knowledge as true belief arising in a socially-situated cognitive agent from epistemically-virtuous acts, rather than the traditional construal of true belief to which an idealised, individual knower has a duty to assent because of particular properties of the belief. They differ in emphasis, however: Sosa stresses reliable mechanisms, while Zagzebski accentuates virtuous motivation. In dealing with Sosa’s reliabilist virtue epistemology, I analyse and build on his precursor Robert Nozick’s model in ways propitious for education, including an extension of his use of formal logic, and the importation of some concepts from artificial intelligence theory. One significant outcome of my work on reliabilist virtue epistemology is the importance of subjunctive conditionals, and thus a more nuanced view of educational propositional targets, involving both p and ~p. Sosa’s two-tier model of knowledge is also addressed. I compare Zagzebski to her historical forebear Aristotle, and then develop some lines of thought congenial to education. Zagzebski’s responsibilist virtue epistemology leads to named intellectual virtues. I supplement these and show how they can be co-ordinated between teacher and learner. Substantial consideration is also given to other-regarding epistemic virtue and to testimony. The model of learning and teaching defended amounts to virtuous belief-modification, carried out by an epistemic agent (the learner), using intellectual virtue to bring his doxastic web into closer cognitive alignment with reality via intersubjective triangulation using the webs of others (particularly that of the teacher). I argue that a combination of the two approaches – virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism – yields a richer, more decent basis for education than rival conceptions, such as technical rationality, can provide.
show inconsistency within the same published paper. So, to avoid any muddle over this, the following conventions will be adopted in this thesis: p Proposition s Subject (Epistemic agent) K Knows B Believes J Is justified G Gettier-proofing condition C Corpus of beliefs F Field of knowledge h Sceptical hypothesis ~ NOT . AND + OR Is an element of Universal quantification [For all …] → Material conditional [If … then …] ↔ Biconditional [If and only if, iff, just in case … then...] □→ Subjunctive conditional [Were it to be the case that … then it would be the case that…] Given that many of the key researchers in this area are American, I keep quotations from these in the original US English. The few Irish words that appear are not italicised, unlike those of Latin, Greek, French and German origin. Expressions and words that have become naturalised (such as maieutic, prima facie, pro tanto, qua and vignette) are generally not shown in italics. I follow the founder of the field, Ernest Sosa, in using the masculine pronoun ‘he’ when referring to the knower. In addition, I call the teacher ‘she’. Some Problems of Traditional Epistemology The tripartite definition of knowledge, which is the starting point of much contemporary epistemology, is, as we have seen, ‘justified true belief’ (JTB). The
word ‘belief’ in this formulation is taken to refer to assent by the putative knower to a proposition p, and is conventionally regarded as being stronger than mere ungrounded opinion but weaker than knowledge. To upgrade a true belief into the knowledge class, a justification must exist, which may or may not be internally accessible to the knower: internalism requires this accessibility, while externalism allows it not to be available to him. Under the tripartite definition, the three conditions, individually necessary and jointly sufficient, for subject s having knowledge of a true proposition p are as follows: p s believes that p s is justified in believing that p Condition (3) is arguably the most interesting epistemologically, and the various schools of epistemology treat the notion of justification in different ways. For example, internalists, as we have already seen, require s to have access to the justifying knowledge while externalists do not. However, the starting point for all camps is the assertion that s has knowledge ‘that p’ if and only if p is true, s believes that p, and s’s belief in proposition p is in some way justified. Using the list of symbols defined above, we can re-write this as follows: Ks p ↔ p . Bs p . JBs p Two traditions pose a threat to this, or, indeed, to any conception of knowledge. The first, in which Descartes is a prominent figure, involves proposing a radical sceptical hypothesis – the existence of a genium malignum, or others’, more recent, Matrix or ‘Brain in a Vat’ scenarios – which undermines claims to knowledge. The arguments for this first tradition, in outline, begin from the premiss that having certain knowledge of proposition p requires that s knows sceptical hypothesis h to be false. Since s cannot know that h is false, because s may be subject to h (the trickery of the genium malignum, for example), without being aware of it, s cannot be certain of p. Again, this can be transliterated into the symbolic conventions defined a moment ago, to enable propositional logic to provide a handrail through the argument: Ks p → Ks [~h]
~Ks [~h] ………………. ~Ks p MT By modus tollens, we see that because s does not know that h is false, it is not the case that ‘s knows p’. Showing that this conclusion need not necessarily be true, and that, on the contrary, knowledge is possible, forms the basis of the epistemological tradition of attempting to defeat the sceptic. A second tradition follows from the work of Edmund Gettier, who famously shows that knowledge is not simply justified true belief. He achieves this by describing some vignettes in which the protagonist ‘Smith’ asserts what turn out to be justified true beliefs – thus apparently meeting the criteria for knowledge – but which had in fact been based on faulty evidence. The first of these scenarios involves the logical conjunction of a true and a false belief about the results of a job interview (that the successful candidate will have ten coins in his pocket AND that Jones will get the job) to arrive at an apparently justified true belief (that the successful candidate will have ten coins in his pocket). This cannot be regarded as knowledge, however. Smith himself is appointed to the post, but the fact that he also has ten coins is mere epistemic luck, derived from an observation of Jones’s pocket-contents and not his own. So Smith has a justified true belief that p, but not, Gettier argues, a knowledge that p. Thus, justified true belief and knowledge are shown to be not the same thing. Despite their apparent triviality, Gettier counter-examples such as this have proved surprisingly difficult to defuse, and they have set off a philosophical cottage industry which attempts to achieve this by proposing ‘Gettier-proof’ definitions of knowledge. A construal of knowledge is sought along the lines of (JTB).G, where G is a requirement. Underlying both of the projects outlined above – defeating the sceptic and knowledge-claims – is the intuition that knowledge is something we should care about. It is seen as being important enough to make the effort of neutralising both the sceptic and Gettier be regarded as worthwhile. In common with Socrates, as educators we feel that knowledge has an extra value, over and above that of mere true belief, which we ought to prize. This feature of knowledge is something for which virtue epistemology might be reasonably expected to account, given (in at least some of
believe it, then it would be true. My contention is that Nozick’s original set of four conditions is suitable for analysing the development of knowledge in the student, while Sosa’s safety [Nozick (5)] is better reserved for describing the reliability of the teacher’s knowledge in her field of expertise. Let us begin by considering the teacher t’s beliefs in her specialist field, F. If t is reliable in F, then her beliefs are safe: if she believes that p (where p is a non-peripheral part of F) then p is in fact the case. p  F p: Bt p □→ p This captures the idea that a knowledgeable teacher is a reliable epistemic source. The propositions in which she believes, in her area of specialisation, are (largely) true. Furthermore, if she asserts (A) any propositions from her field, these will be true, so learners can thus rely on her testimony. p  F p: At p □→ p However, while Sosa’s notion of safety is a useful one for describing the nature of stable beliefs (such as a teacher might hold) it is not as helpful in analysing the learner’s developing knowledge. When considering learning, we are interested in the genesis and maintenance of beliefs and not just in their safety. In this respect, Sosa’s definition of ‘safety’ gives an unfortunate impression about the direction of causation. Were we to apply it to the learner, we would seem to be implying a causal link between his beliefs and some aspect of the world, in which the cause is his belief, and the effect is p becoming the case. It looks like s’s act of believing p makes it true, by fiat, as it were. This was not Sosa’s intention, but we need to look elsewhere for arguments to quash this interpretation. William Harper offers a rival version to the ‘Ramsey Test’ (the latter being suitable only for analysing indicative conditionals, not subjunctive conditionals such as Sosa’s safety). On this rival account D □→ E
in fact be the case that ~p. When p is derived from testimony, as we saw earlier in a discussion of Pinocchio (p.89), these mental mechanisms plausibly operate in the background and are triggered only in the event of certain cues indicating incompetence or insincerity on the part of the testifier, or by discovering significant and irresoluble clashes between the proposition p and the auditor’s existing web C; by carrying out a process of removing ~p and its corollaries from the learner’s existing stock of beliefs; by attaching to p some defensible warrant, so that in the event of some future candidate ‘knowledge’ indicating ~p, resources are available to protect p from derogation. If any of these ways is missing, then the learning has been neither fully intellectually virtuous, nor warranted nor secure. Furthermore, in the case of (ii) (that is, counterfactive removal) not occurring, the learner does not really believe that p. For consistency, to believe that p requires the learner not to believe that ~p (together with all its implications), so even if ~p is not apparently present in the learners’ web, there is still a need on his part to inspect this web for the presence of ~p or its implications, to make sure that he truly is free of mental contamination by ~p. This process can be taken too far, however. As we saw earlier (p.170), one distant implication of rejecting ~p and asserting “that p” is that the world is knowable, and thus that the sceptical hypothesis h (that there exists a genium malignum, who maliciously distorts all our perceptions) is untrue. Thus, only close implications ought to be considered. In less simple cases, in which there is some sort of cognitive dissonance between the new proposition p and prior ‘knowledge’ C, the requirements placed on the learner to deal with candidate knowledge p virtuously are even more demanding. There is now the possibility of some significant change in the learner’s web occurring, a change which may mutilate the web rather than merely add another example to (say) a securely-enwebbed set of propositions that ‘x flies’, where x is a bird.
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[including exotic alien involving] ‘fields of force, waves, mathematical structures and numerical assignments to variables in several dimensions’ (1980, p.159) ‘Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others’ (p.114) ‘Intellectual humility’ (p.114) ‘Intellectual perseverance, diligence, care and thoroughness’ (p.114) ‘The detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts’ (p.114) ‘Being able to recognize reliable authority’ (p.114) ‘Insights into persons, problems, theories’ (p.114) ‘The teaching virtues: the social virtues of being communicative, including intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they respond’ (p.114) ‘Originality and creativity’ (p.123) ‘Curiosity’ (p.123) ‘[but] both Augustine and Aquinas call curiosity a vice’ Intellectual courage (p.150) Zagzebski Virtues (cont.) ‘The virtue that is the mean between the questioning mania and unjustified conviction [which] has no simple ‘Hypocrisy’ (p.162) ‘The vices of excess: excessive attentiveness, thoroughness, diligence, perseverance’ (p.196) ‘Dogmat[ism]’ (p.207) ‘[The] vice of being a chronic guesser [which] has no name’ (p.208) ‘The unreflective acceptance of the opinions of others’ (p.305) ‘Nosiness arising out of envy’ (p.314) ‘Form[ing] a belief as the result of a desire for fame’. (p.321)
The Virtues of Enquiry Learner ‘Ability to think up explanations of complex sets of data’ (VOM, p.21). ‘Ability to think up illuminating scientific hypotheses or interpretations of literary texts’ (VOM, p.21). ‘Ability to recognize the salient facts’ (VOM, p.21). ‘A sensitivity to detail’ (VOM, p.21). ‘ The detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Insights into persons, problems, theories’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Newman’s “illative sense”…’ (VOM, p.225). ‘Adaptability of intellect’ (VOM, p.21). ‘Curiosity’ (VOM, p.123). Teacher ‘Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Sensitivity to detail’ (VOM, p.21). ‘Intellectual fairness’ (VOM, p.109). ‘Intellectual humility’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Insights into persons, problems, theories’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Reflexive critical openness’, a virtue which enables us to avoid ‘epistemic injustice – that is, failing to believe people when they ought to be believed, but also believing someone who ought not to be believed’.
The Virtues of Scholarship Learner ‘[Intellectual] perseverance, diligence, thoroughness’ (VOM, p.114). ‘[Intellectual] care’ (VOM, p.21). ‘[Intellectual] caution’ (VOM, p.109). ‘Intellectual integrity’ (VOM, p.155). ‘Intellectual sobriety’ (VOM, p.185). ‘[Intellectual] discretion’ (VOM, p.21). ‘Virtues opposed to wishful thinking, obtuseness and conformity’ (VOM, p.155). ‘[Intellectual] fairness’ (VOM, p.109). ‘Virtue that is the mean between the questioning mania and unjustified conviction [which] has no simple name’ (VOM, p.154). Teacher ‘The ability to recognize the salient facts’ (VOM, p.21). Sincerity. Praotēs (gentleness, good nature, patience). ‘Proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise’ (VOM, p.319). Epistemic Justice. ‘Sensitivity to detail’ (VOM, p.21).s
The Social Intellectual Virtues Learner ‘Social virtues of being communicative, including intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they respond’ (VOM, p.114). Veracity [or parrhesia] ‘the propensity to be truthful when we tell other people what is what’. ‘A disposition to receive others’ say-so when we hear it or read it’ (Sosa, 2007, p.95). ‘Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others’ (VOM, p.114). ‘Proper trust of authority outside [one’s] area of expertise’ (VOM, p.319). ‘Reflexive critical openness’, a virtue which enables us to avoid ‘epistemic injustice – that is, failing to believe people when they ought to be believed, but also believing someone who ought not to be believed’. Teacher Vorleben – willingness to act as a worthy role-model. Solicitude in determining the epistemic predicaments of our students. Eleutheriotēs (liberality, generosity). Intellectual charity. ‘Reflexive critical openness’ A sense of Eukairos. Provocativeness … Praotēs (gentleness, good nature, patience).