disclosure. This supports the argument that, where there is a high degree of freedom, corporate voluntary disclosure might be low, because more information may have been already disclosed to the society through the media (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Finally, Hypothesis 6 hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between the level of religiosity in a country and corporate voluntary disclosure. In fact, the coefficient of the importance of religion was negative and statistically non-significant ( =-.067, p = .423), implying that changes in religious beliefs did not affect the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure. Hypothesis 02 expected that firms not reporting in accordance with IFRSs and IASs voluntarily would disclose less, and report lower quality information than those reporting in compliance with IFRSs and IASs. The results showed that the coefficient of the accounting professionallevel was negative and statistically significant ( =-.351, p = .000). Thus, the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure of corporations in countries operating in compliance with IFRS and IASs exceeded those operating within country accounting standards by approximately 15%. The adoption of IFRSs has also been attributed with great improvement in disclosure (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Bischof , 2009). Theoretically, IFRSs and IASs may affect corporate voluntary disclosure positively through normative isomorphism, because they normally encourage further disclosure. In fact, the culture of corporate voluntary disclosure in Taiwan increased significantly after the adoption of IFRSs and IASs (Kuasirikun, 2005). Hypothesis 01 expected firms operating in Code law countries to voluntarily disclose lower quality information than those operating in Common law countries. This expectation was supported by the coefficient for Legal System, which was negative and significant ( =-.329, p = .000), indicating that the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure of corporations from Code law countries was lower than disclosure by corporations from Common law countries by approximately 52%. This result was consistent with previous results, in which Common law countries were found to have a significantly larger extent of corporate voluntary disclosure than those countries operating under Code laws (Wallace et al., 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Baker et al., 2003; Nagar et al.,
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