UNGAR 2626(XXV) 1970. Declaration on principles of International Law Concerning Friendly relations and the Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations . UN Doc A/AC 125 /SR 69 18 ff 25A/AC 125/SR 68 UN Doc S/PV 4011 UN Security Council 4011th Meeting, 10th June 1999. UNGAR 2201(XXI) (A-C) International covenant on Economic Social and Cultural rights (1966). UNGAR 2200(XXI) A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). US Mission to UN 114 (75) 10.10.1975 US proposal; UN Doc A. AC. 125 L 32 2(par B) A/AC 125/ SR .68/ 8 A/AC 125/SR 22 A/AC 125 /SR 105
Yet treaties were selectively applied because ‘Minorities’ rights remain a concern and an international interest so that they do not become foyers of irredentism’.The danger of minorities seceding is implicit. Firstly because minorities’ aim is and secondly this gives the impression to other communities of the same territory that a minority resented conforming to the political unity and does not support the territorial integrity of the state. This has been recognised by the UN resolutions, advocating internal self-determination always conditional to the observance of the sanctity of political unity and territorial integrity of the State concerned. Irregular application, of minorities’ rights in a state-centric international order meant conditionally applying the concept as long as it did not threaten the political unity and territorial integrity of the state. Once more conditionality of the international law emerges supporting the hypothesis as proven in the above sections and as will be argued below. 2.4.2 Aspects Versailles Treaty; Territory and the Protection of Minorities When the Treaty of Versailles was concluded, between the victors and Germany, one cannot but ask if internal and external self-determination were taken into account when dealing with territorial issues, or the war indemnities and Article 22, thus the Mandate system, and the Protection of the Minorities. As Baron Heyking and Loewenfeldargued in Stockholm’[R]acial self-determination’, after Paris peace treaty had become the public law of Europe. Temperley agreed with this assertion. Thus the principle of equality demanded that it should apply to the minorities of all member nations and not to the victors alone. The territorial adjustments between Germany, Poland, Belgium and France and Denmark were controversial and a contributory factor in future conflicts. According to the substantive terms of the treaty, Germany ceded Alsace-Lorraine to France, without an initial plebiscite. Furthermore, the German province of the Northern Schleswig province was ceded to Denmark, yet when a plebiscite was held, South Schleswig reverted to Germany. Thus a degree of consultation with people, which was envisaged by the Covenant, was not implemented appropriately, or implemented at all. For instance, the Saar and Ruhr District were placed under the French administration without any plebiscite. This action had two legal effects. First, it had a negative effect in the political self-determination of the German people. Second,
In this discourse, two discrete issues reside. The first is that Frank and Henkin accept state action as a source of law, and both laments the distinction between what is intended, and what is achieved. The second is the role attributed to self-determination oriented armed clashes, which clearly Frank considered as a reason for the nullification of Article 2(4). Henkin also supports the view that oppressed were justified in resorting to arms ’[N]ot international law not the law of the Charter surely does not forbid a people to liberate itself from the colonial yoke?’ 5.5.4 Article 73 of the Charter Higgins in all her discourses referred to the relevance of Articles, 73 and 76 as being more relevant to decolonisation then Article 1(2). The chairman of the US Delegation to the San Francisco Conference reported to President Roosevelt, giving us a historically credible insight, to the views of one of the four drafters of the Charter, as well as the other three national members of the drafting committee. Unlike Kelsen’s view, they suggested that the treaty creates political rights. Chapter 1 aspired moral obligation, the report on the purposes of the Charter purported the following: ‘The Purposes are binding on the Organisation, its organs, and its agencies, indicating the directions their activities should take and limitation within which their activities should proceed.’ With reference to Chapters XI Art 73 the Presidential Report wrote ’three basic principles of far-reaching significance to the future of dependent territories and their people.’ First, the colonies of the colonial powers were now accountable to the international community over their administration of their colonial subjects. Second, their political social and educational advancement were also ’primary concern’. Third, colonial powers were now under obligation to administer in such a manner that they will contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. It is the finding of this research that since 1945 the colonial powers came under an obligation to administer according to the will and best interests of the colonial subjects in pursuance of customary international law. The wording of Article 73 leaves no doubt that the concept of sacred trust creates an international legal obligation that has moved beyond the scope of Article 22 of the 1918 s:
(B) were divided into three sub-groups. The first sub-group (B.1) were those who expressly and actively supported armed intervention to secure stability, to resume political processes for a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis. These were NATO members. The second sub-group (B.2) opposed armed intervention because they deemed intervention contrary to the strict interpretation of the United Nations provisions and included Serbia, Montenegro, Russian Federation, China. The third sub-group (B.3) were former members of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia such Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia. (C) also consisted of three sub-groups (C1, C2, and C3). C1 were conscious of the ethnic nationality syndrome within their states and were keen to see a fair, just and lasting solution to the Kosovo Crisis. China was one such state who opposed what she called USA and NATO intervention as well as state oppression of ethnic grouping and attempts to create division among ethnic groups. The second sub-group (C2) included Brazil who opposed NATO intervention, held Belgrade responsibly and rejected any military action without Security Council mandate. C3 was Cuba who opposed intervention and remained silent on ethnicity issues. Cuba was closest to the Serbian position. (D) consisted of three sub-groups. D1 included states such as Namibia and Malaysia. D2 included Mexico and others who opposed intervention as well expressed abhorrence with ethnic violence and criticised the Security Council. Namibia was equally concerned with peace coming at such a price. Sub-group D3 included distant states, who felt strongly against ethno-religion based violence as well as very critical of Belgrade. Gabon, and Gambia, and Namibia fall into this group. These groupings are not on account of affiliation to an international group. Take the UK being regretful that NATO had to bomb, but blamed the autocratic leadership. So did Namibia and Gambia and Gabon. At times grouping is nothing more than a geographic division but then one has to face the difficulty of explaining USA and Canada involvement in Balkans. 6.6.2 Grouping of States According to Perceived Role of International law The exchanges between the diplomas of Cuba and the USA and the Netherland during the session manifested how dogmatic approaches to international legal
Table 1: Breakdown of Judges Voting Figures 10 for and 4 against on the Question: Judges voting in Affirmative and in Agreement On the Same Grounds Judges voting in Affirmative BUT Separate Opinion. Total of Judges voting in Affirmative Judges voting against the Majority Affirmation 5 5 10 4 Table 2 How judges concurred and differed . Judges voting in Affirmative and in Agreement On the Same Grounds Total of Judges holding different views on the question before them of Judges voting in Affirmative 5 9 10 The above two sets of figures demonstrate that the ICJ opinion could not have the current international law with numerical supremacy. Furthermore, though the issues rising there-within were decided, but not with sufficient overwhelming general agreement among the judges. 6.8.3 Legal Principles ex Injuria Jus Non Obitur in Kosovo Judge Trindade justified the legitimacy of a unilateral secession, not only on the basis of developments in positive, codified conventions and on multilateral norm creating treaties aspired by the UN Charter but as well as on substantive international legal norms such as ex injuria jus non-obitur. It simply means that no state could derive legitimate benefit by breaching peremptory international legal norms. ’ [A] wrongful act cannot become a source of advantage, benefit, or else right for the