conceived as an independent or intervening variable that affects the national security behaviour of states (Duffield 1998; Farrell and Terriff 2002; Gray 1999; Katzenstein 1996). It can therefore be seen as a reflection of a national identity (‘who we are’) and normatively informs ‘what it is that we do’ or ‘should do’ (Berger 1996a, 1998). To put it another way, constructivist strategic culture scholarship attempts to understand national identities, as well as how a state, its policy makers or citizens tend to see and interpret the world and specific events around them (also in relation to others), and how to react. While constructivist scholars do not negate the influence of material factors on social actions, they hold that ideas, knowledge, norms, and rules that led, for example, to the formulation of national security interests also have an influence on the development of security identities (Wendt 1999; Campbell 1998). Identities and interests of states are shaped through practices and interactions with other states’ norms and identities. In this sense, social actors reproduce norms and structure. They act reflexively by basing their actions on their acquired knowledge, habits, and routines. Put simple, strategic cultures are able to provide an understanding for the ‘reasons’ of state actions (Finnemore 2003). 2.2 Norms Generally speaking, norms are defined as “intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action” (Wendt 1995). Norms, according to Katzenstein, are social facts, which set standards of appropriate behaviour and express the agents’ identities (see also Finnemore 2003; Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995a, 1995b). Thus, norms have an ‘oughtness’ character – that is a prescriptive element how things ought to be in the world (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Actor’s knowledge of their social and political relations (e.g. symbols, rules,
3.3 Behavioural Norms in response to Threats America’s foremost behavioural imperative in all NSS documents examined is to maintain its military superiority, enhance the capabilities of its armed forces, and defeat asymmetric threats (NSS 2010, 5). In an effort, as earlier NSS documents note, “to help make the world not just safer but better” (White House 2002) America will “[…] kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support” (White House 2006). US ‘greatness’ results from sturdy alliances, its unmatched military as well having the world’s largest economy, a strong and evolving democracy, and a dynamic citizenry (White House 2006, 1). Phrased differently, hegemony is the first and foremost normative predisposition guiding American internationalism (Jervis 2003; Merlini 2002): “Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security” (White House 2010, 1). This condition will ensure an unwavering commitment to the foremost principle of providing safety and security for the American people as well as its allies and partners (White House 2006, 4, 17, 20). The behavioural preference is to rely on the institution of the military as a primary tool to protect the US homeland, which is a consistency of all NSS documents since 2001: “Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security […]” (Ibid: preface) and to be able to export security to allies and partners, and access to the global commons (Ibid., 14; see also White House 2002, 30, 32). Moreover, security at home could only be achieved by strengthening civil defense, emergency, law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and immigration responses. On this point, however, the NSS of 2010 differs significantly from its two predecessors. While embarking on a global war against terrorism, which the
duplicate their resources and mandates, and the EU should be given autonomy with regards to conducing autonomous operations (BMVg 2006, 48-51). “It is therefore our duty and our mission”, the government charges “to preserve the unique quality of transatlantic relations, to strengthen our ties and our exchanges and to continue to develop the partnership with the United States by performing our tasks responsibly” (BMVg 2011, 7). Above all, however, for Germany, “Franco-German relations play a pivotal role owing to their special nature, underlined in the Élysée Treaty, and their unique closeness” (BMVg 2011, 8). To put it succinctly, for Germany alignment with the West, reconciliation, European integration and effective multilateralism are the essential framework for the pursuit of its values and interests. The UK, on the other hand, as Paul Cornish notes, are “driven by a singular determination to remain involved in international affairs” (Cornish 2013, 372). They also underline their special relationship with the United States, which is above and beyond that with the EU, NATO, and the UN (in that order) (Cabinet Office 2010, 4). Above all, NATO is paramount in the UK’s strategic thinking because it provides collective security “as a basis for territorial defence of the UK, and stability of our European neighbourhood (SDSR 2010, 12). In contrast, the EU is only relevant in UK thinking in so far as it promotes security and prosperity (not defence). 4. Inferences and Conclusions Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, analysts questioned the pervasiveness of shared and deep-seated transatlantic norms, beliefs and ideas about the means and ends of national security policy (Heiselberg 2003; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005; Rynning 2003). They argued that the growing strategic
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