This is not to say that essentialist explanations are the sole kind of causal explanations that people consider (e.g., people readily accept that smoking is causally related to lung cancer), nor that all essentialist explanations rest on a foundation of (for other exemplars, see Gil-White, 2001; Haslam, 2011; Rangel & Keller, 2011). Rather, given the substantial conceptual overlap between people’s lay understanding of both genes and natural kinds’ metaphysical essences, genetic attributions often activate or strengthen certain essentialism-derived cognitive biases. The Genetic Essentialism Framework (GEF: Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011) offers a theoretical foundation for describing cognitive processes set in motion once a person perceives genes to be a relevant causal factor. The GEF suggests that genetic attributions for various traits, conditions, or diseases activate four specific psychological processes termed genetic essentialist biases. The first bias, immutability/determinism, specifies that thinking about genetic attributions leads people to view relevant outcomes as less changeable and more predetermined (see Gould & Heine, 2012). To the extent that a phenomenon is perceived to be immutable, it will be perceived to be beyond someone’s control; and indeed, genetic attributions decrease perceptions of control over relevant outcomes (e.g., Parrott & Smith, 2014) and limit the perceived capability of other means, such as environmental manipulations or individuals’ volition, to modify the outcome (e.g., Jayaratne et al., 2009). For example, research indicates that endorsement of genetic etiological explanations for disease is negatively associated with perception of control over a disease (e.g., Dar-Nimrod, Zuckerman, & Duberstein, 2013; Jayaratne, Giordimaina, Gaviglio, 2012; Shiloh, Rashuk-Rosenthal, & Benyamini, 2002). Discounting one’s personal
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