Johnson, 124 N.C.App. 462, 478 S.E.2d 16 (1996), and North Carolina School Boards Assoc. v. Moore, 359 N.C. 474, 614 S.E.2d 504 (2005). Most recently, the Court of Appeals decided Richmond County Board of Education v. Cowell, __ N.C.App. __, 776 S.E.2d 244 (2015). i. v. Edmisten v. Edmisten arose from a declaratory judgment action in which the Clerk of Court sought a declaratory judgment regarding how to dispose of money collected in thirty-four criminal cases in Guilford County, and designated in those judgments as being collected for disbursement to various state and local agencies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the money collected in thirty-three of the thirty-four cases amounted to punishment and therefore fell under the ambit of Article IX, Section 7 and had to be remitted to the school board. In reaching this determination, the Court in Shore made a number of important observations shedding light on the application of Article IX, Section 7. First, the Court noted that “any statute purporting to give what are in reality fines either to an individual or to another governmental agency [i.e., not a school board] violates this constitutional provision.” Shore, 290 N.C. at 633, 227 S.E.2d at 558. In reaching this determination, “the label given by the judge (or the legislature) is not determinative.” Id. (parenthetical phrase in original). The Court went on to explain that a governmental agency other than a school board can properly be made the recipient of restitution in criminal cases “where the offense charged results in particular damage or loss to it over and above its normal operating costs.” Id. at 633-34, 227 S.E.2d at 559. By way of example, the Court explained that a defendant may be required to reimburse the State for court appointed counsel. Id. at 634, 227 S.E.2d at 559. In contrast, “[i]t would not, however, be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the State’s overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him.” Id.
Cauble v. Asheville addressed the disposition of fees collected by the city of Asheville for overtime parking, in violation of the city’s parking ordinance. Initially, the Court reaffirmed, over a dissent, its holding from an earlier decision in the same case that overtime parking in violation of the city ordinance constituted a violation of “the penal laws of the State.” Cauble, 314 N.C. at 601-02, 336 S.E.2d at 62 (citation omitted). Next, the Court addressed the question of how to determine the “clear proceeds” of the fines, as required under Article IX, Section 7. After reviewing older cases, the Court explained that the “clear proceeds” meant the total sum collected less only the administrative costs of collecting the fines. The Court further explained that the costs of collection do not include the costs associated with enforcing the ordinance … If we were to take the position that the costs of enforcing the penal laws of the State were a part of the collection of fines imposed by the laws, there could never be any clear proceeds of such fines to be used for the support of the public schools. This would itself contravene … Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution[.] Id. at 605-06, 336 S.E.2d at 64. iii. State v. Johnson Next, in State v, Johnson, the defendant, who had been convicted of possession of cocaine, challenged a requirement that he repay the State $100 for the expense of analyzing the cocaine found in his possession. At that time, the repayment was authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.3(b) and was labeled as “restitution.” The defendant relied on the portion of Shore which provided that “it would not … be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the State’s overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him.” Johnson, 124 N.C.App. at 470, 478 S.E.2d at 21, quoting Shore. The Johnson opinion repeatedly characterizes this portion of Shore as dicta, but nevertheless explains why the reimbursement for lab fees in drug cases is not overhead but, rather, represents reimbursement for case-specific expenses. The Court explained that “the