Summary This affirmative case argues that the National Security Administration (NSA) current data collection practices are harmful and should be reformed. The affirmative focuses on domestic data collection. You can choose to construct a case with up to 3 advantages (Privacy, Economy, or Internet Freedom). Read the file select your favorite advantages and practice to make sure you can finish in 8 minutes. Remember the solvency cards too. Privacy- the NSA currently collects data on millions of internet users who are connected in some way to international communications that the organization is monitoring. This advantage argues that this domestic surveillance practice is a violation of the rights of US citizens and not needed to protect the country from a terrorist attack. Economy- this advantage argues that NSA domestic spying programs have hurt the American technology sector as businesses around the world avoid using American products like Dropbox and Google since their content could be monitored by the government. This economic slow down could hurt the world economy and lead to wars. Internet Freedom- this advantage argues that a domestic surveillance program run by the NSA hurts the ability of the US to persuade dictatorships and other authoritarian governments to maintain a free internet. Access to the internet is crucial to fostering democratic transitions around the world. Democratic governments increase peace and are less likely to start wars. The affirmative would solve this advantage by placing limits on the collection of data to only communication to or from a suspect in an active investigation. This would prevent the government from stockpiling information on every citizen and help make the search for terrorists and other dangerous groups more efficient.
Answers to – Topicality Domestic (___) (__) Modern communication blurs the line between Foreign and Domestic. Sanchez, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 2014 Julian,, 6-5-2014, "Snowden: Year One," Cato Unbound, The second basic fact is that modern communications networks obliterate many of the assumptions about the importance of geography that had long structured surveillance law. A “domestic” Internet communication between a user in Manhattan and a server in Palo Alto might, at midday in the United States, be routed through nocturnal Asia’s less congested pipes, or to a mirror in Ireland, while a “foreign” e-mail service operated from Egypt may be hosted in San Antonio. “What we really need to do is all the bad guys need to be on this section of the Internet,” former NSA director Keith Alexander likes to joke. “And they only operate over here. All good people operate over here. All bad guys over here.” It’s never been quite that easy—but General Alexander’s dream scenario used to be closer to the truth. State adversaries communicated primarily over dedicated circuits that could be intercepted wholesale without much worry about bumping into innocent Americans, whereas a communication entering the United States could generally be presumed to be with someone in the United States. The traditional division of intelligence powers by physical geography—particularized warrants on this side of the border, an interception free-for-all on the other—no longer tracks the reality of global information flows.