zilongwang/ReadingBank huggingface dataset:
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 29 April 2012, 0800 EST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Collision with terrain Location: 55 km NE of Bourke, NSW Latitude: 29° 43.7’ S Longitude: 146° 23.2’ E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Cessna Aircraft Company, 150M Registration: VH-UWR Operator: Private Serial number: 15079278 Persons on board: Crew – 1 Passengers – 0 Injuries: Crew – 1 fatal Damage: Substantial
Findings From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the loss of control and collision with terrain involving the SOCATA TB 20, registered VH-HBB, which occurred 3 km south of Lismore Airport, New South Wales on 9 November 2012. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Contributing factors During a left turn in the circuit, an aerodynamic stall occurred, resulting in a significant left winglow and nose-down attitude in close proximity to the terrain. The instructor was unable to prevent the stall due to either insufficient warning or available time to react. The aircraft stalled at an altitude from which recovery to controlled flight was not completed before the aircraft collided with terrain. Other factors that increased risk Half of the crankcase through bolts fitted to the engine were probably not approved parts for use in that engine, meaning that the continued safe operation of the engine was not assured.
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 9 November 2012 – 1015 EDT Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Collision with terrain Location: 3 km south of Lismore Airport, New South Wales Latitude: 28° 52.15’ S Longitude: 153° 15.67’ E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: SOCATA – Groupe AEROSPATIALE TB 20 Registration: VH-HBB Operator: Private Serial number: 1730 Type of operation: Flying training - Dual Persons on Crew – 2 Passengers – 0 Injuries: Crew – 2 fatal Passengers – 0 Damage: Destroyed
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 8 November 2012 – 1931 EDT Occurrence category: Incident Primary occurrence type: Navigation event Location: 11 km south-west of Williamtown (Newcastle Airport), New South Wales Latitude: 32° 52.63' S Longitude: 151° 45.98' E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Saab Aircraft Co. SF-340B Year of manufacture: 1992 Registration: VH-TRX Operator: Regional Express Serial number: 340B-287 Type of operation: Air transport - low capacity Persons on board: Crew – 3 Passengers – 2 Injuries: Crew – 0 Passengers – 0 Damage: None
Findings From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the wirestrike involving Cessna 182A, registered VH-SGB, that occurred at Burrum River, Queensland on 17 December 2012. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Contributing factor The aircraft struck electrical powerlines while operating below the minimum permitted height of 500 ft above ground level. finding The investigation could not identify any operational reason for the pilot to be operating the aircraft below the minimum permitted height.
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 10 January 2013 – 0737 CST Occurrence category: Incident Primary occurrence type: Navigation event Location: 125 NM (232 km) north-west of McArthur River Mine, Northern Territory Latitude: 14° 50' 60" S Longitude: 134° 41' 13" E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Embraer E170 Registration: VH-ANO Operator: Airnorth Serial number: 17000099 Type of operation: Air transport - high capacity Persons on board: Crew – 4 Passengers – 23 Injuries: Crew – nil Passengers – nil Damage: Nil
The object of a safety investigation is to identify and reduce safety-related risk. ATSB investigations determine and communicate the safety factors related to the transport safety matter being investigated. It is not a function of the ATSB to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an investigation report must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings. At all times the ATSB endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner. About this report Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited-scope, fact-gathering investigation was conducted in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.
At about the halfway point the pilots encountered an area of low cloud and rain in storms that stretched from Cape Ford south-east towards the inland direct track, a distance of about 100 km. As they came up to the area the pilots on the direct track diverted slightly to the east (right of track) to get around the cloud mass. Those pilots broadcast their intentions and reported the existence of good visibility and cloud base to the east (right of track) and ahead of the stormy weather. Of the three aircraft on the coastal track, two pilots tracked inland in response to the weather they could see and the broadcasts from other pilots. One of these pilots manoeuvred around the weather and established himself on the direct track. The other pilot found a gap though the storms by tracking inland of the coast and continued onto the mouth of the Daly River, then resumed a coastal track in relatively clear conditions. At some point the pilot of the Cessna 210 broadcast his position and intentions. This radio call, on the discrete frequency used by the group, was heard by a number of the other pilots at about 1510. Communications made on that frequency were not recorded, but the general consensus was that the pilot reported approaching Cape Ford at 500 ft and that the weather ahead was gloomy, or words to that effect. The pilot did not sound distressed and at the time no importance was attached to the call. However, that was the last time anyone heard from the Cessna 210. The aircraft in the group continued on their respective tracks to Emkaytee with a small diversion required due to a small storm about 50 km before the destination. After arrival of all the other aircraft the pilots realised that the Cessna 210 had not arrived. The search and rescue authorities were notified and some pilots from the group departed in a few aircraft to search the area where the pilot last reported and to check the airstrips in the area. Searching in the Cape Ford area was not possible due to continuing storm activity, and fading light forced the return of the search aircraft. The searching resumed the next morning until some bodies and a small amount of wreckage from the aircraft were found on the southern part of Anson Bay, about 10 km south-east of Cape Ford. There were no survivors. No more sightings of aircraft wreckage were made until October 2013, when wreckage was sighted in Anson Bay at low tide, about 2 km from the southern shoreline where debris had been found. Northern Territory police attended the site and collected information that confirmed that the wreckage was VH-EFB.
General details Occurrence 1 details Occurrence category: Incident Primary occurrence type: Aircraft proximity event Location: near Nagambie (ALA), Victoria Latitude: 36° 44.2’ S Longitude: 145° 07.6’ E PA-28, VH-FZW Manufacturer and model: Piper Aircraft Corporation PA-28-151 Registration: VH-FZW Type of operation: Private Persons on Crew – 1 Passengers – Nil Injuries: Crew – Nil Passengers – Nil Damage: Nil Cessna 182, VH-EFY Manufacturer and model: Cessna Aircraft Company 182L Registration: VH-EFY Type of operation: Private Persons on board: Crew – 1 Passengers – Nil Injuries: Crew – Nil Passengers – Nil Damage: Nil Occurrence 2 details Occurrence category: Incident Primary occurrence type: Airspace event Location: near Nagambie (ALA), Victoria Latitude: 36° 44.2’ S Longitude: 145° 07.6’ E Bell 206, VH-CHA Manufacturer and model: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. 206B Registration: VH-CHA Type of operation: Private Persons on board: Crew – 1 Passengers – Nil Injuries: Crew – Nil Passengers – Nil Damage: Nil
Maintenance reporting A briefing will be given to all staff regarding aircraft unserviceability reporting procedures. Safety message On this occasion there was a short delay between the instructor issuing the command ‘taking over”, and being in a position to be able to fully take command. The student’s response in relinquishing control was swift, giving the incorrectly trimmed aircraft an opportunity to be in a nose down position close to the ground. The United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Instructor’s Handbook 2008 (p 8-9) devotes a section to the Positive Exchange of Flight Controls. This publication states that numerous accidents have occurred due to a lack of communication or misunderstanding regarding who had actual control of the aircraft, particularly between students and flight instructors. It continues on to say during flight training, there must always be a clear understanding between students and flight instructors about who has control of the aircraft. It promotes a positive three steep process for the exchange of flight controls including a visual check to see that the other person actually has the flight controls. Flight instructors should always guard the controls, and be prepared, as pilot in command, to take control of the aircraft. Further reading is available at: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Flight Instructor Manual (2) (2007)– Aeroplane, directs instructors to repeatedly practice the “handing over and taking over” drills, in the early air sequences, to prevent any confusion on who is manipulating the controls. The CASA Flight Instructor Manual is available at: General details Occurrence details Date and time: 17 June 2014 – 1300 EST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Hard landing Location: Mangalore Airport, Victoria Latitude: 36° 53.30’ S Longitude: 145° 11.05’ E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Aircraft Corporation PA 28RT-201 Registration: VH-ADU Serial number: 28R-8018063 Type of operation: Flying training - dual Persons on board: Crew – 2 Passengers – 1 Injuries: Crew – Nil Passengers – Nil Damage: Substantial About the ATSB The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is an independent Commonwealth Government statutory agency. The ATSB is governed by a Commission and is entirely separate from transport
Aerobatics peer review The ATSB found no evidence of the pilot undertaking a peer review of their aerobatic performance in the 15 months prior to the accident. A peer review, as suggested by Civil Aviation Advisory Publication 155-1(0) Aerobatics has the potential to help a pilot maintain safety margins in lowlevel aerobatic routines, and may have assisted the pilot avoid inadvertently breaching their minimum approved aerobatics height. However, there was insufficient evidence to determine if the of the peer review influenced the development of the accident. Aircraft flight manual The Civil Aviation Safety Authority did not require amateurbuilt experimental aircraft to have a flight manual or equivalent placards. The ATSB found no evidence that a flight manual or equivalent placarding was produced for the aircraft following flight testing. The lack of a flight manual was unlikely to have influenced this accident due to the pilot's familiarity with the aircraft. This familiarity was a result of their experience building, test flying and operating the aircraft. However, as evidenced by the recommendations made to the United States Federal Aviation Administration by the National Transportation Safety not having a flight manual increases the risk associated with amateurbuilt experimental aircraft operations. Without a flight manual the builder, other pilots and especially subsequent owners do not have reference to operational and performance data necessary to safely operate the aircraft. Given that accidents involving amateurbuilt aircraft occur at a significantly higher rate than comparable factorybuilt aircraft, a requirement to document important operational information would be a valuable safety enhancement.
experienced by the crew of 9M-XXM. Additionally, the flight crew training manual is not routinely referenced in-flight, unlike the quick reference handbook or ECAM guidance. Reliance on electronic centralised aircraft monitoring The FCTM describes the ECAM as a main component of Airbus aircraft that provides information in response to most failure situations. The captain attributed the lack of ECAM guidance before takeoff as an indicator that the aircraft systems were operating correctly, despite two aural chimes associated with master cautions. The captain further stated that they had never experienced a chime with no associated ECAM message and that their response was to continue normal procedures. This behaviour is consistent with a reliance on ECAM to identify and resolve abnormal system situations. The crew reported that the lack of ECAM guidance once airborne was a hindrance to resolving the situation. In the absence of ECAM or engine/warning display messages the FO searched the quick reference handbook and FCOM in an attempt to diagnose the problem. The FO carried out part of an UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED CHECKLIST and part of an ADR FAULT procedure before incorrectly using the ADIRS rotary switches in an attempt to rectify the situation. The operating philosophy and of the flight crew indicate a high expectancy that ECAM guidance would be available to resolve most abnormal situations, including that being experienced out of Sydney. In those rare situations where this guidance is not available, it could reasonably be expected that the risk of misidentification and/or inappropriate attempts to resolve the situation would increase. Air traffic control support A review of the ATC response to this occurrence identified that the controllers carried out several that reduced the risk to both the occurrence aircraft and other aircraft in the area. They were the first to notice and alert the crew to the tracking problem, and provided assistance to identify that the aircraft’s main heading indicators were erroneous. Additionally, ATC quickly resolved a possible conflict with another aircraft lined-up and ready to depart on the parallel runway. Subsequently, coordination with several ATC units and the availability of continuous radar coverage provided the crew with a safe diversion alternate and vectoring from Sydney all the way to final approach in Melbourne. The captain reported that ATC had prevented the situation becoming a ‘dire emergency’ and that in many ways they had ‘saved the day’.
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 14 March 2015 – 0800 EST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Hard landing Location: Melbourne Airport Latitude: 37° 40.9825’ S Longitude: 144° 50.428’ E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Airbus A330-323 Year of manufacture: 2011 Registration: 9M-MTA Operator: Malaysian Airlines Berhad Serial number: MSN 1209 Total Time In Service 18,527 hours Type of operation: Regular Passenger Transport Injuries: Crew – nil Passengers – nil Damage: Substantial
It is not a function of the ATSB to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an investigation report must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings. At all times the ATSB endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner. About this report Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited-scope, fact-gathering investigation was conducted in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.
Aircraft details – VHOWN Manufacturer and Beech Aircraft Corp B200 Year of manufacture: 1981 Registration: VHOWN Operator: Corporate and Leisure Aviation Serial number: BB-936 Type of operation: Charter Persons on Crew – 1 Passengers – 8 Injuries: Crew – 0 Passengers – 0 Damage: None Aircraft details – VHLQR Manufacturer and Beech Aircraft Corp B200 Year of manufacture: 1982 Registration: VHLQR Operator: Altitude Aviation Serial number: BB-1054 Type of operation: Charter Persons on Crew – 1 Passengers – 8 Injuries: Crew – 0 Passengers – 0 Damage: None
Pilot comment The reported feeling substantial operational pressure to ensure no cattle were missed. They commented that this may have increased focus and attention on looking for cattle, and therefore momentarily lost awareness of the powerlines. Figure 1: Accident site showing damage to VH-LYW Source: Queensland Police Safety message Pilots and operators are reminded that they can ask the property and power company to have a wire marked if it presents a hazard to low-level operations, even if it is not required to be marked according to the Australian Standard due to its height and span. ATSB research indicates that in 63 per cent of reported wirestrike incidents, pilots were of the position of the wire before they struck it. In this instance, the pilot was aware of the powerline, however, the pilot’s attention was diverted to looking for cattle, and they did not maintain awareness of the wires. The Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia suggests a way to keep is to ask yourself: Where is the wire now? What do I do it? am I in the paddock? For further risk management strategies for agricultural operations, refer to the The ATSB publication , explains strategies to help minimise the risk of striking wires while flying. Pilots are reminded to avoid unnecessary distractions and to refocus when distracted. Distraction, combined with difficulty in seeing wires makes them extremely hard to avoid at the last minute. General details Occurrence details Date and time: 20 February 2016 – 0808 EST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Wirestrike Location: 88 km NE Roma Aerodrome, Queensland Latitude: 26° 04.98' S Longitude: 149° 29.50' E Helicopter details Manufacturer and Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta Registration: VH-LYW Serial number: 4482 Type of operation: Aerial work – Aerial mustering Persons on board: Crew - 1 Passengers - 0 Injuries Crew - 1 Passengers - 0 Aircraft Damage Substantial
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 17 June 2016 – 0148 EST Occurrence category: Incident Primary occurrence type: Flight below minimum safe altitude Location: Launceston Airport, Tasmania Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: The Boeing Company 737-376 Year of manufacture: 1987 Registration: VH-XMO Operator: Express Freighters Australia Serial number: 23488 Type of operation: Air Transport High Capacity Persons on board: Crew – 2 Passengers – nil Injuries: Crew – nil Passengers – nil Damage: None
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 23 September 2013 – 1946 EST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Collision with terrain Location: Near Hamilton Airport, Victoria Latitude: 37° 38.37’ S Longitude: 142° 04.14’ E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Cessna Aircraft Company – 182R Registration: VH-AUT Serial number: 18268111 Type of operation: Flight training - Solo Persons on Crew – 1 Passengers – 0 Injuries: Crew – 1 Passengers – 0 Damage: Destroyed
Findings From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the collision with terrain involving an Air Tractor AT-502 aircraft, registered VH-LIK, which occurred at an agricultural airstrip 50 km east of Walgett Airport, New South Wales, on 5 November 2016. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Contributing factors The were either never extended, or were retracted at some point during the take-off sequence. This probably resulted in insufficient take-off performance when combined with the high aircraft weight and environmental conditions. The ATSB could not determine at what point during the take-off the flaps were retracted. The pilot attempted to jettison the hopper contents but no significant dump of the chemical occurred and therefore the associated performance gains were not realised. It could not be determined why the load did not dump. The aircraft reached a height the ground where the reduced benefit of ground effect further reduced the aircraft's performance, at a height and airspeed which precluded the pilot from turning the aircraft towards a clear area. This probably resulted in the aircraft descending into trees. Other factors that increased risk was no evidence of appropriate approvals for the modification to the hopper gate box push rod. was no performance data available for the AT-502 aircraft to calculate the required departure runway length. The aircraft was operated under a Civil Aviation Safety Authorityapproved system of maintenance that did not explicitly require a daily or periodic inspection of the hopper dump system.
General details Occurrence details Date and time: 5 October 2013 – about 0900 EST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Loss of control Location: 12 km west of New South Wales Latitude: 35°16 5’ S Longitude: 148° 06 1’ E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Rand Robinson KR-2 Amateur built Registration: VH-CTE Operator: Owner/pilot Serial number: V261 Type of operation: Private Persons on board: Crew – 1 Passengers – 0 Injuries: Crew – 1 Fatal Passengers – 0 Damage: Destroyed
Wing walkers should remain in sight of the flight crew, but the captain did not see the ramp supervisor signal to indicate reducing clearance between the two aircraft. The captain’s attention was to the incoming A320. Safety action Whether or not the ATSB identifies safety issues in the course of an investigation, relevant organisations may proactively initiate safety action in to reduce their safety risk. The ATSB has been advised of the following safety action in response to this occurrence. Aircraft operator As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety actions: Flight crew operational notice The aircraft operator issued a flight crew operational notice (FCON) which stated that: When taxiing out of power-out bay, crew shall ensure the aircraft maintains the apron lead-out line until: the end of the lead-out line; or the lead-out line joins a taxiway centreline. This may involve an exit turn of more than 180 degrees to assure clearance from adjoining bays. Should the aircraft be stopped before completion of the entire turn to exit the caution should be made when re-initiating movement to ensure the above requirements are maintained. If at any time aircraft clearance cannot be assured, the aircraft should cease taxiing and request assistance. Training and checking notice The aircraft operator also issued a training and checking notice (TCN) that stated ‘All Check Captains and Training Captains are requested to ensure that wingtip geometry, turn markings, turn procedures and hazards are well understood by flight crew during line training and recurrent line checks’. Flight crew information bulletin The aircraft operator published a flight crew information bulletin (FCIB) for educational and standardisation purposes titled Wingtip Clearance Hazard and applicable to Boeing 737 aircraft. The FCIB included information about taxiing in accordance with lead-out lines, appropriate use of ground crew, images of Hobart and other airports used by the operator, and wing and tail turning geometry for the aircraft. The FCIB stated In summary, it is recommended that taxi guidance lines be adhered to, whenever practical. Continued vigilance should be employed by crews in the monitoring of obstacles during ground manoeuvring. If is any doubt whatsoever regarding wingtip clearance, STOP and seek guidance. Safety message This incident highlights the importance of aircraft operators conducting a thorough risk assessment where ground movement is confined, particularly movements involving congested power-out bays. Effective risk assessments ensure that hazards are clearly identified and well understood, and that the associated risks are appropriately managed.
this report Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited-scope, fact-gathering investigation was conducted in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.
Safety message While pilots conduct a pre-flight inspection of their aircraft to determine airworthiness, this accident highlights the importance of pilots also assessing their own wellbeing. Tools such as the FRAT form (Figure 2), the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) (United States) ‘I’m safe checklist’ (Figure 3), and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s (CASA) personal minimums checklists allows pilots to determine if they are physically and mentally prepared, and if the operating conditions are suitable for the conduct of the flight. Figure 3: I’m Safe Checklist Source: Federal Aviation Administration The following provide additional information on these tools: Flight risk assessment tool: I’m Safe Checklist: CASA personal minimums checklists: The effect of sun-glare when relying on visual cues is an important consideration for all pilots. The FAA has conducted research into sunlight and its association with aviation accidents. This research found that: 85 per cent of accidents where glare from natural sunlight was considered among the reasons for the accident occurred in clear weather and optimal visual conditions. 55 per cent were during the approach/landing and take-off/departure phase of the flight. The report suggests a number of preventative techniques to reduce the effects of sun glare including wearing sunglasses, using the aircraft’s sun visor or a brimmed hat to shield the pilot’s eyes from exposure to glare. The research report is available at: General details Occurrence details Date and time: 11 October 2013 – 1700 WST Occurrence category: Accident Primary occurrence type: Hard landing Location: Merredin (ALA), Western Australia Latitude: 31° 31.37' S Longitude: 118° 19.82' E Aircraft details Manufacturer and model: Grob G-115C2 Registration: VH-ZIV Serial number: 82081/C2 Type of operation: Flying training - solo
School, college and university education From To Month Year Month Year 4b. GCSE’S OR EQUIVALENT (photocopies of certificates should be appended to this application; originals should be available at interview) Subject Name of examining body Date taken/to be taken Grade NARIC Statement4 obtained Y/N Applying for equivalency Month Year Mathematics English Language Science 4c. OTHER GCSE’S OR EQUIVALENT Subject Level Grade Year Subject Level Grade Year Subject Level Grade Year 4d. A Level/AS OR EQUIVALENT Subject Level Grade Year Subject Grade Year Subject Level Grade Year 5a. FIRST DEGREE OR EQUIVALENT (photocopies of certificates should be appended to this application; originals should be available at interview) Name of institution Title Class of course Entry date Completion date Year Year 5b. CONTENT OF FIRST DEGREE OR EQUIVALENT Main subject(s) of degree Time spent Main subject(s) of degree Time spent 6. OTHER RELEVANT QUALIFICATIONS (e.g. PGCE Post 16, Overseas Teacher Training, Masters)
Safety analysis The circumstances associated with the accident involving VH-TZJ on 24 October 2013 are still being investigated. This analysis focuses only on the recorded aircraft hours for M18 aircraft operating at higher weights. A number of aircraft manufacturer supplements, Australian exemptions and national and overseas supplemental type certificates have allowed for operation of the PZL Mielec M18 Dromader aircraft at gross weights above the maximum stipulated by the aircraft manufacturer. A number of strategies to reduce accompanying risk have been used, including the progressive adjustment (or factoring) of actual flight hours to determine airframe life. The evidence to date shows that, in a number of cases, the application of adjustments to M18 aircraft flight hours in Australia has been inconsistent and/or unreliable. In particular, it would appear that in the period prior to 2009, such factors may not have been applied at all. In consequence, operators of such aircraft may not have assured themselves that their aircraft’s recorded flight hours truly reflect their aircraft’s airframe life. This raises the possibility that these aircraft might be close to or have exceeded their prescribed maintenance schedules or airframe life, increasing the risk of in-flight failure of aircraft structure(s), components and/or controls. The issue applies to turbine- or piston-engined Australian M18 aircraft approaching any of the 5,000, 6,000 or 10,000-hour service life limits, and which were flown at weights above 4,700 kg prior to 2009 without the appropriate service life factoring having been applied. The centre wing to outboard wing fittings on VH-TZJ, including the one that failed on 24 October 2013, were installed new in 2004. The ATSB estimated that, even if appropriate factoring had been applied, these fittings would not have exceeded the 10,000-hour limit at the time of the accident. However, it is likely that the aircraft would have accrued more than the permitted limit of 10,000 hours by the time of the accident and the airframe would have been required to be removed from service.
Response Response Organisation: Chair: Address: Line 1: Line 2: Line 3: Line 4: Post Code: Telephone: Email: Website: Main Contact: Telephone: Email: Second Contact: Telephone: Please tick which client groups your members work with: Adult Children Supervisees Families Individuals Groups Couples What descriptors are you that have been agreed by your College? For existing organisational members only Which College do you currently belong to? If applying for OM status please indicate which College you would like to be a part of? Cognitive Psychotherapies College Constructivist and Existential College College of Child and Adolescent Psychotherapies Council for Psychoanalysis and Jungian Analysis College College for Family, Couple and Systemic Therapy Humanistic and Integrative Psychotherapy College College of Hypno-Psychotherapists Psychotherapeutic Counselling and Intersubjective College of Medical Psychotherapists Psychotherapy College College for Sexual and Relationship Psychotherapy Universities Training College Please indicate which committees you currently have? Ethics Membership Training Council Diversity and Equality Finance Exam Other Accreditation Audit and Risk Board of Trustees
Response Response Organisation: Chair: Address: Line 1: Line 2: Line 3: Line 4: Post Code: Telephone: Email: Website: Main Contact: Telephone: Email: Second Contact: Telephone: Email: Please tick which client groups your members work with: Adult Children Supervisees Families Individuals Groups Couples What descriptors are you using that have been agreed by your College?: For existing OM’s only Which College do you currently belong to? If applying for OM status please indicate which College you would like to be a part of? Cognitive Psychotherapies College Constructivist and Existential College College of Child and Adolescent Psychotherapies Council for Psychoanalysis and Jungian Analysis College College for Family, Couple and Systemic Therapy Humanistic and Integrative Psychotherapy College College of Hypno-Psychotherapists Psychotherapeutic Counselling and Intersubjective College of Medical Psychotherapists Psychotherapy College College for Sexual and Relationship Psychotherapy Universities Training College Please indicate which committees you currently have? Ethics Membership Training Council Diversity and Equality Finance Exam Board Other Accreditation and Risk Board of Trustees
Safety summary What happened At about 0518 Eastern Standard Time on 25 March 2013, a Cessna T210N aircraft, registered VHMEQ, took off in dark night conditions from runway 36 at Roma Airport on a flight to Cloncurry, Queensland. Following the activation of the aircraft’s emergency locator transmitter, a search was commenced for the aircraft by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. It was subsequently located 2 km to the northwest of the airport, having collided with terrain while heading in a direction. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot and passenger were fatally injured. What the ATSB found The ATSB found that the departure was conducted in dark night conditions, despite the pilot not holding a night visual flight rules rating and probably not having the proficiency to control the aircraft solely by reference to the flight instruments. During the climb after take-off, the pilot probably became spatially disorientated from a lack of external visual cues, leading to a loss of control and impact with terrain. No mechanical defect was identified with the aircraft or its systems that may have contributed to the accident. Safety message This accident reinforces the need for day visual flight rules pilots to consider the minimum visual conditions for flight, including the relevant weather information and usable daylight. In this case, if the pilot had delayed the departure by 30 minutes, the flight would most likely have progressed safely in daylight conditions. There are numerous airports in Australia, including Roma, that have an abundance of ground lighting in one take-off direction but not another. This accident highlights the potential benefits of night visual flight rules and instrument-rated pilots considering the location of ground lighting when planning night operations. Finally, the benefit of crash-activated emergency locator transmitters that include global positioning system-based location information, thereby providing for a timely emergency response in the event of an accident, is emphasised.
Sources and submissions Sources of information The sources of information during the investigation included: Virgin Australia International Airlines (Virgin) the primary flight crew the Bureau of Meteorology the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). References Battelle Memorial Institute 1998, An Overview of the scientific literature concerning fatigue, sleep, and the circadian cycle, Report prepared for the Office of the Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors, US Federal Aviation Administration. International Civil Aviation Organization 2011, Fatigue risk management systems (FRMS): Implementation guide for operators, 1st edition. Performance-based operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee/Commercial Aviation Safety Team Flight Deck Automation Working Group 2013, Operational use of flight path management systems. Available from . Reason, J 1990, Human Error, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Thomas, MJW & Ferguson, SA 2010, ‘Prior sleep, prior wake, and crew performance during normal flight operations’, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, vol. 81, pp. 665–670. Thomas, MJW, Petrilli, RM & Dawson, D 2004, ‘An exploratory study of error detection processes during normal line operations’, Proceedings of the 26th conference of the European Association for Aviation Psychology, Lisbon, Portugal. Submissions Under Part 4, Division 2 (Investigation Reports), Section 26 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (the Act), the ATSB may provide a draft report, on a confidential basis, to any person whom the ATSB considers appropriate. Section 26 (1) (a) of the Act allows a person receiving a draft report to make submissions to the ATSB about the draft report. A draft of this report was provided to the primary flight crew, Virgin, Boeing and CASA. Submissions were received from the primary flight crew, Boeing and Virgin. The submissions were reviewed and where considered appropriate, the text of the report was amended accordingly.
Table 1: Rescue strop summary 65 kg subject 80 kg subject 140 kg subject With hypothermic strap Strop With hypothermic strap Strop With hypothermic strap Ability to hold arms down Achieved with difficulty. Easier. Achieved with difficulty. Easier. Struggled to keep arms down. A lot of pressure the arms and around the chest area. Started getting ‘tingling’ in finger tips after 1 minute 30 seconds but able to keep hands clasped. Breathing Breathing was affected making it hard to keep arms down. Much easier, only a little restricted. Unrestricted. Unrestricted. Breathing was laboured and developed ‘shakes’. Breathing easier but became laboured towards end of trial. Comfort Fingers were ‘tingling’. Significantly reduced pressure the armpits. 90 seconds arms started ‘tingling’. Pressure across back of knees. Incredibly uncomfortable after 15 seconds, and shoulder cramp after 30 seconds. Significantly more comfortable, some pressure the legs and across top of knees. Time able to be maintained in equipment 121 seconds. No effort required, trial terminated after 110 seconds as the subject reported no effect from securing the strap. 165 seconds. No effort required, trial terminated after 150 seconds as the subject reported no effect from securing the strap. 40 seconds. Less effort required, trial terminated after 120 seconds. Security in equipment (wearing Lifted arms, no slippage. Chest strap lost tension as soon as person lifted. No slippage with and without chest strap secured. Wriggling had no effect. Physically had to bring arms inside rescue strop to promote slippage. Lifted arms, no slippage. Chest strap lost tension as soon as person lifted. No slippage with and without chest strap secured. Wriggling had no effect. Physically had to bring arms inside rescue strop to promote slippage. Lifted arms, slipped out easily. Chest strap lost tension as soon as person lifted. No slippage with and without chest strap secured. Wriggling had no effect. Had to bring arms inside rescue strop to promote slippage, and then slipped very quickly. Security in equipment (wearing synthetic jumper) Lifted arms, easier to slip out. Not tested. Lifted arms, slipped out in less than 7 seconds. Not tested. Lifted arms, slipped out very easily. No slippage with and without chest strap secured. Wriggling had no effect. Had to bring arms inside rescue strop to promote slippage, and then slipped very quickly.
Why would we have a responsibility to ourselves? How does that help us to be responsible? What responsibility do we have to our classroom community? What surprised you about “Your Job”? What surprised you about “My Job”? How does “Your Job, My Job” help our classroom community? How does responsibility help our classroom community? _____________Responsibility Means…___________ _______September_____ _Lesson # 3 _ ____Responsibility___ Olweus Connection: Identifying a key concept that students to be safe in every part of the school
Apostrophe quiz! The news said that ___ going to rain tomorrow. it's it its He always carries ___ of his family. picture's pictures pictures' Simon, Johnny, Paul and Peter were playing. Lisa came and kicked the ___ ball away. boy's boys' boys I've never seen ___ before. it its it's Where did you leave ___ bike? you're you your I ___ see anything from where I was sitting. couldnt couldn't ___ leaving in 5 minutes. Wer'e We're Were ___ lessons are really good!! Mr.McCarthys' Mr.McCarthys Mr.McCarthy's A snake uses ___ tongue to sense what is happening around it. it it's its The ___ nice today. weathers' weather's weather ___ name is Sam, isn't it? Your Yours You're ___ my best friend. You're You Your We only sell ___ in this shop. apples apple's
Apostrophe quiz! The news said that ___ going to rain tomorrow. it's it its He always carries ___ of his family. picture's pictures pictures' Simon, Johnny, Paul and Peter were playing. Lisa came and kicked the ___ ball away. boy's boys' boys I've never seen ___ before. it its it's Where did you leave ___ bike? you're you your I ___ see anything from where I was sitting. could'nt couldnt couldn't ___ leaving in 5 minutes. Wer'e We're Were ___ lessons are really good!! Mr.McCarthys' Mr.McCarthys Mr.McCarthy's A snake uses ___ tongue to sense what is happening around it. it it's its The ___ nice today. weathers' weather's weather ___ name is Sam, isn't it? Your Yours You're ___ my best friend. You're You Your We only sell ___ in this shop. apples apple's
Answers 1. What is a paragraph? You said: A collection of sentences linked together by a common theme. Correct. Well done. 2. Which of the following describes what a paragraph in a story does? You said: Introduces a new setting, character or new speech. Correct. Well done. 3. of the following describes what paragraphs in newspaper reports do? You said: Breaks up the report into chronological order making it easier to read and understand. Correct. Well done 4. Which of the following sentences would you expect to find at the beginning of a paragraph that introduces a new character? You said: When the had cleared, I saw him, six feet tall and covered in mud and blood. Correct. Well done. 5. Paragraphs in a non-fiction text are used to... You said: Introduce a new piece of information. Correct. Well done. 6. A sub-heading is... You said: A short title that informs the reader what a paragraph is about. Correct. 7. Why does a plan help when writing paragraphs? You said: It helps to organise your writing into clear sections. Correct. Well done. 8. Which of the following connectives is a good one to use in the final paragraph of an argument? You said: In conclusion Correct. Well done. 9. of the following is a connective? You said: Furthermore Correct. Well done. 10. Which of the following is a good story plan that will help you to organise your writing into paragraphs and write an effective story? You said: Beginning, set the scene, introduce problem, build the tension, resolution, conclusion Correct. Refer back to The Great Gatsby extract for help
Resources and Materials on Pediatric Eye Health…………………………………………………………………………………………11 Dear Colleague, I know you’ve seen the Evidence-Based Clinical Practice Guideline: Comprehensive Pediatric Eye and Vision Examination that the AOA released last year, and I hope that it’s proved a useful tool for your practice. However, an issue we continue to face is that some of our pediatrician colleagues don’t appreciate the complexity of children’s vision and ocular health. Instead, they favor office-based screenings over comprehensive eye exams that can diagnose and treat vision problems with a potential lifelong impact. This can mean that parents have a false sense of security regarding their child’s ability to see and process visual information and that children aren’t making it into your office for the care they need to succeed in school, sports, and social activities. In an attempt to out to our colleagues across disciplines to improve the care for children and create long-term referral relationships, we have developed a small toolkit for you. It includes a draft letter to your local pediatricians (or family physicians) about the importance of providing the right care at the right time and offering a brief introduction to the pediatric guideline and you, their local doctor of optometry. The toolkit also includes a summary of the pediatric guideline designed specifically for the health professional audience, and links to the guideline itself. I hope you will use this toolkit, modify and personalize the draft letter, and share it with your local colleagues caring for children. I will also be offering myself as a further resource to those doctors, in the belief that we can provide the best care possible for our patients by working together. Please feel free to contact me with any questions. Sincerely, Samuel D. Pierce, O.D. President, American Optometric Association LETTER TO PEDIATRICIAN (PHYSICIAN ACQUAINTANCE)
COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC EYE AND VISION EXAMINATION RESOURCE FOR PEDIATRICIANS The American Optometric Association (AOA) convened an expert panel in 2017 to develop an evidence-based guideline that recommends annual comprehensive eye exams for children. This guideline is intended to help ensure all children’s health care providers have the latest, scientifically based information to provide the best care for their young patients. This guideline shows which tests and interventions are proven to optimize a child’s eye care and the frequency with which children should receive a comprehensive eye exam to ensure their visual health. . 1. AN EPIDEMIC OF UNDIAGNOSED EYE AND VISION PROBLEMS 2. SEEING A SOLUTION 3. COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC EYE EXAMS ARE ESSENTIAL 4. EVIDENCE-BASED STEPS FOR PROTECTING PEDIATRIC PATIENT’S EYES 5. CONCLUSION
Name and Full Address of Employer Date of Employment (From - To) Position held and main duties – giving Grade and salary if known Reason for leaving Name and Full Address of Employer Date of Employment (From - To) Position held and main duties – giving and salary if known Reason for leaving Name and Full Address of Employer Date of Employment (From - To) Position held and main duties – giving Grade and salary if known Reason for leaving Name and Full Address of Employer Date of Employment (From - To) Position held and main duties – giving Grade and salary if known Reason for leaving Have you ever been dismissed by an employer? (Delete as appropriate) Yes / No If you have answered yes to this question, please give details on a separate sheet. COURSES, QUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER TRAINING UNDERTAKEN WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THIS JOB APPLICATION Course/Training
To be completed in full by the athlete and returned to the Alberta Orienteering Association PERSONAL INFORMATION Last name: Given name: Address: City: Prov.: Postal Code Telephone: Email: No Yes If you are not originally from Alberta, have you been residing in the province for a minimum of 12 consecutive months? No Yes Do you currently live in another province for studying/training purposes? Are you a member of an Alberta Orienteering Club for the current membership year? No Yes TRAINING INFORMATION Name of your home club: (The club you represented during the competitive year) I am a member of Orienteering Canada HPP No Yes I have been named by Orienteering Canada to be on the National Team for: (check all the appropriate ones) : WOC JWOC WUOC World Cup World Games Or to be National Team Coach National Team Leader International Competitions Please provide details regarding the international events in you have competed in 2018 2018 International Competitions
List of Event (s) Please fill out this form listing all out of province competitions or training events in which you participated or were in a key official position in 2017. Date (Month/Year) Name of the Competition/training camp Location Role Grant amount allowed (100-200-300) Total: Maximum amounts for this Grant: $100 for western Canada: BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba & Yukon $200 for the rest of Canada $300 for International events, including the United States List evidence of active volunteering (such as coaching, organizing or helping at events, writing article for newsletter, presenting at AOA Retreat, etc) during the last 12 months prior the date of the grant application. Date (Month/Year) Active Volunteering Location Signature: _____________________ Date______________________ Pursuit of Athletic Excellence Grant criteria
CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT [See rule 8.204(c)(1) of the California Rules of Court and chapter 5.] I, [appellate counsel’s name], hereby certify in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(b)(1), that this brief contains [number] words as calculated by the [name of program] software in which it was written. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: [date] Respectfully submitted, [Attorney’s name] Bar No. [number]