variables attempts to measure a latent concept. What we can claim is that the explanations we offered are the simplest possible ones that are consistent with the existing literature, and are corroborated by the data. In focusing on constitutional length, our analysis also expands upon the literature using “leximetric” analysis of constitutions. A key difference between our work and prior studies is that we were able to assess not just “garrulity” or other cultural features associated with a constitution, but also the negative qualities of long constitutions, namely undue restrictions on political behavior. Constitutional provisions that compel the societies to amend them cannot be innocuous and must contain restrictions or other content that have a real effect on political behavior. Further research is needed to determine precisely which constitutional topics in longer constitutions have the strongest negative impact on economic wealth. We suspect that socioeconomic issues (for example, natural resources, right to work) will prove more important than more innocuous matters (for example, the national flag) or technical fixes (for example, the boundaries of constituencies). Legislators and constitutional drafters motivated by corrupt incentives would likely focus on socioeconomic regulations that could protect or increase their rents. Unfortunately, there are currently no datasets that contain information on the length of specific topics within national constitutions. While collecting these data require considerable effort, on the preliminary results in our paper we strongly believe doing so could greatly contribute to our understanding of the political economy of constitutions. Appendix: Summary of Variables Name Measure Year Expectations Source
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita at price purchasing parity 2006-2011 Dependent variable only WDI Constitutional Length Log of number of words in constitution 2006 (-) relationship with GDP per capita CCP Constitutional Rigidity 1 minus predicted probability of amendment 2006 (+) relationship with constitutional length CCP Amendment Frequency Average number of amendments per year for current constitution 2006 (+) relationship with constitutional length CCP Number of Amendments Number of amendments under a constitution since government was a democracy 2006 (+) relationship with GDP per capita CCP Corruption (WGI) Perceptions-based index of corruption; higher values mean less corruption 2000-2005 (+) relationship with constitutional length (-) relationship with GDP per capita WGI Corruption (TI) Survey-based ranking of corruption; higher values mean less corruption 2000-2005 (+) relationship with constitutional length (-) relationship with GDP per capita TI Federalism Dummy for federal system N/A N/A Norris, 2008 Age of Constitution Age of current constitution since the country became a democracy 2006 (+) relationship with amendment frequency CCP Common Law Dummy with 1 for common law, 0 else N/A (+) relationship with GDP per capita LaPorta, 2008 Education % of labor force with a secondary or tertiary degree 2000-2006 (+) relationship with GDP per capita WDI Natural Resources Natural resources rents as % GDP 2000-2006 (-) relationship with GDP per capita WDI Trade Openness Exports + Imports as % GDP 2000-2006 (+) relationship with GDP per capita WDI Investment Gross investment as % GDP 2000-2006 (+) relationship with GDP per capita WDI Savings Gross domestic savings as % GDP 2000-2006 (+) relationship with GDP per capita WDI
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