Data Validation & Encoding A Data Validation & Encoding Data Validation & Encoding 2 Data Validation & Encoding 3 You have invented a new attack against Data Validation and Encoding (no card) Brian can gather information about the underlying configurations, schemas, logic, code, software, services and infrastructure due to the content of error messages, or due to poor configuration, or due to the presence of default installation files or old, test, backup or copies of resources, or exposure of source code Robert can input malicious structured or unstructured data because the allowed protocol format is not being checked, or the structure is not being verified, or the individual data elements are not being validated for format, type, range, length and a whitelist of allowed characters or formats
Read more about this topic in OWASP’s free Cheat Sheets on Input Validation, XSS Prevention, DOM-based XSS Prevention, SQL Injection Prevention, and Query Parameterization Data Validation & Encoding 4 Data Validation & Encoding 5 Data Validation & Encoding 6 Data Validation & Encoding 7 Dave can input malicious data because it is not being checked within the context of the current user and process Jee can bypass the centralized encoding routines since they are not being used comprehensively, or the wrong encodings are being used for the context can bypass the centralized validation routines since they are not being used comprehensively on all inputs Jan can special payloads to foil input validation because the character set is not specified/enforced, or the data is encoded multiple times, or the data is not fully converted into the same format the application uses (e.g. canonicalization) before being validated, or variables are not strongly typed Data Validation & Encoding 8 Data Validation & Encoding 9 Data Validation & Encoding 10 Data Validation & Encoding J can bypass the centralized sanitization routines since they are not being used comprehensively for all sanitization Shamun can bypass input validation or output validation checks because validation failures are not rejected or sanitized Jerry can exploit the trust the application places in a source of data (e.g. user-definable data, manipulation of locally stored data, alteration to state data on a client device, lack of verification of identity such as Jerry can pretend to be Colin) Dennis has control over input validation, output validation or output encoding code/routines so they can be bypassed
Data Validation & Encoding Q Data Validation & Encoding K Geoff can inject data into a client or device interpreter because a parameterised interface is not being used, or has not been implemented correctly, or the data has not been encoded correctly for the context, or there is no restrictive policy on code or data includes Gabe can inject data into an server-side interpreter (e.g. SQL, OS commands, Xpath, Server JavaScript, SMTP) because a strongly typed parameterised interface is not being used or has not been implemented correctly (no card) (no card) Authentication A Authentication Authentication 2 Authentication 3 You have invented a new attack against Authentication (no card) James can undertake authentication functions (e.g. attempt to log in, log in with stolen credentials, reset the password) without the real user ever being aware this has occurred Muhammad can obtain a user's password or secrets such as security questions, by observation during entry, or from a local cache, or in transit, or by reading it from some unprotected location, or because it is widely known, or because it never expires, or because the user cannot change her own password
Read more about this topic in OWASP’s free Cheat Sheets on Session Management, and Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Session Management 4 Session Management 5 Session Management 6 Session Management 7 Alison can set session identification cookies on another web application because the domain and path are not restricted sufficiently John can predict or guess session identifiers because they are not changed when the user's role alters (e.g. pre and post authentication) and when switching between non-encrypted and encrypted communications, or are not sufficiently long and random, or are not changed periodically Gary can take over a user's session because there is a long or no inactivity timeout, or a long or no overall session time limit, or the same session can be used from more than one device/location can utilize Adam's session after he has finished, because there is no log out function, or he cannot easily log out, or log out does not properly terminate the session Session Management 8 Session Management 9 Session Management 10 Session Management J Matt can abuse long sessions because the application does not require periodic re-authentication to check if privileges have changed Ivan can steal session identifiers because they are sent over insecure channels, or are logged, or are revealed in error messages, or are included in URLs, or are accessible un-necessarily by code which the attacker can influence or alter Marce can forge requests because per-session, or per-request for more critical actions, strong random tokens or similar are not being used for actions that change state Jeff can resend an identical repeat interaction (e.g. HTTP request, signal, button press) and it is accepted, not rejected
Read more about this topic in OWASP’s Development and Testing Guides Authorization 4 Authorization 5 Authorization 6 Authorization 7 Kelly can bypass authorization controls because they do not fail securely (i.e. they default to allowing access) Chad can access resources (including services, processes, AJAX, video, images, documents, temporary files, session data, system properties, configuration data, registry settings, logs) he should not be able to due to missing authorization, or due to excessive privileges (e.g. not using the principle of least privilege) Eduardo can access data he does not have permission to, even though he has permission to the form/page/URL/entry point Yuanjing can access application functions, objects, or properties he is not authorized to access Authorization 8 Authorization 9 Authorization 10 Authorization J Tom can bypass business rules by altering the usual process sequence or flow, or by undertaking the process in the incorrect order, or by manipulating date and time values used by the application, or by using valid features for unintended purposes, or by otherwise manipulating control data Mike can misuse an application by using a valid feature too fast, or too frequently, or other way that is not intended, or consumes the application's resources, or causes race conditions, or a feature Richard can bypass the centralized authorization controls they are not being used comprehensively on all interactions Dinis can access security configuration information, or access control lists
Authorization Q Authorization K Christopher can inject a command that the application will run at a higher privilege level Ryan can influence or alter authorization controls and permissions, and can therefore bypass them (no card) (no card) Cryptography A Cryptography Cryptography 2 Cryptography 3 You have invented a new attack against Cryptography (no card) Kyun can access data because it has been obfuscated rather than using an approved cryptographic function Axel can modify transient or permanent data (stored or in transit), or source code, or updates/patches, or configuration data, because it is not subject to integrity checking
Cryptography Q Cryptography K Randolph can access or predict the master cryptographic secrets Dan can influence or alter cryptography code/routines (encryption, hashing, digital signatures, random number and GUID generation) and can therefore bypass them (no card) (no card) Cornucopia A Cornucopia Cornucopia 2 Cornucopia 3 You have invented a new attack of any type (no card) Lee can bypass application controls because dangerous/risky programming language functions have been used instead of safer alternatives, or there are type conversion errors, or because the application is unreliable when an external resource is unavailable, or there are race conditions, or there are resource initialization or allocation issues, or overflows can occur Andrew can access source code, or decompile, or otherwise access business logic to understand how the application works and any secrets contained
Read more application security in OWASP’s free Guides on Requirements, Development, Code Review and Testing, the Cheat Sheet series, and the Open Software Assurance Maturity Model Cornucopia 4 Cornucopia 5 Cornucopia 6 Cornucopia 7 Keith can perform an action and it is not possible to attribute it to him Larry can influence the trust other parties including users have in the application, or abuse that trust elsewhere (e.g. in another application) Aaron can bypass controls because error/exception handling is missing, or is implemented inconsistently, or is partially implemented, or does not deny access by default (i.e. errors terminate access/execution), or relies on handling by some other service or system Mwengu's actions cannot be investigated because there is not an adequate accurately record of security events, or there is not a full audit trail, or these can be altered or deleted by Mwengu, or there is no centralized logging service Cornucopia 8 Cornucopia 9 Cornucopia 10 Cornucopia J David can bypass the application to gain access to data because the network and host infrastructure, and supporting services/applications, have not been securely configured, the configuration rechecked periodically and security patches applied, or the data is stored locally, or the data is not physically protected Michael can bypass the application to gain access to data because administrative tools or administrative interfaces are not secured adequately Xavier can circumvent the application's controls because code frameworks, libraries and components contain malicious code or vulnerabilities (e.g. commercial off the shelf, outsourced, open source, externally-located) Roman can exploit the application because it was compiled using out-of-date tools, or its configuration is not secure by default, or security information was not documented and passed on to operational teams
Cornucopia Q Cornucopia K Wild Card Wild Card Jim can undertake malicious, non-normal, actions without detection and response by the application Gareth can utilize the application to deny service to some or all of its users Alice can utilize the application to attack users' systems and data Bob can influence, alter or affect the application so that it no longer complies with legal, regulatory, contractual or other organizational mandates Have you thought about becoming an individual OWASP member? All tools, guidance and local meetings are free for everyone, but individual membership helps support OWASP’s work Examine vulnerabilities and discover how they can be using training applications in the free OWASP Broken Web Applications VM, or using the online challenges in the free Hacking Lab Cut here