Consistency A related purpose of the scheme was to increase consistency, thereby strengthening confidence in the value of pleading guilty. Encouraging earlier guilty pleas To the extent that rewarding a guilty plea has a utilitarian benefit, an additional aim of the scheme was to ensure that this benefit was maximised by encouraging defendants who intend to plead guilty to do so at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings, without improperly inducing a guilty plea: Specifying the reduction in sentence available or given for a guilty plea is intended to encourage defendants who are intending to plead guilty to do so as early as possible without inducing or coercing defendants to change their plea decision on that account. The optimum result would be no change in the proportion of cases resolved by a guilty plea, but an increase in the proportion of guilty pleas entered at an early stage of the proceedings. Accountability and appellate review Another purpose of the stated sentence discount scheme was to increase accountability in the decision about the weight of the guilty plea. The Council anticipated that: If courts were to articulate the weight given to the guilty plea, appeal courts would have a clearer indication of the basis for imposing the sentence and therefore they would be better equipped to determine whether the sentencer had fallen into error. Since the scheme’s introduction, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the: ‘notional’ sentence announced in accordance with s 6AAA is not part of the sentence imposed. No appeal lies in respect of the notional sentence. There were some early conflicting judicial statements as to the use that might be made of a 6AAA statement on appeal. It now seems settled that a 6AAA statement is generally not to be taken to exhibit error (that is, only in very narrow circumstances will a 6AAA statement be taken to exhibit error). For
plea, but an increase in the proportion of guilty pleas entered at an early stage of the proceedings. One of the aims of the current study was to examine whether or not the proportion of guilty pleas has remained stable and whether or not there have been any changes to plea timing since the introduction of the stated sentence discount scheme. The Council expected that: in Victoria there should be an appreciable change in the stage at which defendants facing indictable charges indicate a willingness to plead guilty once the effect on the sentence is made clear. We note, however, that the impact of this change will depend partly on the extent to which the parties are able to prepare the cases early enough to place the defendant in a position to benefit from an early guilty plea. In its 2005–06 Annual Report, the County Court identified a number of issues contributing to delays and low plea rates: The delays experienced in hearing cases in the criminal jurisdiction, combined with the significant increase in the number of cases initiated, had contributed to the reduced clearance rate. During 2005–06, this Court received considerably more cases proceeding to trial due to fewer pleas of guilty in the Magistrates’ Court. In many cases, defendants committed to this Court failed to receive a trial date for 12 months or more. Fuelling the influx of trials was the lack of incentive in the committal stream for considering sentencing options in exchange for pleas of guilty, driving defendants to take their chances at trial, where the possibility exists for acquittal[.] Another issue identified by the County Court was the 10 to 12 week delay between a committal and the initial directions hearing in the County Court, which represented ‘an unnecessary disconnect in the progress of a criminal matter between jurisdictions’. Other barriers to early guilty pleas include the late service of the prosecution brief; no or late legal representation of the defendant or changes in legal representation; a perception by the defence that closer to the trial charges may be reduced or further evidence disclosed; late acceptance by the prosecution of a
Discount by plea timing In 107 out of the 122 cases that received a youth justice centre order, the offender indicated the guilty plea during the committal stage. Therefore, the level of discount at each plea timing stage cannot be compared meaningfully, as the number of cases at the other plea timing stages is too small. Figure 18: Discount in length of youth justice centre order because of the guilty plea, higher court cases, 2009–10 to 2013–14 Type of discount % of proven cases Less than 10% (n = 0.0 10% to less than 20% (n = 3) 2.5 20% to less than 30% (n = 41) 33.6 30% to less than 40% (n = 44) 36.1 40% to less than 50% (n = 7.4 50% to less than 60% (n = 16) 13.1 60% or more (n = 6.6 Judge does not quantify discount (n = 1) 0.8 Eligible fines Percentage discount for guilty plea Figure 19 shows the discounts given for the guilty plea in cases in which the offender was sentenced to a fine above the prescribed amount (10 penalty units for individual fines or 20 penalty units for aggregate fines). There were 67 cases in which the 6AAA statement had sufficient information to calculate the discount given for the guilty plea. The majority of cases with a quantifiable discount for the guilty plea (40.3% of cases) had a discount in the 20–30% range. The range of discounts for guilty pleas in cases with fines was narrower than the range for imprisonment and youth justice centre orders, with no discounts of 60% or higher. The average (mean) plea-based reduction was 31.6%, while the median was 28.9%. In one case, the sentencing judge stated that but for the guilty plea, the fine would have remained the same but the accompanying custodial sentence would have been longer. In six cases, the judge stated the fine would have been much higher but for the guilty plea, without deciding on a final dollar amount.