became bored if they went on for too long (EW4/71: 180). Even more bizarrely, HMG thought the typical British consumer was irrational: Our impression is that “foreign goods” (Italian shoes, French cars, Scandinavian furniture), are often bought as a symbol of affluence and prestige and not because they are better value than our own products. It is possible a campaign could help to counter this irrational element in consumer buying’ (EW 4/71: 138) A campaign which drew attention to the difference between British and foreign goods might raise sales of the latter, ‘as a symbol of affluence, many people are inclined to go for what is foreign; and to mark goods “Made in Britain” could well be until this general attitude can be changed. Concern was also expressed that such a campaign ‘may be understood as implying that domestic products are inferior to imported goods and therefore need an artificial boost. It may give the impression that the Government is taking desperate measures’. But HMG Ministers appear to have taken a diametrically opposite view: ‘British products should always be bought when they are of good value even if their prestige is less than that of goods from overseas’ (This statement is bizarre and shows a complete lack of knowledge of even the basic economics driving purchasing decision). The Nationalised Industries (NI’s), appeared to offer some salvation for a ‘Buy British’ campaign, especially because Britain no longer possessed an empire and therefore its ability to rely on imperial sentiment to support this campaign was reduced. In any case, Britain’s share of industrial countries’ exports to Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, between 1962 and 1976, declined by the biggest magnitude compared to her shares of exports to other countries. This reinforces the perspective that the empire was not a ‘soft’ market’. In addition, because of their public ownership, they represented a more captive market which could be used to enforce a ‘Buy British’ campaign. Viewed from this perspective, the NI’s were a more attractive bet compared to the uncertainties of
partly explained by recognition that growing imports affected all CBI members. To address the problem of import penetration, British Leyland launched an independent campaign, and its chairman Sir Michael Edwardes, arranged a lunch, involving senior directors of Debenhams, Marks and Spencer, Sainsbury’s, The National Coal Board, and the National Farmers Union, to discuss a possible campaign. The CBI was at the forefront of a series of publicity events, and displays involving prominent British firms to ‘Win Through Better Buying’ and ‘Can You make It? A Challenge to British Industry’. The latter occurred in London, Nottingham, Solihull and Haydock Park. In launching its campaign, the CBI was adamant that it would not support an unqualified or patriotic appeal to British consumers. It recognized that a publicity campaign on a scale large enough to be effective was too expensive; it was concerned that such initiatives would be perceived as an attempt to undermine consumers’ own preferences ad that hostile critics would claim it was an ‘admission of defeat’. Moreover, ‘Buy British’ diverted attention (and resources) from what it perceived to be the most important task: improving the competitiveness of British exports, independently of any Buy British campaign. Even a qualified ‘Buy British’ campaign was considered suspect until ‘British made’ an extra guarantee of quality – and this considered, ‘some distance away’. In any case, the CBI acknowledged that: ‘Britain appears to be in a unique position amongst other nations in having to even consider campaigns to persuade its people to buy its own products’. The CBI concluded that the impact of its scheme was limited. It estimated that the exhibitions resulted in new quotations valued between £15-£20m, whereas the total annual expenditure on all exhibited items was around £100m. The Confederation conducted a survey of the exhibitors which revealed that the single biggest factor why so little new business was done was the inability of British manufacturers to compete on price. The second biggest explanation was the inability to meet requied technical specifications.