B. Corporate Control: Mergers and Takeovers Corporate Governance Matters Chapter 11. Andrade, M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford. "." Journal of Economic Perspectives (2001): 103-120. S. B. Moeller, F. P. Schlingemann, R. M. Stulz, “,” Journal of Financial Economics 73, 2004, 201-228. J. Harford, M. Humphery-Jenner, R. Powell. “,” Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 106, November 2012, Pages 247–26. S. Bhagat, M. Dong, D. Hirshleifer and R. Noah, "" Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, V76 N1, U. Malmendier and G. Tate, “” Journal of Financial Economics 89, 20-43, 2008. M. Zhao and K. Lehn, “” 2006, Journal of Finance 61, 1759-1812. Spinoffs and Corporate Refocusing P. G. Berger and E. Ofek, “,” Review of Financial Studies 12, 1999, 311-346. S. Krishnaswami and V. Subramaniam, “,” 1999, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 1999, 73-112. C. Shareholder Voting and Activism J.A. Brickley, R.C. Lease and C.W. Smith, Jr., "Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments," Journal of Financial Economics 20, 1988, 267-292. S. Bhagat and R.H. Jefferis, "," Journal of Financial Economics 30, 1991, 193-226. L. Bebchuk, A. Brav and W. Jiang, ,” Harvard University working paper, 2013. A. Brav, W. Jiang, F. Partnoy, and R. Thomas, “, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,” 2010, Duke University working paper. Paul Gompers*, Steven N. Kaplan and Vladimir Mukharlyamov, “?” 2014, Harvard University working paper. Steven Davis, et al, “,” 2014, University of Chicago working paper. Corporate Governance Matters Chapter 12.
D. Corporate Board Structure Corporate Governance Matters Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Gompers, P. A., J. L. Ishii, and A. Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107-155. S. Bhagat and B. Bolton, “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,” Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 257-273, 2008. S. Bhagat and B. Bolton "," Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 2013, . S. Bhagat , B. Bolton, and R. Romano, “,” Columbia Law Review, v108 n8, pp 1803-1882, 2008 E. Management and Board Compensation Corporate Governance Matters Chapter 8. S. Bhagat and B. Bolton, “” Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014. S. Bhagat , B. Bolton, and R. Romano, “” Yale Journal on Regulation, 2014. S. Bhagat, “Bank Capital and Executive Compensation Reform: Preventing the Next Financial Crisis” 2016. [] F. Corporate Social Responsibility Kitzmueller, Markus and Jay Shimshack. "," Journal of Economic Literature, 2012, v 50(1), 51-84. Simons, Robert, “,” Harvard Business School, Capitalism and Society: Vol. 8: Iss. 1 , Article 2., 2013. Guenther, David et al, “” Accounting Review, 2016. IV. Course Policies Course Schedule January 11 Introduction January 18 Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday January 25 Corporate Control February 1 Corporate Control Proposal due February 8 Corporate Control February 15 Shareholder Voting and Activism February 22 Corporate Board Structure
FNCE 4825 - Corporate Governance Seminar Student Presentation Schedule – Spring 2016 Day Time Student Name Topic April 25 4:00 pm - 4:10 pm Mark Hammond Hostile Takeovers April 25 4:10 pm - 4:20 pm Connor Smith Management & Board Compensation April 25 4:20 pm - 4:30 pm Declan Hyde Executive Compensation April 25 4:30 pm - 4:40 pm Will Zimmerman Management Compensation April 25 4:40 pm - 4:50 pm Rick Brubaker Activist Investing / M&A April 25 4:50 pm - 5:00 pm Griffin Midler CSR April 25 5:00 pm - 5:10 pm Ryan Nole Venture Debt April 25 5:10 pm - 5:20 pm Lexi Shryack Corporate Governance & CSR April 25 5:20 pm - 5:30 pm Hannah Safari Compensation & CSR April 25 5:30 pm - 5:40 pm James Kade M&A in Insurance April 25 5:40 pm - 5:50 pm Rachel Hillen Company Culture & VC Contracts April 25 5:50 pm - 6:00 pm Lauren Thomas CSR April 25 6:00 pm - 6:10 pm Maria Morrish CEO Compensation April 25 6:10 pm - 6:20 pm Jack Pillsbury CSR April 25 6:20 pm - 6:30 pm Andrea Di Falco Corporate Governance April 25 6:30 pm - 6:40 pm Michael Arrington CSR April 25 6:40 pm - 6:50 pm Connor Watson Hedge Fund Activism April 25 6:50 pm - 7:00 pm Andrew Spruck M&A April 25 7:00 pm - 7:10 pm Natalie Schmille Corporate Governance April 25 7:10 pm - 7:20 pm Tyler Glatch CEO Compensation April 25 7:20 pm – 7:30 pm Stephanie Leimbach Mergers & Acquisitions Presentation Format: Presentation: 8 - 9 minutes. Q&A: 1 - 2 minutes. Suggestions: Please allocate equal time for your literature review, and the original analysis. Please rehearse your presentation at least twice (and preferably thrice). If Plan A does not work, have a back-up Plan B, … and Plan C. Overheads: Less is more! (Instead of including too much information on one overhead, consider presenting that material in two or three overheads.) Be creative!
to hold robust capital buffers against losses. He said in an open letter to AIG’s board last week that he wouldn’t be satisfied with “small-scale asset sales and incremental cost-cutting.” The board Chairman Mr. Steenland said “being a nonbank SIFI is not currently a binding constraint on return of capital.” He said a “lack of diversification benefits would reduce capital available for distribution, and there would be a loss of tax benefits.” Write to Leslie Scism at and Lisa Beilfuss at Siemens CEO Faces Investors After Strong First Quarter Joe Kaeser is pressed to show that a two-year revamp is starting to pay off ENLARGE Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser addressed a news conference before the company's annual shareholders’ meeting in Munich on Tuesday.PHOTO: REUTERS By CHRISTOPHER ALESSI Updated Jan. 26, 2016 8:41 a.m. ET MUNICH— AG Chief Executive Joe Kaeser faced investors Tuesday at the company’s annual meeting, a day after disclosing strong earnings and a big, strategic deal—but while many shareholders are still questioning whether a two-year restructuring effort is bearing fruit. “2014 was a year of strategic reorientation for Siemens. In 2015, we consolidated the company’s operations. 2016 is now the year of optimization,” Mr. Kaeser said in a speech to shareholders. “That means higher profitability and productivity,” he added. Siemens posted and raised its guidance for the full fiscal year. The results reflected positive currency effects, as well as a strong order intake.