opening brief and requesting that we accept Respondent’s supplemental brief. We granted Respondent’s petition for rehearing and accepted Respondent’s supplemental brief. Petitioner filed a supplemental responding brief. We have considered the supplemental briefs. DISCUSSION I. In Light of Franklin, Petitioner Is Entitled to a Hearing to Make a Record of Mitigating Evidence Tied to Youth. We noted in Cook, supra, G050907, it was undisputed that Petitioner’s sentence of 125 years to life was a de facto sentence of life without the possibility of parole and that, when sentencing Petitioner, the trial court did not consider his age, youthful attributes, and capacity for reform and rehabilitation. We concluded that Miller applies retroactively to matters on collateral review. (Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 718].) As a consequence, we concluded, Petitioner’s sentence was unconstitutional under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at page __ [132 S.Ct. at page 2460] and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262. (Cook, supra, G050907.) But we were compelled by Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 718], to conclude that Penal Code section 3051 cured the constitutional error in sentencing by giving Petitioner the right to a parole hearing after serving 25 years of his sentence. (Cook, supra, G050907.) The California Supreme Court’s order granting Petitioner’s petition for review of our opinion transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our decision and consider, in light of Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, “whether [P]etitioner is entitled to make a record before the superior court of ‘mitigating evidence tied to his youth.’” In Franklin, the defendant was 16 years old when he shot and killed the victim. (Id. at p. 269.) A jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder and found true a personal firearmdischarge enhancement. (Id. at p. 268.) The defendant was sentenced to two
California Rules of Court, and subject to the rules of evidence.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) “[The defendant] may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to crossexamination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors. The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youthrelated factors ([Pen. Code,] § 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation].” (Ibid.) In this case, Petitioner asserts, “the record of [his] characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense is bare bones at best, with the probation officer’s report consisting of less than a half page of ‘personal history’; as opposed to ensuring a full and accurate record, the report noted that the information in that personal history section was ‘not independently verified.’” We agree with Petitioner. In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 284, it was “not clear” whether the defendant “had sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that [Penal Code] sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” Here, in contrast, it is clear that Petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to make such a record. Petitioner’s sentence was imposed before the decision in Miller and before enactment of Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801. We noted in Cook that the trial court, when sentencing Petitioner, did not consider his age, youthful attributes, and capacity for reform and rehabilitation. (Cook, supra, G050907.) Thus, rather than direct the trial court to make the determination whether Petitioner had sufficient opportunity at sentencing to make a record of “information that