart Chain Is Subject to Risks, including Staking Liquidity and Operational Uncertainty on the BNB Smart Chain.

Validation on the BNB Smart Chain requires BNB to be transferred into smart contracts on the underlying BNB Smart Chain not under the Trust’s or anyone else’s control. If the BNB Smart Chain source code or protocol fails to behave as expected, suffer cybersecurity attacks or hacks, experience security issues, or encounter other problems, such assets may be irretrievably lost. In addition, the BNB Smart Chain dictates requirements for participation in validation activity, and may impose penalties, if the relevant activities are not performed correctly. The BNB Smart Chain sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is imposed if a validator commits certain forms of validator misconduct, including double-signing, malicious voting, or excessive downtime/unavailability. Slashing on the BNB Smart Chain is implemented primarily through protocol-level mechanisms, including system smart contracts that record validator unavailability and process slashing requests and penalties for certain validator misconduct, such as excessive downtime, double-signing, or malicious voting. These penalties may include the loss of transaction-fee-based staking rewards, reductions in a validator’s self-delegated stake, and temporary removal (“jailing”) from the active validator set. Based on publicly available on-chain data since 2020, slashing events have occurred periodically, with the vast majority relating to automated downtime penalties. More severe penalties, such as those relating to double-signing or malicious voting, have historically been rare relative to the total number of blocks produced. Slashing penalties apply to a validator’s self-delegated BNB and do not directly reduce the principal of BNB delegated by third parties. However, delegators may lose potential staking rewards during periods in which a validator is jailed or otherwise unable to participate in block production. Although slashing rules are embedded in protocol-level mechanisms, certain parameters, including thresholds and penalty amounts, may be modified through governance

processes. The BNB Smart Chain community generally aspires to slash 100% of staked assets in cases where a BNB node is maliciously trying to violate safety rules and 0% during routine operation. There is currently no automatic slashing in the BNB Smart Chain. Rather, for regular consensus, after a safety violation, the BNB Chain will halt. The validators will analyze the data prior to the halt and figure out who was responsible and propose that the stake of the malicious actors responsible for the safety violation should be slashed after restart, typically 100%. Separately, as part of the “activating” and “de-activating” or “cooling down” processes of staking, staked BNB will be inaccessible for a variable period of time determined by a range of factors, resulting in potential inaccessibility during those periods. “Activation” is the funding of a validator to be included in the active set, thereby allowing the validator to participate in the BNB Smart Chain’s proof-of-staked-authority consensus protocol. “De-activating” is the request to exit from the active set and no longer participate in the BNB Smart Chain’s proof-of-staked-authority consensus protocol. As part of these “activating” and “de-activating” processes of staking on the BNB Smart Chain, any staked BNB will be inaccessible for a period of time, as the duration of activating and exiting periods are dependent on a range of factors. This can also be longer depending on network conditions and the total amount of BNB being un-staked globally.

The Sponsor is responsible for assessing, managing, and periodically reviewing the Trust’s liquidity risk annually. In conducting the liquidity risk assessment, the Sponsor considers all relevant risks, including the Trust’s investment strategy and liquidity during normal and stressed conditions and the Trust’s holdings of cash and cash equivalents and determines whether any adjustments to the management of the Trust’s liquidity risk are necessary. Potential adjustments may include increasing the amount of BNB kept readily available to meet redemption requests.