the social context in which their relation is embedded (Moellering 2005). Here, on “generalized reciprocity” which “constitutes the solidary extreme, referring to transactions that are altruistic” (Enjolras 2009: 764) a trustor can trust a trustee without establishing trust in a specific personal relationship (Zucker 1986). Or as Moellering (2006: 373) puts it: “[…] institutions are a basis for trust between actors, because they imply a high degree of which enables shared expectations even between actors who have no mutual experience or history of interaction. In the first instance this approach is based on the phenomenological assumption that actors are ‘looking at the world from within the natural attitude’ (Schuetz 1932/1967: 98) relying on […] the validity of institutionalized rules, roles and routines. However, this approach does afford the actor an active role in interpreting […] institutions.” However, as the actors cannot be seen as passive reproducers of structure, trust between the cooperative’s members requires that the institutions, on which such trust is based, are trusted themselves. Therefore, institutions are both source and an object of norm-based trust (Giddens 1990; Moellering 2006). Norm-based trust involves the development of interpretative schemes, social resources and place-bounded norms to which the actors refer in trustful and trustworthy interaction, thereby (re)producing the social structure of signification, domination, legitimation in which norm-based trust is constituted (Sydow 1998). Based on this assumption, the cooperative’s members (re)produce collectively the institutional framework which then serves as a source for trust (in other members) (Moellering 2006). Citizenship behavior from the cooperative’s members and socio-economic support from the cooperative organization are characteristic of high levels of norm-based trust (Eisenberger et al. 1986; Organ 1990). Thus, only norm-based trust can coordinate relations within 3PFC and is able to explain such community-based enterprises focusing on advantages of third parties. The role of cooperatives in reproducing trust and social capital
(Bachmann 2006). In general, if the institutional arrangements of a cooperative organization are unreliable and patchy, the development of trust is hampered, exacerbating the mobilization of social capital. Additionally, on the one hand, maxim-based trust appears to be no option at all if the actors do not take enough time and effort for developing a viable relation and for gaining the experiences within the relationship necessary for trust development. On the other hand, trust is no option if shared interpretations of the social context in which this relation is embedded do not emerge. List of References Adler, P.S. (2001). Market, Hierarchy and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism. Organization Science, 12 (2), 215-234. Anheier, H., & Kendall, J. (2002). Interpersonal Trust and Voluntary Associations. British Journal of Sociology, 53, 343-362. Bachmann, R. (2006). Trust and/or power: towards a sociological theory of organizational relationships. In R. Bachmann, & A. Zaheer (Eds.), Handbook of trust research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 393-408. Ben-Ner, A. & Van Hoomissen, T. (1994). The governance of nonprofit organizations: law and public policy, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 4 (4), 393-414. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1), July, 122-142. Bowles S., & Gintis H. (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance. Economic Journal, 112, 419-436. Bradach, J.L., & Eccles, R.G. (1989). Price, authority and trust: From ideal types to plural forms. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 97-118.