process and output factors, as was discussed in Chapter 4. Where those outputs or outcomes are diminished because increased transparency has forced government to appeal to the lowest common denominator, government may be delegitimised to a greater extent than it would be by restricting transparency and accordingly limiting popular rights to public decision making. Treading this fine-line necessarily has significant implications in terms of what information to disclose and what not to disclose, and perhaps also when that information should be disclosed. More importantly perhaps, who should make that decision? The EU regulation on access (1049/2001) attempts to navigate some of these difficulties by providing that the institutions can refuse disclosure of documents where that disclosure would ‘seriously undermine the decision making process’. This however is the most heavily criticised provision of the regulation. In addition, where that provision was relied upon by the Council in Access Info. Europe, to justify only partial release of the requested document, the Court of Justice found that the ‘sensitive nature’ of the provisions contained in the requested document, was not sufficient evidence to indicate that the Council’s decision-making process would be ‘seriously undermined’. Both the criticism that has been levied at the exception to disclosure where it would ‘seriously undermine the decision making process’, and the decision of the Court of Justice to very strictly interpret the scope of that exception, seemingly speak to a belief that inconsiderate, bad or corrupt public decision-making is more likely to occur than a situation in which populism prevents public officials from taking wise, considered and often hard decisions that might be facilitated behind closed doors, or otherwise at arms’ length. There are of course situations in which such a belief might be conceivably justified. It is also to be noted that transparency itself can work to sustain that belief where supposedly bad decisions have been disclosed and they remain within the public psyche. The risk of course is that this manner of thinking about transparency can become obsessively concerned with transparency maximisation, rather than optimisation, with transparency gains failing to satisfy the appetites of the public.
greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, there can be no ‘static equilibrium’ between the ways of life in any given society; they are all in a perpetual state of flux. This perpetual dynamic imbalance is supposed to account for both observable differences between societal regimes and the change within regimes over time. The foregoing claims present a heady and attractive mix for scholars in a variety of social science disciplines. Using the typology, grid-group analysts can deduce preferences and attitudes, behaviours and likely responses to behaviours regarding all kinds of topics for each of the ideal types (i.e. the four types posited in the cultural map). It is for these reasons that the theory has attracted the interest of a plethora of social scientists. If the theory in fact lives up to its claims, then it offers something of a powerful predictive (though not deterministic) mapping tool that could be adapted to a number of areas of policy development, particularly in analysing the utility of different forms of law and regulation, their reception within various social and political groups and the extent to which it is likely to be perceived as useful, or legitimate, or indeed fit for purpose. 6.2.3 A Note on the Grid and Group Dimensions How one chooses to define the dimensions has important methodological consequences. Douglas herself defines the dimensions as ‘polythetic scales’. If the dimensions are in fact polythetic then they should be viewed as sharing a number of characteristics, which individually may not all be present in each observable case. For the Grid dimension, Douglas specifies four specific constituent elements: insulation, control, autonomy and competition. It is to be recalled that the Grid represents the extent to which an individual is circumscribed by regulation; the more binding and extensive the regulation, the less an individual’s passage through life is open to negotiation within social and political communities. Conversely, as one moves down the Grid dimension, the more s/he is expected to independently negotiate the nature of their relationships with others. For the Group dimension, the relevant constituent elements have been identified as frequency of group interaction, scope of group activities and the definable group boundary. For Group, the higher the level of group bondedness, the greater an individual’s incorporation, ultimately signifying the loss of individual choice to group decision. As one continues to move along the group dimension, the tighter the controls become over group
negotiations being to establish an acceptable compromise between those more and less disposed to different implementation approaches. Policy Core Belief Hierarchist Individualist Egalitarian Fatalist Promotes upscale accountability with oversight by hierarchical superiors, preference for vertical relationships and large-scale implementation. Emphasis on formal processes and Emphasis on efficient task performance and not on vertical hierarchies. Indifference to scale of implementation, opposition to formalised processes where they have efficiency costs. Strong horizontal networks of accountability. All are equally entitled to access available information. Preference for smaller scale accountability structures & total internal openness towards the group (outer limits of which are tightly defined by circumstance). Resignation to belief that the system is fundamentally corrupt. Individual powerless to demand accountability. (Systems may combine fatalist and hierarchist approaches, introducing accountability through contrived randomness’ or lottery).
By way of tabulating the foregoing analysis, Figure 3 considers three different possible transparency belief systems and their cultural influences. The belief systems emerge out of the public policy debate on transparency and are affected chiefly by the dominance of particular cultural biases in the arguments made within that policy arena. Further belief systems are possible, and these emerge out of dyads and triads, of biases operating in combination with one another. The tabulation demonstrates that any potential future policy brokerage on revised access to documents legislation in the EU, must focus on promoting mutually acceptable solutions to the policy approach framed within that legislation. As was discussed in Chapter 7, there is limited scope for influencing the deep core beliefs that inform actor positions on transparency, but there is potential to pursue negotiation on the ‘policy core’ beliefs in relation to the terms of the legislative instrument itself and pursuing forms of wording that do not undermine deep core beliefs. Belief System 1 Belief System 2 Belief System 3 More transparency? Yes, on the condition that it does not impact on institutional effectiveness and is subjected to an accepted regulatory design process. More transparency? Absolutely, it is a prerequisite of democratic quality and promotes accountability. More transparency? No, not unless there is empirical evidence of the ‘value’ it adds, along with its necessity. Style of Thinking and Acting Hierarchical and moderately individualistic. Egalitarian and moderately hierarchical. Strongly individualistic, moderately fatalistic. Policy Approach Stabilises existing institutional structures. Prioritises the ‘value’ in information. Prioritises core democratic values, subjugates the preferences to those values. Questions normative assumptions, promotes less regulation. Planning and Implementation Decisive, structured with agreement about legislative instruments. Decisive, broadly construed legislative provisions with few constraints and exceptions. Not decisive, limited intervention.