1.2 Research Question and Unit of Analysis This study frames its research question as follows: Under which combination(s) of macro-level demand-side and / or supply-side conditions have radical right parties in CEECs been electorally successful in national parliamentary elections held from 2000 to 2010? The units of analysis are national parliamentary elections. The study analyses how conditions combined at the time of each election and which of them produced electoral success for radical right parties. In total, the analysis includes twenty parliamentary elections. Following the conventional structure of studies using QCA, the next section begins by explaining how this study conceptualizes electoral success in terms of radical right parties. This will be followed by a discussion of the selection of conditions thought to increase the chances of achieving electoral success by radical right parties. While doing so, the discussion touches on historical and economic differences between West Europe and CEE; these differences have led this study to include some conditions that are less relevant (or totally irrelevant) to West European countries.
context of CEECs, this study formulates a hypothesis that predicts that the presence of a large number of historically rooted minority groups (and/or Roma people) contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE. 1.4.4. Presence of a Liberal Right Wing Mainstream Party on Cultural Policies (LIBM) Electoral success is not only commensurate with a political party’s leadership and party organizations. The behaviour of other political parties can also affect a party’s chance of achieving electoral success. Particularly, the interaction between political parties whose ideologies are related is likely to affect each party’s electoral performance. Following this possibility, this study suggests that interaction between radical right parties and right wing mainstream parties may contribute to or stifle the electoral success of the former. There are two different approaches in the literature regarding the impact of the interaction between right-wing mainstream and radical right parties on the electoral performance of the latter. The first approach suggests that when the positional distance between a right-wing mainstream party and a radical right party increases (due to the moderate position of the former), the latter has a better chance of electoral success. Briefly speaking, the logic behind this suggestion is that radical right parties can appeal to voters who have renounced the right-wing mainstream party for its moderate position (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Meguid, 2005). The second approach argues the opposite. According to this explanation, it is the narrowing distance between a right-wing mainstream party and a radical right party that increases the latter’s chance of
46). When it was in coalition (2006-2010), the SNS contributed to introducing the ‘Patriotism Act’, requiring the presence of the national emblem, the flag, and the preamble to Slovak Constitution in each classroom (Malova and Ucen, 2010: 1161). The Greater Romania Party makes reference to all nationalist figures from Codreanu (the leader of the Iron Guard) to Ceausescu (Minkenberg, 2002: 348). Moreover, the PRM considers ex communist leader Ceausescu as a national hero who saved Romania from the secret plans executed by Jews and Hungarians (Shafir, 1999: 214). The PRM also undertook campaigns to promote peasant culture and religion (Cinpoes, 2010: 91). The radical right attaches greater importance to family traditions and preaches intolerance and hate towards people embracing alternative lifestyles. Radical right parties have adopted policies aiming at instilling ‘moral values’ to the next generation and supporting multi-child families. They are strongly opposed to gay and lesbian relationships (e.g. JOBBIK Program, 2010; SNS Program, 2006 Program). Once, MIEP asked its candidates to sign a document stating that they were not alcoholics, drug addicts, or homosexuals (Bernarth, et al. 2005: 82). All Polish Youth (linked to the LPR) organized what they called a ‘tradition march’ against ‘gay pride’ in April 2006. Those taking part in the ‘tradition march’ threw eggs and stones at people taking part in the ‘pride march’. Furthermore, those in the former bore banners saying ‘Stop Deviation’ and chanted slogans saying, ‘Lesbian and gays, all of Poland is laughing at you.’ Radical right parties even seek to impose severe punishment, including the death penalty, to preserve public order and national culture (MIEP Program, and Hockenos, 1993: 225, 226; Hanley, 2012: 70).
without a large ethnic minority population, right-wing mainstream parties should take liberal positions in order to ultimately keep illiberal discourses at bay, thereby undermining the electoral credibility of radical right parties promoting extreme and exclusionary cultural policies in society. Leaving aside the fact that right-wing mainstream parties’ illiberal positions increased the electoral strength of radical right parties in countries without a large ethnic minority population, the former’s Europhile position on the issue of Europeanization appears to have been at least as important in allowing the latter to achieve electoral success. As mentioned in the previous chapter, various studies in the literature on EU-issue voting conclude that the issue of Europeanization can affect electoral preferences not only in European Parliamentary elections but also in national parliamentary elections (Tillman, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Dechezelles and Neumayer, 2010; Sum, 2010; De Vries and Tillman, 2011). Remember that CEECs experienced the process of Europeanization starting in the late 1990s. During that period, both PiS and SDS held a Europhile positions on the issue. They advised their supporters to cast a ‘yes’ vote in EU accession referenda. The PiS campaigned in the referendum under the banner of ‘A Strong Poland in Europe’. At the time, the leader of the PiS, Jaroslaw Kacyznski, argued that ‘Poland’s integration with the EU would make it possible for the country to exert influence on European economy and international politics’ (BBC Monitoring European, 27 April 2003). Similarly, SDS’s leader, Janez Jansa, labelled Slovene membership as a good development at the ceremony, which was organized to celebrate the country’s admission to the EU. As a result, LPR and SNS became the only right-wing parties who could
hypothesis assumes that a strong public perception of corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties. As mentioned earlier, because the problem of corruption is so endemic in CEECs that the electorate may take the problem for granted; in other words, they may view corruption as a problem impossible for politicians to solve. Yet, this ‘acceptance’ may turn into aggression during times of economic strife. Based on this, an alternative hypothesis was formulated. It assumes that a strong public perception of corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties when it coincides with high levels of unemployment. The fact that neither the first nor the second path involves the condition of corruption (CORR) undermines both the first and the second hypotheses. This is a surprising finding, since it is quite common in the literature to argue that the problem of corruption is the main source of protest voting in CEECs, in which voters move to radical right parties for their anti-political establishment rhetoric (e.g. Bustikova, 2009, Cinpoes, 2010). Instead, the result appears to confirm the argument that voters who are dissatisfied with the established system do not go to the polls at all (Anderson et al., 2005). In addition, a poll conducted in early 2000 shows that the right-wing mainstream Law and Justice Party (PiS), not the League of Polish Families (LPR), which took advantage of public anger over the problem of corruption (Millard, 2003: 371; Szczerbiak, 2007: 212; Pankowski, 2010: 152). The argument that voters believe that political parties with a chance of winning elections (e.g. mainstream parties) can in fact solve problems and are therefore more inclined to vote for these parties during times of serious problems, can possibly explain why the problem of corruption benefited radical right parties (e.g. Knigge, 1998: 270; Vermeir et al., 2007: 144). Nevertheless, among the countries of interest, Romania, which is
that the problem of corruption is a component of the second path. As a result, all Romanian elections, and the 2009 Bulgarian election (the cases that are more in than out of the set of the countries with the problem of corruption) are included in this analysis. Moreover, on account of setting a lower crossover point for the electoral success, ROM2008 emerged as a typical case, whereas the main would be a label it a deviant case. Remember that the first path in the main analysis was ephilm*~libm*~ethpop covering two cases: POL2001 and SLV2008. The first path in the new analysis is different in that the condition ~ethpop is not a component of the configuration. Besides POL2001 and SLV2008, this path covers HUN2002. Actually, the inclusion of HUN2002 caused the condition to disappear. With its Roma population (about 8 per cent), Hungary is more in than out of the set of countries with large ethnic minority populations. While discussing the first path of the main analysis, it was stated that in countries without the condition ethpop, the position of the right-wing mainstream party in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition plays an ancillary role in the electoral success of radical right parties by leading to an increase in the saliency of socio-cultural issues strongly embraced by radical right ideology. The interaction between this condition and right-wing mainstream parties’ Europhile position, as the argument went, ultimately paved the way for radical right to reserve seats in national parliaments during the decade from 2000 to 2010. This causal
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