Instructions for Rights Claims Under Section 1983 Numbering of Section 1983 Instructions 4.1 Section 1983 Introductory Instruction 4.2 Section 1983 – Burden of 4.3 Section 1983 – Elements of Claim 4.4 Section 1983 – Action under Color of State Law 4.4.1 Section 1983 – Action under Color of State Law Is Not in Dispute 4.4.2 Section 1983 – Determining When an Official Acted under Color of State Law 4.4.3 Section 1983 – Determining Whether a Private Person Conspired with a Official 4.5 Section 1983 – Deprivation of a Federal Right 4.6 Section 1983 – Liability in Connection with the Actions of Another 4.6.1 Section 1983 – Supervisory Officials 4.6.2 Section 1983 – Failure to Intervene 4.6.3 Section 1983 – Municipalities – General Instruction 4.6.4 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Statute, Ordinance or Regulation 4.6.5 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Choice by Policymaking Official 4.6.6 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Custom 4.6.7 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Training or Supervision 4.6.8 Section 1983 – Municipalities – Liability Through Inadequate Screening 4.7 Section 1983 – Affirmative Defenses 4.7.1 Conduct Not Covered by Absolute Immunity
4.7.2 Qualified Immunity 4.7.3 Release-Dismissal Agreement 4.8 Section 1983 – Damages 4.8.1 Compensatory Damages 4.8.2 Nominal Damages 4.8.3 Punitive Damages 4.9 Section 1983 – Excessive Force (Including Some Types of Deadly Force) – Stop, Arrest, or Other “Seizure” 4.9.1 Section 1983 – Instruction for GarnerType Deadly Force Cases – Stop, Arrest, or Other “Seizure” 4.10 Section 1983 – Excessive Force – Convicted Prisoner 4.11 Section 1983 – Conditions of Confinement – Convicted Prisoner 4.11.1 Section 1983 – Denial of Adequate Medical Care 4.11.2 Section 1983 – Failure to Protect from Suicidal Action 4.11.3 Section 1983 – Failure to Protect from Attack 4.12 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure 4.12.1 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure – Terry Stop and Frisk 4.12.2 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure – Arrest – Probable 4.12.3 Section 1983 – Unlawful Seizure – Warrant Application 4.13 Section 1983 – Malicious Prosecution 4.13.1 Section 1983 – Burdens of Proof in Civil and Criminal Cases 4.14 Section 1983 – Danger 4.15 Section 1983 – High-Speed Chase 4.16 Section 1983 – Duty to Protect Child in Foster Care
Law enforcement officers who serve as witnesses generally have absolute immunity from claims concerning their testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345 (1983) (trial testimony); Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012) (grand jury testimony). In addition to the immunities recognized by the Supreme Court, there may exist other categories of absolute immunity. See, e.g., Ernst v. Child and Youth Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 488-89 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “child welfare workers and attorneys who prosecute dependency proceedings on behalf of the state are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for all of their actions in preparing for and prosecuting such dependency proceedings”); B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 265 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding “that Ernst's absolute immunity for child welfare employees is appropriate when the employee in question ‘formulat[es] and present[s] . . . recommendations to the court’ with respect to a child's custody determination, even if those recommendations are made outside the context of a dependency proceeding” (quoting Ernst, 108 F.3d at 495)).
entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.”); id. at 169-75 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of a good faith defense); Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413 (declining to determine “whether or not . . . private defendants . . . might assert, not immunity, but a special ‘goodfaith’ defense”). Taking up the issue thus left open in Wyatt, the Third Circuit has held that “private actors are entitled to a defense of subjective good faith.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994). The discussion in Jordan focused on the question in the context of a due process claim arising from a creditor’s execution on a judgment. See id. at 1276 (explaining that “a creditor's subjective appreciation that its act deprives the debtor of his constitutional right to due process” would show an absence of good faith).
at 331. See also Comment 4.6.1 (discussing supervisory liability). When the Supreme Court reversed on the issue of qualified immunity, it did not reach the merits of the constitutional claim itself. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043 (2015). It did, however, express some skepticism, noting that “the weight of authority at the time of Barkes’s death suggested that such a right did not exist.” Id. at 2044-45 (citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits).