SEC Filing Document

Company: VanEck BNB ETF
Ticker: 
CIK: 2066824
Filing Type: S-1/A
Document Type: S-1/A
Date Filed: 2025-10-30
Accession Number: 0001628280-25-047581
Exchange: 
SIC Code: 6221
SIC Description: Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2066824/000162828025047581/vaneckbnbs-1a1.htm

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may be intended to permit the Custodian to assess the resulting versions of the Blockchain, to determine how best to securely "split" the BNB from the forked asset, and to prevent malicious users from conducting "replay attacks" (i.e., broadcasting transactions on both versions of the forked networks to put Custodian assets at risk). As a result, the Trust is likely to suspend creations and redemptions during a period in which the Custodian's operations are halted. In addition, any losses experienced by the Custodian due to a hard fork, including due to replay attacks or technological errors in assessing the fork, could have a materially adverse impact on an investment in the Shares. Any Name Change And Any Associated Rebranding Initiative By The Core Developers Of BNB May Not Be Favorably Received By The Digital Asset Community, Which Could Negatively Impact The Value Of BNB And The Value Of The Shares.

From time to time, digital assets may undergo name changes and associated rebranding initiatives. For example, Bitcoin Cash may sometimes be referred to as Bitcoin ABC in an effort to differentiate itself from any Bitcoin Cash hard forks, such as Bitcoin Satoshi's Vision, and in the third quarter of 2018, the team behind ZEN rebranded and changed the name of ZenCash to "Horizen." We cannot predict the impact of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative on BNB. After a name change and an associated rebranding initiative, a digital asset may not be able to achieve or maintain brand name recognition or status that is comparable to the recognition and status previously enjoyed by such digital asset. The failure of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative by a digital asset may result in such digital asset not realizing some or all of the anticipated benefits contemplated by the name change and associated rebranding initiative, and could negatively impact the value of BNB and the value of the Shares.

[The BNB Chain Could Be Vulnerable To Attacks on Transaction Finality and Consensus Processes, Which Could Adversely Affect An Investment In The Trust Or The Ability Of The Trust To Operate.

The BNB Chain is currently vulnerable to several types of attacks, including:

•"33% attack" where, if a validator or group of validators were to gain control of more than 33% of the total staked BNB on the BNB Chain, a malicious actor could impede or delay block confirmation or even cause a fork in the blockchain.

•"50% attack" where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 50% of the total staked BNB on the BNB Chain, a malicious actor would be able to gain full control of the BNB Chain and the ability to manipulate the blockchain on a forward-looking basis, including censoring transactions following the achievement of threshold, double- spending and fraudulent block propagation, while the attacker maintains the threshold. In theory, the minority non-attackers might reach social consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker's ability to engage in malicious activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively.

•">66% attack" where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked BNB on the BNB Chain, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the blockchain, including censorship, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, both on a forward- and backward-looking basis. The attacker could unilaterally finalize their preferred chain without the votes of any other stakers, and could also reverse past finalized blocks.

If a malicious actor, group or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains certain percentages of the validating power dedicated to validation on the BNB Chain is controlled by a bad actor (often referred to as a "51% attack", though the numerical thresholds vary in the proof-of-stake consensus mechanism of the BNB Chain), it may be able to alter the BNB Chain on which the BNB Chain and BNB transactions rely. The BNB Chain's proof- of-stake consensus mechanism requires a 2/3 supermajority of validators who have staked BNB to vote in favor in order to finalize transactions and add blocks to the BNB Chain. If the bad actor were to obtain 2/3 of the total BNB staked in validation processes, it is widely believed that the bad actor could construct fraudulent blocks, "double-spend" its own BNB (i.e., spend the same BNB in more than one transaction), or censor other users' transactions by preventing them from being confirmed while continuing to validate and confirm its own transactions and earn the associated block reward, thereby enriching itself while also entrenching its own control of the BNB Chain. If the bad actor were to obtain 1/3 of the total BNB staked in validation processes, the bad actor could prevent certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all, and prevent the confirmation of other users' transactions, though this would likely be temporary (since it would likely be penalized for inactivity leakage, resulting in the bad actor's staked BNB being

slashed, as defined below) and it likely could not double spend or propagate fraudulent blocks without the 66% supermajority of staked assets. With control of the respective threshold of total staked assets on the BNB Chain, it could be possible for the malicious actor to control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions on the BNB Chain and prevent the confirmation of other users' transactions, while continuing to mine new BNB and confirm its own blocks, for so long as it maintained control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the validating power on the BNB Chain or the BNB community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious or to the extent that such bad actor did not yield its control of processing power, reversing any changes made to the BNB Chain may be difficult or impossible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the BNB Chain.

For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Any similar attacks on the BNB Chain could negatively impact the value of BNB and the value of the Shares.

In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a 51% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work-based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the BNB Chain, which could negatively impact the value of BNB and the value of the Shares.

Although there are no known reports of malicious control of the BNB Chain, if groups of coordinating or connected BNB holders that together have more than 50% of outstanding BNB, were to stake that BNB and run validators, they could exert authority over the validation of BNB transactions. This risk is heightened if over 50% of the validating power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of validating pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of BNB, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the validating power on the BNB Chain will increase, which may adversely affect the value BNB and the value of the Shares.