type of representative. Instead, districts will be internally heterogeneous and competitive elections will be common. Partisan Gerrymander: One party controls the map-drawing process. They “pack” members of the opposed party into a small number of ideologically homogenous districts, creating some safe incumbents. But they also create a large number of districts that favor their own party. How homogenous and “safe” these districts are will depend on how “aggressive” the gerrymander is. If the map-drawers create many districts that tilt only slightly in favor of the majority party, they risk having the map “backfire” and losing many seats in the event of a modestly averse partisan tide. When maps are drawn by legislatures or committees, I posit that the partisan composition of that body will determine which “regime” the map should resemble, possibly influenced by other institutional factors. However, the paper offers no general supposition when maps are drawn by courts; although an ostensibly nonpartisan institution, the resulting maps are influenced by many factors, including the circumstances and issues which lead the process into court, the state’s judicial selection systems, and the personal partisan leanings of the judges. To more fully explain the difference between the three procedural gerrymandering regimes that serve as the primary dependent variable in this project, examples of each regime is shown in both a “toy state” of 25 voters, and a short case study from the 2001 redistricting cycle. The Bipartisan Gerrymander In further detailing each of these gerrymandering regimes, let us begin with a simple toy state. Consider a state with 25 voters, to be apportioned into 5 legislative districts of equal population. As shown in Figure 1, assume that the most liberal voters are on the left side of the state, and the most conservative are on the right side of the state; the 10 most liberal voters
represented by a member of their group for increased influence on the overall composition of the legislature. To the Voinovich plaintiffs, being a member of a very safe majority-black district did not represent a democratic or expressive good, but simply a wasted vote. It would seem that these plaintiffs were more content than those in Gomez to feel only “virtually” represented. The simulation model will measure “personal representation” as the ideological distance between a voter and the legislator in that voter’s district. Discursive Representation This is probably the least studied of the dimensions in the context of districting. I am using the term “Discursive Representation” as propounded by Dryzek and Niemeyer in their 2008 APSR article with that title; it is similar to “the politics of presence” as discussed by Canon and other works on racial representation. While the “compositional” measure of representation assumes that each additional marginal legislator contributes equally in their ability to represent an interest, we might also imagine that a single voice within a deliberative body can be uniquely powerful. Indeed, Dryzek and Niemeyer argue “there is no need for proportionality in discursive representation”. But unlike “personal” representation, there is no need for a voter’s interests to be represented discursively by the legislator they elect from their own district; this voice just needs to be present somewhere in the body. The relevance of this dimension to the representation of racial minorities is probably best exemplified by drawing examples from the United Senate, which has varied in recent years between have zero and one African-American members. Canon (1999) recounts an instance where Carol Moseley Braun, as the lone black member of the Senate, was able to convince 74