F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (class certification in action seeking relief for violations of Title II on the denial of community-based services); Lane, 283 F.R.D. 587 (certifying a class of persons with I/DD in segregated employment workshops, and rejecting defendants’ claims that class members’ different abilities, skills, needs, and preferences preclude certification); Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 508 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (certifying a class of 80 prisoners alleging discrimination claims based upon their HIV status); Oster v. Lightbourne, No. C 09-4668 CW, 2012 WL 685808, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (certifying a class of persons whose services will be “limited, cut, or terminated” under California's home-care program; Pashby, 279 F.R.D. at 356 (same). See also Gray v. Golden Gate Nat’l Recreational Area, 279 F.R.D. 501 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (certified class of people with mobility and vision disabilities claiming barriers in access to recreation area violate Title II of ADA), Gray v. Golden Gate Nat’l Recreational Area, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying request to decertify class). Class certification is routine in Title II integration cases because they raise the common question of whether defendants’ policies or practices systemically result in needless institutionalization. In addition, relief can be afforded in a single injunction that requires the public entity to modify its program to end the offending policies or practices and allow individuals to receive services in “the most integrated setting.” Thus, the court can, “in a single stroke,” correct the federal
legal violations and provide class members the opportunity to receive services in the community rather than an institution. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Classes have been certified without exception in cases where individuals in or at risk of entering nursing facilities assert claims under the ADA’s integration mandate or similar requirements in the Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e), and these rulings have been left undisturbed by four different courts of appeals. See Steward v. Janek, 315 F.R.FD. 472 (W.D. Tex. 2016), Rule 23(f) appeal denied, Dkt. No. 16-90019 (5th Cir., Aug. 5, 2016); Dunakin at v. Quigley, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1324 (W.D. Wa. 2015), 23(f) review denied, Dunakin v. Quigley, No. 15-80076 (9th Cir., Aug. 10, 2015); Thorpe v. District of Columbia, 303 F.R.D. 120, 138 (D.D.C. 2014), leave to appeal denied by In re District of Columbia, 792 F.3d 96, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Rolland v. Cellucci, No. 1999 WL 34815562, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 1999), 23(f) review denied, Dkt No. 99-8089 (1st Cir., Mar. 2, 1999); Rolland v. Patrick, No. 98-30208-KPN, 2008 WL 4104488 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2008) (refusing to decertify the class based upon alleged differences in the needs and conditions of persons in nursing facilities); Van Meter v. Harvey, 272 F.R.D. 274, 282 (D. Me. 2011). See also, Conn. Office of Prot. and Advocacy, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 266; (certifying a class of individuals with mental illness unnecessarily segregated in nursing facilities); Long v. Benson,
[individuals with disabilities] at serious risk of institutionalization.”); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 321-322 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100, 1116-1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“an ADA plaintiff need not show that institutionalization is ‘inevitable’ or that she has ‘no choice’ but to submit to institutional care in order to state a violation of the integration mandate. Rather, a plaintiff need only show that the challenged state action creates a serious risk of institutionalization”), as amended on denial of rehearing en banc, 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012); Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2003); M.A. v. Norwood, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2015); O.B. v. Norwood, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1186 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Kenneth R., 293 F.R.D. at 263; Lane, 283 F.R.D. at 598 (D. Or. 2012); Oster v. Lightbourne, No. C 09-4668, 2012 WL 685808, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012); Makin ex rel. Russel v. Hawaii, 114 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1033 (D. Haw. 1999). The U.S. Department of Justice, to which Congress delegated the authority to interpret and enforce Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12134, has come to the same conclusion. In its 2011 “Statement of the Department of Justice on Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C.,” the Department makes clear that the protections of the ADA and its integration mandate extend to persons “at serious risk of institutionalization or segregation” and are not limited to individuals