SEC Filing Document

Company: T. Rowe Price Active Crypto ETF
Ticker: 
CIK: 2089855
Filing Type: S-1/A
Document Type: S-1/A
Date Filed: 2026-02-11
Accession Number: 0001999371-26-003054
Exchange: 
SIC Code: 6221
SIC Description: Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2089855/000199937126003054/active-s1a_021126.htm

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of the Shares. Layer 2 solutions on the Ethereum Network were only recently conceived and may not properly function as intended, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ether Layer 2 solutions are protocols built on top of an underlying smart contract platform blockchain intended to provide scalability to the underlying blockchain by increasing transaction efficiency. For example, Arbitrum is a smart contract platform protocol built on top of the Ethereum Network; it is intended to provide scalability to Ethereum Network by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on the Ethereum Network. Under this model, the Ethereum Network functions as the base layer, or “Layer 1” blockchain. Such solutions are intended to improve upon the transaction speed, cost and efficiency of transactions on their respective Layer 1. Layer 2 solutions therefore rely, to various degrees, on the functionality of the underlying Layer 1 blockchain.

The details of how this is
done vary significantly between different Layer 2 technologies and implementations. For example, “rollups” perform
transaction execution outside the Layer 1 blockchain and then post the data, typically in batches, back to the Layer 1 Ethereum
Network where consensus is reached. “Zero knowledge rollups” are generally designed to run the computation needed to
validate the transactions off-chain, on the Layer 2 protocol, and submit a proof of validity of a batch of transactions (not the
entire transactions themselves). By contrast, “optimistic rollups” assume transactions are valid by default and only
run computation, via a fraud proof, in the event of a challenge. Other proposed Layer 2 scaling solutions include, among others,
“state channels,” which are designed to allow participants to run a large number of transactions on the Layer 2 side
channel protocol and only submit two transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum Network (the transaction opening the state channel,
and the transaction closing the channel), “side chains,” in which an entire Layer 2 blockchain network with similar
capabilities to the existing Layer 1 Ethereum Network runs in parallel with the existing Layer 1 Ethereum Network and allows
smart contracts and DApps to run on the Layer 2 side chain without burdening the main Layer 1 network, and others. To date, the
Ethereum Network community has not coalesced overwhelmingly around any particular Layer 2 solution, though this could change. There
is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the speed and throughput of settlement of
Ethereum Network transactions will be effective, or as to the length of time these mechanisms will take to become effective, which
could cause the Ethereum Network to not adequately resolve scaling challenges and adversely impact the adoption of ether and the
Ethereum Network and the value of the Shares. There is no guarantee that any potential scaling solution, whether a change to the
Layer 1 blockchain or the introduction of a Layer 2 solution like rollups, state channels or side chains, will achieve widespread
adoption. It is possible that proposed changes to the Layer 1 Ethereum Network could divide the community, potentially even causing
a hard fork, or that the decentralized governance of the Ethereum Network causes network participants to fail to coalesce overwhelmingly
around any particular solution, causing the Ethereum Network to suffer reduced adoption or causing users or validators to migrate
to other blockchain networks. It is also possible that scaling solutions could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs,
coding defects or flaws, security risks, or other problems that could cause them to suffer operational disruptions. For example,
in multiple instances, the Arbitrum network experienced outages due to failures in its primary node responsible for submitting
transactions to Ethereum. Further, smart contracts deployed on one Layer 2 solution may not be interoperable with smart contracts
deployed on other Layer 2 solutions. In particular, the advent of Layer 2 solutions risks fracturing liquidity of DeFi DApps on
a smart contract platform’s mainchain by splitting such liquidity among multiple, non-interoperable Layer 2 solutions, which
could limit their use case or reduce efficiency. As Layer 2 solutions grow in popularity and total value locked, these types of
difficulties may lead to transactional congestion or forfeiture of value held on the Ethereum Network, which in turn could have
an adverse impact on the value of ether.

Liquid staking applications
pose centralization concerns, and a single liquid staking application has reportedly controlled around or in excess of 33% of the
total staked ether on the Ethereum Network

Validators must deposit 32
ether to activate a unique validator key pair that is used to sign block proposals and attestations on behalf of its stake (i.e.,
participate in the PoS consensus mechanism). For every 32 ether deposit that is staked, a unique validator key pair is generated.
This validator key pair is only used in validation processes (block proposal and attestation, and the staking associated therewith),
and is separate from the public-private key pair generated in respect of the blockchain address on the Ethereum Network which is
used to hold the ether. An application built on the Ethereum Network, or a single node operator, can manage many validator key
pairs. For example, Lido, an application that provides a so-called “liquid staking” solution that permits holders of
ether to deposit them with Lido, which stakes the ether while issuing the holder a transferrable token, is reported by some sources
to have or have had up to 275,000 validator key pairs (each representing 32 staked ether) divided across over 30 node operators.
At times, Lido has reportedly controlled around or in excess of 33% of the total staked ether on the Ethereum Network. This poses
centralization concerns. If Lido, or a bad actor with a similar sized stake, were to attempt to interfere with transaction finality
or block confirmations, it could negatively affect the use and adoption of the Ethereum Network, the value of ether, and thus the
value of the Shares.

Risks Associated with the Use of Stablecoins

Stablecoins are crypto assets
designed to have a stable value over time and are often pegged to a fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar, at a certain value.
Although the prices of stablecoins are intended to be stable, in many cases their prices fluctuate, sometimes significantly. This
volatility has in the past impacted the prices of certain crypto assets, and has at times caused certain stablecoins to lose their
“peg” to the underlying fiat currency. Stablecoins are a relatively new development, and it is impossible to know all
of the risks that they could pose to participants in the crypto asset markets.

USDC is a reserve-backed stablecoin
issued by Circle Internet Financial that is commonly used as a method of payment in crypto asset markets. The issuer of USDC uses
the Circle Reserve Fund to hold cash, U.S. Treasury bills, notes and other obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and
interest by the U.S. Treasury, and repurchase agreements secured by such obligations or cash, which serve as reserves backing USDC
stablecoins. While USDC is designed to maintain a stable value at 1 U.S. dollar at all times, on March 10, 2023, the value of USDC
fell below $1.00 (and remained below for multiple days) after Circle Internet Financial disclosed that $3.3 billion of the USDC
reserves were held at Silicon Valley Bank, which had entered Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership earlier
that day. Popular stablecoins are reliant on the U.S. banking system and U.S. treasuries, and the failure of either to function
normally could impede the function of stablecoins or lead to outsized redemption requests, and therefore could adversely affect
the value of the Shares.

The Fund may only use stablecoins
that are not securities. The Fund may hold other stablecoins so long as such stablecoins meet the definitions of “payment
stablecoin” of the GENIUS Act and “covered stablecoin” in the Stablecoin Statement.

Section 2(22) of the GENIUS
Act defines a “payment stablecoin” to mean a digital asset that is, or is designed to be, used as a means of payment
or settlement; and the issuer of which (1) is obligated to convert, redeem, or repurchase for a fixed amount of monetary value,
not including a digital asset denominated in a fixed amount of monetary value; and (2) represents that such issuer will maintain,
or create the reasonable expectation that it will maintain, a stable value relative to the value of a fixed amount of monetary
value. That definition goes on to clarify that the term “payment stablecoin” does not include any digital asset that
is a national currency, a deposit under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or a security under any of the Securities Act, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”) or the Investment Company Act.

The Stablecoin Statement
defines a “covered stablecoin” to mean stablecoins that:

●	are designed to maintain a stable value relative to the U.S. dollar, on a one-for-one basis;

●	can be redeemed for U.S. dollars on a one-for-one basis; and