FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) All FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) All FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol Feature Dependent FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol Feature Dependent FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Feature Dependent FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Feature Dependent FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Feature Dependent FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client with authentication Feature Dependent FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Feature Dependent FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server with mutual authentication Feature Dependent FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation All FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management One FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management One FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication One FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism One FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback Feature Dependent FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certification Validation Feature Dependent
FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT X.509 Certification Validation Feature Dependent FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication Feature Dependent FIA_X509_EXT.3 Certificate Requests Feature Dependent4 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Trusted Update - Management of Security Functions behaviour All FMT_MOF.1/Services Trusted Update - Management of TSF Data All FMT_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour All FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data All FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data Feature Dependent FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Feature Dependent FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles One FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) All FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords Feature Dependent FPT_TST_EXT.1 Testing (Extended) All FPT_FLS.1/LocSpace Failure with preservation of secure All
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. The developer should review the Evaluation Activities contained in the SD to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance. Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1) As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures. The refinement below describes some specific requirements for distributed TOEs. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures Refinement: The following specific topics must be addressed as part of the Preparative Procedures for the TOE: If the TOE is a distributed TOE and relies on the environment to provide security for the registration process when joining components to the TOE then the Preparative Procedures shall: clearly the strength of the authentication and encryption provided by the registration channel itself and the specific requirements on the environment used for joining components to the TOE (e.g. where the environment is relied upon to prevent interception of sensitive messages, IP spoofing attempts, attacks, or race conditions) identify what confidential values are transmitted over the enablement channel (e.g. any keys, their lengths, and their purposes), use of any non-confidential keys (e.g. where a developer uses the same key for more than one device or across all devices of a type or family), and use of any unauthenticated identification data (e.g. IP addresses, self-signed certificates) highlight any situation in which a secret value/key may be transmitted over a channel that uses a key of lower comparable strength than the transmitted value/key. Comparable strength is defined as the amount of work required to compromise the algorithm or key and is typically expressed as ‘bits’ of security. The ST author should consult NIST 800-57 Table 2 for further guidance on comparable algorithm strength. A distributed TOE that relies on the environment in this way is one where the ST author uses the FTP_TRP.1/Join channel type in the main selection for FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2, and the TOE relies on the operational environment to provide security for some aspects of the
SFR Dependencies Analysis The dependencies between SFRs implemented by the TOE are addressed as follows. SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 included FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 included Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, specifies the relevant administrator identification timing FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_GEN.1 FTP_ITC.1 FAU_GEN.1 included FTP_ITC.1 included FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_CKM.4 included FCS_CKM.2 FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import) FCS_CKM.4 included FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 None FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant administrator authentication FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1 included FMT_MTD.1/CoreData FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1 included FMT_SMF.1 None FMT_SMR.2 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant administrator identification FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None FPT_APW_EXT.1 None FPT_TST_EXT.1 None FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1/SigGen or FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/SigGen and FCS_COP.1/Hash included FPT_STM.1 None FTA_SSL_EXT.1 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant administrator authentication
SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev None FIA_X509_EXT.2 None FIA_X509_EXT.3 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 included as selection-based SFRs FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash,
FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included