18 times (22%), with the remaining allocations being an equal split. This difference is statistically significant (Pearson Chi-square = 5.60, p = 0.01, one-tailed), supporting H3b. We further compare the bonus decisions of superiors with initial resource allocation responsibility and information about the agents (Resp/Info) to those without initial resource allocation responsibility or information about the agents (i.e., No Resp/No Info, our baseline condition) and those with only initial resource allocation responsibility (Resp/No Info), to provide further support for H3b. Sympathy for superiors in the Resp/Info condition (-0.83) is significantly less than that for superiors in the No Resp/No Info (5.19) and the Resp/No Info (4.00) conditions, (ps < 0.01, one-tailed). Further, the 61% likelihood of superiors in the Resp/Info condition to allocate a greater bonus to the advantaged agent is significantly greater than for superiors in the No Resp/No Info (6%) and the Resp/Info (18%) conditions (ps < 0.001, one-tailed). We also analyze superiors’ perceptions of distributional fairness and decision justification to further support our prediction. For these tests, we combine the No Resp/No Info and the Resp/No Info conditions to compare them in aggregate to the Resp/Info condition. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for superiors’ responses concerning who they felt more sympathy towards, who was entitled to a higher payout, and how justified they felt in their allocation of the probability of winning the lottery (allocation of chips – resources). We find that superiors with initial resource responsibility and information about the agents sympathize more with the advantaged agent (3.89 > 3.06, p = 0.08, one-tailed) and believe the advantaged agent is more entitled to a higher payoff (6.33 > 4.85, p < 0.001, one-tailed) than those without both resource responsibility and information about the agents. Further, these superiors feel more justified in
As with any experimental study, care should be taken when attempting any generalizations. However, we argue that the underlying phenomenon of sympathy, consistency, and bias from information are pervasive constructs in human decision making, and that these behavioral tendencies can exhibit themselves at all levels of an organization and in various settings. Future research could examine the underlying predictions pertaining to these types of allocation decisions in suitable field, case, or archival studies. Future research can also build on the organizational context and behaviors that affect decisions, including disparate risk related to employee’s actions or demographics including effort, training, education, etc. References Aronson, E. 1997. The theory of cognitive dissonance: The evolution and vicissitudes of an idea. In, The Message of Social Psychology: Perspectives on Mind in Society, edited by C. McGarty and S. A. Haslam, 20-35. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Asay, H. S., J. Garrett, and W. B. Tayler. 2017. Contracts, controllability, fairness, and misreporting. Working paper, University of Iowa, Clemson University, and Brigham Young University. Aguiar, F., A. Becker, and L. Miller. 2013. Whose Impartiality? An experimental study of veiled stakeholders, involved spectators and detached observers. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2): 155-174. Bailey, W. J., G. Hecht, and K. L. Towry. 2011. Dividing the pie: The influence of managerial discretion extent on bonus pool allocation. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): Bem, D. J. 1972. Self-perception theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 6: 1-62. Black, D. E., and M. D. Vance. 2017. Do first impressions last? The impact of initial assessments and subsequent performance on promotion decisions. Working Paper, Dartmouth University and University of Southern California. Boiney, L. G., J. Kennedy, and P. Nye. 1997. Instrumental bias in motivated reasoning: More when more is needed. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 72 (1): 1-24. Bol, J. C. 2008. Subjectivity in compensation contracting. Journal of Accounting Literature 27: 1-24.
this agent is exogenously allocated more resources (advantaged agent, Match) or less resources (disadvantaged agent, No Match) than their fellow agent. Table 3 Descriptive Statistics – Superiors’ Perceptions of Fairness and Justification No Resp/Respa No Info Resp Info More Sympathy b 3.06 (1.41) n = 33 3.89 (2.19) n = 18 More Entitled to Payoff c 4.85 (1.68) n = 33 6.33 (2.11) n = 18 Justified in Chip Allocation d 5.88 (2.00) n = 17 e 6.88 (1.41) n = 17 a We combine ratings from the No Resp/No Info and Resp/No Info conditions to compare them in aggregate to the ratings from the Resp/Info condition. b More Sympathy is a rating to the question of “Who did you have more sympathy for?” on a 9-pt Likert scale with end caps as “Person with 5 chips” and “Person with 10 chips”. A higher rating shows less sympathy to the disadvantaged agent. c More Entitled to Payoff is a rating to the question of “Who was more entitled to a higher payoff?” on a 9-pt Likert scale with end caps as “Person with 5 chips” and “Person with 10 chips”. A higher rating shows that the advantaged agent is more entitled to the higher payoff. d Justified in Chip Allocation is a rating to the statement of “I felt justified in my decision of the number of chips to allocate to the other group members” on a 9-pt Likert scale with end caps of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”. e The sample size for ‘Justified in Chip Allocation’ is reduced as participants in the No Resp/No Info condition did not make a chip allocation decision. Thus, the 17 observations are only from the Resp/No Info condition.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics – Difference in Agents’ Perceptions of Fairness and Satisfaction No Resp No Info Resp No Info No Resp/Respa No Info Resp Info Paid Fairly Differenceb <0.60> (3.34) n = 10 <2.58> (2.19) n = 12 <1.68> (2.88) n = 22 <1.93> (3.52) n = 14 Satisfied Process Differencec <0.70> (3.16) n = 10 <2.17> (3.07) n = 12 <1.50> (3.13) n = 22 <2.93> (3.22) n = 14 Satisfied Allocation Differenced 0.60 (2.95) n = 10 <0.42> (3.37) n = 12 <1.35> (3.15) n = 22 <2.07> (3.36) n = 14 a We combine ratings from the No Resp/No Info and Resp/No Info conditions to compare them an aggregate to the ratings from the Resp/Info condition. b Paid Fairly Difference is the difference in agreement ratings between the disadvantaged and advantaged agents to the statement “I believe I was paid fairly”, on a 9-pt Likert scale with end caps as “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”. A positive (negative) difference shows a higher rating from the disadvantaged (advantaged) agent. c Satisfied Process Difference is the difference in agreement ratings between the disadvantaged and advantaged agents to the statement “I was satisfied with the process”, on a 9-pt Likert scale with end caps as “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”. A positive (negative) difference shows a higher rating from the disadvantaged (advantaged) agent. d Satisfied Allocation Difference is the difference in agreement ratings between the disadvantaged and advantaged agents to the statement “I was satisfied with how the ORANGE group member decided to distribute the $25 payoff”,