What is being fixed or improved? (How does, or could, the public sector results chain operate?) How will we help fix or improve it? (What are the inputs that make up the intervention and on what basis are they deployed?) Why will actors comply so that our assistance makes a lasting difference? (What is the theory of change?) Program goals – the ends Part A – interventions which cause functional improvements in central agencies SIGOV assumes that financial and human resources are marshalled and regulated through the central agencies to enable and require downstream ministries to undertake service provision. SIGOV inputs (primarily technical advice and guidance, and temporary capacity enhancement through external advisors) are intended to lead directly to institutional and system improvements in the functioning of some public sector central agencies (and the associated public management systems. However, coaching and confidential mentoring not considered. SIGOV assumes that the political and managerial champions within the central agencies can be helped and encouraged to support reform, at least formally. Reasonable Limited Reasonable Part B – ensuring that those improvements result in government performance improvements SIGOV assumes a model of how the public sector operates now or could operate more effectively downstream in which: (i) the right things to improve at the centre are known; and (ii) those improvements will be both necessary and sufficient for downstream service delivery performance. It ignores the need to learn by doing and to work with the distinctively strong role of MPs in determining public sector outputs at the local level in Solomon Islands. As a consequence of the weak specification of the results chain, SIGOV has little to say about prioritization or about potential interventions outside of the central agencies. Interventions are not targeted with types of service delivery in mind, or with any focus on the role of user groups or citizen pressures. Again, inputs other than technical advice and guidance, and temporary capacity enhancement through external advisors not considered. Most crucially, the intervention for Part B must embody an approach to learning how the public sector operates in practice and adjusting implementation accordingly. SIGOV offers no theory about when and why line departments and MPs should want to achieve a short term and visible impact on service delivery in the sectors. Implausible Under-developed developed
Step 1: Identify the functional problem Revisiting assumptions about the problem that matters – avoiding beginning with the preferred reform Which public sector problem areas: Are truly functional and not Are widely as Prima facie have a clear link to poor outcomes? “Weak educational outcomes for primary school children”, “teacher absenteeism is high” etc. is a functional problem. Absence of pay or a Medium Term Expenditure Framework is not a functional problem. Step 2: Diagnose “binding” constraints based on evidence Finding evidence where the binding constraint is located by showing that when the constraint is absent, then things work on additional evidence that can be gathered and reasonable judgment, what are the underlying causes of the functional problem? Why do they persist – what purpose do they serve? If late cash disbursements to the department or cash rationing are believed to be behind the poor delivery, then in periods when cash disbursements came earlier the delivery should be better. Does cash rationing provide an additional opportunity for political influence about budget distribution?