When considering the identities of those who were captured at Singapore, as reinforcements were sent under secrecy rules, many families did not know if their loved-ones had been in the area at the time of its surrender. In these circumstances as letters home stopped arriving in the United Kingdom, many families could only hope their relatives were alive and in enemy hands. Apart from the emotional strain, the lack of reliable information also carried financial implications. Barbara Hately-Broad pointed out that different allowances were made for the families of men who were missing, dead, or prisoners of war with Family and Dependents Allowances being paid by the War Office for the period of captivity for both Officers and Other Ranks. The War Office was eventually forced to assume that the great majority of the forces fighting in Hong Kong, Malaya, and particularly Singapore had been taken prisoner. If the British government had failed to adequately provide for welfare of the next-of-kin of those sent to fight on Britain’s behalf and who were now thought to be prisoners of the Japanese, this may have been a potential source of political embarrassment and could have led to a public outcry. London was already aware of the public concerns regarding the welfare of prisoners in Europe. As a consequence of the capture of British service personnel, prisoners of war committees and support groups had already been formed in many towns and cities. Nonetheless, negative publicity surrounding the government’s failure to adequately provide a supply of relief parcels to prisoners in Europe, had already raised the profile of issues surrounding the welfare of prisoners of war both in Whitehall, and with the wider British public. The capture of British service personnel and members of the public by the Japanese resulted in enquiries to the British authorities, from some worried family members concerned with the welfare of their relatives. Records demonstrate the amount of correspondence and time was demanded of government departments; for example, Mrs Rose Hunt wrote letters to Mr Eden, Lord Cranborne, Sir John Wardlaw Milne, Sir Robert Craigie, Miss Megan Lloyd George and the Manchester Guardian. Her persistence was seen by some to be taking time away from the business of helping the prisoners of war and internees. Although individuals had some influence, collectively the relatives of prisoners were able to exert greater pressure on the government. As a result of the paucity of information from the Japanese, it is perhaps not surprising that the British authorities had difficulty in dealing with enquiries concerning the plight
and poor rations being provided by the Japanese, and demonstrates that London was willing to provide funds in the hope that aid could be purchased locally and sent into camps. The IPWC recorded that the British government were able to obtain Swiss francs by supplying the Swiss government with gold in Ottawa. However, at this time the Swiss were ‘showing increasing reluctance’ to accept gold, unless it could be exported to Europe; it appeared that even gold seemed to be unacceptable as compared with goods which the United Nations as a whole are unable to supply. London was in a perilous financial position with regard to both American dollars and Swiss francs, and through the actions of the Bank of England, Britain had compromised its relations with both. Accordingly, the Swiss made it exceedingly difficult for London to purchase Swiss francs. Wylie stated that by the winter of 1941-42 the Bank of England was ‘doubly compromised’. It had avoided US currency regulations ‘by selling dollars on the Continent and conspired to gain control over Switzerland’s gold stocks in London.’ Over the winter of 1941-42 Washington insisted that London stop using free dollars to cover its financial needs on the Continent, and the Swiss made life difficult for Britain. From March 1942 until December 1943, the Swiss National Bank refused to release francs in exchange for blocked gold or sterling. In an explanation of ‘the machinery for the despatch of funds to the Far East’ to the IPWC, in August 1943, a War Office memorandum noted that it was not always clear how funds were transmitted from Geneva to Japanese controlled territories. It was considered sufficient for the Sub-Committee to know that the only effective way of transmitting funds, was by placing at the disposal of the ‘body concerned’ Swiss francs in Switzerland, and that ‘the whole problem’ was one of making Swiss francs available. In turn the Swiss government would only provide Swiss francs in return for ‘free dollars’ which could be transferred into other currencies such as Argentine Pesos or Portuguese Escudos. This was contrary to American policy, and would only be allowed for ‘special reasons’ such as relief for prisoners of war in the Far East. The IPWC noted that the Japanese government was dependent on their ability to provide either Swiss francs, or gold to maintain their missions and activities in Europe. They also relied on the currency for the purchase of any supplies which they could obtain outside their own occupied territory, including supplies from their own allies.
the changes which had occurred in Britain during the previous years. This process continued throughout their homeward journeys. As Allied personnel entered camps the former prisoners were suddenly exposed to new expressions and new words, however some of the information contained in the papers which began to reach camps highlighted the changes which had occurred in the previous years. As illustrated papers such as ‘Punch’ arrived in the camp library one prisoner noted that the jokes fell flat, as ‘most of the jokes refer to things which do not mean a thing to us.’ Other publications such as Weekly Illustrated and Picture Posts nonetheless, filled prisoners with nostalgia and homesickness. However, some of the news was far less welcome and one prisoner only learned of the death of his wife as he read The Times which was dated two weeks previously. Major Dicker noted that when newspapers began to arrive from Britain, the stories did not always match the idealised picture of home that many had dreamed of over the previous years. He was struck by the amount of crime which was reported after having lived in a ‘crime free’ environment. He stated, ‘the British newspapers recorded their catalogues of murder, rape and robbery, apparently the Britain of 1945 was not quite the kind of paradise we had thought it was, in fact I had a sneaking feeling that if might be better if we stayed where we were.’ This pointed to the fact that the idealised picture of Britain that many prisoners had built up over the years of captivity did not necessarily represent the reality the former prisoners could expect on their return. As will be discussed below when former prisoners received replies to their initial contact with family and loved-ones, some found that circumstances had changed in the years they had been away. The use of aircraft allowed a relatively large number of prisoners to be transported quickly from French Indo China and Bangkok to reception centres in Rangoon. In addition, the efforts to supply Java enabled some prisoners to also be flown from the area rapidly to Singapore, on transport planes which had been used to land supplies. Similarly, some prisoners were able to be flown directly to Australia and New Zealand by the 27th of September. Official figures suggested that during the evacuation by air from Siam and French Indo China some 16,624 were flown to Rangoon, and 5000 to Singapore and a further 2,500 direct to their home countries.
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