communication and focus that is important to get right and the details of each unique individual operational envelope must be developed and "tailored" appropriately. This concept is transferable, scalable, and more importantly vital and doable. Thanks for persevering Ella and perhaps my presentation of these ideas is improving? Corrupt Culture: • Operating outside of the “safe operating envelope”. • Contempt towards circumspection of “how things are done”. • Closed minded obstinance to examine “how things are done”. • Corruption hides “how things are done” deceptively hiring "lackeys" and firing "whistleblowers". • Rationalizing against any investigation and becoming "hidebound" into the corruption. Strong Culture: (1) Operating within the “safe operating envelope”. Micah Endsley Air Force Pilot (2) Encouragement to learn based on open minded acceptance that things can be improved. (3) Open minded efforts at examining “how things are done” in learning situations. Carol Dweck (4) Adoption of measures to discover and/or expose operations outside of the “safe operating envelope” and lead "actions" and share lessons learned. (5) Straight, honest, talk and focus on precursors of consequence in communicating situational awareness and internalizing its externalities and in assessing consequences to redraw the boundaries of the “safe operating envelopes”. Ella: First let me disagree with, “comes down to people or their willingness to follow the prescribed processes” because this doesn’t seem correct. People seem infinitely smarter than the “prescribed processes” and “game” the bad ones so we need better ones and people are not the problem, yet the solution. Process safety needs to be focused on the precursors of processes that create strong and positively reinforced processes. My statement was in “context” and the complete statement was, “We are applied scientists as engineers and as such we should be
able to discern how our structures will withstand all of the operational loads from installation in construction through production after completion. We might have a lot of "history based" engineering, aka "cut and paste" engineering going on and this is a problem in the most complex and interdependent operations.” The point in saying, “should” and not “are” is, as it has been mentioned by many people before now, that “cut n paste” or “history based” engineering is a problem. History based engineering uses a successful well design in another location and the problem is that the reason for this might be to avoid the diligence necessary to carefully develop the operational envelope of exposures and vulnerabilities. While the “cut n paste” program may very well work in most cases the common language we need to focus on and internalize is never even acknowledged. This is where a language of “will probably be okay” and “who cares” about the details gets dangerously introduced into the vernacular of complex and interdependent operations. We must operate on that precursory level of "knowing" and not on the risk and probability level of "will probably be okay" since it worked for someone else and yet "who cares" about the "uniqueness" of the details, and the precursors of consequence. The better vernacular is in terms of the “operational envelope” and thus the precise location our focus must be in order to detect emergencies because hazard emerges from the epiclipse of the operating envelope of load (exposure) versus resistance (vulnerability). We must utilize exposure and vulnerability based engineering, not only as a “nicety” of formal protocol and yet because it creates the very vernacular that our human based operations must use to communicate internally.