role of power in embedding legitimacy and co-operation in supply chains to the importance of trust and the way it mitigates the expedient and opportunist use of coercive power. It is worthwhile revisiting this literature briefly. The study of power has come some way since Dahl’s (1957) original statement that ‘A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.’ Applying this definition to a supply chain context was always fraught with difficulties when, for example, it was never clear what B would ‘otherwise do’ in the absence of A’s power, when B was locked into a relationship with A because B was reliant on A to purchase his/her goods or services, and the relation between A and B might be zero sum (B’s margin was A’s cost). One response was to refine Dahl’s definition and make it more relevant for a supply chain application. Hence Wilemon (1972) argued that: ‘power refers to the ability of one channel [supply chain] member to induce another channel [supply chain] member to change its behaviour in favour of the objectives of the channel member exerting influence.’ This made Dahl’s subtle distinction more apparent: power is not just something one partner ‘has,’ but is also something that one partner ‘exercises’; power is a relation as much as a possession. This distinction led to what Gatski (1984) referred to as the growth of ‘channel power and conflict theory’ – the study of the impact of one supply chain member’s power (its character, source and extent) on the amount of conflict with their chain partners. For some authors the results were predictable and conclusive. Robicheaux and (1975) for example argued that when one partner possessed significantly higher levels of power, this led to an increase in the coercive use of that power. This was reinforced by many laboratory studies which demonstrated a positive correlation between power and coercion (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Roering 1977). But others were
that power is a ‘…function of the perceptions of power bases on the part of the one subjected to the power or influence’ and suggests it maybe more correct to regard the perception of power itself as the source of power. Similarly the power held by processors may derive from farmers’ perceptions of constraints on their own agency or dependence upon an individual processor or group of processors (Emerson, 1962). We will now develop this idea in more detail. The Impact of Power on Agency and Trust As previously discussed, the dominant view is that in the academic literature around supply chain management is that (coercive) power and trust are inversely related - as coercive power is exercised, trust in the supply chain decreases (Doukidis et al., 2007). Our respondents highlighted mistrust across three different relations: between farmers and processors, between farmers and government (DAERA) and between farmers themselves. Many farmers expressed mistrust towards processors and similar results were observed at a national level with a study by Fischer et al. (2007). Their study found high levels of mistrust for processors among UK beef farmers, which increased as coercive control was exerted by processors. This adversarial relation took on an almost apocalyptic tone in some cases as one farmer made clear: “Farmers do not trust them factories [processors]…I've heard them call them things I couldn't repeat. It’s unreal what people think of them…there has to be a bit more honesty…and if it doesn’t come I don’t know…what’s going to happen…[I] just can't handle them. They can do things that nobody else could do.” (P19)
Many farmers recognise the importance of farmer cooperatives to increase their supply chain power and position, (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006; Fleming and Spicer, 2014 for discussion of benefits). Nitschke and O’Keefe (1997) state the formation of such producer co-operatives require a great deal of trust to develop practice that avoids opportunism and reinforces mutual goals. However, results of this study suggest the processors use of (explicit or diffuse) power had an effect on farmers’ own sense of trust, collegiality and togetherness with each other. This lack of trust and collegiality among farmers may be rooted in the suspicion that their counterparts have been financially encouraged to function outside of the format by processors, as discussed previously: “The small mindedness of Northern Ireland farmers. Rather than helping somebody, they would cut their throat; that's the problem…If you did a deal with the dairy farmer they would be think ‘oh my, they're worth more in XXX today!' And they just wouldn't stand over it, that's the problem.” (P13). Farmers also noted the presence of strongly individualist sentiments amongst other farmers which worked against the formation of co-operatives which might be able to wrestle back some control within the supply chain. Respondents mentioned the failure of co-operatives in the past due to farmer intransigence and an inability to organise collectively: “…Farmers are particularly bad at working together…we are very much individuals… we don’t work together well for our own benefit.” (P22)
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