16 Second Debate Without knowing the details with regard to conventions, one cannot realize emptiness. 17 Conventions have to be validly established. 18 The ultimate is other than conventionalities. 19 Without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness. 20 Third Debate Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that phenomena are natureless. 21 Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless. 22 The Diverged Afars’, that is, Nihilists’, holding former and later births as natureless, for example, is not a view of emptiness. 23 The reasons why this view of the Diverged Afars is a view of annihilation but the Middle Way Proponents’ holding former and later births as natureless is a pure view are respectively due to the Diverged Afars’ not asserting but the Middle Way Proponents’ asserting establishment in conventional terms. 24 The Diverged Afars’ holding that former and later births are natureless is a view of annihilation. 25 The Diverged Afars do not realize naturelessness as the Proponents of the Middle Way do within knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventionalities. 26 The Middle Way view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless do not accord with those of the Diverged Afars. 27 Both the Diverged and the Proponents of the Middle Way hold that former and later births are natureless. 28 Although the Diverged Afars and the Proponents of the Middle Way are similar in holding that the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle Way view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers’ awarenesses. 29 For example, when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say, “He is the robber,” it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and that the one did not identify the robber.
39 The thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is not to be explained as being that howsoever forms are apprehended—as the four extremes of being empty or not empty or as the middle free from them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence have to be refuted. 40 Tsong-kha-pa, having solely refuted truth, that is, true establishment (bden par grub pa), asserts that forms abide in the middle. 41 The distinction should be made that reasoning analyzing the ultimate refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings. 42 Reasoning does not refute all whatsoever objects. 42 Go-ram-pa contradicts many sūtras and treatises such as Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words which says: We are not propounding that “Action, doer, effect, and so forth do not exist.” Why? We posit that inherent existence does not exist. 43 Seventh Debate Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. 44 Even innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later phenomena as one. 45 is something eliminated by “only” in the statement that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly: namely, what is misapprehended by innate misapprehensions. 46 Whatever is an apprehension of permanence is not necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders’ superimposition that the self is permanent. 47 An innate apprehension of permanence does not apprehend in that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders’ superimposition that the self is permanent. 48 In the continuums of who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is no apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions.
49 In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death. 50 Since the Proponents of the Great Exposition, the Proponents of Sūtra, and so forth have not entered the Middle Way view, they cannot harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence. 51 The thesis that statement—“Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly”—is not logically feasible is not logically feasible. 52 Eighth Debate There are two objects of negation by correct reasoning: existent and nonexistent. 53 Object of negation by a correct reasoning and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign are not equivalent. 54 The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning. 55 The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true existence. 56 The apprehension of true existence is not a probandum of a correct sign. 57 The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning proving something as not truly existent. 58 Reasoning (rigs pa) and logicality (’thad pa) are equivalent. 59 Both an apprehension of true existence as well as its conceived object—that is, true establishment—must be posited as objects of negation by a correct reasoning, which is also called a correct logicality. 60 the apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, the apprehension of true existence comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality. 61 The apprehension of true existence is existent. 62 You cannot negate by of a correct sign something that exists.
།དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས། དངོས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། Has Tsong-kha-pa found the key for unlocking the meaning of this passage? According to his reading, one type of saṃvṛti, obscurative ignorance, displays phenomena as if ultimately produced, but another type of saṃvṛti, conceptual consciousnesses and nonconceptual consciousnesses, are the valid means of positing the conventional existence of phenomena. Or is it that Tsong-kha-pa’s identification of the meaning of kun rdzob tu (saṃvṛtyā) in the first line of the passage in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra as meaning “conventionally” based on Kamalashīla’s mention of “mentations” differs from Kamalashīla’s thought in this presentation of the meaning of the same with the result that the passage from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra should read: The production of things [exists] obscurationally (kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā); Ultimately it lacks inherent existence. That [consciousness] mistaken with regard to the lack of inherent existence Is asserted as the obscurer of reality (yang dag kun rdzob, satyaṃ saṃvṛti). If read this way, Kamalashīla be saying that things exist and are produced only in the face of the ignorance superimposing true existence. Evidence suggesting this very reading is found in Kamalashīla’s Difficult Points in (Shāntarakṣhita’s) “Ornament for the Middle” where he comments on stanza 63ab in Shāntarakṣhita’s text:
The independence of the object—its true existence—is indicated by “without being posited through the power of appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness.” It is as if one’s awareness does not influence the existence of the object at all. The word “without (min par)” makes Tsong-kha-pa’s restatement opposite from Kamalashīla’s exposition that things only exist conventionally through the power of mentations. Tsong-kha-pa understands mentations as Kamalashīla’s prerequisite for explaining all things as conventionally existing; that is, without the power of mentations, nothing would exist conventionally. He does this by changing “through the power of mentations” in Kamalashīla’s statement to “through the power of appearing to an awareness, or through the power of an awareness,” thereby emphasizing that mentations are not mistaken awarenesses since they allow things to conventionally exist. True existence is the very opposite of this conventional existence. Conventional existence itself depends upon the force of and non-conceptual awarenesses, whereas true establishment excludes the role of awarenesses from its appearance. In this way signifies that true existence is seemingly dissociated from what appears to an awareness. By bringing in “posited,” Tsong-kha-pa explains that the role of mentations, or awarenesses, is to posit, or certify things as conventionally existent. Tsong-kha-pa also converts the status of the object in Kamalashīla’s statement, “All entities of false things…are said ‘only to exist conventionally’” into its opposite. He converts “All entities of false things” into the mode of true existence: “existing in the manner of an objective mode of abiding,” and Kamalashīla’s “only to exist conventionally” into its opposite: “to truly exist.” Then, he adds “apprehension of such is an innate apprehension of true existence” to introduce the notion of the apprehending consciousness and to summarize his point. Unlike the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence that is only apprehended in dependence
summarized they are included within two [types] because of being included into the reasoning of analyzing the ultimate and the reasoning of analyzing conventions. Logically feasible (’thad pa), suitable (rung ba), and reasonable (rigs pa) are equivalent because Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation says such. The [rigs pa of] ’thad rigs (’thad pa dang rigs pa, logicality and reasoning) and the rig pa of blo rig (blo dang rig pa, awareness and knowledge) are not equivalent because in Tibetan the presence and absence of the suffix sa differ, and in Sanskrit the terms also differ since yoṣir is used for [the rigs pa of] ’thad rigs (logicality and reasoning) and vidyā is used for [the rig pa of] blo rig (awareness and knowledge), and also that the meanings differ is to be known from the earlier [discussion] (see above, 68ff.). Therefore, the opposite of logicality is taken as an object of negation by reasoning because when comparing the high speech (gsung rab, pravacana) of Tsong-kha-pa and his spiritual sons and Gyal-tshab], it turns out that the four non-reasonables, which are the opposites of the four reasonings, are taken as objects of negation.
ཞེས་པ་ནས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། [This passage from a Mother Sūtra] entails that [it is reasonable to posit that the object of apprehension of true existence is the meaning of “the ultimate” and that establishment as that (that is to say, as truly existent) is the meaning of “established ultimately,”] because this scriptural passage [from a Mother Sūtra] describes—as ultimate existence—existence that is not existence in conventional terms, and one should differentiate that “both such an ultimate and establishment that way do not exist, but both ‘the ultimate’ when a rational consciousness is taken as the ultimate and its objects’ establishment in the face of that ultimate exist.”
established in the perspective of awareness by a full-fledged opponent for the proof of that [that is, for the proof that the self and the aggregates are not truly established, the lack of being truly established one and many] proves only the terminology and convention of the absence of true establishment in the probandum of the proof of that [that is, in the proof that the self and the aggregates are not truly established]. It follows [that although the meaning of the absence of true establishment has already been established in the perspective of awareness by a full-fledged opponent for the proof of that, that is, for the proof that the self and the aggregates are not truly established, the lack of being truly established one and many proves only the terminology and convention of the absence of true establishment in the probandum of the proof of that, that is, in the proof that the self and the aggregates are not truly established] because although at that time the meaning of the absence of true establishment has been ascertained from the sign, the association of terminology [that is, conceptual consciousness (rtog pa)] thinking with regard to the probandum “These are not truly established” and of the verbal convention “[These] are not truly established” is meaningful,
དེས་ན་སྒྱུ་མ་རྟ་གླང་དུ་སྣང་ཡང་ནས། [དེས་སྟོང་པ་བཞིན་དུ། །དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཆོས་དེ་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། ། 16. Moreover, someone says: Parts-possessors are to be associated only with the physical. And several say: Parts-possessors are to be associated only with compounded phenomena. Our response: are not logically feasible because it must be treated that there is nothing among all [phenomena]—the compounded such as forms and so forth and the uncompounded such as space, nirvāṇa, and so forth that are not necessarily part-possessors. It follows [that it must be treated that there is nothing among all (phenomena)—the compounded such as forms and so forth and the uncompounded such as space, nirvāṇa, and so forth that are not necessarily part-possessors] because doing it that way is the thought of the father Shāntarakṣhita and the son [Kamalashīla] and of the Supramundane Victor, ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག
The first [reason which is that these [Autonomists] assert that forms and so forth are established as they appear to children and above] is established because: (1) Shāntarakṣhita’s Autocommentary of the Ornament for the Middle says: We do not negate inherent natures—coming to mind within sole non-examination—that are experienced ranging from the states of childish beings through to omniscient pristine wisdom. (2) and Jñānagarbha’s Differentiation of the Two Truths (22ab) says: Make an explanation why From this cause that appears. and Jñānagarbha’s Autocommentary [on the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”] on that says: Well, if [things] are only not ultimately produced at all, then why from this cause and so forth, in answer to which his Autocommentary (22cd) says: A response to this is returned: This such appears from this cause. What [more] should be said! If as much as appears to you also appears to us, what is be asked about that! Even if asked, we would say just that. We would not say anything not experienced before. (3) and also Jñānagarbha’s Differentiation of the Two Truths (28) says: That which is an entity of appearance Is just not to be negated. It is not at all logically feasible To negate whatever is experienced. and Jñānagarbha’s Autocommentary [on the “Differentiation of