grammatical aspect reveal that the two propositions in that statement are of different logical types. That observation speaks in favor of casting action-theoretic explanation as logically prior to the instrumental form because it is of the same logical type as thought about action more generally. Thompson has another argument to make against his instrumentalist opponent, but it calls for a change in the way I’ve been framing the discussion. Up to this point, I have been characterizing the issue as a choice between two kinds of rationalization of action, and we were figuring out which was more fundamental. That’s not quite right. For Thompson, there aren’t two fully distinct ways of rationalizing an action. There is only one: the action-theoretic kind. Taking a closer look at instrumental rationalizations, he argues that, while they initially seem to refer to an agent’s psychological attitudes, they aren’t actually doing so. The “wanting,” “intending,” and “trying” we encounter in instrumental explanations are really cloaked gestures at aspectual features of the action in question. They convey how far along one is in the performance of an action. Thus, instrumental explanations actually do convey the imperfective aspect of actions. Explanations like, “I’m building this pillar because I want to support the roof” don’t refer to an orectic attitude. Rather, they signal how far along the agent is in the action of supporting the roof. An agent offering this explanation is in the preliminary stages of the action. Thompson’s main conclusion, then, is that action-theoretic rationalization isn’t merely logically prior to its instrumental counterpart because instrumental rationalization just is action-theoretic. If the argument works, Thompson doesn’t defeat his opponent, he makes her disappear. The argument focuses on the psychologistic explanans, “I want to support the
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