other supply components associated with serving the contracted load, including capacity, ancillary services, AEPS compliance, and other costs. The fixed price portion will be established through the Companies’ DCA. 24. Contracts for 50% of the residential class load will have terms of twelve months, and contracts for the remaining 50% will have terms of twenty-four months. 25. The full requirements contracts for the commercial class will include a fixed price for 100% of the supply and will be procured through DCAs in the same manner and at the same time as the residential class. 26. The commercial class full requirements product mix will be comprised of three month contracts (28%), twelve month contracts (36%) and twenty-four month contracts (36%). 27. The procurement terms and schedule for the residential and customer class contracts are set forth in Exhibit C. Industrial Class Procurement 28. The industrial class product is an hourly-priced service product based upon PJM real-time zonal hourly market prices. Suppliers will bid for the right to serve a portion of the hourly-priced service load for twelve-month terms (commencing on either June 1, 2015 or June 1, 2016). Winning suppliers will be paid the winning price bid in the hourly-priced auction, the hourly PJM real time zonal LMP, and a fixed adder of $4/MWh to capture the estimated costs of other supply components, including capacity, ancillary services, AEPS compliance and other costs. 29. The Companies will procure default service supply for the industrial class load through two separate auctions for twelve-month contracts in January 2015 and January 2016. Supplier Master Agreement 30. Attached as Exhibit D to the Joint Petition is the form of the Supplier Master Agreement (“SMA”) that each Company will execute with wholesale suppliers that are successful bidders in the Companies’ default service supply
Section 54.182, is to level the playing field for default service and competitive EGS products. The Companies asserted that a level playing field is established by assuring that the costs EGSs bear to purchase generation for delivery to an EDC’s load zone mirror the “default service costs” the EDC includes in its PTC. In that way, the Companies maintained that an accurate comparison can be made between the prices for competitive service offerings and the PTC. The Companies claimed that the NITS Proposal accomplishes the level playing field envisioned by the Commission’s default service regulations by recovering PJM-imposed NITS charges through the Companies’ DSSRs. Companies R.B. at 5-6. Exelon argued that including NITS among those charges collected through the DSSR for all customers will encourage greater competition by reducing risks for default service suppliers, which in turn will promote procurement of the least cost generation supply contracts. Exelon averred that this creates a more competitive backstop service against which EGSs can compete in order to serve shopping customers at the lowest competitive cost. Exelon opined that the collection of costs through the DSSR for all customers will allow for EGSs to more effectively compete on an basis against default service. Exelon M.B. at 10. Exelon explained that the “plain language” of the Competition Act does not prohibit the NITS Proposal as the focus of the Act is on competition for the generation, not transmission, of electricity. See, 66 Pa. C.S. § 2802(13); Exelon R.B. at 8. Exelon opined that there is no prohibition anywhere in the Act. With regard to the IUG’s reliance on the statutory section that requires unbundling to separate the charges for generation, transmission and distribution, 66 Pa. C.S. § 2804(3), Exelon responded that under IUG’s reading of these sections, if transmission costs are no longer allowed to be collected and charged by EDCs, then the EDCs must also be prohibited from collecting and charging for distribution costs, since both of these charges are included, along with generation, in the list of those subject to “unbundling.” According to Exelon, the