of party platforms on legislative performance. He compared the state legislatures of Illinois and Wisconsin in the United States, examining the extent to which these fulfil legislatively their platform commitments. He differentiated between ‘issue oriented’ and ‘moralistic parties’ on one hand and ‘job oriented’ and ‘individualistic parties’ on the other. He argues that issue oriented and moralistic parties are likely to do well in the fulfilment of legislative platform agenda than the job oriented and individualistic parties. He described the Wisconsin parties as the issue oriented and moralistic, while the Illinois parties as the job- oriented and individualistic parties. ‘Job- oriented parties’ in Illinois, are described as parties that are characterised by an orientation towards winning office for tangible reward, while a concern with issues is notably lacking. On the other hand, ‘issue oriented and moralistic parties’ in Wisconsin usually have extensive state-making activity (especially by the Chicago Democratic organisation) and a closed primary does seem to translate into external party organisational control of state legislators by the Democrats if not Republicans. Richard, (1979) described the process of fulfilling party pledges as “Party Responsibility. In Nigeria, legislatures at both national and state level are ‘job oriented and individualistic parties’. This explains why legislatures in Nigeria are vulnerable to financial shocks. Thus bribes, gratifications and providing cover for the corruption of the executive for kickbacks are some of the ways in which the executive control legislature in Nigeria. This is even worse at state level where governors give directives to state Assemblies on virtually all issues of public concern. This scenario has made state governors godfathers of state legislators. In some instances, members of the state assemblies who are elected on different party platform with the governor are compelled by the dominance of the governor to decamp to the platform of the governor for incentives and personal favours. Similarly, Timothy (2000) examined the dynamics of congressional loyalty from 1947 to 1997. The rate of party defection among members of the U.S Congress within the stipulated period was also investigated. It is argued that one interesting thing about congressional loyalty in the U.S is that Congress members enjoy relatively free hand to cast roll call votes than their counterparts in the parliamentary system. This is because members of parliament only vote against their party preferences at the risk of severe party sanctions; and in the extreme, the possibility of government dissolution.
executive dominance from the military rule one party states guides the executive in their relations with the legislature. Attempt to assert their position as an autonomous institution often degenerates into conflicts, policy gridlock, party switching, political victimization of various sorts and above all subordination of the legislature by the executive through the instrumentalities of political parties. Party incentives and sanctions for or against loyal and disloyal party members appears to be central to the control of the legislature by the executive in emerging democracies. The rampant nature of corruption which gives the executive unlimited access to state resources also limit the powers and influence of legislatures and increase thus far the powers of the executive over parties and legislatures. Powers and Functions of the State Legislature and Executive: Evidence from 1999 Constitution of Nigeria Across modern democratic societies, legislatures perform basically three conventional functions of representation, law-making and oversight responsibilities. The Nigerian National Legislature is no exception. The 1999 Constitution has provided the legislature in different sections, the powers to perform these functions at both the central and state levels. In the context of representation for instance, the Constitution provided for delineation of constituencies in different groups of people are represented on the basis of their population size, state of origin or `in the case of state legislatures the number seats a state has in the House of Representatives. Section 91 of the Constitution states that: Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, A of Assembly of a State shall consist of three or four times the number of seats which that state has in the House of Representatives, divided in a to reflect, as far as possible, nearly equal population. Provided that a House of Assembly of a State shall consist of not less than twenty four and not more than forty members. Therefore, based on the State Assembly constituencies created by the constitution, people vote to elect their representatives to the National Assembly. The elected Representatives are required to interact with the electorate and as much as possible reflect the interests of their constituents in their general conduct and activities. It is against this backdrop that Esebagbon (2005) argues that: