difference between the percentage of male and female voters who identify as Democrats) evolved from being non-existent in the early 1980s to a nearly 10 point difference by the end of the 1990s. Partisan Cleavages and the Descriptive-Substantive Representation Link The 1980 party platform divergence on the ERA coincides with the beginning of a dramatic divergence – borne out at the polls a decade later – between the parties on the proportion of women in each party’s Congressional delegation, a difference that provides a unique opportunity to explore the relationship between the number of women and their corresponding treatment in Congress. When the electoral consequences of this party divergence on ERA was borne out approximately a decade later (1992) as the proportion of Democratic female House members began to sharply increase, whereas the proportion of their Republican female counterparts remained relatively stable (see Figure 2.1). From the 105th through 108th Congresses, for instance, the average proportion of Democratic women in the Democratic Caucus was 2½ times greater than the average proportion of Republican women in their caucus. Furthermore, this trend is also reflected in the electorate as a whole, where women are more likely than men to identify with the Democratic Party (Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin 2004; Frankovic 1982; Kaufman 2002) and vote for Democratic political candidates (Klein 1985; Wirls 1986) since 1980. [Insert Figure 2.1 About Here] This partisan dissimilarity in descriptive representation has tangible implications for substantive representation for two reasons. First, members of historically underrepresented and/or minority groups (e.g., women and racial minorities) tend to be more supportive of
of this threshold, which Kanter (1977) places at 15 percent based on the workplace she considered, but others argue is much higher in legislatures (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Wolbrecht 2000). The theory predicts that the extent to which legislators value their minority group colleagues depends upon differences in marginal utility attributable to minority group size. The of Groups and Tokenism The theory’s first principles capture the relationship between colleague valuations and group membership. Following Kanter (1977), consider an organization that comprises two groups, a long-standing majority/“in” group (Group A) and a long-standing minority/ “out” group (Group B). Note, however, that the discussion presented here differs from the previous literature in that we take into account all possible proportions of Groups A and B within the larger organization. Although the extant literature discusses what occurs when small minorities become larger minorities, the story presented here goes beyond that point to discuss valuations even as the “minority” group grows to become the majority, or even a large majority. The theory presented here, however, does not take into account Yoder’s (1991) argument that tokenism occurs only when the smaller group is of a lower status. But since there are virtually no legislatures in which men are a small minority, one cannot empirically test this aspect of Yoder’s conception of tokenism in the legislative context. In this sense, then, the unified theory of colleague valuation makes the strong assumption that sexism qua sexism does not exist. Colleague valuation is based entirely on group size rather than on any external conception of a higher or lower status for a particular group. This does not mean, however, that the entire unified theory of colleague valuation is refuted if this assumption is false. This is because accounting for sexism mathematically in the formal model would be a simple matter of including a negative
squared normalized ideological distance between these members’1st dimension DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) – i.e., , the interaction between these theoretical causal variables, a binary dummy variable accounting for female-male donor differences (denoted by WD) predicted by our theory, where WD = 1 for female donors, WD = 0 for male donors) and its interaction with relative group size and preference divergence variables; a generic kth dimension X vector of ancillary control variables at election cycle t which comprise of donor-specific effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term. The hypothesized coefficient signs consistent with the key predictions generated from the unified theory of colleague valuation model are as follows: α2, β2 < 0 and α5, β5 > 0. That is, we expect that male House members will lower their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women trigger increases in the level of threat men feel. Similarly, we expect that female House members will increase their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women allow women to work together to affect change within an institution. Because the data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad that are likely not independent across election cycles, we report robust standard errors clustered on dyad. Ancillary Control Variables We also include several variables that are likely to be related to the valuation of a colleague, but unrelated to the theoretical predictions. First, several variables indicate that legislators might, ceteris paribus, be more likely to donate to those colleagues who have personal characteristics other than gender that the potential donor might find valuable. For this reason, we include are two binary variables, Same State, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient represent the same state, 0 otherwise, and Same Region, coded 1 if the donor and potential
Majority as well. The group of players, then, all plays Majority. This indifference point is important, however, in determining which pure strategy will be an ESS since coordination games are, by definition, about trying to copy the choices other players make. Whichever strategy has the higher payoff at the outset of the game is the ESS for that group (Weibull 1995: 110). In the context of our model, if playing Majority yields the greatest utility at the outset, this is the stable ESS. Any player who unilaterally attempts to play Minority will receive lower utility from doing so, and will therefore return immediately to the higher-payoff Majority strategy. This is true, of course, even when Minority would pay more if all players were playing it. Once an ESS of Majority exists, changes in players’ strategies are very difficult, even when changes in w increase the value of working with other members of the minority. Put another way, once women are playing a strategy reflecting false tokenism behavior (i.e., Majority, Majority), it is quite difficult for them to play a strategy consistent with critical mass behavior (i.e., Minority, Minority). To see how this works, consider again the normal form game in Table 5.1. Suppose the value of bw is much greater than the value of 1-w. Under these circumstances, minority group members would derive much more utility for playing Minority than for playing Majority. Yet if one player unilaterally chooses Majority, she receives a payoff not of bw, but of zero (0). Observing this lower payoff, she rationally returns to playing Majority, thus preventing minority group members from enjoying the benefits of critical mass, regardless of how large those benefits become. This depiction makes clear that the critical mass problem is not one of numbers, as much of the previous literature has presumed, but rather of coordination. Increases in w serve only to increase potential payoffs that minority group members will never enjoy because they cannot overcome this coordination problem. In other words, minority group members began playing the game when playing Majority was rational
(denoted by C superscripts) – i.e., and , plus the natural logarithm amount donated (plus a scalar of positive unity), conditional on a leadership PAC donation being made – i.e., and . More formally, a pair of double hurdle regression models are estimated to test the theory’s predictions in relation to women group size (denoted by w) for male and female Senators’ colleague valuation decisions with respect to incumbent and challenger women: and The variable Donor is a binary measure that accounts for female-male donor differences, and is equal to 1 for female donors, 0 for male donors. Each equation also has a generic kth dimension X vector of control variables at election cycle t comprising donor-specific effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term, denoted as v or ε in the equations above. Moreover, because the data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad which may exhibit dependence across election cycles, robust standard errors clustered on this dimension are calculated and reported. Equation (5.1a) models the probability of a donation decision being made to a female incumbent Senator from a male Senator (α1I) or a female Senator (α1I + α2I ), conditional on the proportion of women (w), via a Probit equation. Equation (5.1b) models the expected value of the natural log of donations, conditional on one being made, female incumbent Senators obtain from their male (β1I) and female (β1I + β2I) Senate colleagues in relation to w by truncated normal regression methods. Equations (5.2a) and (5.2b) represent analogous specifications for the challenger models which capture Senators’ valuation of prospective colleagues.
TABLE 6.1 Women’s Caucus Structures in American State Legislatures No Women’s Caucus Informal Women’s Caucus Formal Women’s Caucus Alabama Arizona Iowa Kansas Minnesota Mississippi Montana* (2005-2006) Nevada New Mexico Dakota (2007-2009) Ohio Oregon Pennsylvania South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Virginia Washington Wisconsin (2008-2009) Wyoming (2005) Colorado (2005-2008) Connecticut Delaware Idaho Indiana Kentucky Michigan New Hampshire New Jersey (2005-2008) North Dakota (2005-2006) Oklahoma Wisconsin (2005-2007) Wyoming (2006-2009) Arkansas California Colorado (2009) Georgia Florida Hawaii Illinois Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts Missouri Montana* (2007-2009) New Jersey (2009) New York Carolina Rhode Island South Carolina Vermont West Virginia** Nebraska and Alaska are excluded for reasons noted in Footnote 1. * Montana’s women’s caucus consists solely of Democratic members. ** West Virginia’s women’s caucus serves only House members.
TABLE 6.2 Organizational Coordination and Women Advancement in American States Legislatures: Explaining the Number of Women Committee Chairs Variable Chamber Senate Chamber w 14.16** (4.18) 8.16** (2.32) w 2 16.56** (8.17) -7.19** (3.26) Informal Caucus 1.26 (0.79) -1.16* (0.71) Formal Caucus 1.04 (0.68) 10.11** (5.55) Informal Caucus × w -9.03 (5.92) -21.69** (10.37) Informal Caucus × w 2 15.48 (10.29) 2.68** (0.98) Formal Caucus × w -5.92 (5.71) 10.78** (2.86) Formal Caucus × w 2 9.21 (10.93) -21.02** (5.18) Ideology 0.05 (0.04) 0.08* (0.04) Legislative Professionalism -6.25E-07 (1.30E-06) -7.63E-07 (1.31E-06) Party Balance -0.12 (0.30) -0.06 (0.17) Party Majority -0.26 (0.17) -0.40** (0.13) Ln (Committees) 0.86** (0.10) 0.78** (0.13) Ln (Women) 0.15* (0.08) 0.18 (0.18) Ln (α) -16.59 (0.37) -27.04 (____) Constant -3.93** (0.52) -2.66** (0.45) Log Likelihood -460.20 -339.23 Wald χ2 (k) 514.45** [0.000] 475.00** [0.000] Sample Size 236 223 * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (one-tail). ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (one-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted by state.
because diverse people bring diverse outlooks to problems. Increasing the voice of minority group members also increases the capacity of these minority group members to bring their differences to bear for purposes of improving the decisions political organizations make. Diversity results in increased acceptance of the policy decisions political institutions make (Gibson 2008). Members of political institutions, like political parties, therefore have an incentive to foster diversity among their ranks. Although organizational diversity, for example, yields an additional benefit of producing better collective decisions in both hierarchical and flat organizational structures (e.g., Downs 1967; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; March and Simon 1958; March 1991; Page 2007), such benefits are realized only if these diverse groups are able to work together effectively (Krause and Douglas 2011). At the same time, increasing the size of the majority decreases the volatility with which individual legislators react to their colleagues’ different policy preferences. This effect works for all colleague relationships, not solely minority-majority group relations. Indeed, both majority and minority group members are differentially valued for preference divergence as the proportion of minority group members increases. In other words, majority group members are less susceptible to decreases in the level colleagues value them due to preference divergence. This has both individual and group benefits. On the individual level, legislators can feel freer to express their views without fear of retaliation from their colleagues. On the group level, the minority group provides stability in political organizations that may help them to operate more effectively. Barriers from the Minority Group
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