SEC Filing Document

Company: T. Rowe Price Active Crypto ETF
Ticker: 
CIK: 2089855
Filing Type: S-1/A
Document Type: S-1/A
Date Filed: 2026-05-15
Accession Number: 0001999371-26-010860
Exchange: 
SIC Code: 6221
SIC Description: Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2089855/000199937126010860/tknz-s1a_051526.htm

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which could negatively impact the value of ether In 2021, the Ethereum Network implemented the EIP 1559 upgrade. EIP 1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to ether validators in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of ether fees paid to validators. If the crypto asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expending validating power to validate blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum Network could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: ● A reduction in staked ether on the Ethereum Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor obtaining control of the network.

●	Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most crypto asset
networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Ethereum blockchain or a software upgrade automatically
charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum Network, the cost of using ether may increase and the marketplace may be reluctant to
accept ether as a means of payment. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees
on the Ethereum Network and force users to pay
higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion
or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network, the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

●	To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction
fee in blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum
blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower
fee. Any widespread delays or disruptions in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the Ethereum Network
and could prevent the Fund from completing transactions associated with the day-to-day operations of the Fund, including creations and
redemptions of the Shares in exchange for ether with Authorized Participants.

●	During the course of the block validation processes, validators exercise the discretion to select which
transactions to include within a block and in what order to include these transactions. Beyond the standard block reward and transaction
fees, validators have the ability to extract what is known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) by strategically choosing, reordering, or
excluding certain transactions during block production in return for increased transaction fees or other forms of profit for such validators.
In blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum Network, users may attempt to gain an advantage
over other users by offering additional fees to validators for effecting the order or inclusions of transactions within a block. Certain
software solutions, such as MEV Boost by Flashbots, have been developed which facilitate validators and other parties in the ecosystem
in capturing MEV. The presence of MEV may incentivize associated practices such as sandwich attacks or front running that can have negative
repercussions on DeFi users. A “sandwich attack” is executed by placing two transactions around a large, detected transaction
to capitalize on the expected price impact. For instance, a market participant might identify a sizable transaction within the so-called
memory pool (mempool) that will significantly alter an asset’s price on a decentralized exchange. The participant could then, for
example, orchestrate a transaction bundle: one transaction to acquire the asset prior to the detected transaction, followed by the large
transaction itself, and a final transaction to sell the asset after the market price has increased due to the large transaction’s
execution. Such transaction bundles can be submitted to validators through mechanisms like MEV-Boost, with validators receiving a share
of the profits as an incentive to include the specific transaction bundle in the block. In the context of MEV, “front running”
is said to occur when a user spots a transaction in the publicly visible mempool of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation,
and then pays a high transaction fee to a validator to have their transaction executed on a priority basis in a manner designed to profit
from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction execution,
which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions in the mempool
are publicly visible, any potential perception of MEV as unfair manipulation may also discourage users and other stakeholders from engaging
with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum Network in general. In addition, regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict practices
associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum Network among users and validators. Any of these or other outcomes
related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ether and the corresponding value of the Shares.

Layer 2 solutions on the Ethereum
Network were only recently conceived and may not properly function as intended, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ether

Layer 2 solutions are protocols built
on top of an underlying smart contract platform blockchain intended to provide scalability to the underlying blockchain by increasing
transaction efficiency. For example, Arbitrum is a smart contract platform protocol built on top of the Ethereum Network; it is intended
to provide scalability to Ethereum Network by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on the Ethereum Network. Under
this model, the Ethereum Network functions as the base layer, or “Layer 1” blockchain. Such solutions are intended to improve
upon the transaction speed, cost and efficiency of transactions on their respective Layer 1. Layer 2 solutions therefore rely, to various
degrees, on the functionality of the underlying Layer 1 blockchain.