1.1.3 Participation and coordination of all relevant organizations in the structure(s) defined. Level of participation and coordination achieved (see right) 5 – Effective participation of all relevant agencies, private and public, in pre-event and event response activities. 4 – Effective participation but with some minor exceptions 3 – Participation but with significant gaps in participation, or failing to resolve some overlap, duplication etc. 2 – Some participation, perhaps between pairs of agencies – but not universal. Subject is receiving significant attention, however. 1 – Intent exists to improve coordination but so far no impact. 0 – Collaboration is poor and no intent to improve it. Effectiveness of participation and coordination can be measured by: Attendance at meetings as required with of the right level for the decisions being made; Timely and complete provision of agreed physical contributions (see below) Absence of disagreement on roles, strategy, methods etc; Achievement of planned timelines and milestones; Extent to which proven either in practice or by simulation exercises (see essential 9). Documented agreements to collaborate. 1.1.4 Co-option of physical contributions by both public and private sectors. Identification of physical contributions for each major organization. 5 – All key contributions defined for pre and post-event, underwritten by MOUs. 4 – Most key contributions defined – some minor gaps in coverage. MOUs may not exist. 3 – Some contributions formally defined but full leverage of private sector yet to be achieved. Physical contributions refer to plant and equipment, people, premises and accommodation, supplies, data, computer systems, and so on. These will supplement those provided by the city and may come from other agencies or from private sector organizations such as those defined above. The key is to have a clear view of what will be needed to supplement the city’s own resources (defined in essential 9); and then to enter into
event 2 – One or two contributions defined for specific – perhaps via informal agreements. 1 – Plans being developed to seek contributions. 0 – No private sector contribution defined. explicit MOUs with the organizations that will supply those items. 1.1.5 Coordination for all activities in the city’s area, with clarity of roles and accountability across all relevant organizations. . Presence of organizational documenting structure and role definitions at each relevant agency to achieve a single overall point of co-ordination. Structure agreed and preferably signed off by all participants via MOU or similar. 5 – Single point of coordination exists with agreed roles and responsibilities. 4 – Single point exists but with some minor exceptions. 3 – Single point in principle, but with some major omissions, or lack of agreement on some areas. 2 – Initial steps taken to create a single point of coordination. 1– No single point but plans exist to create one. 0 – No single and no plans to create one. As above – the single point may be a person or a group. Key activities will be: Day to day government (especially if provided by a stand-in entity such as the armed forces, a neighboring state etc). Longer term management of rebuilding process – an organizational arrangement is needed for including all stakeholders including citizen groups. One major issue will be the speed with which this organization can be assembled and begin operation. The post event organization should in effect be mobilized at the same time as the event response organization, and will have a high degree of continuity with it.
1.2 Integration of disaster resilience with initiatives 1.2.1 Extent to which any proposal in government is also evaluated for disaster resilience benefits or impairments. Explicit stage in policy and budget approval process where disaster resilience side benefits, or impairments, of any city government initiative are identified and counted towards the Return on Investment (ROI) for that proposal. . 5 – Explicit decision step, applied to all policy and budget proposals in all relevant functional areas. 4 – Explicit or semi-explicit decision step, applied in most and in most functional areas. 3 –No formal process, but disaster resilience benefits are generally understood to be “helpful” to a proposal, in most functional areas. 2 – Decision step sometimes applied, but very likely to be overlooked in most functional areas if a proposal would impair disaster resilience. 1 – Applied ad hoc or occasionally. 0 – Not applied. For example: Traffic management systems may also help with evacuation, so increasing disaster resilience; A development approval may locate people in harm’s way; A land use change may reduce benefit of wetlands in preventing floods. Includes, but not restricted to, the functional areas of: land use and zoning; development; water, energy; public safety; transportation; food supply; healthcare. 1.3 Capture, publication and sharing of data 1.3.1 Extent to data on the city’s resilience position is shared with other organizations involved with the city’s resilience. Availability of a single “version of the truth” – a single integrated set of resilience data for practitioners. 5 – Full availability of the information listed at on readiness and risk; fully shared with other organizations.. 4 – Some minor gaps, or the information is in more than one place – but it is shared and it is at least linked to enable navigation. Information to consider making open for public access might include: A summary of readiness – perhaps the LG SAT. The outcomes of this scorecard; An explanation of the hazards and perils that the city is thought to face, and probabilities;
3 – Some more significant gaps, for example on readiness; other organizations may have to “hunt around” to create a complete picture for themselves. 2 – Some significant information on readiness and risk is withheld from organizations or is missing and/or badly fragmented across multiple websites. 1 – Information provision to other organizations on readiness and risk is rudimentary at best. Not possible to for those organizations to derive specific conclusions for themselves. 0 – No information. A hazard-map based summary (see Essential 2) of at-risk areas; A description of what building codes will protect against, and where these have been applied; A full set of disaster response and known issues; Key roles and accountabilities; Planned investments that will affect the city’s resilience position. Further resources and contact details. 1.3.2 Extent to data on the city’s resilience position is shared with the community organizations and public. Availability of a single “version of the – a single integrated set of resilience data for citizens and community organizations containing at least the items shown at right. 5 – Full availability of the information listed at right on readiness and risk; fully shared with other community organizations and available to the public via website, mobile device etc. 4 – Some gaps, or the information is in more than one place – but it is shared and it is at least linked to enable navigation. 3 – Some more significant gaps, for example on readiness; other organizations or citizens may Information to consider making open for public access might include: A summary of readiness – perhaps the LG SAT or a summary of the outcomes of this scorecard; An explanation of the hazards and perils that the city is thought to face, and probabilities; A hazard-map based summary (see Essential 2) of at-risk areas; A description of what building codes will protect against, and where these have been applied;
Estimates of recovery time, given estimated benefit of mitigation measures, if any. Scenarios will ideally have been for reviewed for thoroughness and plausibility by a 3rd and updated in last 18 months. This is more frequently than the reviews of hazards, above, as land use and development that may affect exposure and vulnerability happens on a faster time-scale. 2.1.3 Understanding of critical assets and the linkages between these. All critical assets are identified (see Essential 8) and relationships between them are identified in the form of potential “failure chains”. This is used to disaster plans and triage (se essential 9) and also retrofits and upgrades to improve the capability of the infrastructure to withstand disasters. 5 – Critical assets are identified and systematically linked into failure chains as applicable. The city has a retrofit and triage strategy that allows it to prioritize upgrades and repairs. 4 – Critical assets and failure chains are generally identified with some minor gaps and omissions. A retrofit and triage strategy exists but it may also have gaps. 3 = Critical assets and failure chains identified to some degree but some significant omissions; or 3 = Critical assets are identified but failure chains are not. No triage or strategy is therefore possible and retrofits are prioritized, if they happen at all, by individual city departments. 1 – Identification of critical assets is patchy at best – significant gaps As identified above, critical assets are equipment, facilities, infrastructure or computer systems/data that are critical to the functioning of the city, maintenance of public safety or disaster response. While many cities will identify these, at least to some degree it is much rarer to identify how they are linked and the “failure chains” that may exist. A failure chain is a set of linked failures spanning critical assets in multiple infrastructure systems in the city. As an example – loss of an electricity substation may stop a water treatment plant from functioning; this may stop a hospital from functioning; and this in turn may mean that much of the city’s kidney dialysis capability (say) is lost. This is a failure chain that spans energy, water and healthcare systems.
together deliver the required level of disaster resilience. 1 – Plans exist but with substantial gaps. 0 – No prioritization – spending, if any, is haphazard. No plan 3.1.2 Capital funding for long run engineering and works that address scenarios and critical asset identification in Essential 2 and Essential 8. Funding for capital elements of plan(s) relative to estimated cost. Degree of protection from cuts or from taken away to be used for other purposes. 5 – Plans are 100% funded and protected. 4 – Plans are 75-100% funded and protected. 3 – Plans are 50-75% funded, and may be liable to funds being diverted for other purposes. 2 – are 25-50% funded, and liable to funds being diverted for other purposes. 1 – Plans are 0-25% funded, and routinely diverted for other purposes. 0 – No plan. If capital funds are spread across separate sources and/or organizations, the deployment of the combined funding needs to be coordinated and mutually consistent in line with the plan above. 3.1.3 Operating funding to meet all operating costs of disaster resilience activities. Funding for operating expenses relative to estimated costs: presence of separately delineated budget line item(s). Degree of protection from cuts or from being taken away to be used for other purposes. 5 – Budget exists, is 100% adequate and is protected. 4 – Budget exists, is 75-100% adequate, and is protected. 3 – Budget exists, is 50-75% adequate but is liable to diversion for other purposes. If operating funds are spread across separate sources and/or organizations, or separate budget line-items, the deployment of the combined funding needs to be coordinated and mutually consistent in line with the plan above.
“most severe” scenario (Essential 2). 4 – Incentives/financing for most of the population with minor gaps in coverage of issues. 3 = Incentives/financing exist for most neighborhoods but gaps in issue coverage exist. 3 = Incentives exist for some issues but neighborhood coverage gaps exist. 1 – Significant weakness in coverage of the city, coverage of issues or in level of adequacy. 0 – No incentives. 3.3.2 Domestic insurance coverage Extent of coverage of domestic housing. (Personal or life coverage is not assessed). 5 – 75 - 100% of likely housing losses from “most severe” scenario are covered city-wide by insurance. 4 – 75-100% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered city-wide. 3 – 50-75% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered city-wide. 2 – 25-50% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered city-wide. 1 – 0-25% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered 0 – No cover. This assessment covers insurance on domestic dwellings. Personal or life coverage is excluded. Governmental, industrial and commercial insurance is covered below. Insurance may come from multiple public or private providers.
3.3.3 Incentives to businesses organizations to improve disaster resilience – disaster plans, premises etc. Existence of incentives to help business owners take to improve disaster resilience to a standard to deal with the “most severe” scenario (Essential 2). 5 – Incentives are visibly achieving (or have achieved) required results evenly with businesses across the city. 4 – Incentives are generally effective but with some minor shortcomings perhaps in some areas. 3 = Incentives have larger gaps in coverage of the economic base. 3 = Incentives have larger gaps in coverage of the required issues. 1 – Incentives have major weaknesses and have so far failed to achieve their purpose 0 – No incentives. Incentives and financing may come from multiple sources. 3.3.4 Incentives to non-profit organizations to improve disaster resilience – disaster premises etc. Existence of incentives to help non-profits take to improve disaster resilience to a standard to deal with the “most severe” scenario (Essential 2). 5 – Incentives are visibly achieving (or have achieved) required results evenly with non profits across the city. 4 – Incentives are generally effective but with some shortcomings perhaps in some areas. 3 = Incentives have larger gaps in coverage of the non-profit base. 3 = Incentives have larger gaps in coverage of the required issues. 1 – Incentives have major weaknesses and have so far failed to achieve their purpose Incentives and financing may come from multiple sources. Non profits may be directly concerned with disaster resilience issues (for example, emergency response groups, neighborhood watch, food kitchens); or indirectly (for example, churches, environmental watch or similar).
organizations and citizens. 0 – No incentives. 3.3.5 Non-domestic insurance coverage Extent of insurance coverage of non-domestic property, infrastructure and assets. 5 – 75 - 100% of likely losses from most severe scenario are covered by insurance. 4 – 75-100% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered city-wide. 3 – 50-75% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered city-wide. 2 – 25-50% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered city-wide. 1 – 0-25% of likely losses from “most probable” scenario are covered 0 – No cover. This question covers insurance to commercial, industrial property and assets, as well as to NGO-, government- or city-owned buildings, assets and infrastructure. Domestic insurance is covered above. Insurance may come from multiple providers. Some governments and agencies and some businesses may self-insure. It will be necessary to confirm that exist to meet the likely needs. 3.4 Financing of resilience expenditures. 3.4.1 Pursuit of all possible methods of financing and funding, as required. Where a city has outstanding resilience expenditure needs (revenue or capital) – the extent to which it has pursued all possible financing strategies and funding sources. 5 – The city has a systematic inventory of financing methods and all potential sources of funds for different resilience expenditures, and a strategy for using them in ways that complements its own resources. 4 – The city knows of many funding methods and uses them, but not (If no additional financing needs apply, omit this assessment). Alternative financing methods and sources may include, but are not restricted to: Leasing;
necessarily systematically or as part of an overall strategy. 3 – The city has a good range of funding sources and financing methods but uses them in an ad hoc way – some opportunities may be missed or sometimes external funds duplicate internal activity. 2 – The city knows of some funding sources and alternative financing strategies, and uses these from time to time, but some needed expenditures are not made when in fact funds might have been available. 1 – The city has only just begun to explore alternative financing methods and funding sources – it may have used them once. 0 – No exploration of financing methods and funding sources. Government grants, including matching grants; Social impact or resilience bonds (payment for results achieved); Development banks and aid organizations; Foundations that may have a direct interest in some aspect of resilience – for example a conservation NGO might support restoration of ecosystem services, or an education NGO might support awareness and training; Other government agencies that may have a direct interest in some aspect of resilience – for example where a transportation agency finances a new bridge that may also improve evacuation capacity; Crowd-funding; Development fees; Public-private partnerships; Taxes and surcharges.
4 – No loss of agricultural land from “most probable” scenario. 3 – <2.5% of agricultural land at risk from “most probable” scenario. 2 – 2.5-5% of agricultural land at risk from “most probable” scenario. 1 – 5-7.5% of agricultural land at risk from “most probable” scenario. 0 - >7.5% of agricultural land at risk from “most probable” scenario. Loss is for 6 months or longer. Effectiveness of zoning should ideally be independently validated (see also Essential 2). 4.1.2 Economic activity at risk. % of employment at risk 5 – No loss of employment from “most severe” scenario. 4 – No loss of employment from “most probable” scenario 3 – <2.5% of employment at risk from “most probable” scenario 2 – 2.5-5% of employment at risk from “most probable” scenario 1 – 5-7.5% of employment risk from “most probable” scenario 0 - >7.5% of employment at risk from “most probable” scenario Employment is at risk from damage to farmland, factories, offices, and so on. Loss is for 3 months or longer. Effectiveness of zoning should ideally be independently validated (see also Essential 2). % of business output at risk 5 – No loss of business output from “most severe” scenario. 4 – No loss of business output from “most probable” scenario. Business output measured in financial terms. This assessment also includes loss through business being forced to relocate elsewhere, even if only temporarily, due to loss of premises or facilities, loss of markets, loss of
preventing exposure (See also essential 5 on ecosystem services) 3 – <2.5% of business output at risk from “most probable” scenario. 2 – 2.5-5% of business output at risk from “most probable” scenario. 1 – 5-7.5% of business output risk from “most probable” scenario. 0 - >7.5% of business output at risk from “most probable” scenario. services from the city or loss of workforce through inability to reach their place of work. Loss is for 3 months or longer. Effectiveness of zoning should ideally be independently validated (see also Essential 2). 4.1.3 Potential population displacement. % of population at risk of displacement 5 – No population displacement from “most severe” scenario. 4 – No population displacement from “most probable” scenario. 3 – <2.5% population displacement from “most probable” scenario. 2 – 2.5-5% population displacement from “most probable” scenario. 1 – 5-7.5% population displacement from “most probable” scenario. 0 - >7.5% population displacement from “most probable” scenario. Displacement for 3 months or longer as a consequence of housing being destroyed or rendered uninhabitable, or the area in which it is located being rendered uninhabitable. This assessment also needs to cover informal and unplanned settlements. Effectiveness of zoning should ideally be independently validated (see also Essential 2). 4.2 Building codes 4.2.1 Existence of building codes designed to address risks identified in Essential 2. Existence of applicable to all physical assets. Codes exist that will ensure: 1– Zero damage (to the point safety risk) from “most severe” scenario. 4 – Zero damage (to the point of safety risk) from “most probable” scenario. Building codes should be specifically evaluated for ability to deal with “most probable” and “most severe” scenarios in Essential 2. It may make sense to subdivide the city by region or neighborhood.
4.2.3 Updates to building codes. Conformity of statutory codes with latest standards in building practice and with perils faced. 5 – are or will be reviewed for suitability for “most severe” scenario and updated every 5 years or more frequently. They embody the latest standards in building practice. 4 – Codes are or will be reviewed for suitability for the “most probable” scenario every 10 years. They may not embody the very latest standards in building practice. 3 – Codes are or will be reviewed for suitability for the “most probable” scenario every 10 years. They probably do not embody the very latest standards in building practice. 2 – Codes are or will be reviewed for suitability for the “most probable” every 15 years or longer. They are known to be obsolete in significant respects. 1 – Codes exist, but are not reviewed at all, and no there are no plans for this. They are wholly obsolete. 0 – No codes. may be updated as building practice evolves or as new needs (for example an increased storm risk) dictate. 4.3. New development 4.3.1 design solutions that increase resilience. Use of urban design solutions to improve resilience, often by maximizing the extent and benefit of ecosystem services within the city (see also Essential 5). 5 – Systematic use of design solutions to improve resilience throughout the city, enforced by codes. Assumed to be “the norm”. 4 – Widespread use of urban design features but some missed opportunities. Proposals to use urban design solutions that can improve resilience will include, but are not limited to: soakaways and porous pavement used to deal with urban storm-water run-off and replenish ground water;
design solutions are likely to be favourably received but not mandated.. 3 – Some use of urban design features – perhaps in some areas, or perhaps concentrating on one or two solutions. Their use is not assured but the argument for using them can be made depending on each case. 2 – Scattered use of urban design solutions, but interest in expanding this. 1 – Little use and little interest. 0 – No use and no interest. underground parking garages used as holding tanks for storm water, and parks that function as flood zones; green roofs to help cool buildings and reduce storm run-off; trees and greenery to reduce heat-island effects, or stabilize hillsides; neighbourhood micro-grids or roof-top generation as back-up to the main energy supply. 4.3.2 Sustainable building design standards Use of sustainable building design standards such as LEED, GreenStar and BREEAM to improve resilience. 5 – Systematic specification of meaningful building standards for all new-build or retrofit, enforced by codes. Assumed to be “the norm”. 4 – Widespread use of green building standards, but some missed opportunities. Proposals to use such standards are likely to be favourably received but not mandated. 3 – Some use of green building standards – perhaps in the downtown area. Their use is not assured but the argument for using them can be made depending on each case. 2 – Scattered use of building standards developing on the Sustainable building designs can improve resilience by: reducing demand for energy and water; dealing better with heat events; incorporating features such as green roofing that also helps to control storm water runoff;
Essential 5: Safeguard Natural Buffers to Enhance the Protective Functions Offered by Natural Ecosystems Essential 5 addresses the identification, monitoring and protection of critical ecosystem services that confer a disaster resilience benefit. Relevant ecosystem services may include, but are not limited to: water retention or water infiltration; afforestation; urban vegetation; floodplains; sand dunes; mangrove and other coastal vegetation; and pollination. Many ecosystem services that are relevant to the city’s resilience may be provided well outside its geographical area. The essential includes: Recognising value and benefits from ecosystem services for disaster risk prevention, protect and /or enhance them as part of risk reduction strategies for cities. Integrating ecosystem services for more resilience into urban land use management, urban design and into relevant investment projects. Considering also natural buffers in the rural hinterland of the city and wider region, and cooperation with municipalities there to establish a regional approach of land use planning to protect the buffers. Anticipating changes from climate trends and urbanization and planning to enable ecosystem services to withstand these. Integration of ecosystem services for more urban resilience into urban land use management, urban design and into relevant investment projects, is covered in Essential 4. Note that ecosystem services that benefit a city may be located many miles away (for example, where upstream forests may manage floodwater to the benefit of cities on downstream floodplains). Ecosystem services may not be recognized or even suspected, and you may require external expertise to identify them. But if there really are no ecosystem services that affect your city’s disaster resilience, omit this section. Ecosystem services that offer a generalized, planetary benefit (for example, polar icecaps) are excluded. Data you will need to complete this section of the scorecard will include: land use and zoning documentation, plus data on the extent and health of relevant ecosystems as measured by applicable indicators. Subject/Issue Item measured Indicative Measurement Indicative Measurement Scale Comments
6.2 Public education and awareness 6.2.1 Exposure of public to education and awareness materials/messaging. Coordinated public relations and education campaign exists, with structured messaging, channels, and delivery. 5 - Systematic, structured campaign exists using at least 6 of the media at right, via neighborhood mobilization (see essential 7), and schools outreach. 4 – Campaign uses at least 5 of the media/channels above, including 1 of neighborhood mobilization and schools outreach. 3 - Campaign uses at 4 of the media/channels above; also weighted to least informative such as radio and poster ads. 2 – Campaign uses 3 of the media/channels above; also weighted to least informative such as radio and poster ads. 1 – Ad hoc – no structured education and awareness campaign as such. 0 - No education work. Likely to be based on information made public – see Essential 1. Media may include: Print – books, newspapers, leaflets, fliers; School and college teaching material; TV – advertisements. Documentaries, news features; Radio – as for TV; Web – websites, advertisements, content on city web-sites; – as for web but also social media – Twitter, Facebook, Weebo etc; Possibly also create specialist app for city’s disaster resilience information; Posters – on buildings, busses, trains, city offices. Material may come from multiple agencies and sources, but should have coordinated messages. Schools and colleges may be an especially important channel; also churches, neighborhood groups, libraries. Exposures per member of the public, per month to messaging 5 - Average 1 or more exposures per person per week, city-wide. 4 - Average 1 exposure per person per two weeks, city-wide. Exposures established, for example, via traffic counts (web sites, mobile), audience figures (TV, radio), road traffic counts (ie, road traffic past posters), and so on.
not be city-wide or reach all participants. 2 – Two-yearly refreshers and emergency drill cycle but may not be city-wide or reach all participants. 1 – Ad hoc refreshers and emergency drills – timing, attendance and content depends on enthusiasm of local organization. 0 - No refreshers or emergency drills. 6.4 Languages 6.4.1 Accessibility of education and training to all linguistic groups in the city. Availability of all education and training in all languages spoken in the city. 5 – Available for 100% of linguistic groups and 100% of the population. 4 – Available for 95% of the population irrespective of language. 3 – Available for 90% of the population irrespective of language. 2 – Available for 85% of the population irrespective of language. 1 – Available for 80% of the population irrespective of language. Cities with high numbers of different languages may need to settle for a selection of languages that reaches everyone as a first or second language. Validation will be required that 100% of population is being reached in this way.
1 – Even networking is limited and learning potential is therefore also limited. 0 – No attempt to learn from others. Essential 7: Increase societal and cultural resilience Social “connectedness” and a culture of mutual help has a major impact on the actual outcomes of disasters of any given magnitude. These can be encouraged by measures that include: Establishing and maintaining neighbourhood emergency response groups and training; Engaging and co-opting civil society organizations – churches, youth groups, clubs, advocacy groups (for example for the disabled); Providing community groups with “unvarnished” data on risk scenarios, the current level of response capabilities and thus the situation they may need to deal with; Formulation of neighbourhood by reference to such groups (see Essential 9); Offering education, training and support to such groups; Undertaking formal or informal censuses of who may be vulnerable and less able to help themselves, in each neighbourhood, and understanding from them what their needs are; Using government “touch-points” with the public such as welfare or social services visits and offices, police, libraries and museums to build awareness and understanding; Ensuring that the education curriculum within schools, higher education, universities and the workplace to includes disaster awareness and training; Recognize the role of cultural heritage in building resilience and protecting the sites, structures and artefacts they represent. Engaging with employers as a communications channel with their workforces for disaster awareness, business continuity planning and training; Engage local media in capacity building (TV, print, social media, etc); Mobile and web-based “systems of engagement” (for example, crowdsourcing or disseminating data on preparedness). Translation of all materials into all languages used in the city.
event, and regularly thereafter to confirm safety, issues, needs etc. 100% of residents will be contacted within 12 hours of an event. 4 – 90% of residents within 12 hours 3 – 80% of residents 2 – 70% of residents 1 – 50% or less of residents 0 – No volunteers. disasters, and also in reducing opportunistic crime following an event. Connectedness is however difficult to measure directly. This assessment is written in terms of specifically identified volunteers and organizations, taking these as a proxy measurement for connectedness. In addition, the “reasonable confidence” standard is inherently subjective. As well as this proxy measurement, therefore, other factors that you may also wish to take into account will include: A history of people in each neighborhood meaningfully helping each other after previous events; A strong fabric of community organizations in general, even if not focused on disaster resilience in the first instance. 7.1.4 Engagement of vulnerable segments of the population. Evidence of disaster resilience planning with or for the relevant groups covering the span of the vulnerable population. Confirmation from groups of effective engagement. 5 – All groups are regularly engaged on disaster resilience issues and they or their representatives confirm as such. 4 – All major groups (measured by membership % of those defined as vulnerable in the city as a whole) are engaged – some minor gaps. 3 – One or more gaps in coverage or effective engagement. Vulnerable segments of the population include, as examples: Those in areas of high poverty; Transient or nomadic communities; The elderly; Physically or mentally sick or disabled; Children; Non-native language speakers.
2 – Multiple major gaps in coverage or effective engagement 1 – Generalized failure to engage. 0 – No groups specifically identified. Engagement may be through neighborhood organizations or via specialist government organizations, charities, NGOs etc. may also function as “grass roots” organizations (see above) (Public awareness, education and training materials – see Essential 7) 7.2 Private sector / employers 7.2.1 Extent to which employers act as a channel with employees. Proportion of employers that pass resilience communications to employers, and allow limited time off for resilience volunteer activities. 5 – 50% of employers with more than 10 employees takes part in communicating with their workforce about resilience issues/ 10% take part in resilience training and allow small amounts of time off for resilience volunteer activities. 4 – 40%/8%... 3 – 30%/5%... 2 – 20%/3%... 1 – 10%/1%... 0 – 0%/0%... Employees can act as an important communications conduit to employees on resilience issues, especially in the area of hazards faced and preparation – which are also likely to benefit them in the form of better continuity of operations after an event. 7.2.2 Business continuity planning Proportion of business with a business continuity plan 5 – All employers with more than 10 employees have some form of business continuity plan based on a planning assumptions validated by the city. 4 – 80%... 3 – 50%... While business continuity plans are the concern of each business, their presence and effectiveness will play a major role in how rapidly the city’s economy restarts after a disaster. Therefore cities need to be proactive in persuading businesses to undertake continuity plans, based on a shared view of the hazards and issues likely to arise.
2 – 30% 1 – 10% or less 0 – 0% or don’t know. 7.3 “Systems of Engagement” 7.3.1 Use of mobile and e-mail “systems of engagement” to enable citizens to receive and give updates before and after a disaster Use of mobile and social computing-enabled systems of engagement (supported by 5 – All information before, during and after an event is available on mobile devices; this is supported by alerts on social media; this is also used to enable an in-bound “citizen to government” flow allowing crowd sourcing of data on events and issues. 4 – Extensive use is made of systems of engagement, with a few minor omissions. 3 – Some use is made, but there are larger gaps in the information available by this means and the in-bound flow works only via direct communication rather than mining of data generally. 2 – As for 3 but with no inbound flow. 1 – Only rudimentary use of systems of engagement – perhaps only via mobile access to the existing website which may not have been optimized for smartphones etc – but interest in expanding this. “Systems of engagement” is the term given to mobile device/social media and e-mail-based systems to pass information to individuals and also to capture information from them. They are usually paired with “systems of record” which are back-office and enterprise systems (such as the emergency management system). Data capture may be directly, where a citizen directly contacts the city government, or via a data-mining – for example where some governments in Australia mine data from Twitter and SMS to gain an extra source of intelligence on wildfire outbreaks and status.
1 – 25-50% 0 - >50% of annual billed revenue 8.4 sanitation 8.4.1 Customer service days at risk of loss. “Water/sanitation loss factor”. If a = estimated # of days to restore regular service area-wide b = % of user accounts affected … then water/sanitation loss factor = a x b (Example – 1.5 day’s loss of service for 10% of user accounts in city = loss factor of 15%; 3 days’ loss of service for 50% of user accounts in city = loss factor of 150%) 5 – No loss of service even from “most severe” scenario 4 – No loss of service even from “most probable” scenario 3 – Loss factor of 1-25% from most probable” scenario 2 – Loss factor of 25-100% from “most probable” scenario 1 – Loss factor of 100-200% from “most probable” scenario 0 – Loss factor >200% from “most probable” scenario Loss of service refers to service from the main water or sanitation system for the neighborhood or city, if present. It excludes the use of back up supplies or portable sanitation systems. If the main supply is a localized water supply or sanitation system (eg well or septic tank), this may in fact prove more than a city-wide system. Loss of service needs to be assessed relative to the “normal” state. For example: If “normal” service is potable running water in every house, 24 hours a day - then loss of service needs to be assessed as the removal or diminution of this service; If “normal” is running water for washing but not drinking, 24 hours a day - then loss should be assessed relative to this; If “normal” is either of the above but only for some hours a day, then the loss is relative to the “normal” number of hours – ie, where user accounts have even fewer hours a day of availability until service is restored; If “normal” is standpipes or communal toilets, then loss is relative to this - the loss factor will be calculated by
a = estimated # of days to restore regular service area-wide b = % of critical assets affected … then GCA loss factor = a x b (Example – 1.5 day’s loss of service for 10% of critical assets in city = loss factor of 15%; 3 days’ loss of service for 50% of critical assets in city = loss factor of 150%) 4 – No loss of service even from “most probable” scenario 3 – Loss factor of 1-25% from most probable” scenario 2 – Loss factor of 25-100% from “most probable” scenario 1 – Loss factor of 100-200% from “most probable” scenario 0 – Loss factor >200% from “most probable” scenario Essential for the operation of some part of mains gas system for the city; Essential for the functioning of some other critical asset (say, a Service may be provided either from the asset itself or via a designated alternative/back-up. 8.5.4 Cost of restoration of service Likely cost of lost service and restoration as % of annual billed revenue 5 – No loss of service. 4 - 10% of annual billed revenue 3 – 10-15% 2 – 15-25% 1 – 25-50% 0 - >50% of annual billed revenue. This assessment is designed to help establish the return on investment from investing in hardening the relevant infrastructure, in reducing the burden of restoring the city to normal life after a disaster. 8.6 Transportation 8.6.1 Road – service from road system at risk of loss Road loss factor – if: a = miles of major road network for city and surrounding area at risk of becoming impassable to any type of vehicle after event b = likely number of days estimated before reopening, 5 – No loss of service even from “most severe” scenario 4 – No loss of service even from “most probable” scenario 3 – Loss factor of 1-25% from most probable” scenario 2 – Loss factor of 25-100% from “most probable” scenario Loss of service refers to general road mobility. It primarily refers to damage to road surfaces or bridges and tunnels, or from fallen debris from buildings, cliffs etc.
c = total of major roads in the city and surrounding area lost for one day …then road loss factor = (a/c) x b as a % (Example - 10 miles of major road likely to be lost for two days, out of total of 100 miles of major road = road loss factor of 20% ((10/100) x 2) 1 – Loss factor of 100-200% from “most probable” scenario 0 – Loss factor >200% from “most probable” scenario 8.6.2 Road – survival of critical access and evacuation routes Road critical asset (RCA) loss factor. If: a = carrying capacity (vehicles per hour) of evacuation/emergency supply routes to and from the city at risk of becoming impassable event. b = # of days estimated before reopening c = carrying capacity (vehicles per hour) of all designated critical evacuation/emergency supply routes … then RCA loss factor = (a/c) x b as a % (Example –route with carrying capacity of 1,000 vehicles per hour likely to be closed for 3 days, out of a total carrying capacity on all evacuation/ 5 – No loss of service even from “most severe” scenario 4 – No loss of service even from “most probable” scenario 3 – Loss factor of 1-25% from most probable” scenario 2 – Loss factor of 25-100% from “most probable” scenario 1 – Loss factor of 100-200% from “most probable” scenario 0 – Loss factor >200% from “most probable” scenario Loss of service on critical access and evacuation routes should if possible also include an estimate of the likely impact of traffic gridlock on access or evacuation rates.
8.6.6 Other public transport (if applicable) (Buses and taxis effectively captured in road measures above). 5 – No loss of service even from “most severe” scenario 4 – No loss of service even from “most probable” scenario 3 – Loss factor of 1-10% from most probable” scenario 2 – Loss factor of 20% from “most probable” scenario 1 – Loss factor of 30% from “most probable” scenario 0 – Loss factor >30% from “most probable” scenario Omit if not applicable. 8.7 Law and Order, First responders 8.7.1 Protection of critical law and assets. “Law & critical asset (LOCA) loss factor”. If a = estimated # of designated critical law and assets rendered inoperable by the event b = # of designated critical law and order assets … then LOCA loss factor = a/b expressed as % (Note – days loss of use is not relevant here as these are assets are most likely to be needed right after the event) 5 – No loss of service even from “most severe” scenario 4 – No loss of service even from “most probable” scenario 3 – Loss factor of 1-10% from most probable” scenario 2 – Loss factor of 20% from “most probable” scenario 1 – Loss factor of 30% from “most probable” scenario 0 – Loss factor >30% from “most probable” scenario Critical law and order/responder assets include such items as: Vehicles (fire-fighting, ambulances, police vehicles) Helicopters and aircraft Emergency food and aid stocks/supplies; Shelters; Back-up generators; (Communications systems – see above) (Operations centers – see (Key buildings – see below);
(Critical IT systems – see below). Service may be provided either from the asset itself or via a designated alternative/back-up. 8.7.2 Disaster resilience of prison system Ability of prison system to survive “most probable” and “most severe”, scenarios, without releasing or harming inmates. Under “most severe” scenario: 5 – No loss 4 – Some minor damage to facilities is probable – no less of life or loss of custody 3 – Significant damage to facilities is probable but no loss of life or custody. 2 – Significant damage to facilities and possible risk of loss of life or custody 1 - Significant damage to facilities and possible significant risk of loss of life or custody 0 – Widespread generalized failure to keep inmates in place, safely, Includes police station cells or other detention facilities blocks as well as prisons. 8.8 Education facilities 8.8.1 Structural safety of education facilities % of education structures at risk of damage from “most probable” and “most severe” scenarios 5 – No teaching facilities at risk even from “most severe” 4 – No teaching facilities at risk from “most probable” 3 – 1-5% of teaching facilities at risk from “most probable” 2 – 5-10% of teaching facilities at risk from “most probable” Some schools may be assessed as critical assets as they provide shelter – see Essential 9.
1 – 10-15% of teaching facilities at risk from “most probable” 0 – >15% of teaching facilities at risk from “most probable” 8.8.2 Loss of teaching time Number of teaching days lost as % of total in academic year. 5 – No loss of teaching days 4 – 1% of annual teaching days lost from “most severe”; 0.5% from “most probable”. 3 – 5% of annual teaching days lost from “most severe”; 2.5% from “most probable”. 2 – 10% of annual teaching days lost from “most severe”; 5% from “most probable”. 1 – 20% of annual teaching days lost from “most severe”; 10% from “most probable”. 0 – > 20% of annual teaching days lost from “most severe”; >10% from “most probable”. Teaching may continue to be provided in the original facilities or in designated alternative facilities. However, this assessment needs to include an estimate of the impact of teachers either injured or unable to get to work. 8.8.3 Education data % of critical education data and associated applications imaged at remote site. 5 – All critical education data and associated apps routinely backed up and processable within 24 hours at a remote site not known to be vulnerable to any events affecting the city 4 – 90% or more of critical education data, with associated apps… (Communications disaster resilience – see above).
2 – 2.5-5% of critical annual bed days lost from “most probable” scenario 1 – 5-7.5% of critical annual bed days lost from “most probable” scenario 0 –>7.5% of critical annual bed days lost from “most probable” scenario 8.9.2 Health records and data % of patient and health system data and associated apps stored and processable at location unlikely to be affected by the event. 5 – All critical healthcare data and associated apps routinely backed up and processable within 1 hour at a remote site not known to be vulnerable to any events affecting the city 4 – 95% or more of critical healthcare data, with associated apps. 3 – 90% or more of critical healthcare data, with associated apps. 2 – 85% or more of critical healthcare data, with associated apps. 1 – 80% or more of critical healthcare data, with associated apps. 0 – Less than 80% or more of critical healthcare data, with associated apps. Healthcare data covers: Personal medical records and histories Dental records (may be needed for identification of victims); Critical operating data for healthcare facilities. (Communications disaster resilience – see above). Loss of data needs to be assessed relative to what pre-existed the disaster. 8.9.3 Availability of emergency healthcare including facilities and urgent medical supplies for acute needs. Sufficient acute healthcare capabilities exist to deal with expected major injuries. 5 – 100% of injuries in “most probable” scenario; and 90% of major injuries in “most severe” scenario, can be treated within 6 hours. 4 – 100% of major injuries in “most probable” scenario; and 90% of major This assessment needs to take into account estimated losses in critical bed days, above.
injuries in “most severe” scenario, can be treated within 12 hours. 3 – 100% of major injuries in “most probable” scenario; and 90% of major injuries in “most severe” scenario, can be treated within 18 hours. 2 – 100% of major injuries in “most probable” scenario; and 90% of major injuries in “most severe” scenario, can be treated within 24 hours. 1 – 100% of major injuries in “most probable” scenario; and 90% of major injuries in “most severe” scenario, can be treated within 36 hours. 0 – Longer than 36 or no emergency healthcare capability. 8.10 Administrative operations 8.10.1 Assurance of continuity of all critical administration functions. Estimated # of days disruption to critical administration services under “most probable” and “most severe” scenarios, given availability of redundant facilities, support staff etc. 5 – No disruption to services even under “most severe” scenario 4 – No disruption to services under “most probable” scenario 3 - Minor disruptions (few hours or less) under “most probable” scenario 2 – Some significant disruptions for up to 48 hours or less under “most probable” scenario 1 – Significant disruptions for 48 hours – 5 days under “most probable” scenario Critical administration functions will include those that directly affect the well being of the public or individuals. For example: Payment of food-stamps or unemployment benefit; Housing offices; Reporting of damage after the disaster; Trash collection and disposal (impacts from road closures are covered above). (Healthcare and education – see above). (Critical IT systems – see below)
0 – Generalized failure of services for > 5 days The assessment of disruption is intended to apply at the neighborhood level, for example with closure of or damage to neighborhood offices. 8.11 Computer systems and data 8.11.1 Assurance of continuity of computer systems and data critical to government continuity. % of critical applications and associated data (to include social services and other personal records) imaged at, and accessible from, remote site. 5 – All critical apps and data routinely backed up and processable within 1 hour at a remote site not known to be vulnerable to any events affecting the city 4 – 90% or more of critical apps, with associated data… 3 – 80% or more of critical apps, with associated data… 2 – 70% or more of critical apps, with associated data… 1 – 60% or more of critical apps, with associated data… 0 – Less than 60% of critical apps, with associated data… This assessment is focused on the computer systems required for the critical administration functions identified above. (Communications disaster resilience – see above). (Health and Education data – see above) 8.11.2 Assurance of continuity of computer systems and data critical to % of critical applications and associated imaged at, and accessible from, remote site. 5 – All critical apps and data routinely backed up and processable within 15 minutes at a remote site not known to This assessment is focused on the SCADA systems, PLCs, control rooms, logistics and planning systems and so on that are required
Triage policies; Incorporation of contributions from citizen/grass roots organization. Elements of emergency management plans may be linked to, and tested through, plans for “regular” events such as sporting fixtures, carnivals or parades (see below). 9.3 Staffing/responder needs 9.3.1 capacity of police also to support first responder duties Sufficient back-up or capacity to maintain law and order in “most severe” and “most probable” scenarios, in addition to supporting burden of first responder duties. 5 – capacity exists and is tested either via actual events or practice drills for scenarios in Essential 2 – coverage of all neighborhoods will be possible within 4 hours. 4 – Adequate capacity nominally exists but is untested. 3 – Surge capacity exists but is known or suspected to have minor inadequacies, perhaps in location, numbers. Coverage of all neighborhoods within 4-12 hours. 2 – Coverage of all neighborhoods within 12-48 1 – Coverage of all neighborhoods within 48-72 hours. 0 – No surge capacity identified. This capacity may come from other agencies such as the Army or civil defense force but needs to be confirmed via MOU or similar. 9.3.2 Definition of first responder and other staffing needs, availability – including fire, ambulance, Staffing needs are defined for “most probable” and “most severe” scenarios. 5 – Needs defined, either from actual events or from practice drills for scenarios in Essential 2, taking into account the role of volunteers. Different national response standards may apply in this area.
healthcare, neighborhood support etc. 4 – Needs defined independently of latest scenarios. 3 – Some needs defined but with some gaps for specific professions or for specific areas of the city. 2 –Needs definition has more serious shortcomings. 1 –Needs definition is essentially nominal or guesswork. 0 - No defined (or no plan – see above). Parts of this capacity may come from other agencies such as the Army or civil defense force. Estimated shortfall in staff/responders per defined needs – potentially from multiple sources. MOUs exist for non city sources, especially from private sector. 5 - Staffing and responders to be available either from actual events or practice drills for scenarios in Essential 2, in line with defined needs for “most severe” scenario. 4 - Staffing and responders known to be available in line with defined needs for “most probable” scenario. 3 – Shortfall of <5% of ideal staff numbers from “most probable”. 2 – Shortfall of 5-10% of ideal staff numbers. 1 – Shortfall of >10% of ideal staff numbers. 0 - No definition of needs – see above. Different national response standards may apply in this area.
9.4 Equipment and relief supply needs 9.4.1 Definition of equipment and supply needs, and availability of equipment. Equipment and supply needs are defined for “most probable” and “most severe” scenarios in essential 2 5 – defined, keyed to scenarios from essential 2, and take into account the role of volunteers. 4 – defined independently of latest scenarios 3 – Some needs defined but with some gaps for specific professions or for specific areas of the city. 2 –Needs definition has more serious shortcomings. 1 –Needs definition is essentially nominal or guesswork. 0 - No needs defined (or no plan). Equipment includes: Police, fire and ambulance vehicles, and fuel; Helicopters, planes as applicable, and fuel; Rescue equipment; Medical supplies; Bulldozers, excavators, debris trucks (may be supplied by private organizations); Local emergency response IT systems, hand-held devices. (Medical/hospital – see Essential 8) Estimated shortfall in available equipment per defined needs – potentially from multiple sources. MOUs exist for non city sources, especially from private sector. 5 – Equipment known to be available in line with defined needs for “most severe” scenario. 4 – Equipment to be available in line with defined needs for “most probable” scenario. 3 – Shortfall of <5% of ideal equipment numbers for key items. 2 – Shortfall of 5-10% of ideal equipment numbers for key items. 1 – Shortfall of >10% of ideal equipment numbers for key items. Equipment defined as above.
2 - Negative outcome – estimated shelter gap is 10%. 1 - Negative outcome – estimated shelter gap is 15%. 0 - Negative outcome – estimated shelter gap is 20%. or more owners of shelter facilities/safe places should be engaged via MOUs or similar. “Shelter gap” – ability of shelters to withstand disaster events and remain safe and usable. Under “most severe” scenario: 5 – All designated shelter places are assessed as likely to safely withstand a “most severe” event. 4 – 90% of shelter places are assessed as likely to safely withstand a “most severe” 3 - 80% of shelter places are assessed as likely to safely withstand a “most severe” event. 2 - 70% of shelter places are assessed as likely to protect in “most severe” event. 1 – 50% of shelter places are assessed as likely to safely withstand a “most severe” 0 – Less than 50%, are assessed as likely to withstand a “most severe “event. This applies to shelters in which people may have taken refuge prior to an event (for example a hurricane, where there will be some hours warning); or shelters to which people may be directed after the event. 9.5.3 Ability to meet likely needs for staple goods. “Staples gap” - % shortfall in supply within 24 hours relative to demand Under “most severe” scenario: Cities will need to compile of critical staple items, as these are to some extent
9.7 Drills 9.7.1 Practices and rehearsals – involving both the public and professionals. Testing of plans annually, by reference to simulated emergency and actual events. . 5 - Annual suite of drills validated by professionals to be realistic representation of “most severe” and “most probable” scenarios. 4 – Annual suite of drills broadly thought to be realistic. 3 – Annual suite of drills but not realistic in some significant respects. 2 – Less than annual drills. 1 – Ad hoc partial exercises – not all scenarios tested, not realistic. 0 – No exercises (or no plans – see above). Drills to include use of/response to education and healthcare facilities. Drills linked to public engagement and training – see essential 6. Specific emergency drills may be supplemented by use of sporting events, rallies, parades and other local activities, and also minor versions of the disaster event (eg minor flooding, weaker earthquakes) to: Practice aspects of emergency response such as crowd management; Test carrying capacity of potential evacuation routes; Evaluate response and access times, etc. (These may also be used for disaster awareness). 9.7.2 Effectiveness of drills and training of effectiveness of drills 5 – All professional and public participants in drills show strong evidence of having absorbed training. 4 – Most participants show evidence of having absorbed training, with some minor issues. 3 – One or more issues with training evident from outcome of drills. 2 – Several significant skills or knowledge gaps revealed. Requires evaluation of every drill after completion. Training delivery and level of participation – see essentials 6 & 7.
Arrangements to ensure social equality – equality of attention, inputs, funding, priority across all neighborhoods. Plans may be from several organizations, but these should be reviewed for consistency of assumptions and priorities. (Post organization structures – see Essential 1) (Funding – see Essential 3) 10.1.2 Shadow financial arrangements for processing incoming aid and disbursing Post event arrangements exist for dealing with incoming financial aid and disbursements 5 – Arrangements exist and are believed to be workable. 4 – Arrangements have some minor gaps but are believed to be workable. 3 – Arrangements have one or more significant gaps that may compromise aspects of workability. 2 – Arrangements have more significant shortfalls that place overall workability in doubt. 1 – Partial or incomplete arrangements only. Unlikely to be workable. 0 – No plan. May be provided by national government, if still functional, or by a private sector organization such as an accounting firm. 10.1.3 Learning loops Existence of a process and format for “post-mortems” on what went well and less well in the event response and post-event phases. 5 – Comprehensive plans exist that are shared by all stakeholder, and they have in fact been used after a disaster – changes have been made to plans and practices. This process could be the process used for usual learning and review after drills and practices – the difference being that this is “for real”.
Scenario A comprehensive assessment of the severity, probability of a hazard and its impact – the exposure and vulnerability of the city to loss of life, damage or other adverse impact in the resulting disaster. As a minimum cities will ideally have two scenarios – one for the “most probable” event and one for the “most severe” Single point of coordination Person or group/committee (with subgroups or sub committees as required) from which all organizations with any role in the city’s disaster resilience accept direction or guidance in resilience matters, and to which they report on such matters. Standard operating procedure (SOP) Pre-rehearsed processes and procedures for emergency response. Vulnerability The potential consequences of exposure to some hazard (loss of life, property or service; physical damage; health impact, economic impact; environmental impact and so on). Different exposures and/or vulnerabilities may combine, for example where the tsunami generated by the Tohoku earthquake in in 2011 badly damaged the nuclear power plant – generating a whole additional set of exposures and vulnerabilities “Most Probable” A disaster-causing hazard and its severity computed to be at the midpoint of a probability distribution (preferred) or assessed as “typical;” through expert judgment and other ad hoc estimation. “Most Severe” A disaster-causing hazard and its severity computed to be in the top 10% of a probability distribution (preferred) or assessed as “worst case” through expert judgment or other ad hoc estimation.