do not exhibit dominance behavior, as elevated power leads to increased attention to rewards and decreased inhibition-related tendencies (Keltner et al., 2003). As such, dominance expressions may not change the perceived power balance within a dyad to the same extent when the relatively powerful negotiator expresses dominance. Dominance expressions from a relatively powerful negotiator may not communicate that the negotiator has any power beyond what is already perceived by both negotiators. Dominance expressions from a relatively powerless negotiator, by contrast, would be more likely to lead negotiators to question the power balance. Acting dominantly may therefore be less likely to affect the high-power negotiators’ senses of power within the negotiation than it is to affect negotiators’ senses of power. We offer: Hypothesis 1: Only relatively powerless negotiators will come to feel more powerful after receiving instructions to act dominantly. Consistent with theory proposing that perceived negotiator power can influence value claiming by altering negotiator and counterpart behavior (Kim et al., 2005), negotiators who are perceived as having greater power than their counterparts typically claim a larger share of the value than do their counterparts (Komorita & Leung, 1985; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016). If expressing dominance improves relatively powerless negotiators’ senses of power and perceived power increases value claiming, expressing dominance should be particularly likely to improve relatively powerless negotiators’ abilities to claim value. If high-power negotiators’ dominance expressions do not change the perceived power balance in the dyad, it is unclear whether those expressions would have yielded more or larger concessions than the high-power negotiator
t(85.79) = 2.61, p = .01, d = .44. Furthermore, Mixed High-Power Dominance dyads created more value than did Mixed No Dominance dyads (t(78.0) = 2.96, p = .04, d = .45) and Mixed Both Dominance dyads; t(78.9) = 2.08, p = .04, d = .45. They also created somewhat more value than did Mixed Low-Power Dominance dyads; t(81.3) = 2.96, p = .06, d = .41. Neither Mixed Low-Power Dominance dyads nor Mixed Both Dominance dyads created significantly different amounts of value, ps > .60. We analyzed whether the effect of dominance instructions on total points depended upon whether the counterpart of the person expressing dominance expressed dominance in return. An ANOVA, however, showed that the effect of dominance instructions was not moderated by the degree to which a counterpart responded with dominance of his/her own, ps > .60. ----------------------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ------------------------------------------------ Own Points. We then examined the effects of power and dominance on the number of points accumulated by each negotiator. A mixed-models analysis revealed a significant main effect of negotiator power (F(1, 166) = 22.4, p = .001, d = .51) on own points. As shown in Table 1, high-power negotiators accumulated more points than did low-power negotiators. The analysis also revealed a significant Own Power x Counterpart Dominance Instructions interaction (F(1, 331.9) = 6.36, p = .01), and a marginally significant Own Dominance Instructions x Counterpart Dominance Instructions interaction, F(1, 166) = 2.89, p = .09. No other main effects or interactions were significant.
Leading and Following the Conversation. We next examined how our manipulations of and dominance affected how much negotiators led the conversations and how much they followed the conversational lead of their counterparts. A mixed-models analysis revealed a significant main effect of power (F(1, 163.0) = 4.09, p = .05, d = .24), such that high-power negotiators were perceived to have led the conversations more (M = 4.05, SD = 1.13) than were low-power negotiators (M = 3.76, SD = 1.24). There was also a marginally significant main effect for dominance instructions (F(1, 303.1) = 3.09, p = .08, d = .19), such that negotiators receiving dominance instructions led the conversations more (M = 4.02, SD = 1.18) than did negotiators not receiving those instructions (M = 3.79, SD = 1.20). No other main effects or interactions were significant. A mixed-models analysis of how much negotiators were perceived by their counterparts to follow the lead of those counterparts revealed only a significant Own Power x Own Dominance instructions interaction, F(1, 320.8) = 3.87, p = .05. Negotiators followed the lead of low-power counterparts who received dominance instructions (M = 4.72, SD = 1.10) more than they did low-power negotiators who did not receive such instructions (M = 4.40, SD = 1.06), t(162) = 1.87, p = .06, d = .30. Negotiators, in contrast, did not follow the lead of high-power negotiators who received dominance instructions (M = 4.46, SD = 1.10) more than they followed the lead of high-power negotiators who did not receive such instructions (M = 4.62, SD = 1.06), t(163) = -0.90 , p = .37, d = .15. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Discussion Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that the effects of dominance in negotiations depend upon whether dominance is expressed by a relatively powerful or relatively powerless
conditions, three of these dyads were Matched Low-Power Dominance dyads and one dyad was a Matched High-Power No Dominance dyad. We included the data from these dyads and note any instances in which excluding the data changes key significant results to Manipulation Checks across Mixed-Power Dyads. We first conducted a 2 (own power instructions: low power vs. high power) x 2 (own dominance instructions: no instructions vs. dominance instructions) x 2 (counterpart dominance instructions: no instructions vs. dominance instructions) mixed-models analysis on negotiators’ subjective senses of power in the mixed-power conditions. Negotiators in the high-power condition reported having significantly more power (M = 4.99, SD = 0.86) than did their low-power counterparts (M = 3.46, SD = 1.07), F(1, 155.4) = 148.2, p < .001, d = 1.58. Negotiators given dominance instructions also believed they had more power (M = 4.41, SD = 1.16) than did those who did not receive such instructions (M = 4.06, SD = 1.28), F(1, 265.2) = 11.70, p = .001, d = .29. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this effect was qualified by a significant Own Power x Own Dominance Instructions interaction, F(1, 267.1) = 4.21, p = .04. Negotiators in the low-power condition felt more powerful as a result of receiving dominance instructions (M = 3.75, SD = 1.06 vs. M = 3.18, SD = 1.00), t(155) = 3.50, p = .001, d = .55, whereas high-power negotiators did not (M = 5.07, SD = 0.85 vs. M = 4.92, SD = 0.87), t(157) = 1.05, p = .29. The main effect of the counterpart’s dominance instructions was also significant. Negotiators whose counterparts received dominance instructions perceived themselves to be less powerful than did negotiators whose counterparts did not receive dominance instructions (M = significance.
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