“materially identical.” Id. at **1, 6. However, because the parties had agreed that Johnson “does not affect this case,” the court “[left] for another day” whether its decision in United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2012) should be reconsidered. Id. at *1. The panel noted, “however, that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has begun the process of amending the career-offender guideline to delete the residual clause, bringing the Guidelines into alignment with Johnson.” Id. The government has since conceded that Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the guidelines, and that the Seventh Circuit should overrule Tichenor. See Br. of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7-14, United States v. Gillespie, No. 15-1686 (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015). For excellent additional arguments why the Seventh Circuit should overrule Tichenor, and the Eighth Circuit should overrule United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1990), see Appellant's Supplemental Brief, United States v. Matchett, No. 14-10396 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2015), .] The Department of Justice agrees as well. In a brief filed by the Criminal Division of the Appellate Section of the Department of Justice, the government conceded that Johnson’s constitutional holding regarding the ACCA’s residual clause applies to the residual clause of the career offender guideline, § 4B1.2(a)(2), and to the other guidelines that incorporate that residual clause as well. United States Attorneys Offices across the country have followed suit. [If the guideline range was increased under 2K2.1, you can specifically cite the government’s concessions in 2K2.1 cases, i.e., Pagan-Soto, Talmore, Goodwin, Grayer and Gillespie.] The Sentencing Commission also recognizes that Johnson has rendered § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause void. Because “the statutory language the Court found
833 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); Wynn v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2945 (2015) (vacating order in Wynn v. United States, No. 13-4167 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014) (same); Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2944 (2015) (vacating order in United States v. Jones, No. (3d. Cir. Feb. 20, 2015) (denying certificate of appealability to appeal denial of § 2255 motion), and four in which the prisoner had been sentenced under the ACCA, see Nipper v. Pastrana, 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015) (vacating Nipper v. Warden, 597 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of § 2241 habeas corpus petition); Coney v. Pastrana, 135 S. Ct. 2943 (2105) (vacating Coney v. Warden, 579 F. App’x 848 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); Aiken v. Pastrana, 135 S. Ct. 2940 (2015) (vacating Aiken v. Warden, 595 F. App’x 953 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); Lynch v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2942 (2015) (vacating order in Lynch v. United States, No. 14-14016E (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2015) (denying certificate of appealability to appeal denial of § 2255 motion). C. This motion is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). This motion is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), which provides for a one-year limitations period to run from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” The Supreme Court decided Johnson on June 26, 2015, and [MR. DOE] filed his claim within a year of that date. As discussed above, the Supreme Court recognized a new right in Johnson, and announced a substantive rule that is therefore retroactive to cases on collateral review. CONCLUSION