Instructions for Civil Rights Claims Under Section 1983 Numbering of Section 1983 Instructions 4.1 Section 1983 Introductory Instruction 4.2 Section 1983 – Burden of Proof 4.3 Section 1983 – Elements of Claim 4.4 Section 1983 – Action under Color of State Law 4.4.1 Section 1983 – Action under Color of State Law Is Not in Dispute 4.4.2 Section 1983 – Determining When an Official Acted under Color of State Law 4.4.3 Section 1983 – Determining Whether a Private Person Conspired with a State Official 4.5 Section 1983 – Deprivation of a Federal Right 4.6 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another 4.6.1 Section 1983 – Supervisory Officials 4.6.2 Section 1983 – Failure to Intervene 4.6.3 Section 1983 – Municipalities – General Instruction 4.6.4 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Statute, Ordinance or Regulation 4.6.5 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Choice by Policymaking Official 4.6.6 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Custom 4.6.7 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Training or Supervision 4.6.8 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Screening 4.7 Section 1983 – Affirmative Defenses 4.7.1 Conduct Not Covered by Absolute Immunity 4.7.2 Qualified Immunity
4.7.3 Release-Dismissal Agreement 4.8 Section 1983 – Damages 4.8.1 Compensatory Damages 4.8.2 Nominal Damages 4.8.3 Punitive Damages 4.9 Section 1983 – Excessive Force (Including Some Types of Deadly Force) – Stop, Arrest, or Other “Seizure” 4.9.1 Section 1983 – Instruction for GarnerType Deadly Force Cases – Stop, Arrest, or Other “Seizure” 4.10 Section 1983 – Excessive Force – Convicted Prisoner 4.11 Section 1983 – Conditions of Confinement – Convicted Prisoner 4.11.1 Section 1983 – Denial of Adequate Medical Care 4.11.2 Section 1983 – Failure to Protect from Suicidal Action 4.11.3 Section 1983 – Failure to Protect from Attack 4.12 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure 4.12.1 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure – Terry Stop and Frisk 4.12.2 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure – Arrest – Probable Cause 4.12.3 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure – Warrant Application 4.13 Section 1983 – Malicious Prosecution 4.13.1 Section 1983 – Burdens of Proof in Civil and Criminal Cases 4.14 Section 1983 – State-created Danger 4.15 Section 1983 – High-Speed Chase 4.16 Section 1983 – Duty to Protect Child in Foster Care
4.5 Section 1983 – Deprivation of a Federal Right Model [I have already instructed you on the first element of [plaintiff’s] claim, which requires [plaintiff] to prove that [defendant] acted under color of state law.] The second element of [plaintiff’s] claim is that [defendant] deprived [him/her] of a federal [constitutional right] [statutory right]. [Insert instructions concerning the relevant constitutional or statutory violation.] Comment See below for instructions concerning particular constitutional violations. Instructions 7.0 through 7.5 concern employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Section 1983.
4.6.2 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another – Failure to Intervene Model [Plaintiff] contends that [third person] violated [plaintiff’s] [specify right] and that [defendant] should be liable for that violation because [defendant] failed to intervene to stop the violation. [Defendant] is liable for that violation if plaintiff has proven all of the following four things by a preponderance of the evidence: First: [Third person] violated [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. Second: [Defendant] had a to intervene. [I instruct you that [police officers] [corrections officers] have a duty to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force by a fellow officer.] [I instruct you that prison guards have a duty to intervene during an attack by an inmate in the prison in which they work.] Third: [Defendant] had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Fourth: [Defendant] failed to intervene. Comment A defendant can in appropriate circumstances be held liable for failing to intervene to stop a beating. See, e.g., Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “a corrections officer's failure to intervene in a beating can be the basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 if the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so,” and that “a corrections officer can not escape liability by relying upon his inferior or nonsupervisory rank visavis the other officers”); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 371 (3d Cir. 2012) (“extending [the Smith v. Mensinger] standard to inmate-on-inmate attacks”); Williams v. Fields, 2013 WL 4498670 (3d Cir., Aug 23, 2013) (non-precedential opinion) (reversing grant of judgment as a matter of law because jury could have “reasonably inferred” that officer “must have seen” the beating by other officers “and declined to intervene”).
is final.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Praprotnik); LaVerdure v. County of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Even though Marino himself lacked final policymaking authority that could bind the County, LaVerdure could have demonstrated that the Board delegated him the authority to speak for the Board or acquiesced in his statements.”); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The second means of holding the municipality liable is if Tucker knowingly acquiesced to the decisions made at AID.”). In an appropriate case, Instruction 4.6.5 may be modified to refer to a policymaker’s “agreeing after the fact to a subordinate’s decision to engage in the violation.”
foreseeable: “[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. In a post-Connick case, Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2014), the court of appeals found the evidence sufficient for the claim to go to a jury under this standard. It held that “a reasonable jury could conclude based on the frequency of fights and the volatile nature of the prison” that the county was deliberately indifferent based on its failure to provide training in conflict de-escalation. The Third Circuit has previously applied a three-part test to determine whether “a municipality's failure to train or supervise to amount[s] to deliberate indifference”: Under this test, “it must be shown that (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999). Readers should note that a substantially similar instruction was given in Connick, a case in which the closely-divided Court held that the municipal defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the plaintiff’s failure to prove a pattern of similar violations. Because Connick states that such a pattern is ordinarily needed in order to establish deliberate indifference in connection with a failure-to-train claim, Instruction 4.6.7 no longer tracks the Carter instruction precisely: The second element no longer offers as an alternative a finding that the situation “involved a difficult choice.” For the narrow range of cases in which no pattern of similar violations is necessary, Instruction 4.6.7 can be modified.
4.6.8 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Screening Model [Plaintiff] claims that [municipality] adopted a policy of inadequate screening, and that this policy caused the violation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. Specifically, [plaintiff] claims that [municipality] should be held liable because [municipality] did not adequately check [employee’s] background when hiring [him/her]. [Plaintiff] cannot establish that [municipality] is liable merely by showing that [municipality] hired [employee] and that [employee] violated [plaintiff’s] [specify right]. In order to hold [municipality] liable for [employee’s] violation of [plaintiff’s] [specify right], you must also find that [plaintiff] has proved each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence: First: [Municipality] failed to check adequately [employee’s] background when hiring [him/her]. Second: [Municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background amounted to deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of [specify right] would follow the hiring decision. Third: [Municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background proximately caused the violation of that federal right. In order to find that [municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background amounted to deliberate indifference, you must find that [plaintiff] has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that: adequate scrutiny of [employee’s] background would have led a reasonable policymaker to conclude that it was obvious that hiring [employee] would lead to the particular type of [constitutional] [statutory] violation that [plaintiff] alleges, namely [specify constitutional (or statutory) violation]. In order to find that [municipality’s] failure to check adequately [employee’s] background proximately caused the violation of [plaintiff’s] federal right, you must find that [plaintiff] has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [municipality’s] deliberate indifference led directly
4.12 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure Model The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from being subjected to unreasonable seizures by the police. A law enforcement official may only seize a person (for example, by stopping or arresting the person) if there is appropriate justification to do so. In this case, [plaintiff] claims that [defendant] subjected [plaintiff] to an unreasonable [stop] [arrest], in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To establish this claim, [plaintiff] must prove each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence: First: [Defendant] intentionally [describe the acts plaintiff alleges led to or constituted the seizure]. Second: Those acts subjected [plaintiff] to a “seizure.” Third: The “seizure” was unreasonable. I will now give you more details on what constitutes a “seizure” and on how to decide whether a seizure is reasonable. [Add appropriate instructions concerning the relevant type[s] of seizure[s]. See infra Instructions 4.12.1 - 4.12.3.] Comment A Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest or unlawful imprisonment must be based upon a claim of constitutional violation. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (requiring a showing of a federal constitutional violation, on the ground that the state-law tort of “false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official”). Ordinarily, the relevant constitutional provision will be the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he constitutionality of arrests by state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than due process analysis.”); see also id. (noting “the possibility that some false arrest claims might be subject to a due process analysis”); Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”).
runs from the point when the plaintiff is no longer detained without legal process. Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1096 (“Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process – when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.”). Relationship to malicious prosecution claims. The common law tort of false arrest covers the time up to the issuance of process, whereas the common law tort of malicious prosecution would cover subsequent events. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484; Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1096; see also Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 126 (“A claim for false arrest, unlike a claim for malicious prosecution, covers damages only for the time of detention until the issuance of process or arraignment, and not more.”); Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000), as amended (Jan. 26, 2001) (“[F]alse arrest does not permit damages incurred after an indictment.”). Regarding malicious prosecution claims, see Instruction 4.13.