despite Pataki’s efforts to maintain a positive relationship with the Legislature, he still faced strong opposition and periods of difficult budgetary disputes. Eliot Spitzer was elected during a national Democratic landslide in 2006, and came into office as governor in January of 2007 with a drastically different approach. Spitzer, who previously referred to himself as a “steamroller,” came into office with a style that was described as “hard-charging” and aggressive. His interactions with the Legislature were not always easy during the budget process, and as the other governors before him, Spitzer had to learn to compromise. The resulting negotiations were characterized as “behind the scenes deals” lacking transparency. Governor Spitzer only had one attempt to forge budgetary deals with the Legislature, as a 2008 scandal led to his resignation and passed his position onto Liuetentant Governor David Paterson. Paterson was another former legislator, and in his inaugural speech he reached out to the Legislature and promised a departure from the “politics of confrontation.” Amid the political turmoil following Spitzer’s resignation, Paterson struggled to gain legislative approval for his first budget bills and held meetings with legislative leaders that were criticized for their secrecy and lack of transparency. The 2010-11 budget bills, which were not included in this paper due to data unavailability, were a surprising 125 days late. It is apparent that Governor Paterson, in common with most of his predecessors, struggled to successfully negotiate with the Legislature on budgetary matters. To measure the difference in gubernatorial influence over appropriations across individuals, I graphed the average percent change and overall percent change of all four governors on top of each other, with the horizontal axis representing their respective length in office. Eliot Spitzer’s one budgetary year is represented by a single data point, and the two years
Budget conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government is a topic which is frequently studied by political scientists. New York is an interesting state to examine because of its clearly established constitutional executive budgeting system. By analyzing data from four different governors and twenty seven years, it is possible to obtain a better understanding of why some governors are more successful at advancing their preferred agency appropriations within this system. The factors emphasized in this study were the length in office of individual governors, their governing style and interactions with the Legislature, the election cycle, and solitary events such as court cases and political disputes. Several conclusions can be drawn from the correlations which were observed. There was no support for the hypothesis that governors gain more influence over agency appropriations over time. Fluctuations persisted throughout each governor’s time in office. Individual governors may have been able to develop stronger relationships with legislative leaders and learn how to navigate the budget process, but budgetary conflict was unavoidable. For the majority of the years studied, the Assembly was controlled by the Democratic Party and the Senate was controlled by the Republican Party. Regardless of each governor’s political affiliation, one of the houses of the Legislature opposed most of his agenda, which likely contributed to the constant conflict observed. None of the governors studied showed any indication of getting more influence over agency appropriations the longer they were in office. None of the governors had significantly higher or lower level of influence over appropriations when compared to each other. Governor Cuomo had slightly higher influence than Governor Pataki at similar points in their tenure for a number of years, but the difference was not particularly large. These findings suggest that it may not be possible for one governor to be more successful than others at advancing preferred agency appropriations. Despite efforts to
In order to gain a more accurate understanding of the factors which influence the budget process in New York State, the hypotheses examined in this study could be expanded for a longer span of time. Additional factors may be relevant, such as the growth of legislative budgetary staff, the styles of individual legislative leaders, and partisan division. Although this study does not take into account every possible factor or explanation for differences in gubernatorial influence over agency appropriations, the correlations provide some basic observations about budget conflict between the executive and legislative branches in New York State. Control over agency appropriations will continue to be an important part of state politics, and understanding when governors have the most influence over enacted budget bills is crucial for analyzing the success of their policy initiatives. Bibliography Abney, Glenn, and Thomas P. Lauth. “Perceptions of the Impact of Governors and Legislatures in the State Appropriations Process.” The Western Political Quarterly 40, (June 1987): 335-42. ———. “The End of Executive Dominance in State Appropriations.” Public Administration Review 58, (October 1998): 388-94. Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States.” The American Political Science Review 88, (December 1994): 811-28. Baker, Al. “Budgets in Crisis: Overview; State Legislature Overrides Pataki on Budget Vetoes.” The New York Times, May 16, 2003. ———. “Court Ruling Backs Powers of Governor in Budgeting.” The New York Times, April 23, 2004. ———. “Governor Vetoes Increase in Taxes.” The New York Times, May 15, 2003. ———. “Rivals Unite to Fight Change in Albany's Budget Process.” The New York Times, May 1, 2005.
Verhovek, Sam Howe. “Albany's Leaders Announce Accord on State's Budget.” The New York Times, March 29, 1992. ———. “No Budget Deal, No Break: Cuomo Orders Senate Back.” The New York Times, December 27, 1991. Zimmerman, Joseph. The Government and Politics of New York State. Second Edition. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008.