Instructions for Civil Rights Claims Under Section 1983 Numbering of Section 1983 Instructions 4.1 Section 1983 Introductory Instruction 4.2 Section 1983 – Burden of Proof 4.3 Section 1983 – Elements of Claim 4.4 Section 1983 – Action under Color of State Law 4.4.1 Section 1983 – Action under Color of State Law Is Not in Dispute 4.4.2 Section 1983 – Determining When an Official Acted under Color of State Law 4.4.3 Section 1983 – Determining Whether a Private Person Conspired with a State Official 4.5 Section 1983 – Deprivation of a Federal Right 4.6 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another 4.6.1 Section 1983 – Supervisory Officials 4.6.2 Section 1983 – Failure to Intervene 4.6.3 Section 1983 – Municipalities – General Instruction 4.6.4 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Statute, Ordinance or Regulation 4.6.5 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Choice by Policymaking Official 4.6.6 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Custom 4.6.7 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Training or Supervision 4.6.8 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Screening 4.7 Section 1983 – Affirmative Defenses 4.7.1 Conduct Not Covered by Absolute Immunity
conspiracy in order to use the existence of the conspiracy to demonstrate state action. See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 638 n.11 (3d Cir. 1990) (addressing plaintiff’s argument and “assum[ing], without deciding, that the complaint alleges the prerequisites of a civil conspiracy”), aff'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). The Melo court cited a Seventh Circuit opinion that provides additional detail on those elements. See Melo, 912 F.2d at 638 & n.11 (citing Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). Melo’s citation to Hampton suggests that the plaintiff must show both a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s federal rights and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that results in such a violation. See Hampton, 600 F.2d at 620-21 (discussing agreement and overt act requirements). Of course, in order to find liability under Section 1983, the jury must in any event find a violation of the plaintiff’s federal rights; and it will often be the case that the relevant act in violation of the plaintiff’s federal rights would necessarily have constituted an action by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. This may explain why the Supreme Court’s references to the “conspiracy” test do not emphasize the overt-act-resulting-in-violation requirement. See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152. In appropriate cases, the existence of a conspiracy may also establish that a federal official was acting under color of state law. See Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal officials are subject to section 1983 liability when sued in their official capacity where they have acted under color of state law, for example in conspiracy with state officials.”).
4.6.4 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another – Municipalities – Statute, Ordinance or Regulation Model In this case, there was a [statute] [ordinance] [regulation] that authorized the action which forms the basis for [plaintiff’s] claim. I instruct you to find that [municipality] caused the action at issue. Comment It is clear that a municipality’s legislative action constitutes government policy. “No one has ever doubted . . . that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single decision by its properly constituted legislative body – whether or not that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future – because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official government policy.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). Likewise, if the legislative body delegates authority to a municipal agency or board, an action by that agency or board also constitutes government policy. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 660-61 & n.2 (1978) (describing actions by Department of Social Services and Board of Education of the City of New York); id. at 694 (holding that “this case unquestionably involves official policy”). On the other hand, where an ordinance is facially valid, the mere existence of the ordinance itself will not provide a basis for municipal liability for a claim concerning discriminatory enforcement. See Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 292-94 (3d Cir. 2009).
4.6.7 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Training or Supervision Model [Plaintiff] claims that [municipality] adopted a policy of [inadequate training] [inadequate supervision], and that this policy caused the violation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. In order to hold [municipality] liable for the violation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right], you must find that [plaintiff] has proved each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence: First: [[Municipality’s] training program was inadequate to train its employees to carry out their duties] [[municipality] failed adequately to supervise its employees]. Second: [Municipality’s] failure to [adequately train] [adequately supervise] amounted to deliberate indifference to the fact that inaction would obviously result in the violation of [specify right]. Third: [Municipality’s] failure to [adequately train] [adequately supervise] proximately caused the violation of [specify right]. In order to find that [municipality’s] failure to [adequately train] [adequately supervise] amounted to deliberate indifference, you must find that [plaintiff] has proved each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence: First: [Governing body] or [policymaking official] knew that employees would confront a particular situation. Second: The situation involved [a matter that employees had a history of mishandling]. Third: The wrong choice by an employee in that situation will frequently cause a deprivation of [specify right]. In order to find that [municipality’s] failure to [adequately train] [adequately supervise] proximately caused the violation of [plaintiff’s] federal right, you must find that [plaintiff] has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [municipality’s] deliberate indifference led directly to the deprivation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. Comment
4.6.8 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Screening Model [Plaintiff] claims that [municipality] adopted a policy of inadequate screening, and that this policy caused the violation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. Specifically, [plaintiff] claims that [municipality] should be held liable because [municipality] did not adequately check [employee’s] background when hiring [him/her]. [Plaintiff] cannot establish that [municipality] is liable merely by showing that [municipality] hired [employee] and that [employee] violated [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. In order to hold [municipality] liable for [employee’s] violation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right], you must also find that [plaintiff] has proved each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence: First: [Municipality] failed to check adequately [employee’s] background when hiring [him/her]. Second: [Municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background amounted to deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of [specify right] would follow the hiring decision. Third: [Municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background proximately caused the violation of that federal right. In order to find that [municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background amounted to deliberate indifference, you must find that [plaintiff] has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that: adequate scrutiny of [employee’s] background would have led a reasonable policymaker to conclude that it was obvious that hiring [employee] would lead to the particular type of [constitutional] [statutory] violation that [plaintiff] alleges, namely [specify constitutional (or statutory) violation]. In order to find that [municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background proximately caused the violation of [plaintiff’s] federal right, you must find that [plaintiff] has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [municipality’s] deliberate indifference led directly to the deprivation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. Comment Although inadequate screening during the hiring process can form the basis for municipal
collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. Id. at 409-10. Thus, in the inadequate screening context, [a] plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision. Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right can the official's failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's background constitute “deliberate indifference.” Id. at 411; see id. at 412 (“[A] finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff.”); id. (question is “whether Burns’ background made his use of excessive force in making an arrest a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision”). Instruction 4.6.8 is designed for use in cases where the plaintiff alleges that the municipality failed adequately to check the prospective employee’s background. In some cases, the asserted basis for liability may be, instead, that the municipality checked the prospective employee’s background, learned of information indicating the risk that the person would commit the relevant constitutional violation, and nonetheless hired the person. In such cases, Instruction 4.6.8 can be modified as needed to reflect the fact that ignoring known information also can form the basis for an inadequate screening claim.
(1983). Although a police officer has reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation to justify a stop to investigate that violation, he may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion of a drug offense, in order to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). See also United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion for a drug sniff after a traffic stop because the defendant was “visibly nervous, with a shaky voice and a vein on his neck pulsating rapidly,” his “answers to questions came out hesitatingly,” and the amount of his luggage “appeared to be inconsistent with the stated length of the trip”). A Terry stop carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion. In Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014), an officer was searching for an armed man and encountered an unidentified man who turned away and appeared to reach for his waist. The officer grabbed the man’s arm until he saw that the man was unarmed. The court upheld a jury verdict that the officer acted reasonably in grabbing the man’s arm. As noted in the Comment to Instruction 4.12.2, in the case of a warrantless arrest, Third Circuit caselaw divides as to the burden of proof regarding probable cause. By contrast, the caselaw does not appear to have addressed the burden of proof regarding reasonable suspicion in the case of a Terry stop; but one district court decision concerning an analogous issue suggests that the burden would be on the plaintiff. See Armington v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 767 F. Supp. 661, 667 (E.D.Pa.) (in Section 1983 case involving school district’s order that bus driver undergo urinalysis, holding that the bus driver plaintiff “has the burden of proving that defendant lacked reasonable suspicion”), aff’d without opinion, 941 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1991).
government “must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125. Based on the balance between the government’s “interest in protecting public safety” and the harm that detention can inflict on the individual, the Supreme Court has held “that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52, 56 (1991). If the judicial determination is provided within 48 hours of arrest, the burden is on the prisoner to show that the length of the delay, though less than 48 hours, was nonetheless unreasonable. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 (listing possible bases for a finding of unreasonableness). By contrast, if the delay extends longer than 48 hours, “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id. at 57.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. Id. Judge McKee concurred but wrote separately to note that “if the record supported a finding that police gratuitously rammed [the suspect’s] car, and if plaintiff properly alleged that they did so to injure or terrorize [the suspect], liability could still attach under Lewis.” Id. at 172-73 (McKee, J., concurring); see also id. at 173 (“I do not read the majority opinion as holding that police can use any amount of force during a high speed chase no matter how tenuously the force is related to the legitimate law enforcement objective of arresting the fleeing suspect.”).