phones, field cable on drums for pack animal transportation, and a cable wagon for the tele- graph section, which had 10 miles of single cable and 3 vibrator (telegraph) offices, one in the wagon and two portable sets with a 10- cell wet battery. Most of the equipment and the training associated with it was soon to be shown to be of little value on the Western Front. Visual signalling by heliograph was im- possible because of the mostly flat terrain and prevailing weather. The use of flags and lamps were only possible in positions where the ter- rain permitted it to be done out of sight of the enemy. The lamp was more often used, be- cause the operator did not need to stand up, and it could be seen at night. The main means of communication was by telephone and tele- graph carried by over- head wires, usually out of German artillery range, or by under- ground wire in the for- ward brigade areas. On 1 November 1914, the strength of the Company was brought back up to 203 all and 78 horses. Training for 1 CID, which for 1 Div Sigs Coy consisted mainly of con- necting the far-flung units of 1 CID by tele- phone, had begun in the face of the worst wet weather in living mem- ory. Beginning on 21 October, it rained on 89 of the next 123 days, and the Canadians lived in a sea of mud, where their uniforms never re- ally dried out. Between 4 and 6 December there was a violent storm, that blew down tents and forced training to be cancelled for several days. Gradually, the troops were placed in huts, although 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade (4 CIB) stayed in tents until it sailed to France. The 1 Div Sigs Coy was more fortunate and were put into winter quarters at Enford, a few miles north of Bulford Camp on the main road from Amesbury to Upavon. Remarkably, cases of sickness were low and the morale of the men remained high. Part of the reason was the decision of the Divisional Com-
1 Div Sigs Coy Signal Office underground. tation from the dangers of the front line to the less dangerous support line, about 300 - 400 yards behind, and then to the reserve line, about 1,000 yards in rear. A battalion usually did six days in each position, and then, if pos- sible, was removed to a reserve brigade posi- tion further back still. While the positions back of the front line would seem to be less dangerous, men there were expected to work at night bringing up supplies and ammuni- tion, digging trenches and dugouts, and dig- ging cable trenches into which was laid the telephone wire. This last duty required enor- mous amounts of work, which had to be done by the infantry, since there were insufficient men in the signal organizations. All of the work done by the men in the less dangerous positions had to be done in the open, making the men vulnerable to artillery fire. Men in the front lines were safer generally because they were below ground level. Artillery fire caused over 50 per cent of the casualties, the rest mainly by machine gun and rifle fire. The Engineers fostered improvements in the design and building of trenches, dugouts, and headquarters by the copious use of barbed wire, sandbags, timber, and corrugated iron. Within the next two years, the standard for a good defence system was set: for every 1,000 yards of front line, there had to be 1.5 million yards of barbed wire arranged in great depth, and 6 million sandbags to build up parapets above ground level, particularly in areas where the water table was high. For bombproof dugouts and headquarters re- quired 150,000 cubic yards of timber and 33,500 square yards of corrugated iron. The most essential tool was the spade; digging-in was the key to survival. For Signallers, the biggest improvement was the decision to bury all telephone cable at least six feet deep. This decision was driven by the German’s increased use of the 5.9 inch howitzer, which produced a deep crater. The 1 Div Sigs Coy mandate of 28 July 1915 to bury the cables to a depth of three feet was in-
tantly with the Lee-Enfield rifle. Although 1 CID had been re-armed earlier, the rest of the Corps was still using the Canadian Ross rifle. By this time, the Ross had been found want- ing, especially during rapid fire when it tended to jam and become inoperable. These improvements were essential as there was every indication that the Canadian Corps would be drawn into the Battle of the Somme. It began with a mammoth British Army assault on German defences on 1 July 1916, mainly to draw German reserves away from the in- tense battle at Verdun, where the French were being bled white to prevent a German victory. The opening day of the assault was a disaster as the new British divisions suffered nearly 60,000 casualties. The attacks continued until early September when most of the 1 July ob- jectives had been captured after an advance of 7,000 yards, but at a cost of nearly 200,000 ca- sualties. The battle of attrition did force the Germans to abandon their attack at Verdun, but at the Somme they still held the northern end of their position in the area of Thiepval. It was to this area that the Canadian was sent, over a distance of 50 miles, to relieve the exhausted Australian Corps. By 3 September, 1 CID had taken over 3,000 yards of the front, while 2 and 3 CIDs prepared to mount an at- tack on 15 September. 4 CID had arrived in France by the middle of August, but it was still in the Ypres Salient becoming accustomed to the routines and rigours of trench warfare. At 0620 hours, 15 September 1916, 2 and 3 CIDs attacked with Courcelette as the objec- tive. The assault was novel in two ways: the ar- tillery fire plan called for a creeping barrage and tanks were used for the first time; it was highly successful. As a surprise move, there was a second Canadian attack at 1800 hours, also a success. At the end of the week, during which 1 CID was also involved, the Canadians had made daily gains greater than any the British Army had made to date. The effort ad- vanced the front line by nearly one mile and took important ground, at a cost of nearly 7,000 casualties. Yet the main German strong points had not been taken. As a second phase
3 Brigade Sections 90 Horse lines 20 Divisional signal office 30 Line maintenance 30 DRs and Orderlies 30 “Picking Up Parties” (old wire) 5 Cooks, Batmen, Clerks 10 Total 215 The Company had only one casualty on the Somme: Cpl W.A. Taylor on 15 November 1916. The Canadian operations at the Somme cost 24,029 casualties, 31 per cent of the total strength of 77,000, for taking a num- ber of German strong points and a few trench systems, and advanced the front line about a mile. One positive result was that the CEF learned valuable lessons, mainly how not to at- tack German defences. The next offensive would see all four divisions attacking together with improved infantry tactics, improved ar- tillery support, and improved communica- tions, especially from brigade HQ forward, all vital to success. The last three months of 1916 had been less costly to Canadian Signallers in terms of casualties, in addition to Cpl W.A. Taylor there was: Capt W.W. Wilson, Paymaster for 1 Div Sigs Coy; Spr V.F. Posthill, CHQ Sig Coy; and Sgt W. Bird, Sigs Trg Depot. On 18 November 1916, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner presented awards. For his leadership at the Somme Maj T. E. Powers received the DSO and also a MiD. There were 9 awards of the MC, 3 awards of the DCM, and 20 awards of the MM. For the first time a Bar to the MM was awarded to Sgts H.J. Faulkner and E.G. Weeks, and Cpl L.P Smardon. There were 10 awards of a MiD. Another eight NCOs were commissioned from the ranks. Just as a reminder that not everyone was a saint, 1 Div Sigs Coy War Diary recorded that on 18 December 1916, the CSM was court-martialled for drunkenness, and re- duced in rank to private.