facto equality’. It is claimed that substantive equality strives for inclusion. It takes into account social reality and tries to improve the societal position of deprived groups. Real equality seeks to ensure that the different societal groups are represented proportionally in for example, the workplace. The concepts of indirect discrimination and affirmative action (infra nos 17-20 and 25-28) are often linked to substantive equality. Another term often encountered is equality of opportunity. According to some, this is a subcategory of substantive equality. For others it is an independent concept which is located between formal and substantive equality. For the purpose of this dissertation, the second approach will be adhered to. Equality of opportunity reflects the idea of a ‘level playing field’. It wants to guarantee that everybody sets off from the same starting line when competing for valuable social goods. Equality of opportunity does however not strive for equality of results or proportionate representation. Once each person has received the same opportunities to ‘compete in the race’, the attention shifts to choice and individual merit and qualities. Finally, it must be admitted that the distinction between formal equality, substantive equality and equality of opportunity is not always fully apparent. 10. From a merely linguistic point of view the verb ‘to discriminate’ does not have a negative connotation. To discriminate means to differentiate. From a social and legal perspective discrimination nevertheless has a detrimental undertone. At present, lawyers agree that discrimination can only be constituted by arbitrary and illegal discrepancies in treatment. ‘Discrimination’ has not yet been defined in a universal manner. As regards EU law, it is not always easy to figure out the difference between equality, equal treatment and The European Court of Justice is not always consistent and sometimes uses these concepts interchangeably. 11. One may wonder whether a discriminatory intent or motive is required before a distinction in treatment is considered to be illegal. In other words, does the prohibition on discrimination require that the perpetrator knew that his practice, measure or rule would disadvantage a certain group or individual? One can answer this question in the negative. Neither EU law, nor the relevant human rights instruments require a discriminatory intent. §2. Prohibited Classifications 12. A legal provision normally does not interdict discrimination per se. In most instances, it prescribes prohibited grounds of discrimination. There are authors who prefer to use the word ‘protected’ instead of ‘prohibited’. Both words will be used interchangeably here. For this discrimination.
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