On 29.9.17 p451 he continued on this theme, calling for the promotion of saving, not amongst the workers, where the War Savings Committee was succeeding in harnessing resources, but amongst ‘the well-to-do classes’ who were not doing ‘anything like their duty’ and wasting money on clothes, Stock Exchange speculation and parties. Too much of the war, HW argued, was being funded by borrowing abroad and ‘the machinery of credit’, not enough by saving. As the war continued, there was a convergence of views between the Economist and the IR that Government policy was not working. On 16.3.18, for instance, The Economist reported (p 462) that the last week’s war bonds campaign had produced £139m. But the Government should go for ‘real saving’ steadily, not ‘explosive outbursts…injunctionary booming.’ The grand promotional campaigns resulted in a response that was ’not saving at all’, just a sort of craze or panic. What HW wanted to see was a change of morale brought about by policy, not by marketing. The IR argued that the German economy was in a state of collapse (see e.g. 29.7.16) and buoyed up only by inflation, but it, too, was losing confidence in the efficacy of WL. On 21.10.16 264-5 ‘Our borrowing muddlements’ attacked British borrowing: WSC, though advertised ‘by all the devices known to the expert publicist’ were ‘only feebly popular’ and there was the danger of ‘a credit storm’ leading Britain to ‘financial paralysis.’ For the IR, the problem was that Britain had started the war unprepared for financial demands: ‘in this respect our treasury management contrasts unfavourably with the German and still more the French.’ The British should have prepared for war with long-term bonds (10-20 years) issued in bulk. The difference between the journals was in the solution they promoted. For the IR, it was crucial to promote mass saving, and this could not be achieved by WSC alone.
and German media were aware of and monitored each other. The deployment of statistics, in particular by Germany, attacking the enemy’s financial stability and praising the nation’s own were the adaptation of peace-time reporting and editing skills to the needs of the war. Conclusion In Britain and Germany 1914-1918, governments used some similar strategies to fund their war efforts, and the press was involved in the financial campaign. Both the powers made an increasing effort to promote savings through advertising and the media. In Germany, the Reichsbank oversaw a highly co-ordinated strategy that used different newspapers and journals in ways aimed at their readership – direct advertising, material for editorials, articles aimed at different social classes and occupations. The British approach was less directed, and editors retained freedom to criticise Government policy. The Economist’s wartime reporting is interesting because it shows a range of viewpoints. Editorial tone altered from FWH’s dismay to HW’s support for the war. But HW’s initial support was tempered more and more by frustration that government was not imposing a regime of national long-term planning and individual thrift and self-denial. ‘Financial heroism’ was a mission that had not been fulfilled. References Altenhöner Florian (2014) Press/Journalism (Germany)