provisions were important in persuading them to accede to the treaty; a good example is the Republic of Korea, which initially expanded its domestic CFC production, but realizing the disadvantages of being shut out of Western markets, became a party” (Brack 2003: 220). Finally, consider an IEA that enforces both compliance and participation. Furthermore, assume: (1) that the threatened punishment for non-participation is credible and sufficiently severe to outweigh the incentive for nonparticipation, and (2) that the threatened punishment for noncompliance is also credible and sufficiently severe to outweigh the incentive for noncompliance by participating countries. The utility-maximizing course of action will then be to participate and comply. Thus, all N countries (both type 1 and type 2 countries) will participate. Moreover, all N countries will also comply. The Montreal Protocol’s current (second) compliance system provides an example of an attempt to enforce both compliance and participation. Montreal is widely regarded as highly successful. While several reasons exist for this success, Montreal’s enforcement system might partly explain it. While the first compliance system enforced only participation, provisions for enforcing compliance were soon added. Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that Montreal’s compliance enforcement system has induced some members to fulfill their commitments. Several examples exist of cases where the use of measures from the indicative list of consequences has been threatened against noncompliant members: “Their use has been threatened, in a series of MOP decisions, usually in the following terms: ‘These measures may include the possibility of actions available under Article 4, such as ensuring that the supply of CFCs … is ceased and that exporting parties [parties exporting to the party] are not contributing to a continuing situation of non-compliance’. So far, this provision has never had to be used, but, as with the former non-parties that decided to accede, its existence appears to be important in encouraging compliance” (Brack 2003: 220). Table 1 summarizes these point predictions for the number of participating countries and the number of compliant countries for each of the four options. Table 1:Number of participating and compliant countries in a deep IEA, depending on its enforcement system Enforcing Compliance?
enforcing compliance will increase the number of participating countries that comply, but only provided that the IEA also enforces participation. This result is in keeping with the enforcement school because it shows that enforcement can enhance compliance. Third, some countries will participate only if the IEA enforces participation, meaning that enforcing participation will cause the number of participating countries to increase. This is true regardless of whether the IEA enforces compliance, provided that the number of type 2 countries is bigger than zero (N – z > 0). If the IEA does not enforce participation (options 1 and 2), only the z type 1 countries participate. In contrast, if the IEA does enforce participation (options 3 and 4), all N countries will participate. This result may be said to be in keeping with the spirit of the enforcement school, although both schools have so far mostly focused on compliance. Fourth, circumstances exist under which enforcing participation will cause the number of noncompliant countries to increase. Consider an IEA that does not enforce compliance (options 1 and 3). If this IEA also does not enforce participation (option 1), only type 1 countries will participate, and all participating countries will comply. In contrast, if the IEA does enforce participation (option 3), all N countries will participate, but only type 1 countries will comply; type 2 countries will not. This prediction has also been overlooked by both schools. Finally, an IEA that enforces both compliance and participation (option 4) will achieve higher compliance or higher participation, or both, than any of the other three options. In an IEA that does not enforce participation (options 1 and 2) type 2 countries will not participate. In an IEA that enforces participation, but not compliance (option 3) type 2 countries will participate but will not comply. Only in an IEA that enforces both compliance and participation (option 4) will both types of countries participate and comply. This is another prediction overlooked by both schools. Explaining Henkin’s Dictum Both schools acknowledge the validity of Henkin’s dictum. However, they explain differently why countries comply. While the managerial school emphasizes factors such as norms and administrative routines, the enforcement school attributes high compliance rates to the shallowness of many IEAs.