regarding the once through cooling technique used by Diablo Canyon, and system overgeneration problems related to Diablo Canyon’s constant operation. [fn. omitted] PG&E showed also that continued operation of Diablo Canyon is a bad fit in the context of California’s goal of reducing GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions in part by increasing use of renewable energy resources. This is because Diablo Canyon is a baseload, relatively inflexible resource that would exacerbate overgeneration and would result in continued curtailment of renewable resources. PG&E also admits that Diablo Canyon is no longer necessary for reliability. [fn. omitted] PG&E also projects that its load will shrink considerably by the time Diablo Canyon closes. Between 2017 and 2025, PG&E forecasts that approximately 20,000 GWh [gigawatt hours] of load will migrate to CCAs . [fn. omitted] This is comparable to the amount of bundled customer load (18,500 GWh) Diablo Canyon currently serves. In PG&E’s own words “whether CCA loads depart somewhat sooner or later than expected does not change the overall conclusion that DCPP is not needed for PG&E’s customers after the expiration of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses in 2024 and 2025.” [fn. omitted] (City and County of San Francisco Opening Brief at 3.) Other parties, while not actively supporting PG&E’s proposal, do not oppose it, including: ORA (ORA Opening Brief at 4), Alliance for Retail Energy Markets, the California Clean DG Coalition, CLECA, the Direct Access Customer Coalition, the Energy Users Forum, Marin Clean Energy, Peninsula Clean Energy, Silicon Valley Clean Energy Authority, and Sonoma Clean Power Authority (Joint Opponents Opening Brief at 2). Only one active party, CGNP, argues that Diablo Canyon should continue to operate beyond 2025. CGNP makes three substantive arguments for keeping Diablo Canyon operating: Diablo Canyon is more cost effective than the
53 CPUC 276, 295.) Absent legislative change, or Board of Equalization change, PG&E's taxes are what they are under existing law and the County's proposal will not change that fact. The County must direct its request for relief to the Legislature and the Board, not this Commission. (D.9705088 at 91100.) As in 1997, this Commission is reluctant to require ratepayers to pay for the cost of local government services that are typically paid for by taxpayers, no matter how beneficial those services may be. Absent legislative authorization, utility rates should be used to provide utility services, not government services. While Resolution E3535 subsequently did authorize ratepayer payment to the County and the School District, it is important to take into consideration what happened in between D.9705008 and Resolution E3535. As described in Resolution E3535: After the Commission's Decision was issued, the California Legislature passed into law Chapter 282, section 86600010462, paragraph 3, of Statutes of 1997. This new law states that if PG&E and the County and School District enter into a settlement that resolves claims by the latter parties relating to the effects of AB 1890 (Brulte), enacted 1996, Chapter 854, then PG&E may recover an additional amount, not to exceed $ 10 million, through base rates in 1998. (Resolution E3535 at 3.) In short, there was express legislative authorization for rate recovery for a payment to the community, which was implemented by Resolution E3535. Accordingly, ratepayer funding of the CIMP is not authorized. If legislation specifically directs this Commission to provide ratepayer funding for the CIMP (or a similar payment to the community), the Commission would do